MOBILE-ID TECHNOLOGIES AND SERVICES JOINT STOCK COMPANY
Level 9, Thuy Loi 4 Building, 286 – 288 Nguyen Xi, Binh Loi Trung Ward, Ho
Chi Minh City, Vietnam
Tel: (84-28) 3622 2982 - Fax: (84-28) 3622 2983 – Hotline: 1900 6884
info@mobile-id.vn – https://www.mobile-id.vn
Trusted Key Token Cryptographic Module
Part No: Trusted-Key
Firmware Version No: V1.3.02
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS Security Level: 3
Document Version: V1.1
Date: April 1st
, 2026
International Copyright© Mobile-ID Technologies And Services Joint Stock Company (Mobile-
IDTM
). All rights reserved. This document is the property of Mobile-IDTM
. and as such may only
be distributed, partly or in full, in lieu of a non-disclosure agreement (NDA). Permission to copy
and implement the material contained herein is granted subject to the conditions of the
aforementioned NDA and that any copy must bear this legend in full, that any derivative work
must bear a notice that it is a Mobile-IDTM
. copyright document jointly published by the copyright
holders, and that none of the copyright holders shall have any responsibility or liability
whatsoever to any other party arising from the use or publication of the material contained
herein.
Ho Chi Minh – 2026
MOBILE-ID TECHNOLOGIES AND SERVICES JOINT STOCK COMPANY
Level 9, Thuy Loi 4 Building, 286 – 288 Nguyen Xi, Binh Loi Trung Ward, Ho
Chi Minh City, Vietnam
Tel: (84-28) 3622 2982 - Fax: (84-28) 3622 2983 – Hotline: 1900 6884
info@mobile-id.vn – https://www.mobile-id.vn
Document Revisions
Version Date Description Author
1.1 2026-04-01
Change Model/PartNumber from K4B to A4B on Table 2:
Tested Module Identification - Hardware
KHANHPX
1.0 2026-03-06 First submission KHANHPX
MOBILE-ID TECHNOLOGIES AND SERVICES JOINT STOCK COMPANY
Level 9, Thuy Loi 4 Building, 286 – 288 Nguyen Xi, Binh Loi Trung Ward, Ho
Chi Minh City, Vietnam
Tel: (84-28) 3622 2982 - Fax: (84-28) 3622 2983 – Hotline: 1900 6884
info@mobile-id.vn – https://www.mobile-id.vn
Contents
Document Revisions ...................................................................................................................... 2
Contents ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Tables.......................................................................................................................................... 2
Figures......................................................................................................................................... 2
1. General ................................................................................................................................. 1
1.1. Overview............................................................................................................................ 1
1.2. Security Levels.................................................................................................................... 1
2. Module Overview .................................................................................................................... 2
2.1. Description ......................................................................................................................... 2
2.2. Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification.................................................. 4
2.3. Excluded Components.......................................................................................................... 4
2.4. Mode of Operation ............................................................................................................... 4
2.5. Algorithms.......................................................................................................................... 4
2.6. Security Function Implementations........................................................................................ 6
2.7. Algorithm Specific Information .............................................................................................. 9
2.8. RBG and Entropy............................................................................................................... 10
2.9. Key Generation ................................................................................................................. 10
2.10. Key Establishment ......................................................................................................... 10
2.11. Industry Protocols.......................................................................................................... 10
3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces ............................................................................................ 11
3.1. Ports and Interfaces .......................................................................................................... 11
4. Roles, Services, and Authentication......................................................................................... 12
4.1. Authentication Methods...................................................................................................... 12
4.2. Roles ............................................................................................................................... 13
4.3. Approved Services............................................................................................................. 13
4.4. Non-Approved Services ...................................................................................................... 26
4.5. External Software/Firmware Loaded .................................................................................... 26
5. Software/Firmware Security................................................................................................... 27
5.1. Integrity Techniques .......................................................................................................... 27
5.2. Initiate on Demand............................................................................................................ 27
6. Operational Environment ....................................................................................................... 28
6.1. Operational Environment Type and Requirements.................................................................. 28
7. Physical Security .................................................................................................................. 29
7.1. Mechanisms and Actions Required ....................................................................................... 29
7.2. EFP/EFT Information.......................................................................................................... 29
7.3. Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges ................................................................................ 29
8. Non-Invasive Security ........................................................................................................... 30
8.1. Mitigation Techniques ........................................................................................................ 30
9. Sensitive Security Parameters Management ............................................................................. 31
9.1. Storage Areas................................................................................................................... 31
9.2. SSP Input/Output Methods ................................................................................................. 31
9.3. SSP Zeroization................................................................................................................. 31
9.4. SSPs................................................................................................................................ 32
9.5. Transitions ....................................................................................................................... 39
10. Self-Tests......................................................................................................................... 40
10.1. Pre-Operational Self-Tests .............................................................................................. 40
10.2. Conditional Self-Tests..................................................................................................... 40
10.3. Periodic Self-Test Information.......................................................................................... 42
10.4. Error States .................................................................................................................. 43
10.5. Operator Initiation of Self-Tests....................................................................................... 44
11. Life-Cycle Assurance.......................................................................................................... 45
11.1. Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures.............................................................. 45
11.2. Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................. 45
11.3. Non-Administrator Guidance............................................................................................ 45
11.4. Design and Rules ........................................................................................................... 45
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Level 9, Thuy Loi 4 Building, 286 – 288 Nguyen Xi, Binh Loi Trung Ward, Ho
Chi Minh City, Vietnam
Tel: (84-28) 3622 2982 - Fax: (84-28) 3622 2983 – Hotline: 1900 6884
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11.5. Maintenance Requirements ............................................................................................. 46
11.6. End of Life..................................................................................................................... 46
12. Mitigation of Other Attacks ................................................................................................. 47
13. References and Definitions ................................................................................................. 48
Tables
Table 1: FIPS 140-3 Section Security Levels ..................................................................................... 1
Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Hardware .............................................................................. 4
Table 3: Modes List and Description................................................................................................. 4
Table 4: Approved Algorithms......................................................................................................... 5
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ............................................................................................... 6
Table 6: Security Function Implementations ..................................................................................... 9
Table 7: Entropy Certificates......................................................................................................... 10
Table 8: Entropy Sources ............................................................................................................. 10
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................ 11
Table 10: Authentication Methods.................................................................................................. 12
Table 11: Roles ........................................................................................................................... 13
Table 12: Approved Services ........................................................................................................ 26
Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required................................................................................... 29
Table 14: EFP/EFT Information...................................................................................................... 29
Table 15: Hardness Testing Temperatures ...................................................................................... 29
Table 16: Storage Areas............................................................................................................... 31
Table 17:SSP Input-Output Methods.............................................................................................. 31
Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................ 32
Table 19:SSP Table 1................................................................................................................... 35
Table 20:SSP Table 2................................................................................................................... 39
Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests.............................................................................................. 40
Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests.................................................................................................... 42
Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information ............................................................................... 42
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information ..................................................................................... 43
Table 25: Error States.................................................................................................................. 44
Table 26: References ................................................................................................................... 48
Table 27: Acronyms and Definitions............................................................................................... 49
Figures
Figure 1: Module Boundary............................................................................................................. 2
Figure 2: Block Diagram................................................................................................................. 3
Figure 3: Module Appearance.......................................................................................................... 3
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Tel: (84-28) 3622 2982 - Fax: (84-28) 3622 2983 – Hotline: 1900 6884
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1. General
1.1. Overview
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the Trusted Key Token. It contains the
security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements
as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3 for an overall
Security Level 3 module).
1.2. Security Levels
The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the Module are as follows:
Section Section Title Level
1 General 3
2 Cryptographic Module Specification 3
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces 3
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware Security 3
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Physical Security 3
8 Non-Invasive Security N/A
9 Sensitive Security Parameter Management 3
10 Self-Tests 3
11 Life-cycle Assurance 3
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall Level 3
Table 1: FIPS 140-3 Section Security Levels
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2. Module Overview
This Mobile-IDTM
Trusted Key Token module, hereafter denoted as the Module. The Module supports multiple
identity authentication system frameworks such as PKI/OTP/FIDO, among which PKI includes three
applications: Trusted Key PKI/Trusted Key PIV/Trusted Key OpenPGP. The OTP functional unit complies
with OATH standards. The PIV functional unit meets the specifications NIST.SP.800-73-4. The OpenPGP
functional unit is an ISO Smart Card Operating Systems.
2.1. Description
Purpose and Use:
The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies or other markets that require FIPS 140-3 validated
identity authentication product, the Module is intended to be used in E-mail encryption, system login,
transaction protection, etc.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: MultiChipEmbed
Cryptographic Boundary:
The physical form of the Module is depicted in Figure 1. The Module is a multi-chip embedded embodiment.
The Module is a USB token containing Mobile-IDTM
owned MIDCOS, which is embedded in a HSC32K2 with
PAA Integrated Circuit (IC) chip and has been developed to support Trusted Key Token. The Module is
designed to provide strong authentication and identification and to support network login, secure online
transactions, digital signatures, and sensitive data protection.
Figure 1: Module Boundary
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Figure 2: Block Diagram
Figure 3: Module Appearance
Model Description: There are two types, one without buttons and the other with buttons. In the above
Figure 3, the top row (A2 models – Blue and Purple) do not come with buttons, they are only used for
MOBILE-ID TECHNOLOGIES AND SERVICES JOINT STOCK COMPANY
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Trusted Key products. All other models (K9, K40, A4B, K49, K50 and K28) have a button which can be
used for all functional units.
2.2. Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
The operator can correlate the module’s name and versioning information with the CMVP validation record
by following the instructions in the Mobile-IDTM
Trusted Key Token Administrator Guidance, Section 5.8 Get
Device Info, #7 Get Version Info.
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Mobile-IDTM
Trusted Key Token cryptographic module is tested on the following operational environment.
Model and/or
Part Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
A2 V1.2 V1.3.02 HSC32K2 with PAA
K9 V1.0 V1.3.02 HSC32K2 with PAA
K40 V1.0 V1.3.02 HSC32K2 with PAA
A4B V1.0 V1.3.02 HSC32K2 with PAA
K49 V1.0 V1.3.02 HSC32K2 with PAA
K50 V1.0 V1.3.02 HSC32K2 with PAA
K28 V1.0 V1.3.02 HSC32K2 with PAA
Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Hardware
2.3. Excluded Components
The module does not exclude any components.
2.4. Mode of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
Mode
The module has only one mode of operation - the
Approved mode, which is entered after power up.
Approved LED on and blink
Table 3: Modes List and Description
The module only supports Approved mode. IG 2.4.C scenario 2) is applied to the module, i.e. A static code
(9000 or 00) indicating the completion of service. The successful completion of a service is an implicit
indicator for the use of an approved service.
2.5. Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
The Module implements the Approved cryptographic algorithms listed the table below.
