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Cisco Firepower Threat Defense on 4K/9K Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Table of Contents
1 General ......................................................................................................................................5
1.1 Overview .............................................................................................................................5
1.2 Security Levels....................................................................................................................5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification ..........................................................................................5
2.1 Description ..........................................................................................................................5
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification .........................................7
2.3 Excluded Components ........................................................................................................8
2.4 Modes of Operation.............................................................................................................8
2.5 Algorithms ...........................................................................................................................9
2.6 Security Function Implementations ...................................................................................12
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information...........................................................................................19
2.8 RBG and Entropy ..............................................................................................................20
2.9 Key Generation .................................................................................................................21
2.10 Key Establishment...........................................................................................................21
2.11 Industry Protocols............................................................................................................22
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces.............................................................................................22
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ..........................................................................................................22
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ........................................................................................23
4.1 Authentication Methods.....................................................................................................23
4.2 Roles .................................................................................................................................25
4.3 Approved Services ............................................................................................................26
4.4 Non-Approved Services ....................................................................................................42
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded .................................................................................42
4.6 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status .........................................................................42
4.7 Additional Information........................................................................................................43
5 Software/Firmware Security.....................................................................................................43
5.1 Integrity Techniques..........................................................................................................43
5.2 Initiate on Demand ............................................................................................................43
6 Operational Environment .........................................................................................................43
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ...........................................................43
7 Physical Security......................................................................................................................43
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required...................................................................................43
8 Non-Invasive Security..............................................................................................................43
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management...........................................................................44
9.1 Storage Areas ...................................................................................................................44
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9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ...............................................................................................44
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods..................................................................................................45
9.4 SSPs .................................................................................................................................46
9.5 Transitions.........................................................................................................................62
10 Self-Tests...............................................................................................................................62
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests..............................................................................................62
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests .....................................................................................................62
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information .........................................................................................68
10.4 Error States .....................................................................................................................70
11 Life-Cycle Assurance.............................................................................................................70
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ..........................................................70
11.2 Administrator Guidance...................................................................................................72
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance ...........................................................................................72
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks.....................................................................................................72
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels................................................................................................................5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware .......................................................................8
Table 3: Modes List and Description.............................................................................................9
Table 4: Approved Algorithms - CiscoSSL FOM Cryptographic Implementation........................11
Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Marvell Cavium Nitrox V...........................................................11
Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms..........................................................................................11
Table 7: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms........................................................................12
Table 8: Security Function Implementations...............................................................................19
Table 9: Entropy Certificates.......................................................................................................20
Table 10: Entropy Sources .........................................................................................................20
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces....................................................................................................23
Table 12: Authentication Methods ..............................................................................................24
Table 13: Roles...........................................................................................................................25
Table 14: Approved Services......................................................................................................41
Table 15: Non-Approved Services..............................................................................................42
Table 16: Mechanisms and Actions Required ............................................................................43
Table 17: Storage Areas.............................................................................................................44
Table 18: SSP Input-Output Methods.........................................................................................45
Table 19: SSP Zeroization Methods ...........................................................................................45
Table 20: SSP Table 1................................................................................................................53
Table 21: SSP Table 2................................................................................................................61
Table 22: Pre-Operational Self-Tests .........................................................................................62
Table 23: Conditional Self-Tests.................................................................................................68
Table 24: Pre-Operational Periodic Information..........................................................................68
Table 25: Conditional Periodic Information .................................................................................70
Table 26: Error States.................................................................................................................70
List of Figures
Figure 1 FTD-CM..........................................................................................................................6
Figure 2 FPR 4112, FPR 4115, FPR 4125, FPR 4145 – Front Panel .........................................6
Figure 3 FPR 4112, FPR 4115, FPR 4125, FPR 4145 - Back Panel...........................................7
Figure 4 FPR 9300 SM40, FPR 9300 SM48 and FPR 9300 SM56 – Front Panel .......................7
Figure 5 FPR 9300 SM40, FPR 9300 SM48 and FPR 9300 SM56 – Front Panel .......................7
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This is Cisco Systems, Inc. non-proprietary security policy for the Cisco Firepower Threat
Defense on 4K/9K Cryptographic Module (hereinafter referred to as FTD, FTD-CM or Module),
version 7.4.2. The following details how this module meets the security requirements of FIPS
140-3, SP 800-140 and ISO/IEC 19790 for a Security Level 1 Hardware cryptographic module.
The security requirements cover areas related to the design and implementation of a
cryptographic module. These areas include cryptographic module specification; cryptographic
module interfaces; roles, services, and authentication; software/firmware security; operational
environment; physical security; non-invasive security; sensitive security parameter
management; self-tests; life-cycle assurance; and mitigation of other attacks. The following table
indicates the actual security levels for each area of the cryptographic module.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security 1
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
This module is a multi-chip embedded hardware cryptographic module deployed under the
Cisco Firepower Threat Defense which houses ASA, FX-OS, and Firepower solutions. The
module’s operational environment is Limited.
Cisco FTD is an integrated network security system providing enterprise-class firewall with a
comprehensive range of next-generation network security services, intrusion prevention system
(IPS), content security and secure unified communications, HTTPS/TLSv1.2, SSHv2,
IPsec/IKEv2, SNMPv3 and Cryptographic Cipher Suite B using the FTD Cryptographic Module.
Module Type: Hardware
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Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Embedded
Module Characteristics:
Cryptographic Boundary:
The Cisco FTD-CM is an integrated network security module housed in a single blade
architecture, which is designed to integrate into the Cisco Firepower 4100 or 9300 Series
Appliances. Once integrated, the FTD-CM provides enhanced security, reliability, and
performance. Delivering industry-leading firewall data rates, this module provides exceptional
scalability to meet the needs of today's dynamic organizations.
Figure 1 FTD-CM
Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):
The TOEPP is defined as the entire chassis unit’s physical perimeter encompassing the "top,"
"front," "left," "right," “rear” and "bottom" surfaces of the case, and shown in the figures below
and in the Physical Security section. The FPR 4112, FPR 4115, FPR 4125 and FPR 4145 have
the same exterior features while FPR 9300 SM-40, FPR 9300 SM-48, and FPR 9300 SM-56
have the same exterior features. Where they differ is in Firewall throughput, IPS throughput,
IPsec VPN throughput and number of VPN peers allowed.
Figure 2 FPR 4112, FPR 4115, FPR 4125, FPR 4145 – Front Panel
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Figure 3 FPR 4112, FPR 4115, FPR 4125, FPR 4145 - Back Panel
Figure 4 FPR 9300 SM40, FPR 9300 SM48 and FPR 9300 SM56 – Front Panel
Figure 5 FPR 9300 SM40, FPR 9300 SM48 and FPR 9300 SM56 – Front Panel
The hardware version can be verified by using the command `show version` as an example, this
command will output “Hardware: FPR4K-SM-32S.” Additionally, the front panels of chassis for
the FPR 4112, FPR 4115, FPR 4125, FPR 4145 (Figure 2) are identical, and display “Cisco
4100 series” on the front panel. The chassis for the FPR 9300 SM40, FPR 9300 SM48 and FPR
9300 SM56 (Figure 3) show “Cisco 9k.”
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
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Model
and/or
Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
FPR 4112 FPR-4112 7.4.2 Intel Xeon Silver 4116 (Skylake) &
NITROX-V, Marvell Semiconductor,
NITROX
N/A
FPR 4115 FPR-4115 7.4.2 Intel Xeon Silver 4116 (Skylake) &
NITROX-V, Marvell Semiconductor,
NITROX
N/A
FPR 4125 FPR-4125 7.4.2 Intel Xeon Gold 6130T (Skylake) &
NITROX-V, Marvell Semiconductor,
NITROX
N/A
FPR 4145 FPR-4145 7.4.2 Intel Xeon Gold 6152 (Skylake) &
NITROX-V, Marvell Semiconductor,
NITROX
N/A
FPR 9300
SM-40
FPR 9300
SM-40
7.4.2 Intel Xeon Gold 6138T (Skylake) &
NITROX-V, Marvell Semiconductor,
NITROX
N/A
FPR 9300
SM-48
FPR 9300
SM-48
7.4.2 Intel Xeon Platinum 8160 (Skylake) &
NITROX-V, Marvell Semiconductor,
NITROX
N/A
FPR 9300
SM-56
FPR 9300
SM-56
7.4.2 Intel Xeon Platinum 8176 (Skylake) &
NITROX-V, Marvell Semiconductor,
NITROX
N/A
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
2.3 Excluded Components
N/A for this module.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
Mode of
Operation
The module is always in the approved mode
of operation after initial operations are
performed.
Approved Approved mode
indicator: "FIPS is
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Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
currently
enabled."
Non-
Approved
Mode of
Operation
The module is configured to have the
Approved Mode disabled (Which is not
recommended by Cisco). In the Non-
Approved Mode, both Non-Approved and
Approved algorithms can be configured.
Non-
Approved
Non-Approved
mode indicator:
"FIPS is currently
disabled."
Table 3: Modes List and Description
The module supports an Approved and a Non-Approved mode of operation.
Mode change instructions and status indicators:
The module will operate in the Approved mode of operation once the configuration steps for the
Approved mode in section 11.1 are completed. The module upon successful completion of all
pre-operational self-tests and cryptographic algorithm self-tests from both hardware and
firmware implementations will be operational.
Although not recommended by Cisco. the module can be configured into the Non-Approved
mode by following the steps for the Non-Approved mode in section 11.1.
