© 2018 Western Digital Corporation or its affiliates. Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
Ultrastar® SS200 TCG Enterprise SSD
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Protection of Data at Rest
Version: 2.1
Date: 7/10/2018
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FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Page 2 of 28
Table of Contents
1 Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary ................................................................................... 6
1.2 Firmware and Logical Cryptographic Boundary...................................................................................... 8
1.3 Mode of Operation................................................................................................................................. 8
2 Cryptographic Features .................................................................................................................... 9
2.1 Critical Security Parameters.................................................................................................................. 10
2.2 Public Keys ............................................................................................................................................ 11
2.3 SP800 132 Key Derivation Function Affirmations................................................................................. 11
3 Roles, Authentication, and Services ............................................................................................... 11
3.1 Assumption of Roles ............................................................................................................................. 11
3.2 Authentication Methods....................................................................................................................... 12
3.3 Services ................................................................................................................................................. 13
4 Self-tests ......................................................................................................................................... 18
5 Physical Security ............................................................................................................................. 19
5.1 Mechanisms.......................................................................................................................................... 19
5.2 Tamper-Evident Seals and Locations.................................................................................................... 19
5.3 Operator Inspection.............................................................................................................................. 21
6 Operational Environment............................................................................................................... 22
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy.................................................................................................. 22
8 Security Rules and Guidance .......................................................................................................... 22
8.1 Invariant Rules ...................................................................................................................................... 22
8.2 Crypto-Officer Initialization .................................................................................................................. 23
8.3 Crypto-Officer Zeroization.................................................................................................................... 24
9 Non-security Related Services........................................................................................................ 24
9.1 Non-security Related TCG Methods and Protocol................................................................................ 24
9.2 Non-security Related SCSI Commands ................................................................................................. 24
10 References ...................................................................................................................................... 25
11 Glossary........................................................................................................................................... 26
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Product Models and Versions.....................................................................................................................5
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements ....................................................................................................6
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces....................................................................................................................................7
Table 4 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions ...........................................................................9
Table 5 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation..................................................... 10
Table 6 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions............................................................................. 10
Table 7 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs).......................................................................................................... 10
Table 8 – Public Security Parameters (PSPs) ........................................................................................................... 11
Table 9 – Roles Description ..................................................................................................................................... 12
Table 10 – Unauthenticated Roles .......................................................................................................................... 12
Table 11 – Authentication Description.................................................................................................................... 13
Table 12 – Authenticated Services .......................................................................................................................... 13
Table 13 – Authenticated Services (Non-Approved Mode) .................................................................................... 14
Table 14 – Unauthenticated Services...................................................................................................................... 15
Table 15 –Access Rights within Services.................................................................................................................. 17
Table 16 – Power Up Self-tests................................................................................................................................ 18
Table 17 – Conditional Self-tests............................................................................................................................. 19
Table 18 – TCG Methods/Messages........................................................................................................................ 24
Table 19 – SCSI Commands ..................................................................................................................................... 24
Table 20 – References ............................................................................................................................................. 25
Table 21 – Acronyms and Definitions...................................................................................................................... 26
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Cryptographic Module Definition for SDLL1HLR-076T-CF, SDLL1MLR-038T-CF, SDLL1MLR-032T-CF, and