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CBC A4980
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key
Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CMAC A4980
Direction - Generation, Verification
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38B
AES-ECB A4980
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key
Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A4980
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV
Generation Mode - 8.2.2 Key Length
- 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38D
Counter DRBG A4980
Prediction Resistance - Yes Mode -
AES-128 Derivation Function
Enabled - Yes
SP 800-90A Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-
5)
A4980
Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Secret
Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-
5)
A4980 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A4980
Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash
Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512 Component - Yes
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) A4980
Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash
Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
FIPS 186-5
HMAC-SHA-1 A4980
Key Length - Key Length: 8-2048
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A4980
Key Length - Key Length: 8-2048
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3 A4980
Domain Parameter Generation
Methods - P-256 Function - Key Pair
Generation Scheme -
ephemeralUnified - KAS Role -
Responder KDF Methods -
twoStepKdf - Key Length - 256
SP 800-56A Rev. 3
KDF SP800-108 A4980
KDF Mode - Counter Supported
Lengths - Supported Lengths: 8-256
Increment 8
SP 800-108 Rev. 1
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) A4980
Key Generation Mode - probable
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Primality
Tests - 2powSecStr Private Key
Format - crt
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) A4980
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) A4980
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
FIPS 186-5
SHA-1 A4980
Message Length - Message Length:
160, 0-65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A4980
Message Length - Message Length:
256, 0-65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A4980
Message Length - Message Length:
384, 0-65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A4980
Message Length - Message Length:
512, 0-65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
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The Module implements the FIPS Vendor Affirmed cryptographic algorithms listed below.
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG1 Key Type:Asymmetric and Symmetric N/A
[133r2] section 4,
example 1 and IG D.H
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
2.6. Security Function Implementations
The SFI table shows the Security Function Implementations that the module implements:
Name Type Description Properties
Algorithm
s
RSA_GEN_KEY_PAIR
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
Asymmetric
Key-Pair
Generation
Publications:Publications:[FI
PS 186-5], [SP800-90A],
[SP800-133r1], [IG C.E]
RSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5):
(A4980)
Counter
DRBG:
(A4980)
CKG1: ()
Key Type::
Symmetric
ECC_GEN_KEY_PAIR
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
Asymmetric
Key-Pair
Generation
Publications:[FIPS 186-5],
[SP800-90A], [SP800-
133r1], [IG C.A]
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
5):
(A4980)
Counter
DRBG:
(A4980)
CKG1: ()
Key Type::
Symmetric
AES_KEY_GEN CKG
Symmetric
Key
Generation
Sections 4
and 6.1
Direct
symmetric
Publications:[SP800-90A],
[IG D.H], [FIPS 197]
AES-CBC:
(A4980)
Size: 128
AES-GCM:
(A4980)
Size: 128
AES-ECB:
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Name Type Description Properties
Algorithm
s
key
generation
using
unmodified
DRBG output
(A4980)
Size: 128
Counter
DRBG:
(A4980)
CKG1: ()
Key Type::
Symmetric
SESSIONKEY_GEN KBKDF
Symmetric
Key
Generation
using KBKDF
Publications:[SP800-108r1],
[SP800-38B], [FIPS 197]
AES-
CMAC:
(A4980)
Size: 128
KDF
SP800-
108:
(A4980)
Size: 128
RSA_SIG_GEN
DigSig-
SigGen
Digital
Signature
Generation
Publications:[FIPS 186-5],
[SP800-133r1], [IG C.E]
RSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-
5):
(A4980)
SHA2-256:
(A4980)
SHA2-384:
(A4980)
SHA2-512:
(A4980)
RSA_SIG_VER DigSig-SigVer
Signature
Verification
Publications:[FIPS 186-5],
[IG C.E]
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
5):
(A4980)
SHA2-256:
(A4980)
SHA2-384:
(A4980)
SHA2-512:
(A4980)
ECC_SIG_GEN
DigSig-
SigGen
Digital
Signature
Generation
Publications:[FIPS 186-5],
[SP800-133r1], [IG C.A]
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-
5):
(A4980)
SHA2-256:
(A4980)
SHA2-384:
(A4980)
SHA2-512:
(A4980)
ECC_SIG_VER DigSig-SigVer
Signature
Verification
Publications:[FIPS 186-5],
[IG C.A]
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
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Name Type Description Properties
Algorithm
s
5):
(A4980)
SHA2-256:
(A4980)
SHA2-384:
(A4980)
SHA2-512:
(A4980)
ECC_KEY_VER
AsymKeyPair-
KeyVer
Check the
validity of
the public
key
Publications:[FIPS 186-5],
[IG C.A]
ECDSA
KeyVer
(FIPS186-
5):
(A4980)
DRBG_GEN DRBG
Random
Number
Generation
Publications:[SP800-90A],
[IG D.L]
Counter
DRBG:
(A4980)
ENT_GEN ENT-ESV
Entropy
Source
Publications:[SP800-90B],
[IG 9.3.A], [IG D.J] [IG
D.O]
SHAREDSECRETKEY_GEN_K
AS
KAS-Full
Key
Agreement
Shared
Secret
Calculation
[56Ar3] Key
Derivation
KDA [56Cr2]
IG:D.F Scenario 2, path 2,
end-to-end
Caveat:Key establishment
methodology provides 128
bits of security strength
Key confirmation:No
Key derivation:KDA (tested
as part KAS certificate)
KAS-ECC
Sp800-
56Ar3:
(A4980)
AES_ENC_AUTH
BC-
AuthEncrypt
Block Cipher Publications:[FIPS 197]
AES-
CMAC:
(A4980)
Sizes: 128
AES-GCM:
(A4980)
Size: 128
AES_ENC
BC-
UnAuthEncry
pt
Block Cipher Publications:[FIPS 197]
AES-CBC:
(A4980)
AES-ECB:
(A4980)
AES_DEC_AUTH
BC-
AuthDecrypt
Block Cipher Publications:[FIPS 197]
AES-
CMAC:
(A4980)
Size: 128
AES-GCM:
(A4980)
Size: 128
AES_DEC
BC-
UnAuthDecry
pt
Block Cipher Publications:[FIPS 197]
AES-CBC:
(A4980)
AES-ECB:
(A4980)
HMAC_GEN MAC
Message
Authenticatio
n Generation
Publications:[FIPS198-1]
[IG C.B]
HMAC-
SHA-1:
(A4980)
HMAC-
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Name Type Description Properties
Algorithm
s
SHA2-256:
(A4980)
SHA-1:
(A4980)
SHA2-256:
(A4980)
KTS_SCP03_WRAP KTS-Unwrap
used as
SCP03
Standard:SP 800-38F
IG D.G:Approved
Caveat:Key establishment
methodology provides 128
bits of security strength
AES-CBC:
(A4980)
Sizes: 128
AES-
CMAC:
(A4980)
Sizes: 128
KTS_AESGCM_WRAP
KTS-Unwrap
KTS-Wrap
SP800-38D
Based on IG
D.G
Standard:SP 800-38F
IG D.G:Approved
Caveat:Key establishment
methodology provides 128
bits of security strength
AES-GCM:
(A4980)
Sizes: 128
KTS_CTAP_WRAP
KTS-Unwrap
KTS-Wrap
Key
Wrapping
Based on IG
D.G
Standard:SP 800-38F
IG D.G:Approved
Caveat:Key establishment
methodology provides 128
bits of security strength
AES-CBC:
(A4980)
Sizes: 128
HMAC-
SHA2-256:
(A4980)
SHA_CAL SHA
Secure Hash
Standard
Publications:[FIPS 180-4],
[IG C.B]
SHA2-256:
(A4980)
SHA2-384:
(A4980)
SHA2-512:
(A4980)
Table 6: Security Function Implementations
2.7. Algorithm Specific Information
AES GCM IV Uniqueness
FIPS140-3 IG C.H, Option 2
The IV is generated internally at its entirety randomly.
The generation uses an Approved DRBG (Cert. #A4980) that is internal to the module’s boundary.
The IV length shall be at least 96 bits (per SP 800-38D).
KAS [56Ar3] - Per [IG] D.F Scenario 2 path (2), compliant key agreement scheme where testing is
performed end-to-end for the shared secret computation and a KDF compliant with HKDF (2step KDF).
The Module obtains the [FIPS140-3_IG] D.F required key agreement assurances [SP800-56Ar3] in
accordance with Section 5.6.2.
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2.8. RBG and Entropy
The scenario 1(a) in IG 9.3.A is applied to the module, the security strength of the DRBG seeded by the
entropy source is 128-bit.
According to table 4 of the ESV Public Use Document, to reach 128 bits of strength, at least 581 bits of
random nonce are needed to seed the DRBG. A 640-bit nonce is used in the module, so the DRBG entropy
strength is 128 bits.
Cert Number Vendor Name
E134 Feitian Technologies Co., Ltd.
Table 7: Entropy Certificates
The Module uses the following entropy sources:
Name Type
Operation
Environment
Sample Size
Entropy per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
HSEC_ES Physical HSEC HSC 1 bit 0.3308 N/A
Table 8: Entropy Sources
2.9. Key Generation
For Key Generation, see Section 2.5 and Section 2.6 above.
2.10. Key Establishment
Key Agreement Information
For Key Agreement, see Section 2.5 and Section 2.6 above.
Key Transport Information
For Key Transport, see Section 2.5 and Section 2.6 above.
2.11. Industry Protocols
The module does not support any industry protocols that would be of interest to this standard.
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3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1. Ports and Interfaces
The Module’s ports and associated FIPS defined logical interface categories are listed below.
Physical Port Logical Interface(s) Data That Passes
Power Supply 2 Pins Power Vcc Vdd 1.62-5.5V
Touch Button 1 Pin Control Input Physical input
LED 1 Pin Status Output Physical output
USB(D+/D-) 2 Pins
Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status Output
Primary physical interface (USB) for all service data
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces
Note: The module does not support Control Output.
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4. Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1. Authentication Methods
Method Name Description
Security
Mechanism
Strength Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
Authentication_
PIN
A role is authenticated to the
Module console with a PIN
mechanism The PIN must be
to change by the CO after first
authentication with default
data. The Module enforced a
minimum size of 8 ASCII
characters. The number of
incorrect attempts for PIN is
3-15, which can be set to a
maximum of 15 times and a
minimum of 3 times.
Memorized
Secrets
PIN8-63 characters
PIN, including
numbers, letters,
and special
characters.
Therefore, the
probability of
successful attempt is
1/95^8
Each
authentication
attempt takes
approximately
60 ms which
allows a
maximum of
15 attempts
per minute.
Therefore, the
probability of
successfully
authenticating
to the module
within one
minute
through
random
attempts is
15/95^8
Authentication_
AuthKey
The identity is authenticated
to the module with a
challenge-response
mechanism (Cert. #A4980).
The entity gets challenge from
the module then encrypts it
resulting in cryptogram using
Auth key. The cryptogram is
sent back and decrypted in the
module using same key, then
the module check if the result
is matched with original
challenge. The Auth key
MUST be changed to specific
value for each module by the
CO after first authentication
with default data. The Auth
key is generally a random
number automatically
generated by HSM. The
number of incorrect attempts
for Auth key is 3-15, which
can be set to a maximum of
15 times and a minimum of 3
times.
