Aviat Networks Eclipse Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary
Security Policy
Level 2 Validation
Document revision 053, January 2018
© 2018 Aviat Networks, Inc. This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision]. The information in this document is provided only
for educational purposes and for the convenience of the customers of Aviat Networks, Inc. The information contained herein is subject to change without
notice, and is provided “as is” without guarantee or warranty as to the accuracy or applicability of the information to any specific situation or circumstance.
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Contents
1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................4
1.1 Identification .....................................................................................................................................4
1.2 Purpose..............................................................................................................................................4
1.3 References.........................................................................................................................................4
1.4 Document Organization ....................................................................................................................5
1.5 Document Terminology.....................................................................................................................6
2 Aviat Networks Eclipse.............................................................................................................................7
2.1 Overview ...........................................................................................................................................7
2.2 Module Specification.........................................................................................................................7
2.2.1 Hardware and Firmware Components ......................................................................................7
2.2.2 Cryptographic Boundary..........................................................................................................11
2.2.3 Scope of Validation ..................................................................................................................12
2.2.4 Cryptographic Algorithms........................................................................................................12
2.2.5 Components Excluded From the Security Requirements of the Standard..............................14
2.3 Physical Ports and Logical Interfaces ..............................................................................................15
2.4 Roles, Services and Authentication.................................................................................................16
2.4.1 Roles.........................................................................................................................................16
2.4.2 Services ....................................................................................................................................16
2.4.3 Authentication .........................................................................................................................20
2.5 Physical Security..............................................................................................................................20
2.6 Operational Environment................................................................................................................26
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management ....................................................................................................27
2.7.1 Random Number Generators ..................................................................................................27
2.7.2 Key Generation ........................................................................................................................27
2.7.3 Key Table..................................................................................................................................27
2.7.4 CSP Destruction........................................................................................................................31
2.7.5 Access to Key Material.............................................................................................................31
2.8 Self-Tests .........................................................................................................................................33
2.8.1 Power-up Self-tests..................................................................................................................33
2.8.2 Conditional Self-tests...............................................................................................................35
2.9 Design Assurance ............................................................................................................................35
2.10 Mitigation of Other Attacks.........................................................................................................36
3 FIPS Mode of Operation.........................................................................................................................37
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Figures
Figure 1 Example INUe.....................................................................................................................................8
Figure 2 Module Hardware Variant Locations for INUe ..................................................................................8
Figure 3 Required Baseline Components Cards...............................................................................................9
Figure 4 Hardware Components....................................................................................................................10
Figure 5 Block Diagram of the Cryptographic Boundary ...............................................................................11
Figure 6 Security Level Specification Per Individual Areas of FIPS 140-2 ......................................................12
Figure 7 Approved Algorithms.......................................................................................................................13
Figure 8 Module Interfaces............................................................................................................................15
Figure 9 LED Status Indicators .......................................................................................................................15
Figure 10 Roles...............................................................................................................................................16
Figure 11 User Services..................................................................................................................................17
Figure 12 Crypto-Officer Services ..................................................................................................................18
Figure 13 Other Services................................................................................................................................18
Figure 14 Location of Fan Air Filter in INUe...................................................................................................19
Figure 15 INUe Enclosure...............................................................................................................................21
Figure 16 Louvers...........................................................................................................................................21
Figure 17 Left Hand Louver............................................................................................................................22
Figure 18 Fitting the Left Hand Louver - 1 .....................................................................................................22
Figure 19 Fitting the Left Hand Louver – 2 and Position of “Top” Tamper Evident Labels...........................23
Figure 20 Right Hand Louver..........................................................................................................................24
Figure 21 Fitting the Right Hand Louver - 1...................................................................................................24
Figure 22 Fitting the Right Hand Louver – 2 ..................................................................................................25
Figure 23 Location of Security Labels Over Louver Panel..............................................................................25
Figure 24 Tamper Evident Label Positions.....................................................................................................26
Figure 25 Module Cryptographic Keys and CSPs ...........................................................................................27
Figure 26 Module Public Keys........................................................................................................................28
Figure 27 Key Table Part 1 .............................................................................................................................29
Figure 28 Key Table Part 2 .............................................................................................................................31
Figure 29 Public Key Table Part 1...................................................................................................................31
Figure 30 Public Key Table Part 2...................................................................................................................31
Figure 31 Access to Keys by Services.............................................................................................................33
Figure 32 Power-up Self-tests........................................................................................................................34
Figure 33 Conditional Self-tests.....................................................................................................................35
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1 Introduction
This section identifies the cryptographic module; describes the purpose of this document; provides
external references for more information; and explains how the document is organized.
1.1 Identification
Module Name Aviat Networks Eclipse Cryptographic Module
Module Hardware
Component Part number
INUe 2RU Chassis EXE-002
Fan Card EXF-101
Node Controller Card EXN-004
Either FIPS Installation Kit (customer fitted) 179-530153-001
or FIPS Installation Kit (factory fitted) 179-530153-002
Replacement Labels 007-600331-001
At least one of:
RAC 6X EXR-600-001
RAC 6XE EXR-600-002
RAC 60 EXR-660-001
RAC 60E EXR-660-002
All remaining slots filled by one of the
components listed in Figure 4
Firmware Versions 08.02.911
, 08.03.90
1.2 Purpose
This is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for the Aviat Networks Eclipse Cryptographic
Module, also referred to as “the module” within this document. This Security Policy details the secure
operation of Aviat Networks Eclipse Cryptographic Module as required in Federal Information Processing
Standards Publication 140-2 (FIPS 140-2) as published by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) of the United States Department of Commerce and the Communications Security
Establishment (CSE).
1.3 References
For more information on Aviat Networks Eclipse please visit:
http://aviatnetworks.com/products/microwave-switches/eclipse-carrier-ethernet-microwave-platform/
1
This is the NCC firmware version. The module consists of a number of versioned components. For a complete list see Figure 3.
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For more information on NIST and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP), please visit
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.
1.4 Document Organization
This Security Policy document is one part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. This document outlines
the functionality provided by the module and gives high-level details on the means by which the module
satisfies FIPS 140-2 requirements. With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS
140-2 submission documentation may be Aviat Networks proprietary or otherwise controlled and
releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please
contact Aviat Networks.
The various sections of this document map directly onto the sections of the FIPS 140-2 standard and
describe how the module satisfies the requirements of that standard.
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1.5 Document Terminology
TERM DESCRIPTION
ACM Adaptive Coding and Modulation
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP Critical Security Parameters
CVL Component Validation List
DAC Digital Access Card
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECCCDH Elliptic Curve Cryptography Cofactor Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve DSA
eM Electrical MUX
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GUI Graphical User Interface
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
INU Intelligent Node Unit
IRU Indoor Radio Unit
NCC Node Control Card
NMS Network Management System
NPC Node Protection Card
ODU Outdoor Unit
OS Operating System
RAC Radio Access Card
RSA An algorithm for public-key cryptography. Named after Rivest, Shamir and
Adleman who first publicly described it.
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SP Security Policy
Storage Media Any media for which Cryptographic Module protection in the form of data
encryption is required. Storage Media include internal and external hard
drives, memory sticks and floppy disks.
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
TDM Time-Division Multiplexing
TLS Transport Layer Security
XPIC Cross Polarization Interference Cancellation
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2 Aviat Networks Eclipse
This section provides the details of how the module meets the FIPS 140-2 requirements.
