Copyright 2020 HID Global - may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
HID Global
Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB)
FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Cryptographic Module
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version: 1.2
Date: 3/11/2021
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 2 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
Table of Contents
References........................................................................................................................................... 4
Acronyms and Definitions.................................................................................................................... 6
1 Overview....................................................................................................................................... 7
1.1 Versions, Configurations and Modes of Operation ..................................................................... 7
1.2 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary ........................................................................ 8
1.3 Firmware and Logical Cryptographic Boundary......................................................................... 10
2 Cryptographic Functionality......................................................................................................... 12
2.1 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys............................................................................. 13
3 Roles, Authentication and Services .............................................................................................. 15
3.1 Secure Channel Protocol Authentication Method..................................................................... 16
3.2 Application Administrator Authentication Method................................................................... 16
3.3 Card Holder Authentication Method......................................................................................... 17
3.4 Services ...................................................................................................................................... 17
4 Self-Test ...................................................................................................................................... 21
4.1 Power-On Self-Tests................................................................................................................... 21
4.2 Conditional Self-Tests ................................................................................................................ 21
5 Physical Security Policy................................................................................................................ 22
6 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy ............................................................................................... 22
7 Security Rules and Guidance........................................................................................................ 22
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 3 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
List of Tables
Table 1: References....................................................................................................................................... 4
Table 2: Acronyms and Definitions ............................................................................................................... 6
Table 3: Security Level of Security Requirements.........................................................................................7
Table 4 - Approved Mode Indicators ............................................................................................................ 8
Table 5: Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................................ 9
Table 6: Approved Algorithms .................................................................................................................... 12
Table 7: Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions..................................................................13
Table 8: Critical Security Parameters..........................................................................................................13
Table 9: Public Keys..................................................................................................................................... 15
Table 10: Roles Supported by the Module .................................................................................................15
Table 11: Unauthenticated Services ...........................................................................................................17
Table 12: Authenticated Services ...............................................................................................................18
Table 13: CSP Accesses within Services of Card Manager, ACA applet, and PIVExt applet........................18
Table 14: CSPs within Services of ZKM and OATH1
applets, and Public Keys Access within Services ........20
Table 15: Power-On Self-Test ..................................................................................................................... 21
Table 16: Conditional Self-Tests..................................................................................................................21
List of Figures
Figure 1: NXP Semiconductors JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB): Physical Form..................................................9
Figure 2: Module Block Diagram.................................................................................................................10
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 4 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
References
Table 1: References
Acronym Full Specification Name
References used in Approved Algorithms Table
[38A] NIST, Special Publication 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and
Techniques, December, 2001
[38B] NIST, Special Publication 800-38B, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC
Mode for Authentication, May, 2005, updated on June 06 2016
[38F] NIST, Special Publication 800-38F, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for
Key Wrapping, December, 2012
[56A] NIST, Special Publication 800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, March, 2007
[56Ar3] NIST, Special Publication 800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, Revision 3, April, 2018
[56B] NIST Special Publication 800-56B, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using
Integer Factorization Cryptography, Revision 1, September 2014
[56Crev1]
NIST, Special Publication 800-56C, Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key-Establishment
Schemes, Revision 1, April 2018
[67r2] NIST Special Publication 800-67, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block
Cipher, Revision 2, November, 2017
[90Ar1] NIST, Special Publication 800-90A, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators, Revision 1, June, 2015
[108] NIST, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions (Revised), FIPS Publication