AES-ECB
(A4980)
128-bit AES-ECB Key
Challenge-Response
A minimum 16-byte
(128 bit) binary
string has a
probability that a
random attempt will
succeed or a false
acceptance will occur
of 1/2^128.
Each
authentication
attempt takes
approximately
60 ms which
allows a
maximum of
15 attempts
per minute.
Therefore, the
probability of
successfully
authenticating
to the module
within one
minute
through
random
attempts is
15/2^128.
Table 10: Authentication Methods
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All authentication states are all stored in RAM, so they are cleared automatically once the module is powered
down.
Note:
Authentication-PIN is an abstract noun that includes the PIN of Trusted Key unit, PIN/PUK of PIV unit, PIN
of FIDO unit, AccessiCode of OTP unit, PGP User PIN(PW1)/ PGP Admin PIN(PW3) of OpenPGP unit.
Authentication-AuthKey is an abstract noun that includes the Device authenticate key of a universal service
unit, the External Auth Key of an Trusted Key unit, and the PIV Authentication Key of a PIV unit.
4.2. Roles
The Module supports four distinct operator roles: User, Admin, Cryptographic Officer (CO) and Unauth. The
CO is responsible for device authentication and resetting user PINs, etc. The Admin role is responsible for
configuring SSPS and performing cryptographic operations. The User utilizes the module as an
authenticator. The unauthenticated role can only access some non-operational SSP services, such as Select
functional unit, get a challenge, read non-security relevant information, self-tests, etc.
The Module does not support a maintenance role.
The Module does not support concurrent operators.
The Roles Table below lists all operator roles supported by the Module.
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
CO Identity Crypto Officer Authentication_AuthKey
Admin Identity User
Authentication_AuthKey
Authentication_PIN
User Identity User Authentication_PIN
UnAuth Role Unauthenticated None
Table 11: Roles
4.3. Approved Services
All approved services implemented by the Module are listed in the table below:
The SSPs modes of access shown in the table below are defined as:
• G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the Module (e.g., the SSP is output).
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the Module (SSP is input).
• E = Execute: The Module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the SSP
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs
Security
Fucntions
SSP Access
SELECT
Select
functional
unit
9000 or error
status
Command
with AID
FCI (File Control
Information)
None
Unauthenticated
- KSenc: Z
- KSmac: Z
Get Device
Info
Get device
information
content
including
versioning
information
9000 or error
status
Command
without input
parameter
Device Info None Unauthenticated
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs
Security
Fucntions
SSP Access
and show
status
Get
Challenge
Request
random data
that will be
used as a
challenge
within the
Device
Authenticate
service
9000 or error
status
Command
with expected
data length
random value
DRBG_GEN
ENT_GEN
Unauthenticated
- DRBG V: G,Z
- DRBG Seed: G
- DRBG Key: G,Z
Device
Authenticate
Request
administrato
r privileges
9000 or error
status
Kid and cipher
text
N/A
AES_DEC_AUT
H
CO
- Device
authenticate key: E
Update key
Change
Device
authenticate
key,
INIT_KEYenc
and
INIT_KEYma
c
9000 or error
status
cipher text N/A AES_DEC
CO
- KSenc: E
- KSmac: E
- Device
authenticate key:
W,E,Z
- INIT_KEYenc:
W,Z
- INIT_KEYmac:
W,Z
GP Initialize
Update
Create
Secure
Channel
Session
9000 or error
status
Host random
Card random
cipher text
SESSIONKEY_
GEN
Admin
- INIT_KEYenc: E
- INIT_KEYmac: E
- KSenc: G
- KSmac: G
User
- INIT_KEYenc: E
- INIT_KEYmac: E
- KSenc: G
- KSmac: G
GP External
Authenticate
This service
may also be
used to both
authenticate
and initiate a
secure
session with
an external
entity.
9000 or error
status
cipher text N/A
SESSIONKEY_GE
N
Admin
- KSenc: E
- KSmac: E
User
- KSenc: E
- KSmac: E
Terminate
token
The token
into
terminate
state.
9000 or error
status
Command
without input
parameter
N/A None
CO
- DRBG-EI: Z
- DRBG V: Z
- DRBG Key: Z
- Managing Key:
Z
- Device
authenticate
key: Z
- INIT_KEYenc:
Z
- INIT_KEYmac:
Z
- KSenc: Z
- KSmac: Z
- AES-GCM Key:
Z
- FIDO Device
ECDSA Private
Key: Z
- FIDO Device
ECDSA Public
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs
Security
Fucntions
SSP Access
Key: Z
- FIDO User
ECDSA Private
Key: Z
- FIDO User
ECDSA Public
Key: Z
- FIDO
Agreement ECC
Private Key: Z
- FIDO
Agreement ECC
Public Key: Z
- FIDO
Agreement
sharedSecret: Z
- FIDO
SharedSecret
AES Key: Z
- FIDO
SharedSecret
HMAC Key: Z
- FIDO
PinUvAuthToken
: Z
- FIDO PIN: Z
- PIV
Authentication
Key: Z
- PIV ECC
Signature
Private Key: Z
- PIV ECC
verification
Public Key: Z
- PIV RSA
Signature
Private Key: Z
- PIV RSA
verification
Public Key: Z
- PIV User PIN:
Z
- PIV PUK PIN: Z
- 2003 Internal
Auth Key: Z
- 2003 External
Auth Key: Z
- 2003 PIN: Z
- 2003 PSO
calculation key:
Z
- 2003 Unblock
PIN: Z
- 2003 RSA
Private Key: Z
- 2003 RSA
Public Key: Z
- 2003 ECDSA
Private Key: Z
- 2003 ECDSA
Public Key: Z
- OTP HMAC
Seed Key: Z
- OTP
AccessCode: Z
- PGP Admin
PIN(PW3): Z
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs
Security
Fucntions
SSP Access
- PGP User
PIN(PW1): Z
- PGP Resetting
Code: Z
- PGP Signature
Private Key: Z
- PGP
Verification
Public Key: Z
- External
Agreement ECC
Public Key: Z
- DRBG Seed: Z
- AES-GCM IV: Z
Manage
Security
Environment
(MSE)
Prepares the
Module for
the
subsequent
commands,
Perform
Security
Operation.
9000 or error
status
Command
without input
parameter
N/A None
User
Admin
Hash
Performs a
hash using
SHA-256,
SHA-384, or
SHA-512.
9000 or error
status
message Hash value SHA_CAL Unauthenticated
Read Binary
Allows read
access to a
binary file. A
binary file is
a file whose
content is a
sequential
string of
bits.
9000 or error
status
Command
with file info
Binary
database
None
Admin
User
Update
Binary
Allows write
access to a
binary file.
9000 or error
status
Binary data N/A None
Admin
User
Read Record
Allows read
access to a
record. A
record is a
type of data
storage
structure as
defined
within ISO
7816.
Records are
stored in
files.
9000 or error
status
Command
With file info
Record data None
Admin
User
Update
Record
Allows write
access to a
record
9000 or error
status
Record data N/A None
Admin
User
Append
Record
Allows a
record to be
append
9000 or error
status
Record data N/A None
Admin
User
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs
Security
Fucntions
SSP Access
Internal
Authenticate
Authenticate
the
cryptographi
c module by
an external
entity
NOTE: In
order for this
service to be
utilized, the
external
entity must
have
privileged
access to the
referenced
key.
9000 or error
status
Random data cipher text AES_ENC
Admin
- 2003 Internal
Auth Key: E
User
- 2003 Internal
Auth Key: E
External
Authenticate
Authenticate
s an external
entity by the
cryptographi
c module.
NOTE:
Prerequisite
to this
service is
the use of
Get
Challenge
service. The
key as
referenced
within the
service call
exists under
the current
file
9000 or error
status
cipher text N/A AES_DEC
Admin
- 2003 External
Auth Key: E
User
- 2003 External
Auth Key: E
Verify PIN
Provides PIN
verification.
9000 or error
status
PIN data N/A
KTS_SCP03_W
RAP
Admin
- 2003 PIN: E
- KSenc: E
- KSmac: E
User
- KSenc: E
- KSmac: E
- 2003 PIN: E
Change
Reference
Data
Modify the
PIN
9000 or error
status
PIN and new
PIN data
N/A
KTS_SCP03_W
RAP
Admin
- 2003 PIN: W,E
- KSenc: E
- KSmac: E
User
- 2003 PIN: W,E
- KSenc: E
- KSmac: E
Reset Retry
Counter
Resets the
retry counter
9000 or error
status
Command
without input
parameter
N/A
KTS_SCP03_W
RAP
User
- KSenc: E
- KSmac: E
Admin
- KSenc: E
- KSmac: E
Generate
Asymmetric
Key Pair
Generates
an
9000 or error
status
Command
without input
parameter
N/A RSA_GEN_KEY
_PAIR
Admin
- DRBG-EI: G,E
- 2003 RSA
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs
Security
Fucntions
SSP Access
Asymmetric
key pair.
ECC_GEN_KEY
_PAIR
Private Key: G
- 2003 RSA
Public Key: G
- 2003 ECDSA
Private Key: G
- 2003 ECDSA
Public Key: G
- DRBG Seed:
G,E
User
- DRBG-EI: G,E
- 2003 RSA
Private Key: G
- 2003 RSA
Public Key: G
- 2003 ECDSA
Private Key: G
- 2003 ECDSA
Public Key: G
- DRBG Seed:
G,E
Encrypt
Performs an
encrypt
operation
using an
Approved
security
function.
9000 or error
status
Kid and plain
text
cipher text AES_ENC
Admin
- 2003 PSO
calculation key:
E
- Managing Key:
E
User
- 2003 PSO
calculation key:
E
- Managing Key:
E
Decrypt
Performs a
decrypt
operation.
9000 or error
status
Kid and cipher
text
plain text AES_DEC
Admin
- 2003 PSO
calculation key:
E
- Managing Key:
E
User
- 2003 PSO
calculation key:
E
- Managing Key:
E
Verify Digital
Signature
Verifies a
digital
signature
using RSA
PKCS#1 or
ECDSA
9000 or error
status
Signature and
kid
N/A
RSA_SIG_VER
ECC_SIG_VER
ECC_KEY_VER
Admin
- 2003 RSA
Public Key: E
- 2003 ECDSA
Public Key: E
User
- 2003 RSA
Public Key: E
- 2003 ECDSA
Public Key: E
Generate
Digital
Signature
Generates a
digital
signature
using RSA
PKCS#1 or
ECDSA.
9000 or error
status
message and
kid
Signature
RSA_SIG_GEN
ECC_SIG_GEN
Admin
- 2003 RSA
Private Key: E
- 2003 ECDSA
Private Key: E
User
- 2003 RSA
Private Key: E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs
Security
Fucntions
SSP Access
- 2003 ECDSA
Private Key: E
Verify
Cryptographi
c Checksum
Performs
AES CMAC
verification.
9000 or error
status
cipher text N/A
AES_ENC_AUT
H
Admin
- 2003 PSO
calculation key:
E
User
- 2003 PSO
calculation key:
E
Compute
Cryptographi
c Checksum
Compute
AES CMAC.
