



Trusted Key Token Cryptographic Module

Part No: Trusted-Key

Firmware Version No: V1.3.02

FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

FIPS Security Level: 3

Document Version: V1.1

Date: April 1st, 2026

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Document Revisions

Version	Date	Description	Author
1.1	2026-04-01	Change Model/PartNumber from K4B to A4B on Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Hardware	KHANHPX
1.0	2026-03-06	First submission	KHANHPX

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1. General

1.1. Overview

This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the Trusted Key Token. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3 for an overall Security Level 3 module).

1.2. Security Levels

The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the Module are as follows:

Section	Section Title	Level
1	General	3
2	Cryptographic Module Specification	3
3	Cryptographic Module Interfaces	3
4	Roles, Services, and Authentication	3
5	Software/Firmware Security	3
6	Operational Environment	N/A
7	Physical Security	3
8	Non-Invasive Security	N/A
9	Sensitive Security Parameter Management	3
10	Self-Tests	3
11	Life-cycle Assurance	3
12	Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A
	Overall Level	3

Table 1: FIPS 140-3 Section Security Levels

2. Module Overview

This Mobile-ID™ Trusted Key Token module, hereafter denoted as the Module. The Module supports multiple identity authentication system frameworks such as PKI/OTP/FIDO, among which PKI includes three applications: Trusted Key PKI/Trusted Key PIV/Trusted Key OpenPGP. The OTP functional unit complies with OATH standards. The PIV functional unit meets the specifications NIST.SP.800-73-4. The OpenPGP functional unit is an ISO Smart Card Operating Systems.

2.1. Description

Purpose and Use:

The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies or other markets that require FIPS 140-3 validated identity authentication product, the Module is intended to be used in E-mail encryption, system login, transaction protection, etc.

Module Type: Hardware

Module Embodiment: MultiChipEmbed

Cryptographic Boundary:

The physical form of the Module is depicted in Figure 1. The Module is a multi-chip embedded embodiment. The Module is a USB token containing Mobile-ID™ owned MIDCOS, which is embedded in a HSC32K2 with PAA Integrated Circuit (IC) chip and has been developed to support Trusted Key Token. The Module is designed to provide strong authentication and identification and to support network login, secure online transactions, digital signatures, and sensitive data protection.




Figure 1: Module Boundary




Figure 2: Block Diagram



Figure 3: Module Appearance

Model Description: There are two types, one without buttons and the other with buttons. In the above Figure 3, the top row (A2 models – Blue and Purple) do not come with buttons, they are only used for

Trusted Key products. All other models (K9, K40, A4B, K49, K50 and K28) have a button which can be used for all functional units.

2.2. Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification

The operator can correlate the module's name and versioning information with the CMVP validation record by following the instructions in the Mobile-ID™ Trusted Key Token Administrator Guidance, Section 5.8 Get Device Info, #7 Get Version Info.

Tested Module Identification – Hardware:

Mobile-ID™ Trusted Key Token cryptographic module is tested on the following operational environment.

Model and/or Part Number	Hardware Version	Firmware Version	Processors	Features
A2	V1.2	V1.3.02	HSC32K2 with PAA	
K9	V1.0	V1.3.02	HSC32K2 with PAA	
K40	V1.0	V1.3.02	HSC32K2 with PAA	
A4B	V1.0	V1.3.02	HSC32K2 with PAA	
K49	V1.0	V1.3.02	HSC32K2 with PAA	
K50	V1.0	V1.3.02	HSC32K2 with PAA	
K28	V1.0	V1.3.02	HSC32K2 with PAA	

Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Hardware

2.3. Excluded Components

The module does not exclude any components.

2.4. Mode of Operation

Modes List and Description:

Mode Name	Description	Type	Status Indicator
Approved Mode	The module has only one mode of operation - the Approved mode, which is entered after power up.	Approved	LED on and blink

Table 3: Modes List and Description

The module only supports Approved mode. IG 2.4.C scenario 2) is applied to the module, i.e. A static code (9000 or 00) indicating the completion of service. The successful completion of a service is an implicit indicator for the use of an approved service.

2.5. Algorithms

Approved Algorithms:

The Module implements the Approved cryptographic algorithms listed the table below.

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-CBC	A4980	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-CMAC	A4980	Direction - Generation, Verification Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38B
AES-ECB	A4980	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-GCM	A4980	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation Mode - 8.2.2 Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38D
Counter DRBG	A4980	Prediction Resistance - Yes Mode - AES-128 Derivation Function Enabled - Yes	SP 800-90A Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	A4980	Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5)	A4980	Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	A4980	Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 Component - Yes	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	A4980	Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	FIPS 186-5
HMAC-SHA-1	A4980	Key Length - Key Length: 8-2048 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256	A4980	Key Length - Key Length: 8-2048 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3	A4980	Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256 Function - Key Pair Generation Scheme - ephemeralUnified - KAS Role - Responder KDF Methods - twoStepKdf Key Length - 256	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
KDF SP800-108	A4980	KDF Mode - Counter Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 8-256 Increment 8	SP 800-108 Rev. 1
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	A4980	Key Generation Mode - probable Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Primality Tests - 2powSecStr Private Key Format - crt	FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	A4980	Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5	FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	A4980	Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5	FIPS 186-5
SHA-1	A4980	Message Length - Message Length: 160, 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256	A4980	Message Length - Message Length: 256, 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384	A4980	Message Length - Message Length: 384, 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512	A4980	Message Length - Message Length: 512, 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4

Table 4: Approved Algorithms

Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:

The Module implements the FIPS Vendor Affirmed cryptographic algorithms listed below.

Name	Properties	Implementation	Reference
CKG1	Key Type:Asymmetric and Symmetric	N/A	[133r2] section 4, example 1 and IG D.H

Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms

Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:

N/A for this module.

Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:

N/A for this module.

Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:

N/A for this module.

2.6. Security Function Implementations

The SFI table shows the Security Function Implementations that the module implements:

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
RSA_GEN_KEY_PAIR	AsymKeyPair- KeyGen	Asymmetric Key-Pair Generation	Publications:Publications:[FIPS 186-5], [SP800-90A], [SP800-133r1], [IG C.E]	RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A4980) Counter DRBG: (A4980) CKG1: () Key Type:: Symmetric
ECC_GEN_KEY_PAIR	AsymKeyPair- KeyGen	Asymmetric Key-Pair Generation	Publications:[FIPS 186-5], [SP800-90A], [SP800-133r1], [IG C.A]	ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A4980) Counter DRBG: (A4980) CKG1: () Key Type:: Symmetric
AES_KEY_GEN	CKG	Symmetric Key Generation Sections 4 and 6.1 Direct symmetric	Publications:[SP800-90A], [IG D.H], [FIPS 197]	AES-CBC: (A4980) Size: 128 AES-GCM: (A4980) Size: 128 AES-ECB:

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
		key generation using unmodified DRBG output		(A4980) Size: 128 Counter DRBG: (A4980) CKG1: () Key Type:: Symmetric
SESSIONKEY_GEN	KBKDF	Symmetric Key Generation using KBKDF	Publications:[SP800-108r1], [SP800-38B], [FIPS 197]	AES-CMAC: (A4980) Size: 128 KDF SP800-108: (A4980) Size: 128
RSA_SIG_GEN	DigSig-SigGen	Digital Signature Generation	Publications:[FIPS 186-5], [SP800-133r1], [IG C.E]	RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A4980) SHA2-256: (A4980) SHA2-384: (A4980) SHA2-512: (A4980)
RSA_SIG_VER	DigSig-SigVer	Signature Verification	Publications:[FIPS 186-5], [IG C.E]	RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A4980) SHA2-256: (A4980) SHA2-384: (A4980) SHA2-512: (A4980)
ECC_SIG_GEN	DigSig-SigGen	Digital Signature Generation	Publications:[FIPS 186-5], [SP800-133r1], [IG C.A]	ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A4980) SHA2-256: (A4980) SHA2-384: (A4980) SHA2-512: (A4980)
ECC_SIG_VER	DigSig-SigVer	Signature Verification	Publications:[FIPS 186-5], [IG C.A]	ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A4980) SHA2-256: (A4980) SHA2-384: (A4980) SHA2-512: (A4980)

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
				5): (A4980) SHA2-256: (A4980) SHA2-384: (A4980) SHA2-512: (A4980)
ECC_KEY_VER	AsymKeyPair- KeyVer	Check the validity of the public key	Publications:[FIPS 186-5], [IG C.A]	ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5): (A4980)
DRBG_GEN	DRBG	Random Number Generation	Publications:[SP800-90A], [IG D.L]	Counter DRBG: (A4980)
ENT_GEN	ENT-ESV	Entropy Source	Publications:[SP800-90B], [IG 9.3.A], [IG D.J] [IG D.O]	
SHAREDSECRETKEY_GEN_KAS	KAS-Full	Key Agreement Shared Secret Calculation [56Ar3] Key Derivation KDA [56Cr2]	IG:D.F Scenario 2, path 2, end-to-end Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides 128 bits of security strength Key confirmation:No Key derivation:KDA (tested as part KAS certificate)	KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3: (A4980)
AES_ENC_AUTH	BC-AuthEncrypt	Block Cipher	Publications:[FIPS 197]	AES-CMAC: (A4980) Sizes: 128 AES-GCM: (A4980) Size: 128
AES_ENC	BC-UnAuthEncrypt	Block Cipher	Publications:[FIPS 197]	AES-CBC: (A4980) AES-ECB: (A4980)
AES_DEC_AUTH	BC-AuthDecrypt	Block Cipher	Publications:[FIPS 197]	AES-CMAC: (A4980) Size: 128 AES-GCM: (A4980) Size: 128
AES_DEC	BC-UnAuthDecrypt	Block Cipher	Publications:[FIPS 197]	AES-CBC: (A4980) AES-ECB: (A4980)
HMAC_GEN	MAC	Message Authentication Generation	Publications:[FIPS198-1] [IG C.B]	HMAC-SHA-1: (A4980) HMAC-