108, October, 2009
[133r2] NIST Special Publication SP800-133, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation, Revision 2,
June, 2020
[180] NIST, Secure Hash Standard, FIPS Publication 180-4, March, 2012
[186] NIST, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS Publication 186-4, July, 2013
[197] NIST, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), FIPS Publication 197, November 26, 2001
[198-1] NIST, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), July, 2008
Other References
[FIPS140-2] NIST, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[INCITS 504-1]
INCITS, Information Technology ‐ Generic Identity Command Set ‐ Part 1: Card Application
Command Set, Amendment
[GlobalPlatform] GlobalPlatform Consortium: GlobalPlatform Card Specification 2.2.1, January 2011,
http://www.globalplatform.org
GlobalPlatform Consortium: GlobalPlatform Card -- Confidential Card Content Management --
Card Specification 2.2 -- Amendment A, January 2011
GlobalPlatform Consortium: GlobalPlatform Card Technology -- Contactless Services -- Card
Specification v2.2 -- Amendment C, July 2014
GlobalPlatform Consortium: GlobalPlatform Card Technology -- Secure Channel Protocol ‘03’ –
Card Specification v2.2 – Amendment D, May 2009
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 5 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
Other References
[IG] NIST, Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program, last updated December 03, 2019
[ISO 7816] ISO/IEC 7816-1: 2011 Identification cards -- Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts -- Part 1:
Physical characteristics
ISO/IEC 7816-2:2007 Identification cards -- Integrated circuit cards -- Part 2: Cards with
contacts -- Dimensions and location of the contacts
ISO/IEC 7816-3:2006 Identification cards -- Integrated circuit cards -- Part 3: Cards with
contacts -- Electrical interface and transmission protocols
ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 Identification cards -- Integrated circuit cards -- Part 4: Organization,
security and commands for interchange
ISO/IEC 7816-6:2016 Identification cards -- Integrated circuit cards -- Part 6: Interindustry data
elements for interchange
ISO/IEC 7816-8:2016 Identification cards -- Integrated circuit cards – Part 8: Commands and
mechanisms for security operations
ISO/IEC 7816-12:2005 Identification cards -- Integrated circuit cards -- Part 12: Cards with
contacts -- USB electrical interface and operating procedures
ISO/IEC 7816-15:2016 Identification cards – Integrated circuit cards – Part 15: Cryptographic
Information application
[ISO 14443] ISO/IEC 14443-3:2016 Identification cards -- Contactless integrated circuit cards -- Proximity
cards -- Part 3: Initialization and anticollision
ISO/IEC 14443-4:2016 Identification cards -- Contactless integrated circuit cards – Proximity
cards – Part 4: Transmission protocol
[JavaCard] Java Card 2.2.2 Runtime Environment (JCRE) Specification, March 15, 2006
Java Card 2.2.2 Virtual Machine (JCVM) Specification, March 15, 2006
Java Card 2.2.2 Application Programming Interface, March 2006
Java Card 3.0.4 Runtime Environment (JCRE) Specification, May 2015
Java Card 3.0.4 Virtual Machine (JCVM) Specification, May 2015
Java Card 3.0.4 Application Programming Interface
Published by Oracle
[SP800-73] SP 800-73-4, Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification, NIST, May 2015
[SP800-78] SP 800-78-4, Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification, NIST,
May 2015
[PKCS#1] PKCS #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories, June 14, 2002
[SP800-131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key
Lengths, Revision 2, March 2019
[DTR] NIST, Derived Test Requirements for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules, January 2011
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 6 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
Acronyms and Definitions
Table 2: Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit, see [ISO 7816]
API Application Programming Interface
BS Block Size
CM Card Manager, see [GlobalPlatform]
CNRNGT Continuous random Number Generator Test, see [DTR] AS09.42
CSP Critical Security Parameter, see [FIPS 140-2]
DAP Data Authentication Pattern, see [GlobalPlatform]
DPA Differential Power Analysis
GP GlobalPlatform
HID Human Interface Device (Microsoftism)
IC Integrated Circuit
ISD Issuer Security Domain, see [GlobalPlatform]
KAT Known Answer Test
KS Key Size
MDS Message Digest Size
NVM Non-Volatile Memory (e.g., EEPROM, Flash)
OP Open Platform (predecessor to GlobalPlatform)
PIN Personal Identification Number
PCT Pairwise Consistency Test
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
SCP Secure Channel Protocol, see [GlobalPlatform]
SPA Simple Power Analysis
TPDU Transaction Protocol Data Unit, see [ISO 7816]
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 7 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
1 Overview
This document defines the Security Policy for the HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS
(OSB) cryptographic module, hereafter denoted the Module. The Module, validated to FIPS 140-2 overall
Level 2, is a single chip module implementing the Global Platform operational environment, with a Card
Manager and the HID Global Applets v3.0.
The HID Global Applets v3.0 is conformant to PIV specification [SP800-73] and validated in the NPIVP
program (Cert. #47).
The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows:
Table 3: Security Level of Security Requirements
Security Requirement Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 4
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 3
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks 2
The Module is the physical boundary of the single chip, which provides a Global Platform JavaCard
operational environment. The Module is a non-modifiable operational environment under the FIPS140-2
definitions.
1.1 Versions, Configurations and Modes of Operation
Hardware: P6022y VB
Product identifier: J3H145C
OS Firmware: 19790400
Application Firmware: HID Global ActivID Applet Suite v3.0, comprising:
• ASCLIB: 3.0.0.36
• ACA: 3.0.0.46
• PIVExt: 3.0.0.57
• HMACLib: 3.0.0.24
• OATH: 3.0.0.38 1
• SMAv3 (ZKM) library: 3.0.0.14 1
• SMAv3: 3.0.0.36 1
Factory configuration: FIPS 140-2-L2.
1
This applet was tested but it is optional; the related services and CSPs will be annotated with this index.
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 8 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
HID Global ActivID Applet Suite v3.0 can be configured by HID Global with OATH applet or not. The OATH
applet provides additional services which are independent of the services provided by the other applet.
The module was tested with and without OATH applet.
HID Global ActivID Applet Suite v3.0 can be configured by HID Global with SMAv3 (applet and library) or
not. The SMAv3 library provides OPACITY ZKM Secure Messaging protocol establishment service for PIV
applet, when PIV Discovery Object is configured with VCI interface. The module was tested with and
without SMA v3 applet/library.
