TippingPoint IPS Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE
FIPS 140‐2 NON‐PROPRIETARY SECURITY
POLICY
TippingPoint Intrusion Prevention System
Hardware Version: S6100N
Firmware Version: 3.8.0
Document Version: 1.4
Revision Date: 12/2/2015
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FIPS 140‐2 Non‐Proprietary Security Policy
TippingPoint Intrusion Prevention System
Contents
1. Introduction................................................................................................................. 4
1.1. Purpose................................................................................................................ 4
1.2 References........................................................................................................... 4
1.3 Definitions and Acronyms.................................................................................. 4
2. Module Specifications ................................................................................................ 6
2.1 Overview............................................................................................................. 6
2.2 Security Level..................................................................................................... 6
2.3 Physical Characteristics ...................................................................................... 7
2.4 Cryptographic Boundary..................................................................................... 8
2.5 Excluded Components ........................................................................................ 8
2.6 Ports and Interfaces............................................................................................. 9
2.7 Modes of Operation .......................................................................................... 10
3. Roles, Services, and Authentication ......................................................................... 11
3.1. Authentication Mechanisms and Strength ........................................................ 11
3.2. Roles ................................................................................................................. 13
3.3. Module Services................................................................................................ 14
3.4. Unauthenticated Services.................................................................................. 17
3.5 Non-FIPS Mode Services ................................................................................. 18
4. Secure Operation and Security Rules ....................................................................... 19
4.1. Secure Operation............................................................................................... 19
4.2. Security Rules................................................................................................... 20
4.3. Crypto-Officer Guidance .................................................................................. 22
4.4. User Guidance................................................................................................... 24
4.5. Physical Security Rules..................................................................................... 24
5. Security Relevant Data Items and Access Control ................................................... 25
5.1. Cryptographic Algorithms ................................................................................ 25
5.2. Cryptographic Keys, CSPs, and SRDIs............................................................ 26
5.3. Access Control Policy....................................................................................... 30
6. Mitigation of Other Attacks...................................................................................... 31
List of Figures
Figure 1: TippingPoint IPS Deployment in a Network ...................................................... 6
List of Tables
Table 1: Definitions and Acronyms.................................................................................... 4
Table 2: Module Security Level Specification ................................................................... 6
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Table 3: S6100N Model Configuration .............................................................................. 8
Table 4: FIPS 140-2 Interfaces and the Corresponding Module’s Physical Ports.............. 9
Table 5: Roles and Descriptions ....................................................................................... 13
Table 6: Module Services ................................................................................................. 14
Table 7: Unauthenticated Services.................................................................................... 17
Table 8: FIPS Mode Cryptographic Algorithms............................................................... 25
Table 9: Non-FIPS Mode Cryptographic Algorithms ...................................................... 26
Table 10: SRDI Information............................................................................................. 26
Table 11: Access Control Policy....................................................................................... 30
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1. Introduction
This document is a non‐proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the
TippingPoint Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) model S6100N. This model should be
operated with the 3.8.0 firmware version for compliance with the security policy
described herein. Using other versions of firmware will remove the module from the
FIPS approved mode of operation.
This Security Policy may freely be reproduced and distributed in its entirety (without
modification).
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140‐2, Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules, specifies the U.S. and Canadian Governments’ requirements for
cryptographic modules. The following pages describe how TippingPoint IPS meets these
requirements and how to use the IPS in a mode of operation compliant with FIPS 140‐2.
This policy was prepared as part of the Overall Level 1 FIPS 140‐2 validation of the
TippingPoint Intrusion Prevention System.
More information about FIPS 140‐2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program
(CMVP) is available at the website of the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST): http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.
In this document, the TippingPoint Intrusion Prevention System is referred to as the IPS,
the module, or the device.
1.1. Purpose
This document covers the secure operation of the TippingPoint IPS appliances including
the initialization, roles, and responsibilities of operating the product in a secure, FIPS‐
compliant manner.
1.2 References
This Security Policy deals specifically with the operation and implementation of the
module in the technical terms of the FIPS 140‐2 standard. Additional information on the
module can be found on the TippingPoint website.
1.3 Definitions and Acronyms
This Security Policy uses the following definitions and acronyms.
Table 1: Definitions and Acronyms
Term/Acronym Description
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CF Compact Flash
CLI Command Line Interface
CSP Critical Security Parameter
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DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie Hellman
DRNG Deterministic Random Number Generator
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GbE Gigabit Ethernet
GUI Graphical User Interface
HMAC Hash‐based Message Authentication Code
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IPS Intrusion Prevention System
LCD Liquid Crystal Display
LSM Local Security Manager
MD5 Message Digest 5
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA
Public Key encryption developed by RSA Data Security,
Inc. (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman)
SFP Small Form‐Factor Pluggable
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMS Security Management System
SRDI Security Relevant Data Item
SSH Secure Shell
Triple‐DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TLS Transport Layer Security
TP TippingPoint
XFP 10 Gigabit Small Form Factor Pluggable
ZPHA
Zero Power High Availability. ZPHA is a mechanism
which allows IPS network traffic intended for the
module’s monitoring ports to continue to flow when it
loses power.
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2. Module Specifications
2.1 Overview
The TippingPoint IPS operates in‐line in the network, blocking malicious and unwanted
traffic, while allowing good traffic to pass unimpeded. In fact, the module optimizes the
performance of good traffic by continually cleansing the network and prioritizing
applications that are mission critical.