Degraded Mode Description:
The module does not implement a degraded mode of operation.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
CiscoSSL FOM Cryptographic Implementation
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A4446 Key Length - 128, 256 SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A4446 Key Length - 128, 256 SP 800-38D
Counter DRBG A4446 Prediction Resistance - Yes
Mode - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
A4446 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - Testing Candidates
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
A4446 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-
384, SHA2-512
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A4446 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-
384, SHA2-512
FIPS 186-4
HMAC-SHA-1 A4446 Key Length - Key Length: 256-448 Increment
8, Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
HMAC-SHA2-
224
A4446 Key Length - Key Length: 256-448 Increment
8, Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A4446 Key Length - Key Length: 256-448 Increment
8, Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
384
A4446 Key Length - Key Length: 256-448 Increment
8, Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512
A4446 Key Length - Key Length: 256-448 Increment
8, Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A4446 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-
256, P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A4446 Domain Parameter Generation Methods -
ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, modp-2048,
modp-3072, modp-4096
Scheme -
dhEphem -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDF IKEv2
(CVL)
A4446 Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-
Hellman Shared Secret Length: 2048
Derived Keying Material Length - Derived
Keying Material Length: 3072
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
KDF SNMP
(CVL)
A4446 Password Length - Password Length: 256, 64 SP 800-135
Rev. 1
KDF SSH (CVL) A4446 Cipher - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-
256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
A4446 Key Generation Mode - B.3.4
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
Private Key Format - Standard
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
A4446 Signature Type - PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A4446 Signature Type - PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Modulo - 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096
FIPS 186-4
Safe Primes Key
Generation
A4446 Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072,
ffdhe4096, modp-2048, modp-3072, modp-
4096
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
SHA-1 A4446 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224 A4446 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A4446 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
SHA2-384 A4446 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A4446 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627 (CVL)
A4446 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
Table 4: Approved Algorithms - CiscoSSL FOM Cryptographic Implementation
Marvell Cavium Nitrox V
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CBC C1026 Key Length - 128, 256 SP 800-38A
AES-GCM C1026 Key Length - 128, 256 SP 800-38D
HMAC-SHA-1 C1026 - FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
C1026 - FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
384
C1026 - FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512
C1026 - FIPS 198-1
SHA-1 C1026 Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 C1026 Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 C1026 Message Length - Message Length: 0-102400
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 C1026 Message Length - Message Length: 0-102400
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Marvell Cavium Nitrox V
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Key
Type:Asymmetric
N/A The cryptographic module performs
Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for
asymmetric keys as per section 4 example 1
in SP800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed) and FIPS
140-3 IG D.H. A seed (i.e., the random value)
used in asymmetric key generation is a direct
output from SP800-90Arev1 CTR_DRBG
(A4446)
Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
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N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
Name Use and Function
3DES Used for symmetric encryption in SSHv2, TLSv1, TLSv1.2, IPsec/IKEv2,
and SNMPv3
ChaCha20-
poly1305
Used for authenticated symmetric encryption in SSHv2, and TLSv1.3
Table 7: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KAS-ECC-KeyGen
(SSHv2)
CKG
KAS-KeyGen
KAS ECC
keygen used in
SSHv2 service
Bit-strength
Caveat:Provides
between 128
and 256 bits
encryption
strength
Counter
DRBG:
(A4446)
CKG: ()
KAS-FFC-KeyGen
(SSHv2)
CKG
KAS-KeyGen
KAS FFC
keygen used in
SSHv2 service
Bit-strength
Caveat:Provides
between 112
and 152 bits
encryption
strength
Counter
DRBG:
(A4446)
Safe Primes
Key
Generation:
(A4446)
Safe Prime
Groups:
modp-2048,
modp-3072,
modp-4096
CKG: ()
KAS-ECC-KeyGen
(TLSv1.2)
CKG
KAS-KeyGen
KAS ECC
keygen used in
TLSv1.2
service
Bit-strength
Caveat:Provides
between 128
and 256 bits
encryption
strength
Counter
DRBG:
(A4446)
CKG: ()
KAS-FFC-KeyGen
(TLSv1.2)
CKG
KAS-KeyGen
KAS FFC
keygen used in
Bit-strength
Caveat:Provides
Counter
DRBG:
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
TLSv1.2
service
between 112
and 152 bits
encryption
strength
(A4446)
Safe Primes
Key
Generation:
(A4446)
Safe Prime
Groups:
ffdhe2048,
ffdhe3072,
ffdhe4096
CKG: ()
KAS-ECC-KeyGen
(IKEv2)
CKG
KAS-KeyGen
KAS ECC
keygen used in
IKEv2 service
Bit-strength
Caveat:Provides
between 128
and 256 bits
encryption
strength
Counter
DRBG:
(A4446)
CKG: ()
KAS-FFC-KeyGen
(IKEv2)
CKG
KAS-KeyGen
KAS FFC
keygen used in
IKEv2 service
Bit-strength
Caveat:Provides
between 112
and 152 bits
encryption
strength
Counter
DRBG:
(A4446)
Safe Primes
Key
Generation:
(A4446)
Safe Prime
Groups:
modp-2048,
modp-3072,
modp-4096
CKG: ()
KAS-ECC (SSHv2) KAS-Full KAS-ECC for
SSHv2 Service
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 128
and 256 bits of
security strength
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2,
Path 2 (Split)
Key
Confirmation:No
Key
Derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
KAS-ECC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3:
(A4446)
KDF SSH:
(A4446)
KAS-FFC (SSHv2) KAS-Full KAS-FFC for
SSHv2 Service
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
KAS-FFC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3:
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
provides
between 112
and 152 bits of
security strength
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2,
Path 2 (Split)
Key
Confirmation:No
Key
Derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
(A4446)
Domain
Parameter
Generation
Methods:
MODP-2048,
MODP-3072,
MODP-4096
KDF SSH:
(A4446)
KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2) KAS-Full KAS-ECC for
TLSv1.2
Service
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 128
and 256 bits of
security strength
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2,
Path 2 (Split)
Key
Confirmation:No
Key
Derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
KAS-ECC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3:
(A4446)
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627:
(A4446)
KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2) KAS-Full KAS-FFC for
TLSv1.2
Service
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 112
and 152 bits of
security strength
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2,
Path 2 (Split)
Key
Confirmation:No
Key
Derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
KAS-FFC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3:
(A4446)
Domain
Parameter
Generation
Methods:
ffdhe2048,
ffdhe3072,
ffdhe4096
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627:
(A4446)
KAS-ECC (IKEv2) KAS-Full KAS-ECC for
IKEv2 Service
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides
KAS-ECC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3:
(A4446)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
between 128
and 256 bits of
security strength
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2,
Path 2 (Split)
Key
Confirmation:No
Key
Derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
KDF IKEv2:
(A4446)
KAS-FFC (IKEv2) KAS-Full KAS-FFC for
IKEv2 Service
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 112
and 152 bits of
security strength
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2,
Path 2 (Split)
Key
Confirmation:No
Key
Derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
KAS-FFC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3:
(A4446)
Domain
Parameter
Generation
Methods:
MODP-2048,
MODP-3072,
MODP-4096
KDF IKEv2:
(A4446)
KTS (TLSv1.2 with
AES and HMAC)
KTS-Wrap KTS via
TLSv1.2
service by
using AES and
HMAC
Standard:SP
800-38F
IG
D.G:Approved
"Combination"
method
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 128 or
256 bits of
security strength
AES-CBC:
(A4446)
Key Length:
128, 256
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A4446)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A4446)
HMAC-SHA2-
384: (A4446)
SHA-1:
(A4446)
SHA2-256:
(A4446)
SHA2-384:
(A4446)
KTS (TLSv1.2 with
AES-GCM)
KTS-Wrap KTS via
TLSv1.2
service by
using AES-
GCM
Standard:SP
800-38F
IG
D.G:Approved
"Authenticated"
AES-GCM:
(A4446)
Key Length:
128, 256
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UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
method
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 128 or
256 bits of
security strength
KTS (SSHv2 with
AES and HMAC)
KTS-Wrap KTS via SSHv2
service by
using AES and
HMAC
Standard:SP
800-38F
IG
D.G:Approved
"Combination"
method
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 128 or
256 bits of
security strength
AES-CBC:
(A4446)
Key Length:
128, 256
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A4446)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A4446)
SHA-1:
(A4446)
SHA2-256:
(A4446)
KTS (SSHv2 with
AES-GCM)
KTS-Wrap KTS via SSHv2
service by
using AES-
GCM
Standard:SP
800-38F
IG
D.G:Approved
"Authenticated"
method
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 128 or
256 bits of
security strength
AES-GCM:
(A4446)
Key Length:
128, 256
RSA KeyGen
(SSHv2, TLSv1.2,
IKEv2)
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
CKG
RSA KeyGen
for SSHv2,
TLSv1.2, and
IKEv2 services
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A4446)
Counter
DRBG:
(A4446)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Asymmetric
ECDSA KeyGen
(SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and
IKEv2)
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
CKG
ECDSA
KeyGen for
SSHv2,
TLSv1.2 and
IKEv2 services
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A4446)
Counter
DRBG:
(A4446)
CKG: ()
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Key Type:
Asymmetric
RSA SigGen (SSHv2,
TLSv1.2, IKEv2)
DigSig-SigGen RSA SigGen
for SSHv2,
TLSv1.2, and
IKEv2 services
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A4446)
ECDSA SigGen
(SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and
IKEv2)
DigSig-SigGen ECDSA
SigGen for
TLSv1.2, and
IKEv2 services
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A4446)
RSA SigVer (SSHv2,
TLSv1.2, and IKEv2)
DigSig-SigVer RSA SigVer for
SSHv2,
TLSv1.2, and
IKEv2 services
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A4446)
ECDSA SigVer
(SSHv2, TLSv1.2,
and IKEv2)
DigSig-SigVer ECDSA SigVer
for TLSv1.2
and IKEv2
services
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A4446)
Session
Encryption/Decryption
(SSHv2)
BC-Auth
BC-UnAuth
SSHv2 session
protection.
AES-CBC:
(A4446)
Key Length:
128, 256
AES-GCM:
(A4446)
Key Length:
128, 256
Session
Encryption/Decryption
(TLSv1.2)
BC-Auth
BC-UnAuth
TLSv1.2
session
protection.
AES-GCM:
(A4446)
Key Length:
128, 256
AES-CBC:
(A4446)
Key Length:
128, 256
Session
Encryption/Decryption
(IPSec/IKE)
BC-Auth
BC-UnAuth
IPSec/IKE
session
protection.
AES-CBC:
(A4446,
C1026)
AES-GCM:
(A4446,
C1026)
Session
Encryption/Decryption
(SNMPv3)
BC-UnAuth SNMPv3
sesssion
protection.
AES-CBC:
(A4446)
Session
Authentication
(SSHv2)
MAC SSHv2 session
authentication.
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A4446)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A4446)
SHA-1:
(A4446)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SHA2-256:
(A4446)
Session
Authentication
(TLSv1.2)
MAC TLSv1.2
session
authentication.
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A4446)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A4446)
HMAC-SHA2-
384: (A4446)
SHA-1:
(A4446)
SHA2-256:
(A4446)
SHA2-384:
(A4446)
Session
Authentication
(IPSec/IKEv2)
MAC IPSec/IKEv2
session
authentication.
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A4446,
C1026)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A4446,
C1026)
HMAC-SHA2-
384: (A4446,
C1026)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A4446,
C1026)
SHA-1:
(A4446,
C1026)
SHA2-256:
(A4446,
C1026)
SHA2-384:
(A4446,
C1026)
SHA2-512:
(A4446,
C1026)
Session
Authentication
(SNMPv3)
MAC SNMPv3
session
authentication.
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A4446)
SHA-1:
(A4446)
HMAC-SHA2-
384: (A4446)
SHA2-256:
(A4446)
SHA2-384:
(A4446)
HMAC-SHA2-
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
224: (A4446)
SHA2-224:
(A4446)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A4446)
SSHv2 Keying
Materials
Development
KAS-135KDF SSHv2 session
keying
materials, used
to derive
SSHv2 session
keys.
KDF SSH:
(A4446)
TLSv1.2 Keying
Materials
Development
KAS-135KDF TLSv1.2
session keying
materials, used
to derive TLS
session keys.
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627:
(A4446)
IPSec/IKEv2 Keying
Materials
Development
KAS-135KDF IPSec/IKEv2
session keying
materials, used
to derive
IPSec/IKEv2
session keys.
KDF IKEv2:
(A4446)
SNMPv3 Keying
Materials
Development
KAS-135KDF SNMPv3
session keying
materials, used
to derive
SNMPv3
session keys.
