Page 1 of 28
Focus Systems Corporation
MonoCrypt AES Enhanced Crypto Library
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Table of Contents
1 General................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................ 5
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 6
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 7
2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 7
2.5 Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 8
2.6 Security Function Implementations................................................................................... 9
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................10
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................10
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................10
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................10
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................10
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................10
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................10
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................11
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................11
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................11
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................11
4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................14
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................14
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................15
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................15
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................15
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................15
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................15
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................16
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................16
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................16
9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................16
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................16
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................16
9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................17
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10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................17
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................17
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................18
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................22
10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................23
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests .....................................................................................24
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................24
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................24
11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................26
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................27
11.4 Design and Rules ..........................................................................................................27
11.5 Maintenance Requirements...........................................................................................27
11.6 End of Life .....................................................................................................................27
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................28
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets).... 7
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid .................................. 7
Table 4: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 8
Table 5: Approved Algorithms.................................................................................................... 8
Table 6: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms........................................................................ 9
Table 7: Security Function Implementations............................................................................... 9
Table 8: Ports and Interfaces ....................................................................................................10
Table 9: Roles...........................................................................................................................11
Table 10: Approved Services ....................................................................................................14
Table 11: Non-Approved Services.............................................................................................14
Table 12: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................16
Table 13: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................16
Table 14: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................17
Table 15: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................17
Table 16: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................17
Table 17: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................18
Table 18: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................21
Table 19: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................22
Table 20: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................23
Table 21: Error States...............................................................................................................24
List of Figures
Figure 1: Block Diagram............................................................................................................. 6
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1 General
1.1 Overview
MonoCrypt AES Enhanced Crypto Library (MonoCrypt AES) is Software module. It runs on
general-purpose computing system.
This module complies with FIPS140-3 requirement level 1 and is defined as Ver3.0.0.
The requirements of FIPS140-3 and the security levels for module are as follows.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 1
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security N/A
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
This product is a cryptographic software library. Applications running on a general-purpose
computing system can use various cryptographic services by calling the C or C++ language
API. This product is currently configured as a standalone module in the form of a shared library.
Module Type: Software
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
Cryptographic Boundary:
The cryptographic boundary for the Module is comprised of the following six files: CSL.h,
CSL_AES.h, CSL_AES_KEY_WRAP.h, MonoCrypt.lib, MonoCrypt.dll, and libMonoCrypt.so.
Among these, the integrity test is performed only on the executable binary files, MonoCrypt.dll
and libMonoCrypt.so, when they are loaded into RAM for execution. The header files (CSL.h,
CSL_AES.h, CSL_AES_KEY_WRAP.h) and the import library (MonoCrypt.lib) are excluded
from the integrity test. This exclusion is justified because these files are development-time
resources used solely for compiling and linking the calling application; they do not contain any
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executable cryptographic logic or sensitive security parameters that reside within the operational
RAM during the module's execution.
Figure 1: Block Diagram
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
The “MonoCrypt.dll” is a module for Windows. It is separated into 32-bit and 64-bit versions.
The “libMonoCrypt.so” is a module for Linux and AIX. A 64-bit version is provided.
Package or File
Name
Software/ Firmware
Version
Features Integrity Test
MonoCrypt.dll
(Windows_32bit)
3.0.0 HAMC-SHA2-256
MonoCrypt.dll
(Windows_64bit)
3.0.0 HAMC-SHA2-256
Black line: Physical connection
Blue line: API command
Green Line: API command with
“Data Input”, “Data Output”, “Control
Input”, or “Status Output”
Red line: Internal Data
Page 7 of 28
Package or File
Name
Software/ Firmware
Version
Features Integrity Test
libMonoCrypt.so
(AIX_64bit)
3.1.0 HAMC-SHA2-256
libMonoCrypt.so
(Linux_64bit)
3.0.0 HAMC-SHA2-256
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Operating
System
Hardware
Platform
Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor or Host
OS
Version(s)
Windows11
Pro
Dell Optiplex
5090
11th Gen
Intel®
Core(TM) i7-
11700 @
2.50GHz
No N/A 3.0.0
Windows
Server 2025
Dell
PowerEdge
R430
Intel® Xeon®
CPU E5-2620
v4 @ 2.10GHz
No Hyper-
V10.0.14393.0 on
Windows Server
2016 Standard
3.0.0
Redhat
Enterprise
Linux 10.1
Dell Optiplex
5090
11th Gen
Intel®
Core(TM) i7-
11700 @
2.50GHz
No Hyper-V
10.0.22621.4249 on
Windows 11 Pro
3.0.0
AIX 7.3 IBM Power
System
S814+
POWER8
3.026 GHz
No N/A 3.0.0
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
2.3 Excluded Components
N/A for this module.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
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Mode
Name
Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
mode
When the module is loaded and
passes the pre-operational self-test, it
operates in the Approved mode of
operation.
