Document Version 1.0 Oracle® Communications
This document may be reproduced whole and intact including the Copyright notice.
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Oracle Communications
Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
Prepared by:
www.lightshipsec.com
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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Title: Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
Date: May 29th, 2026
Contributing Authors:
Oracle Acme Packet Engineering
Security Evaluations – Global Product Security
Lightship Security, Inc.
Oracle Corporation
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Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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Table of Contents
1 General.................................................................................................................................................................................1
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................................................................1
1.2 Security Levels...............................................................................................................................................................1
1.3 Additional Information..................................................................................................................................................1
2 Cryptographic Module Specification ..................................................................................................................................2
2.1 Description....................................................................................................................................................................2
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ................................................................................2
2.3 Excluded Components ..................................................................................................................................................2
2.4 Modes of Operation......................................................................................................................................................3
2.5 Algorithms.....................................................................................................................................................................3
2.6 Security Function Implementations..............................................................................................................................5
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information.....................................................................................................................................7
2.8 RBG and Entropy...........................................................................................................................................................7
2.9 Key Generation .............................................................................................................................................................8
2.10 Key Establishment.......................................................................................................................................................8
2.11 Industry Protocols.......................................................................................................................................................8
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces.......................................................................................................................................9
3.1 Ports and Interfaces......................................................................................................................................................9
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication .................................................................................................................................12
4.1 Authentication Methods.............................................................................................................................................12
4.2 Roles............................................................................................................................................................................12
4.3 Approved Services.......................................................................................................................................................13
4.4 Non-Approved Services...............................................................................................................................................18
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded..........................................................................................................................18
4.6 Bypass Actions and Status...........................................................................................................................................18
5 Software/Firmware Security.............................................................................................................................................19
5.1 Integrity Techniques ...................................................................................................................................................19
5.2 Initiate on Demand .....................................................................................................................................................19
5.3 Additional Information................................................................................................................................................19
6 Operational Environment .................................................................................................................................................20
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements....................................................................................................20
7 Physical Security................................................................................................................................................................21
8 Non-Invasive Security........................................................................................................................................................22
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ...................................................................................................................23
9.1 Storage Areas..............................................................................................................................................................23
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods.........................................................................................................................................23
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods ............................................................................................................................................23
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9.4 SSPs .............................................................................................................................................................................23
9.5 Transitions...................................................................................................................................................................27
10 Self-Tests..........................................................................................................................................................................28
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................................................................28
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................................................................28
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ..................................................................................................................................30
10.4 Error States ...............................................................................................................................................................31
11 Life-Cycle Assurance........................................................................................................................................................32
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ..................................................................................................32
11.2 Administrator Guidance............................................................................................................................................32
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance....................................................................................................................................33
11.4 End of Life .................................................................................................................................................................33
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ............................................................................................................................................34
List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels...........................................................................................................................................................1
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware................................................................................................................2
Table 3: Modes List and Description.......................................................................................................................................3
Table 4: Approved Algorithms - Oracle Acme Packet Cryptographic Library .........................................................................4
Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Cavium Octeon II (CN6880)..................................................................................................4
Table 6: Approved Algorithms - Cavium Octeon III (CN7890) ................................................................................................4
Table 7: Approved Algorithms - Cavium Nitrox PX (CN1620) .................................................................................................4
Table 8: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms.....................................................................................................................................4
Table 9: Security Function Implementations..........................................................................................................................7
Table 10: Entropy Certificates.................................................................................................................................................8
Table 11: Entropy Sources ......................................................................................................................................................8
Table 12: Ports and Interfaces ..............................................................................................................................................10
Table 13: Authentication Methods.......................................................................................................................................12
Table 14: Roles......................................................................................................................................................................13
Table 15: Approved Services.................................................................................................................................................18
Table 16: Storage Areas ........................................................................................................................................................23
Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods ...................................................................................................................................23
Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods ......................................................................................................................................23
Table 19: SSP Table 1 ............................................................................................................................................................26
Table 20: SSP Table 2 ............................................................................................................................................................27
Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests ....................................................................................................................................28
Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests............................................................................................................................................29
Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information ..................................................................................................................30
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information..........................................................................................................................31
Table 25: Error States............................................................................................................................................................31
List of Figures
Figure 1: Acme Packet 4600....................................................................................................................................................2
Figure 2: Acme Packet 6350....................................................................................................................................................2
Figure 3: Acme Packet 4600 Front View ...............................................................................................................................10
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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Figure 4: Acme Packet 4600 Rear View ................................................................................................................................10
Figure 5: Acme Packet 6350 Front View ...............................................................................................................................10
Figure 6: Acme Packet 6350 Rear View ................................................................................................................................11
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This document is the FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for the Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350 appliances (running
firmware version: S-Cz9.3) manufactured by Oracle Communications, hereafter referred to as “the module” or “module”. This Security
Policy specifies the security rules under which the module shall operate to meet the requirements of FIPS 140-3 Overall Security Level
1. It also describes how the Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350 appliances function to meet the FIPS requirements, and the
actions that operators must take to maintain the security of the modules.