KDF SNMP:
(A4446)
Firmware Load Test MAC MAC for
firmware load
test
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A4446)
DRBG Function DRBG Used for DRBG
generation
Counter
DRBG:
(A4446)
Table 8: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
• The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to Implementation Guidance C.H
scenario #1d following RFC 5647 for SSH. A new IV parameter is generated by the
module for each AES-GCM encryption. As shown in Section 7.1 of RFC 5647, the IV
consists of a 4-byte fixed field and an 8-byte invocation counter. The initial IV value is
generated as shown in Figure 1 of RFC 5647 and the fixed field of this IV remains the
same for the duration of the session. Therefore, the method for minimizing the (key, IV)
collision probability within the same session depends entirely on the management of the
invocation field of the IV. The invocation counter is treated as a 64-bit integer and is
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UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
incremented by one when performing an AES-GCM encryption of a new binary packet.
The formation of binary packets is explained in Section 7.2 of RFC 5647.
• The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to Implementation Guidance C.H
scenario #1a following RFC 5288 for TLS. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2 and
provides support for the acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1, Section
3.3.1. The operations of one of the two parties involved in the TLS key establishment
scheme were performed entirely within the cryptographic boundary of the module being
validated. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic
boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given
session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a
handshake to establish a new encryption key. In case the module’s power is lost and
then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be
established.
• The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to Implementation Guidance C.H
scenario #1b following RFC 7296 for IPsec. The module uses RFC 7296 compliant
IKEv2 to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which the AES GCM encryption
keys are derived. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a
given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a
handshake to establish a new encryption key. In case the module’s power is lost and
then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be
established.
• The module was algorithm tested based on the FIPS 186-4 standard Digital Signatures.
According to IG C.K, this module is 186-5 compliant as all 186-4 CAVP tests performed
are mathematically identical to the 186-5 CAVP tests. The Module does not support 186-
4 DSA or RSA X9.31 for Signature Generation or Signature Verification.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert
Number
Vendor Name
E3 Cisco Systems, Inc.
Table 9: Entropy Certificates
Name Type Operational Environment Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
Cisco
Jitter
Entropy
Source
Non-
Physical
Intel Xeon Platinum 8160
(Skylake), Intel Xeon Platinum
8176 (Skylake), Intel Xeon
Silver 4116 (Skylake), Intel
Xeon Gold 6130T (Skylake),
Intel Xeon Gold 6138T
(Skylake), Intel Xeon Gold 6152
(Skylake)
256 bits Full
Entropy
A2810
(SHA3-256)
Table 10: Entropy Sources
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The module implements a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on SP800-
90Arev1, CTR_DRBG with Algo Cert. #A4446.
The DRBG is used internally by the module (e.g. to generate symmetric keys, seeds for
asymmetric key pairs, and random numbers for security functions). The DRBG is seeded by the
entropy source described in the table above. The CTR_DRBG (AES-128/192/256) enables
Derivation Function capability. The DRBG is instantiated with a 384-bits long entropy input
(corresponding to 384 bits of entropy) and provides at least 256 bits security strength for the
cryptographic keys generation while in the approved mode.
The Cisco JENT entropy source implementation generates an output that is considered to have
full entropy. More information can be found in the public use document for ESV Cert. #E3.
2.9 Key Generation
The module generates RSA, ECDSA, KAS-ECC-SSC, and KAS-FFC-SSC asymmetric key
pairs compliant with FIPS 186-4, using a NIST SP 800-90Arev1 CTR_DRBG for random
number generation. In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic module performs
CKG for asymmetric keys as per section 5.1 of NIST SP 800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed) by
obtaining a random bit string directly from an approved DRBG. The random bit string supports
the required security strength requested by the calling application (without any V, as described
in Additional Comments 2 of IG D.H.).
2.10 Key Establishment
The module provides the following key/SSP establishment services in the approved mode of
operation:
KAS-FFC Shared Secret Computation:
• The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS
140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-FFC shared secret computation. The shared
secret computation provides between 112 and 152 bits of encryption strength.
• The module supports the use of the safe primes defined in RFC 4419 (SSH), RFC
7919 (TLS) and RFC 3526 (IKE). Note that the module only implements domain
parameter generation, key pair generation and verification, and shared secret
computation.
o SSH (RFC 4419):
 MODP-2048 (ID = 14)
 MODP-3072 (ID = 15)
 MODP-4096 (ID = 16)
o TLS (RFC 7919):
 ffdhe2048 (ID = 256)
 ffdhe3072 (ID = 257)
 ffdhe4096 (ID = 258)
o IKE (RFC 3526):
 MODP-2048 (ID = 14)
 MODP-3072 (ID = 15)
 MODP-4096 (ID = 16)
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KAS-ECC Shared Secret Computation:
• The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS
140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-ECC shared secret computation. The shared
secret computation provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.
• The modules NIST recommended curves correspond to the curves uses in these
industry protocols
o TLS (RFC 4492):
 P-256 (secp256r1)
 P-384 (secp384r1)
 P-521 (secp521r1)
o IKE (RFC 5903):
 P-256 (secp256r1)
 P-384 (secp384r1)
 P-521 (secp521r1)
The module also provides the following key transport mechanisms:
• Key wrapping using AES-GCM with a security strength of 128 or 256 bits.
• Key wrapping using AES-CBC with a security strength of 128 or 256 bits with HMAC-
SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-256 or HMAC-SHA2-384.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The module supports SSHv2, TLS v1.2, SNMPv3 and IPsec/IKEv2 industrial protocols. Please
refer to the Security Function Implementations Table for more information. No parts of
IPSec/IKEv2, SNMPv3, SSH and TLS protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the
CAVP and CMVP.
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
SFP Ethernet
Ports, PCI port
Data Input Data input into the module for all the services defined in
Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2,
SNMPv3 and IPsec/IKEv2 service data.
SFP Ethernet
Ports, PCI port
Data Output Data output from the module for all the services defined in
Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2,
SNMPv3 and IPsec/IKEv2 service data.
SFP Ethernet
Ports, PCI port
Control Input Control Data input into the module for all the services
defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2,
SSHv2, SNMPv3 and IPsec/IKEv2 service data.
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Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
SFP Ethernet
Ports, PCI port,
LED
Status
Output
Status Information output from the module.
N/A Control
Output
N/A
Power Power Provide the Power Supply to the module.
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces
The module’s physical perimeter encompasses the case of the tested platform mentioned in
Table 2. The module provides physical ports which are mapped to logical interfaces provided by
the module (data input, data output, control input, control output and status output) as above.
The module’s data output interface will be disabled when performing pre-operational self-tests,
loading new firmware, zeroizing keys, or when in an error state.
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each Attempt
Strength per Minute
Password The minimum length is
eight (8) characters (94
possible characters).
The configuration
supports at most ten
failed attempts to
authenticate in a one-
minute period.
Password
Based
The probability
that a random
attempt will
succeed or a
false
acceptance
will occur is
1/(94^8) which
is less than
1/1,000,000.
The probability of
successfully
authenticating to the
module within one
minute is 10/(94^8),
which is less than
1/100,000.
RSA-
Based
Certificate
The modules support
RSA public-key based
authentication
mechanism using a
minimum of RSA 2048
bits, which provides 112
bits of security strength.
The probability that a
random attempt will
succeed is 1/(2^112)
which is less than
1/1,000,000. For
multiple attacks during a
one-minute period, as
the module at its highest
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A4446)
The probability
that a random
attempt will
succeed is
1/(2^112).
Please refer to
Description
section in this
table for more
details.
The probability of
successfully
authenticating to the
module within a one
minute period is
17,000 * 60 =
1,020,000/(2^112).
Please refer to
Description section in
this table for more
details.
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Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each Attempt
Strength per Minute
can support at most
17,000 new sessions
per second to
authenticate in a one-
minute period, the
probability of
successfully
authenticating to the
module within a one
minute period is 17,000
* 60 =
1,020,000/(2^112),
which is less than
1/100,000.
ECDSA-
Based
Certificate
The modules support
ECDSA public-key
based authentication
mechanism using a
minimum of curve P-
256, which provides 128
bits of security strength.
The probability that a
random attempt will
succeed is 1/(2^128)
which is less than
1/1,000,000. For
multiple attacks during a
one-minute period, as
the module at its highest
can support at most
17,000 new sessions
per second to
authenticate in a one-
minute period, the
probability of
successfully
authenticating to the
module within a one
minute period is 17,000
* 60 =
1,020,000/(2^128),
which is less than
1/100,000.
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A4446)
The probability
that a random
attempt will
succeed is
1/(2^128)
which is less
than
1/1,000,000.
Please refer to
Description
section in this
table for more
details.
The probability of
successfully
authenticating to the
module within a one
minute period is
17,000 * 60 =
1,020,000/(2^128).
Please refer to
Description section in
this table for more
details.
Table 12: Authentication Methods
The module implements identity-based authentication. The module supports Crypto Officer role
and the User role. The module also allows the concurrent operators.
