

CryptoServer Se-Series Gen2

Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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1 Introduction

CryptoServer Se-Series Gen2 is a hardware security module made by Utimaco IS GmbH which is available with crypto accelerator (CryptoServer Se1500 and CryptoServer Se500) or without crypto accelerator (CryptoServer Se12 and CryptoServer Se52). If run in FIPS mode, CryptoServer Se-Series Gen2 (**CryptoServer**) meets overall FIPS 140-2 Level 3 requirements.

This document describes the security policy of CryptoServer Se-Series Gen2 (Hardware P/N CryptoServer Se-Series Gen2 Version 5.01.2.0 and 5.01.4.0 each with and without crypto accelerator; Firmware Package Version 5.0.10.1) if run in FIPS mode.

2 Module Overview

The CryptoServer Se-Series Gen2 (**CryptoServer**) is an encapsulated, protected security module which is realized as a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module as defined in FIPS 140-2 [FIPS140-2] (Hardware P/N CryptoServer Se-Series Gen2 Version 5.01.2.0 and 5.01.4.0 each with and without crypto accelerator; Firmware Package Version 5.0.10.1). Its realization meets overall FIPS 140-2 Level 3 requirements. The primary purpose of this module is to provide secure cryptographic services such as encryption or decryption (for various cryptographic algorithms like Triple-DES, RSA and AES), hashing, signing and verification of data (RSA, ECDSA, DSA), random number generation, on-board secure key generation, key storage and further key management functions in a tamper-protected environment.

In FIPS mode the module offers a general purpose cryptographic API with FIPS Approved algorithms for the above mentioned cryptographic services, as well as an administrative interface. A Secure Messaging concept uses message encryption and MAC authentication to protect communication to and from the module.

If not in FIPS mode, the CryptoServer's flexible firmware architecture enables it to be used in almost all proprietary environments in which cryptographic services and highest security are required, such as archiving systems and payment systems. It can serve as a signature server, time stamp, and generator for PINs, cryptographic keys, or random numbers.

The CryptoServer offers hardware-based as well as deterministic random number generation in FIPS mode and non-FIPS mode. The hardware based RNG is only used to seed the Approved deterministic RBG.

Together with Utimaco's appropriate host application software the module also provides cryptographic standard interfaces like PKCS#11, JCE, OpenSSL, CSP/CNG and EKM.

All hardware components of the cryptographic module, including the Central Processing Unit, all memory chips, Real Time Clock, and hardware noise generator for random number generation, are located on a printed circuit board (PCI express board). These hardware components are completely covered with potting material (epoxy resin) and heat sink. This hard, opaque enclosure protects the sensitive CryptoServer hardware components from physical attacks.

The picture below shows the CryptoServer cryptographic module with its PCIe interface:



Figure 1 – CryptoServer Se-Series Gen2

For communication with a host the PCIe board offers a PCIe interface and two USB interfaces.

The module's cryptographic boundary is defined as the outer perimeter of the heat sink on the top side and the epoxy surface on the bottom side of the module. Figures 2 and 3 below show views of the cryptographic boundary from the side and top, and from the bottom. The red dashed line indicates the cryptographic boundary.

Figure 2 – CryptoServer Se-Series Gen2 – side view and top view



Figure 3 – CryptoServer Se-Series Gen2– bottom view

3 Security Level

The cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 3 security in FIPS 140-2.

Table 1 – Module Security Level Specification

Security Requirements Section	Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	3
Module Ports and Interfaces	3
Roles, Services and Authentication	3
Finite State Model	3
Physical Security	3
Operational Environment	N/A
Cryptographic Key Management	3
EMI/EMC	3
Self-Tests	3
Design Assurance	3
Mitigation of Other Attacks	3

4 Modes of Operation

4.1 Approved mode of operation

The cryptographic module supports the following FIPS Approved algorithms:

CAVP Cert	Algo-rithm	Standard	Mode/ Method	Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli	Use
2066 and 2067	RSA	FIPS 186-4	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	2048, 3072	Digital Signature Generation and Verification
2066 and 2067	RSA	FIPS 186-2	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096	Digital Signature Verification
2066 and 2067	RSA	FIPS 186-4		2048, 3072	Key Generation
897 and 898	ECDSA	FIPS 186-4	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571	Digital Signature Generation
897 and 898	ECDSA	FIPS 186-4	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	P-192, K-163, B-163, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571,	Digital Signature Verification
897 and 898	ECDSA	FIPS 186-4		P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571	Key Generation
2205	Triple-DES	SP 800-67; SP 800-38A		24 bytes	Data Encryption
2205	Triple-DES	SP 800-67; SP 800-38A		16 or 24 bytes	Data Decryption
Vendor Affirmed	Triple-DES-MAC	FIPS 113; SP 800-20		24 bytes	Triple-DES MAC Generation
Vendor Affirmed	Triple-DES-MAC	FIPS 113; SP 800-20		16 or 24 bytes	Triple-DES MAC verification
4028	AES	FIPS 197; SP 800-38A	ECB, CBC, CFB8, OFB		Data Encryption/ Data Decryption
4028	AES CMAC	SP 800-38B			Message Authentication

CAVP Cert	Algo-rithm	Standard	Mode/ Method	Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli	Use
1091	DSA	FIPS 186-4	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	2048/224, 2048/256 or 3072/256	Digital Signature Generation
1091	DSA	FIPS 186-4	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	1024/160, 2048/224, 2048/256 or 3072/256	Digital Signature Verification
1091	DSA	FIPS 186-4		2048/224, 2048/256 or 3072/256	Key Generation
1091	DSA	FIPS 186-4			Domain Parameter Generation
1091	DSA	FIPS 186-4	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	1024/160, 2048/224, 2048/256 or 3072/256	Parameter Verification
3323	SHS	FIPS 180-4	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512		Message Digest
3322	SHS	FIPS 180-4	SHA-512		Message Digest
3321	SHS	FIPS 180-4	SHA-512		Message Digest
2628	HMAC	FIPS 198-1	SHA -1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	key size >= 112 bits	Message Authentication
2628	HMAC	FIPS 198-1	SHA -1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	key size >= 80 bits	Message Authentication Verification
1202	DRBG	SP 800-90A	SHA-512-based		
855 and 856	CVL EC-DH	SP 800-56A	ECC CDH	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571	Shared Secret Computation ECC CDH Primitive (ECDH component)
97	KBKDF	SP 800-108	SHA-256	L=256	Key Derivation

CAVP Cert	Algo-rithm	Standard	Mode/ Method	Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli	Use
4028 and 4028	KTS (AES; AES CMAC)	FIPS 197, SP 800-38A; SP 800-38B	CBC CMAC	Provides 112 bits of encryption strength	Key Transport Scheme

CryptoServer also implements and uses the following non-FIPS Approved but Allowed algorithms:

Algorithm	Caveat	Use
NDRNG based on a hardware noise source		Used to generate the seed material for the Approved DRBG
RSA (key wrapping)	Provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength (depending on the wrapping key's security strength)	Key establishment methodology
Diffie-Hellman (commercially available protocol [PKCS#3] for key establishment; see below for the *Secure Messaging* concept)	Provides 112 bits of encryption strength	Key establishment methodology (key agreement)
EC Diffie-Hellman (curves P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409 and B-571 as specified in [FIPS186-4]) Validation Certificates 855 & 856 for primitive ECC CDH as of SP 800 56A	Provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength (depending on the security strength of the original keys and the selected hash algorithm)	CVL certs. #855 & #856, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength
Diffie-Hellman with |P| >= 2048, |Q| >= 224 using primitive FFC DH as of SP 800 56A	Provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength (depending on the security strength of the original keys and the selected hash algorithm)	Key establishment methodology (key agreement)

The CryptoServer can be configured for FIPS mode as follows:

- Perform a "GetState" command and confirm that the module is in the initialized state, and in operational or maintenance mode and the alarm state "off".
- Load the FIPS firmware module package using the "LoadPkg" command of Utimaco's CryptoServer administration tool csadm.