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
				SHA2-256: (A4980) SHA-1: (A4980) SHA2-256: (A4980)
KTS_SCP03_WRAP	KTS-Unwrap	used as SCP03	Standard:SP 800-38F IG D.G:Approved Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides 128 bits of security strength	AES-CBC: (A4980) Sizes: 128 AES-CMAC: (A4980) Sizes: 128
KTS_AESGCM_WRAP	KTS-Unwrap KTS-Wrap	SP800-38D Based on IG D.G	Standard:SP 800-38F IG D.G:Approved Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides 128 bits of security strength	AES-GCM: (A4980) Sizes: 128
KTS_CTAP_WRAP	KTS-Unwrap KTS-Wrap	Key Wrapping Based on IG D.G	Standard:SP 800-38F IG D.G:Approved Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides 128 bits of security strength	AES-CBC: (A4980) Sizes: 128 HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4980)
SHA_CAL	SHA	Secure Hash Standard	Publications:[FIPS 180-4], [IG C.B]	SHA2-256: (A4980) SHA2-384: (A4980) SHA2-512: (A4980)

Table 6: Security Function Implementations

2.7. Algorithm Specific Information

AES GCM IV Uniqueness

FIPS140-3 IG C.H, Option 2

The IV is generated internally at its entirety randomly.

The generation uses an Approved DRBG (Cert. #A4980) that is internal to the module's boundary.

The IV length shall be at least 96 bits (per SP 800-38D).

KAS [56Ar3] - Per [IG] D.F Scenario 2 path (2), compliant key agreement scheme where testing is performed end-to-end for the shared secret computation and a KDF compliant with HKDF (2step KDF).

The Module obtains the [FIPS140-3_IG] D.F required key agreement assurances [SP800-56Ar3] in accordance with Section 5.6.2.

2.8. RBG and Entropy

The scenario 1(a) in IG 9.3.A is applied to the module, the security strength of the DRBG seeded by the entropy source is 128-bit.

According to table 4 of the ESV Public Use Document, to reach 128 bits of strength, at least 581 bits of random nonce are needed to seed the DRBG. A 640-bit nonce is used in the module, so the DRBG entropy strength is 128 bits.

Cert Number	Vendor Name
E134	Feitian Technologies Co., Ltd.

Table 7: Entropy Certificates

The Module uses the following entropy sources:

Name	Type	Operation Environment	Sample Size	Entropy per Sample	Conditioning Component
HSEC_ES	Physical	HSEC HSC	1 bit	0.3308	N/A

Table 8: Entropy Sources

2.9. Key Generation

For Key Generation, see Section 2.5 and Section 2.6 above.

2.10. Key Establishment

Key Agreement Information

For Key Agreement, see Section 2.5 and Section 2.6 above.

Key Transport Information

For Key Transport, see Section 2.5 and Section 2.6 above.

2.11. Industry Protocols

The module does not support any industry protocols that would be of interest to this standard.

3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces

3.1. Ports and Interfaces

The Module's ports and associated FIPS defined logical interface categories are listed below.

Physical Port	Logical Interface(s)	Data That Passes
Power Supply 2 Pins	Power	Vcc Vdd 1.62-5.5V
Touch Button 1 Pin	Control Input	Physical input
LED 1 Pin	Status Output	Physical output
USB(D+/D-) 2 Pins	Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output	Primary physical interface (USB) for all service data

Table 9: Ports and Interfaces

Note: The module does not support Control Output.

4. Roles, Services, and Authentication

4.1. Authentication Methods

Method Name	Description	Security Mechanism	Strength Each Attempt	Strength per Minute
Authentication_PIN	A role is authenticated to the Module console with a PIN mechanism. The PIN must be changed by the CO after first authentication with default data. The Module enforces a minimum size of 8 ASCII characters. The number of incorrect attempts for PIN is 3-15, which can be set to a maximum of 15 times and a minimum of 3 times.	Memorized Secrets	PIN 8-63 characters, including numbers, letters, and special characters. Therefore, the probability of successful attempt is $1/95^8$.	Each authentication attempt takes approximately 60 ms which allows a maximum of 15 attempts per minute. Therefore, the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute through random attempts is $15/95^8$.
Authentication_AuthKey	The identity is authenticated to the module with a challenge-response mechanism (Cert. #A4980). The entity gets challenge from the module then encrypts it resulting in a cryptogram using Auth key. The cryptogram is sent back and decrypted in the module using the same key, then the module checks if the result is matched with the original challenge. The Auth key MUST be changed to a specific value for each module by the CO after first authentication with default data. The Auth key is generally a random number automatically generated by HSM. The number of incorrect attempts for Auth key is 3-15, which can be set to a maximum of 15 times and a minimum of 3 times.	AES-ECB (A4980)	128-bit AES-ECB Key Challenge-Response. A minimum 16-byte (128 bit) binary string has a probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur of $1/2^{128}$.	Each authentication attempt takes approximately 60 ms which allows a maximum of 15 attempts per minute. Therefore, the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute through random attempts is $15/2^{128}$.

Table 10: Authentication Methods

All authentication states are all stored in RAM, so they are cleared automatically once the module is powered down.

Note:

Authentication-PIN is an abstract noun that includes the PIN of Trusted Key unit, PIN/PUK of PIV unit, PIN of FIDO unit, AccessiCode of OTP unit, PGP User PIN(PW1)/ PGP Admin PIN(PW3) of OpenPGP unit.

Authentication-AuthKey is an abstract noun that includes the Device authenticate key of a universal service unit, the External Auth Key of an Trusted Key unit, and the PIV Authentication Key of a PIV unit.

4.2. Roles

The Module supports four distinct operator roles: User, Admin, Cryptographic Officer (CO) and Unauth. The CO is responsible for device authentication and resetting user PINs, etc. The Admin role is responsible for configuring SSPS and performing cryptographic operations. The User utilizes the module as an authenticator. The unauthenticated role can only access some non-operational SSP services, such as Select functional unit, get a challenge, read non-security relevant information, self-tests, etc.

The Module does not support a maintenance role.

The Module does not support concurrent operators.

The Roles Table below lists all operator roles supported by the Module.

Name	Type	Operator Type	Authentication Methods
CO	Identity	Crypto Officer	Authentication_AuthKey
Admin	Identity	User	Authentication_AuthKey Authentication_PIN
User	Identity	User	Authentication_PIN
UnAuth	Role	Unauthenticated	None

Table 11: Roles

4.3. Approved Services

All approved services implemented by the Module are listed in the table below:

The SSPs modes of access shown in the table below are defined as:

- G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the SSP.
- R = Read: The SSP is read from the Module (e.g., the SSP is output).
- W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the Module (SSP is input).
- E = Execute: The Module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
- Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the SSP

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
SELECT	Select functional unit	9000 or error status	Command with AID	FCI (File Control Information)	None	Unauthenticated - KSend: Z - KSmac: Z
Get Device Info	Get device information content including versioning information	9000 or error status	Command without input parameter	Device Info	None	Unauthenticated

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
	and show status					
Get Challenge	Request random data that will be used as a challenge within the Device Authenticate service	9000 or error status	Command with expected data length	random value	DRBG_GEN ENT_GEN	Unauthenticated - DRBG V: G,Z - DRBG Seed: G - DRBG Key: G,Z
Device Authenticate	Request administrator privileges	9000 or error status	Kid and cipher text	N/A	AES_DEC_AUTH	CO - Device authenticate key: E
Update key	Change Device authenticate key, INIT_KEYenc and INIT_KEYmac	9000 or error status	cipher text	N/A	AES_DEC	CO - KSenc: E - KSmac: E - Device authenticate key: W,E,Z - INIT_KEYenc: W,Z - INIT_KEYmac: W,Z
GP Initialize Update	Create Secure Channel Session	9000 or error status	Host random Card random	cipher text	SESSIONKEY_GEN	Admin - INIT_KEYenc: E - INIT_KEYmac: E - KSenc: G - KSmac: G User - INIT_KEYenc: E - INIT_KEYmac: E - KSenc: G - KSmac: G
GP External Authenticate	This service may also be used to both authenticate and initiate a secure session with an external entity.	9000 or error status	cipher text	N/A	SESSIONKEY_GEN	Admin - KSenc: E - KSmac: E User - KSenc: E - KSmac: E
Terminate token	The token into terminate state.	9000 or error status	Command without input parameter	N/A	None	CO - DRBG-EI: Z - DRBG V: Z - DRBG Key: Z - Managing Key: Z - Device authenticate key: Z - INIT_KEYenc: Z - INIT_KEYmac: Z - KSenc: Z - KSmac: Z - AES-GCM Key: Z - FIDO Device ECDSA Private Key: Z - FIDO Device ECDSA Public