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4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Identity CO Password
RSA-Based Certificate
ECDSA-Based Certificate
User Identity User Password
RSA-Based Certificate
ECDSA-Based Certificate
Table 13: Roles
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4.3 Approved Services
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Show Status Provide
Module's
current status
(return codes
and/or syslog
messages)
N/A Command
used to show
Module's
Status
Module's
Operational
Status
None Crypto Officer
User
Show Version Provide
Module's name
and version
information
N/A Command to
show version
Module's ID
and versioning
information
None Crypto Officer
User
Perform Self-
Tests
Perform Self-
Tests (Pre-
operational
self-test and
Conditional
Self-Tests)
N/A Command to
trigger Self-
Test
Status of the
self-tests
results
None Crypto Officer
User
Unauthenticated
Perform
Zeroization
Perform
Zeroization
N/A Command to
zeroize the
module
Status of the
SSPs
zeroization
None Crypto Officer
- DRBG Entropy
Input: Z
- DRBG Seed: Z
- DRBG Internal
State V value: Z
- DRBG Key: Z
- User
Password: Z
- Crypto Officer
Password: Z
- Firmware Load
Test Key: Z
- SSH DH
Private Key: Z
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- SSH DH Public
Key: Z
- SSH Peer DH
Public Key: Z
- SSH DH
Shared Secret: Z
- SSH ECDH
Private Key: Z
- SSH ECDH
Public Key: Z
- SSH Peer
ECDH Public
Key: Z
- SSH ECDH
Shared Secret: Z
- SSH RSA
Private Key: Z
- SSH RSA
Public Key: Z
- SSH ECDSA
Private Key: Z
- SSH ECDSA
Public Key: Z
- SSH Session
Encryption Key:
Z
- SSH Session
Authentication
Key: Z
- TLS DH Private
Key: Z
- TLS DH Public
Key: Z
- TLS Peer DH
Public Key: Z
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- TLS DH
Shared Secret: Z
- TLS ECDH
Private Key: Z
- TLS ECDH
Public Key: Z
- TLS Peer
ECDH Public
Key: Z
- TLS ECDH
Shared Secret: Z
- TLS ECDSA
Private Key: Z
- TLS ECDSA
Public Key: Z
- TLS RSA
Private Key: Z
- TLS RSA
Public Key: Z
- TLS Master
Secret: Z
- TLS Session
Encryption Key:
Z
- TLS Session
Authentication
Key: Z
- IPSec/IKE DH
Private Key: Z
- IPSec/IKE DH
Public Key: Z
- IPSec/IKE Peer
DH Public Key:
Z
- IPSec/IKE DH
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Shared Secret: Z
- IPSec/IKE
ECDH Private
Key: Z
- IPSec/IKE
ECDH Public
Key: Z
- IPSec/IKE Peer
ECDH Public
Key: Z
- IPSec/IKE
ECDH Shared
Secret: Z
- IPSec/IKE
ECDSA Private
Key: Z
- IPSec/IKE
ECDSA Public
Key: Z
- IPSec/IKE RSA
Private Key: Z
- IPSec/IKE RSA
Public Key: Z
- IPSec/IKE Pre-
shared Secret: Z
- SKEYSEED: Z
- IPSec/IKE
Session
Encryption Key:
Z
- IPSec/IKE
Authentication
Key: Z
- SNMPv3
Shared Secret: Z
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- SNMPv3
Encryption Key:
Z
- SNMPv3
Authentication
Key: Z
Configure
Network
Sets
configuration of
the systems
N/A Commands to
configure the
network
Status of the
completion of
network
configuration
status
None Crypto Officer
Account
Management
Manage User
Account
N/A Commands to
create User
account
Account status None Crypto Officer
Crypto Officer
Authentication
CO Role
Authentication
N/A CO
Authentication
Request
Status of the
CO
authentication
None Crypto Officer
- Crypto Officer
Password: W,Z
User
Authentication
User Role
Authentication
N/A User role
authentication
request
Status of the
User role
authentication
None User
- User
Password: W,Z
Configure
SSHv2
Function
Configure
SSHv2
Function
Status Mode
Indicator "FIPS
is currently
enabled" and
SSHv2
configuration
success status
message
Commands to
configure
SSHv2
Status of the
completion of
the SSHv2
configuration
KTS (TLSv1.2 with
AES and HMAC)
KTS (TLSv1.2 with
AES-GCM)
KTS (SSHv2 with AES
and HMAC)
KTS (SSHv2 with
AES-GCM)
RSA KeyGen (SSHv2,
TLSv1.2, IKEv2)
ECDSA KeyGen
(SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and
IKEv2)
DRBG Function
Crypto Officer
- SSH RSA
Private Key: W,E
- SSH RSA
Public Key: W,E
- SSH ECDSA
Private Key: W,E
- SSH ECDSA
Public Key: W,E
- DRBG Entropy
Input: W,E
- DRBG Seed:
W,E
- DRBG Internal
State V value:
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UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
W,E
- DRBG Key:
W,E
Configure
HTTPS over
TLSv1.2
Function
Configure
HTTPS over
TLSv1.2
Function
Status Mode
Indicator "FIPS
is currently
enabled" and
HTTPS over
TLSv1.2
configuration
success status
message
Commands to
configure
TLSv1.2
Status of the
completion of
TLSv1.2
configuration
KTS (SSHv2 with AES
and HMAC)
KTS (SSHv2 with
AES-GCM)
KTS (TLSv1.2 with
AES and HMAC)
KTS (TLSv1.2 with
AES-GCM)
RSA KeyGen (SSHv2,
TLSv1.2, IKEv2)
ECDSA KeyGen
(SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and
IKEv2)
DRBG Function
Crypto Officer
- TLS ECDSA
Private Key: W,E
- TLS ECDSA
Public Key: W,E
- TLS RSA
Private Key: W,E
- TLS RSA
Public Key: W,E
- DRBG Entropy
Input: W,E
- DRBG Seed:
W,E
- DRBG Internal
State V value:
W,E
- DRBG Key:
W,E
Configure
IPsec/IKEv2
Function
Configure
IPSec/IKEv2
Function
Status Mode
Indicator "FIPS
is currently
enabled" with
IPsec/IKEv2
configuration
success status
message
Commands to
configure
IPsec/IKEv2
Status of the
completion of
IPsec/IKEv2
configuration
KTS (TLSv1.2 with
AES and HMAC)
KTS (TLSv1.2 with
AES-GCM)
KTS (SSHv2 with AES
and HMAC)
KTS (SSHv2 with
AES-GCM)
RSA KeyGen (SSHv2,
TLSv1.2, IKEv2)
ECDSA KeyGen
(SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and
IKEv2)
DRBG Function
Crypto Officer
- IPSec/IKE
ECDSA Private
Key: W,E
- IPSec/IKE
ECDSA Public
Key: W,E
- IPSec/IKE RSA
Private Key: W,E
- IPSec/IKE RSA
Public Key: W,E
- IPSec/IKE Pre-
shared Secret:
W,E
Page 32 of 72
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UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- DRBG Entropy
Input: W,E
- DRBG Seed:
W,E
- DRBG Internal
State V value:
W,E
- DRBG Key:
W,E
Configure
SNMPv3
Function
Configure
SNMPv3
Function
Status Mode
Indicator "FIPS
is currently
enabled" and
SNMPv3
configuration
success status
message
Commands to
configure
SNMPv3
Status of the
completion of
SNMPv3
configuration
KTS (TLSv1.2 with
AES and HMAC)
KTS (TLSv1.2 with
AES-GCM)
KTS (SSHv2 with AES
and HMAC)
KTS (SSHv2 with
AES-GCM)
Crypto Officer
- SNMPv3
Shared Secret:
W,E
- SNMPv3
Encryption Key:
W,E
- SNMPv3
Authentication
Key: W,E
Run SSHv2
Function
Execute SSHv2
Function
Status Mode
Indicator "FIPS
is currently
enabled" and
successful
SSHv2 log
message
Initiate SSHv2
tunnel
establishment
Status of
SSHv2 tunnel
establishment
KAS-ECC-KeyGen
(SSHv2)
KAS-FFC-KeyGen
(SSHv2)
KAS-ECC (SSHv2)
KAS-FFC (SSHv2)
KTS (SSHv2 with AES
and HMAC)
KTS (SSHv2 with
AES-GCM)
RSA SigGen (SSHv2,
TLSv1.2, IKEv2)
ECDSA SigGen
(SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and
IKEv2)
RSA SigVer (SSHv2,
Crypto Officer
- SSH DH
Private Key: W,E
- SSH DH Public
Key: W,E
- SSH Peer DH
Public Key: W,E
- SSH DH
Shared Secret:
W,E
- SSH ECDH
Private Key: W,E
- SSH ECDH
Public Key: W,E
- SSH Peer
ECDH Public
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UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
TLSv1.2, and IKEv2)
ECDSA SigVer
(SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and
IKEv2)
Session
Encryption/Decryption
(SSHv2)
Session
Authentication
(SSHv2)
SSHv2 Keying
Materials
Development
DRBG Function
Key: W,E
- SSH ECDH
Shared Secret:
W,E
- SSH RSA
Private Key: W,E
- SSH RSA
Public Key: W,E
- SSH ECDSA
Private Key: W,E
- SSH ECDSA
Public Key: W,E
- SSH Session
Encryption Key:
W,E
- SSH Session
Authentication
Key: W,E
- DRBG Entropy
Input: W,E
- DRBG Seed:
W,E
- DRBG Internal
State V value:
W,E
- DRBG Key:
W,E
User
- SSH DH
Private Key: W,E
- SSH DH Public
Key: W,E
- SSH Peer DH
Public Key: W,E
- SSH DH
Page 34 of 72
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UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Shared Secret:
W,E
- SSH ECDH
Private Key: W,E
- SSH ECDH
Public Key: W,E
- SSH Peer
ECDH Public
Key: W,E
- SSH ECDH
Shared Secret:
W,E
- SSH RSA
Private Key: W,E
- SSH RSA
Public Key: W,E
- SSH ECDSA
Private Key: W,E
- SSH ECDSA
Public Key: W,E
- SSH Session
Encryption Key:
W,E
- SSH Session
Authentication
Key: W,E
- DRBG Entropy
Input: W,E
- DRBG Seed:
W,E
- DRBG Internal
State V value:
W,E
- DRBG Key:
W,E
Page 35 of 72
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UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Run HTTPS
over TLSv1.2
Function
Execute
HTTPS over
TLSv1.2
function
Status Mode
Indicator "FIPS
is currently
enabled" and
successful
HTTPS over
TLSv1.2 log
message
Initiate
TLSv1.2 tunnel
establishment
request
Status of
TLSv1.2 tunnel
establishment
KAS-ECC-KeyGen
(TLSv1.2)
KAS-FFC-KeyGen
(TLSv1.2)
KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2)
KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2)
KTS (TLSv1.2 with
AES and HMAC)
KTS (TLSv1.2 with
AES-GCM)
RSA SigGen (SSHv2,
TLSv1.2, IKEv2)
ECDSA SigGen
(SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and
IKEv2)
RSA SigVer (SSHv2,
TLSv1.2, and IKEv2)
ECDSA SigVer
(SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and
IKEv2)
Session
Encryption/Decryption
(TLSv1.2)
Session
Authentication
(TLSv1.2)
TLSv1.2 Keying
Materials
Development
DRBG Function
Crypto Officer
- TLS DH Private
Key: W,E
- TLS DH Public
Key: W,E
- TLS Peer DH
Public Key: W,E
- TLS DH
Shared Secret:
W,E
- TLS ECDH
Private Key: W,E
- TLS ECDH
Public Key: W,E
- TLS Peer
ECDH Public
Key: W,E
- TLS ECDH
Shared Secret:
W,E
- TLS ECDSA
Private Key: W,E
- TLS ECDSA
Public Key: W,E
- TLS RSA
Private Key: W,E
- TLS RSA
Public Key: W,E
- TLS Master
Secret: W,E
- TLS Session
Encryption Key:
W,E
- TLS Session
Authentication
Page 36 of 72
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UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Key: W,E
- DRBG Entropy
Input: W,E
- DRBG Seed:
W,E
- DRBG Internal
State V value:
W,E
- DRBG Key:
W,E
User
- TLS DH Private
Key: W,E
- TLS DH Public
Key: W,E
- TLS Peer DH
Public Key: W,E
- TLS DH
Shared Secret:
W,E
- TLS ECDH
Private Key: W,E
- TLS ECDH
Public Key: W,E
- TLS Peer
ECDH Public
Key: W,E
- TLS ECDH
Shared Secret:
