Copyright © 2016 by Ceragon Networks Ltd. All rights reserved.
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy:
FibeAir® IP-20C
FibeAir® IP-20S
FibeAir® IP-20N
FibeAir® IP-20A
FibeAir® IP-20G
FibeAir® IP-20GX
Firmware: CeraOS 8.3, CeraOS 8.3b512, CeraOS 8.3b517
Hardware:
IP-20N, IP-20A, IP-20G, IP-20GX, IP-20C, IP-20S
IP-20-TCC-B-MC+SD-AF: 24-T009-1|A
IP-20-TCC-B2+SD-AF: 24-T010-1|A
IP-20-TCC-B2-XG-MC+SD-AF: 24-T011-1|A
IP-20-RMC-B-AF: 24-R010-0|A
Ceragon Networks, Ltd.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Revision: 1.2
Prepared By:
Acumen Security
18504 Office Park Dr.
Montgomery Village, MD 20886
www.acumensecurity.net
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Notice
This document contains information that is proprietary to Ceragon Networks Ltd. No part of this publication
may be reproduced, modified, or distributed without prior written authorization of Ceragon Networks Ltd.
This document is provided as is, without warranty of any kind.
Trademarks
Ceragon Networks®, FibeAir® and CeraView® are trademarks of Ceragon Networks Ltd., registered in the
United States and other countries.
Ceragon® is a trademark of Ceragon Networks Ltd., registered in various countries.
CeraMap™, PolyView™, EncryptAir™, ConfigAir™, CeraMon™, EtherAir™, CeraBuild™, CeraWeb™, and
QuickAir™, are trademarks of Ceragon Networks Ltd.
Other names mentioned in this publication are owned by their respective holders.
Statement of Conditions
The information contained in this document is subject to change without notice. Ceragon Networks Ltd. shall
not be liable for errors contained herein or for incidental or consequential damage in connection with the
furnishing, performance, or use of this document or equipment supplied with it.
Open Source Statement
The Product may use open source software, among them O/S software released under the GPL or GPL alike
license ("Open Source License"). Inasmuch that such software is being used, it is released under the Open
Source License, accordingly. The complete list of the software being used in this product including their
respective license and the aforementioned public available changes is accessible at:
Network element site:
ftp://ne-open-source.license-system.com
NMS site:
ftp://nms-open-source.license-system.com/
Information to User
Any changes or modifications of equipment not expressly approved by the manufacturer could void the user’s
authority to operate the equipment and the warranty for such equipment.
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.2
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Purpose...........................................................................................................................5
1.2 Document Organization ..................................................................................................5
1.3 Notices ............................................................................................................................5
2. FibeAir® IP-20C, FibeAir® IP-20S, FibeAir® IP-20N, FibeAir® IP-20A, FibeAir® IP-20G,
and FibeAir® IP-20GX ...................................................................................... 6
2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification ...............................................................................6
2.1.1 Cryptographic Boundary .................................................................................................7
2.1.2 Modes of Operation ........................................................................................................9
2.2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces .................................................................13
2.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication .............................................................................19
2.3.1 Authorized Roles...........................................................................................................19
2.3.2 Authentication Mechanisms..........................................................................................19
2.3.3 Services ........................................................................................................................20
2.4 Physical Security...........................................................................................................23
2.5 Operational Environment ..............................................................................................23
2.6 Cryptographic Key Management ..................................................................................24
2.6.1 Key Generation.............................................................................................................26
2.6.2 Key Entry/Output...........................................................................................................26
2.6.3 Zeroization Procedures.................................................................................................26
2.7 Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) ..................27
2.8 Self-Tests......................................................................................................................27
2.8.1 Power-On Self-Tests.....................................................................................................27
2.8.2 Conditional Self-Tests...................................................................................................27
2.8.3 Self-Tests Error Handling .............................................................................................28
2.9 Mitigation Of Other Attacks...........................................................................................28
3. Secure Operation............................................................................................ 29
3.1 Installation.....................................................................................................................29
3.2 Initialization ...................................................................................................................29
3.3 Management.................................................................................................................29
3.3.1 Symmetric Encryption Algorithms:................................................................................29
3.3.2 KEX Algorithms:............................................................................................................29
3.3.3 Message Authentication Code (MAC) Algorithms: .......................................................29
3.3.4 TLS Usage ....................................................................................................................30
3.4 Additional Information ...................................................................................................30
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4. Appendix A: Acronyms.................................................................................. 31
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1. Introduction
This is a non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for Ceragon Networks, Ltd and the
following Ceragon products: FibeAir® IP-20C FibeAir® IP-20S FibeAir® IP-20N FibeAir®
IP-20A FibeAir® IP-20G FibeAir® IP-20GX. Below are the details of the product certified:
Hardware Version #: IP-20N, IP-20A, IP-20G, IP-20GX, IP-20C, IP-20S, IP-20-TCC-B-
MC+SD-AF: 24-T009-1|A, IP-20-TCC-B2+SD-AF: 24-T010-1|A, IP-20-TCC-B2-XG-MC+SD-
AF: 24-T011-1|A, IP-20-RMC-B-AF: 24-R010-0|A
Software Version #: CeraOS 8.3, CeraOS 8.3b512, CeraOS 8.3b517
FIPS 140-2 Security Level: 2
1.1 Purpose
This document was prepared as part of the Federal Information Processing Standard
(FIPS) 140-2 validation process. The document describes how FibeAir® IP-20C FibeAir®
IP-20S FibeAir® IP-20N FibeAir® IP-20A FibeAir® IP-20G FibeAir® IP-20GX meet the
security requirements of FIPS 140-2. It also provides instructions to individuals and
organizations on how to deploy the product in a secure FIPS-approved mode of operation.