Figure 1: TippingPoint IPS Deployment in a Network
The TippingPoint IPS is deployed seamlessly into the network and immediately begins
filtering out malicious and unwanted traffic. Its switch‐like performance characteristics
allow it to be placed in‐line at the perimeter, on internal network segments, at the core,
and at remote site locations. These powerful enforcement points can be centrally
controlled to institute and enforce business‐wide security policies, allowing the
TippingPoint IPS to see all network traffic and protect against external as well as internal
attacks.
TippingPoint solutions decrease IT security cost by eliminating ad‐hoc patching and alert
response, while simultaneously increasing IT productivity and profitability through
bandwidth savings and protection of critical applications.
2.2 Security Level
When operated in the FIPS approved mode of operation (denoted ‘Full‐FIPS’ mode on
the appliance), the TippingPoint IPS Cryptographic module meets the overall
requirements applicable to Level 1 security of FIPS 140‐2.
Table 2: Module Security Level Specification
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
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Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services and Authentication 3
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security 1
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self Tests 1
Design Assurance 2
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
2.3 Physical Characteristics
From a FIPS 140‐2 perspective, each TippingPoint IPS model is considered to be a
multiple‐chip standalone hardware module using production‐grade components
contained within an opaque, hard enclosure made of production‐grade steel.
The S6100N IPS model should be operated with the 3.8.0 firmware version.
The IPS module only allows the installation of new firmware signed by a TippingPoint
private key so it has a limited operational environment.
The module configurations are shown in the picture below:
Figure 2: TippingPoint S6100N
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The module configuration is listed in the Table below:
Table 3: S6100N Model Configuration
2.4 Cryptographic Boundary
The cryptographic boundary of the module is the module’s external hard‐metal
enclosure that forms the physical perimeter of the module. The cryptographic boundary
includes all components within the hard metal enclosure of the module.
2.5 Excluded Components
The following module components are excluded from FIPS 140‐2 requirements:
1. Monitoring Ports
The module may have different types of monitoring ports (i.e. Copper or SFP) depending
on the module configuration used. Each of the above physical configurations of the
module has 2 ports per segment, which are used for the IPS functionality. One of the
ports in a segment is typically used for the internal protected network while the other
port is used for the external unprotected network. These ports are used only for the
network data that is monitored for intrusion prevention services, and these ports are
not associated with any cryptographic processes, keys or CSPs. The monitoring ports can
never input or output any cryptographic keys, CSPs, or any FIPS‐relevant data. Thus,
IPS
Model
Removable
components
Dimension
(H*W*D)
(inches)
Monitoring Ports
(excluded)
Management
Interfaces
Inspectio
n
Through‐
put
S6100N
Fans, power
supplies,
external CF,
SFP and XFP
transceivers,
Interface for
external
ZPHA device
3.42*16.8*
24
(2U rack‐
mountable
)
5 segments (10
ports) RJ‐45
10/100/1000
Ethernet (Copper);
5 segments (10
ports) 1GbE SFP;
1 segment (2
ports) 10GbE XFP
1
10/100/1000
GbE Copper
port, 1 RJ‐45
Console port,
1 LCD and
Keypad
8Gbps
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these ports cannot affect the security of the module and are excluded from FIPS 140‐2
security requirements.
2. ZPHA Connector Port:
The module configurations have a ZPHA connector port which can be used to support an
optional ZPHA Module. The ZPHA connector can accommodate only one ZPHA module
at a time. These ZPHA modules have monitoring ports which can be connected to
external networks and to the IPS module’s monitoring ports using external network
cables. This enables the module to support the Zero Power High Availability (ZPHA)
mechanism, which allows IPS network traffic to continue to flow when the box loses
power. The ZPHA connector and the ports supported by the ZPHA modules are not
associated with any management data, cryptographic services, keys or CSPs. The ZPHA
connector can never compromise the IPS module’s security and is excluded from FIPS
140‐2 security requirements.
2.6 Ports and Interfaces
Each IPS model provides a management port and a console port, which carry all of the
module’s cryptographic data, keys and CSPs.
COMPACT FLASH PORT:
The module S6100N has an external compact flash port located on the front side of the
module. The compact flash can be used only to store logs and other system data. No
cryptographic keys, CSPs, or security‐relevant management data can ever be input or
output using this external compact flash.
The module S6100N has only one USB port that is labeled “ZPHA” on the front side of
the module body. This port is only used to provide power to an external ZPHA appliance.
There is no other use of this port and it is not associated with any cryptography, keys,
CSPs or security‐relevant data.
The following table indicates the mapping of the module’s physical ports to the FIPS
140‐2 logical interfaces.
Table 4: FIPS 140‐2 Interfaces and the Corresponding Module’s Physical Ports
FIPS 140‐2 Logical Interface Module’s Physical Port
Data Input
Ethernet Management Port
RJ‐45 Console Port
Compact Flash Port
Data Output
Ethernet Management Port
RJ‐45 Console Port
Compact Flash Port
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Control Input
Ethernet Management Port
RJ‐45 Console Port
Power/Reset Button/Switch
LCD Keypad
Status Output
Ethernet Management Port
RJ‐45 Console Port
LCD Screen
LEDs
Compact Flash Port
Power Interface
Power Port
USB Port
2.7 Modes of Operation
The module can be operated in a FIPS‐approved mode or in a non‐FIPS mode. The
module supports 3 modes of operation: Disable, Crypto, and Full. Only the ‘Full’ FIPS
mode on the module is considered as the FIPS Approved mode of operation. The
‘Disable’ mode and the ‘Crypto’ mode on the module are considered as non‐FIPS modes
of operation.
The cryptographic algorithms allowed by the module in the Approved Full‐FIPS mode of
operation are indicated in Table 8 of this document. The Cryptographic Keys, CSPs, and
SRDIs of the module in an Approved mode of operation are described in Table 10 of this
document. The rules and procedures followed and enforced by the module in the
Approved mode of operation are described in Section 4 of this document.