This is described in the *CryptoServer Administrator's Guide* [CSAdmGuide]. If this has been performed successfully, the module's internally stored *FIPS mode indicator* flag is set. The

user can check whether the cryptographic module is running in FIPS or non-FIPS mode by executing the “GetState” service. The system will then display the FIPS mode indicator.

4.2 Non-FIPS mode of operation

Any firmware that has not been validated for FIPS140-2, if loaded into the cryptographic module while the module is in delivery state, will not set the module’s internally stored FIPS mode indicator flag. This missing flag will indicate to the user of the cryptographic module that the module is running in non-FIPS mode when the user requests the “GetState” service.

For example, while the module is in delivery state, non-FIPS firmware that could provide one or more of the following non-FIPS validated algorithms can be loaded into the module:

Algorithm	Use
RSA public key cipher of bulk data	Encryption/Decryption (non-compliant; key sizes 512-16384)
EC Cryptography public key cipher of bulk data (ECIES)	Encryption/Decryption
MD5, MDC-2 or RIPEMD-160	Hashing
Single DES	Encryption/Decryption
Triple DES ANSI retail MAC (ANSI X9.19: 1986, Financial Institution Retail Message Authentication)	Message Authentication
AES MAC CBC Mode (non-compliant)	Message Authentication
AES (GCM mode) (non-compliant to requirements of IG A.5 scenario 3)	Encryption/Decryption and Message Authentication
NDRNG	Key generation PIN generation/PIN verification

Algorithm	Use
Several key derivation algorithms as specified in [PKCS#11]: • KDF_ENC_DATA: Derive key using the result of an encryption (chaining mode ECB or CBC) of a given text with a base key (DES, AES) (CBC: and given IV) • KDF_HASH: Derive key using the hash value over the key components of a base key (DES or AES or Generic Secret; Hash algorithm must output at least as many bits as are needed for the requested key size within key template).	Key derivation (see [PKCS#11] for details)
• KDF_ECDH: (Brainpool curves 160..512, NIST 163..571, Secp 112..571) Derive key using the (concatenated) hash value (KDF according to ANSI X9.63) over a shared secret that was calculated with the secret part of a base key (ECDH/EC/ECDSA) and the public part of a second key (ECDSA based secret agreement, Standard Diffie Hellmann primitive (P:>=512; Q:>=160) according to ANSI X9.63 and ECC DH primitive according to NIST SP 800-56A).	ECDH (key agreement; key establishment; non-compliant below 112 bits of encryption strength) Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment; non-compliant below 112 bits of encryption strength)
• The two previous functions (KDF_HASH and KDF_ECDH) may utilize one of the following HASH algorithms: MD5, RipeMD 160, SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512. • KDF_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: Derive key by XOR'ing the key components of a base key (DES, AES, Generic Secret) with given data. • KDF_CAT_BASE_AND_KEY: Concatenate a base key with a second key (both DES, AES, Generic Secret) to derive new key. • KDF_CAT_BASE_AND_DATA: Concatenate a base key (DES, AES, Generic Secret) with given data to derive new key. • KDF_CAT_DATA_AND_BASE: Concatenate given data with a base key (DES, AES, Generic Secret) to derive new key. • KDF_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: Extract part of a base key (DES, AES, Generic Secret) to derive new key.	

4.3 Secure Messaging for secure communication with the CryptoServer

The CryptoServer implements a *Secure Messaging* concept which enables any operator to secure their communication with the CryptoServer over the PCIe interface, even from a remote host. With Secure Messaging, commands sent to the CryptoServer and response data received from the CryptoServer can be AES CBC encrypted and integrity-protected/signed with an AES CMAC. In FIPS mode, Secure Messaging must be performed for every sensitive command, i. e., for every command that is only available for authenticated users.

To perform Secure Messaging, the operator must open a Secure Messaging *Session*. For a Session, a 32 bytes AES session key $\mathbf{K_S}$ will be negotiated between CryptoServer and host, using the Diffie-Hellmann algorithm as the key establishment technique in accordance with [PKCS#3] and with a parameter size of 2048 bits. For generating its random value $\mathbf{K_{SM\_MOD\_PRIV}}$ that is needed for the key agreement, the CryptoServer will use its deterministic random bit generator.

The CryptoServer can simultaneously manage multiple sessions (with multiple operators): Each session manages its own session key, which is identified by a session ID. All commands using the same session ID and the same session key are said to belong to one session. In this way a secure channel is established between the CryptoServer and the host application.

5 Ports and Interfaces

The physical interface of CryptoServer Se-Series Gen2 consists of 19 printed circuit board tracks, embedded inside the printed circuit board (PCB) and passing the cryptographic boundary to the outer world (see Figure 1). The device provides the following physical ports on these tracks:

1) Power input (including operational power input and backup power input).
2) An External Erase button, which acts as a control input and can be used to zeroize all security relevant information inside the module.
3) External communication ports (PCIe and USB) which are used for data input, data output, control input and status output:

   To enable communication with a host, the module supports a PCIe interface and two USB interfaces. All requests for services are sent over the PCIe interface. The first USB interface is used for status output only. The second USB interface is not used in FIPS mode.

All Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) are input and output over the services that are offered over the PCIe interface. In particular, CSPs are entered and output only in a wrapped form: All command and response data (except for status requests) to and from the CryptoServer are AES CBC encrypted and AES CMAC authenticated by the Secure Messaging layer. For details, see previous subsection 4.3 *Secure Messaging for secure communication with the CryptoServer.*

Additionally, all secret or private keys can only be exported encrypted with a Key Encryption Key (via e. g. the *Export Key* or *Wrap* services, see section 7.1 *Roles and authorized* services*)*.

6 Identification and Authentication Policy

6.1 Assumption of roles

The CryptoServer cryptographic module supports three distinct operator roles:

- *Cryptographic User* (performing key management and cryptographic services),
- *Security Officer* (performing key group specific administration functions like key group specific user management or key group specific configuration management) and
- *Administrator* (performing global configuration and user management).

The *Cryptographic User* role can optionally be split into two different user roles:

- '*User'* (performing cryptographic services like encryption or signing) and
- '*Key Manager'* (performing key management services like key generation or key backup/restore).

Additionally, any user is allowed to perform non-sensitive services such as requesting status information without prior authentication.

The cryptographic module uses identity-based operator authentication to enforce the separation of roles. Two authentication methods are supported by the module: Password authentication and RSA signature authentication.

- For *password based authentication* the operator must enter its user name and its password to log in. The user name is an alphanumeric string. The password is a binary string of a minimum of four (4) characters. To prevent the password from being eavesdropped an HMAC is calculated including authentication data, command data, and a random challenge. The hash algorithm for the HMAC calculation is SHA-256. This HMAC value is sent to the CryptoServer instead of the password. The CryptoServer recalculates and checks the HMAC value using the operator's password that is stored inside the CryptoServer.
- For *RSA signature based authentication* the user sends an RSA signed command containing its user name to authenticate to the cryptographic module.