SDLL1CLR-016T-CF......................................................................................................................................................6
Figure 2 - Cryptographic Module Definition for SDLL1CLR-020T-CF, SDLL1DLR-960G-CF, SDLL1DLR-480G-CF,
SDLL1DLR-800G-CF, and SDLL1DLR-400G-CF .............................................................................................................6
Figure 3 – Module Block Diagram ..............................................................................................................................8
Figure 4 - Tamper-Evident Seal Over Screws, 12mm x 7mm seal........................................................................... 19
Figure 5 - Tamper-Evident Seal Over HDMI Port, 20mm x 10mm seal ................................................................... 19
Figure 6 – Tamper-Evident Seal Locations on Top, SDLL1HLR-076T-CF, SDLL1MLR-038T-CF, SDLL1MLR-032T-CF,
CSDLL1CLR-016T-CF, Version 1................................................................................................................................ 20
Figure 7. - Tamper-Evident Seal Locations on Top, SDLL1CLR-020T-CF, SDLL1DLR-960G-CF, SDLL1DLR-480G-CF,
SDLL1DLR-800G-CF, SDLL1DLR-400G-CF, Version 1................................................................................................ 20
Figure 8. - Tamper-Evident Seal Location on Back Covering HDMI Port, SDLL1HLR-076T-CF, SDLL1MLR-038T-CF,
SDLL1MLR-032T-CF, CSDLL1CLR-016T-CF, Version 1 .............................................................................................. 21
Figure 9 - Tamper-Evident Seal Location on Back Covering HDMI Port, SDLL1CLR-020T-CF, SDLL1DLR-960G-CF,
SDLL1DLR-480G-CF, SDLL1DLR-800G-CF, SDLL1DLR-400G-CF, Version 1 ............................................................... 21
Figure 10 – Small Seal Before Tamper..................................................................................................................... 22
Figure 11 – Small Seal with Tamper Evidence......................................................................................................... 22
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Figure 12 – Large Seal Before Tamper..................................................................................................................... 22
Figure 13 – Large Seal with Tamper Evidence......................................................................................................... 22
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1 Introduction
This document defines the Security Policy for the Ultrastar® SS200 TCG Enterprise SSD cryptographic modules,
hereafter denoted as the Module. It is compliant with FIPS 140-2 overall Level 2 requirements and is a multi-chip
embedded embodiment. The Module is a 12Gbps Solid State Drive (SSD)-Self-Encrypting Drive (SED). The
Module is constructed and compliant with the following standards and specifications:
• FIPS PUB 140-2 [FIPS140]
• NIST [SP800 88] Guidelines for Media Sanitization
• Trusted Computing Group Storage Architecture Core Specification [TCG Core]
• Trusted Computing Group Enterprise Specification [TCG Enterprise]
• Trusted Computing Group Storage Interface Interaction Specification [TCG SIIS]
• Small Computer System Interface Block Commands [SCSI SBC]
• Small Computer System Interface Primary Commands [SCSI SPC]
• Serial Attached SCSI [SAS]
• Small Form Factor 8200 2.5” Enclosure Specification [SFF Enclosure]
• Small Form Factor 8639 Connector Specification [SFF Connector]
More information on the Module is available from the following sources:
• http://www.hgst.com/products/solid-state-solutions/ultrastar-ss200 has information on this product
• Cryptographic Module Validation Program has contact information for individuals that can answer
technical and sales questions
There shall be no discrepancies with the product model numbers, the hardware version numbers and the
firmware version numbers from the three following sources:
• This Security Policy
• The NIST/CMVP website
• The output information provided by the ‘FIPS Info’ service
Table 1 – Product Models and Versions
Model Number, HW Version FW Versions Capacity Description
SDLL1HLR-076T-CF Version 1 X141 and X350 7680 GB 1 DW/D, 12Gbs SAS, 2.5in, 15mm
SDLL1MLR-038T-CF Version 1 X141 and X350 3840 GB 1 DW/D, 12Gbs SAS, 2.5in, 15mm
SDLL1CLR-020T-CF Version 1 X141 and X350 1920 GB 1 DW/D, 12Gbs SAS, 2.5in, 15mm
SDLL1DLR-960G-CF Version 1 X141 and X350 960 GB 1 DW/D, 12Gbs SAS, 2.5in, 15mm
SDLL1DLR-480G-CF Version 1 X141 and X350 480 GB 1 DW/D, 12Gbs SAS, 2.5in, 15mm
SDLL1MLR-032T-CF Version 1 X141 and X350 3200 GB 3 DW/D, 12Gbs SAS, 2.5in, 15mm
SDLL1CLR-016T-CF Version 1 X141 and X350 1600 GB 3 DW/D, 12Gbs SAS, 2.5in, 15mm
SDLL1DLR-800G-CF Version 1 X141 and X350 800 GB 3 DW/D, 12Gbs SAS, 2.5in, 15mm
SDLL1DLR-400G-CF Version 1 X141 and X350 400 GB 3 DW/D, 12Gbs SAS, 2.5in, 15mm
DW/D = Drive Writes per Day endurance
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The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are:
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 3
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary
Figure 1 and Figure 2 depict the front and rear views of the Module. The drive enclosure defines the
cryptographic boundary.
Figure 1 – Cryptographic Module Definition for SDLL1HLR-076T-CF, SDLL1MLR-038T-CF, SDLL1MLR-032T-CF,
and SDLL1CLR-016T-CF
Figure 2 - Cryptographic Module Definition for SDLL1CLR-020T-CF, SDLL1DLR-960G-CF, SDLL1DLR-480G-CF,
SDLL1DLR-800G-CF, and SDLL1DLR-400G-CF
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Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces
FIPS140 Logical Interface Module Physical Ports
Power Power connector
Control Input Dual Port SAS connector, Micro-HDMI connector is disabled with
a tamper evidence seal
Status Output Dual Port SAS connector, Micro-HDMI connector is disabled with
a tamper evidence seal
Data Input Dual Port SAS connector, Micro-HDMI connector is disabled with
a tamper evidence seal
Data Output Dual Port SAS connector, Micro-HDMI connector is disabled with
a tamper evidence seal
The SAS (Serial Attached SCSI) connector is defined by the storage industry [SFF]. Two independent SAS ports are
implemented. The Data Input interface is active only during the data phase of a SCSI Write command, and the
Data Output interface is active only during the data phase of a SCSI Read Command. The Micro-HDMI connector
is enabled only at Western Digital facilities; it is disabled with a tamper evidence seal before the Module is
delivered.
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1.2 Firmware and Logical Cryptographic Boundary
Figure 3 depicts the Module’s operational environment.
Figure 3 – Module Block Diagram
1.3 Mode of Operation
Configuration and policy determine the Cryptographic Module’s mode of operation. The Cryptographic Module
enters FIPS Approved Mode after successful completion of the Crypto-Officer initialization instructions provided
in Section 8.2. The operator can determine if the Cryptographic Module is operating in a FIPS Approved mode
by executing the steps listed below.
1. Start session with the Admin SP
2. Attempt to authenticate SID with the MSID pin. Verify that authentication fails.
3. End session
4. Start session with the Locking SP
5. Attempt to authenticate EraseMaster with MSID pin. Verify that authentication fails.
6. Attempt to authenticate each initialized Bandmaster with the MSID pin. Verify that authentication fails.
7. Get ReadLockEnabled for each initialized band and verify that it is set to TRUE.
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8. Get WriteLockEnabled for each initialized band and verify that it is set to TRUE.