W,E
- TLS ECDSA
Private Key: W,E
- TLS ECDSA
Public Key: W,E
- TLS RSA
Page 37 of 72
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UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Private Key: W,E
- TLS RSA
Public Key: W,E
- TLS Master
Secret: W,E
- TLS Session
Encryption Key:
W,E
- TLS Session
Authentication
Key: W,E
- DRBG Entropy
Input: W,E
- DRBG Seed:
W,E
- DRBG Internal
State V value:
W,E
- DRBG Key:
W,E
Run
IPSec/IKEv2
Function
Execute
IPsec/IKEv2
Function
Status Mode
Indicator "FIPS
is currently
enabled" and
succesful
IPsec/IKEv2
log message
Initiate
IPsec/IKEv2
tunnel
establishment
request
Status of
IPSec/IKEv2
tunnel
establishment
KAS-ECC-KeyGen
(IKEv2)
KAS-FFC-KeyGen
(IKEv2)
KAS-ECC (IKEv2)
KAS-FFC (IKEv2)
RSA SigGen (SSHv2,
TLSv1.2, IKEv2)
ECDSA SigGen
(SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and
IKEv2)
RSA SigVer (SSHv2,
TLSv1.2, and IKEv2)
ECDSA SigVer
(SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and
Crypto Officer
- IPSec/IKE DH
Private Key: W,E
- IPSec/IKE DH
Public Key: W,E
- IPSec/IKE Peer
DH Public Key:
W,E
- IPSec/IKE DH
Shared Secret:
W,E
- IPSec/IKE
ECDH Private
Key: W,E
- IPSec/IKE
Page 38 of 72
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UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
IKEv2)
Session
Encryption/Decryption
(IPSec/IKE)
Session
Authentication
(IPSec/IKEv2)
IPSec/IKEv2 Keying
Materials
Development
DRBG Function
ECDH Public
Key: W,E
- IPSec/IKE Peer
ECDH Public
Key: W,E
- IPSec/IKE
ECDH Shared
Secret: W,E
- IPSec/IKE
ECDSA Private
Key: W,E
- IPSec/IKE
ECDSA Public
Key: W,E
- IPSec/IKE RSA
Private Key: W,E
- IPSec/IKE RSA
Public Key: W,E
- IPSec/IKE Pre-
shared Secret:
W,E
- SKEYSEED:
W,E
- IPSec/IKE
Session
Encryption Key:
W,E
- IPSec/IKE
Authentication
Key: W,E
- DRBG Entropy
Input: W,E
- DRBG Seed:
W,E
- DRBG Internal
Page 39 of 72
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UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
State V value:
W,E
- DRBG Key:
W,E
User
- IPSec/IKE DH
Private Key: W,E
- IPSec/IKE DH
Public Key: W,E
- IPSec/IKE Peer
DH Public Key:
W,E
- IPSec/IKE DH
Shared Secret:
W,E
- IPSec/IKE
ECDH Private
Key: W,E
- IPSec/IKE
ECDH Public
Key: W,E
- IPSec/IKE Peer
ECDH Public
Key: W,E
- IPSec/IKE
ECDH Shared
Secret: W,E
- IPSec/IKE
ECDSA Private
Key: W,E
- IPSec/IKE
ECDSA Public
Key: W,E
- IPSec/IKE RSA
Private Key: W,E
Page 40 of 72
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UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- IPSec/IKE RSA
Public Key: W,E
- IPSec/IKE Pre-
shared Secret:
W,E
- SKEYSEED:
W,E
- IPSec/IKE
Session
Encryption Key:
W,E
- IPSec/IKE
Authentication
Key: W,E
- DRBG Entropy
Input: W,E
- DRBG Seed:
W,E
- DRBG Internal
State V value:
W,E
- DRBG Key:
W,E
Run SNMPv3
Function
Execute
SNMPv3
Function
Status Mode
Indicator "FIPS
is currently
enabled" and
successful
SNMPv3 log
message
Initiate
SNMPv3
tunnel
establishment
request
Status of
SNMPv3
tunnel
establishment
Session
Encryption/Decryption
(SNMPv3)
Session
Authentication
(SNMPv3)
SNMPv3 Keying
Materials
Development
Crypto Officer
- SNMPv3
Shared Secret:
W,E
- SNMPv3
Encryption Key:
W,E
- SNMPv3
Authentication
Key: W,E
User
- SNMPv3
Page 41 of 72
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UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Shared Secret:
W,E
- SNMPv3
Encryption Key:
W,E
- SNMPv3
Authentication
Key: W,E
Firmware Load
Test
Execute the
Firmware Load
Test
Successful
Firmware
Loading status
message
Commands to
load new
firmware
image
Outcome of
the Firmware
Load Test
Firmware Load Test Crypto Officer
- Firmware Load
Test Key: R
Table 14: Approved Services
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Cisco Systems logo is registered trademark of Cisco Systems, Inc.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
Name Description Algorithms Role
SSHv2 Run SSHv2 using non-approved algorithms. Non-
Approved mode indicator "FIPS is currently
disabled" and successful SSHv2 log message
demonstrates the non-approved service
3DES
ChaCha20-
poly1305
Crypto
Officer,
User
TLSv1 Run TLSv1 in the non-approved mode using non-
approved algorithms. Non-Approved mode
indicator "FIPS is currently disabled" and
successful TLSv1 log message demonstrates the
non-approved service
3DES Crypto
Officer,
User
TLSv1.2 Run TLSv1.2 using non-approved algorithms. Non-
Approved mode indicator "FIPS is currently
disabled" and successful TLSv1.2 log message
demonstrates the non-approved service
3DES Crypto
Officer,
User
TLSv1.3 Run TLSv1.3 in the non-approved mode using non-
approved algorithms. Non-Approved mode
indicator "FIPS is currently disabled" and
successful TLSv1.3 log message demonstrates the
non-approved service
ChaCha20-
poly1305
Crypto
Officer,
User
IPsec/IKEv2 Run IPsec/IKEv2 using non-approved algorithms.
Non-Approved mode indicator "FIPS is currently
disabled" and successful IPsec/IKEv2 log message
demonstrates the non-approved service
3DES Crypto
Officer,
User
SNMPv3 Run SNMPv3 using non-approved algorithms.
Non-Approved mode indicator "FIPS is currently
disabled" and successful SNMPv3 log message
demonstrates the non-approved service
3DES Crypto
Officer,
User
Table 15: Non-Approved Services
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module supports the firmware load test by using HMAC-SHA2-512 (HMAC Cert. #A4446)
for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module. A Firmware Load Test Key was
preloaded to the module’s binary at the factory and used for firmware load test. In order to load
new firmware, the Crypto Officer must authenticate to the module before loading the firmware.
This ensures that unauthorized access and use of the module is not performed. The module will
load the new update upon reboot. The update attempt will be rejected if the verification fails.
Any firmware loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate, is out of the
scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.
4.6 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status
The module implements Self-initiated cryptographic output capability without external operator
request. The Crypto Officer shall configure self-initiated cryptographic output capability. Prior to
Page 43 of 72
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UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
executing the self-initiated cryptographic output capability, the module conducts two
independent internal actions to activate the capability to prevent the inadvertent output due to a
single error.
4.7 Additional Information
The module supports unauthenticated service. The unauthenticated operator can trigger the
self-test service by power-cycling the module.
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The module is provided in the form of binary executable code. To ensure firmware security, the
module is protected by RSA 2048 bits with SHA2-512 (RSA Cert. #A4446) algorithm. A
Firmware Integrity Test Key (non-SSP) was preloaded to the module’s binary at the factory and
used for firmware integrity test only at the pre-operational self-test. The module uses the RSA
2048 bits modulus public key to verify the digital signature. If the firmware integrity test fails, the
module would enter to an Error state with all crypto functionality inhibited.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
Integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed
at power-on. The operator can power-cycle or reboot the tested platform to initiate the firmware
integrity test on-demand.
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
Mechanism Inspection
Frequency
Inspection
Guidance
Production-grade components with standard passivation N/A N/A
Table 16: Mechanisms and Actions Required
8 Non-Invasive Security
N/A for this module.
Page 44 of 72
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UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
DRAM Volatile Memory Dynamic
Flash Non-Volatile Memory Static
Table 17: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distributio
n Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorith
m
Peer Public Key
Input
External
(Outside
of the
Module's
Boundary
)
Module Plaintext Automated Electroni
c
Module Public
Key Output
Module External
(Outside
of the
Module's
Boundary
)
Plaintext Automated Electroni
c
Password/Secre
t Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
AES and HMAC
External
(Outside
of the
Module's
Boundary
)
Module Encrypte
d
Automated Electroni
c
KTS
(SSHv2
with AES
and
HMAC)
Password/Secre
t Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
External
(Outside
of the
Module's
Boundary
)
Module Encrypte
d
Automated Electroni
c
KTS
(SSHv2
with AES-
GCM)
Password/Secre
t Input via
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES and HMAC
External
(Outside
of the
Module's
Boundary
)
Module Encrypte
d
Automated Electroni
c
KTS
(TLSv1.2
with AES
and
HMAC)
Password/Secre
t Input via
External
(Outside
Module Encrypte
d
Automated Electroni
c
KTS
(TLSv1.2
Page 45 of 72
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UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name From To Format
Type
Distributio
n Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorith
m
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
of the
Module's
Boundary
)
with AES-
GCM)
Table 18: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Zeroization
Command
CO issues
zeroization
service
The zeroization command will
erase all SSPs stored in the
DRAM or in the Flash of the
module.
'erase secure
security_module 1'
command
Session
termination
Zeroization upon
session
termination
Session termination will
automatically zeroize all
session based temporary SSPs
Terminate session
Reboot Zeroization upon
rebooting the
module
Reboot to zeroize all temporary
SSPs stored in Module's DRAM
Reboot
Table 19: SSP Zeroization Methods
Please note that the Firmware Load Test Key is only used for Firmware Load Test
Authentication and not subject to the zeroization requirement.
