Ruckus Wireless, Inc.
R710 Access Point
R610 Access Point
R720 Access Point
T610 Access Point
T710 Access Point
FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Documentation Version Number: 1.12
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Table of Contents
1. Module Overview...................................................................................................................................................3
2. Modes of Operation...............................................................................................................................................7
2.1 Approved Cryptographic Functions .....................................................................................................................7
2.2 Non-FIPS Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Functions. ................................................................................9
3. Ports and interfaces...............................................................................................................................................9
4. Roles, Services and Authentication......................................................................................................................12
5. Cryptographic Keys and CSPs...............................................................................................................................14
6. Self-tests ..............................................................................................................................................................15
7. Physical Security...................................................................................................................................................16
8. References ...........................................................................................................................................................21
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1. Module Overview
The access point provides the connection point between wireless client hosts and the wired network.
Once authenticated as trusted nodes on the wired infrastructure, the access points provide the encryption
service on the wireless network between themselves and the wireless client. The APs also communicate
directly with the wireless controller for management purposes. The management traffic between Ruckus
Wireless, Inc. AP and Ruckus Wireless, Inc. Controller is encrypted using AES SSH.
The APs have an RF interface and an Ethernet interface, and these interfaces are controlled by the
software executing on the AP. The APs vary by the antenna support they offer, however the differences
do not affect the security functionality claimed by the module.
Figure 1: Encryption between AP and Controller
FIPS 140-2 conformance testing was performed at Security Level 2. The following configurations were
tested by the lab.
Table 1: Configurations tested by the lab.
Module Name and Version Firmware version
R710 Access Point
R610 Access Point
R720 Access Point
T610 Access Point
T710 Access Point
3.6.0.3
The Cryptographic Module meets FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements.
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Table 2: Module Security Level Statement.
FIPS Security Area Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self-tests 2
Design Assurance 2
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
The cryptographic boundary of the module is the enclosure that contains components of the module.
The enclosure of the cryptographic module is opaque within the visible spectrum. The module uses
tamper evident labels to provide the evidence of tampering.
Figure 2: R710 Access Point
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Figure 3: R610 Access Point
Figure 4: R720 Access Point
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Figure 5: T610 Access Point
Figure 6: T710 Access Point
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2. Modes of Operation
The module is intended to always operate in the FIPS approved mode. However, a provision is made to
disable/enable FIPS mode via configuration. Refer to the Ruckus Wireless, Inc. FIPS Configuration Guide
for more information.
The following command must be executed prior to operating the module in the FIPS mode:
set fips-mode enable
2.1 Approved Cryptographic Functions
The following approved cryptographic algorithms are used in FIPS approved mode of operation.
Table 3: Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm Standard Model/
Method
Key Lengths,
Curves or Moduli
Use
5096 AES FIPS 197, ECB, CBC, CTR, 128, 192, 256 Data Encryption/
5309 SP 800-38F, GCM5
, CCM Decryption
5312 SP 800-38C, KTS
5381 SP 800-38D (key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 128
and 256 bits of
encryption
strength)
1902 DRBG SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Deterministic
Random Bit
Generation1
1321 ECDSA FIPS 186-4 P-256, P-384, P-521 Digital Signature
Generation and
Verification
3398 HMAC FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA-1 160, 256, 512 Message
3564 HMAC-SHA-256 Authentication
HMAC-SHA-512 KTS
2627 Triple-DES SP 800-67 TECB, TCBC 192 Data Encryption/
Decryption2
KTS
(key
establishment
methodology
provides 112
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CAVP
Cert
AlgorithmStandard Model/
Method
Key Lengths,
Curves or Moduli
Use
bits of
encryption
strength)
4144 SHA FIPS 180-4 SHA-1 Message Digest
4317 SHA-256
SHA-512
2758
2878
RSA FIPS 186-4,
FIPS186-2
SHA-1
SHA256
SHA512
PKCS1 v1.5
2048 (FIPS 186-4 RSA
SigGen/SigVer);
4096 (FIPS 186-2 RSA for
SigVer only)
Digital Signature
Generation and
Verification
1646 CVL SP 800-135 Key Derivation3
1777 TLS 1.2,
SSH,
SNMP
199 KBKDF SP 800-108 Key Derivation
CKG
(vendor
affirmed)
Cryptograph
ic
Key
Generat
ion
SP 800-133 Key Generation4
Note: not all CAVS tested modes of the algorithms are used in this module
1
The minimum number of bits of entropy generated by the module is 368 bits.