After reception of the Module, the Module will be configured with HID Global Credential Management
System and the profile of the end-user. To be in approved mode of operation, the profile of the Module
shall meet security rule #16 of Section 7 below. At the end of the configuration, the Module state cannot
be changed, and the Module will support an Approved mode of operation. The user will be able to know
that the Module is configured in Approved mode of operation by sending the command of Table 4 below.
Table 4 - Approved Mode Indicators
Command and associated elements Expected Response
ACA applet Module Info service (GET PROPERTIES
command with tag 24).
80 56 02 00 01 24 00
0x24 0x02 0x01 YY, where 0x01 (in bold italics)
value indicates the FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Approved
mode.
1.2 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary
The Module is designed to be embedded into plastic card bodies, with a contact plate and contactless
antenna connections. The physical form of the Module is depicted in Figure 1 (to scale); the red outline
depicts the physical cryptographic boundary, representing the surface of the chip and the bond pads. In
production use, the Module is delivered to either vendors or end user customers in various forms:
• As bare die in wafer form for direct chip assembly by wire bonding or flip chip assembly
• Wire bonded and encapsulated by epoxy with additional packaging (e.g., Dual Interface Modules;
Contact only Modules; Contactless Modules; SMD packages)
The contactless ports of the module require connection to an antenna. The Module relies on [ISO 7816]
and [ISO 14443] card readers as input/output devices.
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 9 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
Figure 1: NXP Semiconductors JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB): Physical Form
Table 5: Ports and Interfaces
Port Description Logical Interface Type C D
VCC, GND ISO 7816: Supply voltage Power X X
RST ISO 7816: Reset Control in X X
CLK ISO 7816: Clock Control in X X
I/O ISO 7816: Input/Output Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out X X
LA, LB ISO 14443: Antenna Power, Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out X
NC Not connected Not connected
In the table above, an “X” in the C column indicates the port is active in the Contact mode; an “X” in the
D column indicates the port is active in the Dual interface (Contact and contactless) mode.
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 10 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
1.3 Firmware and Logical Cryptographic Boundary
Figure 2 depicts the Module operational environment.
Figure 2: Module Block Diagram
The JavaCard and Global Platform APIs are internal interfaces available to applets. Only applet services
are available at the card edge (the interfaces that cross the cryptographic boundary).
The HID Crescendo Applets v3.0 comprises:
• ASC Library package – This is the library package that implements functions required by other
applets. The library functions are not directly accessible via the cryptographic Module command
interface.
• Access Control Applet (ACA) – This applet is responsible for Access Control Rules (ACR) definition,
access control rules enforcement and secure-messaging processing for all card services.
• SMAv3 (ZKM) Library package1
- This library implements ECC OnePassDH Key Agreement with
Key Confirmation (Key Agreement Role Responder - Key Confirmation Role Provider and Type
Unilateral). It is used by SMAv3 applet for OPACITY ZKM Secure Messaging protocol
establishment.
• SMAv3 Applet1
– This applet implements the OPACITY ZKM Secure Messaging protocol based on
[INCITS 504-1]. This Secure Messaging is initiated through the use of a key establishment protocol,
based on a static ECC key pair stored in the applet and an ephemeral ECC key pair generated on
the host application. This key establishment is a one-way authentication protocol that
Hardware
Power Mgmt
Clock
Mgmt
Sensors
Reset Mgmt
RAM
MMU
EEPROM
ROM
CPU
DES
Engine
AES Engine
RSA/ECC
Engine
HW RNG
CRC
Timers
ISO 7816
(UART)
ISO 14443
(RF)
Vcc, GND
CLK
RST
I/O (Contact)
LA/LB (RF)
Firmware Platform
JCOP OS
JavaCard API
Global Platform API
Card
Manager
HID Global
Applets v3.0
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 11 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
authenticates the card to the host application and establishes a set of AES session keys used to
protect the communication channel between the two parties.
• PIVExt Applet – This Applet implements [SP800-73](both at card-edge and data model levels)
and is extended to support additional features on top of native PIV such as support of additional
PKI RSA/ECC keys, etc. This applet can be instantiated in PIV EP mode (native PIV features) or in
PIV Ext mode (extensions accessible through the 800-73-4 card edge.).
• HMAC Library package - This library implements Hash Message Authentication Code. It is used
by ACA for HMAC Power-On Self-Test and by OATH applet1
for authentication codes computation.
• OATH Applet1
– The OATH Applet provides Open Authentication services that can be used by
client application / embedded devices like the BLE Token to authenticate against an
authentication server like ActivID Authentication Server. These authentication services consist in
HMAC-Based One-Time password (HOTP), Time-Based One-Time password (TOTP), OATH
Challenge-Response / Digital Signature Algorithm (OCRA)
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 12 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
2 Cryptographic Functionality
The module implements the Approved and Allowed cryptographic functions listed below.