This Security Policy describes the features and design of the Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350 modules using the terminology
contained in the FIPS 140-3 specification. FIPS 140-3, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules specifies the security
requirements that will be satisfied by a cryptographic module utilized within a security system protecting sensitive but unclassified
information. The NIST/CCCS Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) validates cryptographic modules to FIPS 140-3.
Validated products are accepted by the Federal agencies of both the USA and Canada for the protection of sensitive or designated
information.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 2
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security 1
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
1.3 Additional Information
Except for this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-3 Validation Documentation is proprietary to Oracle and is releasable only
under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Oracle.
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350 are Enterprise Session Border Controllers. The module is designed to securely manage,
control, and protect real-time IP-based communications such as voice, video, and unified communications across trusted and
untrusted network boundaries. The module is intended for use in government, enterprise, and carrier-grade environments.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
Cryptographic Boundary:
The cryptographic boundary for the Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350 is defined as the module case and all components within
the case.
A representation of the cryptographic boundary is shown in the Figures below:
Figure 1: Acme Packet 4600
Figure 2: Acme Packet 6350
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model and/or
Part Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
Acme Packet 4600 4600 S-Cz9.3 Intel Core i3-3120ME
Acme Packet 6350 6350 S-Cz9.3 Intel Xeon D-1548
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
2.3 Excluded Components
There are no components within the cryptographic boundary that are excluded from the FIPS 140-3 security requirements.
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2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode Name Description Type Status
Indicator
Approved
Mode
When installed, initialized and configured as specified in Section 11 of the Security Policy,
the module only runs in the approved mode of operation.
Approved Global
Table 3: Modes List and Description
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Oracle Acme Packet Cryptographic Library
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CCM A6582 Key Length - 128 SP 800-38C
AES-CFB128 A6582 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A6582 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A6582 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A6582 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38D
Counter DRBG A6582 Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6582 Curve - P-256, P-384
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6582 Curve - P-256, P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6582 Curve - P-256, P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384
FIPS 186-5
HMAC-SHA-1 A6582 Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A6582 Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384 A6582 Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512 A6582 Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A6582 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256, P-384
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A6582 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - ffdhe2048, MODP-2048,
MODP-4096, MODP-8192
Scheme -
dhEphem -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDF SNMP (CVL) A6582 Password Length - Password Length: 64-128 Increment 8 SP 800-135
Rev. 1
KDF SSH (CVL) A6582 Cipher - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-256
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-
5)
A6582 Key Generation Mode - probable
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
FIPS 186-5
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
Primality Tests - 2pow100
Private Key Format - standard
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A6582 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) A6582 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
Safe Primes Key
Generation
A6582 Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, MODP-2048, MODP-4096, MODP-
8192
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
Safe Primes Key
Verification
A6582 Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, MODP-2048, MODP-4096, MODP-
8192
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
SHA-1 A6582 Message Length - Message Length: 8-51200 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A6582 Message Length - Message Length: 8-51200 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A6582 Message Length - Message Length: 8-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A6582 Message Length - Message Length: 8-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627
(CVL)
A6582 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384 SP 800-135
Rev. 1
TLS v1.3 KDF (CVL) A6582 HMAC Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384
KDF Running Modes - DHE
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
Table 4: Approved Algorithms - Oracle Acme Packet Cryptographic Library
Cavium Octeon II (CN6880)
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CTR A6578 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128
SP 800-38A
HMAC-SHA-1 A6578 Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
KDF SRTP (CVL) A6578 AES Key Length - 128 SP 800-135 Rev. 1
SHA-1 A6578 Message Length - Message Length: 8-51200 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Cavium Octeon II (CN6880)
Cavium Octeon III (CN7890)
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CTR A6579 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128
SP 800-38A
HMAC-SHA-1 A6579 Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
KDF SRTP (CVL) A6579 AES Key Length - 128 SP 800-135 Rev. 1
SHA-1 A6579 Message Length - Message Length: 8-51200 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
Table 6: Approved Algorithms - Cavium Octeon III (CN7890)
Cavium Nitrox PX (CN1620)
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) A6577 Modulo - 2048, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) A6577 Modulo - 2048, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