Approved CSL_OutputAppr
ovalMode service called
after a service call returns
0x00000102.
Non-
Approved
mode
When a service is called under the
parameter conditions of the Non-
Approved mode described in Section
2.5, the module implicitly transitions to
the Non-Approved mode of operation.
Non-
Approved
CSL_OutputAppr
ovalMode service called
after a service call returns
0x00000103.
Table 4: Modes List and Description
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CBC A8008,
A8009
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A8008,
A8009
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 8-128
Increment 8
Supports Counter larger than maximum value
- No
Incremental Counter - Yes
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A8008,
A8009
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-KW A8008,
A8009
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Cipher - Cipher
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 192, 256,
320, 512, 1024
SP 800-38F
AES-KWP A8008,
A8009
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Cipher - Cipher
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 8, 24, 64,
96, 1024
SP 800-38F
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A8008,
A8009
MAC - MAC: 128, 192, 256
Key Length - Key Length: 160, 192, 512, 576,
640
FIPS 198-1
SHA2-256 A8008,
A8009
Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 5: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
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N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
Name Use and Function
AES-KW per RFC3394 A key wrapping functionality per RFC3394
AES-KWP per RFC5649 A key wrapping functionality per RFC5649
Table 6: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms
If a non-null arbitrary value is set to “Integrity data” parameter for AES-KW or AES-KWP, the
algorithm becomes Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SW Integrity test MAC Used in the
software
integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A8008,
A8009)
SHA2-256:
(A8008, A8009)
AES BC-UnAuth AES -
Unauthenticated
Cipher
AES-CBC:
(A8008, A8009)
AES-CTR:
(A8008, A8009)
AES-ECB:
(A8008, A8009)
KeyWrap BC-Auth AES KeyWrap
Cipher
AES-KW:
(A8008, A8009)
AES-KWP:
(A8008, A8009)
Table 7: Security Function Implementations
Page 10 of 28
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
The module does not establish SSPs using an approved key transport scheme (KTS). However,
it does offer approved authenticated algorithms that can be used by an external
operator/application as part of an approved KTS.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
N/A for this module.
N/A for this module.
2.9 Key Generation
N/A for this module.
2.10 Key Establishment
N/A for this module.
2.11 Industry Protocols
N/A for this module.
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
N/A Data Input Cryptographic Function API Input Data
N/A Data Output Cryptographic Function API Output Data
N/A Control
Input
API function calls
N/A Status
Output
The following data elements are output from the support function
APIs: -Module SelfTest Status Information -Module Approved mode
Status Information - Module Version Information
Table 8: Ports and Interfaces
This cryptographic module provides only logical interfaces via API. It does not provide any direct
interface to the physical ports. The logical interface is a C language application programming
interface (API), and its mapping is shown in Ports and Interfaces Table. When the module is
performing self-tests or is in an error state, all output on the logical data output interface is
prohibited.
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The logical interfaces for the MonoCrypt AES cryptographic module are defined by the input
arguments of its API functions. These interfaces are categorized into the following types of
information flow:
• Data Input: Plaintext and ciphertext to be processed.
• Control Input: Control parameters that govern the module's operations.
• CSP Input: Critical Security Parameters (CSPs), such as key information. Data output
during CSP Input is inhibited because the control is not returned to the superior
application until the API processing is complete.