2.1 Overview
Aviat Networks' Eclipse is an all-in-one next generation dual hybrid and packet microwave radio. Eclipse
provides superior networking features to address cost-optimized mobile backhaul, public, and private
networking applications, along with high performance RF and Carrier Ethernet capabilities.
Aviat Eclipse delivers a "complete" set of microwave nodal networking capabilities. Eclipse delivers multi-
directional integrated microwave switching within a single system, supporting up to 6 RF or up to 45
Ethernet radios in a single rack unit.
Eclipse also supports both native TDM and Ethernet services and provides fully integrated Ethernet
switching and IP networking, eliminating the need for external TDM grooming or Ethernet aggregation
devices.
Additionally, Eclipse can deliver greater than 2Gbps wireless transport with intelligent and fully integrated
bandwidth optimization features like XPIC, ACM, and data compression.
The cryptographic module is housed within the Eclipse Intelligent Node Unit (INUe) chassis.
The Eclipse INUe supports hardware redundancy to maintain data traffic by protecting a link with a
backup card that takes over in the event of hardware failure. It is possible to have up to 6 non-protected
links or:
• 1 protected/diversity and 4 non-protected links
• 2 protected/diversity and 2 non-protected links
• 3 protected/diversity links
The module provides data security by encrypting the payload traffic on the microwave link between up to
three radios. It also provides the Strong Encryption Suite for secure module management and uses AES
encryption to secure SNMP v3 management traffic.
2.2 Module Specification
2.2.1 Hardware and Firmware Components
The module runs on proprietary hardware. The hardware consists of a number of plug-in cards housed in
a proprietary chassis in 2RU format.
The module consists of an Eclipse Node Control Card (NCC), one or more Radio access card (RAC) and a
number of other plug-in cards in combination. Only the NCC and RAC cards are involved with
cryptography. The remaining cards provide physical security via tamper evidence but do not provide any
other security relevant functionality.
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Figure 1 Example INUe
Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 3 F
Slot 4 Slot 5 Slot 6 A
Slot 7 Slot 8 Slot 9 N
NCC only Slot 10 S
Figure 2 Module Hardware Variant Locations for INUe
• Any of the Slots 1 through 10 may be covered with a blank panel. They shall not be left
unpopulated and shall have tamper labels applied per Section 2.5 below.
• Slots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 are universal. Any RAC, DAC, NCM or AUX plug-in card.
• Slots 7, 8, 9 are restricted: any DAC, NCM or AUX, except DAC 155oM/eM where NMS is required.
• Slot 10 is for NPC option only
• NCC and FAN slots are dedicated – the INUe is supplied as standard with a single 2RU FAN,
although it accepts two 1RU FANs.
• RAC/RAC or RAC/DAC 155oM/eM protected pairings must be installed in paired slots (Slot 1 and
Slot 4, Slot 2 and Slot 5, or Slot 3 and Slot 6).
• For protected DACs or NCMs, the protection partners can be installed in Slots 1 through 9, except
for the case of DAC 155oM/eM where NMS access is needed, which is restricted to Slots 1 through
6.
NCC: Node control card
FAN: Fan card (cooling)
RAC: Radio access card (supports the ODU/IRU)
DAC: Digital access card (user interfaces)
AUX: Auxiliary card (auxiliary data and alarm I/O)
NPC: Node protection card (NCC protection)
NCM: Node Convergence Module
Interface traffic options include:
• Ethernet, E1/DS1, E3/DS3, STM1/OC3
• Auxiliary data and alarm I/O
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The minimum module configuration requires baseline components, an NCC card, and at least one suitable
security relevant RAC card to be installed in order to support the Payload Encryption and Payload
Decryption services (see Figure 3).
ITEM PART NUMBER AND
REVISION
FIRMWARE/FPGA VERSION INFORMATION QUANTITY IN
MODULE
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
FUNCTIONALITY
BASELINE CONFIGURATION
INUe 2RU Chassis EXE-002 N/A 1 No
Node Controller
Card
EXN-004 Firmware: 08.02.91, 08.03.90
Bootloader: 1.0.36
FPGA_NCCV2_E1_DS1_004.bit
FPGA_NCCV2_STM1_006.bit
1 Yes
Fan Card EXF-101 N/A 1 No
FIPS Installation
Kit
Either:
179-530153-001
(customer fitted)
or:
179-530153-002
(factory fitted)
N/A 1 No
Replacement
Labels
007-600331-001 N/A 1 No
And at least one of the following:
RAC 6X EXR-600-001 FPGA_RAC6X_PDH_ACM-14.19.52.bit
FPGA_RAC6X_SDH-2.3.1.bit
0-6 Yes
RAC 6XE EXR-600-002 FPGA_RAC6X_PDH_ACM-14.19.52.bit
FPGA_RAC6X_SDH-2.3.1.bit
0-6 Yes
RAC 60 EXR-660-001 FPGA_RAC6X_PDH_ACM-14.19.52.bit
FPGA_RAC6X_SDH-2.3.1.bit
0-6 Yes
RAC 60E EXR-660-002 FPGA_RAC6X_PDH_ACM-14.19.52.bit
FPGA_RAC6X_SDH-2.3.1.bit
0-6 Yes
Figure 3 Required Baseline Components Cards
If a suitable card is not installed, then the Payload Encryption and Payload Decryption services are not
available.
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All other cards that can be installed in the 2RU chassis are interchangeable (see Figure 4). No slot shall be
left unpopulated.
ITEM PART NUMBER
AND REVISION
FIRMWARE/FPGA VERSION INFORMATION QUANTITY IN
MODULE
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
FUNCTIONALITY
Fan filter kit,
2RU
131-501768-
001
N/A 0-1 No
Aux EXA-001 FPGA_AUX_132.bit 0-5 No
DAC 4x EXD-040-001 FPGA_DAC_4E1_DS1-15.1.4.bit
FPGA_DAC_4E1_WAYSIDE-15.1.4.bit
0-5 No
DAC 155o EXD-152-001 FPGA_DAC_155_MUXV2-2.1.3.bit 0-5 No
DAC 155oM
(long)
EXD-153-001 FPGA_DAC_155_MUX_001.bit 0-5 No
DAC 155oM
(short)
EXD-156-001 FPGA_DAC_155_MUXV2-2.1.3.bit 0-5 No
DAC 155eM EXD-158-001 FPGA_DAC_155_MUXV2‐2.1.3.bit. 0-5 No
DAC 16x EXD-160-001 FPGA_DAC_16E1_DS1-15.1.4.bit 0-5 No
DAC 16xV2 EXD-161-001 FPGA_DAC16V2_E1_DS1-3.1.4.bit 0-5 No
DAC 16xV3 EXD-161-002 FPGA_DAC16V2_E1_DS1-3.1.4.bit 0-5 No
DAC ES EXD-171-001 FPGA_DAC_ES_018.bit 0-5 No
DAC GE v2 EXD-180-002 N/A 0-5 No
DAC LL EXD-180-005 N/A 0-5 No
DAC GE v2
no SFP
EXD-180-102 N/A 0-5 No
DAC GE3 EXD-181-001 FPGA_DAC_E3_MUX_132.bit 0-5 No
DAC GE3 EXD-181-002 FPGA_DAC_E3_DS3_NOMUX_002.bit 0-5 No
DAC 2x155o EXD-252-001 FPGA_DAC_2STM1_020.bit 0-5 No
DAC 3xE3M EXD-331-001 N/A 0-5 No
NCM EXD-400-002 FPGA_NCM-1.1.112.bit
FPGA_NCM_CES-1.1.417.bit
FPGA_NCM_CES1-1.1.443.bit
FPGA_NCM_HSF-1.0.133.bit
FPGA_NCM_HSF_FIX-1.1.152.bit
0-5 No
24V card EXP-024 N/A 0-1 No
RAC LL EXR-910-001 FPGA_RACLL_IFC-3.1.8.bit 0-6 No
RAC 30v3 EXR-999-003 FPGA_RAC30_E3_DS3_002.bit 0-6 No
NPC EXS-001 N/A 0-1 No
NPC, high
output
EXS-002 N/A 0-1 No
Blank panel EXX-001 N/A 0-10 No
Figure 4 Hardware Components
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2.2.2 Cryptographic Boundary
The cryptographic boundary of the module is the hardware chassis. The module is a hardware module
with firmware running on the NCC card within the chassis.