FIPS 186-5
Table 7: Approved Algorithms - Cavium Nitrox PX (CN1620)
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Key Type:Symmetric and Asymmetric N/A SP800-133rev2: Section 4, example 1
Table 8: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
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Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SNMP Encrypt/Decrypt BC-UnAuth AES-CFB128: (A6582)
SNMP Message
Authentication
MAC HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A6582)
HMAC-SHA2-512:
(A6582)
SHA2-256: (A6582)
SHA2-512: (A6582)
TLS Encrypt/Decrypt BC-UnAuth AES-CCM: (A6582)
AES-GCM: (A6582)
TLS Message
Authentication
MAC HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A6582)
HMAC-SHA2-384:
(A6582)
SHA2-256: (A6582)
SHA2-384: (A6582)
SRTP Encrypt/Decrypt 1 BC-UnAuth AES-CTR: (A6578)
SRTP Encrypt/Decrypt 2 BC-UnAuth AES-CTR: (A6579)
SRTP Message
Authentication 1
MAC HMAC-SHA-1: (A6578)
MAC: 80
SHA-1: (A6578)
SRTP Message
Authentication 2
MAC HMAC-SHA-1: (A6579)
MAC: 80
SHA-1: (A6579)
SSH Encrypt/Decrypt BC-Auth
BC-UnAuth
AES-CTR: (A6582)
AES-GCM: (A6582)
SSH Message
Authentication
MAC HMAC-SHA-1: (A6582)
MAC: 96, 160
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A6582)
SHA-1: (A6582)
SHA2-256: (A6582)
SSH Key Transport 1 KTS-Wrap IG D.G:Approved Bullet
2 / Bit Strength:
Provides 128 or 256
bits of encryption
strength
AES-GCM: (A6582)
SSH Key Transport 2 KTS-Wrap IG D.G:Approved Bullet
2 / Bit Strength:
Provides between 128
and 256 bits of
encryption strength
AES-CTR: (A6582)
HMAC-SHA-1: (A6582)
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A6582)
TLS Key Transport KTS-Wrap IG D.G:Approved Bullet
2 / Bit Strength:
Provides 128 or 256
bits of encryption
strength
AES-GCM: (A6582)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
DRBG DRBG Counter DRBG: (A6582)
AES-ECB: (A6582)
TLS Key Pair Generation AsymKeyPair-KeyGen ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5): (A6582)
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-
5): (A6582)
Modulo: 2048, 4096
TLS Digital Signature
Generation
DigSig-SigGen ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5): (A6582)
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5): (A6582)
Signature Type: pss
Modulo: 2048, 4096
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5): (A6577)
TLS Digital Signature
Verification
DigSig-SigVer ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-
5): (A6582)
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5):
(A6582)
Signature Type: pss
Modulo: 2048, 4096
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5):
(A6577)
Bypass Integrity Check MAC HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A6582)
SHA2-256: (A6582)
TLS KAS 1 KAS-Full IG D.F :Scenario 2 Path
2/ Bit Strength:
Provides 128 or 192
bits of encryption
strength
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3: (A6582)
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627:
(A6582)
TLS v1.3 KDF: (A6582)
TLS KAS 2 KAS-Full IG D.F:Scenario 2 Path
2/ Bit Strength:
Provides 112 bits of
encryption strength
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3: (A6582)
Domain Parameter
Generation Methods:
ffdhe2048
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627:
(A6582)
TLS v1.3 KDF: (A6582)
SSH KAS KAS-Full IG D.F:Scenario 2 Path
2/ Bit Strength:
Provides between 112
and 200 bits of
encryption strength
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3: (A6582)
Domain Parameter
Generation Methods:
MODP-2048, MODP-
4096, MODP-8192
KDF SSH: (A6582)
SNMP KDF KAS-135KDF KDF SNMP: (A6582)
SRTP KDF 1 KAS-135KDF KDF SRTP: (A6578)
SRTP KDF 2 KAS-135KDF KDF SRTP: (A6579)
SSH KDF KAS-135KDF KDF SSH: (A6582)
SSH Key Pair
Generation
AsymKeyPair-KeyGen RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-
5): (A6582)
SSH Signature
Generation
DigSig-SigGen RSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5): (A6582)
Signature type:
pkcs1v1.5
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SSH Signature
Verification
DigSig-SigVer RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5):
(A6582)
Signature type:
pkcs1v1.5
TLS KDF KAS-135KDF TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627:
(A6582)
TLS v1.3 KDF: (A6582)
Verify Firmware
Integrity
DigSig-SigVer RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5):
(A6582)
Signature Type: pss
Modulus: 2048
Hash: SHA2-256
Entropy Source ENT-ESV
KAS ECDSA KeyGen AsymKeyPair-KeyGen ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5): (A6582)
KAS SafePrimes KeyGen AsymKeyPair-KeyGen Safe Primes Key
Generation: (A6582)
Safe Primes Key
Verification: (A6582)
Generate Symmetric
Key
CKG CKG: ()
Password Hash/Verify SHA SHA2-512: (A6582)
Table 9: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
The module's TLS v1.2 firmware AES-GCM implementation conforms to FIPS 140-3 IG C.H Scenario #1. The module is compatible with
TLS v1.2 and provides support for acceptable GCM ciphersuites from SP 800-52 Rev2, Section 3.3.1. The counter portion of the IV is
set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. The nonce_explicit management logic inside the module ensures that when the
nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server,
to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key (in accordance with 7.4.1.1 and 7.4.1.2 RFC
5246). In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be
established.
The module's TLS v1.3 firmware AES-GCM implementation conforms to FIPS 140-3 IG C.H Scenario #1. The module is compatible with
TLS v1.3 and provides support for acceptable GCM ciphersuites from SP 800-52 Rev2, Section 3.3.1. The counter portion of the IV is
set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. The sequence number, and the client_write_iv or server_write_iv value
(depending on role) are used to construct the per-record nonce, following the procedure in Section 5.3 of RFC 8446. Furthermore, as
required by Section 5.3 of RFC 8446, the module ensures that when the sequence number would wrap, the first party, client or server,
to encounter this condition rekeys (in accordance with Section 4.6.3 in RFC 8446) or terminates the connection. In case the module’s
power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
The module’s SSHv2 firmware AES-GCM implementation conforms to FIPS 140-3 IG C.H Scenario #1. The IV generation is in compliance
with the SSHv2 specification and only for use within the SSHv2 protocol, following the specifications defined in RFCs 4252, 4253 and
5647. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be
established.