Upon correct authentication the role is selected based on the operator's user name. During authentication a session key $\mathbf{K_S}$ is negotiated which is used to secure subsequent service requests by the operator (see the description of the Secure Messaging concept on page 16). Since the session key (and session ID) are stored in volatile memory all information about the authentication and session is lost if the module is powered down.

The CryptoServer supports multiple simultaneous operators, each using their own session key for message authentication for the service requests. This ensures the separation of the authorized roles and services performed by each operator.

At the end of a session, the operator can log out, or, after 15 minutes of inactivity, the session key is invalidated inside the cryptographic module.

Table 2 – Roles and Required Identification and Authentication

Role	Type of Authentication	Authentication Data
Cryptographic User (called *User* in [FIPS140-2])	Identity-based operator authentication	User Name and Password or User Name and RSA Signature
User (sub-role of Cryptographic User)	Identity-based operator authentication	User Name and Password or User Name and RSA Signature
Key Manager (sub-role of Cryptographic User)	Identity-based operator authentication	User Name and Password or User Name and RSA Signature
Security Officer	Identity-based operator authentication	User Name and Password or User Name and RSA Signature
Administrator (called *Crypto Officer* in [FIPS140-2])	Identity-based operator authentication	User Name and Password or User Name and RSA Signature

Table 3 – Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms

Authentication Mechanism	Strength of Mechanism
Username and Password (4 characters password chosen from 94 printable ASCII characters)	The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 1/(4^94) = 1/78,074,896 which is less than 1/1,000,000. Due to a correctional delay of 120 milliseconds for every non-successful authentication there is a maximum limit of 60 * 1000 / 120 = 500 non-successful authentications per minute. This can be stated as allowing only 500 non-successful authentication attempts per minute based on a rate of 120 ms per attempt. Therefore the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is (less than) 1/156,149 which is less than 1/100,000.

Authentication Mechanism	Strength of Mechanism
RSA Signature (minimum 1024 bit key)	The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is less than or equal to approximately 2^{-80} (according to SP 800-57-Part1 page 67) which is less than 1/1,000,000. Due to a correctional delay of 120 milliseconds for every non-successful authentication there is a maximum limit of 60 * 1000 / 120 = 500 non-successful authentications per minute. This can be stated as allowing only 500 non-successful authentication attempts per minute based on a rate of 120 ms per attempt. Therefore the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is less than 2^{-71} ($500 * 2^{-80} < 512 * 2^{-80} = 2^9 * 2^{-80} = 2^{-71}$) which is less than 1/100,000.

7 Access Control Policy

7.1 Roles and authorized services

General definitions:

An ***Operator*** may be an Administrator, Security Officer or Cryptographic User, User or Key Manager.

An ***Object*** may be a (cryptographic) key, a storage object or a configuration object.

A ***Backup Blob*** contains an Object. Secret keys (incl. Generic Secrets) and private key parts are always encrypted with the Master Backup Key (back-up key, see 7.3) within a Backup Blob.

Each Object and each Operator may be assigned to a ***Key Group.***

An Object is ***Local*** if it is assigned to a Key Group; an Object which is assigned to no Key Group is called ***Global***.

An Object is ***Assigned*** to an Operator if both are assigned to the same Key Group, or if the Object is Global.

Table 4 – Services Authorized for Roles

Role	Authorized Services
Cryptographic User:	This role provides all cryptographic services, i. e. services for management and use of Assigned private, public and secret keys, hashing services and random number generation. It comprises all services authorized for *Key Managers* and all services authorized for *Users*.
Key Manager: This role provides all key management services.	• Change Operator's Password or Key: This service changes the password or RSA public key which is used for the *Key Manager's* authentication and resets the user's counter for consecutive failed authentication attempts. • Get Session Key: This service generates a new Secure Messaging session key for secure communication to the module. • List Keys: This service outputs the key properties (such as the algorithm, key name, key size, etc.) of all Assigned cryptographic keys and storage objects stored inside the cryptographic module. • Open Key: This service opens an Assigned Object which is stored inside the cryptographic module and returns a key handle or a Backup Blob containing the Object itself. • Get Key Property: This service returns one or more properties (attributes) of an Assigned Object. It can export the public part of a cryptographic key but no secret or private key parts. • Set Key Property: This service sets one or more properties (attributes) for an Assigned key or storage object (but no key parts).

Role	Authorized Services
	• Backup Key: This service outputs a Backup Blob containing an Assigned key or storage object for back-up purposes. • Restore Key: This service imports a Backup Blob containing the back-up of an Assigned key or storage object into the cryptographic module. Optionally the key or storage object can also be exported within a Backup Blob. • Delete Key: This service deletes an Assigned key or storage object from the module. • Generate DSA Parameters: This service generates a DSA Domain Parameter set P, Q and G using the DRBG. • Generate DSA Parameters PQ: This service generates a DSA Domain Parameter set P and Q using the DRBG. • Generate DSA Parameters G: This service generates a DSA Domain Parameter G by given P and Q (optionally) using the DRBG. • Compute Hash: This service calculates a SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512 hash or HMAC value for given data or for the components of an Assigned key. • Agree Secret: This function calculates a shared secret from two Assigned EC keys. The shared secret is exported in a wrapped form, encrypted with the Master Backup Key. • Generate Key: This service generates a cryptographic key (Triple-DES, AES, RSA, DSA, EC or Generic Secrets) using the DRBG. On request, the generated key is not stored but exported within a Backup Blob. • Export Key: This service outputs an Assigned cryptographic key. The exported key is AES CBC encrypted and authenticated with an AES CMAC by Secure Messaging. • Import Key: This service imports a cryptographic key into the cryptographic module. The key must be AES CBC encrypted and authenticated with an AES CMAC by Secure Messaging. On request the imported key can be exported again . • Generate Key Pair: This service generates a cryptographic key pair (RSA, DSA or EC) using the DRBG and stores the two key parts in different key objects. On request the generated key parts are not stored but exported within two Backup Blobs.

Role	Authorized Services
	• Derive Key: This function derives a DES or AES key or a Generic Secret from an Assigned base key (DSA or EC). The derived key is stored in the CryptoServer, or exported within a Backup Blob. • Wrap Key: This function exports an Assigned key in form of a key blob, which is formatted as required by PKCS#11 (see [PKCS#11]). The key blob is AES CBC encrypted and authenticated with an AES CMAC by Secure Messaging. • Unwrap Key: This function imports an Assigned key from an encrypted key blob. The key is encoded as specified by PKCS#11 (see [PKCS#11]). The key blob is AES CBC encrypted and authenticated with an AES CMAC by the current Secure Messaging session. • Create Object: This function creates an Assigned cryptographic key or storage object according to the given property list. • Copy Object: This function copies an Assigned key or storage object. A template may be given that contains an additional list of properties which should be added to the original properties or replace existing properties. The copied object is either stored within the CryptoServer or exported within a Backup Blob.
User: This role provides all cryptographic services, i. e., services for use of private, public and secret keys, hashing services and random number generation.	• Change Operator's Password or Key: This service changes the password or RSA public key which is used for the User's authentication and resets the User's counter for consecutive failed authentication attempts. • Get Session Key: This service generates a new Secure Messaging session key for secure communication to the module. • List Keys: This service outputs the key properties (such as the algorithm, key name, key size, etc.) of all Assigned keys and storage objects stored inside the cryptographic module. • Open Key: This service opens an Assigned Object which is stored inside the cryptographic module and returns a key handle or a Backup Blob containing the Object itself. • Get Key Property: This service returns one or more properties (attributes) of an Assigned Object. It can export the public part of a key but no secret or private key parts. • Generate DSA Parameters: This service generates a DSA Domain Parameter set P, Q and G using the DRBG. • Generate DSA Parameters PQ: This service generates a DSA Domain Parameter set P and Q using the DRBG.