Table 6: Approved Algorithms
CAVP
Cert
List Standard Mode/Method Strength2
Use
4812 AES [197], [38A] CBC, ECB
128, 256
Not Used: 192
Data Encryption/ Decryption
4812
AES
CMAC
[197], [38B] CMAC
128, 256
Not Used: 192
Message Authentication.
SP 800-108 KDF
Vendor
Affirmed
CKG [133r2] §4 Key Pairs for Digital
Signature Schemes,
generation uses the
unmodified DRBG
Cert. #1187 output
112, 128, 192 ECDSA and RSA Key Generations
824
CVL
ECDH
[56B] ECC CDH Primitive
P-256, P-384
Not used: P-224, P-
521
Shared Secret Computation
C901
CVL
RSADP
[56B] n=2048
PIV system key (non-CSP)
decryption
C901
CVL
RSASP1
[186] n=2048
Signature generation primitive (off
card hash).
1187 DRBG [90Ar1] Hash_DRBG 256
Deterministic Random Bit
Generation
890 ECDSA [186]
P-256, P-384
Not Used: P-224, P-521
ECC Key Generation
P-256: (SHA-256), P-384: (SHA-384)
Not Used: P-224: (SHA-224), P-521: (SHA-512)
Digital Signature Generation
Not Used: P-192: (SHA-1)3
, P-224: (SHA-224),
P-256: (SHA-256), P-384: (SHA-384), P-521:
(SHA-512)
Digital Signature Verification
implementation is not reachable
except for the Self-Test
C399 HMAC [198-1]
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-512 with:
- KS < BS, KS > BS, KS = BS
- λ > 32
OTP Generation
Vendor
Affirmed
KAS-SSC [56Ar3] ECC DH
P-256, SHA-256
P-384, SHA-384
PIV Secure Messaging Key
Agreement
Key establishment methodology
provides 128 or 192 bits of
encryption strength
91 KBKDF [108] CTR
128, 256
Not Used: 192
Deriving keys from existing keys
Vendor
Affirmed
KDA [56Crev1]
One-step key-
derivation functions
option 1
SHA-256, SHA-384
Deriving keys KAS-SSC Shared
Secret for Secure Messaging
2
Strength indicates DRBG Strength, Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli
3
Legacy use only
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 13 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
CAVP
Cert
List Standard Mode/Method Strength2
Use
4812 KTS [38F] AES CBC/AES CMAC
128, 256
Not Used: 192
Meets the SP 800-38F §3.1 ¶3
requirements for symmetric key
wrapping, using Cert. #4812 AES
CBC and AES CMAC.
Key establishment methodology
provides 128 or 256 bits of
encryption strength.
2086 RSA [186]
n=2048
Not used: n = 3072
RSA key generation
2053 RSA [186]
n=2048
SHA-256
Not used: n = 3072; SHA-(224, 384, 512)
Digital signature generation
Not used: n = 10243
, 2048, 3072; SHA-( 14
,
224, 256, 384, 5125
)
Digital signature verification
implementation is not reachable
except for the Self-Test
3299 SHS [180]
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
Not used: SHA-224
Message Digest generation
2547
Triple-
DES
[67r2] CBC, ECB 3-Key (112)
This algorithm is implemented but
it is never called except for the Self-
Test
Table 7: Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description
NDRNG Hardware NDRNG; used as entropy input (384 bits) to the FIPS approved (Cert. #1187)
DRBG.
The non-deterministic hardware RNG outputs 8 bits per access, buffered by the device
driver, which performs the continuous RNG test when a 32-bit value is available.
2.1 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All usage of these CSPs is described in the
services detailed in Section 3.4. In the tables below, the following prefixes are used:
• OS prefix denotes operating system.
• SD prefix denotes a GlobalPlatform Security Domain.
• ACA prefix denotes an ACA Applet CSP or Public Key
• PIV prefix denotes a PIV Applet CSP or Public Key
• SMA1
prefix denotes an SMA V3 Applet CSP or Public Key
• OATH1
prefix denotes an OATH Applet CSP or Public Key
Table 8: Critical Security Parameters
4
This algorithm is Approved for legacy use
5
The SHA-512 is not available for 1024-bit RSA signature verification
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 14 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
CSP Description/Usage
Card Manager
OS-DRBG-EI 384-bit NDRNG entropy input to Hash_DRBG.
OS-DRBG-STATE 880-bit value; the current hash_DRBG state (V, C, reseed_counter).
OS-MKEK AES-128/192/256 key used to encrypt all secret and private key data stored in NVM.
SD-KENC AES (128-bit, 192-bit, 256-bit) Master key used to derive SD‐SENC.
SD-KMAC AES (128-bit, 192-bit, 256-bit) Master key used to derive SD‐SMAC.
SD-KDEK AES (128-bit, 192-bit, 256-bit) Sensitive data decryption key used to decrypt CSPs.
SD-SENC
AES (128-bit, 192-bit, 256-bit) Session encryption key used to encrypt / decrypt secure
channel data.
SD-SMAC
AES (128-bit, 192-bit, 256-bit) Session MAC key used to verify inbound secure channel
data integrity.
