



**Cisco Catalyst 6506-E, Catalyst 6509-E and Catalyst
6513-E Switches with Supervisor Cards (VS-S2T-10G
and VS-S2T-10G-XL) and Line Cards (WS-X6908-10G
and WS-X6908-10G-2TXL)
FIPS 140-2 Level 2
Non-Proprietary Security Policy**

Overall Level 2 (Sections 3 and 10 Level 3) Validation

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Introduction

This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Cisco Catalyst 6506-E, Catalyst 6509-E and Catalyst 6513-E Switches with Supervisor Cards (VS-S2T-10G and VS-S2T-10G-XL) and Linecards (WS-X6908-10G and WS-X6908-10G-2TXL), referred to in this document as the modules or switches. This security policy describes how modules meet the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 and how to run the modules in a FIPS 140-2 mode of operation and may be freely distributed.

The module may be deployed in multiple configurations of linecards and supervisors installed in the module chassis. The following table identifies the possible combinations of hardware.

Chassis			Supervisor Cards				Line Cards	
6506-E	6509-E	6513-E	One VS-S2T-10G	Two VS-S2T-10G	One VS-S2T-10G-XL	Two VS-S2T-10G-XL	WS-X6908-10G	WS-X6908-10G-2TXL
X			X				X (Up to 4)	
	X		X				X (Up to 7)	
		X	X				X (Up to 11)	
X				X			X (Up to 4)	
	X			X			X (Up to 7)	
		X		X			X (Up to 11)	
X					X			X (Up to 4)
	X				X			X (Up to 7)
		X			X			X (Up to 11)
X						X		X (Up to 4)
	X					X		X (Up to 7)
		X				X		X (Up to 11)

Table 1: Module Configurations

Versions:

- 6506-E -M0
- 6509-E-N0
- 6513-E -S0
- Supervisor Card VS-S2T-10G -B0
- Supervisor Card VS-S2T-10G-XL -C0
- Line Card WS-X6908-10G-A0
- Line Card WS-X6908-10G-2TXL-B0
- FIPS kit packaging (CVPN6500FIPS/KIT=)
- IOS version 15.0(1)SY2

References

This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources:

- The Cisco Systems website (<http://www.cisco.com>) contains information on the full line of products from Cisco Systems.
- FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST website at <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html>.

FIPS 140-2 Submission Package

The security policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the submission package includes:

- Vendor Evidence
- Finite State Machine
- Other supporting documentation as additional references

With the exception of this non-proprietary security policy, the FIPS 140-2 validation documentation is proprietary to Cisco Systems, Inc. and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Cisco Systems, Inc. See “Obtaining Technical Assistance” section for more information.

Module Description

Branch office networking requirements are dramatically evolving, driven by web and e-commerce applications to enhance productivity and merging the voice and data infrastructure to reduce costs. The Catalyst 6500 series switches offer versatility, integration, and security to branch offices. With numerous network modules and service modules available, the modular architecture of the Cisco switches easily allows interfaces to be upgraded to accommodate network expansion. The Catalyst 6500 series switches provide a scalable, secure, manageable remote access server that meets FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements, as a multi-chip standalone module.

The switches include cryptographic algorithms implemented in IOS software as well as hardware ASICs. The line card ASICs implement Cisco TrustSec (CTS) protocol supporting IEEE 802.1AE for Layer 2 CTS and contain hardware implementations of the GCM and ECB modes of the AES algorithm.

The switches support the Cisco TrustSec protocol which provides policy-based access control, identity-aware networking, and data confidentiality and integrity; and Virtual Switching System which is a system virtualization technology that allows the pooling of multiple Catalyst 6500 switches into a single virtual switch.

The switches also support SSH and TLS to provide remote administrative access to the module

Module Validation Level

The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.

No.	Area Title	Level
1	Cryptographic Module Specification	2
2	Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	2
3	Roles, Services, and Authentication	3
4	Finite State Model	2
5	Physical Security	2
6	Operational Environment	N/A
7	Cryptographic Key management	2
8	Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility	2
9	Self-Tests	2
10	Design Assurance	3
11	Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A
Overall	Overall module validation level	2

Table 2: Module Validation Level

Cryptographic Boundary

The cryptographic boundary is defined as being the physical enclosure of the chassis.

All of the functionality described in this publication is provided by components within this cryptographic boundary. The module incorporates one or two supervisor blades, and one or more line cards in a single configuration.

Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces

Each module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical interfaces provided by the module are mapped to four FIPS 140-2 defined logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, and status output. The module also supports a power interface. The logical interfaces and their mapping are described in the following tables:

Physical Interface	Logical Interface
Supervisor Card 1G SFP Ports (x3) Supervisor Card 10G Ethernet Ports (x2) Line Card 10G Ethernet Ports (x8) Console Port Management Port	Data Input Interface
Supervisor Card 1G SFP Ports (x3) Supervisor Card 10G Ethernet Ports (x2) Line Card 10G Ethernet Ports (x8) Console Port Management Port	Data Output Interface
Console Port Management Port	Control Input Interface
Console Port Management Port LEDs	Status Output Interface
Power Plug	Power Interface

Table 3: Physical To Logical Interfaces

Roles, Services, and Authentication

Authentication is identity-based. Each user is authenticated upon initial access to the module. There are two roles in the Switch that operators may assume: the Crypto Officer (CO) role and the User role. The administrator of the Switch assumes the CO role in order to configure and maintain the Switch using CO services, while the Users exercise security services over the network. The module supports RADIUS for authentication.

User Role

The role assumed by users obtaining general security services. From a logical view, user activity exists in the data-plane. Users access via network ports using CTS protocols. CTS uses 802.1AE(EAP-FAST) for authentication.

CTS can use password based credentials – in such a case the user passwords must be at least eight (8) characters long, including at least one letter and at least one number character, in length (enforced procedurally). If six (6) integers, one (1) special character and one (1) alphabet are used without repetition for an eight (8) digit PIN, the probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in 832,000,000. In order to successfully guess the sequence in one minute would require the ability to make over 13,000,000 guesses per second, which far exceeds the operational capability of the console port. Including the rest of the alphanumeric characters drastically decreases the odds of guessing the correct sequence.

CTS can also use certificate credentials using 1024 bit RSA keys and SHA-1 – in such a case the security strength is 80 bits, so an attacker would have a 1 in 2^{80} chance of a successful authentication which is much stronger than the one in a million chance required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 1.8×10^{21} attempts per minute, which vastly exceeds the operational capabilities of the module to support.

CO Role

The role assumed by an authorized CO connecting to the switch via CLI or GUI and performing management functions and module configuration. From a logical view, CO activity exists only in the control plane. IOS prompts the CO for their username and password, if the password is validated against the CO's password in IOS memory, the user is allowed entry to the IOS executive program. A CO can assign permission to access the CO role to additional accounts, thereby creating additional COs.

CO passwords must be at least eight (8) characters long, including at least one letter and at least one number character, in length (enforced procedurally). If six (6) integers, one (1) special character and one (1) alphabet are used without repetition for an eight (8) digit PIN, the probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in 832,000,000. In order to successfully guess the sequence in one minute would require the ability to make over 13,000,000 guesses per second, which far exceeds the operational capability of the console port. Including the rest of the alphanumeric characters drastically decreases the odds of guessing the correct sequence.

Services

Role	Authentication Method	Services
User	CTS Authentication	<p>CTS Network Functions: authentication, access control, confidentiality and data integrity services provided by the CTS protocol.</p> <p>Perform Self Tests: occurs upon system startup</p>
Cryptographic Officer	CLI/GUI login	<p>Configure the switch: define network interfaces and settings, create command aliases, set the protocols the switch will support, enable interfaces and network services, set system date and time, and load authentication information.</p> <p>Define rules and filters: create packet filters that are applied to user data streams on each interface. Each filter consists of a set of rules, which define a set of packets to permit or deny based on characteristics such as protocol ID, addresses, ports, TCP connection establishment, or packet direction.</p> <p>Status functions: view the switch configuration, routing tables, and active sessions; view health, temperature, memory status, voltage, and packet statistics; review accounting logs, and view physical interface status.</p> <p>Manage the module - Log off users, shutdown or reload the router, manually back up router configurations, view complete configurations, manager user rights, initiate power-on self tests on demand and restore router configurations.</p> <p>Perform Self-Tests - Perform the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand.</p>
Unauthenticated	N/A	<p>Show status (viewing LEDs), passing traffic through the device, power-cycling the device.</p>

Cryptographic Key/CSP Management

The module securely administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters such as passwords. The tamper evidence seals provide physical protection for all keys. All keys are also protected by the password-protection on the CO role login, and can be zeroized by the CO. All zeroization consists of overwriting the memory that stored the key. Keys are exchanged and entered electronically. Persistent keys are entered by the CO via the console port CLI, transient keys are generated or established and stored in DRAM. If present, a VSS link can export all DRAM and NVRAM keys to another switch over a secure connection for high availability purposes.