The processor of this platform executes all firmware. All firmware components of the module are
persistently stored within the device and, while executing, are stored in the device local RAM.
Optionally, an ASIC on the RAC card provides the necessary functionality to support the Payload
Encryption and Payload Decryption services.
Figure 5 Block Diagram of the Cryptographic Boundary
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2.2.3 Scope of Validation
The cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of FIPS 140-2,
with Cryptographic Module Specification at Level 3 and Design Assurance at Level 3.
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS SECTION LEVEL
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Figure 6 Security Level Specification Per Individual Areas of FIPS 140-2
2.2.4 Cryptographic Algorithms
2.2.4.1 Approved algorithms
The following table provides details of the Approved algorithms that are included within the module:
ALGORITHM TYPE ALGORITHM CAVP CERTIFICATE USE
Symmetric key AES-128-ECB, AES-192-
ECB, AES-256-ECB,
AES-128-CCM, AES-
192-CCM and AES-256-
CCM (Encryption only)
AES-128-CBC, AES-
256–CBC and AES-256–
CFB128.
(ECB was tested but is
not used)
#2260
#2418
Payload Encryption
Strong Security Suite and
Encryption of SNMPv3 sessions
SP 800-135 component Section 4.2, TLS #73 Within TLS (v1.0/1.1)
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#970 Within TLS (v1.2)
CVL ECCCDH #860 TLS cipher suites. ECCCDH SP
800-56A for NIST defined P-256
Curve
Deterministic Random
Bit Generator
SP 800-90A Hash-
based DRBG
#323 Key generation. Hash used is
SHA-256.
Asymmetric key ECDSA #902 TLS cipher suites. NIST defined P-
256 curve. Cipher suite uses
signature generation and
verification.
Authentication HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-256
(HMAC-SHA-384 was
tested but is not used)
#2634 Within TLS and for SNMPv3
Asymmetric key RSA
RSA
#2071
#2239
Firmware load test, module
integrity test. Image has been
hashed using SHA-256 and then
signed with a 2048-bit RSA key.
RSA signature verification is used
in the self-test procedure.
Bootloader integrity test.
Hashing SHA-1
SHA-256
(SHA-384 was tested
but is not used)
SHA-256
#3328
#3397
Used by SNMPv3 to obfuscate
authentication messages.
Firmware load test, Module
integrity test, Hash DRBG, TLS
cipher suite.
Bootloader integrity test.
Figure 7 Approved Algorithms
For each Approved Key Derivation Function the module supports or uses a corresponding protocol. Any
such related protocol can be used in the Approved mode of operation, but has not been reviewed or
tested by the CAVP and CMVP as testing such protocols is not within the scope of CMVP or CAVP
activities.
2.2.4.2 Non-Approved algorithms allowed in Approved mode
• Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman, not compliant (untested) to SP800-56A but allowed by IG D.8 (key
agreement; key establishment methodology provides 128 bits of encryption strength)
• MD5
• NDRNG for seeding material to the FIPS Approved SP800-90A DRBG. The NDRNG provides at least
256 bits of entropy.
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Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman is used for Payload Encryption key exchange. The module uses MD5 to hash
firmware components to check integrity. This check is run in addition to the RSA integrity test and
predates the FIPS Firmware integrity test. It is not security relevant. MD5 is also employed in RADIUS.
2.2.4.3 Non-Approved algorithms
The following algorithms are also included within the module and available in the Approved mode, but
are only used by RADIUS for tasks related to authentication.
• MD5-CFB for encrypted password output to RADIUS server (RFC 2865 §5.2)
• MD5-MAC for authentication of RADIUS server (RFC 2865 §3, “Response Authenticator”)
The following algorithms are also included within the module but are only available within the module
services in a non-FIPS mode of operation:
• DES
• Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption
strength)
DES is used for securing the management interface (Portal) in a non-Approved mode of operation. Diffie-
Hellman is used for Payload Encryption key exchange.
2.2.5 Components Excluded From the Security Requirements of the Standard
The following observable, non-security relevant components are excluded from FIPS 140-2 requirements:
• The components of all cards listed in Figure 4 except the faceplates. Since tamper evident seals are
applied and necessary for physical security protection, the faceplates are security relevant and
cannot be excluded. All other card components are excluded from FIPS requirements because
they are non-security relevant.
• Components along both left and right sides of the RAC cards with the exception of U42 on cards
RAC 6X, RAC 6XE, RAC 60, and RAC 60E. (Please see Appendix A for a complete list of excluded RAC
card components.)
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2.3 Physical Ports and Logical Interfaces
The module is classified as a multi-chip standalone module for FIPS 140-2 purposes. The module’s physical
boundary is that of the INUe chassis.
The module provides its logical interfaces via the physical interfaces provided in the chassis. These logical
interfaces expose the services (described in section 2.4.2) provided by the module.
The logical interfaces provided by the module are mapped onto the FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces: data
input, data output, control input, and status output as follows:
FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL
INTERFACE
MODULE MAPPING
Data Input INUe Front panel sockets. The NCC component has four NMS connectors,
providing Ethernet access for Portal or ProVision
(http://www.aviatnetworks.com/products/network-
managementoss/provision/). Pin assignments represent industry-standard
LAN cable assembly for a 10/100Base-T, RJ-45 connector. It also has a V.24
connector providing serial data access for Portal. (See Figure 15 for an image
of the physical ports.)
Data enter and leave RAC adapters via a single RJ-45 Ethernet socket. There is
an RF socket to connect the RAC to a radio transceiver so that the data can be
sent and received on a microwave link.
Data Output INUe Front panel sockets
Control Input INUe Front panel sockets
Status Output INUe Front panel sockets and LEDs
Power Interface NCC power interface and optional NPC. Power input limits are -40.5 to -60 V
DC. The power connector is a D-Sub M/F 2W2. The positive DC return pin is
connected to chassis ground.
Figure 8 Module Interfaces
LED status indicators:
EVENT NCC STATUS LED NCC TEST LED RAC STATUS LED
FIPS Power-up self-tests in progress Flashing orange Flashing orange Solid red
Power-up self-test failure Solid red Off Solid red
Self-tests pass/FIPS (Approved) mode enabled Solid green Solid green Solid green
Figure 9 LED Status Indicators
When the three indicated LEDs are green, the module is in the Approved mode of operation.
The use of the Approved mode locks out the use of non-Approved algorithms.
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2.4 Roles, Services and Authentication
2.4.1 Roles
The Cryptographic Module implements both a Crypto-Officer role and a User role. Roles are assumed
explicitly using the authentication mechanisms described below. Section 2.4.2 summarizes the services
available to each role.
ROLE DESCRIPTION
Crypto-Officer Mapping to a combination of the Eclipse’s “Crypto”, “Engineer” and “Admin”
users. Crypto-Officer is able to configure security settings and payload
encryption and manage user accounts.