The module's SRTP firmware AES-GCM implementation conforms to FIPS 140-3 IG C.H Scenario #5. The IV is generated and used within
this SRTP protocol’s implementation. The SRTP protocol and, specifically, the use of the AES-GCM encryption within the protocol are
defined in RFC 7714.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert
Number
Vendor Name
E235 Oracle Corporation
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Table 10: Entropy Certificates
Name Type Operational Environment Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
Kernel CPU Time Jitter RNG Entropy
Source
Non-
Physical
Intel Core i3-3120ME Intel Xeon D-
1548
64 bits 59.119
Table 11: Entropy Sources
The module employs a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on [SP800-90Arev1] for random number generation. The
DRBG used for the module is CTR_DRBG. The module performs the DRBG health tests as defined in Section 11.3 of [SP800-90Arev1].
The module uses an [SP 800-90B] compliant entropy source for seeding the DRBG.
2.9 Key Generation
Please see SFI Table entries for the following: TLS Key Pair Generation, SNMP KDF, SRTP KDF 1, SRTP KDF 2, SSH KDF, SSH Key Pair
Generation, TLS KDF, KAS ECDSA KeyGen, KAS SafePrimes KeyGen, Generate Symmetric Key.
When the module generates symmetric keys or seeds used for generating asymmetric keys, unmodified DRBG output is used as the
symmetric key or as the seed for generating the asymmetric keys.
2.10 Key Establishment
Key Agreement:
Please see SFI Table entries for the following: TLS KAS 1, TLS KAS 2, SSH KAS.
Key Transport:
Please see SFI Table entries for the following: SSH Key Transport 1, SSH Key Transport 2, TLS Key Transport.
2.11 Industry Protocols
No parts of the SSH, TLS, SNMP or SRTP protocols, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested
by the CAVP and CMVP.
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
Acme Packet 4600 USB Port Control
Input
The USB port is reserved for recovery only by Oracle, for a non-bootable
system.
Acme Packet 4600 Console Port Data Input
Control
Input
Status
Output
Provides console access to the module. The module supports only one
active serial console connection at a time
Acme Packet 4600 Ethernet MGT
(Mgmt0, Mgmt1, Mgmt2) Ports
Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
Status
Output
Used for EMS control, CDR accounting, CLI management, and other
management functions. High Availability (HA), use ports 1 and 2
Acme Packet 4600 Signaling and
Media (P0, P1, P2, P3) Ports
Data Input
Data Output
Provide network connectivity for signaling and media traffic. These ports
are also used for incoming and outgoing data (voice) connections
Acme Packet 4600 Signaling and
Media (P4, P5) Port
Data Input
Data Output
Provide network connectivity for signaling and media traffic. These ports
are also used for incoming and outgoing data (voice) connections
Acme Packet 4600 LEDs Status
Output
Status information output from the module
Acme Packet 4600 Alarm Port Status
Output
Provides status output
Acme Packet 4600 LCD Status
Output
Provides status output
Acme Packet 4600 Power Switch Control
Input
Powers on the platform
Acme Packet 4600 Reset Button Control
Input
Provides reset functionality
Acme Packet 4600 Power Port Power Provides the power supply to the module
Acme Packet 6350 USB Port Control
Input
The USB port is reserved for recovery only by Oracle, for a non-bootable
system.
Acme Packet 6350 Console Port Data Input
Control
Input
Status
Output
Provides console access to the module. The module supports only one
active serial console connection at a time
Acme Packet 6350 Ethernet MGT
(Mgmt0, Mgmt1, Mgmt2) Ports
Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
Status
Output
Used for EMS control, CDR accounting, CLI management, and other
management functions. High Availability (HA), use ports 1 and 2
Acme Packet 6350 Signaling and
Media (P0, P1, P2, P3) Ports
Data Input
Data Output
Provide network connectivity for signaling and media traffic. These ports
are also used for incoming and outgoing data (voice) connections
Acme Packet 6350 LEDs Status
Output
Status information output from the module
Acme Packet 6350 Alarm Port Status
Output
Provides status output
Acme Packet 6350 LCD Status
Output
Provides status output
Acme Packet 6350 Power Switch Control
Input
Powers on the platform
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
Acme Packet 6350 Reset Button Control
Input
Provides reset functionality
Acme Packet 6350 Power Ports Power Provides the power supply to the module
Table 12: Ports and Interfaces
The module does not support a Control Output interface. All data output via the data output interface is inhibited whenever the
cryptographic module is performing pre-operational self-tests, zeroization, and when the module is in an error state.
Figure 3: Acme Packet 4600 Front View
Figure 4: Acme Packet 4600 Rear View
Figure 5: Acme Packet 6350 Front View
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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Figure 6: Acme Packet 6350 Rear View
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each Attempt Strength per Minute
Console
Auth
Username
and
Password
Passwords must be a minimum of 8
characters. The password can consist
of alphanumeric values, [a-z, A-Z, 0-
9, and special characters], yielding 94
choices per character. The
probability of a successful random
attempt is 1/94^8, which is less than
1/1,000,000.
Passwords must be a minimum of 8 characters.