Role	Authorized Services
	• Generate DSA Parameters G: This service generates a DSA Domain Parameter G by given P and Q (optionally) using the DRBG. • Generate Random Number: This service generates a random number using the DRBG. • Crypt Data: This service encrypts or decrypts data using an Assigned Triple-DES or AES key in CBC or ECB mode (Triple-DES) or in ECB, CBC, OFB mode (AES). • Sign Data: This service generates an RSA, DSA or ECDSA signature or calculates a Triple-DES MAC, AES CMAC, or HMAC ((hashed) message authentication code) for given data with an Assigned signing key. • Verify Signature: This service verifies an RSA, DSA or ECDSA signature or a Triple-DES or AES CMAC, or HMAC using an Assigned verification key. • Compute Hash: This service calculates a SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512 hash or HMAC value for given data or for the components of an Assigned key. • Agree Secret: This function calculates a shared secret from two Assigned EC keys. The shared secret is exported in a wrapped form, encrypted with the Master Backup Key.
Administrator: This role provides all services necessary for firmware and user management.	• Change Operator's Password or Key: This service changes the password or RSA public key which is used for an operator's authentication and resets the operator's counter for consecutive failed authentication attempts. • Get Session Key: This service generates a new Secure Messaging session key for secure communication to the module. • Add Operator: This service adds an Operator to the cryptographic module. • Delete Operator: This service deletes an Operator from the cryptographic module. • Add Group User (for Security Officer): This service adds a *Security Officer* to the cryptographic module. • Delete Group User (for Security Officer): This service deletes a *Security Officer* from the cryptographic module.

Role	Authorized Services
	• Backup User: This service exports all user account data for a given user for backup purposes. All secrets (passwords) are encrypted in the exported data with the Master Backup Key. • Restore User: This service creates a new user in the user database. All information about the user (name, permission, authentication token, etc.) is taken from a backup data block that was output by the *Backup User* service. • List Master Backup Keys: This service outputs information (key type, key size, key check value, etc.) about all Master Backup Keys (back-up keys) that are stored inside the CryptoServer. • Generate Master Backup Key: This service generates and outputs a Master Backup Key (back-up key). The key is only exported in a wrapped form, AES CBC encrypted and authenticated with an AES CMAC by the current Secure Messaging session. The generated key is not stored inside the CryptoServer. • Import Master Backup Key: This service imports a Master Backup Key (back-up key). The key is only imported if AES CBC encrypted and authenticated with an AES CMAC by the current Secure Messaging session. • Load File: This service loads files. If a file with the same file name is currently loaded, that current file will be replaced. This command is usually used to load and replace firmware modules. If the file is a firmware module, the old file will only be replaced if the RSA signature for the firmware module is verified successfully. (Note: loading non-FIPS-validated firmware onto the cryptographic module will cause the module to cease being FIPS-validated.) • Delete File: This service is used to delete files. (Note: deleting FIPS-validated firmware from the cryptographic module will cause the module to cease being FIPS-validated.) • Clear Audit Log: This service deletes the audit log file except for the first ‘k’ parts. • Set Maximum Failure Counter: This service sets the maximum number of allowed consecutive failed authentication attempts before a user is blocked. • Set Time, Set Time Rel: These services are used to set the internal clock on the module. • List Keys (for the Global configuration object): This service lists the Global configuration object.

Role	Authorized Services
	• Open Key (for configuration objects): This service opens a configuration object and returns a reference, or the configuration object itself is exported. • Get Key Property (for configuration objects): This service returns one or more configuration properties. • Set Key Property (for the Global configuration object): This service sets one or more Global configuration properties. • Backup Key (for the Global configuration object): This service outputs the Global configuration object for back-up purposes. • Restore Key (for the Global configuration object): This service imports the back-up of the Global configuration object into the cryptographic module. • Delete Key (for the Global configuration object): This service deletes all Global configuration values by setting them to their default values.
Security Officer: This role provides all services necessary for Key Group specific user and configuration management.	• Change Operator's Password or Key: This service changes the password or RSA public key which is used for the *Security Officer's* authentication and resets his counter for consecutive failed authentication attempts. • Get Session Key: This service generates a new Secure Messaging session key for secure communication to the module. • Add Group User (for a *Cryptographic User, Key Manager* or *User)*: This service adds a *Cryptographic User, Key Manager* or *User* to the cryptographic module. The added operator and the authorizing *Security Officer* must be assigned to the same Key Group. • Delete Group User (for a *Cryptographic User, Key Manager* or *User*): This service deletes a *Cryptographic User, Key Manager* or *User* from the cryptographic module. The deleted operator and the authorizing *Security Officer* must be assigned to the same Key Group. • List Keys (for Local configuration objects): This service lists all Assigned Local configuration objects. • Open Key: This service opens an Assigned Object and returns a reference or a Backup Blob containing the Object itself. • Get Key Property: This service returns one or more properties (attributes) of an Assigned Object. It can export the public part of a key but no secret or private key parts. • Set Key Property: This service allows the Security Officer to set a Local configuration value, or to set the TRUSTED attribute of an Assigned key encryption key.

Role	Authorized Services
	• Backup Key (for Local configuration objects): This service outputs an Assigned Local configuration object for back-up purposes. • Restore Key (for Local configuration objects): This service imports the back-up of a Local configuration object into the cryptographic module. • Delete Key (for Local configuration objects): This service deletes an Assigned Local configuration object by setting all configuration attributes to their default values. • Init Key Group: This service deletes all Local Objects belonging to a given Key Group.

7.2 Unauthenticated services

In addition the CryptoServer supports the following unauthenticated services, i. e. services which are available to any operator:

- Get Boot Log: Retrieve a log file which contains log messages made by the operating system and other firmware modules (or by the boot loader if the command is called in boot loader mode) during the boot process.
- Show Status (or "GetState"): View the current status of the cryptographic module, including the FIPS mode indicator.
- Get Time: Read out the current time of the internal Real Time Clock of the module.
- Get Maximum Fail Count: This service outputs the maximum number of allowed consecutive failed authentication attempts before a user is blocked.
- List Files: Retrieve a list of all files stored in the flash file system of the module.
- List Active Modules: List all currently active firmware modules.
- List Operators: Read a list of all *Security Officers*, *Cryptographic Users, Key Managers, Users* and *Administrators*.
- Get Operator Info: Retrieve all non-sensitive information about the specified operator.
- End Session: Terminate a Secure Messaging session by invalidating the relevant session key.
- Get Audit Log: Read a log file.
- Get Audit Config: Read configuration for auditing.
- Get Memory Info: Return statistical information about the file system usage.
- Echo: Communication test (echo input data).
- Get Challenge: Generate and output a challenge (8 bytes random value generated by the CryptoServer's deterministic random bit generator) for using the challenge/response mechanism in the next authenticated command.