9. Get LockOnReset for each initialized band and verify that it is set to Power Cycle.
10. End Session
If the Crypto-Officer determines that the Cryptographic Module is operating in FIPS non-Approved mode the
Crypto-Officer shall zeroize the module before executing the Crypto-Officer initialization instructions provided in
Section 8.2. This assures that no CSPs are shared between FIPS Approved mode and FIPS non-Approved mode.
2 Cryptographic Features
The Module implements FIPS Approved and Allowed cryptographic functions. All algorithms and key lengths
comply with [SP800 131A].
Table 4 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description Cert #
AES Firmware [FIPS 197, SP800 38A]
Functions: Encryption and Decryption
Modes: ECB
Key sizes: 256 bits
5019
AES XTS Hardware [FIPS 197, SP800 38A, SP800 38E]
Functions: Encryption of Data In, Decryption of Data Out
Modes: XTS
Key sizes: 256 bits
• XTS Key 1 is not equal to XTS Key 2
• XTS data unit length is less than 220
blocks
Modes: ECB
Key sizes: 256 bits
4463
DRBG Firmware [SP800 90A]
Functions: HMAC_DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
Security Strength: 256 bits
1834
HMAC Firmware [FIPS 198-1]
Functions: SP800 132 KDF and SP800 90A DRBG
SHA sizes: SHA-256
3333
RSA Hardware [FIPS 186-4, PKCS#1 v1.5]
Functions: Signature Verification with SHA-256
Key sizes: 2048 bits
2439
SHA Firmware [FIPS 180-4]
Functions: non-Digital Signature Applications
SHA sizes: SHA-256
4078
SHA-256 Hardware [FIPS 180-4]
Functions: Digital Signature Verification and Integrity
SHA sizes: SHA-256
3675
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Table 5 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation
Algorithm Description Rationale
CKG [SP800 133] Cryptographic Key Generation
Functions: Generated from the DRBG without further
modification or post processing
Vendor Affirmed
[FIPS140] IG D.12.
See Section 2.1.
PBKDF [SP800 132] Password Based Key Derivation Function
Functions: Key Encrypting Key
Modes: HMAC/SHA-256
Key Sizes: 256 bits
Vendor Affirmed
[FIPS140 IG] D.6.
See Section 2.3.
Table 6 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description
NDRNG [FIPS140 IG] 7.11
Hardware Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator with 16-bits per access.
The output seeds the SP800 90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator.
There are no Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions.
2.1 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All usage of these CSPs by the Module (including all
CSP lifecycle states) is described in the services detailed in Section 4.
Table 7 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
CSP Type Description
CO TCG PIN: 2
User TCG PIN: 16
256-bit value Authentication data of TCG Authorities (Roles) is
a binary value with no encoding; industry
practice is a 256-bit random number or a SHA-
256 digest [TCG App]
MEKs
(Media Encryption Keys)
16 total
AES256-XTS
(512 bits)
Encrypts User data for the Data In interface and
decrypts User data for the Data Out interface;
generated from the DRBG without modification
KEKs
(Key Encrypting Keys)
16 total
256 bits SP800 132 KDF output; ephemeral, calculated
keys that wrap MEKs
DRBG HMAC_DRBG state
(256-bit output)
State associated with the SP800 90A
Deterministic Random Bit Generator; the
internal state includes values “V” and “Key”
NDRNG entropy source 2048-bit seed and 1024-bit nonce for DRBG
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2.2 Public Keys
Table 8 – Public Security Parameters (PSPs)
Key Description
Download Key Public key of a 2048-bit RSA key pair used to verify downloaded firmware
Value [qty] Description
MSID [1] Initial authentication data for all operators
PSID [1] Crypto-Officer authentication data for TCG Revert
AUTH Salt [18] Concatenated with a CO TCG PIN or a User TCG PIN. Hashed with SHA256. The digest
is stored within the Module.
KEK Salt [16] Input to SP800 132 PBKDF
2.3 SP800 132 Key Derivation Function Affirmations
The Module deploys a [SP800 132] Key Derivation Function (KDF).
• The KEKs (SP800 132 Master Keys) are derived from the User TCG PINs and the CO TCG PINs (SP800 132
Password) with SP800-132 Option 1a
• The length of the User TCG PINs and the CO TCG PINs is 256 bits and the stored security strength is 256
bits
• The upper bound for the probability of guessing the User TCG PINs and the CO TCG PINs is 2-256.
• The difficulty of guessing the User TCG PINs and the CO TCG PINs is equivalent to a brute force attack
• The KEKs (SP800 132 Master Keys) are only used to wrap the Media Encryption Keys (MEKs).
• The CSPs derived using [SP800 132] are only used within storage applications.
3 Roles, Authentication, and Services
3.1 Assumption of Roles
The Module supports three (3) distinct authenticated operator roles: Crypto-Officer (CO), User and one HGST
role. The Module enforces the separation of roles with role-based authentication and fixed entity to key
relationships. The relationship between Users (BandMasters), Bands, and MEKs (Media Encryption Keys) is 1:1:1.
Each CO and User role is associated with a 64-bit public Unique ID (UID) that is defined in [TCG Core]. The HGST
role uses RSA2048 PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification.
Table 9 lists all of the operator roles supported by the Module. The Module does not support a maintenance
role or a bypass mode. The Module protects authentication data from unauthorized disclosure on the Data Out
and Status Out interfaces by not storing plaintext authentication data within the Module and by the constraints
imposed by the TCG/SCSI protocol stack.