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3. Roles, Services, and Authentication
3.1. Authentication Mechanisms and Strength
An operator can authenticate and access the module in any one of the following ways:
 CLI over Console Port
 CLI via SSH over Management Port
 CLI via Telnet over Management Port
 LSM (HTTP or HTTPS) over Management Port. LSM stands for the Local Security
Manager, which offers a Web‐based GUI for managing one IPS device. LSM
provides a graphical display for reviewing, searching, and modifying settings.
The GUI interface also provides reports to monitor the device traffic, triggered
filters, and packet statistics. HTTP is disabled in FIPS mode and HTTPS provides
TLS protection.
 Using the TippingPoint SMS Client GUI via TLS over Management Port for
allowing management of the IPS module by the SMS. SMS stands for the
Security Management System, which is a central management point for
managing different TippingPoint appliances, monitoring events and scheduling
reports. A single SMS can be used to monitor and manage multiple IPS devices.
This authentication is required for enabling the SMS management.
 Using a TippingPoint SMS as a remote authentication server. This is possible
only when the IPS is already being managed by an SMS. Remote authentication
can only be used with CLI and LSM. The remote authentication data is always
protected by TLS.
 Using RADIUS for remote authentication (disallowed by policy when in Full FIPS
mode).
 Using TACACS+ for remote authentication (disallowed by policy when in Full
FIPS mode).
Telnet and HTTP are disabled by default and cannot be enabled while in Full FIPS mode.
SSH and HTTPS must be used instead.
RADIUS and TACACS+ authentication support is disallowed by policy so should not be
enabled when in Full FIPS mode.
The TippingPoint IPS supports password authentication for all users. A user must specify
a name and password when authenticating to the IPS through LSM, through the CLI,
using the SMS Client, or using an SMS as a remote authentication server.
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AUTHENTICATION STRENGTH:
When authenticating through the CLI, through LSM, or using the SMS client to an IPS in
Full FIPS mode with remote authentication disabled, the IPS does the enforcement of
user name and password restrictions. The IPS requires usernames with a minimum of 6
characters and passwords with a minimum of 8 characters. In the default configuration,
there is no restriction on what characters can be in the password. Thus, there are 95^8
(i.e. 6.6*10^15) possible passwords of the minimum length from the set of all
displayable ASCII characters including space. The odds of randomly guessing a password
of the minimum length would thus be 1 in 6.6*10^15 which is much less than 1 in
1,000,000. Thus, it meets the FIPS requirement.
The IPS has a password configuration option that requires passwords to have at least 2
letters (i.e. 52 possible for each), 1 number (i.e. 10 possible), and 1 non‐alphanumeric
character (i.e. 95‐52‐10=33 possible). This would reduce the number of possible
passwords from the default settings. Assuming a minimum password length and fixed
positions (but not values) for the restrictive character classes, the number of possible
passwords is 52*52*10*33*(95^4) = 7.3*10^13. The odds of randomly guessing a
password would thus be 1 in 7.3*10^13 which is much less than 1 in 1,000,000. Since
the positions of the required character classes are not fixed, the number of possible
passwords of the minimum length is larger. Thus the actual odds are even lower.
When authenticating through the CLI or through LSM to an IPS in Full FIPS mode with
remote authentication enabled, the SMS by default does the enforcement of user name
and password restrictions. For maintaining FIPS compliance while using remote
authentication with an IPS in Full FIPS mode, the SMS must be configured to use the
highest setting (i.e. level 2) for users and passwords. The SMS level 2 setting requires a
minimum of 6 character usernames. This setting also requires a minimum of 8 character
passwords with no spaces where 2 must be letters (i.e. 52 possible for each), 1 must be
numeric (i.e. 10 possible), and 1 must be non‐alphanumeric (i.e. 94‐52‐10=32 possible).
Assuming a minimum password length and fixed positions (but not values) for the
restrictive character classes, the number of possible passwords is 52*52*10*32*(94^4)
= 6.7*10^13. The odds of randomly guessing a password would thus be 1 in 6.7*10^13
which is much less than 1 in 1,000,000. Since the positions of the required character
classes are not fixed, the number of possible passwords of the minimum length is larger.
Thus the actual odds are even lower.
When authenticating through the CLI or through LSM to an IPS in Full FIPS mode with
remote authentication disabled, the IPS does the enforcement of the number of
unsuccessful login attempts allowed within a given period. In the default configuration,
a user account is locked for 5 minutes after 5 failed login attempts for that user. Thus
the odds of randomly guessing a password with retries within one minute is 5 times the
odds discussed above (i.e. 1 in 7.3*10^13 in the largest odds case) for IPS enforcement
resulting in odds of about 1 in 1.4*10^13, which is much less than 1 in 100,000, and thus
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meets the FIPS requirement. The maximum number of retries can be configured up to
10, which would result in 10 times the odds discussed above, which results in odds of
about 1 in 7.3*10^12, which is still much less than 1 in 100,000. To maintain FIPS
compliance, the user must not disable the configuration for account lockout on login
failure or configure the lockout time to less than 1 minute.
When authenticating to an IPS in Full FIPS mode using the SMS client or through the CLI
or LSM with remote authentication enabled, the fastest transfer speed is 1 Gbps over
the management port. 1 Gbps corresponds to 7.5*10^9 bytes/min. For any of these
scenarios, both the user name and password are sent on each login attempt. The
minimum for this will be 14 bytes (6 character username plus 8 character password).