User Mapping on to the Eclipse “Read-only” user. A User is able to view the
configuration for a specific link.
Maintenance This role supports the capability for users to add or remove plug-in cards to
the module to provide extra bandwidth or different data formats. It also
allows for the insertion and removal of an optional fan air filter. Crypto-
Officer support is required to perform Maintenance services.
Figure 10 Roles
Multiple concurrent operators are allowed. Up to five operators may be logged on to the module at any
one time. It is possible for an operator in the User role and one in the Crypto-Officer role to be logged on
concurrently.
2.4.2 Services
2.4.2.1 User Services
The following services may only be performed by an operator with “User” access permissions who has
been successfully authenticated to the module.
SERVICE SERVICE INPUT SERVICE OUTPUT DESCRIPTION
RADIUS Authentication
request, username
and password
Success/fail User authentication using RADIUS.
Successful authentication permits
the identified User access to Craft
Tool User Services.
Craft Tool
Authentication
Authentication
request, username
and password
Success/fail User authenticated locally by
module. Successful authentication
permits the identified User access
to Craft Tool User Services. These
allow a User to configure the
characteristics of a specific
microwave radio links, including
enabling or disabling that link.
View Configuration View Configuration Event log entry Provides a user with configuration
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SERVICE SERVICE INPUT SERVICE OUTPUT DESCRIPTION
Request information as an event log
Figure 11 User Services
2.4.2.2 Crypto-Officer Services
The following services may only be performed by an operator with “Crypto-Officer” access permissions
who has been successfully authenticated to the module.
SERVICE SERVICE INPUT SERVICE OUTPUT DESCRIPTION
Enable Payload
Encryption
Request to switch
on payload
encryption for a
specific link
Success/Fail A Crypto-Officer may configure a
secure data link to enable payload
encryption.
Disable Payload
Encryption
Request to switch
off payload
encryption for a
specific link
Success/Fail Although only a Crypto-Officer may
configure a secure data link, a User may
enable and disable encryption on a
specific microwave radio link.
Craft Tool
Authentication
Authentication
request, username
and password
Success/fail Crypto-Officer authenticated locally by
module. Successful authentication
permits the identified Crypto-Officer
access to Craft Tool Services.
Firmware Upgrade Upgrade request
and firmware
image
Success/fail Successfully upgrading the firmware
loads the new image into module and
reboots the module to allow the new
firmware to become operational. If the
firmware upgrade fails, then the new
image is not loaded and the module
rolls back to the original firmware and
this remains operational.
Zeroize Zeroize request Success/fail Zeroizes all plaintext secret and private
cryptographic keys and CSPs within the
module, specifically those listed in
section 2.7.3.
Key Management
(Payload Encryption)
Link ID. Service
accessed via Craft
tool GUI
Event log entry
indicates
success/failure
Generates a new key for the selected
link.
Key Management
(Secure
Management)
Enable strong
security via GUI
Event log entry
indicates
success/failure
Enabling strong security is a
requirement of the FIPS mode of
operation. Once enabled, the key
management is automatic. Keys are
established as required and used to
secure the appropriate services.
Module Craft tool GUI Confirmation of The Craft tool is used to configure the
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SERVICE SERVICE INPUT SERVICE OUTPUT DESCRIPTION
Configuration parameters and
actions
“strong security suite” within the
module.
SNMP v3 Secure SNMP
session request
Secure SNMP
session
The module adds an extra layer of
security to SNMP v3 by encrypting
SNMP traffic using AES. SNMPv3 keys
are manually entered. There is no
internal key derivation.
RADIUS Authentication
request, username
and password
Success/fail Crypto-Officer authentication using
RADIUS. Successful authentication
permits the identified Crypto-Officer
access to Craft Tool Services.
View Status
Request
View Status
Request
Event log entry Provides a Crypto-Officer with status
information as an event log.
Figure 12 Crypto-Officer Services
2.4.2.3 Unauthenticated Services
SERVICE SERVICE INPUT SERVICE OUTPUT DESCRIPTION
Payload Encryption Plaintext payload
data
Encrypted payload
data
Once a microwave link is
configured and keys are
established, any data sent
on the link will be
encrypted
Payload Decryption Encrypted payload
data
Plaintext payload
data
Decrypts payload data
received on a secure
microwave link.
Perform Self-Tests Power-up module Self-test status Self-tests are performed
automatically at startup. If
the self-tests fail, the
module enters an error
state. If they succeed, the
module becomes
operational.
View Status indicators N/A LED indicators LED indicators provide
information about the state
of the payload encryption
service and the self-test
results.
Figure 13 Other Services
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2.4.2.4 Maintenance
Maintenance consists of inserting, removing or replacing plug-in cards and the fan air filter. The Crypto-
Officer must perform the zeroize service and then power down the module. The module must remain
powered down during maintenance and then the Crypto-Officer must power up the module and perform
the zeroize service to complete the maintenance.
Plug-in Cards
To remove a plug-in card or blank, remove its tamper evident labels, loosen its front-panel fastening
screws and pull it towards you. Inserting a card may require the removal of a blank to access the card slot.
To insert a plug-in card, push it into the appropriate slot. Ensure its backplane connector is correctly
engaged before applying sufficient pressure to bring the plug-in panel flush with the front panel. Secure
the card using its fastening screws.
Fan Air Filter
For the INUe, a fan air filter kit is supplied, comprising a filter frame, filter element, and fastening screw. It
is installed in the INUe to the right side of the FAN module, as illustrated below.
Remove the FAN module and slide the air filter into the chassis so that it locates to the right side of the
FAN module backplane connector, and up against the chassis side. FAN module removal and replacement
does not affect traffic.
Installation instructions are included with the fan filter kit.
Figure 14 Location of Fan Air Filter in INUe
Renewing Physical Security Following a Maintenance Task
The physical security measures must be checked and renewed as appropriate following any module
maintenance. When replacing a tamper evident label, any residue from a previous label must be removed
before a new label is applied.
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2.4.3 Authentication
The module uses role-based and identity-based operator authentication. RADIUS may be used for user
authentication and RADIUS is authenticated to the module using a shared secret. The RADIUS
authentication is role-based. All other authentication is identity based.
User and Crypto-Officers are authenticated by presenting a username and password to the module for
authentication. This is either done locally by the module using its own list of local users and their
credentials or remotely using a RADIUS server and a centrally held database of users and credentials. If
the user identity and password match stored values then authentication is successful.
Locally defined passwords:
The passwords for the User and Cryptographic Officer roles, authenticating via the Portal GUI, are
alphanumeric strings of between 8 and 32 alphanumeric characters comprised of at least one letter and
one number.
The minimum number of possible passwords is, therefore, 94^6*10*52 or 3.59x10^14, which exceeds the
minimum requirement of 1 in 1,000,000 for unsuccessful authentication probability.
With the minimum 8-character password of the required composition, that still gives a random chance of
guessing the correct password in a single attempt of 1 in 946
*10*52, or 1 in 3.59x1014
. Real-world
passwords will normally be more complex than this. The module locks out user logon attempts for one
minute after three consecutive logon failures. Assuming the weakest password and the ability of an
attacker to make three logon attempts in a minute, this still gives the random chance of successfully
guessing correctly a password given multiple attempts in a minute at slightly less than three times the
single attempt chance, or very roughly 1 in 1x1013
, which is significantly more secure than the than the 1
in 100,000 required.