Data Flow and Memory Management
These inputs are passed to the cryptographic module via buffer areas in memory defined by the
superior application. Similarly, the Data Output (such as processed results) and Status Output
(such as error codes or operation status) are returned to the application through memory buffers
pre-allocated by the application.
The application is responsible for subsequently directing this output to various physical devices
as required.
The data flow is depicted in the block diagram provided in Section 2.1.
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
N/A for this module.
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Role CO None
Table 9: Roles
Since the Module only defines the Crypto Officer (CO) role, all services are implicitly permitted
to and associated with the CO role.
The Module operates in a logically separated single-user environment by leveraging the process
separation mechanisms of the General-Purpose Operating System (GPOS). Even in scenarios
where multiple users or processes are active on the OS, each instance of the Module is
confined to a specific process memory space, ensuring that only one operator at a time can
access that specific instance. Consequently, the Module does not support concurrent operators
within a single cryptographic boundary instance.
4.3 Approved Services
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Output
s
Securi
ty
Functi
ons
SSP
Acce
ss
AES_Enc AES
Encryption
CSL_OutputAppr
ovalMode service
-key -
PlainText
Cipher
Text
AES Crypt
o
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Output
s
Securi
ty
Functi
ons
SSP
Acce
ss
called after this
service returns
0x00000102
or
CipherText
-iv -
Algorithm
mode
Office
r
- AES
Key:
W,E,
Z
AES_Dec AES
Decryption
CSL_OutputAppr
ovalMode service
called after this
service returns
0x00000102
-key -
PlainText
or
CipherText
-iv -
Algorithm
mode
PlainT
ext
AES Crypt
o
Office
r
- AES
Key:
W,E,
Z
AES_Stream
Initialize
Initialize in
AES_Strea
m
CSL_OutputAppr
ovalMode service
called after this
service returns
0x00000102
-key -
PlainText
or
CipherText
-iv -
Algorithm
mode
Object
ID
AES Crypt
o
Office
r
- AES
Key:
W,E
AES_Stream
Enc/Dec
Encryption
or
Decryption
in
AES_Strea
m
CSL_OutputAppr
ovalMode service
called after this
service returns
0x00000102
-Object ID
-PlainText
or
CipherText
Cipher
Text or
PlainT
ext
AES Crypt
o
Office
r
- AES
Key:
E
AES_Stream
Final
Finalization
in
AES_Strea
m
CSL_OutputAppr
ovalMode service
called after this
service returns
0x00000102
Object ID Cipher
Text or
PlainT
ext
AES Crypt
o
Office
r
- AES
Key:
E,Z
AES_Stream
Release Object
SSP
Release in
AES_Strea
m
CSL_OutputAppr
ovalMode service
called after this
service returns
0x00000102
Object ID - None Crypt
o
Office
r
- AES
Key:
Z
AES_GetMAxLen
gth
Calculate
the
maximum
byte length
CSL_OutputAppr
ovalMode service
called after this
-Object ID
-Input data
length
Output
data
length
None Crypt
o
Office
r
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Output
s
Securi
ty
Functi
ons
SSP
Acce
ss
of the
output data
from AES
encryption
or
decryption
relative to
the data
byte length
of the input
data
service returns
0x00000102
AES_KeyWrap Encryption
In
AES_KeyW
rap
CSL_OutputAppr
ovalMode service
called after this
service returns
0x00000102
- key -
PlainText
or
CipherText
- Algorithm
mode(KW/
KWP)
Cipher
Text
KeyWr
ap
Crypt
o
Office
r
-
KeyW
rap
Key:
W,E,
Z
AES_KeyUnWrap Decryption
In
AES_KeyW
rap
CSL_OutputAppr
ovalMode service
called after this
service returns
0x00000102
- key -
PlainText
or
CipherText
- Algorithm
mode(KW/
KWP)
PlainT
ext
KeyWr
ap
Crypt
o
Office
r
-
KeyW
rap
Key:
W,E,
Z
OnDemondSelfte
st
Selftest OutputStatus
service called
after this service
returns 0
- - SW
Integrit
y test
Crypt
o
Office
r
OutputStatus Get Status
Indicator
- - Module
SelfTe
st
Status
Inform
ation
None Crypt
o
Office
r
ShowVersion Get Module
version
- - Module
Versio
n
Inform
ation
None Crypt
o
Office
r
Page 14 of 28
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Output
s
Securi
ty
Functi
ons
SSP
Acce
ss
CSL_OutputAppr
ovalMode
Get
Indicator for
previously
executed
KeyWrap
&AES
- - Module
Approv
ed
mode
Status
Inform
ation
None Crypt
o
Office
r
FIPS140_2_Zeroi
zation
Zeroization
executed
before
returning
from
AES_Enc
service,
AES_Dec
service,
AES_Strea
m Final
service,
AES_Strea
m Release
Object
service,
AES_KeyW
rap service,
and
AES_KeyU
nWrap
service.