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						Key: Z - FIDO User ECDSA Private Key: Z - FIDO User ECDSA Public Key: Z - FIDO Agreement ECC Private Key: Z - FIDO Agreement ECC Public Key: Z - FIDO Agreement sharedSecret: Z - FIDO SharedSecret AES Key: Z - FIDO SharedSecret HMAC Key: Z - FIDO PinUvAuthToken : Z - FIDO PIN: Z - PIV Authentication Key: Z - PIV ECC Signature Private Key: Z - PIV ECC verification Public Key: Z - PIV RSA Signature Private Key: Z - PIV RSA verification Public Key: Z - PIV User PIN: Z - PIV PUK PIN: Z - 2003 Internal Auth Key: Z - 2003 External Auth Key: Z - 2003 PIN: Z - 2003 PSO calculation key: Z - 2003 Unblock PIN: Z - 2003 RSA Private Key: Z - 2003 RSA Public Key: Z - 2003 ECDSA Private Key: Z - 2003 ECDSA Public Key: Z - OTP HMAC Seed Key: Z - OTP AccessCode: Z - PGP Admin PIN(PW3): Z

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						- PGP User PIN(PW1): Z - PGP Resetting Code: Z - PGP Signature Private Key: Z - PGP Verification Public Key: Z - External Agreement ECC Public Key: Z - DRBG Seed: Z - AES-GCM IV: Z
Manage Security Environment (MSE)	Prepares the Module for the subsequent commands, Perform Security Operation.	9000 or error status	Command without input parameter	N/A	None	User Admin
Hash	Performs a hash using SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512.	9000 or error status	message	Hash value	SHA_CAL	Unauthenticated
Read Binary	Allows read access to a binary file. A binary file is a file whose content is a sequential string of bits.	9000 or error status	Command with file info	Binary database	None	Admin User
Update Binary	Allows write access to a binary file.	9000 or error status	Binary data	N/A	None	Admin User
Read Record	Allows read access to a record. A record is a type of data storage structure as defined within ISO 7816. Records are stored in files.	9000 or error status	Command With file info	Record data	None	Admin User
Update Record	Allows write access to a record	9000 or error status	Record data	N/A	None	Admin User
Append Record	Allows a record to be append	9000 or error status	Record data	N/A	None	Admin User

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
Internal Authenticate	Authenticate the cryptographic module by an external entity NOTE: In order for this service to be utilized, the external entity must have privileged access to the referenced key.	9000 or error status	Random data	cipher text	AES_ENC	Admin - 2003 Internal Auth Key: E User - 2003 Internal Auth Key: E
External Authenticate	Authenticate an external entity by the cryptographic module. NOTE: Prerequisite to this service is the use of Get Challenge service. The key as referenced within the service call exists under the current file	9000 or error status	cipher text	N/A	AES_DEC	Admin - 2003 External Auth Key: E User - 2003 External Auth Key: E
Verify PIN	Provides PIN verification.	9000 or error status	PIN data	N/A	KTS_SCP03_W RAP	Admin - 2003 PIN: E - KSenc: E - KSmac: E User - KSenc: E - KSmac: E - 2003 PIN: E
Change Reference Data	Modify the PIN	9000 or error status	PIN and new PIN data	N/A	KTS_SCP03_W RAP	Admin - 2003 PIN: W,E - KSenc: E - KSmac: E User - 2003 PIN: W,E - KSenc: E - KSmac: E
Reset Retry Counter	Resets the retry counter	9000 or error status	Command without input parameter	N/A	KTS_SCP03_W RAP	User - KSenc: E - KSmac: E Admin - KSenc: E - KSmac: E
Generate Asymmetric Key Pair	Generates an	9000 or error status	Command without input parameter	N/A	RSA_GEN_KEY _PAIR	Admin - DRBG-EI: G,E - 2003 RSA

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
	Asymmetric key pair.				ECC_GEN_KEY_PAIR	Private Key: G - 2003 RSA Public Key: G - 2003 ECDSA Private Key: G - 2003 ECDSA Public Key: G - DRBG Seed: G,E User - DRBG-EI: G,E - 2003 RSA Private Key: G - 2003 RSA Public Key: G - 2003 ECDSA Private Key: G - 2003 ECDSA Public Key: G - DRBG Seed: G,E
Encrypt	Performs an encrypt operation using an Approved security function.	9000 or error status	Kid and plain text	cipher text	AES_ENC	Admin - 2003 PSO calculation key: E - Managing Key: E User - 2003 PSO calculation key: E - Managing Key: E
Decrypt	Performs a decrypt operation.	9000 or error status	Kid and cipher text	plain text	AES_DEC	Admin - 2003 PSO calculation key: E - Managing Key: E User - 2003 PSO calculation key: E - Managing Key: E
Verify Digital Signature	Verifies a digital signature using RSA PKCS#1 or ECDSA	9000 or error status	Signature and kid	N/A	RSA_SIG_VER ECC_SIG_VER ECC_KEY_VER	Admin - 2003 RSA Public Key: E - 2003 ECDSA Public Key: E User - 2003 RSA Public Key: E - 2003 ECDSA Public Key: E
Generate Digital Signature	Generates a digital signature using RSA PKCS#1 or ECDSA.	9000 or error status	message and kid	Signature	RSA_SIG_GEN ECC_SIG_GEN	Admin - 2003 RSA Private Key: E - 2003 ECDSA Private Key: E User - 2003 RSA Private Key: E

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						- 2003 ECDSA Private Key: E
Verify Cryptographic Checksum	Performs AES CMAC verification.	9000 or error status	cipher text	N/A	AES_ENC_AUTH	Admin - 2003 PSO calculation key: E User - 2003 PSO calculation key: E
Compute Cryptographic Checksum	Compute AES CMAC.	9000 or error status	plain text	cipher text	AES_ENC_AUTH	Admin - 2003 PSO calculation key: E User - 2003 PSO calculation key: E
Create File	Create a file.	9000 or error status	Command with file info	N/A	None	Admin
Delete File	Delete a File.	9000 or error status	Command with file info	N/A	None	Admin - 2003 Internal Auth Key: Z - 2003 External Auth Key: Z - 2003 PIN: Z - 2003 Unblock PIN: Z - 2003 RSA Private Key: Z - 2003 RSA Public Key: Z - 2003 ECDSA Private Key: Z - 2003 ECDSA Public Key: Z
Install Secret	This service is used to enter AES keys, and PINs. SSPs which may be entered are as follows: * Internal Auth Key * External Auth Key * Symmetric Key * PIN	9000 or error status	Encrypted Symmetric Key or pin	N/A	KTS_SCP03_W RAP	Admin - 2003 Internal Auth Key: W - 2003 External Auth Key: W - 2003 PSO calculation key: W - KSec: E - KSmac: E - 2003 PIN: W - 2003 Unblock PIN: W
Get File List	Allows the reading of the FID list of child files of the current file	9000 or error status	Command with file	File info	None	Admin User
Read Public Key	Allows the output of a public key.	9000 or error status	Command with key info	RSA/ECC Public Key	None	Admin - 2003 RSA Public Key: R

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						- 2003 ECDSA Public Key: R User - 2003 RSA Public Key: R - 2003 ECDSA Public Key: R
Make Credential	This service is used to generate a new credential in the module	00 or error status	Encrypted Device ECDSA Private Key and message	CredentialID and X.509 certificate	ECC_GEN_KEY_PAIR ECC_SIG_GEN AES_ENC_AUTH KTS_AESGCM_WRAP	User - DRBG-EI: G,E - DRBG V: G,E - AES-GCM Key: E - FIDO Device ECDSA Private Key: E - FIDO User ECDSA Private Key: G,R,W - FIDO Device ECDSA Public Key: R - AES-GCM IV: E - DRBG Seed: G,E - DRBG Key: G,E - FIDO User ECDSA Public Key: G,R
Get Attestation	This service is using Registration's credential to signature	00 or error status	Encrypted User ECDSA Private Key and message	Signature	ECC_SIG_GEN ECC_SIG_VER AES_DEC_AUTH H KTS_AESGCM_WRAP	User - DRBG-EI: G,E - DRBG V: G,E - AES-GCM Key: E - AES-GCM IV: E - DRBG Seed: G,E - DRBG Key: G,E - FIDO User ECDSA Private Key: E - FIDO User ECDSA Public Key: E
Get Next Attestation	The client calls this service when the Attestation response contains the number of credentials member and the number of credentials exceeds 1.	00 or error status	Command without input parameter	Signature	ECC_SIG_GEN	User - DRBG-EI: G,E - DRBG V: G,E - AES-GCM Key: E - DRBG Seed: G,E - DRBG Key: G,E
Get Information	Device Information	00 or error status	Command without input parameter	Version	None	Unauthenticated
PIN Service	This service is used by the platform	00 or error status	PIN	PinUvAuthToken	ECC_GEN_KEY_PAIR AES_KEY_GEN	User - FIDO PIN: W,E - FIDO