RADIUS passwords:
The passwords for the User and Cryptographic Officer roles, authenticating via RADIUS, are alphanumeric
strings consisting of a minimum of 5 characters. The minimum number of possible passwords is therefore
94^5, which exceeds the minimum requirement of 1 in 1,000,000 for unsuccessful authentication
probability.
The module only allows three consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts in any one minute
period. Therefore, the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute through
random attempts is 3/94^5 which is less than 1/100,000.
2.5 Physical Security
The module is entirely encased by a thick steel chassis. The back of the chassis is completely closed off
and internally has a backplane into which plug-in cards may be inserted. The front of the chassis, where
plug-in cards are inserted, must be sealed in a commissioned module. The sides of the chassis have vent
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holes to allow air to flow across components within the module to provide cooling and prevent
overheating.
The INUe enclosure (Figure 15) has an NCC card and ten expansion slots, each of which must either
contain a plug-in card or be covered by a blanking plate.
Figure 15 INUe Enclosure
The module is supplied with a set of tamper evident labels. Once a module is commissioned, the labels
must be applied to the NCC, plug-in cards and blanking plates, such that for each item that borders that
chassis, there is a label joining the item to the chassis. For each item that does not border the chassis,
there is a label linking it to its neighbor.
Opacity: The module enclosure has vent holes at the sides. The vent holes are covered by louvers that
provide no line of sight view of any internal components. Four (4) tamper evident labels are fitted to each
louver.
Two (2) sizes of tamper evident labels are used in the module and must be fitted correctly to satisfy the
physical security requirements for the module. The wider labels must be used for the louvers and the
narrower labels must be used on the top front and on the front panel. Fitting instructions are provided
below.
Figure 16 Louvers
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The tamper evident labels and louvers/filters shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS
Approved mode of operation.
The Crypto-Officer is responsible for the application and maintenance of the physical security policy:
To fit the louvers:
All surfaces must be clean and dry prior to installation. Wipe the side of the INUe surfaces with isopropyl
alcohol and let dry. Place the INUe shelf on flat surface and install the louver panels as shown below.
Left Hand Side (as viewed from the front)
• Locate the louver panel and remove the paper backing from the double sided pressure sensitive
adhesive (PSA) foam tape.
Figure 17 Left Hand Louver
• Align the front edge of the louver panel with the edge of the radius near the front mounting ear.
• Align the bottom edge of the louver panel with the bottom edge of the INUe shelf.
Figure 18 Fitting the Left Hand Louver - 1
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• Apply strong pressure to the side of the louver panel to bond the PSA to the INUe shelf.
Figure 19 Fitting the Left Hand Louver – 2 and Position of “Top” Tamper Evident Labels
• Let the louver panel PSA cure for at least 5 minutes before proceeding to install the right hand side.
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Right Hand Side (as viewed from the front)
• Locate the louver panel and remove the paper backing from the double sided PSA foam tape.
Figure 20 Right Hand Louver
• Align the front edge of the louver panel with the edge of the radius near the front mounting ear.
• Align the bottom edge of the louver panel with the bottom edge of the INUe shelf.
Figure 21 Fitting the Right Hand Louver - 1
• Apply strong pressure to the side of the louver panel to bond PSA to the INUe shelf.
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Figure 22 Fitting the Right Hand Louver – 2
• Let the louver panel PSA cure for at least 5 minutes then proceed to installing the security labels.
Apply security LABELS over louver panels:
Left hand side (as viewed from the front)
• Apply the wider security label over louver panel and across INUe chassis. Use caution to avoid
touching the adhesive with fingerprints to avoid damaging the labels. Allow the label adhesive at
least 60 minutes to cure.
Right hand side (as viewed from the front)
• Apply the wider security label over louver panel and across INUe chassis. Use caution to avoid
touching the adhesive with fingerprints to avoid damaging the labels. Allow the label adhesive at
least 60 minutes to cure.
Figure 23 Location of Security Labels Over Louver Panel
(Left Hand Side Shown – Right Hand Side is Mirror Image)
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Immediately before the INUe is installed into its rack/cabinet, apply the narrower tamper evident labels
as shown in Figure 19 with a label over each of the three (3) top-front screw heads, and apply the four (4)
wider labels per side as indicated in Figure 23.
• Clean the areas where the labels are to be applied as appropriate using alcohol-based cleaning
pads or a rag moistened with isopropyl alcohol, and let dry.
• When peeling and placing the labels avoid finger contact with the label backing to prevent damage
to the label. The use of tweezers applied on the edge of the label is recommended.
• Ensure the labels are not damaged when installing the INUe into its rack/cabinet.
To install the tamper evident labels on front panel:
• Verify that the front panel is contiguous
• For slots that do not contain plug-in cards, fit a blank panel (HW P/N EXX-001 per Figure 4)
• Remove excessive grease, dirt, or oil from the cover if appropriate by using alcohol-based cleaning
pads before applying the tamper evident labels. The chassis temperature should be above 10° C
(50° F).
• Affix (12) narrower tamper evident labels as indicated in Figure 24 below such that it is not
possible to remove either a single card or a group of cards without also removing a label and
leaving tamper evidence.
• Install the INUe shelf into the rack and apply security label over front of the cards in the chassis as
shown. Use caution to avoid touching the adhesive with fingerprints to avoid damaging the labels.
Allow the label adhesive at least 60 minutes to cure.
• The tamper evident labels should be replaced whenever components are added or removed from
the module. Replacement labels can be ordered from Aviat Networks, part number 007-600331-
001
• Tamper evident labels should be inspected for integrity at least once every six (6) months
Figure 24 Tamper Evident Label Positions
2.6 Operational Environment
The module operational environment is derived from a version of embedded Linux. This has been
adapted such that there is no general purpose operating system functionality available to an operator.
The only firmware that can be loaded is the module firmware. The module firmware can be updated using
the “Firmware Upgrade” service. This requires the verification of a digital signature.
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The Operating Environment of the module is a limited operational environment and so the Section 6
Operational Environment requirements are not applicable.
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
2.7.1 Random Number Generators
The module contains an Approved SP 800-90A Hash-based DRBG.
2.7.2 Key Generation
Keys generated internally are generated by the SP 800-90A DRBG seeded by system entropy. The module
uses the Hash-based DRBG to generate symmetric AES keys and Asymmetric ECDSA key pairs.
2.7.3 Key Table
The following tables list all of the keys and CSPs within the module, describe their purpose, and describe
how each key is generated, entered and output, stored and destroyed.
KEY PURPOSE
TLS Private Key ECDSA/ECDH P-256 key used to establish TLS tunnel for
HTTPS and WMTS ports for managing remote radio.
TLS Tunnel Keys Encrypt TLS session for the Craft tool and web server. AES-
128 or AES-256, depending on cipher suite.
TLS HMAC Keys Message authentication within TLS. HMAC/SHA-1 or
HMAC/SHA-256, depending on cipher suite.
RADIUS Shared Secret Used to verify RADIUS messages.
SNMPv3 Privacy Key Used for encrypting SNMPv3 packets. AES-128.
SNMPv3 Authentication Key Used for authenticating SNMPv3 packets. HMAC/SHA-1.
Payload Encryption Private
Key
ECDSA/ECDH P-256 key used to establish the Payload
Encryption TLS tunnel key.
Payload Encryption TLS Tunnel
Keys
Used to encrypt the tunnel established using TLS. AES-256.
Payload Encryption TLS HMAC
Keys
Used to authenticate the tunnel established using TLS.
HMAC/SHA-1.