The password can consist of alphanumeric
values, [a-z, A-Z, 0-9, and special characters],
yielding 94 choices per character. Assuming 10
attempts per second via a scripted or
automatic attack, the probability of a success
with multiple attempts in a one-minute period
is 600/94^8, which is less than 1/100,000.
SSH
Auth 1
Username
and
Password
Passwords must be a minimum of 8
characters. The password can consist
of alphanumeric values, [a-z, A-Z, 0-
9, and special characters], yielding 94
choices per character. The
probability of a successful random
attempt is 1/94^8, which is less than
1/1,000,000.
Passwords must be a minimum of 8 characters.
The password can consist of alphanumeric
values, [a-z, A-Z, 0-9, and special characters],
yielding 94 choices per character. Assuming 10
attempts per second via a scripted or
automatic attack, the probability of a success
with multiple attempts in a one-minute period
is 600/94^8, which is less than 1/100,000.
SSH
Auth 2
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6582)
A 2048-bit RSA has at least 112-bits
of equivalent strength. The
probability of a successful random
attempt is 1 /2^112, which is less
than 1/1,000,000.
Assuming the module can support 60
authentication attempts in one minute, the
probability of a success with multiple
consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is
60/2^112, which is less than 1/100,000.
WebGUI
Auth
Username
and
Password
Passwords must be a minimum of 8
characters. The password can consist
of alphanumeric values, [a-z, A-Z, 0-
9, and special characters], yielding 94
choices per character. The
probability of a successful random
attempt is 1/94^8, which is less than
1/1,000,000.
Passwords must be a minimum of 8 characters.
The password can consist of alphanumeric
values, [a-z, A-Z, 0-9, and special characters],
yielding 94 choices per character. Assuming 10
attempts per second via a scripted or
automatic attack, the probability of a success
with multiple attempts in a one-minute period
is 600/94^8, which is less than 1/100,000.
SNMP
Auth
Username
and
Password
Passwords must be a minimum of 8
characters. The password can consist
of alphanumeric values, [a-z, A-Z, 0-
9, and special characters], yielding 94
choices per character. The
probability of a successful random
attempt is 1/94^8, which is less than
1/1,000,000.
Passwords must be a minimum of 8 characters.
The password can consist of alphanumeric
values, [a-z, A-Z, 0-9, and special characters],
yielding 94 choices per character. Assuming 10
attempts per second via a scripted or
automatic attack, the probability of a success
with multiple attempts in a one-minute period
is 600/94^8, which is less than 1/100,000.
Table 13: Authentication Methods
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto-Officer Role CO Console Auth
SSH Auth 1
SSH Auth 2
WebGUI Auth
SNMP Auth
User Role User Console Auth
SSH Auth 1
SSH Auth 2
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
WebGUI Auth
SNMP Auth
Table 14: Roles
4.3 Approved Services
The abbreviations of the access rights to SSPs have the following interpretation:
G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).
W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP.
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Initialization Initializes the
module for
Approved Mode of
Operation.
N/A Command and
parameters
Command
response/ Status
output
Crypto-Officer
Configure
System
Settings
Configure approved
system parameters
and operational
settings
N/A Command and
parameters
Command
response/Status
output
Crypto-Officer
Show
Module's
Versioning
Information
Outputs the module
name/identifier and
the versioning
information that can
be correlated with
the validation
record.
N/A Command Module
Versioning
information
Crypto-Officer
User
View Alarms View system alarms N/A Command Alarm
information
Crypto-Officer
User
View
Performance
View system
performance
metrics
N/A Command Performance
information
Crypto-Officer
User
Manage
Users
Create, edit, or
delete user
accounts
N/A Command and
parameters
Command
response/Status
output
Crypto-Officer
Change
Password
Change
authentication
credentials
Global and
successful
completion
of service
Command and
parameters
Command
response/Status
output
Password
Hash/Verify
Crypto-Officer
- Operator
Passwords: W
- Operator RSA
public key: W
Authenticate Authenticates users Global and
successful
completion
of service
Authentication
data
Status output Password
Hash/Verify
Crypto-Officer
- Operator
Passwords: W
- Operator RSA
public key: W
User
- Operator
Passwords: W
- Operator RSA
public key: W
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Show Status Outputs current
status of the
module.