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Table 9 – Roles Description
Role Name Description Authentication Type Credentials
Crypto-Officer
(CO)
TCG SID Authority.
initializes the Module
Role-based 64-bit UID and 256-bit
authentication data (TCG PIN)
TCG EraseMaster
Authority is authorized to
generate new Band keys
Role-based 64-bit UID and 256-bit
authentication data (TCG PIN)
User TCG BandMasters [0-15]
Authorities set Band
location and size and
lock/unlock a band.
Role-based TCG BandMasters 64-bit UID and
256-bit authentication data (TCG
PIN);
HGST The Module verifies FW
Images with a RSA2048
public key
Role-based A RSA2048 private key signs FW
images at a Western Digital facility
Table 10 – Unauthenticated Roles
Role Name Description Authentication Type Rationale
Anybody TCG Anybody Authority is
permitted to access
unauthenticated services
None Public 64-bit UID; no TCG
PIN is required
CO.MSID A Module unique default TCG PIN
is installed during manufacturing
Public value Obtained with the Get
service and used by the CO
as authentication data for
the Initialize service
CO.PSID A Module unique TCG PIN is
installed during manufacturing
Public value Printed on the Module’s
label and used by the CO as
authentication data for the
Zeroize service
MakerSymK A TCG Authority that may obtain
a random number from the
[SP800 90A] DRBG
None Equivalent to the Random
service but uses the
Authenticate service
User.MSID A Module unique default TCG PIN
is installed during manufacturing
Public value Obtained with the Get
service and provided by the
User as authentication data
3.2 Authentication Methods
The Authenticate service for User TCG PINs and the CO TCG PINs has two input parameters: a 64-bit public
Unique ID (UID) defined in [TCG Core] and 256-bit authentication data. The authentication data is binary, i.e.,
there are no restrictions on values such as character or digit encoding. The [TCG Core] term for authentication
data is a PIN. The difficulty of guessing a TCG PIN is equivalent to a brute force attack.
Firmware downloads are signed at a Western Digital facility with RSA2048 PKCS#1 v1.5 and verified by the
Module before they are stored within the module.
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Table 11 – Authentication Description
Authentication Method Probability Rationale
256-bit authentication data 1 chance in 2256
A TCG PIN is 256 non-coded bits, which provides 2256
possible values. The probability that a random attempt
succeeds is ~8.6 x 10-78
, which is significantly less than
1/1,000,000 (1 x 10-6
).
Multiple, successive authentication attempts can only
occur sequentially. Any authentication attempt
consumes at least 10 microseconds, and at most,
6,000,000 authentication attempts are possible in one
minute. Thus, the probability that a false acceptance
occurs over a one-minute interval is ~5 x 10-71
, which is
significantly less than 1 chance in 100,000 (1 x 10-5
).
RSA2048 PKCS#1 v1.5 1 chance in 2112
Given the 2112
strength of security from [SP800 131A],
the probability that a random attempt succeeds is ~1.9
x 10-34
, which is significantly less than 1/1,000,000 (1 x
10-6
).
Multiple, successive authentication attempts can only
occur sequentially. Any authentication attempt
consumes at least four (4) seconds, and at most, 15
authentication attempts are possible in one minute.
Thus, the probability that a false acceptance occurs
over a one-minute interval is ~3 x 10-33
, which is
significantly less than 1 chance in 100,000 (1 x 10-5
).
3.3 Services
All services implemented by the Module are listed in Table 12, Table 13, and Table 14. Table 15 declares all
usage of CSPs by service.
Table 12 – Authenticated Services
Service Description
CO.SID
Authority
CO.EraseMaster
User
HGST
Authenticate TCG method to input a UID and PIN for authentication X X X
Set A polymorphic TCG method that writes structured data
subject to operator authorization
X X X
Set TCG PIN A specific TCG Set method that modifies a PIN. An
operator can only change its own PIN
X X X
Set Band A specific TCG Set method that creates and modifies a
Band’s location, capacity and properties
X
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Service Description
CO.SID
Authority
CO.EraseMaster
User
HGST
Lock/Unlock Band A specific TCG Set method that denies/permits access
to a Band
X
Erase Band A TCG method that generates a new Band Media
Encryption Key
X
Read User Data SCSI READ command reads from a Band, transforms
ciphertext to plaintext and outputs User data to the
Data Out interface
X
Write User Data SCSI WRITE command Inputs from the Data In
interface, transforms plaintext User Data to ciphertext
and writes to a Band
X
Set Data Store A specific TCG Set method to write a stream of bytes
to unstructured storage
X
Download Firmware The SCSI WRITE BUFFER command loads and verifies a
firmware image by RSA2048. If the new self-tests
complete successfully, the Module executes the new
code
X
Enable/Disable
Vendor Access
CO may disable the Download Firmware service and
vendor log access
X
Table 13 – Authenticated Services (Non-Approved Mode)
Service Description
CO.SID
Authority
CO.EraseMaster
User
HGST
Authenticate (non-
compliant)
TCG method to input a UID and PIN for authentication X X X
Set (non-compliant) A polymorphic TCG method that writes structured data
subject to operator authorization
X X X
Set TCG PIN (non-
compliant)
A specific TCG Set method that modifies a PIN. An
operator can only change its own PIN
X X X
Set Band (non-compliant) A specific TCG Set method that creates and modifies a
Band’s location, capacity and properties
X
Lock/Unlock Band (non-
compliant)