Thus the maximum logins per minute would be 7.5*10^9 / 14 = 5.4*10^8 logins/min.
The odds for a successful login on repeated tries within a minute would thus be
5.4*10^8 times the odds for one login. When the IPS is enforcing the password
restrictions (i.e. using the largest odds case of 1 in 7.3*10^13), the resulting retry odds
are about 1 in 135,000 which is less than 1 in 100,000 as required by FIPS. When SMS is
enforcing the password restrictions (i.e. using odds of 1 in 6.7*10^13), the resulting
retry odds are about 1 in 120,000 which also meets the FIPS requirement. Note that the
actual odds for these scenarios is even lower due to the actual odds on one attempt
being lower than the estimates (see above) and due to overhead for sending the login
information that is not included in the estimates.
3.2. Roles
For each of the above access methods, the TippingPoint IPS supports identity‐based
authentication mechanism, where each user has an individually identified Username
and Password. An access level is associated with each user. There are 3 user access
levels and their corresponding FIPS roles are shown in the table below. A user, who sets
up and performs the first‐time initialization of the module, is implicitly assigned a Super‐
User Crypto‐Officer role.
Table 5: Roles and Descriptions
User Access
Level
Description
FIPS
Role
Type of
Authenti‐
cation
Authenti‐
cation
Data
Operator
Can login to the CLI and LSM but
primarily has read‐only access to the
configuration settings. The only CSP
an operator can modify is his own
password.
User Identity‐
based
Username
and
Password
Administrator
Can login to the CLI and LSM and
modify some configuration settings.
An administrator can modify his own
Crypto‐
Officer
Identity‐ Username
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password, can load a new TLS RSA
key pair over TLS, and can perform
software upgrades to the module.
based and
Password
Super‐User
Can login to the CLI and LSM and
modify all configuration settings.
Only a Super‐User can login to the
SMS to manage multiple IPS
modules. Only a super‐user can add
and delete users and modify any
user’s password and access level.
Also, only a super‐user can configure
the box for FIPS mode and do all key
management.
Crypto‐
Officer
Identity‐
based
Username
and
Password
The IPS module does not have support for a maintenance role. The IPS module does not
support bypass mode.
Concurrent Operators
The module allows up to 10 concurrently authenticated operators and rejects any
additional authentication requests. In addition, at least one Super‐User must remain in
the module so the module does not allow the deletion of the last Super‐User (Crypto‐
Officer).
3.3. Module Services
The table below shows the services provided by the IPS and the access level required to
perform them.
Table 6: Module Services
Opera‐
tor
Admin‐
istrator
Super
User
Service Service Input
Service
output
Notes
Y
Enable Full‐
FIPS mode
None None
Only applicable
to non‐FIPS
modes. Not
allowed to
change mode
once in full FIPS
mode.
Y Y Y
View FIPS
status
None
FIPS status,
current
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authenticated
user
information,
logs.
Y Y Y
Configure own
password
Username and
Password
None
Y
Configure any
user’s
password and
access level
Username and
password
None
Y Y
Configure
password
restrictions
and other
user account
settings for all
users
New value of
the setting
option.
None
Y Zeroize keys None None
Done by “fips
keys delete” CLI
command which
requires reboot.
The ephemeral
keys are also
always zeroized
on a reboot (see
reboot service
below).
Y
Generate new
keys
None None
Done by “fips
keys generate”
CLI command
which requires
reboot (see
reboot service
below). Some
keys (e.g. RNG
seed and seed
keys) are also
regenerated on
a reboot. The
ephemeral
TLS/SSH keys
are generated
during TLS/SSH
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session
negotiation (see
login services
below).
Y Y
Install new
TLS RSA key
pair
New TLS RSA
Key Pair
encrypted
with TLS
session key
None
Y Y Reboot None None
Can also be
done
unauthenticated
using the
power/reset
button or power
cycling the box.
Y Y
Install or
update new
software
Software
package
signed by
TippingPoint,
TLS
parameters,
data and input
None if it
succeeds and
error
message if it
fails.
Y Y Y Login to CLI
Username and
password, SSH
parameters,
input and data
(when using
SSH)
CLI prompt if
successful
and login
prompt if
unsuccessful
Y Y Y Login to LSM
Username and
password, TLS
parameters,
input and data
(when using
HTTPS)
LSM
homepage if
successful
and login
prompt if
unsuccessful
Y
Login via SMS
Client GUI for
enabling
central
management
Username and
password, TLS
parameters,
input and data
System
summary if
successful
and login
prompt if
unsuccessful
Y Y Y
Remote
authentication
Username and
Password, TLS
CLI prompt or
LSM
Possible only if
SMS is already
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using SMS parameters,
input and data
homepage,
depending on
the method
used
managing the
IPS.
Y Y
Configure
non‐FIPS
related admin
level settings
Corresponding
setting values
None
Y
Configure
non‐FIPS
related super‐
user level
settings
Corresponding
setting values
None
Y Y Y
View non‐FIPS
related
configuration
None
Non‐FIPS
related
configuration
information
Y Y Y
View non‐FIPS
related status
None
Non‐FIPS
related status
3.4. Unauthenticated Services
The IPS module S6100N allows the following unauthenticated services:
Table 7: Unauthenticated Services
Service Procedure
Service
Inputs
Service Outputs
Power‐off, halt or
reboot the module
Using the power
switch, power cycling
the module, or using
LCD and keypad
None None
Perform FIPS power‐
up self‐tests
Reboot the module None
None if all tests pass. If
any test fails, log
message is generated
and module reboots.