- - - None Crypt
o
Office
r
- AES
Key:
Z
-
KeyW
rap
Key:
Z
Table 10: Approved Services
4.4 Non-Approved Services
Name Description Algorithms Role
AES_KeyWrap_Non-
Approved
Encryption or Decryption in
AES_KeyWrap per RFC3394 or
RFC5649
AES-KW per
RFC3394
AES-KWP per
RFC5649
Crypto
Officer
Table 11: Non-Approved Services
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module does not support external software loading.
Page 15 of 28
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
Since this cryptographic module is a software module, it handles software security.
To ensure software security within the cryptographic module, the integrity of the modules
belonging to the cryptographic boundary except for CSL.h, CSL_AES.h,
CSL_AES_KEY_WRAP.h, and MonoCrypt.lib is checked upon module load into the RAM to be
executed as follows.
Since this cryptographic module is a software module, it handles software security
requirements. To ensure software security within the cryptographic module, an integrity test is
performed on the binary file that constitutes the logical cryptographic boundary.
The integrity of MonoCrypt.dll (and libMonoCrypt.so for UNIX-like systems) is checked upon
module load into the RAM to be executed. The reference files used for application development,
specifically header files (CSL.h, CSL_AES.h, CSL_AES_KEY_WRAP.h) and the import library
(MonoCrypt.lib), are excluded from this integrity check. This is because these files are utilized
only during the compilation and linking phases of the calling application and do not contain the
executable cryptographic logic that resides within the cryptographic boundary during runtime.
・A MAC value is provided for integrity testing of this software library, calculated using the
HMAC-SHA2-256 algorithm.
・This calculated MAC value for integrity testing is embedded as part of the library.
・The cryptographic library performs an integrity check when executing a pre-operational self-
test upon loading or an on-demand self-test. This check compares the stored integrity test MAC
value with the library's integrity test MAC value calculated in real-time using HMAC-SHA2-256.
Header files are excluded from the integrity test because they contain only function declarations,
constant definitions, and structure definitions. As text-based source files used only during
compilation, they do not contain executable code and are not loaded into RAM during module
execution.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
OnDemondSelftest service is provided to execute an integrity test, allowing the state of the
cryptographic module to be checked at any time.
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable
The Module runs in a Modifiable Operational Environment as defined by FIPS 140-3. The
Module has been tested for operation on the specific operating systems and hardware platforms
identified in Section 2.2.
Page 16 of 28
The Module is implemented as a software-only cryptographic module in the form of a shared
library (a DLL on Windows and a Shared Object on Linux and AIX), which operates under the
control of a General-Purpose Operating System (GPOS). While the Module is executing, the
GPOS is responsible for maintaining a logically separated, single-user operational environment
for the process. The Module performs the functions described in Section 4 (Roles and
Services).
7 Physical Security
N/A for this module.
8 Non-Invasive Security
N/A for this module.
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
RAM Random Access Memory Dynamic
Table 12: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Key
Input
RAM of the superior
application
RAM Plaintext Manual Electronic
Table 13: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Zero
OverWriting
In the zeroization
Internal function,
the relevant
Zeroization is
performed on the
variables (buffers)
Zeroization is implemented as an
internal function within the
cryptographic services and,
Page 17 of 28
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
memory area is
zeroed out
(cleared) using the
memset function.