N/A Command Command
response/Status
output
Crypto-Officer
User
Certificates Management and
viewing of X.509
certificates
Global and
successful
completion
of service
Command and
parameters
Command
response/Status
output
Crypto-Officer
- Web UI
Certificate: R
User
- Web UI
Certificate: R
Bypass Configure bypass
using TCP or UDP
and viewing bypass
service status
Global and
successful
completion
of service
Command and
parameters
Command
response/Status
output
Bypass Integrity
Check
Crypto-Officer
- Bypass Key:
G,E
SSH Establish secure
session
Global and
successful
completion
of service
Command Session
establishment
SSH
Encrypt/Decrypt
SSH Message
Authentication
SSH Key
Transport 1
SSH Key
Transport 2
SSH KAS
SSH KDF
SSH Key Pair
Generation
SSH Signature
Generation
SSH Signature
Verification
KAS SafePrimes
KeyGen
Crypto-Officer
- Diffie-Hellman
Public Key:
G,R,W,E
- Diffie-Hellman
Private Key: G,E
- Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret:
G,E
- SSH
Authentication
Public Key:
G,R,E
- SSH
Authentication
Private Key: G,E
- SSH Session
Keys: G,E
- SSH Integrity
Keys: G,E
User
- Diffie-Hellman
Public Key:
G,R,W,E
- Diffie-Hellman
Private Key: G,E
- Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret:
G,E
- SSH
Authentication
Public Key:
G,R,E
- SSH
Authentication
Private Key: G,E
- SSH Session
Keys: G,E
- SSH Integrity
Keys: G,E
TLS Establish secure
session
Global and
successful
Command Session
establishment
TLS
Encrypt/Decrypt
TLS Message
Crypto-Officer
- Diffie-Hellman
Public Key:
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
completion
of service
Authentication
TLS Key
Transport
TLS Key Pair
Generation
TLS Digital
Signature
Generation
TLS Digital
Signature
Verification
TLS KAS 1
TLS KAS 2
TLS KDF
KAS ECDSA
KeyGen
KAS SafePrimes
KeyGen
G,R,W,E
- Diffie-Hellman
Private Key: G,E
- Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret:
G,E
- ECDH Public
Key: G,R,W,E
- ECDH Private
Key: G,E
- ECDH Shared
Secret: G,E
- TLS
Authentication
Public Key:
G,R,E
- TLS
Authentication
Private Key: G,E
- TLS Premaster
Secret: G,E
- TLS Master
Secret: G,E
- TLS Session
Keys: G,E
- TLS Integrity
Keys: G,E
User
- Diffie-Hellman
Public Key:
G,R,W,E
- Diffie-Hellman
Private Key: G,E
- Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret:
G,E
- ECDH Public
Key: G,R,W,E
- ECDH Private
Key: G,E
- ECDH Shared
Secret: G,E
- TLS
Authentication
Public Key:
G,R,E
- TLS
Authentication
Private Key: G,E
- TLS Premaster
Secret: G,E
- TLS Master
Secret: G,E
- TLS Session
Keys: G,E
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
- TLS Integrity
Keys: G,E
SRTP Establish secure
session
Global and
successful
completion
of service
Command and
parameters
Session
establishment
SRTP
Encrypt/Decrypt
1
SRTP
Encrypt/Decrypt
2
SRTP Message
Authentication 1
SRTP Message
Authentication 2
SRTP KDF 1
SRTP KDF 2
Generate
Symmetric Key
Crypto-Officer
- SRTP Master
Key: G,W,E
- SRTP Session
Key: G,E
- SRTP
Authentication
Key: G,E
User
- SRTP Master
Key: G,W,E
- SRTP Session
Key: G,E
- SRTP
Authentication
Key: G,E
SNMP Secure network
management
Global and
successful
completion
of service
Command and
parameters
Session
establishment
SNMP
Encrypt/Decrypt
SNMP Message
Authentication
SNMP KDF
Crypto-Officer
- SNMPv3
Passwords
(Privacy and
Auth): W,E
- SNMP Privacy
Key: G,E
- SNMP
Authentication
Key: G,E
User
- SNMPv3
Passwords
(Privacy and
Auth): W,E
- SNMP Privacy
Key: G,E
- SNMP
Authentication
Key: G,E
On-Demand
Self-tests
Initiates and runs
the pre-operational
self-tests.
N/A Command Command
response/ Status
output
Verify Firmware
Integrity
Crypto-Officer
- Firmware
Integrity Key: E
Zeroisation Zeroises
unprotected SSPs
and key
components.
Status Command Command
response/ Status
output
Crypto-Officer
- Operator
Passwords: Z
- Operator RSA
public key: Z
- Firmware
Integrity Key: Z
- DRBG Entropy
Input String and
Nonce: Z
- DRBG Seed: Z
- DRBG Internal
State (V, Key): Z
- Diffie-Hellman
Public Key: Z
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
- Diffie-Hellman
Private Key: Z
- Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret: Z
- ECDH Public
Key: Z
- ECDH Private
Key: Z
- ECDH Shared
Secret: Z
- SNMPv3
Passwords
(Privacy and
Auth): Z
- SNMP Privacy
Key: Z
- SNMP
Authentication
Key: Z
- SRTP Master
Key: Z
- SRTP Session
Key: Z
- SRTP
Authentication
Key: Z
- SSH
Authentication
Public Key: Z
- SSH
Authentication
Private Key: Z
- SSH Session
Keys: Z
- SSH Integrity
Keys: Z
- TLS
Authentication
Public Key: Z
- TLS
Authentication
Private Key: Z
- TLS Premaster
Secret: Z
- TLS Master
Secret: Z
- TLS Session
Keys: Z
- TLS Integrity
Keys: Z
- Web UI
Certificate: Z
- Bypass Key: Z
Random
Number
Generation
Random Number
Generation
Global and
successful
Command Command
response/ Status
output
DRBG
Entropy Source
Crypto-Officer
- DRBG Entropy
Input String and
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
completion
of service
Nonce: G,E
- DRBG Seed:
G,E
- DRBG Internal
State (V, Key):
G,E
User
- DRBG Entropy
Input String and
Nonce: G,E
- DRBG Seed:
G,E
- DRBG Internal
State (V, Key):
G,E
Table 15: Approved Services
4.4 Non-Approved Services
N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
Not Applicable. The module does not support the capability of loading software of firmware from an external source.