2
Operators are responsible for ensuring that the same Triple-DES key is not used to encrypt more than 2^16 64-bit data
blocks.
3
No parts of these protocols, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
4
The module directly uses the output of the DRBG
5
The module's AES-GCM implementation complies with IG A.5 scenario 1 and RFC 5288. AES-GCM is only used in TLS
version 1.2.
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2.2 Non-FIPS Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Functions.
The following non-FIPS approved but allowed cryptographic algorithms are used in FIPS approved mode
of operation.
Table 4: Non-FIPS Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Caveat Use
RSA Key Wrapping using 2048 bits key Provides 112 bits of
encryption strength.
Used during TLS handshake
EC Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #1646, key
agreement; key establishment methodology
provides between 112 and 256 bits of
encryption strength)
Provides between 112
and 256 bits of
encryption strength
Used during TLS handshake
Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #1646, key
agreement; key establishment
methodology provides 112 bits of
encryption strength)
using 2048 bits key
Provides 112 bits of
encryption strength.
Used during SSH session
establishment.
NDRNG N/A Used to seed the SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG (Cert. #1902)
The module also implements other cryptographic algorithms:
Algorithm Use
ECDSA using brainpoolP512r1, brainpoolP384r1,
brainpoolP256r1, and secp256k1
Digital Signature Generation and Verification in
non-approved mode
3. Ports and interfaces
The following table describes physical ports and logical interfaces of the module.
The Access Points have similar ports, except that T610 doesn’t have a Power Receptacle and T710 has an
SFP port as well as the ability to output power via Ethernet. It doesn’t have a USB port.
Table 6: Ports and Interfaces.
R720 Access Point
Port Name Count Interface(s)
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Ethernet Ports 2 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input,
Status Output, Power Input
USB Port 1 Disabled
Power Receptacle 1 Power Input
Reset Button 1 Control Input
LEDs 5 Status Output
R710 Access Point
Port Name Count Interface(s)
Ethernet Ports 2 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input,
Status Output, Power Input
USB Port 1 Disabled
Power Receptacle 1 Power Input
Reset Button 1 Control Input
LEDs 5 Status Output
R610 Access Point
Port Name Count Interface(s)
Ethernet Ports 2 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input,
Status Output, Power Input
USB Port 1 Disabled
Power Receptacle 1 Power Input
Reset Button 1 Control Input
LEDs 5 Status Output
T610 Access Point
Port Name Count Interface(s)
Ethernet Ports 2 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input,
Status Output, Power Input
USB Port 1 Disabled
LEDs 5 Status Output
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Reset Button 1 Control Input
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T710 Access Point
Port Name Count Interface(s)
Ethernet Ports 2 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input,
Status Output, Power Input, Power Output
SFP port 1 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input,
Status Output
Power Receptacle 1 Power Input
Reset Button 1 Control Input
LEDs 5 Status Output
4. Roles, Services and Authentication
The module supports a Crypto Officer role and a User (Wireless Client) Role. The Crypto Officer installs
and administers the module. The User uses the cryptographic services provided by the module. The
module provides the following services.