9000 or error
status
plain text cipher text
AES_ENC_AUT
H
Admin
- 2003 PSO
calculation key:
E
User
- 2003 PSO
calculation key:
E
Create File Create a file.
9000 or error
status
Command
with file info
N/A None Admin
Delete File Delete a File.
9000 or error
status
Command
with file info
N/A None
Admin
- 2003 Internal
Auth Key: Z
- 2003 External
Auth Key: Z
- 2003 PIN: Z
- 2003 Unblock
PIN: Z
- 2003 RSA
Private Key: Z
- 2003 RSA
Public Key: Z
- 2003 ECDSA
Private Key: Z
- 2003 ECDSA
Public Key: Z
Install
Secret
This service
is used to
enter AES
keys, and
PINs. SSPs
which may
be entered
are as
follows: *
Internal
Auth Key *
External
Auth Key *
Symmetric
Key * PIN
9000 or error
status
Encrypted
Symmetric
Key or pin
N/A
KTS_SCP03_W
RAP
Admin
- 2003 Internal
Auth Key: W
- 2003 External
Auth Key: W
- 2003 PSO
calculation key:
W
- KSenc: E
- KSmac: E
- 2003 PIN: W
- 2003 Unblock
PIN: W
Get File List
Allows the
reading of
the FID list
of child files
of the
current file
9000 or error
status
Command
with file
File info None
Admin
User
Read Public
Key
Allows the
output of a
public key.
9000 or error
status
Command
with key info
RSA/ECC
Public Key
None
Admin
- 2003 RSA
Public Key: R
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs
Security
Fucntions
SSP Access
- 2003 ECDSA
Public Key: R
User
- 2003 RSA
Public Key: R
- 2003 ECDSA
Public Key: R
Make
Credential
This service
is used to
generate a
new
credential in
the module
00 or error
status
Encrypted
Device ECDSA
Private Key
and message
CredenticalID
and X.509
certificate
ECC_GEN_KEY
_PAIR
ECC_SIG_GEN
AES_ENC_AUT
H
KTS_AESGCM_
WRAP
User
- DRBG-EI: G,E
- DRBG V: G,E
- AES-GCM Key:
E
- FIDO Device
ECDSA Private
Key: E
- FIDO User
ECDSA Private
Key: G,R,W
- FIDO Device
ECDSA Public
Key: R
- AES-GCM IV: E
- DRBG Seed:
G,E
- DRBG Key: G,E
- FIDO User
ECDSA Public
Key: G,R
Get
Attestation
This service
is using
Registration'
s credential
to signature
00 or error
status
Encrypted
User ECDSA
Private Key
and message
Signature
ECC_SIG_GEN
ECC_SIG_VER
AES_DEC_AUT
H
KTS_AESGCM_
WRAP
User
- DRBG-EI: G,E
- DRBG V: G,E
- AES-GCM Key:
E
- AES-GCM IV: E
- DRBG Seed:
G,E
- DRBG Key: G,E
- FIDO User
ECDSA Private
Key: E
- FIDO User
ECDSA Public
Key: E
Get Next
Attestation
The client
calls this
service when
the
Attestationre
sponse
contains the
number of
credentials
member and
the number
of
credentials
exceeds 1.
00 or error
status
Command
without input
parameter
Signature ECC_SIG_GEN
User
- DRBG-EI: G,E
- DRBG V: G,E
- AES-GCM Key:
E
- DRBG Seed:
G,E
- DRBG Key: G,E
Get
Information
Device
Information
00 or error
status
Command
without input
parameter
Version None Unauthenticated
PIN Service
This service
is used by
the platform
00 or error
status
PIN
PinUvAuthToke
n
ECC_GEN_KEY
_PAIR
AES_KEY_GEN
User
- FIDO PIN: W,E
- FIDO
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs
Security
Fucntions
SSP Access
to establish
the shared
Secret key,
setting a
new user
PIN,
changing
existing user
PIN, and
getting User
PinUvAuthTo
ken from the
module
ECC_KEY_VER
SHAREDSECRE
TKEY_GEN_KA
S
AES_ENC_AUT
H
HMAC_GEN
KTS_CTAP_WR
AP
PinUvAuthToken
: G,R,E
- FIDO
SharedSecret
AES Key: G,E
- FIDO
SharedSecret
HMAC Key: G,E
- FIDO
Agreement
sharedSecret:
G,E
- FIDO
Agreement ECC
Public Key: G,R
- External
Agreement ECC
Public Key: W,E
- Managing Key:
G
FIDO Reset Zeroization
00 or error
status
Command
without input
parameter
N/A
AES_KEY_GEN
DRBG_GEN
CO
- FIDO User
ECDSA Private
Key: Z
- FIDO User
ECDSA Public
Key: Z
- FIDO
Agreement ECC
Private Key: Z
- FIDO
Agreement ECC
Public Key: Z
- FIDO
Agreement
sharedSecret: Z
- FIDO
SharedSecret
AES Key: Z
- FIDO
SharedSecret
HMAC Key: Z
- FIDO
PinUvAuthToken
: Z
- FIDO PIN: Z
- AES-GCM Key:
G
Credential
Management
Listing
credentials
and deleting
credentials
00 or error
status
pinUvAuthPara
m
N/A
AES_ENC
HMAC_GEN
KTS_CTAP_WR
AP
User
- FIDO
PinUvAuthToken
: E
authenticato
rConfig
Used to
configure
various
authenticato
r features
through the
use of its
subcomman
ds.
00 or error
status
pinUvAuthPara
m
N/A
AES_ENC
HMAC_GEN
User
- FIDO
PinUvAuthToken
: E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs
Security
Fucntions
SSP Access
PIV GET
DATA
This service
is used to
read data
object
9000 or error
status
Command
without input
parameter
data object None
User
- PIV ECC
verification
Public Key: R
- PIV RSA
verification
Public Key: R
PIV Verify
PIN
This service
is used to
verify the
PIN.
9000 or error
status
PIN N/A
KTS_SCP03_W
RAP
User
- KSenc: E
- KSmac: E
- PIV User PIN:
W,E
PIV Verify
PUK
This service
is used to
verify the
PUK.
9000 or error
status
PUK N/A
KTS_SCP03_W
RAP
Admin
- KSenc: E
- KSmac: E
- PIV PUK PIN:
W,E
GeneralAuth
(Symmetric
Key)
This service
is used to
external and
mutual
authenticate
with PIV
Symmetric
Key
9000 or error
status
Random data
and cipher
text
N/A
AES_ENC_AUT
H
AES_ENC
User
- DRBG-EI: E
- PIV
Authentication
Key: E
PIV Reset
Reset PIV
card state
and delete
all stored
information
Zeroization
9000 or error
status
Command
without input
parameter
N/A SHA_CAL
CO
- PIV User PIN:
Z
- PIV PUK PIN: Z
- PIV
Authentication
Key: Z
- PIV ECC
Signature
Private Key: Z
- PIV ECC
verification
Public Key: Z
- PIV RSA
Signature
Private Key: Z
- PIV RSA
verification
Public Key: Z
Set
Authenticati
on Key
This service
is used to
change
Authenticati
on key (PIV
Symmetric
Key)
9000 or error
status
Encrypted
Authentication
Key
N/A
AES_ENC
AES_DEC
KTS_SCP03_W
RAP
Admin
- PIV
Authentication
Key: W,E
- Managing Key:
E
Change PUK
This service
is used to
change PUK
9000 or error
status
PUK N/A
KTS_SCP03_W
RAP
Admin
- PIV PUK PIN:
W,E
- KSenc: E
- KSmac: E
Change PIN
This service
is used to
change PIN
9000 or error
status
PIN and new
PIN
N/A
KTS_SCP03_W
RAP
User
- PIV User PIN:
W,E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs
Security
Fucntions
SSP Access
- KSenc: E
- KSmac: E
Unblock PIN
(Reset retry
counter)
This service
is used to
reset retry
counter and
set new user
PIN with
known PUK
9000 or error
status
New PIN and
PUK
N/A
KTS_SCP03_W
RAP
Admin
- PIV User PIN:
W,E
- PIV PUK PIN:
W,E
- KSenc: E
- KSmac: E
Generate
Asymmetric
Key
This service
is used to
generate an
asymmetric
key
9000 or error
status
Command
with Key
length
Asymmetric
Public key
RSA_GEN_KEY
_PAIR
ECC_GEN_KEY
_PAIR
Admin
- DRBG V: G,Z
- PIV ECC
Signature
Private Key: G
- PIV ECC
verification
Public Key: G
- PIV RSA
Signature
Private Key: G
- PIV RSA
verification
Public Key: G
- DRBG Key:
G,Z
- DRBG Seed:
G,E
- DRBG-EI: G,E
GeneralAuth
(RSA/ECDSA
)
This service
is used to
generate
signature
with
asymmetric
key
9000 or error
status
message Signature
RSA_SIG_GEN
ECC_SIG_GEN
User
- PIV ECC
Signature
Private Key: E
- PIV RSA
Signature
Private Key: E
PIV Put Data
This service
is used to
write data
(certicate,
ID and etc)
9000 or error
status
Data object N/A None Admin
Personalizati
on OTP
Add a new
entry and
initialize its
seed key
9000 or error
status
Seed key N/A
KTS_SCP03_W
RAP
User
- OTP HMAC
Seed Key: W
- KSenc: E
- KSmac: E
- DRBG V: E
- OTP
AccessCode: E
- DRBG Key: E
- DRBG Seed:
G,E
- DRBG-EI: G,E
Delete OTP
Remove an
entry and its
seed key.
9000 or error
status
Command
without input
parameter
N/A None
User
- OTP
AccessCode: E
- OTP HMAC
Seed Key: Z
List
List all the
names of the
entries.
9000 or error
status
Command
without input
parameter
Slot info None User
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs
Security
Fucntions
SSP Access
Calculate
OTP
Calculate the
OTP value
for an entry.
9000 or error
status
Command
without input
parameter
6-digit OTP
value or 8-
digit OTP value
HMAC_GEN
User
- OTP HMAC
Seed Key: E
- OTP
AccessCode: E
OTP Reset
Reset the
applet to
manufactory
default
settings.