The module supports the following critical security parameters (CSPs):

ID	Algorithm/Size/Mode	Size	Description	Origin	Storage	Zeroization Method
DRBG entropy input	SP 800-90 CTR_DRBG	256-bits	This is the entropy for SP 800-90 RNG.	Generated by internal entropy source	DRAM (plaintext)	power cycle the device
DRBG seed	SP 800-90 CTR_DRBG	384-bits	This is the seed for SP 800-90 RNG.	Generated by entropy source via the CTR_DRBG derivation function	DRAM (plaintext)	power cycle the device
DRBG V	SP 800-90 CTR_DRBG	128-bits	Internal V value used as part of SP 800-90 CTR_DRBG	Generated by entropy source via the CTR_DRBG derivation function. It is stored in DRAM with plaintext form.	DRAM (plaintext)	power cycle the device
DRBG Key	SP 800-90 CTR_DRBG	256-bits	Internal Key value used as part of SP 800-90 CTR_DRBG	generated from entropy source via the CTR_DRBG derivation function	DRAM (plaintext)	power cycle the device
Diffie Hellman private exponent	Diffie-Hellman	1024-bits/2048-bits	The private exponent used in Diffie-Hellman (DH) exchange.	nist_rng	DRAM (plaintext)	Automatically after shared secret generated.
DH shared secret	Diffie-Hellman	256 bits	Shared secret generated by the Diffie-Hellman Key exchange	Shared secret generated by the Diffie-Hellman Key exchange	DRAM (plaintext)	Automatically when session expires
CTS password	Secret	Up to 256 bytes	This is CTS credential. Used for CTS device to authenticate itself. The maximum size is 256 bytes.	User configured	NVRAM (plaintext)	Via the following CLI, "clear cts credentials".
CTS PAC key	Shared Secret	256-bits	CTS PAC is a Protected Access Credential that is mutually and	Generated and sent by ACS to the CTS device	NVRAM (plaintext)	Via the following CLI, "clear cts pacs"

ID	Algorithm/Size/Mode	Size	Description	Origin	Storage	Zeroization Method
			uniquely shared between the peer and ACS. It is used to secure EAP-FAST tunnel.			
SAP Pairwise Master Key (PMK)	Shared Secret	64 byte key used to derive PTK which is used to generate CTS session MAC and Encryption keys. Only the first 32 bytes are used by CTS.	64 byte key used to derive PTK which is used to generate CTS session MAC and Encryption keys. Only the first 32 bytes are used by CTS.	Manually configured in CTS manual mode and VSL. Generated by ACS and sent to Authenticator and generated internally by supplicant in CTS dot1x mode.	DRAM (plaintext) NVRAM (plaintext) if CTS cache is enabled	unconfigure the PMK in CTS manual mode or unconfigure cts dot1x in CTS dot1x mode.
SAP Pairwise Transient Key (PTK)	Shared Secret	256 bits	Concatenation of KCK and KEK.	Concatenation of KCK and KEK.	DRAM (plaintext)	Automatically when session expires
SAP Key Encryption Key (KEK)	AES	128-bit	Used to encrypt SAP payloads during SAP protocol implementations.	Derived by SAP	DRAM (plaintext)	Automatically when session expires
SAP Key Confirmation Key (KCK)	HMAC-SHA-1	160-bit	Used to protect SAP payloads integrity during SAP protocol implementations.	Derived by SAP	DRAM (plaintext)	Automatically when session expires
802.1ae Session Keys	AES-GCM	128-bit	Used for bulk encryption of data	Derived by SAP	Ganita or Alkindi ASIC (plaintext)	Automatically when session expires
VSL PMK	Shared Secret	256-bit	The preshared key used for VSS connections	User configured	NVRAM (plaintext)	clear switch virtual pmk
VSL session keys	AES-GCM	128-bit	Used for bulk encryption of data in the event of failover	Derived from VSL PMK	Ganita or Alkindi ASIC (plaintext)	Automatically when VSL session expires
RADIUS AES KEK WRAP KEY	AES key wrap KEK	256-bit	[pac] [keywrap encryption-key <secret> message-auth-code-key <secret>] [format {ascii hex}] key <shared-secret>	User configured	DRAM (plaintext)	Resetting or rebooting the module
RADIUS AES KEK WRAP	AES key wrap MACK	160-bit	[pac] [keywrap encryption-key <secret> message-	User configured	DRAM (plaintext)	Resetting or rebooting the module