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
	to establish the shared Secret key, setting a new user PIN, changing existing user PIN, and getting User PinUvAuthToken from the module				ECC_KEY_VER SHAREDSECRET TKEY_GEN_KAS AES_ENC_AUTH HMAC_GEN KTS_CTAP_WRAP AP	PinUvAuthToken : G,R,E - FIDO SharedSecret AES Key: G,E - FIDO SharedSecret HMAC Key: G,E - FIDO Agreement sharedSecret: G,E - FIDO Agreement ECC Public Key: G,R - External Agreement ECC Public Key: W,E - Managing Key: G
FIDO Reset	Zeroization	00 or error status	Command without input parameter	N/A	AES_KEY_GEN DRBG_GEN	CO - FIDO User ECDSA Private Key: Z - FIDO User ECDSA Public Key: Z - FIDO Agreement ECC Private Key: Z - FIDO Agreement ECC Public Key: Z - FIDO Agreement sharedSecret: Z - FIDO SharedSecret AES Key: Z - FIDO SharedSecret HMAC Key: Z - FIDO PinUvAuthToken : Z - FIDO PIN: Z - AES-GCM Key: G
Credential Management	Listing credentials and deleting credentials	00 or error status	pinUvAuthParam	N/A	AES_ENC HMAC_GEN KTS_CTAP_WRAP AP	User - FIDO PinUvAuthToken : E
authenticatorConfig	Used to configure various authenticator features through the use of its subcommands.	00 or error status	pinUvAuthParam	N/A	AES_ENC HMAC_GEN	User - FIDO PinUvAuthToken : E

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
PIV GET DATA	This service is used to read data object	9000 or error status	Command without input parameter	data object	None	User - PIV ECC verification Public Key: R - PIV RSA verification Public Key: R
PIV Verify PIN	This service is used to verify the PIN.	9000 or error status	PIN	N/A	KTS_SCP03_W RAP	User - KSend: E - KSmac: E - PIV User PIN: W,E
PIV Verify PUK	This service is used to verify the PUK.	9000 or error status	PUK	N/A	KTS_SCP03_W RAP	Admin - KSend: E - KSmac: E - PIV PUK PIN: W,E
GeneralAuth (Symmetric Key)	This service is used to external and mutual authenticate with PIV Symmetric Key	9000 or error status	Random data and cipher text	N/A	AES_ENC_AUT H AES_ENC	User - DRBG-EI: E - PIV Authentication Key: E
PIV Reset	Reset PIV card state and delete all stored information Zeroization	9000 or error status	Command without input parameter	N/A	SHA_CAL	CO - PIV User PIN: Z - PIV PUK PIN: Z - PIV Authentication Key: Z - PIV ECC Signature Private Key: Z - PIV ECC verification Public Key: Z - PIV RSA Signature Private Key: Z - PIV RSA verification Public Key: Z
Set Authentication Key	This service is used to change Authentication key (PIV Symmetric Key)	9000 or error status	Encrypted Authentication Key	N/A	AES_ENC AES_DEC KTS_SCP03_W RAP	Admin - PIV Authentication Key: W,E - Managing Key: E
Change PUK	This service is used to change PUK	9000 or error status	PUK	N/A	KTS_SCP03_W RAP	Admin - PIV PUK PIN: W,E - KSend: E - KSmac: E
Change PIN	This service is used to change PIN	9000 or error status	PIN and new PIN	N/A	KTS_SCP03_W RAP	User - PIV User PIN: W,E

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						- KSend: E - KSmac: E
Unblock PIN (Reset retry counter)	This service is used to reset retry counter and set new user PIN with known PUK	9000 or error status	New PIN and PUK	N/A	KTS_SCP03_W RAP	Admin - PIV User PIN: W,E - PIV PUK PIN: W,E - KSend: E - KSmac: E
Generate Asymmetric Key	This service is used to generate an asymmetric key	9000 or error status	Command with Key length	Asymmetric Public key	RSA_GEN_KEY_PAIR ECC_GEN_KEY_PAIR	Admin - DRBG V: G,Z - PIV ECC Signature Private Key: G - PIV ECC verification Public Key: G - PIV RSA Signature Private Key: G - PIV RSA verification Public Key: G - DRBG Key: G,Z - DRBG Seed: G,E - DRBG-EI: G,E
GeneralAuth (RSA/ECDSA)	This service is used to generate signature with asymmetric key	9000 or error status	message	Signature	RSA_SIG_GEN ECC_SIG_GEN	User - PIV ECC Signature Private Key: E - PIV RSA Signature Private Key: E
PIV Put Data	This service is used to write data (certificate, ID and etc)	9000 or error status	Data object	N/A	None	Admin
Personalization OTP	Add a new entry and initialize its seed key	9000 or error status	Seed key	N/A	KTS_SCP03_W RAP	User - OTP HMAC Seed Key: W - KSend: E - KSmac: E - DRBG V: E - OTP AccessCode: E - DRBG Key: E - DRBG Seed: G,E - DRBG-EI: G,E
Delete OTP	Remove an entry and its seed key.	9000 or error status	Command without input parameter	N/A	None	User - OTP AccessCode: E - OTP HMAC Seed Key: Z
List	List all the names of the entries.	9000 or error status	Command without input parameter	Slot info	None	User

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
Calculate OTP	Calculate the OTP value for an entry.	9000 or error status	Command without input parameter	6-digit OTP value or 8-digit OTP value	HMAC_GEN	User - OTP HMAC Seed Key: E - OTP AccessCode: E
OTP Reset	Reset the applet to manufactory default settings.	9000 or error status	Command without input parameter	N/A	None	CO - OTP HMAC Seed Key: Z
Verify AccessCode	Verify user AccessCode	9000 or error status	AccessCode	N/A	KTS_SCP03_W RAP	User - OTP AccessCode: E
Change AccessCode	Change user AccessCode	9000 or error status	AccessCode	N/A	KTS_SCP03_W RAP	User - OTP AccessCode: W,E
Emit OTP from slot	When the device is powered on and the user presses the button, the device outputs a 6-byte or 8-byte password	9000 or error status	press-button	6-digit OTP value or 8-digit OTP value	HMAC_GEN	User - OTP HMAC Seed Key: E
SELECT DATA	Select a current DO ,a following GET DATA or PUT DATA will access this current DO	9000 or error status	DO Data	N/A	None	Unauthenticated
VERIFY	Verify using user PGP User PIN(PW1) or administrator PGP Admin PIN(PW3)	9000 or error status	PGP User PIN(PW1) or PGP Admin PIN(PW3)	N/A	KTS_SCP03_W RAP	Admin - PGP Admin PIN(PW3): E User - PGP User PIN(PW1): E
OpenPGP CHANGE REFERENCE DATA	Change user PGP User PIN(PW1) or administrator PGP Admin PIN(PW3)	9000 or error status	Command with data info	N/A	KTS_SCP03_W RAP	Admin - PGP Admin PIN(PW3): W,E User - PGP User PIN(PW1): W,E
OpenPGP RESET RETRY COUNTER	Reset PGP User PIN(PW1) counter and set new PGP User PIN(PW1) using PGP Admin PIN(PW3) or	9000 or error status	PW1 or PW3/ Resetting Code	N/A	KTS_SCP03_W RAP	Admin - PGP Admin PIN(PW3): W,E - PGP User PIN(PW1): W User - PGP User PIN(PW1): W

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
	Resetting Code.					- PGP Resetting Code: W,E
GET DATA	Read protected or unprotected Data Object	9000 or error status	Command without input parameter	Data Object	None	User - PGP User PIN(PW1): E Unauthenticated
PUT DATA	Write data objects except user writable data objects.	9000 or error status	Data to be written	None	KTS_SCP03_W RAP	Admin - PGP Resetting Code: W - PGP Admin PIN(PW3): E
COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE	Perform signature primitive with signature Private Key	9000 or error status	message and kid	Signature	RSA_SIG_GEN	User - PGP Signature Private Key: E
OpenPGP GENERATE ASYMMETRIC KEY	Generate asymmetric key pair	9000 or error status	Command without input parameter	RSA public key	RSA_GEN_KEY_PAIR	Admin - DRBG V: G,E - PGP Admin PIN(PW3): E - PGP Signature Private Key: G - PGP Verification Public Key: G,R - DRBG Key: G,E - DRBG Seed: G,E - DRBG-EI: G,E
TERMINATE DF	This command is designed to renew a card in case of blocked passwords or other problems.	9000 or error status	Command without input parameter	N/A	None	Admin - PGP Admin PIN(PW3): E
ACTIVATE FILE	Initialize to the manufactory default settings. Zeroization	9000 or error status	Command without input parameter	N/A	None	Admin - PGP Admin PIN(PW3): Z - PGP User PIN(PW1): Z - PGP Resetting Code: Z - PGP Signature Private Key: Z - PGP Verification Public Key: Z
Get Error log	Get self-test result	9000 or error status	Command without input parameter	Self-test result	None	Admin - Device authenticate key: E
On-Demand Self-test	Initiate on-demand self-tests by	None	None	Pass or Fail		Admin Unauthenticated

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
	reboot or power cycle					

Table 12: Approved Services

4.4. Non-Approved Services

N/A for this module.