SD-RMAC
AES (128-bit, 192-bit, 256-bit) Session MAC key used to generate response secure
channel data MAC.
Applets
ACA-SPAK
AES-128 key used by the ACA applet to authenticate the AA role (0-8 keys). One slot is
used for PIV Card Application Administration Key (9B) storage.
ACA-PIN 8 characters string PIN used for local PIN verification
ACA-PUK
8 characters string PIN Unblocking Key used to confirm authorization to unblock a
blocked PIN.
PIVX-GPK-Pr
General purpose key with usage determined outside the Module scope. The following
key types are supported: RSA 2048, ECC P-256 and ECC P-384 curves.
PIV-AuK-Pr
PIV Card Application Authentication Key (9A): RSA (2048-bit) and ECDSA (P-256, P-
384) private key for signature generation
PIV-DSK-Pr
PIV Card Application Digital Signature Key (9C): RSA (2048-bit) and ECDSA (P-256, P-
384) private key for signature generation
PIV-KMK-Pr
PIV Card Application Key Management Key (9D): RSA (2048-bit) and ECDSA (P-256, P-
384) private key for key establishment schemes realization
PIV-RKMK-Pr
PIV Card Application Key Management Key (82-90): RSA (2048-bit) and ECDSA (P-256,
P-384) private key for key establishment schemes realization
PIV-CaK-Pr
PIV Card Application Authentication Key (9E): RSA (2048-bit) and ECDSA (P-256, P-
384) private key for signature generation
SMA-OK-Pr1 PIV Card Application Opacity Secure Messaging keys (04): C(ipher) S(uite) 2 and CS 7
private components used by PIV Secure Messaging Key service.
SMA-SCFRM1 PIV Card Application Opacity Secure Messaging Key Confirmation Key: AES-128 key and
AES-256 used to compute authentication cryptogram
SMA-SENC1 PIV Card Application Opacity Secure Messaging Encryption Session Key: AES-128 and
AES-256 key
SMA-SCMAC1 PIV Card Application Opacity Secure Messaging Command Authentication Session
Key: AES-128 and AES-256 key
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 15 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
CSP Description/Usage
SMA-SRMAC1 PIV Card Application Opacity Secure Messaging Response Authentication Session Key:
AES-128 and AES-256 key
OATH-OTP1 HMAC Key used by the OATH applet for one-time password generation. The following
key lengths are supported: 160 bits, 256 bits and 512 bits
Table 9: Public Keys
Public Key Description/Usage
Applets
PIVX-GPK-Pu
General purpose key with usage determined outside the Module scope. The following
key types are supported: RSA 2048, ECC P-256 and ECC P-384 curves.
PIV-AuK-Pu
PIV Card Application Authentication Key (9A): RSA (2048-bit) and ECDSA (P-256, P-
384) public key for signature verification
PIV-DSK-Pu
PIV Card Application Digital Signature Key (9C): RSA (2048-bit) and ECDSA (P-256, P-
384) public key for signature verification
PIV-KMK-Pu
PIV Card Application Key Management Key (9D): RSA (2048-bit) and ECDSA (P-256, P-
384) public key for key establishment schemes realization
PIV-RKMK-Pu
PIV Card Application Key Management Key (82-90): RSA (2048-bit) and ECDSA (P-256,
P-384) public key for key establishment schemes realization
PIV-CAK-Pu
PIV Card Application Authentication Key (9E): RSA (2048-bit) and ECDSA (P-256, P-
384) public key for signature verification
SMA-OK-Pu1 PIV Card Application Opacity Secure Messaging keys (04): C(ipher) S(uite) 2 and CS 7
public components used by PIV Secure Messaging Key service.
ACA-PC
8 characters string Pairing Code used to associate a peer device for a virtual contact
interface.
3 Roles, Authentication and Services
The Module:
• Does not support a maintenance role.
• Clears previous authentications on power cycle.
• Supports Global Platform SCP logical channels, allowing concurrent operators in a limited fashion.
Authentication of each operator and their access to roles and services is as described below, independent
of logical channel usage. Concurrent operators are supported with limited fashion, controlling access to
restricted objects and services via the ACA applet access control mechanism.
Table 10 lists all operator roles supported by the Module.
Table 10: Roles Supported by the Module
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 16 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
Role ID Role Description
CO Cryptographic Officer – manages Module content and configuration, including issuance and
management of Module data via the ISD. Authenticated as described in Secure Channel
Protocol Authentication below.
AA Application Administrator - responsible for configuration of the applet suite data.
Authenticated as described in Application Administrator Authentication Method.
CH Card Holder (User) – uses the Module for an identity token. Authenticated as described in
Card Holder Authentication Method.