ID	Algorithm/ Size/Mode	Size	Description	Origin	Storage	Zeroization Method
MACK			auth-code-key <secret> [format {ascii hex}] key <shared-secret>			
SSH RSA private Key	RSA	1024-2048- bit	private key used in SSH protocol	crypto key generate rsa	NVRAM (encrypted)	crypto key zeroize rsa
SSH session key	Triple-DES / AES	Triple-DES (Key Size 168 bits)/AES (Key Size 128/192/25 6 bits)	This is the SSH session key. It is used to encrypt all SSH data traffics traversing between the SSH client and SSH server.	Created as part of SSH session establishment	DRAM (plaintext)	Zeroized when SSH session is terminated
SSH session authentica tion key	HMAC-SHA- 1	160-bit	This key is used to perform the authentication between the SSH client and SSH server.	Created as part of SSH session establishment	DRAM (plaintext)	Zeroized when SSH session is terminated
TLS Server RSA private key	RSA	1024/2048- bit	Identity certificates for module itself and also used in TLS negotiations.	crypto key generate rsa	NVRAM (plaintext or encrypted)	Automatically when TLS session terminated.
TLS pre- master secret	Shared Secret	384-bits	Shared secret created using asymmetric cryptography from which new HTTPS session keys can be created.	Created as part of TLS session establishment	DRAM (plaintext)	Automatically when TLS session terminated.
TLS Traffic Keys	Triple- DES/AES/ HMAC SHA- 1 keys	Triple-DES (168- bits)/AES (128/192/25 6- bits)/HMA C (160-bits)	This is the TLS session key.	Generated using the TLS protocol .	DRAM (plaintext)	Automatically when TLS session terminated.
User password	Shared Secret	eight (8) characters long	Password of the user role	User configured	NVRAM (plaintext)	Set new password
Enable password	Shared Secret	eight (8) characters long	CO password	User configured	NVRAM (plaintext)	Set new password
Enable secret	Shared Secret	eight (8) characters long	Obfuscated password of the CO role.	User configured	NVRAM (plaintext)	Set new password
RADIUS secret	Shared Secret	eight (8) characters	The RADIUS Shared Secret	User configured	NVRAM (plaintext)	# no radius- server key

ID	Algorithm/ Size/Mode	Size	Description	Origin	Storage	Zeroization Method
		long				
TACACS+ secret	Shared Secret	eight (8) characters long	The TACACS+ shared secret	User configured	NVRAM (plaintext)	# no tacacs- server key

Table 4: CSP Table

The services accessing the CSPs, the type of access and which role accesses the CSPs are listed below.

Role	Service	Critical Security Parameters
User Role	Network Functions	DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed, DRBG V, DRBG Key, DH private exponent, DH shared secret, SAP Pairwise Master Key (PMK), SAP Pairwise Transient Key (PTK), SAP Key Encryption Key (KEK), SAP Key Confirmation Key (KCK), CTS Password, CTS PAC Key, Secure RADIUS KEK, Secure RADIUS MACK, 802.1ae Session Keys, VSL session keys, SSH session key, SSH session authentication key, TLS pre-master secret, TLS Traffic Keys (R) User password(W)
Crypto-Officer Role	Configure the Switch	SAP Pairwise Master Key (PMK), VSL PMK, Secure RADIUS KEK, Secure RADIUS MACK, CTS Password, SSH RSA private Key, Enable Password, TLS Server RSA private key, Enable secret, RADIUS secret, TACACS+ secret (R/W/D)

R = Read, W = Write, D = Delete

Table 5: Role CSP Access

Cryptographic Algorithms

Approved Cryptographic Algorithms

The Cisco Switches support many different cryptographic algorithms. However, only FIPS approved algorithms may be used while in the FIPS mode of operation. The following table identifies the approved algorithms included in the Switches for use in the FIPS mode of operation.

Algorithm	Implementation	CAVP Certificate
AES	IOS Firmware	#1816
	Hardware	#1426 and #1427
Triple-DES	IOS Firmware	#1171
RSA	IOS Firmware	#911
SHS	IOS Firmware	#1593
SP800-90 RNG	IOS Firmware	#140
HMAC	IOS Firmware	#1072

Table 6: FIPS-Approved Algorithms for use in FIPS Mode

Non-Approved Algorithms

The cryptographic module implements the following non-approved algorithms that are not permitted for use in FIPS 140-2 mode of operations:

- DES
- HMAC-MD5
- MD5
- RC4
- Non-FIPS approved RNGs

Furthermore the module implements Diffie Hellman which is allowed in FIPS 140-2 mode of operations for use in key establishment, providing 112 bits of encryption strength.

Self-Tests

The modules include an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically during operations to prevent any secure data from being released and to ensure all components are functioning correctly. The modules implement the following power-on self-tests:

- IOS Known Answer Tests:
 - AES KAT
 - DRBG KAT
 - HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
 - RSA KAT

- SHA KAT
- Triple-DES KAT
- Linecard (Alkindi and Ganita ASICs) Known Answer Tests:
 - AES-GCM
- Firmware Integrity Test (32-bit EDC)

The modules perform all power-on self-tests automatically at boot. All power-on self-tests must be passed before any operator can perform cryptographic services. The power-on self-tests are performed after the cryptographic systems are initialized but prior any other operations; this prevents the module from passing any data during a power-on self-test failure.

In addition, the modules also provide the following conditional self-tests:

- Continuous Random Number Generator test for the FIPS-approved RNG
- Continuous Random Number Generator test for the non-approved RNG
- Conditional Alternating Bypass Test
- Conditional Pairwise Consistency Test

Physical Security

This module is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module.

The FIPS 140-2 level 2 physical security requirements for the modules are met by the use of opacity shields covering the front panels of modules to provide the required opacity and tamper evident seals to provide the required tamper evidence. The following sections illustrate the physical security provided by the module.

Module Opacity

To install an opacity shield on the Catalyst 6500 series switches, follow these steps:

1. The opacity shield is designed to be installed on a Catalyst 6500 series switch chassis that is already rack-mounted. If your Catalyst 6500 series switch chassis is not rack-mounted, install the chassis in the rack using the procedures contained in the Catalyst 6500 Series Switches Installation Guide. If your Catalyst 6500 series switch chassis is already rack-mounted, proceed to step 2.
2. Open the FIPS kit packaging (part number CVPN6500FIPS/KIT=). The kit contains the following items:
 - A packaged opacity shield assembly with installation hardware for the Catalyst 6506 and Catalyst 6506-E switch chassis.
 - A packaged opacity shield assembly with installation hardware for the Catalyst 6509 and Catalyst 6509-E switch chassis.
 - A packaged opacity shield assembly with installation hardware for the Catalyst 6513 and Catalyst 6513-E switch chassis.
 - An envelope with 60 FIPS tamper evidence labels.
 - An envelope containing a disposable ESD wrist strap.
3. Select the appropriate opacity shield kit for your system. Set the other opacity shield kit aside.
4. Open the protective packaging and remove the opacity shield and the two bags of installation hardware. The bag with the part number 69-1497 contains the installation hardware for -E chassis. Select the bag of installation hardware appropriate for your installation. Set the second bag of fasteners aside; you will not need them for this installation.
5. Open the bag of installation hardware (Bag with part number 69-1497) and remove the following: Two M4 thumbscrews, four M4 snap rivet fastener sleeves, and four M4 snap rivet pins.

Note: Extra snap fasteners are included in the bags of installation hardware in case of loss or damage.

Note: Installation hardware from one bag is not interchangeable with the installation hardware from the second bag.

The following figures illustrate the installation of the opacity shields for each platform.




Figure 1: Cisco Catalyst 6506-E Opacity Shield Installation





Figure 2: Cisco Catalyst 6509-E Opacity Shield Installation



302597

Figure 3: Cisco Catalyst 6513-E Opacity Shield Installation

Tamper Evidence

The module is validated when tamper evident labels and security devices are installed on the initially built configuration as indicated. Any changes, modifications or repairs performed after the initially built configuration that requires the removal of any TEL will invalidate the module.

The number of tamper evident labels required for the configuration is dependent on the cards installed in the chassis. The following formula is used to determine the number of tamper evident labels required:

$$\text{Total Labels on each chassis} = 12 + 3X + 4Y + (S-1)$$

Where the following holds true:

12 is the number of fixed labels on each that never change,

X = number of supervisors,

Y = number of line cards,

S = number of slots

Once the module has been configured to meet overall FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements, the module cannot be accessed without signs of tampering. The CO shall inspect for signs of tampering periodically.

If the CO must remove or change TELs (tamper-evidence labels) for any reason, the CO must examine the location from which the TEL was removed and ensure that no residual debris is still remaining on the chassis or card. If residual debris remains, the CO must remove the debris using a damp cloth.

To seal the system, CO should apply TELs as depicted in the figures below. Please notice that the TELs applications illustrated in the figures below are only for two supervisor cards and one line card configuration. For the case of two or more line cards in a single configuration, the Crypto Officer should apply the TELs horizontally to cover each port on the line card below the top one to protect against any unauthorized physical attempts.

The following figures illustrate the installation of the TELs for each platform.




Figure 4: Cisco Catalyst 6506-E TELs Installation




Figure 5: Cisco Catalyst 6509-E TELs Installation




Figure 6: Cisco Catalyst 6513-E TELs Installation

Secure Operation

The Switches meet all the overall Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. Follow the setup instructions provided below to place the module in FIPS-approved mode. Operating this Switch without maintaining the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS approved mode of operation.

Initial Setup

1. The CO must apply opacity shield and tamper evidence labels as described above.

System Initialization and Configuration

1. The value of the boot field must be 0x0102. This setting disables break from the console to the ROM monitor and automatically boots. From the “configure terminal” command line, the CO enters the following syntax:

config-register 0x0102

2. The CO must create the “enable” password for the CO role. Procedurally, the password must be at least 8 characters, including at least one letter and at least one number, and is entered when the CO first engages the “enable” command. The CO enters the following syntax at the “#” prompt:

enable secret [PASSWORD]

3. The CO must always assign passwords (of at least 8 characters, including at least one letter and at least one number) to users. Identification and authentication on the console/auxiliary port is required for Users. From the “configure terminal” command line, the CO enters the following syntax:

**line con 0
password [PASSWORD]
login local**

4. The CO must assign VSS Preshared Master Keys (PMKs) in order to establish the encrypted link between switches. A 16 character ASCII key shall be used in the following command:

**Switch# switch virtual pmk <key>
Switch# conf t
Switch (config)# switch virtual domain <x>
Switch (config-vs-domain)# encryption**

5. The CO enables FIPS mode using the following command:

Switch(config)# fips

6. The CO may configure the module to use RADIUS or TACACS+ for authentication. If the module is configured to use RADIUS, the Crypto-Officer must define RADIUS or shared secret keys that are at least 8 characters long, including at least one letter and at least one number.

7. Firmware update is not allowed in FIPS mode.

8. The CO shall only assign users to a privilege level 1 (the default).
9. The CO shall not assign a command to any privilege level other than its default.

Remote Access

1. SSH access to the module is allowed in FIPS approved mode of operation, using SSH v2 and a FIPS approved algorithm.
2. HTTPS/TLS access to the module is allowed in FIPS approved mode of operation, using SSLv3.1/TLSv1.0 and a FIPS approved algorithm.

Identifying Switch Operation in an Approved Mode

The following activities are required to verify that that the module is operating in an Approved mode of operation.

1. Verify that the tamper evidence labels and FIPS opacity shields have been properly placed on the module based on the instructions specified in the “Physical Security” and “Secure Operation” sections of this document.
2. Verify that the length of User and Crypto Officer passwords and all shared secrets are at least eight (8) characters long, include at least one letter, and include at least one number character, as specified in the “Secure Operation” section of this document.
3. Verified that the output of "The FIPS mode is on" was shown on the Command Line Interface after login Crypto Officer role.

Related Documentation

This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the security appliances in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic device security policy. More information is available on the security appliances from the sources listed in this section and from the following source:

- The NIST Cryptographic Module Validation Program website (<http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html>) contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the security appliances.

Obtaining Documentation

Cisco documentation and additional literature are available on Cisco.com. Cisco also provides several ways to obtain technical assistance and other technical resources. These sections explain how to obtain technical information from Cisco Systems.

Cisco.com

You can access the most current Cisco documentation at this URL:

<http://www.cisco.com/techsupport>

You can access the Cisco website at this URL:

<http://www.cisco.com>

You can access international Cisco websites at this URL:

http://www.cisco.com/public/countries_languages.shtml

Product Documentation DVD

Cisco documentation and additional literature are available in the Product Documentation DVD package, which may have shipped with your product. The Product Documentation DVD is updated regularly and may be more current than printed documentation.

The Product Documentation DVD is a comprehensive library of technical product documentation on portable media. The DVD enables you to access multiple versions of hardware and software installation, configuration, and command guides for Cisco products and to view technical documentation in HTML. With the DVD, you have access to the same documentation that is found on the Cisco website without being connected to the Internet. Certain products also have .pdf versions of the documentation available.

The Product Documentation DVD is available as a single unit or as a subscription. Registered Cisco.com users (Cisco direct customers) can order a Product Documentation DVD (product number DOC-DOCDVD=) from Cisco Marketplace at this URL:

<http://www.cisco.com/go/marketplace/>

Ordering Documentation

Beginning June 30, 2005, registered Cisco.com users may order Cisco documentation at the Product Documentation Store in the Cisco Marketplace at this URL:

<http://www.cisco.com/go/marketplace/>

Nonregistered Cisco.com users can order technical documentation from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. (0800 to 1700) PDT by calling 1 866 463-3487 in the United States and Canada, or elsewhere by calling 011 408 519-5055. You can also order documentation by e-mail at tech-doc-store-mkpl@external.cisco.com or by fax at 1 408 519-5001 in the United States and Canada, or elsewhere at 011 408 519-5001.

Documentation Feedback

You can rate and provide feedback about Cisco technical documents by completing the online feedback form that appears with the technical documents on Cisco.com.

You can send comments about Cisco documentation to bug-doc@cisco.com.

You can submit comments by using the response card (if present) behind the front cover of your document or by writing to the following address:

Cisco Systems
Attn: Customer Document Ordering
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134-9883

We appreciate your comments.

Cisco Product Security Overview

Cisco provides a free online Security Vulnerability Policy portal at this URL:

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html

From this site, you can perform these tasks:

- Report security vulnerabilities in Cisco products.
- Obtain assistance with security incidents that involve Cisco products.
- Register to receive security information from Cisco.

A current list of security advisories and notices for Cisco products is available at this URL:

<http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt>

If you prefer to see advisories and notices as they are updated in real time, you can access a Product Security Incident Response Team Really Simple Syndication (PSIRT RSS) feed from this URL:

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_psirt_rss_feed.html

Reporting Security Problems in Cisco Products

Cisco is committed to delivering secure products. We test our products internally before we release them, and we strive to correct all vulnerabilities quickly. If you think that you might have identified a vulnerability in a Cisco product, contact PSIRT:

- Emergencies — security-alert@cisco.com

An emergency is either a condition in which a system is under active attack or a condition for which a severe and urgent security vulnerability should be reported. All other conditions are considered nonemergencies.

- Nonemergencies — psirt@cisco.com

In an emergency, you can also reach PSIRT by telephone:

- 1 877 228-7302
- 1 408 525-6532

Tip

We encourage you to use Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) or a compatible product to encrypt any sensitive information that you send to Cisco. PSIRT can work from encrypted information that is compatible with PGP versions 2.x through 8.x. Never use a revoked or an expired encryption key. The correct public key to use in your correspondence with PSIRT is the one linked in the Contact Summary section of the Security Vulnerability Policy page at this URL:

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html

The link on this page has the current PGP key ID in use.

Obtaining Technical Assistance

Cisco Technical Support provides 24-hour-a-day award-winning technical assistance. The Cisco Technical Support & Documentation website on Cisco.com features extensive online support resources. In addition, if you have a valid Cisco service contract, Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) engineers provide telephone support. If you do not have a valid Cisco service contract, contact your reseller.

Cisco Technical Support & Documentation Website

The Cisco Technical Support & Documentation website provides online documents and tools for troubleshooting and resolving technical issues with Cisco products and technologies. The website is available 24 hours a day, at this URL:

<http://www.cisco.com/techsupport>

Access to all tools on the Cisco Technical Support & Documentation website requires a Cisco.com user ID and password. If you have a valid service contract but do not have a user ID or password, you can register at this URL:

<http://tools.cisco.com/RPF/register/register.do>

Note

Use the Cisco Product Identification (CPI) tool to locate your product serial number before submitting a web or phone request for service. You can access the CPI tool from the Cisco Technical Support & Documentation website by clicking the **Tools & Resources** link under Documentation & Tools. Choose **Cisco Product Identification Tool** from the Alphabetical Index drop-down list, or click the **Cisco Product Identification Tool** link under Alerts & RMAs. The CPI tool offers three search options: by product ID or model name; by tree view; or for certain products, by copying and pasting **show** command output. Search results show an illustration of your product with the serial number label location highlighted. Locate the serial number label on your product and record the information before placing a service call.