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9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
DRBG Entropy
Input
Used to seed the
DRBG
384 bits - at
least 256 bits
Entropy Input -
CSP
DRBG Function
DRBG Seed Used in DRBG
Generation
384 bits -
384 bits
DRBG Seed -
CSP
DRBG Function
DRBG Internal
State V value
Used in DRBG
Generation
128 bits -
128 bits
DRBG Internal
State V value -
CSP
DRBG Function
DRBG Key Used in DRBG
Generation
256 bits -
256 bits
DRBG Key -
CSP
DRBG Function
User Password User authentication 8-30
Characters -
8-30
Characters
Password
Hashes - CSP
Crypto Officer
Password
Crypto Officer
authentication
8-30
Characters -
8-30
Characters
Password
Hashes - CSP
Firmware Load
Test Key
Used for Firmware
Load Test
512 bits -
512 bits
HMAC Key -
CSP
Firmware Load Test
SSH DH
Private Key
Used to derive the
SSH DH Shared
Secret
MODP-2048,
MODP-3072,
MODP-4096
- 112-152
bits
Private Key -
CSP
KAS-FFC-
KeyGen
(SSHv2)
KAS-FFC (SSHv2)
SSH DH Public
Key
Used to derive SSH
DH Shared Secret
MODP-2048,
MODP-3072,
MODP-4096
- 112-152
bits
Public Key -
PSP
KAS-FFC-
KeyGen
(SSHv2)
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UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
SSH Peer DH
Public Key
Used to derive SSH
DH Shared Secret
MODP-2048,
MODP-3072,
MODP-4096
- 112-152
bits
Public Key -
PSP
KAS-FFC (SSHv2)
SSH DH
Shared Secret
Used to derive SSH
Session Encryption
Keys, SSH Session
Authentication Keys
MODP-2048,
MODP-3072,
MODP-4096
- 112-152
bits
Shared Secret
- CSP
KAS-FFC
(SSHv2)
SSHv2 Keying
Materials Development
SSH ECDH
Private Key
Used to derive the
SSH ECDH Shared
Secret
Curves: 256,
384, 521 bits
- 128 to 256
bits
Private Key -
CSP
KAS-ECC-
KeyGen
(SSHv2)
KAS-ECC (SSHv2)
SSH ECDH
Public Key
Used to derive SSH
ECDHE Shared
Secret
Curves: 256,
384, 521 bits
- 128-256
bits
Public Key -
PSP
KAS-ECC-
KeyGen
(SSHv2)
SSH Peer
ECDH Public
Key
Used to derive SSH
DH Shared Secret
Curves: 256,
384, 521 bits
- 128 to 256
bits
Public Key -
PSP
KAS-ECC (SSHv2)
SSH ECDH
Shared Secret
Used to derive SSH
Session Encryption
Keys, SSH Session
Authentication Keys
Curves: 256,
384, 521 bits
- 128 to 256
bits
Shared Secret
- CSP
KAS-ECC
(SSHv2)
SSHv2 Keying
Materials Development
SSH RSA
Private Key
Used for SSH
session
authentication
Modulus
2048 and
3072 bits -
112-128 bits
Private Key -
CSP
RSA
KeyGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
IKEv2)
RSA SigGen (SSHv2,
TLSv1.2, IKEv2)
SSH RSA
Public Key
Used for SSH
sessions
aiuthentication
Modulus
2048 and
Public Key -
PSP
RSA KeyGen
(SSHv2,
Page 48 of 72
© 2021-2026 Cisco Systems, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
3072 bits -
112-128 bits
TLSv1.2,
IKEv2)
SSH ECDSA
Private Key
Used for SSH
session
authentication
Curves: 256,
384, 521 bits
- 128 to 256
bits
Private Key -
CSP
ECDSA
KeyGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2 and
IKEv2)
ECDSA SigGen
(SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and
IKEv2)
SSH ECDSA
Public Key
Used for SSH
sessions
aiuthentication
Curves: 256,
384, 521 bits
- 128 to 256
bits
Public Key -
PSP
ECDSA
KeyGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2 and
IKEv2)
SSH Session
Encryption Key
Used for SSH
Session
confidentiality
protection
128-256 bits
- 128-256
bits
Session Key -
CSP
SSHv2 Keying
Materials
Development
Session
Encryption/Decryption
(SSHv2)
SSH Session
Authentication
Key
Used for SSH
Session integrity
protection
At least 160
bits - At least
160 bits
Session Key -
CSP
SSHv2 Keying
Materials
Development
Session Authentication
(SSHv2)
TLS DH
Private Key
Used to Derive TLS
DH Shared Secret
ffdhe2048 -
112 bits
Private Key -
CSP
KAS-FFC-
KeyGen
(TLSv1.2)
KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2)
TLS DH Public
Key
Used to Derive TLS
DH Shared Secret
ffdhe2048 -
112 bits
Public Key -
PSP
KAS-FFC-
KeyGen
(TLSv1.2)
TLS Peer DH
Public Key
Used to derive TLS
DH Shared Secret
ffdhe2048 -
112 bits
Public Key -
PSP
KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2)
TLS DH
Shared Secret
This CSP is also
referred to TLS pre-
master secret if
Diffie-Hellman is
used for TLS key
agreement. This CSP
is used for TLS
ffdhe2048 -
112 bits
Shared Secret
- CSP
KAS-FFC
(TLSv1.2)
TLSv1.2 Keying
Materials Development
Page 49 of 72
© 2021-2026 Cisco Systems, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
master secret
derivation
TLS ECDH
Private Key
Used to Derive TLS
ECDH Shared Secret
Curves P-
256, P-384,
and P-521 -
128-256 bits
Private Key -
CSP
KAS-ECC-
KeyGen
(TLSv1.2)
KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2)
TLS ECDH
Public Key
Used to Derive TS
ECDH Shared Secret
Curves P-
256, P-384,
and P-521 -
128-256 bits
Public Key -
PSP
KAS-ECC-
KeyGen
(TLSv1.2)
TLS Peer
ECDH Public
Key
Used to derive IKE
ECDH Shared Secret
Curves: P-
256, P-384,
P-521 - 128-
256 bits
Public Key -
PSP
KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2)
TLS ECDH
Shared Secret
This CSP is also
referred to TLS pre-
master secret if EC
Diffie-Hellman is
used for TLS key
agreement. This CSP
is used for TLS
master secret
derivation
Curves p-
256, P-384,
P-521 - 128-
256 bits
Shared Secret
- CSP
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.2)
TLSv1.2 Keying
Materials Development
TLS ECDSA
Private Key
Used to support CO
and Admin HTTPS
interfaces
Curves P-
256, P-384,
P-521 - 128-
256 bits
Private Key -
CSP
ECDSA
KeyGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2 and
IKEv2)
ECDSA SigGen
(SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and
IKEv2)
TLS ECDSA
Public Key
Used to support CO
and User HTTPS
Interfaces
Curves P-
256, P-384,
P-521 - 128-
256 bits
Public Key -
PSP
ECDSA
KeyGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2 and
IKEv2)
Page 50 of 72
© 2021-2026 Cisco Systems, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
TLS RSA
Private Key
Used to support CO
and Admin HTTPS
Interfaces
Modulus
2048 and
3072 bits -
112-128 bits
Private Key -
CSP
RSA
KeyGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
IKEv2)
RSA SigGen (SSHv2,
TLSv1.2, IKEv2)
TLS RSA
Public Key
Used to support CO
and User HTTPS
interfaces
Modulus
2048 and
3072 bits -
112-128 bits
Public Key -
PSP
RSA KeyGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
IKEv2)
TLS Master
Secret
Used to protect
HTTPS Session. Pre-
master secret
At least 112
bits - At least
112 bits
Master Secret
- CSP
TLSv1.2
Keying
Materials
Development
TLSv1.2 Keying
Materials Development
TLS Session
Encryption Key
Used to protect
HTTPS Session. TLS
Master secret
128-256 bits
- 128-256
bits
Session Key -
CSP
TLSv1.2
Keying
Materials
Development
Session
Encryption/Decryption
(TLSv1.2)
TLS Session
Authentication
Key
Used to protect
HTTPS Session. TLS
master secret
at least 112
bits - at least
112 bits
Session Key -
CSP
TLSv1.2
Keying
Materials
Development
Session Authentication
(TLSv1.2)
IPSec/IKE DH
Private Key
Used to derive
IPSec/IKE DH
Shared Secret
MODP-2048,
MODP-3072,
MODP-4096
- 112-152
bits
Private Key -
CSP
KAS-FFC-
KeyGen
(IKEv2)
KAS-FFC (IKEv2)
IPSec/IKE DH
Public Key
Used to derive
IPSec/IKE DH
Shared Secret
MODP-2048,
MODP-3072,
MODP-4096
- 112-152
bits
Public Key -
PSP
KAS-FFC-
KeyGen
(IKEv2)
IPSec/IKE
Peer DH
Public Key
Used to derive
IPSec/IKE DH
Shared Secret
MODP-2048,
MODP-3072,
MODP-4096
Public Key -
PSP
KAS-FFC (IKEv2)
Page 51 of 72
© 2021-2026 Cisco Systems, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
- 112-152
bits
IPSec/IKE DH
Shared Secret
Used to derive
IPSec/IKE Session
Encryption Keys,
IPSec/IKE
Authentication Keys
MODP-2048,
MODP-3072,
MODP-4096
- 112-152
bits
Shared Secret
- CSP
KAS-FFC
(IKEv2)
IPSec/IKEv2 Keying
Materials Development
IPSec/IKE
ECDH Private
Key
Used to derive
IPSec/IKE ECDH
Shared Secrets
Curves P-
256, P-384,
P-521 - 128-
256 bits
Private Key -
CSP
KAS-ECC-
KeyGen
(IKEv2)
KAS-ECC (IKEv2)
IPSec/IKE
ECDH Public
Key
Used to derive
IPSec/IKE ECDH
Shared Secrets
Curves P-
256, P-384,
P-521 - 128-
256 bits
Public Key -
PSP
KAS-ECC-
KeyGen
(IKEv2)
IPSec/IKE
Peer ECDH
Public Key
Used to derive
IPSec/IKE ECDH
Shared Secrets
Curves P-
256, P-384,
P-521 - 128-
256 bits
Public Key -
PSP
KAS-ECC (IKEv2)
IPSec/IKE
ECDH Shared
Secret
Used to derive
IPSec/IKE ECDH
Shared Secrets
Curves P-
256, P-384,
P-521 - 128-
256 bits
Shared Secret
- CSP
KAS-ECC
(IKEv2)
IPSec/IKEv2 Keying
Materials Development
IPSec/IKE
ECDSA
Private Key
Used for IPSec/IKE
peer authentication
Curves P-
256, P-384,
P-521 - 128-
256 bits
Private Key -
CSP
ECDSA
KeyGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2 and
IKEv2)
ECDSA SigGen
(SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and
IKEv2)
IPSec/IKE
ECDSA Public
Key
Used for IPSec/IKE
peer authentication
Curves P-
256, P-384,
P-521 - 128-
256 bits
Public Key -
PSP
ECDSA
KeyGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2 and
IKEv2)
Page 52 of 72
© 2021-2026 Cisco Systems, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
IPSec/IKE
RSA Private
Key
Used for IPSec/IKE
peer authentication
Modulus
2048 or 3072
- 112 or 128
bits
Private Key -
CSP
RSA
KeyGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
IKEv2)
RSA SigGen (SSHv2,
TLSv1.2, IKEv2)
IPSec/IKE
RSA Public
Key
Used for IPSec/IKE
peer authentication
Modulus
2048 or 3072
- 112 or 128
bits
Public Key -
PSP
RSA KeyGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
IKEv2)
IPSec/IKE Pre-
shared Secret
Used for IPSec/IKE
peer authentication
16-32 bytes
characters -
16-32 bytes
characters
shared secret -
CSP
SKEYSEED Keying material used
to derive the
IPSec/IKE Session
Encryption Key and
IPSec/IKE
Authentication Key
160 bits -
160 bits
Keying
Material - CSP
IPSec/IKEv2
Keying
Materials
Development
Session Authentication
(IPSec/IKEv2)
Session
Encryption/Decryption
(IPSec/IKE)
IPSec/IKE
Session
Encryption Key
Used to secure
IPSec/IKEv2 session
confidentiality
128-256 bits
- 128-256
bits
Session Key -
CSP
IPSec/IKEv2
Keying
Materials
Development
Session
Encryption/Decryption
(IPSec/IKE)
IPSec/IKE
Authentication
Key
Used to secure
IPSec/IKEv2 session
integrity
at least 160
bits - at least
160 bits
Session Key -
CSP
IPSec/IKEv2
Keying
Materials
Development
Session Authentication
(IPSec/IKEv2)
SNMPv3
Shared Secret
Used for SNMPv3
user authentication
8-32
characters -
N/A
Authentication
Secret - CSP
SNMPv3
Encryption Key
Used to protect
SNMPv3 traffic
confidentiality
128 bits -
128 bits
Encryption Key
- CSP
SNMPv3
Keying
Materials
Development
Session
Encryption/Decryption
(SNMPv3)
Page 53 of 72
© 2021-2026 Cisco Systems, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
SNMPv3
Authentication
Key
Used to secure
SNMPv3 traffic
integrity
At least 112
bits - At least
112 bits
Authentication
Key - CSP
SNMPv3
Keying
Materials
Development
Session Authentication
(SNMPv3)
Table 20: SSP Table 1
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
DRBG Entropy
Input
DRAM:Plaintext Until Reboot Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
DRBG Seed:Used With
DRBG Internal State V
value:Used With
DRBG Key:Used With
DRBG Seed DRAM:Plaintext Until Reboot Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
DRBG Entropy
Input:Used With
DRBG Internal State V