4.5. External Software/Firmware Loaded

NOTE: There is no External Software/Firmware Loaded.

5. Software/Firmware Security

5.1. Integrity Techniques

The Module is composed of the following firmware component(s):

Component 1: cryptographic binary

Component 2: non-modifiable operating system - binary

The firmware components are protected with the error detection code CRC-16. Calculate CRC-16 on code and constant data in flash, then compare the result with expected value, which is also part of pre-operational self-test.

5.2. Initiate on Demand

The operator can initiate integrity test on demand by restarting the module.

6. Operational Environment

6.1. Operational Environment Type and Requirements

The Module has a non-modifiable operational environment at Level 3 under the FIPS 140-3 definitions therefore per the FIPS 140-3 Management Manual Section 7.5 Partial validations and non-applicable areas this section is not applicable.

Type of Operational Environment: Non-Modifiable

7. Physical Security

The Module is made of a completely hardened, production-grade polycarbonate or metal. The colored polycarbonate or metal enclosure obscures a clear view of the hardware components within. A hard, non-malleable metal casing surrounds the USB connector. The casing is made of hard, production-grade, black, opaque plastic.

The coloring of the Module obscures any visible writing on the PCB. The visible critical components within the Module are further covered to meet FIPS 140-3 level 3 physical security requirements. The HSC32K2 with PAA microcontroller is covered with a black, opaque, tamper-resistant, epoxy encapsulated, thus completely covering all critical cryptographic components from plain view. The USB connector located outside of the casing (in the case of the USB Token-A3) of the USB token is made of a hard, black, opaque, production grade plastic and prevents access to the rest of the USB token. Any attempt at removal or penetration of the enclosure has a high probability of causing serious damage to the Module and the hardware components within the enclosure, which will reveal clear tamper evidence. Removal of the metal surrounding the USB connector will result in physical damage of the USB connector and its associated pins, rendering the entire cryptographic module useless. If the USB connector is exposed, there is no power going to the USB token. Once power is removed from the cryptographic module, all plaintext keys and unprotected SSPs in RAM are zeroized.

7.1. Mechanisms and Actions Required

The enclosure of the module is designed with anti-dismantle. After assembly, any attempt at tampering will leave visible damage on the enclosure. So, each time a user uses the module, you should first check the outer appearance of the module to make sure the module has not been tampered since last time use. In case user detects any tamper during inspection, user must stop using the module immediately and contact manufacturer.

Mechanism	Inspection Frequency	Inspection Guidance
Anti-dismantle enclosure	Each time using the module	Check the outer appearance of the module

Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required

7.2. EFP/EFT Information

Temp/Voltage Type	Temperature of Voltage	EFP or EFT	Result
LowTemperature	-29.6	EFP	shutdown
HighTemperature	+86.6	EFP	shutdown
LowVoltage	2.8V	EFP	shutdown
HighVoltage	5.5V	EFP	shutdown

Table 14: EFP/EFT Information

7.3. Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges

Temperature Type	Temperature
LowTemperature	-20C°
HighTemperature	+40C°

Table 15: Hardness Testing Temperatures

Notes: The module is hardness tested at the lowest and highest temperatures within the module's intended temperature range of operation.

8. Non-Invasive Security

8.1. Mitigation Techniques

The Module does not implement any mitigation method against non-invasive attack.

9. Sensitive Security Parameters Management

9.1. Storage Areas

Storage Area Name	Description	Persistence Type
CHIPRAM(S1)	Session Key stored in volatile memory in plaintext.	Dynamic
CHIPRAM(S2)	Session Key stored in volatile memory in encrypted.	Dynamic
CHIPNVM(S3)	CSP is encrypted with AES-128 and stored in FLASH	Static
CHIPNVM(S4)	CSP stored in flash in SHA2-256	Static
CHIPNVM(S5)	CSP stored in flash in plaintext	Static
CHIPNVM(S6)	PSP stored in flash in plaintext	Static

Table 16: Storage Areas

9.2. SSP Input/Output Methods

Name	From	To	Format Type	Distribution Type	Entry Type	SFI or Algorithm
Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1)	Application Software (outside)	CHIPNVM(S3)	Encrypted	Automated	Electronic	KTS_SCP03_WRAP
Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap AES-GCM (IO2)	Application Software (outside)	CHIPRAM(S2)	Encrypted	Automated	Electronic	KTS_AESGC M_WRAP
Output encapsulated by KTS-Wrap AES-GCM (IO3)	CHIPRAM(S2)	Application Software (outside)	Encrypted	Automated	Electronic	KTS_AESGC M_WRAP
Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap AES-CBC with HMAC (IO4)	Application Software (outside)	CHIPNVM(S4)	Encrypted	Automated	Electronic	KTS_CTAP_WRAP
Output encapsulated by KTS-Wrap AES-CBC with HMAC (IO5)	CHIPRAM(S2)	Application Software (outside)	Encrypted	Automated	Electronic	KTS_CTAP_WRAP
Input in plaintext (IO6)	Application Software (outside)	CHIPRAM(S1)	Plaintext	Automated	Electronic	
Output in plaintext (IO7)	CHIPRAM(S1)	Application Software (outside)	Plaintext	Automated	Electronic	
Output in plaintext (IO8)	CHIPNVM(S6)	Application Software (outside)	Plaintext	Automated	Electronic	

Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods

9.3. SSP Zeroization

Zeroization Method	Description	Rationale	Operator Initiation
Z1	Zeroized by Terminate token command	All SSP are cleared, completed by explicit indication of 9000 Status	CO
Z2	Overwritten with all 0 after power cycle	Power on and implicit clear, completed by implicit indication of LED on.	Unauth
Z3	Zeroized by 2003 delete MF	Received command to actively clear SSPs, completed by explicit indication of 9000 Status	CO
Z4	"TERMINATE DF" followed by "ACTIVATE FILE"	Received command to actively clear SSPs, completed by explicit indication of 9000 Status	CO

Zeroization Method	Description	Rationale	Operator Initiation
Z5	Zeroized by FIDO Reset	Received command to actively clear SSPs, completed by explicit indication of 00 Status	CO
Z6	Zeroized by PIV Reset	Received command to actively clear SSPs, completed by explicit indication of 9000 Status	CO
Z7	Select functional unit	Received command to actively clear SSPs, completed by explicit indication of 9000 Status	Unauth
Z8	Zeroized by OTP Reset	Received command to actively clear SSPs, completed by explicit indication of 9000 Status	CO

Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods

9.4. SSPs

All usage of these SSPs by the Module are described in the services detailed in Section 4.3.

Name	Description	Size – Strength	Type – Category	Generate By	Established By	Used By
DRBG-EI	384-bit entropy and 256-bit nonce input collected from the ESV, used to derive the DRBG seed	640 - 128	entropy source and nonce - CSP	ENT_GEN		DRBG_GEN
DRBG Seed	640-bit DRBG Seed from DRBG-EI	640 - 128	entropy source and nonce - CSP	ENT_GEN		DRBG_GEN
DRBG V	Internal CTR_DRBG state value is used for SP800-90A CTR_DRBG (Consists of 128 bits)	128 - 128	state value - CSP	DRBG_GEN		DRBG_GEN
DRBG Key	Internal CTR_DRBG state value is used for SP800-90A CTR_DRBG (Consists of 128 bits)	128 - 128	key value - CSP	DRBG_GEN		DRBG_GEN
Managing Key	128-bit AES key, used to encrypt SSPs and keys	128 - 128	Symmetric Key - CSP	AES_KEY_GEN		AES_ENC AES_DEC
Device authenticate key	128-bit AES key used for CO role to reach a safe state	128 - 128	Authentication - CSP	input during manufacturing		AES_DEC
INIT_KEYenc	AES 128-bit key, used to derive KEnc and KMac which is then used to encrypt/decrypt data over a secure session between an authorized external entity and the Module.	128 - 128	Symmetric Key - CSP	input during manufacturing		SESSIONKEY_GEN
INIT_KEYmac	AES CMAC 128-bit key, used to derive	128 - 128	Symmetric Key - CSP	input during		SESSIONKEY_GEN