4.6 Bypass Actions and Status
First, the Crypto-Officer must modify the SRTP configuration in order to enable the bypass capability for a specific SRTP profile. Then
after the bypass settings for each SRTP profile have been set, the configuration must be saved. The module will prompt the operator
to confirm the changes before committing them to the configuration. Status can be checked through configuration (show running-
config media-sec-policy).
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The module performs a firmware integrity test over the entire firmware image using RSA 2048/SHA 256 signature verification.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The integrity test can be invoked on demand by power cycling the module.
5.3 Additional Information
The temporary values generated during the module’s integrity test are zeroised upon completion of the integrity test.
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Non-Modifiable
How Requirements are Satisfied:
The non-modifiable operational environment of the module prevents users from accessing SSPs which they are not authorized to
access. There is no logical or physical access to the SSPs. The operating system provides process isolation and memory protection
mechanisms that ensure appropriate separation for memory access among the processes on the system. Each process has control
over its own data and uncontrolled access to the data of other processes is prevented.
As per ISO/IEC 19790:2012 7.6.3:
• The cryptographic module has control over its own SSPs.
• The operational environment provides the capability to separate individual application processes from each other to prevent
uncontrolled access to CSPs and uncontrolled modifications of SSPs, regardless if this data is in the process memory or stored on
persistent storage within the operational environment. This ensures that direct access to SSPs is restricted to the cryptographic
module and the trusted parts of the operational environment.
• Processes that are spawned by the cryptographic module are owned by the module and are not owned by external
processes/operators.
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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7 Physical Security
The module has a multi-chip standalone embodiment and is made of commercially available, production grade components meeting
commercial specifications for power, temperature, reliability, shock and vibration. All production-grade components include standard
passivation techniques, in the form of a coating applied over the module’s circuitry to protect against environmental and other physical
damage. The module is entirely contained within a production grade metal enclosure.
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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8 Non-Invasive Security
Currently, the ISO/IEC 19790:2012 non-invasive security area is not required by FIPS 140-3 (see NIST SP 800-140F). The requirements
of this area are not applicable to the module.
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
Flash Non-volatile memory Static
VRAM Volatile memory Dynamic
Table 16: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
SSP Input 1 External via SSH or TLS management
session
Flash Encrypted Automated Electronic
SSP Input 2 External via console Flash Plaintext Manual Electronic
SSP Input 3
(Peer)
External VRAM Plaintext Automated Electronic
SSP Output 1 Flash External via
HA
Plaintext Manual Electronic
SSP Output 2 VRAM External Plaintext Automated Electronic
SSP Output 3 Flash External Plaintext Automated Electronic
Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Session
Termination
Automatic zeroization
upon session termination
Upon session termination, all respective SSPs stored in
volatile memory are actively zeroized.
Operator closes
protocol session
Power Cycle Automatic zeroization
upon power cycle
Upon power cycle, all SSPs stored in volatile memory are
actively zeroized.
Operator power
cycles the module
After Use Automatic zeroization
upon use
Upon crypto operation, all respective SSPs stored in
volatile memory are actively zeroized.
Factory Reset Restores the module to
factory defaults
Upon factory reset command, all SSPs stored in memory
are actively zeroised by overwriting the memory locations
with zeros.
Operator enters
Factory Reset
command
Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods
9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size - Strength Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
Operator
Passwords
Used for authentication
of the crypto officer and
user
8-64 characters -
Please see
Authentication
Methods table
for details.
Authentication
- CSP
Operator RSA
public key
Used for public key
authentication of the
crypto officer and user
via SSH management
session.
2048 bits, 4096
bits - 112 bits,
152 bits
Authentication
- CSP
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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Name Description Size - Strength Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
Firmware
Integrity Key
Public key used to verify
the integrity of
firmware.
2048 bits - 112
bits
Public Key -
Neither
Factory
Installed
Verify Firmware
Integrity
DRBG Entropy
Input String
and Nonce
Used in the random bit
generation process
384 bits - Entropy - CSP Entropy
Source
DRBG
DRBG Seed Used in the random bit
generation process
384 bits - Seed - CSP DRBG DRBG
DRBG Internal
State (V, Key)
Used in the random bit
generation process (CTR
DRBG)
V:16 bytes Key:
32 bytes -
Internal State -
CSP
DRBG DRBG
Diffie-Hellman
Public Key
Used as part of DH key
agreement protocol
SSH: 2048 bits,
4096 bits, 8192
bits. / TLS1.2&3:
2048 bits. - SSH:
112 bits, 152 bits,
200 bits. /
TLS1.2&3: 112
bits.
Public - PSP KAS
SafePrimes
KeyGen
TLS KAS 2
SSH KAS
Diffie-Hellman
Private Key
Used as part of DH key
agreement protocol
SSH: 2048 bits,
4096 bits, 8192
bits. / TLS1.2&3:
2048 bits. - SSH:
112 bits, 152 bits,
200 bits. /
TLS1.2&3: 112
bits.