Table 7: Roles and Services
Service Corresponding
Roles
Types of Access to Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
R – Read or Execute
W – Write or Create
Z – Zeroize
Self-test Crypto Officer N/A
Reboot Crypto Officer N/A
Zeroization Crypto Officer All: Z
Firmware update Crypto Officer Firmware update key: R
TLS Keys: R,W
DRBG seed: R,W
Show status Crypto Officer N/A
Installation Crypto Officer TLS Keys: R,W
DRBG seed: R, W
GRE Tunnel Crypto Officer RGRE tunnel RSA key: R
RGRE packets AES key: R,W
SSH Tunnel Crypto Officer Password: R, W
SSH Keys: R,W
DRBG seed: R, W
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Service Corresponding
Roles
Types of Access to Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
R – Read or Execute
W – Write or Create
Z – Zeroize
Login Crypto Officer Password: R, W
SSH Keys: R, W
TLS Keys: R, W
DRBG seed: R, W
Secure Wireless connection for
Clients
User 802.11i keys: R,W
WPA2 PSK: R,W
Configure module parameters Crypto Officer Password: R, W
SSH Keys: R,W
DRBG seed: R, W
Secure Mesh User 802.11i keys: R,W
The module supports the following authentication mechanisms.
Role Authentication Mechanisms
User 802.11i Pre-shared secret
The module uses 802.11i Pre-shared secret, which corresponds,
at a minimum, to 112 bits of security, therefore the probability is
less than one in 1,000,000 that a random attempt will succeed or
a false acceptance will occur.
For multiple attempts to use the authentication mechanism
during a one-minute period, the probability is less than one in
100,000 that a random attempt will succeed or a false
acceptance will occur due to the authentication process
performance limitation.
Crypto Officer Passwords
The module uses passwords of at least 8 characters therefore the
probability is less than one in 1,000,000 that a random attempt
will succeed or a false acceptance will occur.
For multiple attempts to use the authentication mechanism
during a one-minute period, the probability is less than one in
100,000 that a random attempt will succeed or a false
acceptance will occur due to the authentication process
performance limitation.
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5. Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
The table below describes cryptographic keys and CSPs used by the module.
Table 8: Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
Key Description/Usage Storage
TLS pre-master secret Used to derive TLS master
secret
RAM in plaintext
TLS master secret Used to derive TLS encryption
key and TLS HMAC Key
RAM in plaintext
TLS AES or Triple-DES
key
Used during encryption and
decryption of data within the
TLS protocol
RAM in plaintext
TLS HMAC key Used to protect integrity of
data within the TLS protocol
RAM in plaintext
TLS RSA public and
private keys
Used during the TLS
handshake
RAM in plaintext
Flash in plaintext
TLS ECDSA public keys Used during the TLS
handshake
RAM in plaintext
TLS EC Diffie-Hellman
public and private
keys
Used during the TLS
handshake to establish the
shared secret
RAM in plaintext
CTR_DRBG CSPs:
entropy input, V and
Key
Used during generation of
random numbers
RAM in plaintext
Passwords Used for user authentication RAM in plaintext
Flash in plaintext
4096 bits RSA
Firmware update
public key
Used to protect integrity
during firmware update
RAM in plaintext
Flash in plaintext
SSH AES key Used during encryption and
decryption of data within the
SSH protocol
RAM in plaintext
SSH HMAC key Used to protect integrity of
data within the SSH protocol
RAM in plaintext
SSH RSA public and
private keys
Used to authenticate the SSH
handshake
RAM in plaintext
Flash in plaintext
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SSH Diffie-Hellman
public and private
keys
Used during the SSH
handshake to establish the
shared secret
RAM in plaintext
RGRE tunnel RSA
private key
Used for establishing RGRE
tunnel
RAM in plaintext
Flash in plaintext
RGRE packets AES key Used for establishing RGRE
tunnel
RAM in plaintext
802.11i Pairwise
Master Key(PMK)
Used to derive 802.11i
Pairwise Transient Key(PTK)
RAM in plaintext
802.11i Pairwise
Transient Key(PTK)
All session
encryption/decryption keys
are derived from the PTK
RAM in plaintext
802.11i EAPOL MIC
Key
Used for integrity validation in
4-way handshake
RAM in plaintext
802.11i EAPOL
Encryption Key
Used for 802.11i message
encryption
RAM in plaintext
802.11i Group Master
Key(GMK)
Used to derive Group
Transient Key(GTK)
RAM in plaintext
802.11i Group
Transient Key(GTK)
Used to derive multicast
cryptographic keys
RAM in plaintext
802.11i Group AES-
CCM Data
Encryption/MIC Key
Used to protect multicast
message confidentiality and
integrity (AES-CCM)
RAM in plaintext
802.11i AES-CCM
session key
Used for 802.11i packet
encryption
RAM in plaintext
WPA2 PSK Used for client authentication RAM in plaintext
Flash in plaintext
6. Self-tests
The module performs the following power-up and conditional self-tests. Upon failure or a power-up or
conditional self-test the module halts its operation.