Name	Description	Size – Strength	Type – Category	Generate By	Established By	Used By
	a KSec, KSmac which is then used to authenticate an operator or data over a secure session between an authorized external entity and the Module.			manufacturing		
KSec	AES 128-bit key used to encrypt/decrypt data over a secure session	128 - 128	session Key - CSP	SESSIONKEY_GEN		KTS_SCP03_WRAP
KSmac	AES CMAC 128-bit key used to authenticate data over a secure session	128 - 128	session Key - CSP	SESSIONKEY_GEN		KTS_SCP03_WRAP
AES-GCM Key	128-bit AES-GCM key used to encrypt the key handle or credentialID	128 - 128	Symmetric Key - CSP	AES_KEY_GEN		AES_ENC_ATH AES_DEC_ATH
AES-GCM IV	96-bit AES-GCM IV used to encrypt the key handle or credentialID	96 - N/A	Random IV - CSP	DRBG_GEN		AES_ENC_ATH AES_DEC_ATH
FIDO Device ECDSA Private Key	256-bit ECC private key used to generate signature for registration.	256 - 128	Asymmetric Private Key - CSP	input during manufacturing		ECC_SIG_GEN
FIDO Device ECDSA Public Key	256-bit ECC FIDO public key, it is returned to the server via the certificate to verify the signature generated after registration	256 - 128	Asymmetric Public Key - PSP	input during manufacturing		ECC_SIG_VER
FIDO User ECDSA Private Key	256-bit ECC private key used to Attestation signature	256 - 128	Asymmetric Private Key - CSP	ECC_GEN_KEY_PAIR		ECC_SIG_GEN
FIDO User ECDSA Public Key	256-bit ECC FIDO public key, it is transmitted to the server for verifying signature generated after authentication	256 - 128	Asymmetric public Key - PSP	ECC_GEN_KEY_PAIR		ECC_SIG_VER
FIDO Agreement ECC Private Key	256-bit ECC private key used to perform key agreement with external public ECC key to get shared Secret	256 - 128	Asymmetric Private Key - CSP	ECC_GEN_KEY_PAIR		SHAREDSEC RETKEY_GEN_KAS
FIDO Agreement ECC Public Key	256-bit ECC public key used to perform key agreement, the Module returns it to external to get sharedSecret	256 - 128	Asymmetric public Key - PSP	ECC_GEN_KEY_PAIR		SHAREDSEC RETKEY_GEN_KAS
FIDO Agreement sharedSecret	256-bit key Used to derived FIDO SharedSecret AES Key and FIDO	256 - 128	Shared Secret - CSP	SHAREDSECRETKEY_GEN_KAS		KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3 (A4980)

Name	Description	Size – Strength	Type – Category	Generate By	Established By	Used By
	SharedSecret HMAC Key by HKDF					
FIDO SharedSecret AES Key	256-bit AES CBC key used for encryption calculation of pin related operations	256 - 128	Symmetric Key - CSP		SHAREDSE CRETKEY Y_GEN_K AS	SHAREDSEC RETKEY_GE N_KAS
FIDO SharedSecret HMAC Key	256-bit AES CBC key used for HMAC SHA-256 calculation of pin related operations	256 - 128	Symmetric Key - CSP		SHAREDSE CRETKEY Y_GEN_K AS	SHAREDSEC RETKEY_GE N_KAS
FIDO PinUvAuthToken	256-bit HMAC SHA-256 Key used to authorize operator after PIN authentication	256 - 128	Authentica tion - CSP	DRBG_GEN		HMAC_GEN
FIDO PIN	Authenticate the User, 4 to 63-byte PIN value	32-248 - N/A	Authentica tion - CSP			KTS_CTAP_ WRAP
PIV Authentication Key	128-bit AES ECB key, used for authentication of PIV CO	128 - 128	Authentica tion - CSP			AES_ENC_A UTH
PIV ECC Signature Private Key	256 bit ECC private key, used for signature operations	256 - 128	Asymmetri c Private Key - CSP	ECC_GEN_ KEY_PAIR		ECC_SIG_GE N
PIV ECC verification Public Key	256-bit ECC public key, used for client verification operations	256 - 128	Asymmetri c public Key - PSP	ECC_GEN_ KEY_PAIR		
PIV RSA Signature Private Key	2048 -bit RSA private key, used for signature operations	2048 - 112	Asymmetri c Private Key - CSP	RSA_GEN_ KEY_PAIR		RSA_SIG_G EN
PIV RSA verification Public Key	2048 -bit RSA public key, used for client verification operations	2048 - 112	Asymmetri c public Key - PSP	RSA_GEN_ KEY_PAIR		
PIV User PIN	8-byte pin, used for authenticating the PIV user for Asymmetric services	64 - N/A	Authentica tion - CSP			KTS_SCP03_ WRAP
PIV PUK PIN	8-byte pin, used for unblocking the PIV admin pin	64 - N/A	Authentica tion - CSP			KTS_SCP03_ WRAP
2003 Internal Auth Key	AES 128,192,256-bit, used to authenticate the Module to an external entity	128-256 - 128-256	Authentica tion - CSP			AES_ENC
2003 External Auth Key	AES 128, 192, 256-bit, used to modify the security state of the currently selected DF.	128-256 - 128-256	Authentica tion - CSP			AES_DEC
2003 PIN	8 to 16-byte secret used to modify the security state of the currently selected DF.	64-128 - N/A	Authentica tion - CSP			
2003 PSO calculation key	AES 128, 192, 256-bit, Used to encryption, decryption,	128-256 - 128-256	Symmetric Key - CSP			AES_ENC AES_DEC

Name	Description	Size – Strength	Type – Category	Generate By	Established By	Used By
	checksum calculation, and checksum verification in Unit 2003					
2003 Unblock PIN	8 to 16-byte secret used to unblock the 2003 pin the currently selected DF.	64-128 - N/A	Authenticat tion - CSP			AES_ENC
2003 RSA Private Key	2048, 3072, 4096-bit RSA private key is used to sign data	2048,3072,4096 - 112-152	Asymmetri c Private Key - CSP	RSA_GEN_ KEY_PAIR		RSA_SIG_G EN
2003 RSA Public Key	2048, 3072, 4096-bit RSA public key used to verify data	2048,3072,4096 - 112-152	Asymmetri c public Key - PSP	RSA_GEN_ KEY_PAIR		RSA_SIG_VE R
2003 ECDSA Private Key	256, 384, 521-bit ECDSA private key used to sign data.	256,384,521 - 128-256	Asymmetri c Private Key - CSP	ECC_GEN_ KEY_PAIR		ECC_SIG_GE N
2003 ECDSA Public Key	256, 384, 521-bit ECDSA public key used to verify data.	256,384,521 - 128-256	Asymmetri c public Key - PSP	ECC_GEN_ KEY_PAIR		ECC_SIG_VE R
OTP HMAC Seed Key	16 to 64-byte HMAC SHA-1, HMAC SHA-256 key, - used to calculate OTP values for the User	128-512 - 128	Authenticat tion - CSP			HMAC_GEN
OTP AccessCode	8-byte pin, used for authenticating the OTP user	64 - N/A	Authenticat tion - CSP			HMAC_GEN KTS_SCP03_ WRAP
PGP Admin PIN(PW3)	8 to 127-byte, used for authentication of the OpenPGP CO.	64-1024 - N/A	Authenticat tion - CSP			KTS_SCP03_ WRAP
PGP User PIN(PW1)	8 to 127-byte, used for authenticating the OpenPGP user for Asymmetric services.	64-1024 - N/A	Authenticat tion - CSP			KTS_SCP03_ WRAP
PGP Resetting Code	8 to 127-byte. Used for resetting the User PIN	64-1024 - N/A	Authenticat tion - CSP			KTS_SCP03_ WRAP
PGP Signature Private Key	2048, 3072, 4096 bit RSA private key, used for PKCS#1 v1.5 signing operation	2048,3072,4096 - 112-152	Asymmetri c Private Key - CSP	RSA_GEN_ KEY_PAIR		RSA_SIG_G EN
PGP Verification Public Key	2048, 3072, 4096 bit RSA public key, used for verification specified in PKCS#1 v1.5	2048,3072,4096 - 112-152	Asymmetri c public Key - PSP	RSA_GEN_ KEY_PAIR		
External Agreement ECC Public Key	256-bit ECC Public key used to perform key agreement with FIDO Agreement ECC Private Key to get sharedSecret	256 - 128	Asymmetri c public Key - PSP			SHAREDSEC RETKEY_GE N_KAS

Table 19:SSP Table 1

Name	Input-Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
DRBG-EI		CHIPRAM(S1):Plaintext	after usage is complete	Z2	

Name	Input-Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
DRBG Seed		CHIPRAM(S1):Plaintext	after usage is complete	Z2	
DRBG V		CHIPRAM(S1):Plaintext	after usage is complete	Z2	DRBG-EI:Derived From
DRBG Key		CHIPRAM(S1):Plaintext	after usage is complete	Z2	DRBG-EI:Derived From
Managing Key		CHIPNVM(S5):Plaintext		Z1	Device authenticate key:Encrypts INIT_KEYenc:Encrypts INIT_KEYmac:Encrypts FIDO Device ECDSA Private Key:Encrypts FIDO User ECDSA Private Key:Encrypts PIV Authentication Key:Encrypts PIV ECC Signature Private Key:Encrypts PIV RSA Signature Private Key:Encrypts 2003 Internal Auth Key:Encrypts 2003 External Auth Key:Encrypts 2003 PSO calculation key:Encrypts 2003 RSA Private Key:Encrypts 2003 ECDSA Private Key:Encrypts OTP HMAC Seed Key:Encrypts PGP Resetting Code:Encrypts PGP Signature Private Key:Encrypts
Device authenticate key		CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted		Z1	Managing Key:Encrypted by KSenc:Derives
INIT_KEYenc		CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted		Z1	Managing Key:Encrypted by KSenc:Derives
INIT_KEYmac		CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted		Z1	Managing Key:Encrypted by KSenc:Derives
KSenc		CHIPRAM(S1):Plaintext	after usage is completed	Z7	INIT_KEYenc:Derived From
KSmac		CHIPRAM(S1):Plaintext	after usage is completed	Z7	INIT_KEYmac:Derived From
AES-GCM Key		CHIPNVM(S5):Plaintext		Z5	FIDO User ECDSA Private Key:Wraps
AES-GCM IV		CHIPNVM(S5):Plaintext		Z5	FIDO User ECDSA Private Key:Wraps
FIDO Device ECDSA Private Key		CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted		Z1	FIDO Device ECDSA Public Key:Paired With Managing Key:Encrypted by AES-GCM Key:Wrapped by
FIDO Device ECDSA Public Key	Output in plaintext (IO8)	CHIPNVM(S6):Plaintext		Z1	FIDO Device ECDSA Private Key:Paired With
FIDO User ECDSA Private Key	Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap AES-GCM (IO2)	CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted		Z5	FIDO User ECDSA Public Key:Paired With Managing Key:Encrypted by AES-GCM Key:Wrapped