3.1 Secure Channel Protocol Authentication Method
The Secure Channel Protocol authentication method is provided by the Secure Channel service (Card
Manager or Applets). The SD-KENC and SD-KMAC keys are used to derive the SD-SENC and SD-SMAC
keys, respectively. The off-card entity participating in the mutual authentication sends a 64-bit
challenge to the Smart Card. The Smart Card generates its own challenge and computes a 64-bit
cryptogram with SD-SMAC key and both challenges. The Smart Card cryptogram and challenge are sent
to the off-card entity which checks the Smart Card cryptogram and creates its own 64-bit cryptogram
with both challenges. A 64-bit message authentication code (MAC) is also computed on the command
containing the off-card entity cryptogram with AES-CMAC and SD-SMAC key; the MAC is concatenated
to the command, and this whole command is sent to the Smart Card. The Smart Card checks the
message authentication code and compares the received cryptogram to the calculated cryptogram. If
all of this succeeds, the two participants are mutually authenticated (the external entity is
authenticated to the Module in the CO role).
The probability that a random attempt will succeed using this authentication method is:
• 1/(2^128) = 2.9E‐39 (MAC||cryptogram, using a 128‐bit block for authentication)
The Module enforces a maximum of eighty (80) consecutive failed SCP authentication attempts. The
probability that a random attempt will succeed over a one-minute interval is:
• 80/2^128 = 2.4E-37 (MAC||cryptogram, using a 128‐bit block for authentication)
3.2 Application Administrator Authentication Method
The Application Administrator Authentication method is provided by Authenticate service. This
authentication method decrypts with ACA-SPAK an encrypted 128-bit challenge sent to the module by an
off-card entity and compares the resulting challenge to the expected value. The authentication strength
for this method depends on the algorithm, key size and challenge size used: the minimum strength key
used for this method is AES-128 Key; however, the limiting factor in this authentication method is the 128-
bit block size.
The associated probability of false authentication of this authentication methods is:
• 1/(2^128) = 2.9E -39
The execution of this authentication mechanism is rate limited, the module can perform no more than
2^16 attempts per minute. Therefore, the probability that a random attempt will succeed over a one-
minute period is:
• 2^16/(2^128) = 1.9E -34
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 17 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
3.3 Card Holder Authentication Method
The Card Holder Authentication method is provided by Authenticate service. This authentication method
compares a value sent to the Module to the stored ACA-PIN or ACA-PUK values; if the two values are
equal, the operator is authenticated. This method is used to authenticate to the CH (User) role or to
confirm authorization to unblock a blocked PIN.
The HID ActivID Applet Suite 3.0 does not support the FIPS 201 global PIN option.
The strength of this authentication method depends on both internal and external factors.
The Module supports numeric PIN values coded in ASCII with a length comprises between 6 and 8 bytes.
The character space for the first 6 bytes is 10 (the values ‘30’ through ‘39’ are permitted) and in the last
two (2) characters is eleven (11) (the values ‘30’ through ‘39’ and ‘FF’ are permitted). The probability of
false authentication of this authentication method is as follows:
• 1/(10^6*11^2) = 8.3E-9
Based on the [73] defined maximum count of 15 for failed authentication attempts, the probability that a
random attempt will succeed over a one-minute period is:
• 15/(10^6*11^2) = 1.2E-7
3.4 Services
All services implemented by the Module are listed in the tables below. The ISD Services are provided by
the Card Manager and are available to off card entities. Such services are related to card content
management (e.g., applet installation, deletion, card data access or storage) accessed via communication
protocols like ISO7816 during the configuration of the module. The Applets Services are available to on
card entities, i.e., Java Card applets. These services are typically cryptographic services available via the
Java Card API.
Table 11: Unauthenticated Services
Service Description
ISD (OS/Card Manager) Services
Card Reset Power cycle or reset the Module. Includes Power-On Self-Test.
Context Select an applet or manage logical channels.
Info
Read unprivileged data objects, e.g., module configuration or status
information.
Applets Services
Logout
Logout all previously authenticated roles; if establish, the Secure Messaging
stay opened.
PIV CA Authentication
PIV Application Card authentication to the client application (INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE).
VCI Establishment1
Open a Secure messaging from the Opacity Key Establishment protocol.
Applets Info Read unprivileged data objects info.
ACA update properties
(Unauthenticated)
ACA Update properties: Update Change Pin after first Use flag.
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 18 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
Table 12: Authenticated Services
Service Description CO AA CH
ISD (OS/Card Manager) Services
Secure Channel Establish and use a secure communications channel. X
Lifecycle
Modify the card or applet life cycle status. This service can be
used to zeroize the module.
X
Manage Content Install application packages and associated keys and data. X
Privileged Info Read module data (privileged data objects, but no CSPs). X
Applets Services
Applets Secure
Channel
Establish and use a secure communications channel.
X
Applets Lifecycle Modify the applet life cycle status. X
Applets Manage
Content
Register/unregister applet instances and related information
for access control configuration. Set object identifiers
associated with applet instances. Manage applet properties,
keys, PINs, pairing codes, secure messaging certificate, and
other data associated with the applet.
X X
Authenticate
Application Administrator authentication, Card Holder
authentication by presenting the PIN.