The following table describes self-tests implemented by the module.
Table 9: Self-Tests
Algorithm Test
AES Separate KATs (encryption/decryption)
Triple-DES Separate KATs (encryption/decryption)
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Algorithm Test
SHS KAT
HMAC KAT
SP800-90A DRBG KAT
Continuous Random Number Generator test
NDRNG Continuous Random Number Generator test
RSA KAT
Pairwise Consistency Test
Firmware integrity MD5 checksum during bootup
Firmware update RSA
ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test
7. Physical Security
The cryptographic module consists of production-grade components. The enclosure of the cryptographic
module is opaque within the visible spectrum. The removable covers are protected with tamper-evident
seals. The tamper-evident seals must be checked periodically by the Crypto Officer. If the tamper-evident
seals are broken or missing, the Crypto Officer must halt the operation of the module.
The tamper evident seals shall be installed by either the manufacturer or the customers for the module
to operate in the approved mode of operation.
FIPS security seal application instructions
For all seal applications, Crypto Officer ensures that the following instructions are observed:
• All surfaces to which the seals will be applied must be clean and dry. Use alcohol to clean the
surfaces. Do not use other solvents.
• Do not cut, trim, punch, or otherwise alter the TEL.
• Do not use bare fingers to handle the labels. Slowly peel the backing from each seal,taking
care not to touch the adhesive.
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• Use very firm pressure across the entire seal surface to ensure maximum adhesion.
• Allow a minimum of 24 hours for the adhesive to cure. Tamper evidence might notbe
apparent until the adhesive cures.
Order for seals is placed to Ruckus Wireless, Inc. through a partner/distributor and Ruckus Wireless, Inc.
processes the order. The part number for the seals is XBR-000195.
Number of seals per model: T610 has three tamper evident seals, T710 has 3 tamper evident seals, R610 has 2
tamper evident seals, R710 has 2 tamper evident seals and R720 has 2 tamper evident seals.
Figure 7: Tamper-evident seals on T610 Access Point
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Figure 8: Tamper-evident seals on T710 Access Point
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Figure 9: Tamper-evident seals on R610 Access Point
Figure 10: Tamper-evident seals on R710 Access Point
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Figure 11: Tamper-evident seals on R720 Access Point
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8. References
Table 8: References
Reference Specification
[ANS X9.31] Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry (rDSA)
[FIPS 140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic modules, May 25, 2001
[FIPS 180-4] Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
[FIPS 186-2/4] Digital Signature Standard
[FIPS 197] Advanced Encryption Standard
[FIPS 198-1] The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
[FIPS 202] SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions
[PKCS#1 v2.1] RSA Cryptography Standard
[PKCS#5] Password-Based Cryptography Standard
[PKCS#12] Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard
[SP 800-38A] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of
Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode
[SP 800-38B] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
Authentication
[SP 800-38C] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for
Authentication and Confidentiality
[SP 800-38D] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) and GMAC
[SP 800-38F] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping
[SP 800-56A] Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
Logarithm Cryptography
[SP 800-56B] Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer
Factorization Cryptography
[SP 800-56C] Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-then-Expansion
[SP 800-67R1] Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
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Reference Specification
[SP 800-89] Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications
[SP 800-90A] Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
Generators
[SP 800-108] Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions
[SP 800-132] Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation
[SP 800-135] Recommendation for Existing Application –Specific Key Derivation Functions