A specific TCG Set method that denies/permits access
to a Band
X
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Service Description
CO.SID
Authority
CO.EraseMaster
User
HGST
Erase Band (non-
compliant)
A TCG method that generates a new Band Media
Encryption Key
X
Read User Data (non-
compliant)
SCSI READ command reads from a Band, transforms
ciphertext to plaintext and outputs User data to the
Data Out interface
X
Write User Data (non-
compliant)
SCSI WRITE command Inputs from the Data In
interface, transforms plaintext User Data to ciphertext
and writes to a Band
X
Set Data Store (non-
compliant)
A specific TCG Set method to write a stream of bytes
to unstructured storage
X
Download Firmware (non-
compliant)
The SCSI WRITE BUFFER command loads and verifies a
firmware image by RSA2048. If the new self-tests
complete successfully, the Module executes the new
code
X
Enable/Disable
Vendor Access (non-
compliant)
CO may disable the Download Firmware service and
vendor log access
X
Table 14 – Unauthenticated Services
Service Description
Anybody
CO.MSID
CO.PSID
MakerSymK
User.MSID
Module Services
Initialize The Crypto-Officer takes ownership of the
Module with organizational policies. re: ‘Section
8.2 Crypto-Officer Initialization
X
Reset The Module is reset by a power cycle X
Self-test The Module executes self-tests without
operator intervention at power on
X
Show Status Module Status Out is a compound type
constructed with the TCG, SCSI and SAS
protocol stack. Status elements are the TCG IF-
SEND and IF-RECV payloads, SCSI SENSE DATA
and SAS status
X
Zeroize Invoke the TCG Revert service X
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Service Description
Anybody
CO.MSID
CO.PSID
MakerSymK
User.MSID
TCG Services
Authenticate (at Initialize) TCG method to input a UID and PIN for
authentication
X X X X
Get A polymorphic TCG method that reads
structured data
X
Random The TCG Random method outputs a random
number from the [SP800 90A] DRBG
X X
Get Data Store A specific TCG Get method to read a stream of
bytes from unstructured storage
X
StartSession A TCG method that connects to a TCG Security
Provider object
X
End Session A TCG protocol token from the Module to the
operator that disconnects a TCG Security
Provider object
X
Revert A TCG method that restores authentication data
to MSID, the original factory default, and
generates new Media Encryption Keys
X
SCSI Services
FIPS Info Outputs the [SCSI Core] FIPS 140 compliance
descriptor, which provides a model number,
hardware version, firmware version
X
IF-RECV SCSI SECURITY IN command which provides a
tunnel for the TCG protocol
X
IF-SEND SCSI SECURITY OUT command which provides a
tunnel for the TCG protocol
X
Sanitize1
SCSI SANITIZE command that generates and
establishes a new Media Encryption Key
X
Non-security Related Services
TCG methods/messages re: Section 9.1 Non-security Related TCG
requests
X
SCSI Commands re: Section 9.2 Non-security Related SCSI
Commands
X
Table 15 defines the relationship between access to SSPs (i.e., the union of CSPs and PSPs) and the different
Module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as:
1
Only available when the cryptographic module is in the Non-Approved mode
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• G = Generate: The Module generates the SSP.
• R = Read: The Module reads the SSP. The read access is typically performed before the Module uses the
SSP.
• E = Execute: The Module executes using the SSP.
• W = Write: The Module writes the SSP. The write access is typically performed after a SSP is imported
into the Module, when the Module generates a SSP, or when the Module overwrites an existing SSP.
• Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the SSP.
Table 15 –Access Rights within Services
Service
CSP PSP
CO
TCG
PIN
User
TCG
PIN
MEKs
KEKs
DRBG
NDRNG
Download
Key
MSID
PSID
AUTH
Salt
KEK
Salt
Authenticate R R R
Set W RW GEZ R R GW GWR
Set TCG PIN W W W GEZ R R GW GW
Set Band R W GEZ R
Lock/Unlock Band R R GEZ R
Erase Band R ZGW R R GW
Read User Data E
Write User Data E
Set Data Store R R
Download Firmware E
Enable/Disable Vendor Access R R
Initialize W W W GEZ R R R GW GW
Reset ZG ZR
Self-test
Show Status
Zeroize ZW ZW ZGW ZG ZR R R GW GW
Authenticate (at Initialize) R R R
Get R
Random R R
Get Data Store
StartSession
End Session
Revert ZW ZW ZGW ZG ZR R R GW GW
FIPS Info
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Service
CSP PSP
CO
TCG
PIN
User
TCG
PIN
MEKs
KEKs
DRBG
NDRNG
Download
Key
MSID
PSID
AUTH
Salt
KEK
Salt
IF-RECV
IF-SEND
Sanitize ZGW R R GW
TCG methods/messages
SCSI Commands
4 Self-tests
Each time the Module is powered on, it tests that the cryptographic algorithms operate correctly and that
sensitive data has not been damaged. Power on self–tests are available on demand by power cycling the
Module. Table 16 describes the power-on self-tests. All KATs are completed successfully prior to any other use
of cryptography by the Module. If one of the KATs fails, the Module enters an error state. Table 17 describes the
conditional self-tests that are performed during certain conditions after power-on.
For most self-tests, the module does not output an error indicator. Instead, the module goes offline if a self-test
fails. After entering the error state, the cryptographic module does not process functional commands unless a
power cycle occurs. The only exceptions are the following:
• the error indicator is 0x05269A00 for FW Download failure and
• the error indicator is "*** No firmware images could be loaded ***" for FW integrity failure.
Table 16 – Power Up Self-tests
Test Target Description
Firmware Integrity 32-bit checksum of firmware by parts; all parts are checked.