X X*
Applets
Privileged Info
Read the PIV data content of the single data object being
authenticated.
X
CH
Authentication
Management
Change, unblock the Card Holder PIN of the PIV Applet. X X X*
PIV AU
Authentication
PIV Application authentication to the client application
(INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE).
X
PIV Digital
Signature
Generate RSA/ECDSA signature of an external hash value. X
PIV Key
Establishment
Realize key establishment schemes specified in SP 800-78
(RSA/ECDH).
X
PIVExt Sign Sign an externally generated hash value (RSA/ECDSA). X
OATH
Authentication1
Obtain a One Time Password (HOTP, TOTP), Perform an OCRA
challenge Response or Digital Signature6
.
X
*: Means may be sent through Opacity ZKM (Secure Messaging) session in contactless
Table 13 and Table 14 below describe the access to CSPs by service.
Table 13: CSP Accesses within Services of Card Manager, ACA applet, and PIVExt applet
Services CSPs
6
The Digital Signature is a HMAC computation; this terminology is defined in RFC 6287.
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 19 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
OS-DRBG-EI
OS-DRBG-STATE
OS-MKEK
SD-KENC
SD-KMAC
SD-KDEK
SD-SENC
SD-SMAC
SD-RMAC
ACA-SPAK
ACA-PIN
ACA-PUK
PIVX-GPK-Pr
PIV-AuK-Pr
PIV-DSK-Pr
PIV-KMK-Pr
PIV-RKMK-Pr
PIV-CaK-Pr
Unauthenticated Card Manager ACA applet PIVExt applet
Card Reset GEZ
GEW
Z
-- -- -- -- Z Z Z -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Context -- -- -- -- -- -- EZ EZ EZ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Info -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Logout -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
PIV CA
Authentication
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E
VCI Establishment
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Applets Info
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
ACA update
properties
(Unauthenticated)
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Authenticated Card Manager ACA applet PIV applet
Secure Channel
and Applets
Secure Channel
-- -- -- -- -- -- GE GE GE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Lifecycle and
Applets Lifecycle
Z Z Z Z Z Z E E E Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Manage Content
and Applets
Manage Content
Z Z Z WZ WZ WZE E E E WZ WZ WZ GWZ GWZ GWZ GWZ GWZ GWZ
Authenticate -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E E E -- -- -- -- -- --
Privileged Info
and Applets
Privileged Info
-- -- -- -- -- -- E E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
CH Authentication
Management -- -- -- -- -- -- E E E -- WZ WZ -- -- -- -- -- --
PIV AU
Authentication
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- -- --
PIV Digital
Signature
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- --
PIV Key
Establishment
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E E --
PIVExt Sign -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- -- -- --
OATH
Authentication
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 20 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
Table 14: CSPs within Services of ZKM and OATH1
applets, and Public Keys Access within Services
Services
CSPs Public Key
SMA-OK-Pr
SMA-SCFRM
SMA-SENC
SMA-SCMAC
SMA-SRMAC
OATH-OTP
PIVX-GPK-Pu
PIV-AuK-Pu
PIV-DSK-Pu
PIV-KMK-Pu
PIV-RKMK-Pu
PIV-CaK-Pu
SMA-OK-Pu
ACA-PC
Unauthenticated ZKM applet OATH PIV applet ZKM ACA
Card Reset -- Z Z Z Z -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Context -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Info -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Logout -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
PIV CA Authentication -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
VCI Establishment
E GEZ G G G -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E
Applets Info
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
ACA update
properties
(Unauthenticated)
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Authenticated ZKM applet OATH PIV applet ZKM ACA
Secure Channel and
Applets Secure
Channel
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Lifecycle and Applets
Lifecycle
Z -- -- -- -- Z -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Z
Manage Content and
Applets Manage
Content
GZ -- -- -- -- WZ GR GR GR GR GR GR GR WZ
Authenticate -- -- E E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Privileged Info and
Applets Privileged Info
-- -- E E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
CH Authentication
Management -- -- E E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- WZ
PIV AU Authentication -- -- E E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
PIV Digital Signature -- -- E E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
PIV Key Establishment -- -- E E E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
PIVExt Sign -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
OATH Authentication -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
• G = Generate: The Module generates the CSP.
• R = Read: The Module reads the CSP (read access to the CSP by an outside entity).
• E = Execute: The Module executes using the CSP.
• W = Write: The Module writes the CSP. The write access is typically performed after a CSP is
imported into the Module or when the module overwrites an existing CSP.
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP. For the Context service, SD session keys are destroyed
on applet deselect (channel closure).
• -- = Not accessed by the service.
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 21 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
4 Self-Test
4.1 Power-On Self-Tests
On power-on or reset, the Module performs self-tests as described Table 15 below. All KATs must be
completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If one of the KATs other
than HMAC fails, the system will not answer any services and the module will have to be restarted/reset.