The target audience of this document is anyone who wishes to use or integrate any of
these products into a solution that is meant to comply with FIPS 140-2 requirements.
1.2 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In
addition to this document, the Submission Package contains:
 Vendor Evidence document
 Finite State Machine
 Other supporting documentation as additional references
This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were produced
by Acumen Security, under contract to Ceragon Networks, Ltd. With the exception of this
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package is proprietary to
Ceragon Networks and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements.
1.3 Notices
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without
modification.
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2. FibeAir® IP-20C, FibeAir® IP-20S, FibeAir® IP-20N,
FibeAir® IP-20A, FibeAir® IP-20G, and FibeAir® IP-
20GX
The FibeAir® IP-20C, FibeAir® IP-20S, FibeAir® IP-20N, FibeAir® IP-20A, FibeAir® IP-
20G, and FibeAir® IP-20GX (the module) are multi-chip standalone modules validated at
FIPS 140-2 Security Level 2. Specifically the modules meet that following security levels
for individual sections in FIPS 140-2 standard:
Table 1 - Security Levels
# Section Title Security Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key Management 2
8 EMI/EMC 3
9 Self-Tests 2
10 Design Assurances 3
11 Mitigation Of Other Attacks N/A
2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification
The FibeAir® IP-20 series is a service-centric microwave platform for HetNet hauling. The
platform includes a full complement of wireless products that provide innovative, market-
leading backhaul and fronthaul solutions.
Powered by a software-defined engine and sharing a common operating system, CeraOS,
the IP-20 platform, delivers ultra-high capacities while supporting any radio transmission
technology, any network topology, and any deployment configuration.
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2.1.1 Cryptographic Boundary
The cryptographic boundary for the modules is defined as encompassing the "top,"
"front," "left," "right," and "bottom" surfaces of the case and all portions of the "backplane"
of the case. The following figures provide a physical depiction of the cryptographic
modules.
Figure 1 FibeAir® IP-20C
Figure 2 FibeAir® IP-20S
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Figure 3 FibeAir® IP-20N and FibeAir® IP-20A
Figure 4 FibeAir® IP-20G
Figure 5 FibeAir® IP-20GX
The IP-20G, IP-20C and IP-20S are fixed configuration.
The IP-20GX has slots for Radio Modem Card RNC-B (IP-20-RMC-B-AF). The IP-20-RMC-
B-AF provides the modem interface between the Indoor Unit (IDU) and the Radio
Frequency Unit (RFU).
Finally, the IP-20N and IP-20A have slots to insert the following cards:
 Traffic and Control Card (TCC): The Traffic Control Card (TCC) provides the control
functionality for the IP- 20N unit. It also provides Ethernet management and traffic
interfaces. There are three variants of this card:
IP-20-TCC-B2-XG-MC+SD-AF: Required for Multi-Carrier ABC configurations.
Provides 2 x FE Ethernet management interfaces, 2 x GbE optical interfaces, 2 x
GbE electrical interfaces, and 2 x dual mode electrical or cascading interfaces.