AES Firmware KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB
Key sizes: 256 bits
DRBG Firmware Performed within SP800 90A section 11.3 health checks below
HMAC Firmware KATs: Generation
SHA sizes: SHA-256
KDF Firmware KATs: None during SP800 132 vendor affirmation period per [FIPS140 IG] D.6
SHA Firmware KATs: SHA-256
AES-XTS Hardware KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: XTS
Key sizes: 256 bits
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Test Target Description
RSA Hardware KATs: Signature Verification
Key sizes: 2048 bits
SHA Hardware KATs: SHA-256
Table 17 – Conditional Self-tests
Test Target Description
NDRNG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the NDRNG.
DRBG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the DRBG.
DRBG Health Checks KAT, Instantiate, Generate and Reseed tests are performed per [SP800 90A] §11.3
Firmware Image RSA 2048 with SHA-256 signature verification performed when firmware is
loaded.
5 Physical Security
5.1 Mechanisms
The Module has the following physical security properties:
• Production-grade components with standard passivation are used
• The drive enclosure is opaque
• The tamper-evident seals are comprised of two (2) different sizes, one is smaller at 12mm x 7mm; the
other is larger at 20mm x 10mm
• Three (3) tamper-evident seals are applied at Western Digital manufacturing:
o Two (2) small seals to prevent removal of the top cover in order to gain access or visibility
o One (1) large seal to prevent access to the Micro-HDMI connector
• The tamper-evident seals cannot be penetrated or removed and reapplied without showing tamper-
evidence
• The tamper-evident seals cannot be replicated during a low attack time
5.2 Tamper-Evident Seals and Locations
Figure 4 - Tamper-Evident Seal Over Screws, 12mm x 7mm seal
Figure 5 - Tamper-Evident Seal Over HDMI Port, 20mm x 10mm seal
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Figure 6 – Tamper-Evident Seal Locations on Top, SDLL1HLR-076T-CF, SDLL1MLR-038T-CF, SDLL1MLR-032T-CF,
CSDLL1CLR-016T-CF, Version 1
Figure 7. - Tamper-Evident Seal Locations on Top, SDLL1CLR-020T-CF, SDLL1DLR-960G-CF, SDLL1DLR-480G-CF,
SDLL1DLR-800G-CF, SDLL1DLR-400G-CF, Version 1
1
1
2
2
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Figure 8. - Tamper-Evident Seal Location on Back Covering HDMI Port, SDLL1HLR-076T-CF, SDLL1MLR-038T-CF,
SDLL1MLR-032T-CF, CSDLL1CLR-016T-CF, Version 1
Figure 9 - Tamper-Evident Seal Location on Back Covering HDMI Port, SDLL1CLR-020T-CF, SDLL1DLR-960G-CF,
SDLL1DLR-480G-CF, SDLL1DLR-800G-CF, SDLL1DLR-400G-CF, Version 1
5.3 Operator Inspection
The Operator should inspect the Module for evidence of tampering upon receipt of the Module and once per
year thereafter. If tampering is detected, the module should be removed from service and returned to Western
Digital.
A tamper-evident seal that is intact will look smooth and uniform. Its edges will be firmly adhered to the surface
of the drive. Careful scrutiny of the seal should reveal whether or not the seal has been tampered with.
Attempts to remove the seal may be manifested by one or more of the following indicators:
• The adhesive layer is separated or non-uniform, leaving a visible pattern
• The seal’s surface has blistered, bubbled up, or has bumps beneath it, and is no longer smooth or flat.
Surface irregularities can be highlighted by tilting the seal back and forth in the light.
• Edges of seal are lifted, or will not stay adhered. The seal will lift very easily by gently sliding a pick or
fingernail under its edge.
• Residue of adhesive is visible around edges of seal indicating the seal has been removed and replaced.
3
3
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Figure 10 – Small Seal Before Tamper Figure 11 – Small Seal with Tamper Evidence
Figure 12 – Large Seal Before Tamper Figure 13 – Large Seal with Tamper Evidence
6 Operational Environment
The operational environment is non-modifiable. While the Module is operational, the environment cannot be
modified; the code working set cannot be added, deleted or modified. Parts of the Firmware can be upgraded
with an authenticated download service. If the download operation is successfully authorized and verified, then
the Module will begin operating with the new code working set after successful completion of the Reset service.
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
None
8 Security Rules and Guidance
The Module design corresponds to these Module security rules. This section documents the security rules
enforced by the Module and the Crypto-Officer instructions that are necessary to implement the security
requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 2.
8.1 Invariant Rules
1. The Module provides three distinct authenticated operator roles: User, Crypto-Officer, and HGST.
2. The Module provides role-based authentication.
3. The Module clears previous operator authentications on power cycle.
4. When operators have initialized the Module with a valid configuration, operators do not have access to
cryptographic services without successful authentication.
5. The operator is capable of commanding the Module to perform the self-tests by cycling power.
6. Power on self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. Data output is inhibited during self-tests and error states.
8. Data output is logically disconnected during key generation and zeroization.
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9. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the
Module.
10. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
11. The Module supports concurrent operators.
12. The Module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
13. The Module does not support manual key entry.
14. The Module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
15. The Module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs.
16. The Module does not output intermediate key values.
17. The End Session service deletes all ephemeral operator authentications. The Module requires operators to
re-authenticate upon execution of the End Session service.