- Get Authentication State: This function returns the current authentication level and an optional list of all operators that are authenticated within the current session.
- Get CXI Info: This function returns some status information about the CXI firmware module like module version number or the fill level of the database.
- Get Personalization Key: This function returns the public part of the Local Personalization Key.
- Verify Genuineness: This function enables any user to verify the genuineness of the CryptoServer by signing a challenge with the Local Personalization Key.
- Initiate Self Tests: At any time, the execution of the self-tests required by FIPS 140-2 can be forced by performing a reset or power-cycle of the module. During self-test execution, no further command processing is possible.
- Zeroize: Zeroizes the cryptographic module including all critical security parameters. In particular, all CSPs that are not wrapped by the Master Key will be zeroized. This service will be executed if an external erase input is given. (Note: after zeroization, CryptoServer is no longer in FIPS mode.)

If the module is in FIPS error state, the only services that are available are a small subset of these unauthenticated services. These services only output status information and do *not* perform any cryptographic function.

The services that the module provides are the same between the Approved and non-Approved modes. Non-Approved algorithms can be used in lieu of the Approved algorithms in the non-Approved mode.

7.3 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)

The following CSPs are contained in the module:

- CryptoServer's *Master Key* $\mathbf{K_{CS}}$ (AES 32 bytes)
- *Local Secret DH Key* $\mathbf{K_{SM\_MOD\_PRIV}}$ (generated by the module and used to generate a shared secret via Diffie Hellman for Secure Messaging, see section 4.3) (DSA 2048 bits, volatile storage only)
- *Final Shared Secret* $\mathbf{S_{SM}}$ (calculated by Diffie Hellman algorithm and used to derive a Session Key for Secure Messaging, see section 4.3) (volatile storage only)
- *Session Key* $\mathbf{K_S}$ (derived from the Final Shared Secret $\mathbf{S_{SM}}$ and used for Secure Messaging, see section 4.3) (32 bytes AES, volatile storage only)
- *DRBG Secrets* $\mathbf{S_{DRBG}}$ used by the Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) as specified in [NIST 800-90A] (volatile storage only):
    - Entropy input $\mathbf{S_{DRBG\_EI}}$ generated by the NDRNG
    - Seed $\mathbf{S_{DRBG\_SEED}}$ calculated from Entropy input $\mathbf{S_{DRBG\_EI}}$
    - Working state constant $\mathbf{S_{DRBG\_C}}$ calculated from the $\mathbf{S_{DRBG\_SEED}}$ Seed
    - Working state value $\mathbf{S_{DRBG\_V}}$ initially calculated from the $\mathbf{S_{DRBG\_SEED}}$ Seed and updated each time the DRBG is called

The following CSPs are stored within the cryptographic module encrypted with the Master Key $\mathbf{K_{CS}}$:[1]

- *Local Private Personalization* Key $\mathbf{K_{LP\_PRIV}}$ (ECDSA)
- *Private User Keys:*
    - $\mathbf{K_{USR\_RSA\_PRIV}}$ (RSA; Signature Generation, Key Decryption)
    - $\mathbf{K_{USR\_DSA\_PRIV}}$ (DSA; Signature Generation, Key Agreement)
    - $\mathbf{K_{USR\_EC\_PRIV}}$ (EC; Signature Generation, Key Agreement)
- *Secret User Keys*:
    - $\mathbf{K_{USR\_AES}}$ (AES; for Key Encryption, Data Encryption or MAC)
    - $\mathbf{K_{USR\_TDES}}$ (Triple-DES; for Key Encryption, Data Encryption or MAC)
    - *Generic Secret* $\mathbf{K_{USR\_GS}}$ (to be used as HMAC key; at least 112 bits for HMAC generation)
- *Master Backup Key* **MBK** (AES 16, 24 or 32 bytes, key for back-up purposes)
- *Operator Password* $\mathbf{PSW_{AUTH}}$ (for authentication)

The following CSP is generated but not stored within the cryptographic module and exported after being encrypted with the Master Backup Key:

[1] Note: These non-volatile CSPs are not subject to the zeroization requirement since they are stored in encrypted form (using the AES algorithm).

- *Shared Secret* $\mathbf{S_{USR}}$ as generated by the *Agree Secret* function

7.4 Definition of Public Keys

The following public keys are contained in the cryptographic module:

- *Production Key* (RSA 2048 bit) $\mathbf{K_{PROD\_PUB}}$
- *Module Signature Key* (RSA 4096 bit) $\mathbf{K_{MDL\text{-}SIG\_PUB}}$
- *Default Administrator Key* (RSA 1024 bit) $\mathbf{K_{ADMIN\text{-}DEF\_PUB}}$
- *Local Public Personalization Key* (ECDSA) $\mathbf{K_{LP\_PUB}}$
- *Public User Keys:*
    - $\mathbf{K_{USR\_EC\_PUB}}$ (EC; Signature Verification, Key Agreement)
    - $\mathbf{K_{USR\_DSA\_PUB}}$ (DSA; Signature Verification, Key Agreement)
    - $\mathbf{K_{USR\_RSA\_PUB}}$ (RSA; Signature Verification, Key Encryption)
- Operator's *Public Authentication Key* $\mathbf{K_{AUTH\_PUB}}$ (RSA)

The following public keys are used temporarily within the cryptographic module:

- *Remote Public DH Key* $\mathbf{K_{SM\_HOST\_PUB}}$ (generated by the host and used to generate a shared secret via Diffie Hellman for Secure Messaging)
  (DSA 2048 bits, volatile storage only)
- *Local Public DH Key* $\mathbf{K_{SM\_MOD\_PUB}}$ (generated by the module and used to generate a shared secret via Diffie Hellman for Secure Messaging)
  (DSA 2048 bits, volatile storage only)

7.5 Definition of modes of access to CSPs

Table 5 defines the relationship between the different module services and access to CSPs. The types of access (e. g. Use/Write/Update) are given in the right-hand column.

The following types of access are possible:

- *Write:* the CSP is created (newly written).
- *Update:* replaces the value of the CSP with a new value.
- *Use:* the value of the CSP is used for some cryptographic calculation.
- *Wrapped Export:* the CSP is wrapped by some wrapping key and exported from the cryptographic module.
- *Export:* the key is exported from the cryptographic module (only possible for public RSA, DSA or EC keys $\mathbf{K_{USR\_RSA\_PUB}}$, $\mathbf{K_{USR\_DSA\_PUB}}$ and $\mathbf{K_{USR\_EC\_PUB}}$).
- *Delete:* invalidates the CSP
- *(xxx):* access type is set in brackets if this access type is conditional.