9000 or error
status
Command
without input
parameter
N/A None
CO
- OTP HMAC
Seed Key: Z
Verify
AccessCode
Verify user
AccessCode
9000 or error
status
AccessCode N/A
KTS_SCP03_W
RAP
User
- OTP
AccessCode: E
Change
AccessCode
Change user
AccessCode
9000 or error
status
AccessCode N/A
KTS_SCP03_W
RAP
User
- OTP
AccessCode:
W,E
Emit OTP
from slot
When the
device is
powered on
and the user
presses the
button, the
device
outputs a 6-
byte or 8-
byte
password
9000 or error
status
press-button
6-digit OTP
value or 8-
digit OTP value
HMAC_GEN
User
- OTP HMAC
Seed Key: E
SELECT
DATA
Select a
current DO
,a following
GET DATA or
PUT DATA
will access
this current
DO
9000 or error
status
DO Data N/A None Unauthenticated
VERIFY
Verify using
user PGP
User
PIN(PW1) or
administrato
r PGP Admin
PIN(PW3)
9000 or error
status
PGP User
PIN(PW1) or
PGP Admin
PIN(PW3)
N/A
KTS_SCP03_W
RAP
Admin
- PGP Admin
PIN(PW3): E
User
- PGP User
PIN(PW1): E
OpenPGP
CHANGE
REFERENCE
DATA
Change user
PGP User
PIN(PW1) or
administrato
r PGP Admin
PIN(PW3)
9000 or error
status
Command
with data info
N/A
KTS_SCP03_W
RAP
Admin
- PGP Admin
PIN(PW3): W,E
User
- PGP User
PIN(PW1): W,E
OpenPGP
RESET
RETRY
COUNTER
Reset PGP
User
PIN(PW1)
counter and
set new PGP
User
PIN(PW1)
using PGP
Admin
PIN(PW3) or
9000 or error
status
PW1 or PW3/
Resetting
Code
N/A
KTS_SCP03_W
RAP
Admin
- PGP Admin
PIN(PW3): W,E
- PGP User
PIN(PW1): W
User
- PGP User
PIN(PW1): W
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs
Security
Fucntions
SSP Access
Resetting
Code.
- PGP Resetting
Code: W,E
GET DATA
Read
protected or
unprotected
Data Object
9000 or error
status
Command
without input
parameter
Data Object None
User
- PGP User
PIN(PW1): E
Unauthenticated
PUT DATA
Write data
objects
except user
writable data
objects.
9000 or error
status
Data to be
written
None
KTS_SCP03_W
RAP
Admin
- PGP Resetting
Code: W
- PGP Admin
PIN(PW3): E
COMPUTE
DIGITAL
SIGNATURE
Perform
signature
primitive
with
signature
Private Key
9000 or error
status
message and
kid
Signature RSA_SIG_GEN
User
- PGP Signature
Private Key: E
OpenPGP
GENERATE
ASYMMETRI
C KEY
Generate
asymmetric
key pair
9000 or error
status
Command
without input
parameter
RSA public key
RSA_GEN_KEY
_PAIR
Admin
- DRBG V: G,E
- PGP Admin
PIN(PW3): E
- PGP Signature
Private Key: G
- PGP
Verification
Public Key: G,R
- DRBG Key: G,E
- DRBG Seed:
G,E
- DRBG-EI: G,E
TERMINATE
DF
This
command is
designed to
renew a card
in case of
blocked
passwords
or other
problems.
9000 or error
status
Command
without input
parameter
N/A None
Admin
- PGP Admin
PIN(PW3): E
ACTIVATE
FILE
Initialize to
the
manufactory
default
settings.
Zeroization
9000 or error
status
Command
without input
parameter
N/A None
Admin
- PGP Admin
PIN(PW3): Z
- PGP User
PIN(PW1): Z
- PGP Resetting
Code: Z
- PGP Signature
Private Key: Z
- PGP
Verification
Public Key: Z
Get Error log
Get self-test
result
9000 or error
status
Command
without input
parameter
Self-test result None
Admin
- Device
authenticate
key: E
On-Demand
Self-test
Initiate on-
demand self-
tests by
None None Pass or Fail
Admin
Unauthenticated
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs
Security
Fucntions
SSP Access
reboot or
power cycle
Table 12: Approved Services
4.4. Non-Approved Services
N/A for this module.
4.5. External Software/Firmware Loaded
NOTE: There is no External Software/Firmware Loaded.
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5. Software/Firmware Security
5.1. Integrity Techniques
The Module is composed of the following firmware component(s):
Component 1: cryptographic binary
Component 2: non-modifiable operating system - binary
The firmware components are protected with the error detection code CRC-16. Calculate CRC-16 on code
and constant data in flash, then compare the result with expected value, which is also part of pre-
operational self-test.
5.2. Initiate on Demand
The operator can initiate integrity test on demand by restarting the module.
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6. Operational Environment
6.1. Operational Environment Type and Requirements
The Module has a non-modifiable operational environment at Level 3 under the FIPS 140-3 definitions
therefore per the FIPS 140-3 Management Manual Section 7.5 Partial validations and non-applicable areas
this section is not applicable.
Type of Operational Environment: Non-Modifiable
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7. Physical Security
The Module is made of a completely hardened, production-grade polycarbonate or metal. The colored
polycarbonate or metal enclosure obscures a clear view of the hardware components within. A hard, non-
malleable metal casing surrounds the USB connector. The casing is made of hard, production-grade, black,
opaque plastic.
The coloring of the Module obscures any visible writing on the PCB. The visible critical components within
the Module are further covered to meet FIPS 140-3 level 3 physical security requirements. The HSC32K2
with PAA microcontroller is covered with a black, opaque, tamper-resistant, epoxy encapsulated, thus
completely covering all critical cryptographic components from plain view. The USB connector located
outside of the casing (in the case of the USB Token-A3) of the USB token is made of a hard, black, opaque,
production grade plastic and prevents access to the rest of the USB token. Any attempt at removal or
penetration of the enclosure has a high probability of causing serious damage to the Module and the
hardware components within the enclosure, which will reveal clear tamper evidence. Removal of the metal
surrounding the USB connector will result in physical damage of the USB connector and its associated pins,
rendering the entire cryptographic module useless. If the USB connector is exposed, there is no power
going to the USB token. Once power is removed from the cryptographic module, all plaintext keys and
unprotected SSPs in RAM are zeroized.
7.1. Mechanisms and Actions Required
The enclosure of the module is designed with anti-dismantle. After assembly, any attempt at tampering
will leave visible damage on the enclosure. So, each time a user uses the module, you should first check
the outer appearance of the module to make sure the module has not been tampered since last time use.
In case user detects any tamper during inspection, user must stop using the module immediately and
contact manufacturer.
Mechanism Inspection Frequency Inspection Guidance
Anti-dismantle
enclosure
Each time using the module
Check the outer appearance of the
module
Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required
7.2. EFP/EFT Information
Temp/Voltage
Type
Temperature of
Voltage
EFP or EFT Result
LowTemperature -29.6 EFP shutdown
HighTemperature +86.6 EFP shutdown
LowVoltage 2.8V EFP shutdown
HighVoltage 5.5V EFP shutdown
Table 14: EFP/EFT Information
7.3. Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges
Temperature Type Temperature
LowTemperature -20C°
HighTemperature +40C°
Table 15: Hardness Testing Temperatures
Notes: The module is hardness tested at the lowest and highest temperatures within the module's intended
temperature range of operation.
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8. Non-Invasive Security
8.1. Mitigation Techniques
The Module does not implement any mitigation method against non-invasive attack.
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9. Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1. Storage Areas
Storage Area
Name
Description Persistence Type
CHIPRAM(S1) Session Key stored in volatile memory in plaintext. Dynamic
CHIPRAM(S2) Session Key stored in volatile memory in encrypted. Dynamic
CHIPNVM(S3) CSP is encrypted with AES-128 and stored in FLASH Static
CHIPNVM(S4) CSP stored in flash in SHA2-256 Static
CHIPNVM(S5) CSP stored in flash in plaintext Static
CHIPNVM(S6) PSP stored in flash in plaintext Static
Table 16: Storage Areas
9.2. SSP Input/Output Methods
Name From To
Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Input encapsulated
by KTS-Wrap
SCP03(IO1)
Application
Software (outside)
CHIPNVM(S3) Encrypted Automated Electronic
KTS_SCP03_
WRAP
Input encapsulated
by KTS-Wrap AES-
GCM (IO2)
Application
Software (outside)
CHIPRAM(S2) Encrypted Automated Electronic
KTS_AESGC
M_WRAP
Output encapsulated
by KTS-Wrap AES-
GCM (IO3)
CHIPRAM(S2)
Application
Software (outside)
Encrypted Automated Electronic
KTS_AESGC
M_WRAP
Input encapsulated
by KTS-Wrap AES-
CBC with HMAC (IO4)
Application
Software (outside)
CHIPNVM(S4) Encrypted Automated Electronic
KTS_CTAP_
WRAP
Output encapsulated
by KTS-Wrap AES-
CBC with HMAC (IO5)
CHIPRAM(S2)
Application
Software (outside)
Encrypted Automated Electronic
KTS_CTAP_
WRAP
Input in plaintext
(IO6)
Application
Software (outside)
CHIPRAM(S1) Plaintext Automated Electronic
Output in plaintext
(IO7)
CHIPRAM(S1)
Application
Software (outside)
Plaintext Automated Electronic
Output in plaintext
(IO8)
CHIPNVM(S6)
Application
Software (outside)
Plaintext Automated Electronic
Table 17:SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3. SSP Zeroization
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale
Operator
Initiation
Z1
Zeroized by Terminate
token command
All SSP are cleared, completed by explicit
indication of 9000 Status
CO
Z2
Overwritten with all 0 after
power cycle
Power on and implicit clear, completed by
implicit indication of LED on.
Unauth
Z3 Zeroized by 2003 delete MF
Received command to actively clear SSPs,
completed by explicit indication of 9000
Status
CO
Z4
"TERMINATE DF" followed
by "ACTIVATE FILE"
Received command to actively clear SSPs,
completed by explicit indication of 9000
Status
CO
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Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale
Operator
Initiation
Z5 Zeroized by FIDO Reset
Received command to actively clear SSPs,
completed by explicit indication of 00
Status
CO
Z6 Zeroized by PIV Reset
Received command to actively clear SSPs,
completed by explicit indication of 9000
Status
CO
Z7 Select functional unit
Received command to actively clear SSPs,
completed by explicit indication of 9000
Status
Unauth
Z8 Zeroized by OTP Reset
Received command to actively clear SSPs,
completed by explicit indication of 9000
Status
CO
Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods
9.4. SSPs
All usage of these SSPs by the Module are described in the services detailed in Section 4.3.
Name Description Size – Strength
Type –
Category
Generate By
Established
By
Used By
DRBG-EI
384-bit entropy and
256-bit nonce input
collected from the
ESV,used to derive
the DRBG seed
640 - 128
entropy
source and
nonce -
CSP
ENT_GEN DRBG_GEN
DRBG Seed
640-bit DRBG Seed
from DRBG-EI
640 - 128
entropy
source and
nonce -
CSP
ENT_GEN DRBG_GEN
DRBG V
Internal CTR_DRBG
state value is used
for SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
(Consists of 128
bits)
128 - 128
state value
- CSP
DRBG_GEN DRBG_GEN
DRBG Key
Internal CTR_DRBG
state value is used
for SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
(Consists of 128
bits)
128 - 128
key value -
CSP
DRBG_GEN DRBG_GEN
Managing Key
128-bit AES key,
used to encrypt
SSPs and keys
128 - 128
Symmetric
Key - CSP
AES_KEY_
GEN
AES_ENC
AES_DEC
Device authenticate
key
128-bit AES key
used for CO role to
reach a safe state
128 - 128
Authentica
tion - CSP
input
during
manufactur
ing
AES_DEC
INIT_KEYenc
AES 128-bit key,
used to derive
KSenc and KSmac
which is then used
to encrypt/decrypt
data over a secure
session between an
authorized external
entity and the
Module.