18. The Module enforces fixed entity to key relationships
8.2 Crypto-Officer Initialization
The Crypto-Officer shall initialize and take ownership of the Module by executing the following Module services
and TCG methods:
1. StartSession and SyncSession using the 'Admin SP'.
2. Get 'MSID'.
3. Authenticate 'SID with MSID'; FAILURE indicates the Cryptographic Module has been tampered.
4. Set 'SID PIN' to your organizational value. The organizational value must differ from the MSID.
5. Set 'Makers.Enabled = FALSE'. [Note: The Module does not support the Makers class. Setting
Makers.Enabled to TRUE or FALSE has no effect on the Module. The instruction is listed to be
consistent with other Ultrastar TCG Enterprise SSDs.]
6. EndSession.
7. StartSession and SyncSession on the 'LockingSP'.
8. Authenticate 'EraseMaster with MSID'; FAILURE indicates the Cryptographic Module has been
tampered.
9. Set 'EraseMaster PIN' to an organizational value. The organizational value must differ from the
MSID.
10. Erase Band0
11. Authenticate 'BandMaster0 with MSID'; FAILURE indicates the Cryptographic Module has been
tampered.
12. Set 'BandMaster0 PIN' to an organizational value. The organizational value must differ from the
MSID.
13. TCG Band properties ‘ReadLockEnabled’ and ‘WriteLockEnabled’ shall be set to true and the
‘LockOnReset’ property shall be set to ‘PowerCycle’.
14. Repeat Steps 10 through 13 for Bands 1-15 as needed by the organizational policy. Invoke the Set
Band service to create the location and size for each desired Band.
i. Only 8 authentications, including the Anybody authority, are allowed within a session.
15. EndSession
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8.3 Crypto-Officer Zeroization
The Crypto-Officer shall zeroize the Module by following the below instructions:
• StartSession on 'Admin SP'
• Authenticate the CO.PSID with the PSID that is printed on the Module’s label
• Execute the TCG Revert method2
• Reset the Module
After successful completion of this procedure, the Module is reverted to the state in which it was delivered from
Western Digital manufacturing, except new Media Encryption Keys are generated. Crypto-Officer Initialization
shall be performed to re-enter FIPS Approved mode.
9 Non-security Related Services
9.1 Non-security Related TCG Methods and Protocol
Table 18 – TCG Methods/Messages
Discovery Get GetACL
Next Properties Protocol Stack Reset
Set StartSession CloseSession
9.2 Non-security Related SCSI Commands
Table 19 – SCSI Commands
FORMAT UNIT INQUIRY LOG SELECT
LOG SENSE MODE SELECT MODE SENSE
PERSISTENT RESERVE IN PERSISTENT RESERVE OUT READ
READ BUFFER READ CAPACITY READ DEFECT DATA
READ LONG REASSIGN BLOCKS RECEIVE DIAGNOSTICS RESULTS
REPORT LUNS REPORT SUPPORTED OP CODES RESERVE
REQUEST SENSE SECURITY IN SECURITY OUT
SEND DIAGNOSTIC START STOP UNIT SYNCHRONIZE CACHE
TEST UNIT READY UNMAP VERIFY
WRITE WRITE AND VERIFY WRITE BUFFER
WRITE LONG WRITE SAME
2
The TCG Revert method automatically closes the Admin SP session.
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10 References
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 20 – References
Abbreviation Document Reference
NIST Standards
[AES] Advanced Encryption Standard, FIPS PUB 197, NIST, 2001-Nov
[DSS] Digital Signature Standard, FIPS PUB 186-4, NIST, 2013-Jul
[FIPS140] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, FIPS PUB 140-2, NIST, 2002-Dec
[FIPS140 DTR] Derived Test Requirements for FIPS PUB 140-2, NIST, 2011-Jan
[FIPS140 IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2, NIST, 2017-Dec
[HMAC] The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, FIPS PUB 198-1, 2008-July
[SHA] Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4, NIST, 2015-Aug
[SP 800 38A] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, 2001-Dec
[SP800 38E] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for
Confidentiality on Storage Devices, SP800 38E, NIST, 2010-Jan
[SP800 57] Recommendation for Key Management – Part I General (Revision 4), NIST, 2016-Jan
[SP800 88] Guidelines for Media Sanitization (Revision 1), NIST, 2014-Dec
[SP800 90A] Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
Generators, Revision 1, NIST, 2015 Jun
[SP800 131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms
and Key Lengths, Revision 1, NIST, 2015-Nov
[SP800 132] Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation, NIST, 2010-Dec
[SP800 133] Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation, NIST, 2012-Dec
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) Specifications
[TCG Core] TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification, Specification Version 2.01, Revision
1.00, 2015-Aug
[TCG Enterprise] TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise Specification Version 1.01 Revision
1.00, 2015-Aug
[TCG SIIS] TCG Storage Interface Interactions Specification (SIIS), Version 1.05, Revision 1.00,
2016-Mar
[TCG App] TCG Storage Application Note: Encrypting Storage Devices Compliant with SSC:
Enterprise, Version 1.00 Revision 1.00, 2009-Dec
[TCG Opal] TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal, Version 2.01 Revision 1.00, 2015-Aug
International Committee on Information Technology Standards T10 Technical Committee Standards
[SCSI Core] SCSI Primary Commands-4 Rev 33 (SPC-4)
[SCSI Block] SCSI Block Commands Rev15 (SBC-3)
[SAS] Serial Attached SCSI-2 Rev 13 (SAS-2)
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Abbreviation Document Reference
Small Form Factor (SFF) Committee Specification
[SFF Enclosure] SFF-8200 Specification for Suite of 2.5" Form Factor Drives Rev 3.3, SFF Committee,
2016-Jan
[SFF Connector] SFF-8639 Specification for Multifunction 6X Unshielded Connector
Rev 2.0, SFF Committee, 2015-Jan
Western Digital Specifications
[D&O] Delivery & Operation (Crypto-Officer) Manual
[Product Spec] Ultrastar SS200 Series Product Specification
11 Glossary
Table 21 – Acronyms and Definitions
Term Definition
Allowed NIST approved, i.e., recommended in a NIST Special Publication, or
acceptable, i.e., no known security risk as opposed to deprecated,
restricted and legacy-use. See [SP800 131A] for terms.