Following this
zeroization, the
buffer is then
released.
that contain Critical
Security Parameters
(CSPs) when they
are no longer
needed, typically
near the end of the
cryptographic
service execution.
therefore, does not require
discretionary execution by the
operator. Note that zeroization for
AES_Stream Initialize service and
AES_Stream
Encryption/Decryption service is
performed in AES_Stream Final
service or AES_Stream Release
Object service as a sequential
service.
Table 14: SSP Zeroization Methods
9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
AES Key AES key
used for
encryption
and
decryption
128,192.256
bits -
128,192.256
bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
Outside
the module
AES
KeyWrap
Key
KeyWrap key
used for AES
key
encryption
and AES key
decryption
128,192.256
bits -
128,192.256
bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
Outside
the module
KeyWrap
Table 15: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related
SSPs
AES Key Key
Input
RAM:Plaintext input until Zero
OverWriting
Zero
OverWriting
KeyWrap
Key
Key
Input
RAM:Plaintext input until Zero
OverWriting
Zero
OverWriting
Table 16: SSP Table 2
The Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) for the cryptographic module are input by the
superior application, which must execute with the same privilege level as the cryptographic
module.
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Page 18 of 28
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details
SW
Integrity
Test
HMAC-
SHA2-256
MAC
verification
SW/FW
Integrity
OutputStatus
service returns
0
The integrity of the
modules belonging to
the cryptographic
boundary is checked
upon module load into
the RAM to be executed
Table 17: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorith
m or
Test
Test Properties Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-
ECB
Encryptio
n
(A8008)
Key:128/192/256b
its
KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
Encryptio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed or by
calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
AES-
ECB
Decryptio
n
(A8008)
Key:128/192/256b
its
KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
Decryptio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed or by
calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
AES-
CBC
Encryptio
n
(A8008)
Key:128/192/256b
its
KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
Encryptio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed or by
calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
AES-
CBC
Decryptio
n
(A8008)
Key:128/192/256b
its
KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
Decryptio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed or by
calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
AES-
CTR
Encryptio
n
(A8008)
Key:128/192/256b
its
KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
Encryptio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed or by
calling
Page 19 of 28
Algorith
m or
Test
Test Properties Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
OnDemondSelft
est service
AES-
CTR
Decryptio
n
(A8008)
Key:128/192/256b
its
KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
Decryptio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed or by
calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
AES-KW
Encryptio
n
(A8008)
Key:128/192/256b
its
KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
Encryptio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed or by
calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
AES-KW
Decryptio
n
(A8008)
Key:128/192/256b
its
KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
Decryptio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed or by
calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
AES-
KWP
Encryptio
n
(A8008)
Key:128/192/256b
its
KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
Encryptio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed or by
calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
AES-
KWP
Decryptio
n
(A8008)
Key:128/192/256b
its
KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
Decryptio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed or by
calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
SHA2-
256
(A8008)
Message:240bits KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
Message
Digest
Generatio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed or by
calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
HMAC-
SHA2-
Key: 160bits KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
MAC
verificatio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
Page 20 of 28
Algorith
m or
Test
Test Properties Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
256
(A8008)
executed before
the Integrity test
or by calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
AES-
ECB
Encryptio
n
(A8009)
Key:128/192/256b
its
KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
Encryptio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed or by
calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
AES-
ECB
Decryptio
n
(A8009)
Key:128/192/256b
its
KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
Decryptio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed or by
calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
AES-
CBC
Encryptio
n
(A8009)
Key:128/192/256b
its
KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
Encryptio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed or by
calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
AES-
CBC
Decryptio
n
(A8009)
Key:128/192/256b
its
KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
Decryptio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed or by
calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
AES-
CTR
Encryptio
n
(A8009)
Key:128/192/256b
its
KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
Encryptio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed or by
calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
AES-
CTR
Decryptio
n
(A8009)
Key:128/192/256b
its
KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
Decryptio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed or by
calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
Page 21 of 28
Algorith
m or
Test
Test Properties Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-KW
Encryptio
n
(A8009)
Key:128/192/256b
its
KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
Encryptio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed or by
calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
AES-KW
Decryptio
n
(A8009)
Key:128/192/256b
its
KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
Decryptio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed or by
calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
AES-
KWP
Encryptio
n
(A8009)
Key:128/192/256b
its
KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
Encryptio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed or by
calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
AES-
KWP
Decryptio
n
(A8009)
Key:128/192/256b
its
KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
Decryptio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed or by
calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
SHA2-
256
(A8009)
Message:240bits KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
Message
Digest
Generatio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed or by
calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
(A8009)
Key: 160bits KAT CAS
T
OutputStat
us service
returns 0
MAC
verificatio
n
Performed on
module load into
the RAM to be
executed before
the Integrity test
or by calling
OnDemondSelft
est service
Table 18: Conditional Self-Tests
The Conditional Self-Tests are executed as KATs upon module load into the RAM to be
executed.