128 - 128
Symmetric
Key - CSP
input
during
manufactur
ing
SESSIONKEY
_GEN
INIT_KEYmac
AES CMAC 128-bit
key, used to derive
128 - 128
Symmetric
Key - CSP
input
during
SESSIONKEY
_GEN
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Name Description Size – Strength
Type –
Category
Generate By
Established
By
Used By
a KSenc,KSmac
which is then used
to authenticate an
operator or data
over a secure
session between an
authorized external
entity and the
Module.
manufactur
ing
KSenc
AES 128-bit key
used to
encrypt/decrypt
data over a secure
session
128 - 128
session
Key - CSP
SESSIONK
EY_GEN
KTS_SCP03_
WRAP
KSmac
AES CMAC 128-bit
key used to
authenticate data
over a secure
session
128 - 128
session
Key - CSP
SESSIONK
EY_GEN
KTS_SCP03_
WRAP
AES-GCM Key
128-bit AES-GCM
key used to encrypt
the key handle or
credentialID
128 - 128
Symmetric
Key - CSP
AES_KEY_
GEN
AES_ENC_A
UTH
AES_DEC_A
UTH
AES-GCM IV
96-bit AES-GCM IV
used to encrypt the
key handle or
credentialID
96 - N/A
Random IV
- CSP
DRBG_GEN
AES_ENC_A
UTH
AES_DEC_A
UTH
FIDO Device ECDSA
Private Key
256-bit ECC private
key used to
generate signature
for registration.
256 - 128
Asymmetri
c Private
Key - CSP
input
during
manufactur
ing
ECC_SIG_GE
N
FIDO Device ECDSA
Public Key
256-bit ECC FIDO
public key, it is
returned to the
server via the
certificate to verify
the signature
generated after
registration
256 - 128
Asymmetri
c Public
Key - PSP
input
during
manufactur
ing
ECC_SIG_VE
R
FIDO User ECDSA
Private Key
256-bit ECC private
key used to
Attestation
signature
256 - 128
Asymmetri
c Private
Key - CSP
ECC_GEN_
KEY_PAIR
ECC_SIG_GE
N
FIDO User ECDSA
Public Key
256-bit ECC FIDO
public key, it is
transmitted to the
server for verifying
signature generated
after authentication
256 - 128
Asymmetri
c public
Key - PSP
ECC_GEN_
KEY_PAIR
ECC_SIG_VE
R
FIDO Agreement ECC
Private Key
256-bit ECC private
key used to
perform key
agreement with
external public ECC
key to get shared
Secret
256 - 128
Asymmetri
c Private
Key - CSP
ECC_GEN_
KEY_PAIR
SHAREDSEC
RETKEY_GE
N_KAS
FIDO Agreement ECC
Public Key
256-bit ECC public
key used to
perform key
agreement, the
Module returns it to
external to get
sharedSecret
256 - 128
Asymmetri
c public
Key - PSP
ECC_GEN_
KEY_PAIR
SHAREDSEC
RETKEY_GE
N_KAS
FIDO Agreement
sharedSecret
256-bit key Used to
derived FIDO
SharedSecret AES
Key and FIDO
256 - 128
Shared
Secret -
CSP
SHAREDSE
CRETKEY_
GEN_KAS
KAS-ECC
Sp800-
56Ar3
(A4980)
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Name Description Size – Strength
Type –
Category
Generate By
Established
By
Used By
SharedSecret HMAC
Key by HKDF
FIDO SharedSecret
AES Key
256-bit AES CBC
key used for
encryption
calculation of pin
related operations
256 - 128
Symmetric
Key - CSP
SHAREDS
ECRETKE
Y_GEN_K
AS
SHAREDSEC
RETKEY_GE
N_KAS
FIDO SharedSecret
HMAC Key
256-bit AES CBC
key used for HMAC
SHA-256 calculation
of pin related
operations
256 - 128
Symmetric
Key - CSP
SHAREDS
ECRETKE
Y_GEN_K
AS
SHAREDSEC
RETKEY_GE
N_KAS
FIDO
PinUvAuthToken
256-bit HMAC SHA-
256 Key used to
authorize operator
after PIN
authentication
256 - 128
Authentica
tion - CSP
DRBG_GEN HMAC_GEN
FIDO PIN
Authenticate the
User,4 to 63-byte
PIN value
32-248 - N/A
Authentica
tion - CSP
KTS_CTAP_
WRAP
PIV Authentication
Key
128-bit AES ECB
key, used for
authentication of
PIV CO
128 - 128
Authentica
tion - CSP
AES_ENC_A
UTH
PIV ECC Signature
Private Key
256 bit ECC private
key, used for
signature
operations
256 - 128
Asymmetri
c Private
Key - CSP
ECC_GEN_
KEY_PAIR
ECC_SIG_GE
N
PIV ECC verification
Public Key
256-bit ECC public
key, used for client
verification
operations
256 - 128
Asymmetri
c public
Key - PSP
ECC_GEN_
KEY_PAIR
PIV RSA Signature
Private Key
2048 -bit RSA
private key, used
for signature
operations
2048 - 112
Asymmetri
c Private
Key - CSP
RSA_GEN_
KEY_PAIR
RSA_SIG_G
EN
PIV RSA verification
Public Key
2048 -bit RSA
public key, used for
client verification
operations
2048 - 112
Asymmetri
c public
Key - PSP
RSA_GEN_
KEY_PAIR
PIV User PIN
8-byte pin, used for
authenticating the
PIV user for
Asymmetric
services
64 - N/A
Authentica
tion - CSP
KTS_SCP03_
WRAP
PIV PUK PIN
8-byte pin, used for
unblocking the PIV
admin pin
64 - N/A
Authentica
tion - CSP
KTS_SCP03_
WRAP
2003 Internal Auth
Key
AES 128,192,256-
bit, used to
authenticate the
Module to an
external entity
128-256 - 128-256
Authentica
tion - CSP
AES_ENC
2003 External Auth
Key
AES 128, 192, 256-
bit, used to modify
the security state of
the currently
selected DF.
128-256 - 128-256
Authentica
tion - CSP
AES_DEC
2003 PIN
8 to 16-byte secret
used to modify the
security state of the
currently selected
DF.
64-128 - N/A
Authentica
tion - CSP
2003 PSO calculation
key
AES 128, 192, 256-
bit, Used to
encryption,
decryption,
128-256 - 128-256
Symmetric
Key - CSP
AES_ENC
AES_DEC
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Name Description Size – Strength
Type –
Category
Generate By
Established
By
Used By
checksum
calculation, and
checksum
verification in Unit
2003
2003 Unblock PIN
8 to 16-byte secret
used to unblock the
2003 pin the
currently selected
DF.
64-128 - N/A
Authentica
tion - CSP
AES_ENC
2003 RSA Private
Key
2048, 3072, 4096-
bit RSA private key
is used to sign data
2048,3072,4096 -
112-152
Asymmetri
c Private
Key - CSP
RSA_GEN_
KEY_PAIR
RSA_SIG_G
EN
2003 RSA Public Key
2048, 3072, 4096-
bit RSA public key
used to verify data
2048,3072,4096 -
112-152
Asymmetri
c public
Key - PSP
RSA_GEN_
KEY_PAIR
RSA_SIG_VE
R
2003 ECDSA Private
Key
256, 384, 521-bit
ECDSA private key
used to sign data.
256,384,521 - 128-
256
Asymmetri
c Private
Key - CSP
ECC_GEN_
KEY_PAIR
ECC_SIG_GE
N
2003 ECDSA Public
Key
256, 384, 521-bit
ECDSA public key
used to verify data.
256,384,521 - 128-
256
Asymmetri
c public
Key - PSP
ECC_GEN_
KEY_PAIR
ECC_SIG_VE
R
OTP HMAC Seed Key
16 to 64-byte
HMAC SHA-1,
HMAC SHA-256
key, used to
calculate OTP
values for the User
128-512 - 128
Authentica
tion - CSP
HMAC_GEN
OTP AccessCode
8-byte pin, used for
authenticating the
OTP user
64 - N/A
Authentica
tion - CSP
HMAC_GEN
KTS_SCP03_
WRAP
PGP Admin PIN(PW3)
8 to 127-byte, used
for authentication
of the OpenPGP CO.
64-1024 - N/A
Authentica
tion - CSP
KTS_SCP03_
WRAP
PGP User PIN(PW1)
8 to 127-byte, used
for authenticating
the OpenPGP user
for Asymmetric
services.