Anybody A TCG Authority that is unauthenticated. [TCG Core]
Approved [FIPS140] approved or recommended in a NIST Special Publication
[SP800 57]
Approved mode of
operation
A mode of a cryptographic Module that employs only Approved security
functions. [FIPS140]
Authenticate Prove the identity of an Operator or the integrity of an object [SP800 57]
Authorize Grant an authenticated Operator access to a service or an object
[SP800 57]
Band A contiguous range of non-volatile memory that stores encrypted data.
Bands shall not overlap and each has an individual encryption key, settable
properties and authentication [TCG Core]
CO
Crypto-Officer
An Operator performing cryptographic initialization and management
functions [FIPS140]
Confidentiality A cryptographic property that sensitive information is not disclosed to
unauthorized parties [SP800 57]
Ciphertext Encrypted data transformed by an Approved security function [SP800 57]
Cryptographic Boundary An explicitly defined continuous perimeter that establishes the physical
bounds of a cryptographic module and contains all the hardware, software,
and/or firmware components of a cryptographic module [FIPS140]
CSP
Critical Security Parameter
Security-related information (e.g., secret and private cryptographic keys,
and authentication data whose disclosure or modification can compromise
the security of a cryptographic module [FIPS140]
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator [SP800 90A]
Ephemeral Existing a short time
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
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Term Definition
Integrity A cryptographic property that sensitive data has not been modified or
deleted in an unauthorized and undetected manner [SP800 57]
Interface A logical entry or exit point of a cryptographic module that provides access
to the cryptographic module for logical information flows [FIPS140]
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF
Key Derivation Function
An Approved cryptographic algorithm by which one or more keys are
derived from a shared secret and other information [SP800 57]
KEK
Key Encrypting Key
A cryptographic key that is used to encrypt or decrypt other keys
[SP800 57]
Key
Cryptographic Key
An input parameter to an Approved cryptographic algorithm [SP800 57]
Key Wrap An Approved cryptographic algorithm that uses a KEK to provide
Confidentiality and Integrity [SP800 57]
Logical Block The smallest addressable unit of reading and writing on a standardized
storage unit [SCSI Block]
MEK Media Encryption Key [TCG Core]
Method A TCG operation identified by a UID [TCG Core]
Module
Cryptographic Module
The set of hardware, software, and/or firmware that implement Approved
security functions and is contained within the cryptographic boundary
[FIPS140]
MSID
Manufactured SID
A SED unique value that vendors generate during manufacturing; it is
readable with the TCG protocol and is the default value for TCG PINs
[TCG Core]
NDRNG Non-deterministic Random Number Generator: is the source of entropy for
the DRBG [SP800 57]
Operator A consumer, either human or automation, of Module services that is
external to the Cryptographic Module [FIPS140]
Plaintext Data that is not encrypted [SP800 57]
Port A physical entry or exit point of a cryptographic module that provides
access to the Cryptographic Module for physical signals [FIPS140]
PSP
Public Security Parameter
Information that is not secret but whose modification can compromise the
security of the cryptographic module (e.g., a public key of a keypair)
[ISO19790:2012]
PSID
Physical SID
A unique value that vendors print on an external label; it is used as
authentication data for the Zeroize service [TCG Core]
Session An ephemeral exchange between a Security Provider and Operator that
envelops the lifetime of an Operator’s authentication. It acquires/releases
a Security Provider and enables protocol synchronization
[TCG Core]
SAS Serial Attached SCSI
SCSI Small Computer System Interface
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Term Definition
SID
Security Identifier
A TCG Authority that represents the Crypto-Officer [TCG Core]
SED
Self-Encrypting Drive
A standardized storage unit that provides data storage services and
supports cryptographic erase media sanitization
SP
Security Provider
A collection of data structures and methods with access control that is
identified by a UID [TCG Core]
SSP
Sensitive Security Parameter
The union of CSPs and PSPs [ISO19790:2012]
Storage Medium The non-volatile, persistent memory of a SED that is partitioned into two
disjoint sets, a User Data area and a Reserved Area [SCSI Block]
Reserved Area Private data on the Storage Medium that is not accessible outside the
Cryptographic Boundary [Product Spec]
TCG Trusted Computing Group
TCG Authority Associates a TCG credential with an authentication operation, equivalent
to a FIPS140 role [TCG CORE]
TCG Credential UID, TCG PIN and other non-security related properties [TCG Core]
TCG PIN Personal Identification Number: a string of 32 un-encoded octets that is
used to authenticate a TCG Authority [TCG Core]
UID 64-bit Unique Identifier of objects, methods and Authorities [TCG Core]
User An Operator that consumes cryptographic services [FIPS140]
User Data Data that is transferred from/to a SED using the Read Data and Write Data
services [SCSI Block]
Zeroize Invalidate a Critical Security Parameter. [FIPS140]