Zeroize ephemeral
keys
Reboot the module None None
Show non‐FIPS related
information
Using LCD and keypad None
Non‐FIPS related
information such as
device temperature,
serial number, current
memory usage, etc. No
key or CSP information is
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output by this service.
Configure non‐FIPS
related settings such
as LCD backlight and
contrast
Using LCD and keypad None None
Insert or Eject external
compact flash
Using LCD and keypad
or using eject switch
None None
Intrusion prevention
functionality on the
monitoring ports
Done automatically
based on the non‐FIPS
related configuration.
None None
3.5 Non-FIPS Mode Services
The module supports the following non‐FIPS mode services which shall not be used
when operated in FIPS mode.
 SSH with Blowfish, MD5, and HMAC‐MD5
 TLS with DES, RC2 and RC4
 SNMP v2
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4. Secure Operation and Security Rules
This section describes the rules enforced in the module when operated in the FIPS
approved mode (Full‐FIPS mode) and all FIPS‐related actions or procedures permitted
on the module.
In order to operate the TippingPoint IPS securely, the user should be aware of the
security rules enforced by the module and should adhere to the physical security rules
and secure operation rules and procedures.
4.1. Secure Operation
ENABLING APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION:
To operate in a FIPS‐compliant manner, an IPS module must be placed in the approved
mode of operation (called ‘Full‐FIPS’ mode on the appliance) by using the following
procedure:
 Ensure that the S6100N IPS model is updated to the 3.8.0 software release.
 After updating to the correct version of software, a Crypto‐Officer (Super‐user
role on the appliance) must log in to the CLI over SSH and execute the following
CLI commands:
 conf t host fips‐mode full
 fips auth delete ‐add <superuser> ‐p *
The above mentioned CLI commands cause the IPS to do the following:
 Reboot
 Put the box into Full‐FIPS mode
 Perform the FIPS power‐up self tests
 Zeroize the keys
 Generate new keys
 Delete the existing user database and add the new default super‐user specified
in the “fips auth delete” command.
 Enable monitoring port traffic
 Enable the TLS and SSH servers
 Only use cryptographic algorithms allowed by FIPS
 Perform the conditional FIPS self‐tests as needed
The above steps for the approved mode of operation ensure that the IPS meets the FIPS
requirements for doing self tests, does not use the same keys and users in FIPS and non‐
FIPS modes, does not allow output during power‐up self tests, uses only FIPS‐approved
cryptographic algorithms, etc. The IPS should now be operating in a FIPS compliant
manner. If needed, the super‐user can obtain a new TLS RSA key pair from TippingPoint
and install it through LSM to replace the generated RSA key pair. Note that once the
module is put into the FIPS‐approved mode, it cannot be put back into a non‐FIPS mode
except by resetting the module to factory‐defaults.
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CHECKING FIPS MODE:
The current FIPS status can be shown with the “show fips” CLI command. In case of
power‐up or conditional self‐test errors, the error can be seen in one or more of the
following:
 Console port.
 System Logs, which can be seen using LSM GUI options or using “show log sys”
CLI command.
 LSM GUI pop‐up messages.
RUNNING POWER‐UP SELF‐TESTS:
To force the FIPS power‐up self tests to be rerun, the user must power‐cycle or reboot
the appliance.
ZEROIZING KEYS:
To zeroize the keys, a super‐user must log in to the CLI over SSH and execute the
commands below. The zeroization will happen during the reboot.
 fips keys delete
 reboot ‐full
REGENERATING KEYS:
To regenerate the keys after they have been zeroized, a super‐user must log in over the
console port and execute the commands below. This can only be done over the console
port since the SSH and TLS keys have been deleted. The generation will happen during
the reboot.
 fips keys generate
 reboot ‐full
4.2. Security Rules
The security rules enforced by the TippingPoint IPS appliances include both the security
rules that TippingPoint has imposed and the security rules that result from the security
requirements of FIPS 140‐2.
4.2.1 FIPS 140‐2 Security Rules
The following are the security rules derived from the FIPS 140‐2 requirements when
in Full‐FIPS mode:
 The TippingPoint IPS appliance supports identity‐based operator authentication,
access levels, and services as discussed in section 3.
 The TippingPoint IPS appliance supports CSPs and controls access to them as
discussed in section 5.
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 The TippingPoint IPS appliance has support for changing into Full‐FIPS mode,
zeroizing/generating keys, etc. See section 4.1 for more information.
 When in Full‐FIPS mode, only cryptographic algorithms allowed by FIPS are used.
See section 5.1 for the list of algorithms.
 The TippingPoint IPS module performs the following FIPS power‐up self‐tests on
every power‐up and reboot:
o Firmware integrity test for all executable components using checksum. If
a check fails, a message is displayed on the console and the IPS halts
execution.
o Known‐answer self‐tests for each cryptographic algorithm used by the
module i.e. AES (encrypt/decrypt) KATs, Triple‐DES (encrypt/decrypt)
KATs, SHA (SHA‐1/224/256/384/512) KATs, HMAC‐SHA (SHA‐
1/224/256/384/512) KATs and RSA (sign/verify) KATs . If a test fails, a
message is logged and the IPS reboots.
o Known‐answer self‐test for the ANSI X9.31 Random Number Generator.
If the test fails, a message is logged and the IPS reboots.
 The software performs the following FIPS conditional tests as needed:
o Continuous random number generator tests for the approved ANSI X9.31
RNG and the non‐approved RNG. If a test fails, a message is logged, the
current output of the random number generator is ignored, and the
software tries the random number generator again.
o Software Load Test: When a user attempts to update the
software/firmware, verify that the new software file was signed by the
TippingPoint software/firmware load private key. If the signature check
fails, the software update is aborted with no changes to the existing
installed software. This validation is also done on software loads when
FIPS mode is disabled. Because of this validation, the IPS meets the
requirements for a limited operational environment.
o Pair‐wise consistency test after generating or installing new RSA keys. If
the test fails, the new RSA key is ignored and will not be used.