IP-20-TCC-B-MC+SD-AF: Required for Multi-Carrier ABC configurations. Provides
2 x FE Ethernet management interfaces and 2 x GbE combo interfaces (electrical or
optical) for Ethernet traffic.
IP-20-TCC-B2+SD-AF: Provides 2 x FE Ethernet management interfaces, 2 x GbE
optical interfaces, 2 x GbE electrical interfaces, and 2 x dual mode electrical or
cascading interfaces.
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 Radio Modem Card-B (IP-20-RMC-B-AF): The Radio Modem Card (RMC) provides the
modem interface between the Indoor Unit (IDU) and the Radio Frequency Unit (RFU).
Additionally the following cards can be configured on IP-20GX, IP-20N, and IP-20A
modules. These cards provide port density but do not contain any security-relevant
functionality:
 Ethernet/Optical Line Interface Card (E/XLIC)
 STM-1/OC3
 STM-1 RST
 E1/T1
The models included in this FIPS validation have been tested in the following
configurations:
Table 2 - Tested Configurations
Model Cards
IP-20N  Single or dual TCC
 Dual IP-20-RMC-B-AF
 Dual Power supplies
IP-20A  Single or dual TCC
 Dual IP-20-RMC-B-AF
 Dual Power supplies
IP-20G Fixed configuration
IP-20GX  Dual IP-20-RMC-B-AF
IP-20C Fixed configuration
IP-20S Fixed configuration
2.1.2 Modes of Operation
The modules have two modes of operation:
1 FIPS-approved mode: When the module is configured as per instructions in Section 3:
Secure Operation section of this document, it is considered to be operating in FIPS
approve mode.
2 Non-FIPS Approved mode: In this mode the module is not fully compliant with the
configuration steps listed in Section 3 of this document, Secure Operation, and as such
might allow non-FIPS approved algorithms or services to be executed.
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The following table lists the FIPS approved algorithms supported by the modules.
Table 3 - Supported Algorithms
Cryptographic Algorithm CAVP Cert. # Usage
Software Cryptographic Implementation
AES
CBC ( e/d; 256 ); CTR ( int only; 256 )
KW ( AE , AD , AES-256 , INV , 128 , 256 , 192 , 320 ,
4096 )
3865 Used for control/management plane
SHS
SHA-1 (BYTE-only)
SHA-224 (BYTE-only)
SHA-256 (BYTE-only)
SHA-384 (BYTE-only)
SHA-512 (BYTE-only)
3185
HMAC
HMAC-SHA256 ( Key Size Ranges Tested: KS<BS
KS=BS KS>BS )
2509
SP 800-90A DRBG (HMAC-SHA-256)
HMAC_Based DRBG: [ Prediction Resistance Tested:
Enabled and Not Enabled ( SHA-256 )
1099
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Cryptographic Algorithm CAVP Cert. # Usage
FIPS 186-4 RSA Key Generation, Signature
Generation and Signature Verification
186-4KEY(gen): FIPS186-4_Random_e
PGM(ProbPrimeCondition): 2048 PPTT:( C.3 )
ALG[ANSIX9.31] Sig(Gen): (2048 SHA( 256 , 384 ,
512 )) (3072 SHA( 256 , 384 , 512 ))
Sig(Ver): (1024 SHA( 1 , 256 , 384 , 512 )) (2048
SHA( 1 , 256 , 384 , 512 )) (3072 SHA( 1 , 256 , 384 ,
512 ))
ALG[RSASSA-PKCS1_V1_5] SIG(gen) (2048 SHA(
224 , 256 , 384 , 512 )) (3072 SHA( 224 , 256 , 384 ,
512 ))
SIG(Ver) (1024 SHA( 1 , 224 , 256 , 384 )) (2048
SHA( 1 , 224 , 256 , 384 , 512 )) (3072 SHA( 1 , 224 ,
256 , 384 , 512 ))
[RSASSA-PSS]: Sig(Gen): (2048 SHA( 224 , 256 ,
384 , 512 )) (3072 SHA( 224 , 256 , 384 , 512 ))
Sig(Ver): (1024 SHA( 1 SaltLen( 16 ) , 224 SaltLen(
16 ) , 256 SaltLen( 16 ) , 384 SaltLen( 16 ) , 512
SaltLen( 16 ) )) (2048 SHA( 1 , 224 , 256 , 384 , 512 ))
(3072 SHA( 1 SaltLen( 16 ) , 224 SaltLen( 16 ) , 256
SaltLen( 16 ) , 384 SaltLen( 16 ) , 512 SaltLen( 16 ) ))
1973
CVL (SNMPv3, SSH and TLS)1
TLSv1.2 (SHA-256)
SSH (SHA-1, 256)
SNMP (SHA-1)
742
KTS (key establishment methodology provides 256
bits of encryption strength)
AES: 3865
HMAC: 2509
Hardware Cryptographic Implementation
AES
OFB ( e/d; 256 )
3867 Used for data plan traffic protection
Note that there are algorithms, modes, and keys that have been CAVs tested but not
implemented by the module. Only the algorithms, modes, and keys shown in this table are
implemented by the module.