Page 22 of 28
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
SW Integrity
Test
MAC verification SW/FW Integrity On demand Manually
Table 19: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-ECB
Encryption
(A8008)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-ECB
Decryption
(A8008)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-CBC
Encryption
(A8008)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-CBC
Decryption
(A8008)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-CTR
Encryption
(A8008)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-CTR
Decryption
(A8008)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-KW
Encryption
(A8008)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-KW
Decryption
(A8008)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-KWP
Encryption
(A8008)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-KWP
Decryption
(A8008)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
SHA2-256
(A8008)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A8008)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-ECB
Encryption
(A8009)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
Page 23 of 28
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-ECB
Decryption
(A8009)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-CBC
Encryption
(A8009)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-CBC
Decryption
(A8009)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-CTR
Encryption
(A8009)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-CTR
Decryption
(A8009)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-KW
Encryption
(A8009)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-KW
Decryption
(A8009)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-KWP
Encryption
(A8009)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-KWP
Decryption
(A8009)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
SHA2-256
(A8009)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A8009)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
Table 20: Conditional Periodic Information
The module implements an OnDemondSelftest service and OutputStatus service to allow the
user to execute the self-tests and obtain the operational status at any time.
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Known
Answer
Self-test
Error
The Error State
resulting from the
Conditional Self-Test
failure of the
cryptographic algorithm
self-test.
An error occurred
during the
cryptographic
algorithm test.
Reload the
Module into
Memory Power
Cycle or
Reboot
OutputStatus
service returns
0x40000000
Page 24 of 28
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Integrity
Self-test
Error
The Error State
resulting from the Pre-
Operational Self-Test
failure of the integrity
self-test.
An error occurred
during the
module's integrity
test
Reload the
Module into
Memory Power
Cycle or
Reboot
OutputStatus
service returns
0x80000000
Table 21: Error States
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
The operator can initiate the Self-Tests by calling the OnDemondSelftest service (inclusive of
software integrity verification).
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
(1) Windows Version
1. Folder Access Permissions Setting
The cryptographic administrator sets the user access permissions for the folder where the
module is to be placed.
• Permission granting must follow the Windows OS folder access permission settings.
• Execute, Read, and Write permissions are required.
2. Module Placement (Deployment)
Copy the module to the specified folder.
• Restrictions apply to the module's placement. Refer to "(4) Restrictions".
3. Module Access Permissions Setting
The same access permissions as the destination folder are required for the execution of
this module.
• Access permissions can be set using methods such as the following example:
o (Example) Setting via Properties: Set the same access permissions as the
destination folder for the OS user who acts as the cryptographic administrator
role, under the module's "Properties" → "Security" tab.
. Module Activation (Startup)
This cryptographic module does not operate as a standalone DLL. The cryptographic
functionality is activated by executing a user application that has been compiled and
linked to utilize the module.