64-1024 - N/A
Authentica
tion - CSP
KTS_SCP03_
WRAP
PGP Resetting Code
8 to 127-byte. Used
for resetting the
User PIN
64-1024 - N/A
Authentica
tion - CSP
KTS_SCP03_
WRAP
PGP Signature
Private Key
2048, 3072, 4096
bit RSA private key,
used for PKCS#1
v1.5 signing
operation
2048,3072,4096 -
112-152
Asymmetri
c Private
Key - CSP
RSA_GEN_
KEY_PAIR
RSA_SIG_G
EN
PGP Verification
Public Key
2048, 3072, 4096
bit RSA public key,
used for verification
specified in PKCS#1
v1.5
2048,3072,4096 -
112-152
Asymmetri
c public
Key - PSP
RSA_GEN_
KEY_PAIR
External Agreement
ECC Public Key
256-bit ECC Public
key used to
perform key
agreement with
FIDO Agreement
ECC Private Key to
get sharedSecret
256 - 128
Asymmetri
c public
Key - PSP
SHAREDSEC
RETKEY_GE
N_KAS
Table 19:SSP Table 1
Name
Input-
Output
Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
DRBG-EI CHIPRAM(S1):Plaintext
after usage is
complete
Z2
MOBILE-ID TECHNOLOGIES AND SERVICES JOINT STOCK COMPANY
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36
Name
Input-
Output
Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
DRBG Seed CHIPRAM(S1):Plaintext
after usage is
complete
Z2
DRBG V CHIPRAM(S1):Plaintext
after usage is
complete
Z2 DRBG-EI:Derived From
DRBG Key CHIPRAM(S1):Plaintext
after usage is
complete
Z2 DRBG-EI:Derived From
Managing Key CHIPNVM(S5):Plaintext Z1
Device authenticate
key:Encrypts
INIT_KEYenc:Encrypts
INIT_KEYmac:Encrypts
FIDO Device ECDSA
Private Key:Encrypts
FIDO User ECDSA
Private Key:Encrypts
PIV Authentication
Key:Encrypts
PIV ECC Signature
Private Key:Encrypts
PIV RSA Signature
Private Key:Encrypts
2003 Internal Auth
Key:Encrypts
2003 External Auth
Key:Encrypts
2003 PSO calculation
key:Encrypts
2003 RSA Private
Key:Encrypts
2003 ECDSA Private
Key:Encrypts
OTP HMAC Seed
Key:Encrypts
PGP Resetting
Code:Encrypts
PGP Signature Private
Key:Encrypts
Device authenticate
key
CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted Z1
Managing Key:Encrypted
by
KSenc:Derives
INIT_KEYenc CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted Z1
Managing Key:Encrypted
by
KSenc:Derives
INIT_KEYmac CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted Z1
Managing Key:Encrypted
by
KSmac:Derives
KSenc CHIPRAM(S1):Plaintext
after usage is
completed
Z7
INIT_KEYenc:Derived
From
KSmac CHIPRAM(S1):Plaintext
after usage is
completed
Z7
INIT_KEYmac:Derived
From
AES-GCM Key CHIPNVM(S5):Plaintext Z5
FIDO User ECDSA
Private Key:Wraps
AES-GCM IV CHIPNVM(S5):Plaintext Z5
FIDO User ECDSA
Private Key:Wraps
FIDO Device ECDSA
Private Key
CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted Z1
FIDO Device ECDSA
Public Key:Paired With
Managing Key:Encrypted
by
AES-GCM Key:Wrapped
by
FIDO Device ECDSA
Public Key
Output in
plaintext
(IO8)
CHIPNVM(S6):Plaintext Z1
FIDO Device ECDSA
Private Key:Paired With
FIDO User ECDSA
Private Key
Input
encapsulat
ed by KTS-
Wrap AES-
GCM (IO2)
CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted Z5
FIDO User ECDSA Public
Key:Paired With
Managing Key:Encrypted
by
AES-GCM Key:Wrapped
MOBILE-ID TECHNOLOGIES AND SERVICES JOINT STOCK COMPANY
Level 9, Thuy Loi 4 Building, 286 – 288 Nguyen Xi, Binh Loi Trung Ward, Ho
Chi Minh City, Vietnam
Tel: (84-28) 3622 2982 - Fax: (84-28) 3622 2983 – Hotline: 1900 6884
info@mobile-id.vn – https://www.mobile-id.vn
37
Name
Input-
Output
Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Output
encapsulat
ed by KTS-
Wrap AES-
GCM (IO3)
by
AES-GCM IV:Wrapped by
FIDO User ECDSA
Public Key
Output in
plaintext
(IO7)
CHIPNVM(S6):Plaintext Z5
FIDO User ECDSA
Private Key:Paired With
FIDO Agreement ECC
Private Key
CHIPRAM(S1):Plaintext Z2
FIDO Agreement ECC
Public Key:Paired With
FIDO Agreement
sharedSecret:Derives
FIDO Agreement ECC
Public Key
Output in
plaintext
(IO7)
CHIPRAM(S1):Plaintext Z2
FIDO Agreement ECC
Private Key:Paired With
FIDO Agreement
sharedSecret
CHIPRAM(S1):Plaintext
after their usage
is completed
Z2
FIDO Agreement ECC
Private Key:Derived
From
External Agreement ECC
Public Key:Derived From
FIDO SharedSecret AES
Key:Derives
FIDO SharedSecret
HMAC Key:Derives
FIDO SharedSecret
AES Key
CHIPRAM(S1):Plaintext Z5
FIDO Agreement
sharedSecret:Derived
From
FIDO SharedSecret
HMAC Key
CHIPRAM(S1):Plaintext Z5
FIDO Agreement
sharedSecret:Derived
From
FIDO
PinUvAuthToken
Output
encapsulat
ed by KTS-
Wrap AES-
CBC with
HMAC
(IO5)
CHIPRAM(S1):Plaintext
after their usage
is completed
Z5
FIDO SharedSecret AES
Key:Wrapped by
FIDO SharedSecret
HMAC Key:Wrapped by
FIDO PIN
Input
encapsulat
ed by KTS-
Wrap AES-
CBC with
HMAC
(IO4)
CHIPNVM(S4):Encrypted Z5
PIV Authentication
Key
Input
encapsulat
ed by KTS-
Wrap
SCP03(IO1
)
CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted Z6
Managing Key:Encrypted
by
KSenc:Unwrapped by
KSmac:Unwrapped by
PIV ECC Signature
Private Key
CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted Z6
PIV ECC verification
Public Key:Paired With
Managing Key:Encrypted
by
PIV ECC verification
Public Key
Output in
plaintext
(IO8)
CHIPNVM(S6):Plaintext Z6
PIV ECC Signature
Private Key:Paired With
PIV RSA Signature
Private Key
CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted Z6
PIV RSA verification
Public Key:Paired With
Managing Key:Encrypted
by
PIV RSA verification
Public Key
Output in
plaintext
(IO8)
CHIPNVM(S6):Plaintext Z6
PIV RSA Signature
Private Key:Paired With
PIV User PIN
Input
encapsulat
ed by KTS-
CHIPNVM(S4):Encrypted Z6
KSenc:Unwrapped by
KSmac:Unwrapped by
MOBILE-ID TECHNOLOGIES AND SERVICES JOINT STOCK COMPANY
Level 9, Thuy Loi 4 Building, 286 – 288 Nguyen Xi, Binh Loi Trung Ward, Ho
Chi Minh City, Vietnam
Tel: (84-28) 3622 2982 - Fax: (84-28) 3622 2983 – Hotline: 1900 6884
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38
Name
Input-
Output
Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Wrap
SCP03(IO1
)
PIV PUK PIN
Input
encapsulat
ed by KTS-
Wrap
SCP03(IO1
)
CHIPNVM(S4):Encrypted Z6
KSenc:Unwrapped by
KSmac:Unwrapped by
2003 Internal Auth
Key
Input
encapsulat
ed by KTS-
Wrap
SCP03(IO1
)
CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted Z3
Managing Key:Encrypted
by
KSenc:Unwrapped by
KSmac:Unwrapped by
2003 External Auth
Key
Input
encapsulat
ed by KTS-
Wrap
SCP03(IO1
)
CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted Z3
Managing Key:Encrypted
by
KSenc:Unwrapped by
KSmac:Unwrapped by
2003 PIN
Input
encapsulat
ed by KTS-
Wrap
SCP03(IO1
)
CHIPNVM(S4):Encrypted Z3
2003 PSO calculation
key
Input
encapsulat
ed by KTS-
Wrap
SCP03(IO1
)
CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted Z3
Managing Key:Encrypted
by
KSenc:Unwrapped by
KSmac:Unwrapped by
2003 Unblock PIN
Input
encapsulat
ed by KTS-
Wrap
SCP03(IO1
)
CHIPNVM(S4):Encrypted Z3
Managing Key:Encrypted
by
KSenc:Unwrapped by
KSmac:Unwrapped by
2003 RSA Private
Key
CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted Z3
2003 RSA Public
Key:Paired With
Managing Key:Encrypted
by
2003 RSA Public Key
Output in
plaintext
(IO8)
CHIPNVM(S6):Plaintext Z3
2003 RSA Private
Key:Paired With
2003 ECDSA Private
Key
CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted Z3
Managing Key:Encrypted
by
2003 ECDSA Public
Key:Paired With
2003 ECDSA Public
Key
Output in
plaintext
(IO8)
CHIPNVM(S6):Plaintext Z3
2003 ECDSA Private
Key:Paired With
OTP HMAC Seed Key
Input
encapsulat
ed by KTS-
Wrap
SCP03(IO1
)
CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted Z1
Managing Key:Encrypted
by
KSenc:Unwrapped by
KSmac:Unwrapped by
OTP AccessCode
Input
encapsulat
ed by KTS-
Wrap
SCP03(IO1
)
CHIPNVM(S4):Encrypted Z8
KSenc:Unwrapped by
KSmac:Unwrapped by
PGP Admin PIN(PW3)
Input
encapsulat
CHIPNVM(S4):Encrypted Z4
KSenc:Unwrapped by
KSmac:Unwrapped by
MOBILE-ID TECHNOLOGIES AND SERVICES JOINT STOCK COMPANY
Level 9, Thuy Loi 4 Building, 286 – 288 Nguyen Xi, Binh Loi Trung Ward, Ho
Chi Minh City, Vietnam
Tel: (84-28) 3622 2982 - Fax: (84-28) 3622 2983 – Hotline: 1900 6884
info@mobile-id.vn – https://www.mobile-id.vn
39
Name
Input-
Output
Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
ed by KTS-
Wrap
SCP03(IO1
)
PGP User PIN(PW1)
Input
encapsulat
ed by KTS-
Wrap
SCP03(IO1
)
CHIPNVM(S4):Encrypted Z4
KSenc:Unwrapped by
KSmac:Unwrapped by
PGP Resetting Code
Input
encapsulat
ed by KTS-
Wrap
SCP03(IO1
)
CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted Z4
KSenc:Unwrapped by
KSmac:Unwrapped by
PGP Signature
Private Key
CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted Z4
Managing Key:Encrypted
by
PGP Verification Public
Key:Paired With
PGP Verification
Public Key
Output in
plaintext
(IO8)
CHIPNVM(S6):Plaintext Z4
PGP Signature Private
Key:Paired With
External Agreement
ECC Public Key
Input in
plaintext
(IO6)
CHIPRAM(S1):Plaintext Z2
FIDO Agreement ECC
Private Key:Used With
FIDO Agreement
sharedSecret:Derives
Table 20:SSP Table 2
9.5. Transitions
The SHA-1 algorithm as implemented by the module will be non-approved for all purposes, starting January
1, 2031.
MOBILE-ID TECHNOLOGIES AND SERVICES JOINT STOCK COMPANY
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10. Self-Tests
The Module performs self-tests to ensure the proper operation of the Module. Per FIPS 140-3 these are
categorized as either pre-operational self-tests or conditional self-tests.
10.1. Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The Module performs the following pre-operational self-tests in table below
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details
FIPS_CRC16_FIT CRC-16 KAT
SW/FW
Integrity
9000 or
6F90
Executed on the whole firmware stored in EEPROM
before the Module transition to the idle state.
Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2. Conditional Self-Tests
The Module performs the following conditional self-tests in the table below
Algorithms
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES
Encrypt
AES-128-bit
- ECB
KAT CAST
9000(meani
ng
Successful)
or
6F90(meani
ng fail)
AES decryption Bootup
AES Decrypt
AES-128-bit
- ECB
KAT CAST
9000(meani
ng
Successful)
or
6F90(meani
ng fail)
AES decryption Bootup
AES-CMAC
AES-128-bit
CMAC
KAT CAST
9000(meani
ng
Successful)
or
6F90(meani
ng fail)
Message Authentication Bootup
AES-GCM
Encrypt
AES-128-bit
GCM
KAT CAST
9000(meani
ng
Successful)
or
6F90(meani
ng fail)
Authenticated encryption Bootup
AES-GCM
Decrypt
AES-128-bit
GCM
KAT CAST
9000(meani
ng
Successful)
or
6F90(meani
ng fail)
Authenticated decryption Bootup
Counter
DRBG
AES-128-bit-
ECB
KAT CAST
9000(meani
ng
Successful)
or
6F90(meani
ng fail)
AES-128 CTR_DRBG instantiation,
generate, and reseed KATs performed
before the first random data generation
Bootup
KAS-ECC
Sp800-
56Ar3
ECDH: P-256
HKDF: Using
HMAC-Two
step
KAT CAST
9000(meani
ng
Successful)
or
6F90(meani
ng fail)
KAS-SSC Shared Secret generation
with P-256 per IG D.F.