Name	Input-Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
	Output encapsulated by KTS-Wrap AES-GCM (IO3)				by AES-GCM IV: Wrapped by
FIDO User ECDSA Public Key	Output in plaintext (IO7)	CHIPNVM(S6): Plaintext		Z5	FIDO User ECDSA Private Key: Paired With
FIDO Agreement ECC Private Key		CHIPRAM(S1): Plaintext		Z2	FIDO Agreement ECC Public Key: Paired With FIDO Agreement sharedSecret: Derives
FIDO Agreement ECC Public Key	Output in plaintext (IO7)	CHIPRAM(S1): Plaintext		Z2	FIDO Agreement ECC Private Key: Paired With
FIDO Agreement sharedSecret		CHIPRAM(S1): Plaintext	after their usage is completed	Z2	FIDO Agreement ECC Private Key: Derived From External Agreement ECC Public Key: Derived From FIDO SharedSecret AES Key: Derives FIDO SharedSecret HMAC Key: Derives
FIDO SharedSecret AES Key		CHIPRAM(S1): Plaintext		Z5	FIDO Agreement sharedSecret: Derived From
FIDO SharedSecret HMAC Key		CHIPRAM(S1): Plaintext		Z5	FIDO Agreement sharedSecret: Derived From
FIDO PinUvAuthToken	Output encapsulated by KTS-Wrap AES-CBC with HMAC (IO5)	CHIPRAM(S1): Plaintext	after their usage is completed	Z5	FIDO SharedSecret AES Key: Wrapped by FIDO SharedSecret HMAC Key: Wrapped by
FIDO PIN	Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap AES-CBC with HMAC (IO4)	CHIPNVM(S4): Encrypted		Z5	
PIV Authentication Key	Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03 (IO1)	CHIPNVM(S3): Encrypted		Z6	Managing Key: Encrypted by KSenc: Unwrapped by KSmac: Unwrapped by
PIV ECC Signature Private Key		CHIPNVM(S3): Encrypted		Z6	PIV ECC verification Public Key: Paired With Managing Key: Encrypted by
PIV ECC verification Public Key	Output in plaintext (IO8)	CHIPNVM(S6): Plaintext		Z6	PIV ECC Signature Private Key: Paired With
PIV RSA Signature Private Key		CHIPNVM(S3): Encrypted		Z6	PIV RSA verification Public Key: Paired With Managing Key: Encrypted by
PIV RSA verification Public Key	Output in plaintext (IO8)	CHIPNVM(S6): Plaintext		Z6	PIV RSA Signature Private Key: Paired With
PIV User PIN	Input encapsulated by KTS-	CHIPNVM(S4): Encrypted		Z6	KSenc: Unwrapped by KSmac: Unwrapped by

Name	Input-Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
	Wrap SCP03(IO1)				
PIV PUK PIN	Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1)	CHIPNVM(S4):Encrypted		Z6	KSenc:Unwrapped by KSmac:Unwrapped by
2003 Internal Auth Key	Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1)	CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted		Z3	Managing Key:Encrypted by KSenc:Unwrapped by KSmac:Unwrapped by
2003 External Auth Key	Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1)	CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted		Z3	Managing Key:Encrypted by KSenc:Unwrapped by KSmac:Unwrapped by
2003 PIN	Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1)	CHIPNVM(S4):Encrypted		Z3	
2003 PSO calculation key	Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1)	CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted		Z3	Managing Key:Encrypted by KSenc:Unwrapped by KSmac:Unwrapped by
2003 Unblock PIN	Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1)	CHIPNVM(S4):Encrypted		Z3	Managing Key:Encrypted by KSenc:Unwrapped by KSmac:Unwrapped by
2003 RSA Private Key		CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted		Z3	2003 RSA Public Key:Paired With Managing Key:Encrypted by
2003 RSA Public Key	Output in plaintext (IO8)	CHIPNVM(S6):Plaintext		Z3	2003 RSA Private Key:Paired With
2003 ECDSA Private Key		CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted		Z3	Managing Key:Encrypted by 2003 ECDSA Public Key:Paired With
2003 ECDSA Public Key	Output in plaintext (IO8)	CHIPNVM(S6):Plaintext		Z3	2003 ECDSA Private Key:Paired With
OTP HMAC Seed Key	Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1)	CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted		Z1	Managing Key:Encrypted by KSenc:Unwrapped by KSmac:Unwrapped by
OTP AccessCode	Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1)	CHIPNVM(S4):Encrypted		Z8	KSenc:Unwrapped by KSmac:Unwrapped by
PGP Admin PIN(PW3)	Input encapsulated	CHIPNVM(S4):Encrypted		Z4	KSenc:Unwrapped by KSmac:Unwrapped by

Name	Input-Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
	ed by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1)				
PGP User PIN(PW1)	Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1)	CHIPNVM(S4):Encrypted		Z4	KSenc:Unwrapped by KSmac:Unwrapped by
PGP Resetting Code	Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1)	CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted		Z4	KSenc:Unwrapped by KSmac:Unwrapped by
PGP Signature Private Key		CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted		Z4	Managing Key:Encrypted by PGP Verification Public Key:Paired With
PGP Verification Public Key	Output in plaintext (IO8)	CHIPNVM(S6):Plaintext		Z4	PGP Signature Private Key:Paired With
External Agreement ECC Public Key	Input in plaintext (IO6)	CHIPRAM(S1):Plaintext		Z2	FIDO Agreement ECC Private Key:Used With FIDO Agreement sharedSecret:Derives

Table 20:SSP Table 2

9.5. Transitions

The SHA-1 algorithm as implemented by the module will be non-approved for all purposes, starting January 1, 2031.

10. Self-Tests

The Module performs self-tests to ensure the proper operation of the Module. Per FIPS 140-3 these are categorized as either pre-operational self-tests or conditional self-tests.

10.1. Pre-Operational Self-Tests

The Module performs the following pre-operational self-tests in table below

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details
FIPS_CRC16_FIT	CRC-16	KAT	SW/FW Integrity	9000 or 6F90	Executed on the whole firmware stored in EEPROM before the Module transition to the idle state.

Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests

10.2. Conditional Self-Tests

The Module performs the following conditional self-tests in the table below

Algorithms or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
AES Encrypt	AES-128-bit - ECB	KAT	CAST	9000(meaning Successful) or 6F90(meaning fail)	AES decryption	Bootup
AES Decrypt	AES-128-bit - ECB	KAT	CAST	9000(meaning Successful) or 6F90(meaning fail)	AES decryption	Bootup
AES-CMAC	AES-128-bit CMAC	KAT	CAST	9000(meaning Successful) or 6F90(meaning fail)	Message Authentication	Bootup
AES-GCM Encrypt	AES-128-bit GCM	KAT	CAST	9000(meaning Successful) or 6F90(meaning fail)	Authenticated encryption	Bootup
AES-GCM Decrypt	AES-128-bit GCM	KAT	CAST	9000(meaning Successful) or 6F90(meaning fail)	Authenticated decryption	Bootup
Counter DRBG	AES-128-bit-ECB	KAT	CAST	9000(meaning Successful) or 6F90(meaning fail)	AES-128 CTR_DRBG instantiation, generate, and reseed KATs performed before the first random data generation	Bootup
KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3	ECDH: P-256 HKDF: Using HMAC-Two step	KAT	CAST	9000(meaning Successful) or 6F90(meaning fail)	KAS-SSC Shared Secret generation with P-256 per IG D.F.	Bootup