• Therefore, the execution of the user application constitutes the activation of this
cryptographic module.
o (Example) For a command-line executable user application:
▪ User application name: Encrypt.exe
▪ Installation folder: c:\Programfiles\Focus
▪ i) Folder Navigation: Execute the following command in the command
prompt to move to the location of the executable file:
▪ cd c:\Programfiles\Focus
▪ ii) Program Startup: Execute the following command in the command
prompt:
▪ c:\Programfiles\Focus>Encrypt.exe
Page 25 of 28
o When the above command is executed, and this cryptographic module is loaded
and the self-test succeeds, the cryptographic functionality becomes available to
the user application.
(2) AIX Version
1. Directory Access Permissions Setting
The cryptographic administrator sets the user access permissions for the directory where
the module is to be placed.
• Permission granting must follow the AIX OS directory access permission settings.
• Execute, Read, and Write permissions are required.
2. Module Copying
Copy the module to the specified directory.
• Restrictions apply to the module's placement. Refer to "(4) Restrictions".
3. Module Access Permissions Setting
The same access permissions as the destination directory are required for the execution
of this module.
• Access permissions can be set using methods such as the following example:
o (Example) Executing the permission setting command (chmod):
o chmod 755 ./home/application/libMonoCrypt.so
4. Library Path Specification
Depending on the environment, it may be necessary to set the library path as an
environment variable to enable the user application to locate the module. Since there are
multiple ways to set the library path, configure it using the method recommended for the
specific OS.
• (Example) Setting with LIBPATH:
• export LIBPATH=/home/application/libMonoCrypt.so:$LIBPATH
• The use of an absolute path is highly recommended.
5. Module Activation (Startup)
This cryptographic module does not operate as a standalone shared object. The
cryptographic functionality is activated by executing a user application that has been
compiled and linked to utilize the module.
• Therefore, the execution of the user application constitutes the activation of this
cryptographic module.
o (Example) For a command-line executable user application:
▪ User application name: Crypt.exe
▪ Installation directory: /home/application/Focus
▪ i) Directory Navigation: Execute the following command in the shell to
move to the location of the executable file:
▪ $ cd /home/application/Focus
▪ ii) Program Startup: Execute the following command in the shell:
▪ $ ./Crypt.exe
o When the above command is executed, and this cryptographic module is loaded
and the self-test succeeds, the cryptographic functionality becomes available to
the user application.
(3) Linux Version
1. Directory Access Permissions Setting
The cryptographic administrator sets the user access permissions for the directory where
the module is to be placed.
• Permission granting must follow the Linux OS directory access permission settings.
Page 26 of 28
• Execute, Read, and Write permissions are required.
2. Module Copying
Copy the module to the specified directory.
• Restrictions apply to the module's placement. Refer to "(4) Restrictions".
3. Module Access Permissions Setting
The same access permissions as the destination directory are required for the execution
of this module.
• Access permissions can be set using methods such as the following example:
o (Example) Executing the permission setting command (chmod):
o chmod 755 ./user/application/libMonoCrypt.so
4. Library Path Specification
Depending on the environment, it may be necessary to set the library path as an
environment variable to enable the user application to locate the module. Since there are
multiple ways to set the library path, configure it using the method recommended for the
specific OS.
• (Example) Setting with LD_LIBRARY_PATH:
• export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/application/libMonoCrypt.so:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH
5. Module Activation (Startup)
This cryptographic module does not operate as a standalone shared object. The
cryptographic functionality is activated by executing a user application that has been
compiled and linked to utilize the module.
• Therefore, the execution of the user application constitutes the activation of this
cryptographic module.
o (Example) For a command-line executable user application:
▪ User application name: Crypt.exe
▪ Installation directory: /user/application/Focus
▪ i) Directory Navigation: Execute the following command in the shell to
move to the location of the executable file:
▪ $ cd /user/application/Focus
▪ ii) Program Startup: Execute the following command in the shell:
▪ $ ./Crypt.exe
o When the above command is executed, and this cryptographic module is loaded
and the self-test succeeds, the cryptographic functionality becomes available to
the user application.
(4) Restrictions
The placement location of this module is generally arbitrary, but the following restrictions
apply.
• This module cannot be used when placed in a folder or directory on a different drive from
the user application.