Addititionally the module implements the following non-Approved algorithms that are
allowed for use with FIPS-approved services:
1
Note that CAVP and CMVP does not review or test the SSH, SNMPv3 and TLS protocols
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.2
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- Diffie - Hellman (key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption
strength).
- Elliptic Curve Diffie - Hellman (key establishment methodology provides between 128
and 256-bits bits of encryption strength)
- Non-approved NDRNG for seeding the DRBG. The NDRNG generates a minimum of
256 bits of entropy for use in key generation.
Finally the module implements the following non-approved FIPS algorithms that are not
to be used in FIPS mode of operation:
AES (non-compliant for: ECB (192, 256),
CBC (128, 192), CTR (128, 192), CFB (128,
192, 256), OFB (128, 192, 256), CCM (128,
192, 256), GCM (128, 192, 256))
CRC7
CRC16 CRC32
DES DSA (non-compliant)
Diffie-Hellman (non-compliant less than
112 bits of encryption strength)
ECDSA (non-compliant)
MD5 RC5
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2.2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
The modules provide a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the
physical interfaces provided by the module are mapped to four FIPS 140-2-defined logical
interfaces: data input, data output, control input, and status output. The logical interfaces
and their mapping are described in the following tables:
Figure 6 - IP-20-TCC-B-MC+SD-AF Interfaces
Table 4 - Module Interface Mapping for IP-20-TCC-B-MC+SD-AF (IP-20N and IP-20A)
FIPS Interface Physical Interface
Data Input (2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces or GbE Optical Interfaces
Data Output (2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces or GbE Optical Interfaces
Control Input (1x) Synchronization Interface
(1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface
(2x) FE Management Interfaces
(2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces or GbE Optical Interfaces
Status Output (1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface
(2x) FE Management Interfaces
(1x) ACT LED
(1x) DB9 External Alarms
(2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces or GbE Optical Interfaces
Figure 7 - IP-20-TCC-B2+SD-AF and IP-20-TCC-B2-XG-MC+SD-AF Interfaces
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Table 5 - Module Interface Mapping for IP-20-TCC-B2+SD-AF and IP-20-TCC-B2-XG-MC+SD-
AF (IP-20N and IP-20A)
FIPS Interface Physical Interface
Data Input (2x) GbE Optical Interfaces
(2x) Dual Mode GbE Electrical or Cascading
(2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces
Data Output (2x) GbE Optical Interfaces
(2x) Dual Mode GbE Electrical or Cascading
(2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces
Control Input (1x) Synchronization Interface
(1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface
(2x) FE Management Interfaces
Status Output (1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface
(2x) FE Management Interfaces
(1x) ACT LED
(1x) DB9 External Alarms
Figure 8 - IP-20-RMC-B-AFInterfaces
Table 6 - Module Interface Mapping for IP-20-RMC-B-AF (IP-20N and IP-20A)
FIPS Interface Physical Interface
Data Input (1x) TNC RFU Interface
Data Output (1x) TNC RFU Interface
Control Input (1x) TNC RFU Interface
Status Output (1x) ACT LED
(1x) Link LED
(1x) RFU LED
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Figure 9 - IP-20G Interfaces
Table 7 - Module Interface Mapping for IP-20G
FIPS Interface Physical Interface
Data Input (2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces
(2x) Dual Mode GbE Electrical or Cascading
(2x) GbE Optical Interfaces
(16x) E1/DS1s
Data Output (2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces
(2x) Dual Mode GbE Electrical or Cascading
(2x) GbE Optical Interfaces
(2x) TNC Radio Interfaces
Control Input (1x) Sync In/Out RJ-45 Interface
(1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface
(2x) FE Management Interfaces
Status Output (1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface
(2x) FE Management Interfaces
(1x) DB9 External Alarms
LEDs
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Figure 10 - IP-20GX Interfaces
Table 8 - Module Interface Mapping for IP-20GX
FIPS Interface Physical Interface
Data Input (2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces
(2x) Dual Mode GbE Electrical or Cascading
(2x) GbE Optical Interfaces
(16x) E1/DS1s
(2x) IP-20-RMC-B-AF (optional)
Data Output (2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces
(2x) Dual Mode GbE Electrical or Cascading
(2x) GbE Optical Interfaces
(2x) TNC Radio Interfaces
(2x) IP-20-RMC-B-AF (optional)
Control Input (1x) Sync In/Out RJ-45 Interface
(1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface
(2x) FE Management Interfaces
Status Output (1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface
(2x) FE Management Interfaces
(1x) DB9 External Alarms
LEDs
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Figure 11 - IP-20C Interfaces (Front and Back)
Figure 12 - IP-20S Interfaces (Front and Back)
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Figure 13 - IP-20C and IP-20S Interfaces Side
Table 9 - Module Interface Mapping for IP-20C and IP-20S
FIPS Interface Physical Interface
Data Input (1x) RJ-45 Data Port (PoE)
(2x) Data port (Electrical or Optical)
(2x) Antenna Ports (Only 1 port on IP-
20S)
Data Output (1x) RJ-45 Data Port (PoE)
(2x) Data port (Electrical or Optical)
(2x) Antenna Ports (Only 1 port on IP-
20S)
Control Input (1x) Source Sharing
(1x) RJ-45 Management Interface
Status Output (1x) RSL Indication
(1x) RJ-45 Management Interface
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2.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication
The following sections provide details about roles supported by the module, how these
roles are authenticated and the services the roles are authorized to access.
2.3.1 Authorized Roles
The module supports several different roles, including multiple Cryptographic Officer
roles and a User role.
Configuration of the module can occur over several interfaces and at different levels
depending upon the role assigned. There are multiple levels of access for a Cryptographic
Officer as follows:
 Security Officer, admin, SNMP User: Entities assigned this privilege level has
complete access to configure and manage the module.
 Tech, Operator, Viewer: These entities have more limited access to manage the
module. For example they can only manage the configuration of the data traffic
interface.
The Users of the module are the remote peers from which back haul traffic is transmitted
to and fro. The Users are connected over a secure session protected using Session key.
2.3.2 Authentication Mechanisms
The module supports role-based authentication. Module operators must authenticate to
the module before being allowed access to services, which require the assumption of an
authorized role. The module employs the authentication methods described in the table
below to authenticate Crypto-Officers and Users.
Unauthenticated users are only able to access the module LEDs and power cycle the
module.
Table 10 - Authentication Mechanism Details
Role Type Of Authentication Authentication Strength
Admin Password/Username All passwords must be at least 8 . If (8) integers are used for an eight digit
password, the probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is one
(1) in 100,000,000 (this calculation is based on the assumption that the typical
standard American QWERTY computer keyboard has 10 integer digits. The
calculation should be 108 = 100,000,000). Therefore, the associated probability
of a successful random attempt is approximately 1 in 100,000,000, which is
less than 1 in 1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2. In order to successfully
guess the sequence in one minute would require the ability to make over
1,666,666 guesses per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities
of the module.
Tech
Viewer
Operator
Security Officer
SNMP User
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Role Type Of Authentication Authentication Strength
Users AES 256-bit Session Key or
RSA certificate (if TLS is
used)
When using AES key based authentication, the key has a size of 256-bits.
Therefore, an attacker would have a 1 in 2256 chance of randomly obtaining the
key, which is much stronger than the one in a million chance required by FIPS
140-2. For AES based authentication, to exceed a 1 in 100,000 probability of a
successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be
capable of approximately 3.25X1032 attempts per minute, which far exceeds
the operational capabilities of the modules to support.
2.3.3 Services
The services (approved and non-approved) that require operators to assume an
authorized role (Crypto-Officer or User) as well as unauthenticated services are listed in
the table below. Please note that the keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) listed
below use the following indicators to show the type of access required:
 R (Read): The CSP is read
 W (Write): The CSP is established, generated, or modified,
 Z (Zeroize): The CSP is zeroized
Table 11 - Services, Roles and Key/CSP access
Service Description Role Key/CSP and Type of Access
CO User
FIPS Approved Services
Show Status Provides status of the module X N/A
Perform Self-Tests Used to initiate on-demand self-tests
(via power-cycle)
X X N/A
Transmit/Receive Data Encrypt/Decrypt data passing through
the module
X Session Key Tx (R/W)
Session Key Rx (R/W)
Master Key (R)
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Service Description Role Key/CSP and Type of Access
CO User
Administrative access
over SSH
Secure remote command line
appliance administration over an SSH
tunnel.