Payload Encryption Key Used to encrypt/decrypt payload. Only AES-128, 192 or
256 bits are used for payload encryption.
Hash DRBG C and V These are variables used internally by the Hash DRBG that
are required by Implementation Guidance 14.5 to be listed
in the Cryptographic Module Security Policy document.
They represent the internal state of the DRBG.
Hash DRBG Seed Seed for the Hash DRBG.
User Password Used to authenticate User to Craft Tool.
Crypto-Officer Password Used to authenticate Crypto-Officer to Craft Tool.
Figure 25 Module Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
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KEY PURPOSE
TLS Certificate Self-generated and self-signed certificate used to establish
TLS tunnel for HTTPS and WMTS ports for managing
remote radio. Certificate’s public key is ECDSA/ECDH.
Can use any of the following cipher suites to establish
tunnel:
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
Payload Encryption Certificate Self-generated and self-signed certificate used to generate
the Payload Encryption Tunnel Key and Payload Encryption
HMAC Key. Certificate’s public key is ECDSA/ECDH.
The mechanism for exchanging the Payload Encryption key
is to create a TLS tunnel first and then transmit the
generated AES key to the remote end. For this we are
using a different self-signed TLS certificate and secret key
from the HTTPS and WMTS TLS tunnel. The
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA cipher suite
is used.
Integrity key A fixed and hard coded key used in the firmware load
conditional self-test
Figure 26 Module Public Keys
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KEY KEY TYPE AND
STRENGTH
GENERATION/ESTABLISHMENT STORAGE LOCATION
TLS Private key ECDSA/ECDH
P-256 curve
Generated by module Flash memory
TLS tunnel keys 128 or 256 bit
depending on TLS
cipher suite used
Key is established using TLS RAM
TLS HMAC keys 160 bits Established using TLS RAM
RADIUS shared
secret
5-32 characters Entered by Crypto-Officer RAM, Flash memory
SNMPv3 privacy key 128 bits Entered by Crypto-Officer RAM, Flash memory
SNMPv3
authentication key
128 bits Entered by Crypto-Officer RAM, Flash memory
Payload Encryption
Private key
ECDSA/ECDH
P-256 curve
Generated by module Flash memory
Payload Encryption
TLS tunnel keys
256 bits
Symmetric key
Generated by the module and
established using TLS.
RAM
Payload Encryption
TLS HMAC keys
160 bits
Symmetric key
Generated by the module and
established using TLS.
RAM
Payload encryption
key
128, 192 or256
bits
Generated by module. RAM
Hash DRBG C and V
CSP
440 bits Hash of entropy bits, nonce bits,
and personalization string
RAM
Hash DRBG Seed [Entropy seed] Generated by NDRNG RAM
User Password 8-32 characters N/A A hash of the password is
stored persistently
although the password
itself is only held in RAM
until authentication is
completed
Crypto-Officer
Password
8-32 characters N/A Not persistently stored,
held in RAM until
authentication is
completed
Figure 27 Key Table Part 1
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KEY ARE KEYS SUPPLIED
ENCRYPTED OR
PLAINTEXT?
ENTRY/OUTPUT DESTRUCTION
TLS Private key Plaintext Generated in module,
not entered. Not output.
Key is zeroized.
TLS Tunnel keys Encrypted Established using TLS Key is zeroized.
TLS HMAC keys Encrypted Established using TLS Key is zeroized.
RADIUS shared secret Encrypted Entered by Crypto-
Officer through Craft
tool. Not output
Key is overwritten. When the key is
updated using portal, the new key is
transmitted over TLS to the INU. The
INU zeroizes the existing key in the
encrypted key object. The INU then
stores the new key in the encrypted
key object. This key is used in all
future requests to the RADIUS server.
Encryption of the key is done using
AES-128 in CBC mode.
SNMPv3 privacy key Plaintext Entered by Crypto-
Officer through Craft
tool. Not output
Key is overwritten. To zeroize the key,
the CO needs to overwrite it by
manually entering a new key.
SNMPv3
authentication key
Plaintext Entered by Crypto-
Officer through Craft
tool. Not output.
Key is overwritten. To zeroize the key,
the CO needs to overwrite it by
manually entering a new key.
Payload Encryption
Private key
Plaintext The key neither enters
nor leaves the module.
Key is zeroized.
Payload Encryption TLS
tunnel keys
Encrypted Established using TLS Key is zeroized
Payload Encryption TLS
HMAC keys
Encrypted Established using TLS Key is zeroized
Payload Encryption key Encrypted Exchanged with peer
module using existing
TLS tunnel
Key is zeroized
Hash DRBG C and V Plaintext N/A Key is zeroized
Hash DRBG Seed Plaintext N/A Key is zeroized
User Password N/A Entered by User during
Craft Tool operator
authentication. Not
output.
Hashed passwords are stored to allow
authentication. Actual passwords are
zeroized once authentication is
completed.
Crypto-Officer
Password
N/A Entered by Crypto-
Officer during Craft Tool
operator authentication.
Not output.
Hashed passwords are stored to allow
authentication. Actual passwords are
zeroized once authentication is
completed.
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Figure 28 Key Table Part 2
KEY KEY LENGTH/STRENGTH GENERATION/ESTABLISHMENT STORAGE LOCATION
TLS Certificate ECDSA/ECDH P-256
curve
Generated by module Flash memory.
Payload Encryption
Certificate
ECDSA/ECDH P-256
curve
Derived from private key Flash memory.
Integrity key 2048-bit RSA
certificate
Fixed key Public integrity key will be
stored within the module.
The private key will not.
Figure 29 Public Key Table Part 1
KEY ARE KEYS SUPPLIED ENCRYPTED OR
PLAINTEXT?
ENTRY/OUTPUT
TLS Certificate Signed by ECDSA. Generated in module, not entered.
May be output.
Payload Encryption
Certificate
Plaintext. Generated in module, not entered.
May be output.
Integrity key Plaintext. Fixed.
Figure 30 Public Key Table Part 2
2.7.4 CSP Destruction
All secret and private key material managed by the module can be zeroized using the key zeroization
service. This is a Crypto-Officer service requiring Crypto-Officer authentication. CSP zeroization is
performed procedurally and requires the Crypto-Officer to enter zero values for the manually entered
CSPs (SNMPv3 passwords and RADIUS shared secret) and also perform the key zeroization service to
zeroize the other secret and private keys. A reboot of the module is required to complete the CSP
zeroization and the Crypto Office should remain in control of the module until the module self-tests have
completed following the reboot.
2.7.5 Access to Key Material
The following table shows the access that an operator has to specific keys or other critical security
parameters when performing each of the services relevant to his/her role.