 There is no data output from the data output interfaces of the IPS during the
power‐up self tests.
 With the exception of feedback output of user passwords during their
modification over the console port, no private or secret CSPs are ever output
from the IPS. This option is disabled by policy as mentioned in the User and
Crypto‐Officer enforced rules below.
 All external entry of CSPs is encrypted with the exception of password entry over
the console port.
 The user password is obscured during entry to the module.
 Non‐FIPS service‐access is not accessible in FIPS‐approved mode. This service
enabling is disallowed by the module while it is operating in Full‐FIPS mode.
 The module does not support a FIPS bypass mode.
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 In FIPS approved mode, the operator is not allowed to configure the password
settings for less than 8 characters.
 Telnet and HTTP are disabled in Full‐FIPS mode.
 The operator should use only FIPS approved cryptographic algorithms with SSH
in Full FIPS mode.
 The operator should use only FIPS approved cryptographic algorithms with TLS
1.0 in Full FIPS mode
 The IPS uses production‐grade enclosure and components.
4.2.2 TippingPoint Security Rules
The following are the security rules that are enforced by TippingPoint when the IPS
module is in Full‐FIPS mode:
 TippingPoint always uses secure distribution means by making use of trusted
third‐party carriers such as UPS or FedEx for shipping the module to the
authorized users.
 After receiving the module, it must be installed and initiated by a Crypto‐Officer
by following the procedure specified in the Crypto‐Officer Guidance and in the
documentation shipped with the module.
 No module operator has direct access to the internal storage on the IPS where
the CSPs and installed software images are stored.
 If the module is reset to factory‐defaults, it must be ensured that the module is
using the firmware version specified in this document. If the module has been
reset to an earlier version due to factory default action, it must be upgraded to
this version.
 If remote authentication using a TippingPoint SMS Server is used, then only the
SMS level 2 security setting should be used for establishing usernames and
passwords on the SMS. This is required for meeting FIPS authentication strength
requirements while authenticating to the IPS module. The level 2 setting on the
SMS requires usernames to be a minimum of 6 characters and passwords to be a
minimum of 8 characters, where 2 must be alphabetical, 1 must be numeric, and
1 must be non‐alphanumeric.
4.3. Crypto‐Officer Guidance
The following are the security rules that must be enforced or followed by the Crypto‐
Officer:
 The Crypto‐Officer is responsible for a secure and successful installation,
initialization and start‐up of the module. The Crypto‐Officer should follow the
directions provided in the documentation guide shipped with the module. The
guide details the procedures to do the following:
1) Attach device to a rack
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2) Connect the console port of the module to a computer and access the
module’s terminal.
3) Connect network connection segments to the module.
4) Connect the power.
5) Check the LEDs.
6) Using the console port, follow the prompt in the setup wizard to establish
the Crypto‐Officer authentication information and to configure the
management options of the module.
7) This completes the initial setup configuration.
 Only the console port should be used for module initialization. The LCD and
Keypad should not be used for module initialization and setup since it allows the
plaintext display of username and password on the LCD.
 All physical ports and logical interfaces of the module are allowed for use by the
Crypto‐Officer. Please refer to the ‘Ports and Interfaces’ section for details.
 Use the console port only in a secure, controlled environment since the traffic is
in plain text. In general, use the CLI over SSH instead of over the console port
unless the console port is the only option (e.g. to restore keys after zeroization).
 Add, delete, modify and manage all user accounts as required.
 Refer to Table 6 of this document for the services and their inputs and outputs
which are allowed in this role.
 Follow the steps in the section 4.1 for enabling FIPS mode, generating/zeroizing
keys, etc. to ensure the IPS operates in a FIPS‐compliant manner.
 For CLI commands that take a password such as the password modification and
new user addition CLI commands, use the option to be prompted for the
password (with the use of a ‘*’ in the command) rather than entering the
password as part of the command. This will prevent the password from being
visible to the module operator.
 In the user settings, do not enable RADIUS or TACACS+ authentication support.
 If remote authentication using a TippingPoint SMS Server is used, then only the
SMS level 2 security setting should be used for establishing usernames and
passwords on the SMS. This is required for meeting FIPS authentication strength
requirements while authenticating to the IPS module. The level 2 setting on the
SMS requires usernames to be a minimum of 6 characters and passwords to be a
minimum of 8 characters, where 2 must be alphabetical, 1 must be numeric, and
1 must be non‐alphanumeric.
 Keep the IPS in a secure environment and do not attempt to open the enclosure.
 In the password security settings, do not disable account lockout for repeated
login failures or change the lockout period to less than 1 minute. This will ensure
that the FIPS password strength requirements are met.
 If desired, install a new TLS RSA key pair through the LSM GUI after obtaining it
from TippingPoint’s TMC website. This must only be done using HTTPS.
 Follow all rules applicable to the Crypto‐Officer role as specified in this Security
Policy document.
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4.4. User Guidance
The following are the security rules that must be enforced or followed by the User:
 All physical ports and logical interfaces of the module are allowed for use by the
User role. Please refer to ‘Ports and Interfaces’ section for details.
 Use the console port only in a secure, controlled environment since the traffic is
in plain text. In general, use the CLI over SSH instead of over the console port
unless the console port is the only option (e.g. to restore keys after zeroization).