If the HMAC KAT fails, the module will return a SW_CRYPTO_EXCEPTION exception. In this state, the
module will return a SW_CRYPTO_EXCEPTION exception to all services and the module will have to be
restarted/reset.
Table 15: Power-On Self-Test
Test Target Description
AES Performs separate encrypt and decrypt KATs using an AES-128 key in CBC mode.
Both the standard and fast implementations of AES encrypt and decrypt are
separately tested.
AES CMAC Performs AES CMAC generate and verify KATs using an AES-128 key.
DRBG Performs a fixed input KAT and all SP 800-90A health test monitoring functions.
ECC CDH Performs separate ECDSA signature and verify KATs using the P-256 curve.
ECDSA Performs ECDSA signature and verify KATs using the P-256 curve; this self-test is
inclusive of the ECC CDH self-test.
Firmware Integrity 16-bit CRC performed over all code located in EEPROM. This integrity test is not
required or performed for code stored in masked ROM code memory.
HMAC7
Performs a fixed input KAT (HMAC SHA-1, inclusive of HMAC SHA-256, -512, per IG
9.4) on the first selection of whatever instance after a power-on.
KBKDF Performs a fixed input KAT on SP 800-108 AES-CMAC based KBKDF.
RSA Performs separate RSA signature and verify KATs using an RSA 2048-bit key.
SHA-1 Performs a fixed input KAT.
SHA-256 Performs a fixed input KAT (inclusive of SHA-224, per IG 9.4).
SHA-512 Performs a fixed input KAT (inclusive of SHA-384, per IG 9.4).
Triple-DES Performs encrypt and decrypt KATs using 3-Key Triple-DES in CBC mode.
4.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The Module performs the conditional self-tests as described in Table 16 below. If one of the conditional
self-tests fails, the system will not answer any services and the module will have to be restarted/reset.
Table 16: Conditional Self-Tests
Test Target Description
DRBG CRNGT
On every call to the DRBG, the Module performs the AS09.42 continuous RNG test to
assure that the output is different than the previous value.
Generate PCT
Pairwise consistency test performed when an asymmetric key pair is generated for
RSA or ECC.
7
POST HMAC is performed when OATH applet is loaded only.
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 22 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
Test Target Description
NDRNG CRNGT
AS09.42 continuous RNG test performed on each 32 bits access from the NDRNG
(buffered by the driver) to assure that the output is different than the previous value.
Signature PCT Pairwise consistency test performed when a signature is generated for RSA or ECDSA.
5 Physical Security Policy
The Module is a single-chip implementation that meets commercial-grade specifications for power,
temperature, reliability, and shock/vibrations. The Module uses standard passivation techniques and is
protected by active shielding (a grid of top metal layer wires with tamper response). A tamper event
detected by the active shield places the Module permanently into the Tamper is detected error state.
Hardness Testing was conducted at three (3) different temperatures; at nominal temperature (20o
C, 68o
F), at high temperature (120o
C, 248o
F), and at low temperature (-40o
C, -40o
F).
The Module is intended to be mounted in additional packaging; physical inspection of the die is typically
not practical after packaging.
6 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The module is protected against SPA, DPA, Timing Analysis and Fault Induction using a combination of
firmware and hardware countermeasures. Protection features include detection of out-of-range supply
voltages, frequencies or temperatures, and detection of illegal address or instruction. All cryptographic
computations and sensitive operations such as PIN comparison provided by the module are designed to
be resistant to timing and power analysis. Sensitive operations are performed in constant time, regardless
of the execution context (parameters, keys, etc.), owing to a combination of hardware and firmware
features.
7 Security Rules and Guidance
The Module implementation also enforces the following security rules:
1. The Module provides three distinct operator roles: Cryptographic Officer, Application
Administrator, and the Card Holder (User).
2. The Module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
3. The Module provides identity-based authentication.
4. The Module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
5. The Module allows the operator to initiate power-up self-tests by power cycling power or
resetting the module.
6. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. The Module does not output CSPs (plaintext or encrypted).
8. The Module does not support manual key entry.
9. The Module does not output intermediate key values.
10. No additional interface or service is implemented by the Module which would provide access to
CSPs.
11. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
12. There are no restrictions on which CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
13. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the Module.
14. The Module does not provide bypass services
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 23 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)
15. If the ACA applet is set to “PIN Numeric Only”, then the applet verifies the new PIN is numeric
only.
The following rules are imposed by the Vendor:
16. FIPS Level 2 profiles shall be configured with an ACA applet with “PIN Numeric Only”
configuration, with a Minimum / Maximum PIN Length set from 6 to 8. This ensures end-user’s
PIV PIN value meets the conditions as described in [SP800 73] and that the selected PIN values
also meet the [FIPS 140 2] probability of false authentication of 1 in 1,000,000.
HID Global Applets v3.0 on NXP JCOP 3 SecID P60 CS (OSB) FIPS 140-2 L2 Security Policy
Copyright HID Global, 2021 Version 1.2 Page 24 of 24
HID Global Public Material – may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision)