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Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy:
Motorola Solutions Cryptographic
Firmware Module
FW Version: R01.07.00
Document Version: 1.2
Date: March 17, 2021
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................4
1.1 Module Description and Cryptographic Boundary ......................................................................6
2 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................6
2.1 Approved Mode Configuration ....................................................................................................7
3 Cryptographic Functionality...........................................................................................7
3.1 Critical Security Parameters.........................................................................................................8
4 Roles, Authentication and Services ................................................................................9
4.1 Assumption of Roles.....................................................................................................................9
4.2 Services.........................................................................................................................................9
5 Self-Tests..................................................................................................................... 13
5.1 Power-up Self-Tests....................................................................................................................13
5.2 Conditional Self-Tests.................................................................................................................13
6 Physical Security Policy................................................................................................ 13
7 Operational Environment ............................................................................................ 13
8 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy................................................................................ 14
9 Security Rules and Guidance ........................................................................................ 14
9.1 Invariant Rules............................................................................................................................14
10 References and Definitions .......................................................................................... 15
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List of Tables
Table 1: FIPS Validated Operating Environment...........................................................................................4
Table 2: Historical FIPS 140-2 Validation Status ...........................................................................................4
Table 3: FIPS Non-Validated Operating Environment...................................................................................4
Table 4 – Security Level of Security Requirements.......................................................................................5
Table 5 – Ports and Interfaces ......................................................................................................................6
Table 6 – Approved Algorithms ....................................................................................................................7
Table 7: Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions....................................................................8
Table 8 – Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions.......................................................................................8
Table 9 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) ...............................................................................................8
Table 10 – Roles Description.........................................................................................................................9
Table 11 – Services......................................................................................................................................10
Table 12 – Security Parameters Access by Service .....................................................................................12
Table 13 – References.................................................................................................................................15
Table 14 – Acronyms and Definitions .........................................................................................................16
List of Figures
Figure 1: Module Block Diagram...................................................................................................................6
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1 Introduction
This document defines the Security Policy for the Motorola Solutions Cryptographic Firmware Module,
hereafter denoted the module. The module is a firmware based cryptographic module that runs on
Motorola GRV8000 hardware platform. The module provides FIPS 140-2 approved cryptographic
functionalities via Application Programming Interface (API) to the application layer running in Motorola
Solutions GRV 8000 Comparator product and supporting APCO Project 25 standard.
The module is intended for use by the markets that require FIPS 140-2 validated overall security level 1.
Firmware Version: R01.07.00
Table 1: FIPS Validated Operating Environment
Format Operating System Hardware Platform Processor
Static library (.lib) Enea OSE, Version
5.8
Motorola Solutions GRV 8000
Comparator
NXP QorIQ P1021
The module was previously FIPS 140-2 validated on the following FW/SW versions as listed in Table 2.
Table 2: Historical FIPS 140-2 Validation Status
CMVP Cert# FW/SW Version
3087 R01.01.02 (FW)
3181 R01.03.00 (SW)
The module also runs on the following OEs shown in Table 3 when complied with compatible cross
compiler; however, no target testing was performed for FIPS 140-2 validation with this firmware version.
Note: the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module on the operational
environments for which operational testing was not performed.
Table 3: FIPS Non-Validated Operating Environment
Format Operating System Hardware Platform and Processor
Static library (.lib) Mentor Graphics Nucleus 3.0
(version 2013.08.1)
ARM926EJ-S core of Texas Instrument (TI)
OMAP-L138 C6000 DSP+ARM
Static library (.lib) Texas Instrument (TI)
DSP/BIOS 5.41.04.18
TMS320C674x DSP core of Texas Instrument
(TI) OMAP-L138 C6000 DSP+ARM
Shared object (.so) Linux 2.6.32-
358.23.2.el6.x86_64
GNU/Linux
HP ProLiant Gen8 Intel Servers, Intel(R) Xeon(R)
CPU E5-4620 v2 @ 2.60GHz
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Dynamic-Linked
Library (.dll)
Microsoft Windows 7 and 10
Professional
HP ZBook 15 G3 Mobile Workstation, Intel Core
i7
The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the module are as follows:
Table 4 – Security Level of Security Requirements
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security 1
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 1
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall 1
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1.1 Module Description and Cryptographic Boundary
The module is classified by FIPS 140-2 as a firmware module, and multi-chip standalone module
embodiment. The physical cryptographic boundary is the general-purpose computer on which the
module is installed. The logical cryptographic boundary of the module is the static linked library that is
linked into the application running on Motorola Solution GRV 8000 Comparator Hardware Platform.
The module’s ports and associated FIPS defined logical interface categories are listed in Table 5.
Table 5 – Ports and Interfaces
Logical Interface Type Description
Control input API entry point and corresponding stack parameters
Data input API entry point data input stack parameters
Status output API entry point return values and status stack parameters
Data output API entry point data output stack parameters
2 Modes of Operation
The module can be configured to operate in a FIPS 140-2 Approved mode of operation and a non-
Approved mode of operation. At any given time, the FIPS mode service can be used to determine whether
the module is operating in FIPS approved or non-FIPS Approved mode.
• FIPS Approved mode: DES Voice/Data Encryption/Decryption are blocked. All other services listed
in the Section 4.2 are available when the module is operating in FIPS Approved mode.
• FIPS non-Approved mode: All services listed in the Section 4.2 are available when the module is
operating in FIPS Non-Approved mode.
Application
(Out of validation scope)
Motorola Solutions
Cryptographic Firmware
Module
Operating System
(Enea OSE)
Hardware Platform
(Motorola Solutions GRV 8000 Comparator)
System calls (ex, malloc, free)
Logical Boundary
Application Layer
API Call
Figure 1: Module Block Diagram
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The Version Query service can also be used to verify the firmware version matches an approved version
listed on NIST’s website: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html
2.1 Approved Mode Configuration
The module powers up in FIPS approved mode by default. The operator can put the module in FIPS non-
Approved mode by calling “Set FIPS mode” service. The operator shall zeroize all CSPs by power cycling
the module when transitioning between FIPS 140-2 Approved and non-Approved modes. The operator
must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
3 Cryptographic Functionality
The module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved-but-Allowed cryptographic functions
listed in the following tables.
Table 6 – Approved Algorithms
Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions/Caveats
C1709 AES [197]
ECB [38A] Key Sizes: 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
CBC [38A] Key Sizes: 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
OFB [38A] Key Sizes: 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
GCM [38D]1
Key Sizes: 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
C1712 AES [SP800-38F] KW Key Sizes: 256 Key Wrapping
C1711 DRBG [90A] CTR2
AES-256
Deterministic Random
Bit Generation
C1710 HMAC [198-1] HMAC-SHA-384
Key Size: 1024 bit3
Message authentication,
Code Integrity tests
C1712 KTS [38F] KW Key Sizes: 256 Key establishment
methodology provides
256 bits of encryption
strength
C1709 KTS [IG D.9] GCM Key Sizes: 256
A493 PBKDF [132]
With HMAC-
SHA3844
sLen = 16 – 512 bytes
C = 1 – 100,000
Password Based Key
Derivation
1 Per IG A.5, the module generates GCM IVs randomly as specified in SP800-38D section 8.2.2 using approved DRBG (Cert.
#C1711).
2 The entropy for seeding the SP 800-90A DRBG is determined by the user of the module which is outside of the module’s logical
boundary. The target application shall use entropy sources that meet the security strength required for the random number
generation mechanism as shown in [SP 800-90A] Table 3 (CTR_DRBG) and set required bits into the module by calling module
defined API function. Since entropy is loaded passively into the module, there is no assurance of the minimum strength of
generated keys.
3 HMAC-SHA-384 supports keys sizes from 192-1024 bit but only 1024 bit was CAVP tested. Only the key size of 1024 bit shall be
used in FIPS Approved Mode
4 PBKDF was tested for HMAC SHA-256, 384 and 512. HMAC SHA256 and HMAC SHA 512 have not been CAVP tested. Only PBKDF
HMAC SHA-384 can be used in approved mode.
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Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions/Caveats
Option 1a, 2a
SHA2 (384)
C1710 SHS [180]
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
N/A
Message Digest
Generation, Password
Obfuscation
Table 7: Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description
AES MAC [IG G.13]
AES MAC for Project 25 APCO OTAR (Cert. #C1709)
The following FIPS non-Approved algorithms are only supported when the module operates in FIPS non-
approved mode:
Table 8 – Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description
DES DES Encryption/Decryption – ECB, OFB and CBC Mode
HMAC-SHA 256,
HMAC-SHA 512
Available only through the PBKDF API but not CAVP tested. Not to be used in
Approved mode
3.1 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs used by the module are described in this section. Usage of these CSPs by the module (including
all CSP lifecycle states) is described in the services detailed in the Section 4. All CSPs are stored plaintext
in the volatile memory while in use, and zeroized by power cycling the module. The user of the module
may change the mode of operation to FIPS non-Approved mode by calling “Set FIPS Mode” Service listed
in the Section 10.2. The operator shall zeroize all CSPs by power cycling the module when transitioning
between FIPS 140-2 Approved and non-Approved modes.
Table 9 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
CSP Description / Usage
SP800-90A Seed 384-bit seed value used within the SP800-90A DRBG.
SP800-90A Internal State (“V”
and “Key”)
Internal state of SP800-90A CTR_DRBG (V and Key).
Keyed Hash Key Key used for generating HMAC SHA384 Message Authentication Code.
AES-256 Encrypt Key AES-256 key used for voice and data encryption.
AES-256 Decrypt Key AES-256 key used for voice and data decryption.
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CSP Description / Usage
AES-256 Key Encrypt Key Key used for AES Key Wrapping
AES-256 Key Decrypt Key Key used for AES Key Unwrapping
PBKDF Secret Value PBKDF [SP 800-132] Secret value used in construction of Keyed‐Hash
key for the specified PRF.
OTAR MAC Key AES256 key used for APCO OTAR MAC Generation
4 Roles, Authentication and Services
4.1 Assumption of Roles
The module supports two distinct operator roles, User and Cryptographic Officer (CO). A user is
considered the owner of the thread that instantiates the module and, therefore, only one concurrent
user is allowed.
Table 10 lists all operator roles supported by the module. The module does not support a maintenance
role and/or bypass capability.
Table 10 – Roles Description
Role ID Role Description Authentication Type
CO Cryptographic Officer N/A – Authentication not required for Level 1
User User N/A – Authentication not required for Level 1
4.2 Services
All services supported by the module are listed in the Table 11 below. Note that all services listed in Table
11 below are available in both FIPS Approved and non-Approved mode.
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Table 11 – Services
Service Description
Role
FIPS
Operational
Mode
CO
User
Approved
Non-Approved
Self-Tests
The GRV 8000 Comparator will call the static
constructor for self-tests on module initialization.
X X X X
Initialize Used to configure the module. X X X X
Show Status
Show the module status, version number, and FIPS
status.
X X X X
Initialization Status Query Show the status of the module initialization X X X X
Version Query Query module version X X X X
Utility
Used to retrieve various information such as alg id,
key validity, esync size, etc. out of the module.
X X X X
Set FIPS Mode Set FIPS operational mode X X X X
Get FIPS Mode Get FIPS operational mode X X X X
AES-256 Encryption Voice AES-256 encrypt of voice X X X X
AES-256 Decryption Voice AES-256 decrypt of voice X X X X
AES-256 Encryption Data AES256 encrypt of data X X X X
AES-256 Decryption Data AES-256 decrypt of data X X X X
DES Encrypt Voice DES encrypt of voice X X − X
DES Decrypt Voice DES decrypt of voice X X − X
DES Encrypt Data DES encrypt of data X X − X
DES Decrypt Data DES decrypt of data X X − X
AES Key Wrapping
Used to encrypt of keys using the AES Key Wrap
[SP 800-38F] algorithm.
X X X X
AES Key Unwrapping
Used to decrypt of keys using the AES Key Wrap
[SP 800-38F] algorithm.
X X X X
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Service Description
Role
FIPS
Operational
Mode
CO
User
Approved
Non-Approved
Generate OTAR MAC
Used to generate MAC (Message Authentication
Code) as defined in [OTAR].
X X X X
DRBG
Used for random number, IV and key generation
using DRBG [SP 800-90A].
X X X X
SHA-256 Used to generate SHA-256 message digest. X X X X
SHA-384 Used to generate SHA-384 message digest. X X X X
SHA-512 Used to generate SHA-512 message digest. X X X X
HMAC-SHA384 Used to calculate data integrity codes with HMAC. X X X X
Zeroize5
Zeroize all CSPs X X X X
PBKDF6
Used to generate keys using PBKDF [SP 800-132] X X X X
Table 12 defines the relationship between access to the security parameters and the different module
services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as:
• S = Store CSP: Stores CSP in the volatile memory. The module uses CSPs passed in by the calling
application on the stack.
• U = Use CSP: Uses key internally for encryption/decryption services.
• Z = Zeroize: The service zeroizes the CSP in the volatile memory.
• - = No access: The service does not access the CSP.
The target operating system protects memory and process space from unauthorized access. Keys residing
in the module's internally allocated data structure during the lifetime of the services can only be accessed
5
The zeroize service zeroizes the key in the volatile memory by power cycling the module. Also an
application calling the API (End_Stream) as a part of cipher operations will zeroize the key in the volatile
memory.
6
As per NIST SP 800-132, keys generated by the module shall be used as recommend in section 5.4 of
[132]. Any other use of the approved PBKDF is non‐conformant. In approved mode the operator shall
enter a password no less than 8 hexadecimal digits in length. The probability of guessing the password
will be equal to 1:168
. The iteration count associated with the PBKDF should be as large as practical.
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through the APIs provided by the module. The keys can be zeroized in the module's volatile memory by
calling appropriate API function.
Table 12 – Security Parameters Access by Service
Services
CSPs
AES-256
Encrypt
Key
AES-256
Decrypt
Key
Keyed
Hash
Key
(384)
SP800-90A
Seed
SP800-90A
Internal
State
(V
and
Key)
AES-256
Key
Encrypt
Key
AES-256
Key
Decrypt
Key
OTAR
MAC
Key
PBKDF
Secret
Value
Self-Tests − − − − − − − − −
Initialize − − − − − − − − −
Show Status − − − − − − − − −
Initialization Status Query − − − − − − − − −
Version Query − − − − − − − − −
Utility − − − − − − − − −
Set FIPS Mode − − − − − − − − −
Get FIPS Mode − − − − − − − − −
AES-256 Encryption Voice U,S,Z − − − U − − − −
AES-256 Decryption
Voice
− U,S,Z − − − − − − −
AES-256 Encryption Data U,S,Z − − − U − − − −
AES-256 Decryption Data − U,S,Z − − − − − − −
DES Encrypt Voice − − − − − − − − −
DES Decrypt Voice − − − − − − − − −
DES Encrypt Data − − − − − − − − −
DES Decrypt Data − − − − − − − − −
AES Key Wrapping − − − − U U,S,Z − − −
AES Key Unwrapping − − − − − − U,S,Z − −
Generate OTAR MAC − − − − − − − U,S, Z −
DRBG − − − U,S U,S − − − −
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Services
CSPs
AES-256
Encrypt
Key
AES-256
Decrypt
Key
Keyed
Hash
Key
(384)
SP800-90A
Seed
SP800-90A
Internal
State
(V
and
Key)
AES-256
Key
Encrypt
Key
AES-256
Key
Decrypt
Key
OTAR
MAC
Key
PBKDF
Secret
Value
SHA-256 − − − − − − − − −
SHA384 − − − − − − − − −
SHA512 − − − − − − − − −
HMAC-SHA384 − − U,S − − − − − −
PBKDF − − − − − − − − U
Zeroize Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
5 Self-Tests