 For CLI commands that take a password such as the password modification CLI
command, use the option to be prompted for the password (with the use of a ‘*’
in the command) rather than entering the password as part of the command.
This will prevent the password from being visible to the module operator.
 If remote authentication using a TippingPoint SMS Server is used, then only the
SMS level 2 security setting should be used for establishing usernames and
passwords on the SMS. This is required for meeting FIPS authentication strength
requirements while authenticating to the IPS module. The level 2 setting on the
SMS requires usernames to be a minimum of 6 characters and passwords to be a
minimum of 8 characters, where 2 must be alphabetical, 1 must be numeric, and
1 must be non‐alphanumeric.
 Keep the IPS in a secure environment and do not attempt to open the enclosure.
 Refer to Table 6 of this document for the services and their inputs and outputs
which are allowed in this role.
 Follow all rules applicable to the User role as specified in this Security Policy
document.
4.5. Physical Security Rules
The TippingPoint IPS appliances satisfy the requirements for FIPS 140‐2 Level 1 Physical
Security. The IPS appliances use production‐grade enclosures and components. The
outer enclosure of the module is made of production‐grade steel. The IPS module
should be kept in a secure environment and no operator should attempt to open the
enclosure. No other specific physical security mechanisms are required.
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5. Security Relevant Data Items and Access Control
This section specifies the TippingPoint IPS Security Relevant Data Items (SRDIs) as well as
the access control policy enforced by the IPS.
5.1. Cryptographic Algorithms
When in the approved mode of operation (Full‐FIPS mode), the IPS module uses the
cryptographic algorithms in the table below.
Table 8: FIPS Mode Cryptographic Algorithms
Algorithm Type Modes/Mod sizes/Options Certificate # FIPS‐
approved
Signature Algorithms
RSA 2048 bit modulus (Sign/Verify,
Key Gen)
1637 Yes
Symmetric Algorithms
AES 128, 192, 256 bit (ECB, CBC) 3214 Yes
Triple‐DES 3‐key (ECB, CBC) 1829 Yes
Hashing Algorithms
SHA Byte‐oriented.
SHA‐1,224,256,384,512
2662 Yes
HMAC‐SHA Byte‐oriented.
SHA‐1,224,256,384,512
(Minimum HMAC key size = 112
bits)
2027 Yes
Random Number Generators
RNG ANSI X9.31: 3‐key Triple‐DES 1347 Yes
Non‐approved RNG Only used to seed the ANSI
X9.31 RNG; permitted for use in
FIPS Approved Mode.
N/A No
Key Establishment/Transport Algorithms
Diffie‐Hellman Key
Agreement (used with
SSH)
2048‐bit ; Provides 112 bits of
security strength ; Allowed for
use in FIPS Approved Mode ;
N/A No
RSA Key Transport
(used with TLS)
2048 bit ; Provides 112 bits of
security strength ; Allowed for
use in FIPS Approved Mode
N/A No
CVL SP800‐135 KDFs (SSH, TLS) 438 Yes
Note:
 The KDF (key derivation function) used in each of SSH and TLS protocols was
certified by CAVP with CVL Cert. #438.
 SSH and TLS protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CMVP or CAVP.
Please refer to IG D.11, bullet 2 for more information.
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The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available
entropy. The encryption strength for each of the following generated keys is at least
112 bits: AES key encrypting key, TLS RSA key pair, SSH RSA key pair, TLS pre‐master
secret, and SSH Diffie‐Hellman private exponent.
The IPS supports the following non‐FIPS approved cryptographic algorithms:
Table 9: Non‐FIPS Mode Cryptographic Algorithms
Algorithm Type/Name FIPS‐approved
Symmetric Algorithms
Blowfish No
RC2 No
RC4 No
DES No
Hashing Algorithms
MD5 No
HMAC‐MD5 No
Please note that HMAC‐MD5 and MD5 are allowed in FIPS mode strictly for TLS 1.0.
5.2. Cryptographic Keys, CSPs, and SRDIs
While operating in a FIPS‐compliant manner, the TippingPoint IPS module contains the
following security relevant data items:
Table 10: SRDI Information
Security
Relevant
Data Item
SRDI
Description
Size
Generation/
Entry
Storage Output Zeroization
RNG seed
Seed for
the ANSI
X9.31 RNG
8 bytes
Not entered.
Generated
using a non‐
approved
RNG on
every
reboot
Ephemeral
: Stored in
RAM
No
Zeroized on
reboot or
power cycle.
RNG seed
key
3‐key
Triple‐DES
seed key
for the
ANSI X9.31
RNG
3 keys
of 8
bytes
each
Not entered.
Generated
using a non‐
approved
RNG on
every
Ephemeral
: Stored in
RAM
No
Zeroized on
reboot or
power cycle.
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reboot
Software
load test
key
RSA public
key used to
verify
software
upgrade,
uses SHA‐
256
2048
bits
Not
generated.
Entered
encrypted
with TLS
session key
during
software
package
install
Persistent:
Stored in
plain text
on internal
storage.
No
It is a public
key so no
need to
zeroize.
Password
User
password
8‐32
chars
Not
generated.
Entered by
the user
encrypted
with session
key (TLS or
SSH) or in
clear text
(console
port).
Persistent:
Hashed
using
SHA256
and stored
on internal
storage.
No (The
option of
specifying
the password
as part of
some CLI
commands is
disallowed
by module
policy –
Section 4.2)
Stored in
hashed form
so no need
to zeroize.
Key
encrypting
key
AES
symmetric
key used to
encrypt all
private
keys stored
on internal
storage
128 bits
Not entered.
Generated
using ANSI
X9.31 RNG
during key
generation.