The following definitions are used in Table 5:

- *Any User Key* can be a *Secret User Key* (**K_{USR_AES}, K_{USR_TDES}** or **K_{USR_GS}**) or a *Private* and/or *Public User Key* **($K_{USR\_RSA\_PRIV}$, $K_{USR\_RSA\_PUB}$, $K_{USR\_DSA\_PRIV}$, $K_{USR\_DSA\_PUB}$, $K_{USR\_EC\_PRIV}$, $K_{USR\_EC\_PUB}$)**
- A *Secret Data Encryption Key* is a *Secret AES or DES User Key* (**K_{USR_AES}** or **K_{USR_TDES}**) with attribute[2] "CRYPT"/"DECRYPT".
- A *Secret Key Encryption Key* can be a *Secret AES or Triple-DES User Key* (**K_{USR_AES}** or **K_{USR_TDES}**) with attribute[3] "WRAP"/"UNWRAP".
- A *Secret MAC Key* can be a *Secret User Key* (**K_{USR_AES}**, **K_{USR_TDES}** or **K_{USR_GS}**) with attribute[4] "SIGN"/"VERIFY".
- A *Key Derivation Key* can be a *Private or Public EC or DSA User Key* (**$K_{USR\_EC\_PRIV}$**, **$K_{USR\_EC\_PUB}$**, **$K_{USR\_DSA\_PRIV}$**, **$K_{USR\_DSA\_PUB}$**) with attribute[5] "DERIVE".
- A *Private Sign Key* can be a *Private RSA, DSA or EC User Key* (**$K_{USR\_RSA\_PRIV}$**, **$K_{USR\_DSA\_PRIV}$** or **$K_{USR\_EC\_PRIV}$**) with attribute[4] "SIGN".
- A *Public Verify Key* can be a *Public RSA, DSA or EC User Key* (**$K_{USR\_RSA\_PUB}$**, **$K_{USR\_DSA\_PUB}$** or **$K_{USR\_EC\_PUB}$**) with attribute[4] "VERIFY".

* General remark concerning the access to internal or external keys: If a key is marked with an asterisk the key may be an internal[6] or an external[7] key. In case that such a key is accessed the following CSPs must additionally be used:

- When an internal *Secret or Private User Key* is to be accessed, the *Master Key* **K_{CS}** must be used to decrypt or encrypt the internal key.
- When an external key is to be accessed, the **MBK** must be used to verify or update the MAC and/or to decrypt or encrypt the secret or private key part.

** General remark concerning *DRBG Secrets* ***$S_{DRBG:}$***

- If a new block of random values must be generated but no reseeding is required, the *DRBG Secrets* **S_{DRBG_C}** and **S_{DRBG_V}** are used and **S_{DRBG_V}** is updated.
- If a new block of random values must be generated and reseeding is required, all *DRBG Secrets* **S_{DRBG_EI}**, **S_{DRBG_SEED}**, **S_{DRBG_C}** and **S_{DRBG_V}** are updated and used.

Below, the two left-hand columns indicate the *Roles* for which each service is available.

An asterisk in brackets (*) indicates that the service can be executed by the user but no keys or CSPs are accessed by the service.

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[2] See chapter 9, vendor imposed security rule 9.

[3] See chapter 9, vendor imposed security rule 12.

[4] See chapter 9, vendor imposed security rule 10.

[5] See chapter 9, vendor imposed security rule 11.

[6] An "internal key" is any User Key that is stored inside the cryptographic module.

[7] An "external key" is any User Key that is stored outside the cryptographic module in the form of a secured *Backup Blob* (e. g. as result of the *Backup Key* service). A *Backup Blob is integrity protected with a MAC;* secret and private key parts are always encrypted with the Master Backup Key **MBK**.

Table 5 – CSP and Key Access Rights within Roles & Services – General Services

Role			Service	Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Access Operation	Type of Access
Ad-minis trator	Security Officer	CU, KM, U[8]			
X	X	X	any command authentication	*Public Authentication Key* K_{AUTH_PUB} or *Password* PSW_{AUTH} of respective operator	*Use*
X	X	X	any command using *Secure Messaging*	*Session Key* K_S	*Use*
X	X	X	Get Session Key	*DRBG Secrets* S_{DRBG}**	*Use* and *Update*
				Remote Public DH Key $K_{SM\_HOST\_PUB}$	*Use*
				Local Private DH Key $K_{SM\_MOD\_PRIV}$	*Use*
				Local Public DH Key $K_{SM\_MOD\_PUB}$	*Export*
				Final Shared Secret S_{SM}	*Use*
				Session Key K_S	*Write*
(all without authentication)			End Session	*Session Key* K_S	*Delete*[9]
(all without authentication)			Verify Genuineness	*Local Private Personalization Key* K_{LP_PRIV}	*Use*
(all without authentication)			Get Personal. Key	*Local Public Personalization Key* K_{LP_PUB}	*Export*
X	X	X	Change Operator's Key or Password	*Public Authentication Key* K_{AUTH_PUB} *or Password* PSW_{AUTH} *of Operator*	*Update*
				If operator uses password: *CryptoServer's Master Key* K_{CS}	*(Use)*
(without authentication; only executed when an external erase is triggered by a short-circuit of the 'External Erase' pins on the PCIe card)			Zeroize	*CryptoServer's Master Key* K_{CS}	*Delete*[10]
				All CSPs that are stored temporarily in the Key Cache (volatile storage)	*Delete*[11]
				All CSPs that are stored wrapped with the Master Key	*Delete*[12]

[8] Cryptographic User, Key Manager, User

[9] Invalidated within Key Cache; Key Cache is zeroized on power cycle and in case of an alarm.

[10] Zeroized by overwriting the Key-RAM five times, alternately with 00_h and FF_h patterns.

[11] Key Cache is zeroized by overwriting each memory cell of the Key Cache five times, alternately with 00_h and FF_h patterns.

[12] CSPs are invalidated by zeroizing the Master Key K_{CS} because they are encrypted with the Master Key K_{CS}.

Table 6 – CSP and Key Access Rights within Roles & Services – General Administration

Role			Service	Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Access Operation	Type of Access
Ad-minis trator	Security Officer	CU, KM, U[13]			
X			Add Operator	*Public Authentication Key* ***K**AUTH_PUB*** or *Password* ***PSW**AUTH*** of Operator	*Write*
				If operator uses password: *CryptoServer's Master Key* ***K**CS***	*(Use)*
X			Delete Operator	*Public Authentication Key* ***K**AUTH_PUB*** or *Password* ***PSW**AUTH** of Operator*	*Delete*[14]
X	X		Add Group User	*Public Authentication Key* ***K**AUTH_PUB*** or *Password* ***PSW**AUTH** of Operator*	*Write*
				If operator uses password: *CryptoServer's Master Key* ***K**CS***	*(Use)*
X	X		Delete Group User	*Public Authentication Key* ***K**AUTH_PUB*** or *Password* ***PSW**AUTH*** of Operator	*Delete*[14]
X			Backup User	*Public Authentication Key* ***K**AUTH_PUB*** or *Password* ***PSW**AUTH*** of Operator	*Wrapped Export*
				Master Backup Key ***MBK***	*Use*
				CryptoServer's Master Key ***K**CS***	*Use*
X			Restore User	*Public Authentication Key* ***K**AUTH_PUB*** or *Password* ***PSW**AUTH*** of Operator	*Write or Update*
				Master Backup Key ***MBK***	*Use*
				CryptoServer's Master Key ***K**CS***	*Use*
X			Load File	If file to be loaded is a firmware module: *Public Module Signature Key* ***K**MDL-SIG_PUB***	*(Use)*
X			Delete File	---	---
X			Clear Audit Log	---	---
X			Set Max Fail Cnt	---	---
X			Set Time	---	---
X			Set Time Rel	---	---
X			List Master Backup Keys	---	---
X			Generate Master Backup Key	*Master Backup Key* ***MBK***	*Wrapped Export*
				Session Key ***K**S***	*Use*
				DRBG Secrets ***S**DRBG*** **	*Use* and *Update*
X			Import Master Backup Key	*Master Backup Key* ***MBK***	*Write* or *Update*
				Session Key ***K**S***	*Use*
				CryptoServer's Master Key ***K**CS***	*Use*

[13] Cryptographic User, Key Manager, User

[14] Invalidated within database; no zeroization needed because it is stored encrypted with the Master Key **K**CS.