value:Used With
DRBG Key:Used With
DRBG Internal
State V value
DRAM:Plaintext Until Reboot Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
DRBG Entropy
Input:Used With
DRBG Seed:Used With
DRBG Key:Used With
DRBG Key DRAM:Plaintext Until Reboot Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
DRBG Entropy
Input:Used With
DRBG Seed:Used With
DRBG Internal State V
value:Used With
User Password Password/Secret Input via
TLSv1.2 encrypted by
AES-GCM
Password/Secret Input via
TLSv1.2 encrypted by AES
Flash:Encrypted Zeroization
Command
Page 54 of 72
© 2021-2026 Cisco Systems, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
and HMAC
Password/Secret Input via
SSHv2 encrypted by AES-
GCM
Password/Secret Input via
SSHv2 encrypted by AES
and HMAC
Crypto Officer
Password
Password/Secret Input via
TLSv1.2 encrypted by
AES-GCM
Password/Secret Input via
TLSv1.2 encrypted by AES
and HMAC
Password/Secret Input via
SSHv2 encrypted by AES-
GCM
Password/Secret Input via
SSHv2 encrypted by AES
and HMAC
Flash:Encrypted Zeroization
Command
Firmware Load
Test Key
Flash:Plaintext N/A
SSH DH Private
Key
DRAM:Plaintext While SSH
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
SSH DH Public
Key:Paired With
SSH Peer DH Public
Key:Used With
SSH DH Public
Key
Module Public Key Output DRAM:Plaintext While SSH
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
SSH DH Private
Key:Paired With
SSH Peer DH
Public Key
Peer Public Key Input DRAM:Plaintext While SSH
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
SSH DH Private
Key:Used With
Page 55 of 72
© 2021-2026 Cisco Systems, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
termination
Reboot
SSH DH Shared
Secret
DRAM:Plaintext While SSH
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
SSH DH Private
Key:Derived From
SSH DH Public
Key:Derived From
SSH ECDH
Private Key
DRAM:Plaintext While SSH
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
SSH ECDH Public
Key:Paired With
SSH Peer ECDH Public
Key:Used With
SSH ECDH Public
Key
Module Public Key Output DRAM:Plaintext While SSH
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
SSH ECDH Private
Key:Paired With
SSH Peer ECDH
Public Key
Peer Public Key Input DRAM:Plaintext While SSH
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
SSH ECDH Private
Key:Used With
SSH ECDH
Shared Secret
DRAM:Plaintext While SSH
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
SSH ECDH Private
Key:Derived From
SSH ECDH Public
Key:Derived From
SSH RSA Private
Key
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Command
SSH RSA Public
Key:Paired With
SSH RSA Public
Key
Module Public Key Output Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Command
SSH RSA Private
Key:Paired With
SSH ECDSA
Private Key
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Command
SSH ECDSA Public
Key:Paired With
Page 56 of 72
© 2021-2026 Cisco Systems, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
SSH ECDSA
Public Key
Module Public Key Output Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Command
SSH ECDSA Private
Key:Paired With
SSH Session
Encryption Key
DRAM:Plaintext While SSH
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
SSH Session
Authentication Key:Used
With
SSH Session
Authentication
Key
DRAM:Plaintext While SSH
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
SSH Session Encryption
Key:Used With
TLS DH Private
Key
DRAM:Plaintext While TLS
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
TLS DH Public
Key:Paired With
TLS Peer DH Public
Key:Used With
TLS DH Public
Key
Module Public Key Output DRAM:Plaintext While TLS
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
TLS DH Private
Key:Paired With
TLS Peer DH
Public Key
Peer Public Key Input DRAM:Plaintext while TLS
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
TLS DH Private Key:Used
With
TLS DH Shared
Secret
DRAM:Plaintext While TLS
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
TLS ECDH Private
Key:Derived From
TLS Peer ECDH Public
Key:Derived From
TLS ECDH
Private Key
DRAM:Plaintext While TLS
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
TLS ECDH Public
Key:Paired With
Page 57 of 72
© 2021-2026 Cisco Systems, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Session
termination
Reboot
TLS Peer ECDH Public
Key:Used With
TLS ECDH Public
Key
Module Public Key Output DRAM:Plaintext While TLS
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
TLS ECDH Private
Key:Paired With
TLS Peer ECDH
Public Key
Peer Public Key Input DRAM:Plaintext while TLS
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
TLS ECDH Private
Key:Used With
TLS ECDH
Shared Secret
DRAM:Plaintext While TLS
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
TLS ECDH Private
Key:Derived From
TLS Peer ECDH Public
Key:Derived From
TLS ECDSA
Private Key
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Command
TLS ECDSA Public
Key:Paired With
TLS ECDSA
Public Key
Module Public Key Output Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Command
TLS ECDSA Private
Key:Paired With
TLS RSA Private
Key
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Command
TLS RSA Public
Key:Paired With
TLS RSA Public
Key
Module Public Key Output Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Command
TLS RSA Private
Key:Paired With
TLS Master
Secret
DRAM:Plaintext While TLS
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
TLS ECDH Shared
Secret:Derived From
TLS Session
Encryption Key
DRAM:Plaintext While TLS
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
TLS Session
Authentication Key:Used
With
Page 58 of 72
© 2021-2026 Cisco Systems, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
termination
Reboot
TLS Session
Authentication
Key
DRAM:Plaintext While TLS
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
TLS Session Encryption
Key:Used With
IPSec/IKE DH
Private Key
DRAM:Plaintext While
IPSec/IKEv2
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
IPSec/IKE DH Public
Key:Paired With
IPSec/IKE Peer DH
Public Key:Used With
IPSec/IKE DH
Public Key
Module Public Key Output DRAM:Plaintext While
IPSec/IKEv2
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
IPSec/IKE DH Private
Key:Paired With
IPSec/IKE Peer
DH Public Key
Peer Public Key Input DRAM:Plaintext while IPSec/IKE
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
IPsec/IKE DH Private
Key:Used With
IPSec/IKE DH
Shared Secret
DRAM:Plaintext While
IPSec/IKEv2
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
SKEYSEED:Used With
IPSec/IKE ECDH
Private Key
DRAM:Plaintext While
IPSec/IKEv2
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
IPSec/IKE ECDH Public
Key:Paired With
IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH
Public Key:Used With
Page 59 of 72
© 2021-2026 Cisco Systems, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
IPSec/IKE ECDH
Public Key
Module Public Key Output DRAM:Plaintext While
IPSec/IKEv2
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
IPSec/IKE ECDH Private
Key:Paired With
IPSec/IKE Peer
ECDH Public Key
Peer Public Key Input DRAM:Plaintext While
IPSec/IKEv2
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
IPSec/IKE ECDH Private
Key:Used With
IPSec/IKE ECDH
Shared Secret
DRAM:Plaintext While
IPSec/IKEv2
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
SKEYSEED:Used With
IPSec/IKE ECDSA
Private Key
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Command
IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public
Key:Paired With
IPSec/IKE ECDSA
Public Key
Module Public Key Output Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Command
IPSec/IKE ECDSA
Private Key:Paired With
IPSec/IKE RSA
Private Key
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Command
IPSec/IKE RSA Public
Key:Paired With
IPSec/IKE RSA
Public Key
Module Public Key Output Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Command
IPSec/IKE RSA Private
Key:Paired With
IPSec/IKE Pre-
shared Secret
Password/Secret Input via
SSHv2 encrypted by AES
and HMAC
Password/Secret Input via
SSHv2 encrypted by AES-
GCM
Password/Secret Input via
TLSv1.2 encrypted by AES
and HMAC
Password/Secret Input via
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Command
SKEYSEED:Derived to
Page 60 of 72
© 2021-2026 Cisco Systems, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
TLSv1.2 encrypted by
AES-GCM
SKEYSEED DRAM:Plaintext While
IPSec/IKEv2
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
IPSec/IKE DH Shared
Secret:Derived From
IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared
Secret:Derived From
IPSec/IKE Pre-shared
Secret:Derived From
IPSec/IKE
Session
Encryption Key
DRAM:Plaintext While
IPSec/IKEv2
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
IPSec/IKE DH Shared
Secret:Derived From
IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared
Secret:Derived From
IPSec/IKE
Authentication
Key
DRAM:Plaintext While
IPSec/IKEv2
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
IPSec/IKE DH Shared
Secret:Derived From
IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared
Secret:Derived From
SNMPv3 Shared
Secret
Password/Secret Input via
TLSv1.2 encrypted by
AES-GCM
Password/Secret Input via
TLSv1.2 encrypted by AES
and HMAC
Password/Secret Input via
SSHv2 encrypted by AES-
GCM
Password/Secret Input via
SSHv2 encrypted by AES
and HMAC
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Command
SNMPv3 Encryption
Key:Derive To
SNMPv3 Authentication
Key:Derive To
SNMPv3
Encryption Key
DRAM:Plaintext While SNMPv3
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
SNMPv3 Shared
Secret:Derived From
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Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
termination
Reboot
SNMPv3
Authentication
Key
DRAM:Plaintext While SNMPv3
tunnel is on
Zeroization
Command
Session
termination
Reboot
SNMPv3 Shared
Secret:Derived From
SNMPv3 Encryption
Key:Used With
Table 21: SSP Table 2
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9.5 Transitions
• SHA-1: The module includes an implementation of SHA-1 for hashing and digital
signature verification. This implementation will be non-Approved for all uses starting
January 1, 2031
• FIPS 186-4/186-5: As of February 5, 2024, the CMVP does not accept module
submissions that implement DSA or RSA X9.31 in the approved mode, other than for
signature verification which is approved for legacy use. This module does not implement
DSA or RSA X9.31 for signature generation and therefore is unaffected by the current
transition from 186-4 to 186-5. As detailed in section 2.7, the CAVP testing performed on
the 186-4 algorithms is mathematically similar to the testing performed on the 186-5
algorithms and therefore this module claims compliance with 186-5. This means that no
timeline exists in which any of the implemented algorithms will transition from approved
to non-approved.
• 112-bit strength: The module includes an implementation of DH (MODP-2048 &
ffdhe2048) for shared secret computation and RSA (2048-bit key) for key generation,
digital signature generation and verification. This implementation will be non-Approved
for all uses starting January 1, 2030.