X Crypto Officer Password (R/W/Z)
DRBG entropy input (R)
DRBG Seed (R)
DRBG V (R/W/Z)
DRBG Key (R/W/Z)
Diffie-Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman
Shared Secret (R/W/Z)
Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman
private key (R/W/Z)
Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman public
key (R/W/Z)
SSH Private Key (R/W/Z)
SSH Public Key (R/W/Z)
SSH Session Key (R/W/Z)
SSH Integrity Key (R/W/Z)
Master Key (R/W/X)
Administrative access
over Web EMS
Secure remote GUI appliance
administration over a TLS tunnel.
X Crypto Officer Password (R/W/Z)
DRBG entropy input (R)
DRBG Seed (R)
DRBG V (R/W/Z)
DRBG Key (R/W/Z)
Diffie-Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman
Shared Secret (R/W/Z)
Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman
private key (R/W/Z)
Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman public
key (R/W/Z)
TLS Private Key (R/W/Z)
TLS Public Key (R/W/Z)
TLS Pre-Master Secret (R/W/Z)
TLS Session Encryption Key (R/W/Z)
Master Key (R/W/Z)
SNMPv3 Secure remote SNMPv3-based
system monitoring.
X SNMP Session Key (R/W/Z)
SNMPv3 password (R/W/Z)
Key Entry Enter key over management
interfaces
X Master Key (R/W)
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Service Description Role Key/CSP and Type of Access
CO User
Cycle Power Reboot of module Unauthenticated DRBG entropy input (Z)
DRBG Seed (Z)
DRBG V (Z)
DRBG Key (Z)
Diffie-Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman
Shared Secret (Z)
Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman
private key (Z)
Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman public
key (Z)
SSH Session Key (Z)
SSH Integrity Key (Z)
SNMPv3 session key (Z)
TLS Pre-Master Secret (Z)
TLS Session Encryption Key (Z)
TLS Session Integrity Key (Z)
Session Key Tx (Z)
Session Key Rx (Z)
Status LED Output View status via the modules’ LEDs Unauthenticated N/A
Non-FIPS Approved Services
Administrative Access
over SSH
Secure remote command line
appliance administration over an SSH
tunnel using non-FIPS approved
ciphers (See Section 2.1.2 )
X N/A
Administrative access
over Web EMS
Secure remote GUI appliance
administration over a TLS tunnel (See
Section 2.1.2 )
X N/A
SNMP Secure remote SNMPv1, v2c-based
system monitoring.
X N/A
R – Read, W – Write, Z – Zeroize
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2.4 Physical Security
The appliances are multi-chip standalone cryptographic modules. The appliances are
contained in a hard metal chassis, which is defined as the cryptographic boundary of the
module. The appliances’ chassis is opaque within the visible spectrum. The enclosure of
the appliances has been designed to satisfy Level 2physical security requirements.
Each of the appliances needs Tamper Evidence Labels to meet Security Level 2
requirements. These labels are installed at the factory before delivery to the customer.
The Crypto Officer shall periodically (defined by organizational security policy,
recommendation is once a month) monitor the state of all applied seals for evidence of
tampering. If tamper is detected, the CO must take the device out of commission, inspect it
and if deemed safe, return it to FIPS approved state.
2.5 Operational Environment
Section 4.6.1 (of FIPS 140-2 standard) requirements are not applicable since the module
is a hardware module with a non-modifiable operational environment.
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2.6 Cryptographic Key Management
The following table identifies each of the CSPs associated with the modules. For each CSP, the following information is provided:
 The name of the CSP/Key
 The type of CSP and associated length
 A description of the CSP/Key
 Storage of the CSP/Key
 The zeroization for the CSP/Key
Table 12 - Details of Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
Key/CSP Type Description Storage Generated/Entry/Output Zeroization
DRBG entropy input 256-bit This is the entropy for SP 800-90A RNG. RAM Generated using entropy source Device power cycle.
DRBG Seed 256-bit This DRBG seed is collected from the onboard
hardware entropy source.
RAM Generated using entropy source Device power cycle.