Access Rights
Blank Not Applicable
R Read
W Write
X Execute
Z Zeroize
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KEY
TLS
P
RIVATE
KEY
TLS
T
UNNEL
K
EYS
TLS
HMAC
K
EYS
TLS
C
ERTIFICATE
RADIUS
SHARED
SECRET
SNMP
V
3
P
RIVACY
K
EY
SNMP
V
3
A
UTHENTICATION
K
EY
CA
P
UBLIC
KEY
CA
C
ERTIFICATE
P
AYLOAD
E
NCRYPTION
C
ERTIFICATE
P
AYLOAD
E
NCRYPTION
P
RIVATE
KEY
P
AYLOAD
E
NCRYPTION
K
EY
P
AYLOAD
E
NCRYPTION
TLS
T
UNNEL
KEYS
P
AYLOAD
E
NCRYPTION
TLS
HMAC
K
EYS
F
IRMWARE
I
NTEGRITY
KEY
H
ASH
DRBG
“C”
CSP
H
ASH
DRBG
“V”
CSP
H
ASH
DRBG
S
EED
U
SER
P
ASSWORD
C
RYPTO
-O
FFICER
P
ASSWORD
User Services
View
Configuration
R R R R R R R
Craft Tool R R R R R R R X
Crypto-Officer
Services
Disable
Payload
Encryption
R R R R R R R
Enable Payload
Encryption
R R R R R R R
Craft Tool R R R R R R R X
Firmware
Upgrade
R
Zeroize Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Key
Management
(Payload
Encryption)
R R R R W X X X
Key
Management
(Secure
Management)
R R R R R R R
Module
Configuration
R R R R R
SNMP v3 R,
W
R,
W
RADIUS R,
W
View Status R R R R R R R
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KEY
TLS
P
RIVATE
KEY
TLS
T
UNNEL
K
EYS
TLS
HMAC
K
EYS
TLS
C
ERTIFICATE
RADIUS
SHARED
SECRET
SNMP
V
3
P
RIVACY
K
EY
SNMP
V
3
A
UTHENTICATION
K
EY
CA
P
UBLIC
KEY
CA
C
ERTIFICATE
P
AYLOAD
E
NCRYPTION
C
ERTIFICATE
P
AYLOAD
E
NCRYPTION
P
RIVATE
KEY
P
AYLOAD
E
NCRYPTION
K
EY
P
AYLOAD
E
NCRYPTION
TLS
T
UNNEL
KEYS
P
AYLOAD
E
NCRYPTION
TLS
HMAC
K
EYS
F
IRMWARE
I
NTEGRITY
KEY
H
ASH
DRBG
“C”
CSP
H
ASH
DRBG
“V”
CSP
H
ASH
DRBG
S
EED
U
SER
P
ASSWORD
C
RYPTO
-O
FFICER
P
ASSWORD
Request
Unauthenticat
ed Services
X
Payload
Encryption
X
Payload
Decryption
Perform Self-
Tests
Z Z Z Z Z
View Status
indicators
Figure 31 Access to Keys by Services
Note: Key zeroization zeroizes all keys and CSPs; this is a “write” operation in that all keys are overwritten
with zeroes.
2.8 Self-Tests
The module implements both power-up and conditional self-tests as required by FIPS 140-2.
The following two sections outline the tests that are performed.
2.8.1 Power-up Self-tests
After power cycling or booting the appliance the module executes the Power-Up Self-Tests with no
further inputs or actions by the operator.
The module implements the following power-up self-tests. The module inhibits all data output while it is
operating in the Self-Test state.
OBJECT TEST
AES (#2418) AES-128-CBC Encrypt Known answer test
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OBJECT TEST
AES-256-CBC Encrypt Known answer test
AES-256-CFB128 Encrypt Known answer test
AES-128-CBC Decrypt Known answer test
AES-256-CBC Decrypt Known answer test
AES-256-CFB128 Decrypt Known answer test
AES (#2260) AES-128-CCM Encrypt Known answer test
AES-192-CCM Encrypt Known answer test
AES-256-CCM Encrypt Known answer test
RSA Known answer test (signature verification; RSA
Cert. #2071)
ECDSA Known answer test (signature generation)
Known answer test (signature verification)
DRBG SP 800-90A Hash-based DRBG Known answer
test
SP 800-90A Section 11.3 Health Tests
ECCCDH Performs an ECCCDH KAT using a NIST defined
P-256 curve.
Bootloader Integrity test performed by verifying the RSA-
2048 signature of a SHA-256 hash of the
bootloader image (RSA Cert. #2239; SHS Cert.
#3397)
Module firmware Firmware Integrity test performed by verifying
the RSA-2048 signature of a SHA-256 hash of
the firmware image (RSA Cert. #2071; SHS
Cert. #3328)
HMAC-SHA-1 Known answer test (SHS Cert. #3328)
HMAC-SHA-256 Known answer test (SHS Cert. #3328)
SHA-1 Known answer test (SHS Cert. #3328)
Figure 32 Power-up Self-tests
Note: For historical reasons, the module also performs an RSA signature generation known answer test at
power-up, but the module no longer uses RSA signature generation in an Approved mode of operation.
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2.8.2 Conditional Self-tests
EVENT TEST CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE
Module requests a random
number from the FIPS
Approved SP 800-90A DRBG
A continuous random number
generator test
Random number is not
generated and module enters
an error state
Entropy is supplied to the FIPS
Approved SP 800-90A Hash-
based DRBG
A continuous random number
generator test on the entropy
NDRNG
Entropy is not added and
module enters an error state
Firmware upgrade Firmware load test – Approved
integrity technique using SHA-
256 and RSA. (RSA Cert. #2071;
SHS Cert. #3328)
Firmware upgrade fails
Manual key entry test Duplicate entries Key not loaded
Asymmetric key pair
generated
ECDSA Pairwise Consistency test Key rejected and module enters
an error state
RAC enters switches between
a bypass mode and
cryptographic mode of
operation
Exclusive Bypass test – two
independent actions are
required to change mode
(encrypted to bypass and vice
versa) and test the correct
operation of the services
providing cryptographic
processing when the switch
occurs
RAC is disabled and no data is
passed
Figure 33 Conditional Self-tests
2.9 Design Assurance
Aviat Networks employ industry standard best practices in the design, development, production and
maintenance of the Aviat Networks Eclipse product, including the FIPS 140-2 module.
Aviat Networks has an ISO 9001 Quality Management System.
This includes the use of an industry standard configuration management system that is operated in
accordance with the requirements of FIPS 140-2, such that each configuration item that forms part of the
module is stored with a label corresponding to the version of the module and that the module and all of
its associated documentation can be regenerated from the configuration management system with
reference to the relevant version number.
Design documentation for the module is maintained to provide clear and consistent information within
the document hierarchy to enable transparent traceability between corresponding areas throughout the
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document hierarchy, for instance, between elements of this Cryptographic Module Security Policy (CMSP)
and the design documentation.
Guidance appropriate to an operator’s Role is provided with the module and provides all of the necessary
assistance to enable the secure operation of the module by an operator, including the Approved security
functions of the module.
Delivery of the Cryptographic Module to customers from the vendor is via third party couriers. The
parcels are sealed in tamper evident packaging and each parcel is tracked from vendor to customer. Once
on site, the customer must follow vendor guidance to securely install and configure the module.
2.10 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not mitigate any other attacks.
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3 FIPS Mode of Operation
Once the module has been commissioned, the front panel of the module should be sealed, with no visible
gaps and tamper evident seals applied as described in section 2.5 above.
The module is set into FIPS mode as follows:
1. Install FIPS capable NCC with CF card containing FIPS validated firmware
2. Power up NCC
3. Connect to NCC with Portal
4. Install S/W license containing Strong Security, FIPS compliance, and optional Payload Encryption
5. Set security mode to “FIPS”
6. Select “Yes” when Portal asks for confirmation
7. NCC reboots
8. Connect to NCC using Portal
9. Log in to NCC using a default Crypto-Officer
10. Configure desired security settings and add local users and/or RADIUS servers as required
11. By default Payload Encryption is disabled, Bypass warning alarm raised against RAC
12. Log in as a user with Crypto-Officer permissions
13. Perform other RAC and Payload Encryption configuration and enable Payload Encryption
The use of the Approved mode locks out the use of non-Approved algorithms.
For more details, please see the Eclipse User Manual Addendum for FIPS 140-2.