5.1 Power-up Self-Tests
• Cryptographic algorithm tests
o AES256 Encrypt/Decrypt (ECB, OFB, CBC, GCM) KAT (AES Cert. #C1709)
o AES256 KW [SP800-38F] Encrypt/Decrypt KAT (AES Cert. #C1712)
o SHA-256/384/512 KAT
o HMAC-SHA384 KAT
o DRBG [SP 800-90A] KAT (Instantiate and Generate)
o PBKDF [SP 800-132]
• Firmware integrity test: HMAC-SHA-384
5.2 Conditional Self-Tests
• Random bit generation tests
o DRBG Continuous Tests
o SP800-90A Health Tests (Instantiate and Generate)
6 Physical Security Policy
The module is firmware only and operates in the Motorola Solutions GRV 8000 Comparator that is built
with production grade materials. For the purposes of FIPS 140-2, the embodiment is defined as a multiple-
chip standalone cryptographic module and is designed to meet Level 1 security requirements.
7 Operational Environment
The MSCFM operates and was tested on the following non-modifiable operational environment:
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• Motorola Solutions GRV 8000 Comparator on NXP QorIQ P1021.
8 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The module is not designed to mitigate any specific attacks outside of those required by FIPS 140-2.
9 Security Rules and Guidance
The module enforces the following security rules. These rules are separated into those imposed by FIPS
140-2 and those imposed by Motorola Solutions.
9.1 Invariant Rules
1. The module does not provide any operator authentication.
2. The module is available to perform services only after successfully completing the power-up
self-tests.
3. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and while in critical error
state.
4. The module shall not support a concurrent operator.
5. The module enters the Uninitialized state if any power-up self-tests or conditional self-tests fail.
The Uninitialized state can be exited by restarting the module.
6. The module does not perform any cryptographic functions while in the Uninitialized state.
7. The module returns the results of the power-up and integrity self-tests to the operator.
8. The module may be power cycled to zeroize all CSPs.
9. The module is to be installed on Motorola Solutions GRV 8000 Comparator products.
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10 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 13 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program
[131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic
Algorithms and Key Lengths, March 2019
[132] NIST Special Publication 800-132, Recommendation for Password-Based Key
Derivation, Part 1: Storage Applications, December 2010
[133r2] NIST Special Publication 800-133 Revision 1, Recommendation for Cryptographic
Key Generation, June 2020
[186] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July 2013.
[197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26,
2001
[198] National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
198-1, July, 2008
[180] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015
[38A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A,
December 2001
[38B] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, Special Publication 800-
38B, October 2016
[38D] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication
800-38D, November 2007
[38F] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, Special Publication 800-38F,
December 2012
[90A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random
Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special
Publication 800-90A, June 2015.
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Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[OTAR] Project 25 – Digital Radio Over-The-Air-Rekeying (OTAR) Messages and Procedures
[TIA-102.AACA-A], September 2014
Table 14 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CKG Cryptographic Key Generation
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DES Data Encryption Standard
DPK Data Protection Key
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
HMAC Keyed-hash Hash Message Authentication Code
IV Initialization Vector
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
MAC Message Authentication Code
MK Master Key
OFB Output Feedback
PBKDF Password-Based Key Derivation Function
RTOS Real-Time Operating System
SHS Secure Hash Standard
VA Vendor Affirmed