DRBG V 256-bit Internal V value used as part of SP 800-90A
DRBG
RAM Generated using entropy source Device power cycle.
DRBG Key 256-bit Internal Key value used as part of SP 800-90A
DRBG
RAM Generated using entropy source Device power cycle.
Diffie-Hellman / EC Diffie
Hellman Shared Secret
DH 2048 bits
ECDH: P-256, P-384, P-521
The shared exponent used in Diffie-Hellman
(DH)/ECDH exchange. Created per the Diffie-
Hellman protocol.
RAM Established using DH/ECDH Device power cycle.
Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie
Hellman private key
DH 2048 bits
ECDH: P-256, P-384, P-521
The private exponent used in Diffie-Hellman
(DH)/ECDH exchange.
RAM Generated using DRBG Device power cycle.
Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie
Hellman public key
DH 2048 bits
ECDH: P-256, P-384, P-521
The p used in Diffie-Hellman (DH)/ECDH
exchange.
RAM Generated using DRBG Device power cycle.
SSH Private Key RSA (Private Key) 2048 bits The SSH private key for the module used for
session authentication.
Flash Generated using FIPS 186-4 Zeroization command
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v0.3
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Key/CSP Type Description Storage Generated/Entry/Output Zeroization
SSH Public Key RSA (Public Key) 2048 bits The SSH public key for the module used for
session authentication.
Flash Generated using FIPS 186-4 Zeroization command
SSH Session Key AES 256 bits The SSH session key. This key is created
through SSH key establishment.
RAM Established using SSH key
exchange
Device power cycle.
SSH Integrity Key HMAC-SHA-256 The SSH data integrity key. This key is created
through SSH key establishment.
RAM Established using SSH key
exchange
Device power cycle.
SNMPv3 password Shared Secret, at least eight
characters
This secret is used to derive HMAC-SHA1 key
for SNMPv3 Authentication.
Flash Configured via
HTTPs/SSH/Terminal/SNMPv3
Zeroization command
SNMPv3 session key AES 256 bits SNMP symmetric encryption key used to
encrypt/decrypt SNMP traffic.
RAM Established as part of SNMPv3
session
Device power cycle.
TLS Private Key RSA (Private Key) 2048 bits This private key is used for TLS session
authentication.
Flash Generated using FIPS 186-4 Zeroization command
TLS Public Key RSA (Public Key) 2048 bits This public key is used for TLS session
authentication.
Flash Generated using FIPS 186-4 Zeroization command
TLS Pre-Master Secret Shared Secret, 384 bits Shared Secret created using asymmetric
cryptography from which new TLS session keys
can be created.
RAM Established using TLS exchange Device power cycle.
TLS Session Encryption Key AES 256 bits Key used to encrypt/decrypt TLS session data. RAM Established using TLS exchange Device power cycle.
TLS Session Integrity Key HMAC SHA-256 256 bits HMAC-SHA-256 used for TLS data integrity
protection.
RAM Established using TLS exchange Device power cycle.
Session key Tx AES 256 bits This is the symmetric session key to protect
transmission of back-haul data
RAM Generated using DRBG. Output
using Master key
Device power cycle.
Session key Rx AES 256 bits This is the symmetric session key to decrypt
back-haul data received by the module
RAM Generated using DRBG. Input using
Master key
Device power cycle.
Master key AES 256 bits This is the CO configured key used to protect
transmission of session keys
Flash Configured using
HTTPs/SSH/Terminal/SNMPv3
Zeroization command
Crypto Officer Password Password Authentication password for CO role Flash Configured Zeroization command
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v0.3
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2.6.1 Key Generation
The module generates symmetric and asymmetric keys in compliance with requirements of FIPS 140-2 standard. Specifically
symmetric keys are generated using output of the FIPS approved SP 800-90A DRBG and in compliance with IG 7.8. Asymmetric
keys are generated as part applicable key generation standards. Please see Table 12 - Details of Cryptographic Keys and CSPs for
details.
2.6.2 Key Entry/Output
Please see Table 12 - Details of Cryptographic Keys and CSPs for details. All keys are entered into or output from the module in a
secure manner. Specifically the Session Keys are output from the module encrypted with Master Key with AES key wrap
algorithm.
2.6.3 Zeroization Procedures
Please see Table 12 - Details of Cryptographic Keys and CSPs for details.
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2.7 Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic
Compatibility (EMI/EMC)
The module conforms to FCC Part 15 Class B requirements for home use.