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Appendix A- RAC 60E/6XE Excluded Components
None of these components process plaintext CSPs or represent a threat of the unit being compromised
should they fail.
View 1 (Along Top of RAC Card)
Ref Part Number Part Description Circuit
J6 Connector (not fitted) FPGA 1/2 (SCH Sheet 8) - Test Header
J4 Connector (not fitted) Master Modem 2/3 (SCH Sheet 12) - Debug
Connector
R211 Resistor Master Modem 2/3 (SCH Sheet 12) - Debug
pull-up
J5 Connector (not fitted) Master Modem 2/3 (SCH Sheet 12) -
BDM/JTAG Connector
U20 084-397128-001 IC, CPLD XC9572XL-10VQ64I CPLD & JTAG Interface (SCH Sheet 5) - Logic
U40 083-845385-001 IC, BUFFER / LINE DRIVER CPLD & JTAG Interface (SCH Sheet 5) - JTAG
Buffer
J7 Connector CPLD & JTAG Interface (SCH Sheet 5) - JTAG
Connector
C404 Capacitor Master Modem 1/3 (SCH Sheet 11) - 1.2V
Regulator
C405 Capacitor Master Modem 1/3 (SCH Sheet 11) - 1.2V
Regulator
U16 080-417105-001 IC, REGULATOR 1.2V, 800MA Master Modem 1/3 (SCH Sheet 11) - 1.2V
Regulator
U26 080-417089-001 IC, 500 MA, 3.3 V, REGULATOR Master Modem 1/3 (SCH Sheet 11) - 3.3V
Regulator
C39 Capacitor Master Modem 1/3 (SCH Sheet 11) - 3.3V
Regulator
C35 Capacitor Master Modem 1/3 (SCH Sheet 11) - 3.3V
Regulator
R192 Resistor Master Modem 2/3 (SCH Sheet 12) - Sys Clk
pull-down
R195 Resistor Master Modem 2/3 (SCH Sheet 12) - Sys Clk
pull-up
C49 Capacitor Master IF Transceiver (SCH Sheet 17) - 3.3V
Regulator
FB17 063-501118-001 6A BEAD INDUCTOR Master IF Transceiver (SCH Sheet 17) - 3.3V
Regulator
U30 080-417089-001 IC, 500 MA, 3.3 VDC,
REGULATOR
Master IF Transceiver (SCH Sheet 17) - 3.3V
Regulator
C360 Capacitor N-Plexer / ODU INTF (SCH Sheet 20) - Tx IF
Power
R420 Resistor N-Plexer / ODU INTF (SCH Sheet 20) - Tx IF
Power
R422 Resistor N-Plexer / ODU INTF (SCH Sheet 20) - Tx IF
Power
R423 Resistor N-Plexer / ODU INTF (SCH Sheet 20) - Tx IF
Power
R425 Resistor N-Plexer / ODU INTF (SCH Sheet 20) - Tx IF
Power
R426 Resistor N-Plexer / ODU INTF (SCH Sheet 20) - Tx IF
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Power
R427 Resistor N-Plexer / ODU INTF (SCH Sheet 20) - Tx IF
Power
U35 081-306311-003 DUAL OPAMP LM2904 N-Plexer / ODU INTF (SCH Sheet 20) - Tx IF
Power
R415 Resistor N-Plexer / ODU INTF (SCH Sheet 20) - Tx IF
Power
R416 Resistor N-Plexer / ODU INTF (SCH Sheet 20) - Tx IF
Power
R418 Resistor N-Plexer / ODU INTF (SCH Sheet 20) - Tx IF
Power
R419 Resistor N-Plexer / ODU INTF (SCH Sheet 20) - Tx IF
Power
R421 Resistor N-Plexer / ODU INTF (SCH Sheet 20) - Tx IF
Power
R424 Resistor N-Plexer / ODU INTF (SCH Sheet 20) - Tx IF
Power
C350 Capacitor N-Plexer / ODU INTF (SCH Sheet 20) - Tx IF
Power
L28 063-312470-720 IND,CHIP 47NH 2% 1008 N-Plexer / ODU INTF (SCH Sheet 20) - Tx IF
Power
C353 Capacitor N-Plexer / ODU INTF (SCH Sheet 20) - Tx IF
Power
C354 Capacitor N-Plexer / ODU INTF (SCH Sheet 20) - Tx IF
Power
U12 082-433001-001 IC, 2.5GHZ PWR DETECT
AD8361
N-Plexer / ODU INTF (SCH Sheet 20) - Tx IF
Power
FL4 075-501032-001 N-PLEXER, DC SURGE ARREST N-Plexer / ODU INTF (SCH Sheet 20) - N-Plexer
View 2 (Along Bottom of RAC Card)
Ref Part Number Part Description Circuit
F1 027-386008-001 FUSE, 5A, SMT 125VAC/DC, FAST Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
R7 Resistor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
R8 Resistor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
R30 Resistor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
R31 Resistor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
R32 Resistor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
R33 Resistor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
R34 Resistor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
C67 Capacitor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
U33 081-306311-003 DUAL OPAMP LM2904 Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
Amux and Telemetry (SCH Sheet 6) - 48V
Monitor
R121 Resistor Amux and Telemetry (SCH Sheet 6) - 48V
Monitor
R10 Resistor Amux and Telemetry (SCH Sheet 6) - 48V
Monitor
R123 Resistor Amux and Telemetry (SCH Sheet 6) - 48V
Monitor
CR8 077-313988-001 D'L SWIT'G 70V/.25A BAV99
S023
Amux and Telemetry (SCH Sheet 6) - 48V
Monitor
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C27 Capacitor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - 1.2V
Regulator
C394 Capacitor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - 1.2V
Regulator
C396 Capacitor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - 1.2V
Regulator
C398 Capacitor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - 1.2V
Regulator
C399 Capacitor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - 1.2V
Regulator
FL2 075-316592-003 FILTER 6800PF 110V/10A SMT Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - 1.2V
Regulator
U18 080-417118-001 IC, 8A 4MHZ STEP-DOWN REG Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - 1.2V
Regulator
C393 Capacitor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - 1.2V
Regulator
C401 Capacitor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - 1.2V
Regulator
U15 083-845422-002 IC, QAM XPIC MODEM,
PVG610X
Slave Modem (SCH Sheets 14 & 15) - Modem
U3 081-302321-001 DUAL OPAMP LMC6482 Master IF Transceiver (SCH Sheet 17) - AGC
Slave RX IF (SCH Sheet 18) - AGC
U34 DUAL OPAMP Slave RX IF (SCH Sheet 18) - VCM
Slave RX IF (SCH Sheet 18) - XPOL Alarm
C414 Capacitor Slave RX IF (SCH Sheet 18) - AGC
C415 Capacitor Slave RX IF (SCH Sheet 18) - AGC
R15 Resistor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
R16 Resistor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
R17 Resistor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
R18 Resistor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
R37 Resistor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
Q3 078-362091-002 XSTR GP PNP (2N)5401 Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
Q11 078-381091-001 XSTR GP NPN (2N)5550 Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
R38 Resistor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
R39 Resistor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
R40 Resistor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
R41 Resistor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
C4 Capacitor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
C63 Capacitor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
C402 Capacitor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
U8 081-399558-001 IC, -48V/2.5A HOT SWAP
CNTRLR
Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
R14 Resistor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
R44 Resistor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
R45 Resistor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
R46 Resistor Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power
Q2 078-396196-001 XSTR FET N-CH IRF540NS,
D2PAK
Power Regulation (SCH Sheet 3) - ODU Power