• If this module and the user application are not located in the same folder or directory,
since this module performs a pre-operational self-test, it may take a significant amount of
time before this module becomes available.
• Exclusive to the AIX version, the cryptographic library MUST be located in either /usr/lib,
/home, or the current directory. Furthermore, duplicating and placing the library with the
same name in multiple different locations is strictly prohibited.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
The Crypto Officer is responsible for installing the module and granting usage rights.
Page 27 of 28
For the installation of the module, please refer to the 11.1 Install, Initialization, and Startup
Procedures guidance.
The Crypto Officer may utilize cryptographic functions in both approved and non-approved
modes of operation.
The Cryptographic Officer (CO) may utilize various support functions to aid in the cryptographic
operations. Examples of available support functions include: performing self-tests and retrieving
the result status, retrieving the operational mode status, and retrieving version information.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
N/A for this module.
11.4 Design and Rules
1. The module shall provide a Cryptographic Officer role.
2. The following configuration is required for the Key Wrap function to operate in the Approved
Mode within this module:
Integrity (ig) argument must be set to NULL.
11.5 Maintenance Requirements
N/A for this module.
11.6 End of Life
The method for disposing of the Cryptographic Module depends on the specific Operating
System (OS).
Fundamentally, the module shall be removed using the deletion commands provided by the
respective OS, ensuring that the data in the hard disk drive (HDD) area is overwritten to prevent
restoration. This process constitutes the zeroization of the Module's non-volatile storage
components (if any) and fulfills the End-of-Life requirements for the software module.
(1) Windows Version
1.Standard File Deletion
The operator shall delete the Module file(s) using the standard operating system method
(e.g., selecting the file and pressing the Delete key), and subsequently empty the
Recycle Bin.
2.Execute the cipher Command for Secure Wipe
After the standard deletion, the operator must execute the cipher command to securely
overwrite the free space on the drive where the file was deleted. This ensures the
permanent erasure of the deleted data.
Launch Command Prompt or PowerShell as an Administrator.
Input the following command, replacing C: with the letter of the drive from which the file
was deleted, and execute it:
(Example) cipher /w:C:
This command performs a secure wipe of the free disk space, effectively ensuring the
complete deletion of files hidden in the space made available after the normal deletion
process.
Page 28 of 28
(2) AIX version
The operator shall use the OS dd command to overwrite the module file (libMonoCrypt.so)
with zero or random data, followed by the rm command for final deletion.
1. Secure Overwrite using dd command (Zeroization):
The dd command is used to overwrite the file content with data from a source of
random data (/dev/urandom), ensuring the file's data is irretrievably erased:
(Example) dd if=/dev/urandom of=libMonoCrypt.so bs=1M conv=notrunc
o if=/dev/urandom: Specifies the input file source of random data (or /dev/zero for
zeros).
o of=libMonoCrypt.so: Specifies the output file, which is the module file.
o bs=1M: Sets the block size to 1 megabyte (for faster operation).
o conv=notrunc: Ensures the output file is not truncated, overwriting only the
existing content.
2. Final Deletion using rm command:
After the secure overwrite (zeroization) is complete, the file is removed from the file
system:
(Example) rm libMonoCrypt.so
This combined process ensures the irretrievable zeroization and removal of the
Cryptographic Module's software components from the disk, satisfying the End-of-Life
requirements.
(3) Linux Version
The operator shall use the shred command provided by the OS to securely delete the
shared library file, specifically referencing the file name such as libMonoCrypt.so.
Command Execution: Execute the shred command with appropriate options to ensure
multiple passes of overwriting are performed:
(Example) shred -n 10 -uvz libMonoCrypt.so
This command performs the following actions for secure erasure:
-n 10: Overwrites the file contents 10 times with non-repeatable patterns.
-u: Deallocates and removes the file after overwriting.
-v: Shows the progress of the operation (verbose).
-z: Adds a final overwrite with zeros to mask the shredding.
This secure deletion process ensures the irretrievable zeroization of the Cryptographic
Module's software components from the disk.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
N/A for this module.