2.8 Self-Tests
Self-tests are health checks that ensure that the cryptographic algorithms
within the module are operating correctly. The self-tests identified in FIPS
140-2 broadly fall within two categories:
1 Power-On Self-Tests
2 Conditional Self-Tests
2.8.1 Power-On Self-Tests
The cryptographic module performs the following self-tests at Power-On:
Firmware:
 Software integrity (HMAC-SHA-1)
 HMAC-SHA1 Known Answer Test
 HMAC-SHA224 Known Answer Test
 HMAC-SHA256 Known Answer Test
 HMAC-SHA384 Known Answer Test
 HMAC-SHA512 Known Answer Test
 AES-128 ECB Encrypt Known Answer Test
 AES-128 ECB Decrypt Known Answer Test
 RSA Known Answer Test
 DRBG Health Tests
Hardware:
 AES-256 OFB Encrypt Known Answer Test
 AES-256 OFB Decrypt Known Answer Test
2.8.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The cryptographic module performs the following conditional self-tests:
 Continuous Random Number Generator Test (CRNGT) for FIPS-approved
DRBG
 Continuous Random Number Generator (CRNGT) for Entropy Source
 Firmware Load Test (RSA Signature Verification)
 Pairwise Consistency Test (PWCT) for RSA
 Bypass self-test
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2.8.3 Self-Tests Error Handling
If any of the identified POSTs fail, the module will not enter an operational
state and will instead provide an error message. The module will then be
placed in a Default State (where all keys/CSPs are zeroized) and the FIPS
validated flag is reset.
If either of the CRNGTs fail, the repeated random numbers are discarded and
an error is reported. If the PWCT fails, the key pair is discarded and an error is
reported. If the Firmware Load Test fails, the new firmware is not loaded. If
the Bypass self-test fails, the error is reported and the module does not
transition into or out of bypass.
Both during execution of the self-tests and while in an error state, data output
is inhibited.
2.9 Mitigation Of Other Attacks
The module does not claim to mitigate any other attacks beyond those
specified in FIPS 140.
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3. Secure Operation
The following steps are required to put the module into a FIPS-approved
mode of operation.
3.1 Installation
IP-20G, IP-20C, and IP-20S are fixed configuration with TELs applied at
factory. The Crypto Officer must verify at installation time that the TELs are
affixed and intact.
IP-20GX, IP-20N, and IP-20A are variable configuration and the CO must verify
that they are configured as per one of the approved configurations identified
in Section 2.1.1. Moreover for these as well the Crypto Officer must verify at
installation time that the TELs are affixed and intact.
3.2 Initialization
The CO must follow these steps to place the module in a FIPS mode of
operation
1 Enable configuration to enforce password strength.
2 Configure re-try timeouts for wrong passwords to 3 attempts (default
value).
3 For radio encryption mode, configure Master Key and enable Payload
Encryption.
4 Enable SNMP v3 (default) and disable SNMPv1 and v2.
5 Enable FIPS Admin configuration, i.e., set FIPS mode of operation.
6 Change default CO password
Once the final step is performed the module will prompt the CO to reboot.
Upon successful reboot the module will enter a FIPS mode of operation.
3.3 Management
When in FIPS 140-2 compliance mode, only the following algorithms may be
used for SSH and TLS communications. Note that using any other algorithms
or cipher suites will place the module in a non-FIPS approved mode of
operation.
3.3.1 Symmetric Encryption Algorithms:
1 AES_256_CBC
3.3.2 KEX Algorithms:
1 diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
2 diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
3 diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
3.3.3 Message Authentication Code (MAC) Algorithms:
1 hmac-sha1
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Document Revision: 1.2
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2 hmac-sha1-96
3.3.4 TLS Usage
When in FIPS 140-2 compliance mode, only the following ciphersuites may be
used for TLS communications:
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384
DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256
DH-RSA-AES256-SHA256
ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384
AES256-SHA256
AES256-SHA
3.4 Additional Information
For additional information regarding FIPS 140-2 compliance, see the relevant
User Manuals.
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Document Revision: 1.2
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4. Appendix A: Acronyms
This section describes the acronyms used throughout the document.
Table 13 - Acronyms
Acronym Definition
TEL Tamper Evidence Labels
CO Crypto Officer
CRNGT Continuous Random Number Generator Test
CSEC Communications Security Establishment Canada
CVL Component Validation List
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
KDF Key Derivation Function
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
POST Power-On Self-Test
PWCT Pairwise Consistency Test