Submitting a Service Request

Using the online TAC Service Request Tool is the fastest way to open S3 and S4 service requests. (S3 and S4 service requests are those in which your network is minimally impaired or for which you require product information.) After you describe your situation, the TAC Service Request Tool provides recommended solutions. If your issue is not resolved using the recommended resources, your service request is assigned to a Cisco engineer. The TAC Service Request Tool is located at this URL:

<http://www.cisco.com/techsupport/servicerequest>

For S1 or S2 service requests or if you do not have Internet access, contact the Cisco TAC by telephone. (S1 or S2 service requests are those in which your production network is down or severely degraded.) Cisco engineers are assigned immediately to S1 and S2 service requests to help keep your business operations running smoothly.

To open a service request by telephone, use one of the following numbers:

Asia-Pacific: +61 2 8446 7411 (Australia: 1 800 805 227) EMEA: +32 2 704 55 55 USA: 1 800 553-2447

For a complete list of Cisco TAC contacts, go to this URL:

<http://www.cisco.com/techsupport/contacts>

Definitions of Service Request Severity

To ensure that all service requests are reported in a standard format, Cisco has established severity definitions.

Severity 1 (S1) – Your network is “down,” or there is a critical impact to your business operations. You and Cisco will commit all necessary resources around the clock to resolve the situation.

Severity 2 (S2) – Operation of an existing network is severely degraded, or significant aspects of your business operation are negatively affected by inadequate performance of Cisco products. You and Cisco will commit full-time resources during normal business hours to resolve the situation.

Severity 3 (S3) – Operational performance of your network is impaired, but most business operations remain functional. You and Cisco will commit resources during normal business hours to restore service to satisfactory levels.

Severity 4 (S4) – You require information or assistance with Cisco product capabilities, installation, or configuration. There is little or no effect on your business operations.

Obtaining Additional Publications and Information

Information about Cisco products, technologies, and network solutions is available from various online and printed sources.

- Cisco Marketplace provides a variety of Cisco books, reference guides, documentation, and logo merchandise. Visit Cisco Marketplace, the company store, at this URL:

<http://www.cisco.com/go/marketplace/>

- *Cisco Press* publishes a wide range of general networking, training and certification titles. Both new and experienced users will benefit from these publications. For current Cisco Press titles and other information, go to Cisco Press at this URL:

<http://www.ciscopress.com>

- *Packet* magazine is the Cisco Systems technical user magazine for maximizing Internet and networking investments. Each quarter, Packet delivers coverage of the latest industry trends, technology breakthroughs, and Cisco products and solutions, as well as network deployment and troubleshooting tips, configuration examples, customer case studies, certification and training information, and links to scores of in-depth online resources. You can access Packet magazine at this URL:

<http://www.cisco.com/packet>

- *iQ Magazine* is the quarterly publication from Cisco Systems designed to help growing companies learn how they can use technology to increase revenue, streamline their business, and expand services. The publication identifies the challenges facing these companies and the technologies to help solve them, using real-world case studies and business strategies to help readers make sound technology investment decisions. You can access iQ Magazine at this URL:

<http://www.cisco.com/go/iqmagazine>

- or view the digital edition at this URL:

<http://ciscoiq.texterity.com/ciscoiq/sample/>

- *Internet Protocol Journal* is a quarterly journal published by Cisco Systems for engineering professionals involved in designing, developing, and operating public and private internets and intranets. You can access the Internet Protocol Journal at this URL:

<http://www.cisco.com/ipj>

- Networking products offered by Cisco Systems, as well as customer support services, can be obtained at this URL:

<http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/index.html>

- Networking Professionals Connection is an interactive website for networking professionals to share questions, suggestions, and information about networking products and technologies with Cisco experts and other networking professionals. Join a discussion at this URL:

<http://www.cisco.com/discuss/networking>

- World-class networking training is available from Cisco. You can view current offerings at this URL:

<http://www.cisco.com/en/US/learning/index.html>

Definition List

AES – Advanced Encryption Standard

CMVP – Cryptographic Module Validation Program

CSEC – Communications Security Establishment Canada

CSP – Critical Security Parameter

CTS – Cisco TrustSec

FIPS – Federal Information Processing Standard

HMAC – Hash Message Authentication Code

HTTP – Hyper Text Transfer Protocol

KAT – Known Answer Test

LED – Light Emitting Diode

MAC – Message Authentication Code

NIST – National Institute of Standards and Technology

NVRAM – Non-Volatile Random Access Memory

RAM – Random Access Memory

RNG – Random Number Generator

SHA – Secure Hash Algorithm

Triple-DES – Triple Data Encryption Standard