Bootup
MOBILE-ID TECHNOLOGIES AND SERVICES JOINT STOCK COMPANY
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41
Algorithms
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
ECDSA Key
Generation
PCT PCT
9000(meani
ng
Successful)
or
6F90(meani
ng fail)
Signature and Verification Per IG C.A
Generate
ECDSA key
pairs
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
ECDSA
Signature
Generation
KAT CAST
9000(meani
ng
Successful)
or
6F90(meani
ng fail)
ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256 Signature
Generation
Bootup
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
KAT CAST
9000(meani
ng
Successful)
or
6F90(meani
ng fail)
ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256 Signature
Verification
Bootup
HMAC-
SHA2-256
using HMAC-
SHA256
KAT CAST
9000(meani
ng
Successful)
or
6F90(meani
ng fail)
HMAC-SHA-256 KAT Bootup
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
2048-bit
3072-bit
4096-bit
RSA Key
Generation
Pairwise
Consistency
Test
PCT PCT
9000(meani
ng
Successful)
or
6F90(meani
ng fail)
Signature and Verification per IG C.E.
Generate RSA
key pairs
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
2048-bit
RSA
Signature
Verification
KAT CAST
9000 or
6F90
2048-bit RSA PKCSv1.5 with SHA-256
Signature Verification
Bootup
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
2048-bit
RSA
Signature
Generation
KAT CAST
9000 or
6F90
2048-bit RSA PKCSv1.5 with SHA-256
Signature Generation
Bootup
SHA-1 SHA-1 KAT CAST
9000(me
aning
Successfu
l) or
6F90(me
aning
fail)
SHA-1 Bootup
SHA2-256 SHA2-256 KAT CAST
9000(me
aning
Successfu
l) or
6F90(me
aning
fail)
SHA2-256 Bootup
SHA2-384 SHA2-384 KAT CAST
9000(me
aning
Successfu
l) or
6F90(me
aning
fail)
SHA2-384 Bootup
SHA2-512 SHA2-512 KAT CAST
9000(me
aning
Successfu
l) or
6F90(me
SHA2-512 Bootup
MOBILE-ID TECHNOLOGIES AND SERVICES JOINT STOCK COMPANY
Level 9, Thuy Loi 4 Building, 286 – 288 Nguyen Xi, Binh Loi Trung Ward, Ho
Chi Minh City, Vietnam
Tel: (84-28) 3622 2982 - Fax: (84-28) 3622 2983 – Hotline: 1900 6884
info@mobile-id.vn – https://www.mobile-id.vn
42
Algorithms
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
aning
fail)
KDF SP800-
108
Using
AES128
CMAC
KAT CAST
9000(me
aning
Successfu
l) or
6F90(me
aning
fail)
AES128 CMAC KAT Bootup
Entropy 90B
Start-up
Repetition
Count Test
(RCT)
Repetition
Count Test
RCT CAST
Success
or Failure
Code
As specified in [90B] RCT startup
health tests
At boot up
Entropy 90B
Start-up
Adaptive
Proportion
Test (APT)
Adaptive
Proportion
Test
APT CAST
Success
or Failure
Code
As specified in [90B] APT startup health
tests
At boot up
Entropy 90B
Continuous
Repetition
Count Test
(RCT)
Repetition
Count Test
RCT CAST
Success
or Failure
Code
As specified in [90B] RCT continuous
health tests
Continuous
when entropy
is requested
Entropy 90B
Continuous
Adaptive
Proportion
Test (APT)
Adaptive
Proportion
Test
APT CAST
Success
or Failure
Code
As specified in [90B] APT continuous
health tests
Continuous
when entropy
is requested
Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3. Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm and
Test
Test
Method
Test
Type
Period Periodic Method
FIPS_CRC16_FIT KAT
SW/FW
Integrity
every 1000 services are
processed or power on
performed by the Module
programmatically
Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm and
Test
Test
Method
Test
Type
Period Periodic Method
AES Encrypt KAT CAST
every 1000 services are
processed or power on
Automatic
AES Decrypt KAT CAST
every 1000 services are
processed and power on
Automatic
AES-CMAC KAT CAST
every 1000 services are
processed or power on
Automatic
AES-GCM
Encrypt
KAT CAST
every 1000 services are
processed or power on
Automatic
AES-GCM
Decrypt
KAT CAST
every 1000 services are
processed or power on
Automatic
Counter DRBG KAT CAST
every 1000 services are
processed or power on
Automatic
KAS-ECC Sp800-
56Ar3
KAT CAST
every 1000 services are
processed or power on
Automatic
MOBILE-ID TECHNOLOGIES AND SERVICES JOINT STOCK COMPANY
Level 9, Thuy Loi 4 Building, 286 – 288 Nguyen Xi, Binh Loi Trung Ward, Ho
Chi Minh City, Vietnam
Tel: (84-28) 3622 2982 - Fax: (84-28) 3622 2983 – Hotline: 1900 6884
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Algorithm and
Test
Test
Method
Test
Type
Period Periodic Method
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
PCT PCT
Everytime a key pair is
generated
Automatic
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
KAT CAST
every 1000 services are
processed or power on
Automatic
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
KAT CAST
every 1000 services are
processed or power on
Automatic
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT CAST
every 1000 services are
processed or power on
Automatic
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
PCT PCT
Everytime a key pair is
generated
Automatic
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
KAT CAST
every 1000 services are
processed or power on
Automatic
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
KAT CAST
every 1000 services are
processed or power on
Automatic
SHA-1 KAT CAST
every 1000 services are
processed or power on
Automatic
SHA2-256 KAT CAST
every 1000 services are
processed or power on
Automatic
SHA2-384 KAT CAST
every 1000 services are
processed or power on
Automatic
SHA2-512 KAT CAST
every 1000 services are
processed or power on
Automatic
KDF SP800-108 KAT CAST
every 1000 services are
processed and power on
Automatic
Entropy 90B
Start-up
Repetition Count
Test (RCT)
RCT CAST On Demand Device Reset
Entropy 90B
Start-up
Adaptive
Proportion Test
(APT)
APT CAST On Demand Device Reset
Entropy 90B
Continuous
Repetition Count
Test (RCT)
RCT CAST N/A N/A
Entropy 90B
Continuous
Adaptive
Proportion Test
(APT)
APT CAST N/A N/A
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information
The condition of initiating Periodic Self-Test is to execute every 1000 services. Once every 1000 services
being executed, the periodic self-test function will call Pre-Operational Self-Tests and Conditional Self-
Tests. Self-test failures are indicated to the user through LED status and service return status.
10.4. Error States
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Name Description Conditions
Recovery
Method
Indicator
ES1
The Module fails at CRC16 FIT, ENT
RCT and APT, CTR DRBG KAT,
ECDSA KAT, RSA KAT, AES ECB KAT,
AES CMAC KAT, AES GCM KAT,
HMAC KAT, KBKDF KAT, KAS-ECC
KAT, SHS KAT, RSA Generate key
pair PCT, ECC Generate key pair PCT
The Module enters
Critical error state.
Reboot/Power
cycle the module
6F90 and
blinking LED
Table 25: Error States
10.5. Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
All self-tests, except for the continuous health tests, can be invoked on demand
by restarting the module.
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11. Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1. Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
Installation and Initialization:
The following steps must be performed in order to securely install, initialize, and start up the Trusted Key
Token cryptographic module in the FIPS 140-3 Approved mode of operation.
The steps for the CO to enter the module and change the default password gain authorized access to the
module.
The module is setup at manufacturing and delivered to the CO in approved mode.
Delivery:
The following steps must be performed in order to securely deliver the Trusted Key Token cryptographic
module to the authorized operator:
1. Set the required keys in a secure factory environment
2. Complete packaging and user manual
3. Shipping the modules to the final customer. For each shipment, our factory will use the courier
agreed with customer, such as FedEx or DHL. Our factory will inform customer in advance with the
shipment info by email. When the goods arriving in customer site, the customer will first check the
goods according to the shipment info they received, and sign for acceptance.
4. The final customer checks the module information according to administrator manual.
11.2. Administrator Guidance
Refer to Mobile-IDTM
Trusted Key Token Administrator Guidance.docx, which will be provided to the issuer
through secure communications.
11.3. Non-Administrator Guidance
Refer to Mobile-IDTM
Trusted Key Token Non-Administrator Guidance.docx, which will be provided to the
issuer through secure communications.
11.4. Design and Rules
Rules of Operation:
1. The Module provides two distinct operator roles: User and Cryptographic Officer.
2. The Module provides identity-based authentication.
3. The Module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
4. An operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized
role.
5. The Module allows the operator to initiate power-up self-tests by power cycling power or resetting
the Module.
6. All self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
8. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the Module.
9. There are no restrictions on which keys or SSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
10. The Module does not support concurrent operators.
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11. The Module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
12. The Module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of
data.
13. The Module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs.
14. The Module does not store any plaintext CSPs.
15. The Module does not output intermediate key values.
16. The Module does not provide bypass services or ports/interfaces.
11.5. Maintenance Requirements
The module does not require any maintenance requirements
11.6. End of Life
Administrator SHALL invoke Terminate token service after authentication to switch device into the
terminated state as a result, all CSPs are cleared, and all services are not available anymore. The device
shall be destroyed.
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12. Mitigation of Other Attacks
The Module does not implement any mitigation method against other attacks.
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13. References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-3] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, March 22, 2019
[ISO19790]
International Standard, ISO/IEC 19790, Information technology — Security techniques
— Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Third edition, March 2017
[ISO24759]
International Standard, ISO/IEC 24759, Information technology — Security techniques
— Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Second and Corrected version, 15
December 2015
[IG]
Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program, October 23, 2024
[108r1]
NIST Special Publication 800-108, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
Pseudorandom Functions (Revised), August 2022 INCLUDES UPDATES AS OF 02-02-
2024
[133]
NIST Special Publication 800-133, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation,
Revision 2, June 2020
[135]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Existing
Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions, Special Publication 800-135rev1,
December 2011.
[186]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-5, February 3, 2023.
[197]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, May 9, 2023
[198-1]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
198-1, July, 2008
[180]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015
[38A]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December
2001
[38B]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, Special Publication 800-38B,
May 2005
[38D]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800-
38D, November 2007
[56Ar3]
NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, April 2018
[56Br2]
NIST Special Publication 800-56B Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Finite Field Cryptography, March 2019
[56Cr2]
NIST Special Publication 800-56C Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, August 2020
[90A]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A,
Revision 1, June 2015.
[90B]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Entropy
Sources Used for Random Bit Generation, Special Publication 800-90B, January 2018.
Table 26: References
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Acronym Definition
APT Adaptative Proportion Test
KAT Know Answer Test
RCT Repetition Count Test
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter
PCT Pairwise Consistency Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
KTS Key Transport Scheme
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
VCC Voltage (at the) Common Collector
PIN Personal Identification Number
PGP User PIN
(PW1)
user-password
PGP Admin
PIN (PW3)
admin-password
CO Crypto Officer
PUK PIN Unblocking Key
Table 27: Acronyms and Definitions