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test Method Test
Type
Indicator Details
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A4446)
RSA SigVer 2048
bits with SHA2-
512
RSA signature
verification
SW/FW
Integrity
Module is in
normal state
RSA
SigVer
Table 22: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The module performs the following self-tests, including the pre-operational self-tests and
Conditional self-tests. Prior to the module providing any data output via the data output
interface, the module performs and passes the pre-operational self-tests. Following the
successful pre-operational self-tests, the module executes the Conditional Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-tests (CASTs). If anyone of the self-tests fails, the module transitions into an
error state and outputs the error message via the module’s status output interface. While
the module is in the error state, all data through the data output interface and all
cryptographic operations are disabled. The error state can only be cleared by reloading the
module. All self-tests must be completed successfully before the module transitions to the
operational state.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
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Algorithm or Test Test
Properti
es
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicat
or
Details Conditio
ns
AES-CBC Encrypt KAT
(A4446)
256 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Encrypt Power Up
AES-CBC Decrypt KAT
(A4446)
256 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Decrypt Power Up
AES-GCM Authenticated
Encrypt KAT (A4446)
256 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Authenticat
ed Encrypt
Power Up
AES-GCM Authenticated
Decrypt KAT (A4446)
256 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Authenticat
ed Decrypt
Power Up
Counter DRBG
Instantiate/Generate/Res
eed KAT (A4446)
AES-128 KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Instantiate,
Generate,
and Reseed
KATs
Power Up
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4) KAT
(A4446)
P-256
curve
with
SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
ECDSA
SigGen
KAT
Power Up
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4) KAT
(A4446)
P-256
curve
with
SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
ECDSA
SigVer KAT
Power Up
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
(A4446)
SHA-1 KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
HMAC-
SHA-1
Power Up
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
(A4446)
SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
HMAC-
SHA2-256
Power Up
HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT
(A4446)
SHA2-
384
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
HMAC-
SHA2-384
Power Up
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
(A4446)
SHA2-
512
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
HMAC-
SHA2-512
Power Up
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Algorithm or Test Test
Properti
es
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicat
or
Details Conditio
ns
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 KAT (A4446)
P-256
Curve
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Primitive Z
KAT
Power Up
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 KAT (A4446)
MODP-
2048
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Primitive Z
KAT
Power Up
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-
4) KAT (A4446)
2048 bit
modulus
with
SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
RSA
SigGen
KAT
Power Up
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)
KAT (A4446)
2048 bit
modulus
with
SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
RSA SigVer
KAT
Power Up
KDF IKEv2 KAT (A4446) N/A KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power Up
KDF SNMP KAT (A4446) N/A KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power Up
KDF SSH KAT (A4446) N/A KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power Up
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627
KAT (A4446)
N/A KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power Up
SHA-1 KAT (A4446) N/A KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power Up
AES-CBC Encrypt KAT
(C1026)
128 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Encrypt
KAT
Power Up
AES-CBC Decrypt KAT
(C1026)
128 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Decrypt
KAT
Power Up
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Algorithm or Test Test
Properti
es
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicat
or
Details Conditio
ns
AES-GCM Authenticated
Encrypt KAT (C1026)
128 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Encrypt
KAT
Power Up
AES-GCM Authenticated
Decrypt KAT (C1026)
128 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Decrypt
KAT
Power Up
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
(C1026)
SHA-1 KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
HMAC-
SHA-1
Power Up
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
(C1026)
SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
HMAC-
SHA2-256
Power Up
HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT
(C1026)
SHA2-
384
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
HMAC-
SHA2-384
Power Up
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
(C1026)
SHA2-
512
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
HMAC-
SHA2-512
Power Up
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4) PCT
(A4446)
Curve P-
256 with
SHA2-
256
PCT PCT Module
is in
normal
state
ECDSA Performs
all
required
pair-wise
consisten
cy tests
on the
newly
generated
key pairs
before the
first
operation
al use.
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-
4) PCT (A4446)
2048 bit
Modulus
PCT PCT Module
is in
normal
state
RSA Performs
all
required
pair-wise
consisten
cy tests
on the
newly
generated
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Algorithm or Test Test
Properti
es
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicat
or
Details Conditio
ns
key pairs
before the
first
operation
al use.
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 PCT (A4446)
Curve P-
256 with
SHA2-
256
PCT PCT Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Performs
all
required
pair-wise
consisten
cy tests
on the
newly
generated
key pairs
before the
first
operation
al use.
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 PCT (A4446)
MODP-
2048
PCT PCT Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Performs
all
required
pair-wise
consisten
cy tests
on the
newly
generated
key pairs
before the
first
operation
al use.
Firmware Load Test HMAC-
SHA2-
512
KAT SW/F
W
Load
Module
is in
normal
state
N/A When
firmware
has been
uploaded
to the
module
Entropy 90B Start-up
Repetition Count Test
(RCT)
Repetitio
n Count
Test
RCT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Designed to
quickly
detect
catastrophic
failures that
cause the
noise
source to
Power up
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Algorithm or Test Test
Properti
es
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicat
or
Details Conditio
ns
become
"stuck" on a
single
output value
for a long
period of
time
Entropy 90B Start-up
Adaptive Proportion Test
(APT)
Adaptive
Proportio
n Test
APT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Designed to
detect a
large loss of
entropy that
might occur
as a result
of some
physical
failure or
environment
al change
affecting the
noise
source
Power up
Entropy 90B Continuous
Repetition Count Test
(RCT)
Repetitio
n Count
Test
RCT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Designed to
quickly
detect
catastrophic
failures that
cause the
noise
source to
become
"stuck" on a
single
output value
for a long
period of
time
Power up
Entropy 90B Continuous
Adaptive Proportion Test
(APT)
Adaptive
Proportio
n Test
APT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Designed to
detect a
large loss of
entropy that
might occur
as a result
of some
physical
failure or
environment
al change
Power up
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Algorithm or Test Test
Properti
es
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicat
or
Details Conditio
ns
affecting the
noise
source
Table 23: Conditional Self-Tests
The module performs on-demand self-tests initiated by the operator, by powering off and
powering the module back on. The full suite of self-tests is then executed. The same procedure
may be employed by the operator to perform periodic self-tests.
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A4446)
RSA signature
verification
SW/FW Integrity Recommend 60
Days
Reboot
Table 24: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-CBC Encrypt KAT
(A4446)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
AES-CBC Decrypt KAT
(A4446)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
AES-GCM Authenticated
Encrypt KAT (A4446)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
AES-GCM Authenticated
Decrypt KAT (A4446)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
Counter DRBG
Instantiate/Generate/Reseed
KAT (A4446)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)
KAT (A4446)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)
KAT (A4446)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
(A4446)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT
(A4446)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
(A4446)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 KAT (A4446)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 KAT (A4446)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)
KAT (A4446)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)
KAT (A4446)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
KDF IKEv2 KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
KDF SNMP KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
KDF SSH KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627
KAT (A4446)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
SHA-1 KAT (A4446) KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
AES-CBC Encrypt KAT
(C1026)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
AES-CBC Decrypt KAT
(C1026)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
AES-GCM Authenticated
Encrypt KAT (C1026)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
AES-GCM Authenticated
Decrypt KAT (C1026)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT (C1026) KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
(C1026)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT
(C1026)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
(C1026)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-
4) PCT (A4446)
PCT PCT Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)
PCT (A4446)
PCT PCT Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 PCT (A4446)
PCT PCT Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 PCT (A4446)
PCT PCT Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
Firmware Load Test KAT SW/FW Load N/A N/A
Entropy 90B Start-up
Repetition Count Test (RCT)
RCT CAST N/A N/A
Entropy 90B Start-up
Adaptive Proportion Test
(APT)
APT CAST N/A N/A
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
Entropy 90B Continuous
Repetition Count Test (RCT)
RCT CAST N/A N/A
Entropy 90B Continuous
Adaptive Proportion Test
(APT)
APT CAST N/A N/A
Table 25: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Error
State
If self-test tests fail, the module is
put into an error state
Self-test
failure
Reboot the
module
System
Halt
Table 26: Error States
If any of the above-mentioned self-tests fail, the module reports the error and enters the Error
state. In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited.
The only method to recover from the error state is to reboot the module and perform the self-
tests, including the pre-operational firmware integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The
module will only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre-operational
firmware integrity test and the conditional CASTs.
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
The validated module firmware was installed onto the respective test platforms listed in Table 2
above. Any firmware loaded into the module that is not shown on the module certificate, is out of
scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. The Crypto Officer must
configure and enforce the following initialization steps.
Secure Installation
The Crypto Officer must ensure that:
• The module is installed in a secure physical location.
• Physical access to the module is restricted to authorized personnel only.
Approved Mode of Operation:
Step 1: Log in with the default username admin and the password Admin123.
Step 2: The first time you log in to the Module, you are prompted to accept the End User
License Agreement (EULA) and to change the admin password. You will be prompted
with the CLI setup wizard.
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See the following guidelines:
• Do you want to configure IPv4? and/or Do you want to configure IPv6?
Enter y for at least one of these types of addresses.
• Enter the IPv4 default gateway for the management
interface and/or Enter the IPv6 gateway for the management interface
Set a gateway IP address for Management 1/1 on the management network.
• Manage the device locally? Enter no to use the Firepower Management
Center (FMC).
Step 3: Register the module into Firepower Management Center (FMC) for the further
configuration.
> configure manager add {hostname | IPv4 address | IPv6 address}
{registration key}
Step 4: From the Firepower Management Center (FMC), navigate to Devices > Device
Management and from the “Add” drop-down, choose Device.
Set the following parameters:
• Host: Enter the IP address or hostname of the Firewall Threat Defense you
want to add.
• Display Name: Enter the name for the Firewall Threat Defense as you want it
to display in the Firewall Management Center.
• Registration Key: Enter the same registration key that you specified in
the Firewall Threat Defense initial configuration in step 4 above.
• Domain: Assign the device to a leaf domain if you have a multidomain
environment.
• Group: Assign it to a device group if you are using groups.
• Access Control Policy: Choose an initial policy.
Click Register, and confirm successful registration. If the registration succeeds, the
device is added to the list. If it fails, you will see an error message.
Step 5: From the Firepower Management Center (FMC), navigate to Device > Platform,
select New Policy and choose Threat Defense Settings. Name the new Policy, and
select the FTD from the “Available Devices” list and click Add to Policy.
Then from the sidebar select UCAPL/CC Compliance in the dropdown choose CC
option and save. This sets the mode of operation to the Approved Mode.
Step 6: Reboot the module.
> reboot
Step 7: Check the Module’s name, version and approved service status by using the
following commands:
Output the modules name/version:
> show version
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Output the modules approved mode of operation status:
> show fips
FIPS is currently enabled.
Note: This will enforce the module to only use the approved algorithms and services
described in this Security Policy. The module cannot output “FIPS is currently enabled” if
the module is not in the “Approved Mode.
Non-Approved Mode of Operation:
To change the mode of operation to the “Non-Approved” mode (which is not recommended
by Cisco) the Crypto Officer must completely reinstall the firmware for the module and not
select “CC” compliance.
Note: This will remove the entire configuration and zeroize all SSPs.
Once the module is reinstalled, use the following command to check module’s non-approved
mode status
> show fips
FIPS is currently disabled.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
Further specific Administrator guidance can be found in the Firewall Management Center
Administration Guide: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/secure-
firewall/management-center/admin/740/management-center-admin-74.html
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
Further Non-Administrator guidance can be found in the Datasheets for Firepower series 4100
and 9300: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/security/firepower-4100-
series/datasheet-c78-742474.html and
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/security/firepower-9000-series/datasheet-c78-
742471.html
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
N/A for this module.