Algorithms or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	ECDSA Key Generation	PCT	PCT	9000(meaning Successful) or 6F90(meaning fail)	Signature and Verification Per IG C.A	Generate ECDSA key pairs
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	ECDSA Signature Generation	KAT	CAST	9000(meaning Successful) or 6F90(meaning fail)	ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256 Signature Generation	Bootup
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	ECDSA Signature Verification	KAT	CAST	9000(meaning Successful) or 6F90(meaning fail)	ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256 Signature Verification	Bootup
HMAC-SHA2-256	using HMAC-SHA256	KAT	CAST	9000(meaning Successful) or 6F90(meaning fail)	HMAC-SHA-256 KAT	Bootup
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	2048-bit 3072-bit 4096-bit RSA Key Generation Pairwise Consistency Test	PCT	PCT	9000(meaning Successful) or 6F90(meaning fail)	Signature and Verification per IG C.E.	Generate RSA key pairs
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	2048-bit RSA Signature Verification	KAT	CAST	9000 or 6F90	2048-bit RSA PKCSv1.5 with SHA-256 Signature Verification	Bootup
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	2048-bit RSA Signature Generation	KAT	CAST	9000 or 6F90	2048-bit RSA PKCSv1.5 with SHA-256 Signature Generation	Bootup
SHA-1	SHA-1	KAT	CAST	9000(meaning Successful) or 6F90(meaning fail)	SHA-1	Bootup
SHA2-256	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	9000(meaning Successful) or 6F90(meaning fail)	SHA2-256	Bootup
SHA2-384	SHA2-384	KAT	CAST	9000(meaning Successful) or 6F90(meaning fail)	SHA2-384	Bootup
SHA2-512	SHA2-512	KAT	CAST	9000(meaning Successful) or 6F90(meaning fail)	SHA2-512	Bootup

Algorithms or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
				aning fail)		
KDF SP800-108	Using AES128 CMAC	KAT	CAST	9000(me aning Successfu l) or 6F90(me aning fail)	AES128 CMAC KAT	Bootup
Entropy 90B Start-up Repetition Count Test (RCT)	Repetition Count Test	RCT	CAST	Success or Failure Code	As specified in [90B] RCT startup health tests	At boot up
Entropy 90B Start-up Adaptive Proportion Test (APT)	Adaptive Proportion Test	APT	CAST	Success or Failure Code	As specified in [90B] APT startup health tests	At boot up
Entropy 90B Continuous Repetition Count Test (RCT)	Repetition Count Test	RCT	CAST	Success or Failure Code	As specified in [90B] RCT continuous health tests	Continuous when entropy is requested
Entropy 90B Continuous Adaptive Proportion Test (APT)	Adaptive Proportion Test	APT	CAST	Success or Failure Code	As specified in [90B] APT continuous health tests	Continuous when entropy is requested

Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests

10.3. Periodic Self-Test Information

Algorithm and Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
FIPS_CRC16_FIT	KAT	SW/FW Integrity	every 1000 services are processed or power on	performed by the Module programmatically

Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information

Algorithm and Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
AES Encrypt	KAT	CAST	every 1000 services are processed or power on	Automatic
AES Decrypt	KAT	CAST	every 1000 services are processed and power on	Automatic
AES-CMAC	KAT	CAST	every 1000 services are processed or power on	Automatic
AES-GCM Encrypt	KAT	CAST	every 1000 services are processed or power on	Automatic
AES-GCM Decrypt	KAT	CAST	every 1000 services are processed or power on	Automatic
Counter DRBG	KAT	CAST	every 1000 services are processed or power on	Automatic
KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3	KAT	CAST	every 1000 services are processed or power on	Automatic

Algorithm and Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	PCT	PCT	Everytime a key pair is generated	Automatic
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	KAT	CAST	every 1000 services are processed or power on	Automatic
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	KAT	CAST	every 1000 services are processed or power on	Automatic
HMAC-SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	every 1000 services are processed or power on	Automatic
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	PCT	PCT	Everytime a key pair is generated	Automatic
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	KAT	CAST	every 1000 services are processed or power on	Automatic
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	KAT	CAST	every 1000 services are processed or power on	Automatic
SHA-1	KAT	CAST	every 1000 services are processed or power on	Automatic
SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	every 1000 services are processed or power on	Automatic
SHA2-384	KAT	CAST	every 1000 services are processed or power on	Automatic
SHA2-512	KAT	CAST	every 1000 services are processed or power on	Automatic
KDF SP800-108	KAT	CAST	every 1000 services are processed and power on	Automatic
Entropy 90B Start-up Repetition Count Test (RCT)	RCT	CAST	On Demand	Device Reset
Entropy 90B Start-up Adaptive Proportion Test (APT)	APT	CAST	On Demand	Device Reset
Entropy 90B Continuous Repetition Count Test (RCT)	RCT	CAST	N/A	N/A
Entropy 90B Continuous Adaptive Proportion Test (APT)	APT	CAST	N/A	N/A

Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information

The condition of initiating Periodic Self-Test is to execute every 1000 services. Once every 1000 services being executed, the periodic self-test function will call Pre-Operational Self-Tests and Conditional Self-Tests. Self-test failures are indicated to the user through LED status and service return status.

10.4. Error States

Name	Description	Conditions	Recovery Method	Indicator
ES1	The Module fails at CRC16 FIT, ENT RCT and APT, CTR DRBG KAT, ECDSA KAT, RSA KAT, AES ECB KAT, AES CMAC KAT, AES GCM KAT, HMAC KAT, KBKDF KAT, KAS-ECC KAT, SHS KAT, RSA Generate key pair PCT, ECC Generate key pair PCT	The Module enters Critical error state.	Reboot/Power cycle the module	6F90 and blinking LED

Table 25: Error States

10.5. Operator Initiation of Self-Tests

All self-tests, except for the continuous health tests, can be invoked on demand by restarting the module.

11. Life-Cycle Assurance

11.1. Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures

Installation and Initialization:

The following steps must be performed in order to securely install, initialize, and start up the Trusted Key Token cryptographic module in the FIPS 140-3 Approved mode of operation.

The steps for the CO to enter the module and change the default password gain authorized access to the module.

The module is setup at manufacturing and delivered to the CO in approved mode.

Delivery:

The following steps must be performed in order to securely deliver the Trusted Key Token cryptographic module to the authorized operator:

1. Set the required keys in a secure factory environment
2. Complete packaging and user manual
3. Shipping the modules to the final customer. For each shipment, our factory will use the courier agreed with customer, such as FedEx or DHL. Our factory will inform customer in advance with the shipment info by email. When the goods arriving in customer site, the customer will first check the goods according to the shipment info they received, and sign for acceptance.
4. The final customer checks the module information according to administrator manual.

11.2. Administrator Guidance

Refer to Mobile-ID™ Trusted Key Token Administrator Guidance.docx, which will be provided to the issuer through secure communications.

11.3. Non-Administrator Guidance

Refer to Mobile-ID™ Trusted Key Token Non-Administrator Guidance.docx, which will be provided to the issuer through secure communications.

11.4. Design and Rules

Rules of Operation:

1. The Module provides two distinct operator roles: User and Cryptographic Officer.
2. The Module provides identity-based authentication.
3. The Module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
4. An operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role.
5. The Module allows the operator to initiate power-up self-tests by power cycling power or resetting the Module.
6. All self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
8. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the Module.
9. There are no restrictions on which keys or SSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
10. The Module does not support concurrent operators.

11. The Module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
12. The Module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
13. The Module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs.
14. The Module does not store any plaintext CSPs.
15. The Module does not output intermediate key values.
16. The Module does not provide bypass services or ports/interfaces.

11.5. Maintenance Requirements

The module does not require any maintenance requirements

11.6. End of Life

Administrator SHALL invoke Terminate token service after authentication to switch device into the terminated state as a result, all CSPs are cleared, and all services are not available anymore. The device shall be destroyed.

12. Mitigation of Other Attacks

The Module does not implement any mitigation method against other attacks.

13. References and Definitions

The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.

Abbreviation	Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-3]	Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, March 22, 2019
[ISO19790]	International Standard, ISO/IEC 19790, Information technology — Security techniques — Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Third edition, March 2017
[ISO24759]	International Standard, ISO/IEC 24759, Information technology — Security techniques — Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Second and Corrected version, 15 December 2015
[IG]	Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program, October 23, 2024
[108r1]	NIST Special Publication 800-108, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions (Revised), August 2022 INCLUDES UPDATES AS OF 02-02-2024
[133]	NIST Special Publication 800-133, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation, Revision 2, June 2020
[135]	National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions, Special Publication 800-135rev1, December 2011.
[186]	National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-5, February 3, 2023.
[197]	National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, May 9, 2023
[198-1]	National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198-1, July, 2008
[180]	National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015
[38A]	National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December 2001
[38B]	National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, Special Publication 800-38B, May 2005
[38D]	National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800-38D, November 2007
[56Ar3]	NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, April 2018
[56Br2]	NIST Special Publication 800-56B Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Finite Field Cryptography, March 2019
[56Cr2]	NIST Special Publication 800-56C Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, August 2020
[90A]	National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A, Revision 1, June 2015.
[90B]	National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation, Special Publication 800-90B, January 2018.

Table 26: References

Acronym	Definition
APT	Adaptative Proportion Test
KAT	Know Answer Test
RCT	Repetition Count Test
SSP	Sensitive Security Parameter
PCT	Pairwise Consistency Test
KDF	Key Derivation Function
KTS	Key Transport Scheme
KAS	Key Agreement Scheme
VCC	Voltage (at the) Common Collector
PIN	Personal Identification Number
PGP User PIN (PW1)	user-password
PGP Admin PIN (PW3)	admin-password
CO	Crypto Officer
PUK	PIN Unblocking Key

Table 27: Acronyms and Definitions