Persistent:
Stored in
plaintext in
physically
erasable
part of
internal
storage.
No
Zeroized
when going
into Full‐FIPS
mode, on
deleting fips
keys, or on
reset to
factory
defaults.
TLS RSA
key pair
RSA public
and private
keys used
for TLS, use
SHA‐256
2048
bits
Generated
using ANSI
X9.31 RNG
during key
generation.
A super‐user
or admin
user can
install a new
official key
pair
encrypted
with the TLS
session key.
Persistent:
Encrypted
with the
key
encrypting
key and
stored on
internal
storage.
Public key is
output to its
peer as part
of TLS
negotiation.
Private key is
never
output.
Stored in
encrypted
form so no
need to
zeroize.
TLS Pre‐
Master
Shared
secret
48 bytes
May enter
encrypted
Ephemeral
: Stored in
May be
output
Zeroized on
reboot or
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Secret exchanged
using RSA
Key
Transport
and used
to derive
the Master
Secret
with the
module’s
RSA public
key when
the module
acts as a TLS
Server. If the
module acts
as a TLS
Client, it is
generated
using ANSI
X9.31 RNG.
RAM encrypted
with the
peer’s RSA
public key
when the
module acts
as a TLS
Client. It is
never output
if the module
acts as a TLS
Server.
power cycle.
TLS
master
secret
Master
Secret used
to derive
the
encryption
and MAC
keys for
both ends
of an TLS
session
48 bytes
Not entered.
Computed
as part of
TLS
negotiation
according to
TLS 1.0
standard
using the
pre‐master
secret and
nonces.
Ephemeral
: Stored in
RAM
No
Zeroized on
reboot or
power cycle.
TLS
encryption
key
AES/Triple
DES
symmetric
key for TLS
encryption
in one
direction
AES:
128,
192, or
256 bits;
Triple
DES:
168 bits
Not entered.
Derived
from master
secret as
part of TLS
negotiation.
Ephemeral
: Stored in
RAM
No
Zeroized on
reboot or
power cycle.
TLS
integrity
key
MAC key
for
integrity in
one
direction
160 bits
Not entered.
Derived
from master
secret as
part of TLS
negotiation.
Ephemeral
: Stored in
RAM
No
Zeroized on
reboot or
power cycle.
SSH Diffie‐
Hellman
Exchange
Values
Public
value and
private
exponent
used for
SSH DH Key
Exchange
2048‐bit
Module’s
private
exponent is
generated
during SSH
negotiation
using ANSI
X9.31 RNG.
The public
value is
Ephemeral
: Stored in
RAM
Public value
is output to
its peer as
part of SSH
negotiation.
Private
exponent is
never
output.
Zeroized on
reboot or
power cycle.
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derived
from the
private
exponent
and the DH
group. The
peer’s DH
public value
enters the
module
according to
SSH
Standard.
SSH DH
Shared
Secret
The shared
secret
established
using SSH
DH
exchange
according
to the SSH
Standard
2048‐bit
Not entered.
Derived by
the module
during SSH
negotiation
using DH
parameters.
Ephemeral
: Stored in
RAM
No
Zeroized on
reboot or
power cycle.
SSH RSA
key pair
RSA key
pair
2048
bits
Not entered.
Generated
using ANSI
X9.31 RNG
during key
generation.
Persistent:
Encrypted
with the
key
encrypting
key and
stored on
internal
storage.
Public key is
output to its
peer as part
of SSH
negotiation.
Private key is
not output.
Stored in
encrypted
form so no
need to
zeroize.
SSH
session
encryption
key
AES/Triple
DES
symmetric
key for SSH
encryption
in one
direction
AES:
128,
192, or
256 bits;
Triple
DES:
168 bits
Not entered.
Derived
during SSH
negotiation.
Ephemeral
: Stored in
RAM
No
Zeroized on
reboot or
power cycle.
SSH
integrity
key
MAC key
for
integrity in
one
direction
160,
256,
384, or
512 bits
Not entered.
Derived
during SSH
negotiation.
Ephemeral
: Stored in
RAM
No
Zeroized on
reboot or
power cycle.
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5.3. Access Control Policy
The IPS allows controlled access to the SRDIs contained within it. The following table
defines the access that the IPS services have to the SRDIs (i.e. R=read, W=write,
Z=zeroize, D=delete). If no access is listed, the service does not use that SRDI.
Table 11: Access Control Policy
Service
RNG
seed
and
seed
key
Software
load
test
key
User
passwords
Key
encrypting
key
TLS
RSA
key
pair
TLS
pre‐master
secret,
master
secret,
encryption
key,
and
integrity
key
SSH
RSA
key
pair
SSH
DH
exchange
values,
DH
shared
secret,
session
encryption
key,
and
integrity
key
Enable Full‐FIPS mode WZ WD RWZ W Z W RZ
View FIPS status R R
Configure own password W R R
Configure any user’s password
and access level
W R R
Configure password restrictions
and account lockout settings
R R
Zeroize keys WZ Z D Z D RZ
Generate new keys WZ RWZ W Z W RZ
Install new TLS RSA key pair R RW R
Reboot WZ RZ RZ
Install new firmware/software WZ RW RZ Z
Do FIPS power‐up self‐tests
Login to CLI R R R RW
Login to LSM R R R RW
Configure non‐FIPS related
admin level settings
R R
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Configure non‐FIPS related
super‐user level settings
R R
View non‐FIPS related
configuration
R R
View non‐FIPS related status R R
Intrusion prevention
functionality on the monitoring
ports.
6. Mitigation of Other Attacks
The cryptographic module does not claim to mitigate any other attacks in a FIPS‐
approved mode of operation.