Table 7 – CSP and Key Access Rights within Roles & Services – Key Management

Role				Service	Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Access Operation	Type of Access
Ad-minis-trator	Secu-rity Officer	Crypto-graphic User				
		User	Key Mgr			
	X			Init Key Group	*Any User Key*	*Delete*[15]
(*)	X	X	X	Open Key	If requested key is to be exported: *Any User Key**	(*Wrapped Export)*
(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	List Keys	---	---
(*)	(*)		X	Delete Key	*Any User Key*	*Delete*[15]
X	X	X	X	Get Key Property*	If Public User Key is requested: *Any Public User Key** (***K*USR_RSA_PUB, ***K*USR_DSA_PUB** or ***K*USR_EC_PUB**)	*(Export)*
(*)	(*)		(*)	Set Key Property*	--- (if an external key is addressed the ***MBK*** is used to verify and update the MAC)	---
(*)	(*)		X	Backup Key	*Any User Key*	*Wrapped Export*
					Master Backup Key ***MBK***	*Use*
					If key whose back-up copy will be exported is *Private* or *Secret User Key*: *CryptoServer's Master Key* $\boldsymbol{K_{CS}}$	*(Use)*
(*)	(*)		X	Restore Key	*Any User Key*	*Write, Update* or *Wrapped export*
					Master Backup Key ***MBK***	*Use*
					If key which will be restored is *Private* or *Secret User Key* and shall be stored internally: *CryptoServer's Master Key* $\boldsymbol{K_{CS}}$	*(Use)*
			X	Generate Key, Generate Key Pair	*DRBG Secrets* $\boldsymbol{S_{DRBG}}$**	*Use* and *Update*
					*Any User Key**	*Write* or *Update* (if generated key is to be stored in CryptoServer), or *Wrapped Export* (if generated key is to be exported from CryptoServer)

[15] Invalidated within database; no zeroization needed because it is only stored encrypted with the Master Key $\boldsymbol{K_{CS}}$.

Role				Service	Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Access Operation	Type of Access
Ad-minis-trator	Secu-rity Officer	Cryptographic User				
		User	Key Mgr			
			X	Export Key	*Any User Key**	*Wrapped Export*
					Optional if public key is exported; otherwise mandatory: *Secret Key Encryption Key** or *Public RSA User Key* $K_{USR\_RSA\_PUB}$*	*(Use)*
					Only if random padding is required: *DRBG Secrets* S_{DRBG}**	*(Use* and *Update)*
			X	Import Key	*Any User Key* *	*Write* or *Update* or *Wrapped Export*
					Optional: *Secret Key Encryption Key** or *Private RSA User Key* $K_{USR\_RSA\_PRIV}$*	*(Use)*
			X	Derive Key	*Key Derivation Key**	*Use*
					*Secret User Key**	*Write or Update* or *Wrapped Export*
			X	Wrap	*Any User Key**	*Wrapped Export*
					*Secret Key Encryption Key** or *Public RSA User Key* $K_{USR\_RSA\_PUB}$*	*Use*
					Only if random padding is required: *DRBG Secrets* S_{DRBG}**	*(Use* and *Update)*
			X	Unwrap	*Any User Key**	*Write* or *Update* or *Wrapped Export*
					*Secret Key Encryption Key** or *Private RSA User Key* $K_{USR\_RSA\_PRIV}$*	*Use*
			X	Create Object	*Any User Key**	*Write* or *Update* or *Wrapped Export*
			X	Copy Object	*Any User Key**	*Write* or *Wrapped Export*

Table 8 – CSP and Key Access Rights within Roles & Services – Cryptographic Services

Role				Service	Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Access Operation	Type of Access
Ad-minis-trator	Secu-rity Officer	Crypto-graphic User				
		User	Key Mgr			
		X		Crypt Data	*Secret Data Encryption Key**	*Use*
					If random padding is required: *DRBG Secrets* ***S**DRBG***	*(Use* and *Update)*
		X		Sign Data	*Private Sign Key** or *Secret MAC Key**	*Use*
					If random padding is required: *DRBG Secrets* ***S**DRBG***	*(Use* and *Update)*
		X		Verify Signature	*Public Verify Key** or *Secret MAC Key**	*Use*
		X		Generate Random Number	*DRBG Secrets* ***S**DRBG* **	*Use* and *Update*
		X	X	Compute Hash	optionally*: Any User Key**	(Use)
		X	X	Agree Secret	*Private EC User Key* ***K**USR_EC_PRIV***	*Use*
					Public EC User Key ***K**USR_EC_PUB***	*Use*
					Shared Secret ***S**USR*	*Wrapped Export*
		X	X	Generate DSA Parameters (_PQ/G)	*DRBG Secrets* ***S**DRBG* **	*Use* and *Update*

8 Operational Environment

The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the cryptographic module does not contain a modifiable operational environment.

9 Security Rules

The cryptographic module's design complies with the cryptographic module's security rules. This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of a FIPS 140-2 Level 3 module.

1. The cryptographic module provides three distinct operator roles. These are the *Cryptographic User* role, the *Security Officer* role and the *Administrator* role. The *Cryptographic User* role may be split into two sub-roles *User* and *Key Manager*.
2. The cryptographic module provides identity-based authentication.
3. No access to any cryptographic services is permitted until the operator has been authenticated into the "Cryptographic User", "User", "Key Manager", "Security Officer" or "Administrator" role by the module.
4. The cryptographic module performs the following tests:
   a) Power up Self-Tests:
      i) Cryptographic Algorithm Tests:
         (1) Triple-DES Known Answer Test (Cert. #2205)
         (2) Triple-DES-MAC Known Answer Test
         (3) AES Known Answer Test (Cert. #4028)
         (4) AES-CMAC Known Answer Test (Cert. #4028)
         (5) SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 Known Answer Tests (Cert. #3323)
         (6) BL SHA: SHA-512 Known Answer Test (Cert. #3322)
         (7) SMOS SHA: SHA-512 Known Answer Test (Cert. #3321)
         (8) KDF SP 800-108 Known Answer Test (Cert. #97)
         (9) RSA Known Answer Tests (sign/verify) (Cert. #2066 and 2067)
         (10) RSA Pair-wise Consistency Test (encrypt/decrypt) (Cert. #2066 and 2067)
         (11) EC Pair-wise Consistency Test (sign/verify) (Cert. #897 and 898)
         (12) ECC CDH Known Answer Tests (Cert. #855 and 856)
         (13) DSA Pair-wise Consistency Test (sign/verify) (Cert. #1091)
         (14) HMAC Known Answer Test (Cert. #2628)
         (15) DRBG Known Answer Tests according to [NIST 800-90A] (testing the Instantiate Function, the Generate Function and the Reseed Function) (Cert. #1202)
      ii) Firmware Integrity Test (CRC (32 bit) verification for boot loader program code, SHA-512 hash value verification for the module program code for every firmware module)
      iii) Critical Functions Tests
         (1) SDRAM Test
         (2) Master Key Consistency Test

(3) Temperature Test

(4) TRNG Power-Up test according to [AIS 20/31] (RNG class PTG.2)

b) Conditional Self-Tests:

i) *Continuous Random Number Generator (RNG) Test* performed on DRBG: Prior to each use, the DRBG is tested using the conditional test specified in FIPS 140-2 §4.9.2.

ii) Each time a new random value block has to be generated by the TRNG online tests over 64 bytes of digitized noise data are done according to [AIS 20/31] for RNG class PTG.2.

iii) RSA Key *Pair-wise Consistency Test* (sign/verify and encrypt/decrypt) for RSA key generation

iv) EC Key *Pair-wise Consistency Test* (sign/verify) for EC key generation

v) DSA Key *Pair-wise Consistency Test* (sign/verify) for DSA key generation

vi) *Firmware Load Test* (via RSA signature verification)

5. At any time the operator is capable of commanding the module to perform the power-up self-test.
6. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
7. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to the compromising of the module.
8. The module supports concurrent operators.
9. The successful completion of the power-up self-tests is indicated by executing the “GetState” command which returns state = INITIALIZED and FIPS mode = ON.

This section documents the security rules imposed by the vendor:

1. The module zeroizes all plaintext CSPs within a maximum of 4 milliseconds after any attack or alarm (see section 10 below).
2. If the cryptographic module remains inactive in any valid role for a maximum period of 15 minutes, the module automatically logs off the operator.
3. The module provides functionality for protecting command and response data on their way to and from the module via a *Secure Messaging* mechanism. This mechanism encrypts and integrity protects the data with the AES encrypting algorithm and MAC. In FIPS mode, the use of Secure Messaging is mandatory for every command that has to be authenticated.
4. The module implements a Challenge-Response mechanism to prevent the replay of older authenticated messages.
5. The module prohibits the export of plaintext secret or private cryptographic keys or other CSPs.
6. The module supports an “Exportable” attribute for every stored private or secret cryptographic key. The module only permits the (wrapped) export of a key if this attribute is set.
7. The module supports a “Deny_backup” attribute for every stored private or secret cryptographic key. The module only permits the MBK encrypted export (export for backup

purposes) of a key if this attribute is NOT set.

8. The module supports an (optional) “Key Group” attribute for every stored key and for every registered operator. Access to a key can be restricted by assigning this key to a specific key group. Operators who are not assigned to the same key group are forbidden to access or even ‘see’ the key.
   A key is assigned to a key group by setting its key group attribute value to the desired key group name. An operator is assigned to a key group by setting their operator key group attribute value to the desired key group name.
9. The module supports the “CRYPT” (”DECRYPT”) attribute for every stored secret cryptographic AES or Triple-DES key. The module only permits encryption (decryption) with a secret user key if this attribute is set. In FIPS mode this attribute cannot be set for private or public user keys. In particular, RSA and EC keys cannot be used for bulk data encryption or decryption.
10. The module supports the “SIGN” (”VERIFY”) attribute for every private, public or secret cryptographic key. The module only permits the generation (verification) of a signature with a private (public) user key only if this attribute is set. The module allows the generation (verification) of a MAC or HMAC with a secret user key only if this attribute is set.
11. The module supports a “DERIVE” attribute for private and public cryptographic EC or DSA keys. The module only permits key derivation with a private or public user key if this attribute is set.
    This attribute cannot be set for RSA keys or secret user keys.
12. The module supports the “WRAP” (”UNWRAP”) attribute for every stored secret AES, Triple-DES or public (private) RSA key. The module only permits the key to be used to encrypt (decrypt) other keys for export (import) if, and only if, this attribute is set.
    This attribute cannot be set for EC or DSA keys.
13. The module supports the attribute “TRUSTED” (default: false) for every stored wrapping key (attribute “WRAP” = TRUE), which can only be set to TRUE by a *Security Officer*. It also supports the “WRAP WITH TRUSTED” attribute (default: false) for any key. If set to TRUE the key can only be wrapped with a wrapping key that has the attribute “TRUSTED” set to TRUE.

10 Physical Security Policy

10.1 Physical security mechanisms

The CryptoServer multi-chip embedded cryptographic module is encapsulated in a hard, opaque, tamper-evident coating:

On the top side of the module a (hollow) metal heat sink is directly mounted on the printed circuit board, on three edges, and the space between the PCB and the heat sink is completely filled with potting material (epoxy resin) (see Figure 2). On the bottom side of the PCB a metal frame is stuck directly onto the printed circuit board, and the space inside the metal frame is again completely filled by potting material (see Figure 3).

The heat sink and potting material together define the top and bottom sides of the module and deliver a hard, opaque coating. All the cryptographic module's hardware components (which are all mounted on the PCB) are entirely covered by this coating.

The CryptoServer module with its tamper-evident enclosure (the heat sink and the potting material) implements the following physical security mechanisms:

- Active tamper response and zeroization circuitry.
- The cryptographic module's hardware components are covered by hard, opaque potting material or the heat sink which show evidence of tampering on the enclosure when a physical attack is attempted.
- The potting material is hard and opaque enough to prevent direct observation and easy penetration to the depth of the underlying hardware components. It is highly probable that anyone attempting to penetrate to the depth of the circuitry will break off large pieces of potting material and tear important hardware components off the module, causing serious damage to the module.
- Temperature sensors that activate a tamper response if the module is outside of the defined temperature range of –10°C to 60°C.
- Voltage sensors that monitor the power supply of the module and activate a tamper response if the power input is outside of the defined range (including low or removed battery).
- Tamper response and zeroization circuitry is active while module is in standby mode (powered down).
- Zeroization is performed within less than 4 milliseconds after tamper detection (foil destruction or temperature or voltage outside of defined range).
- Module stops operation if its internal temperature exceeds the upper limit of its operational temperature range (63.4°C).
- The module regularly inverts all bits of the plaintext CSPs to avoid "burn in" of information into SRAM cells.

To ensure security of the cryptographic module, the module must be periodically inspected for evidence of tampering. The recommended inspection schedule depends on the customer's application area. This may vary between inspecting the module once a week and once a year.

The physical security mechanisms listed above function autonomously and under all circumstances.

11 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy

The cryptographic module has been designed to mitigate Simple and Differential Power Analysis (SPA/DPA) and timing analysis.

Table 9 – Mitigation of Other Attacks

Other Attacks	Mitigation Mechanism
SPA/DPA	SPA/DPA attacks are mitigated by use of hardware components assembled into a special design of the power management circuit, such that it is not feasible to monitor power consumption to determine the value of an algorithm's key. Power consumption of the module does not depend on the value of cryptographic keys.
Timing Analysis	It is not feasible to determine the value of an algorithm's keys by measuring the execution time of a cryptographic operation. Triple-DES and AES operations are executed in fixed time. If possible the input data for a private RSA operation is randomized by use of a blinding technique so that the input parameters of the RSA algorithm are not known by the operator. In this case it is not possible to calculate the bits of a private key by the amount of time required by the private RSA operation. This blinding technique is only possible if the public key is available. If the private key was generated within the CryptoServer the public key is always stored with the private key and blinding will be applied. In the case that the user imports a private key without the public key, blinding is not possible and will not be applied.

12 References

Reference	Title/Company
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[NIST 800-90A]	NIST Special Publication 800-90A, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators / National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), January 2012
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13 Definitions and Acronyms

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DH	Diffie Hellman
DPA	Differential Power Analysis
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
EC	Elliptic Curve
ECDH	Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman Algorithm
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
KDF	Key Derivation Function
MAC	Message Authentication Code
MBK	Master Backup Key
NDRNG	Non-deterministic Random Number Generator
PCB	Printed Circuit Board
PCI	Payment Card Industry
PTS	PIN Transaction Security
RNG	Random Number Generator
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SPA	Simple Power Analysis
Triple-DES	Triple-DES with key size 16 or 24 bytes