Private - CSP KAS
SafePrimes
KeyGen
TLS KAS 2
SSH KAS
Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret
Used as part of DH key
agreement protocol
SSH: 2048 bits,
4096 bits, 8192
bits. / TLS1.2&3:
2048 bits. - SSH:
112 bits, 152 bits,
200 bits. /
TLS1.2&3: 112
bits.
Shared Secret -
CSP
TLS KAS 2
SSH KAS
TLS KAS 2
SSH KAS
ECDH Public
Key
Used as part of ECDH
key agreement protocol
TLS1.2&3: P-256,
P-384 - TLS1.2&3:
128 bits, 192 bits
Public - PSP KAS ECDSA
KeyGen
TLS KAS 1
ECDH Private
Key
Used as part of ECDH
key agreement protocol
TLS1.2&3: P-256,
P-384 - TLS1.2&3:
128 bits, 192 bits
Private - CSP KAS ECDSA
KeyGen
TLS KAS 1
ECDH Shared
Secret
Used as part of ECDH
key agreement protocol
TLS1.2&3: P-256,
P-384 - TLS1.2&3:
128 bits, 192 bits
Shared Secret -
CSP
TLS KAS 1 TLS KAS 1
SNMPv3
Passwords
(Privacy and
Auth)
Used in the derivation of
SNMP keys
8-64 characters -
Please see
Authentication
Methods table
for details.
Authentication
string - CSP
SNMP KDF
SNMP Privacy
Key
Used for encryption /
decryption of SNMP
session traffic
128 bits - 128 bits Symmetric -
CSP
SNMP KDF SNMP
Encrypt/Decrypt
SNMP
Authentication
Key
Used for message
authentication and
verification in SNMP
256 bits, 512 bits
- 256 bits, 512
bits
Symmetric -
CSP
SNMP KDF SNMP Message
Authentication
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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Name Description Size - Strength Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
SRTP Master
Key
Used in the derivation of
SRTP session keys
128 bits - 128 bits Symmetric -
CSP
Generate
Symmetric
Key
SRTP KDF 1
SRTP KDF 2
SRTP Session
Key
Used for encryption /
decryption of SRTP
session traffic
128 bits - 128 bits Symmetric -
CSP
SRTP KDF 1
SRTP KDF 2
SRTP
Encrypt/Decrypt
1
SRTP
Encrypt/Decrypt
2
SRTP
Authentication
Key
Used for message
authentication and
verification in SRTP
160 bits - 160 bits Symmetric -
CSP
SRTP KDF 1
SRTP KDF 2
SRTP Message
Authentication 1
SRTP Message
Authentication 2
SSH
Authentication
Public Key
Used for SSH
host/server
authentication
2048 bits, 3072
bits, 4096 bits -
112 bits, 128 bits,
152 bits
Public - PSP SSH Key
Pair
Generation
SSH Signature
Verification
SSH
Authentication
Private Key
Used for SSH
host/server
authentication
2048 bits, 3072
bits, 4096 bits -
112 bits, 128 bits,
152 bits
Private - CSP SSH Key
Pair
Generation
SSH Signature
Generation
SSH Session
Keys
Used for
encryption/decryption
of SSH session traffic
128 bits, 192 bits,
256 bits - 128
bits, 192 bits, 256
bits
Symmetric -
CSP
SSH KDF SSH
Encrypt/Decrypt
SSH Integrity
Keys
Used for message
authentication and
verification in SSH
160 bits, 256 bits
- 160 bits, 256
bits
Symmetric -
CSP
SSH KDF SSH Message
Authentication
TLS
Authentication
Public Key
Used for TLS host/server
authentication
P-256, P-384,
2048 bits, 4096
bits - 128 bits,
192 bits, 112 bits,
152 bits
Public - PSP TLS Key
Pair
Generation
TLS Digital
Signature
Verification
TLS
Authentication
Private Key
Used for TLS host/server
authentication
P-256, P-384,
2048 bits, 4096
bits - 128 bits,
192 bits, 112 bits,
152 bits
Private - CSP TLS Key
Pair
Generation
TLS Digital
Signature
Generation
TLS Premaster
Secret
Used during the TLS
handshake
384 bits - Secret - CSP TLS KAS 1
TLS KAS 2
TLS KDF
TLS Master
Secret
Used for computing the
TLS keys
384 bits - Secret - CSP TLS KDF TLS KDF
TLS Session
Keys
Used for
encryption/decryption
of TLS session traffic
128 bits, 256 bits
- 128 bits, 256
bits
Symmetric -
CSP
TLS KDF TLS
Encrypt/Decrypt
TLS Integrity
Keys
Used for message
authentication and
verification in TLS
256 bits, 384 bits
- 256 bits, 384
bits
Symmetric -
CSP
TLS KDF TLS Message
Authentication
Web UI
Certificate
Used for secure,
authenticated
management
connections
2048 bits, 4096
bits - 112 bits,
152 bits
Certificate -
CSP
Bypass Key Used to protect bypass
table
256 bits - 256 bits Symmetric -
CSP
Generate
Symmetric
Key
Bypass Integrity
Check
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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Table 19: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Operator Passwords SSP Input 1
SSP Input 2
SSP Output
1
Flash:Obfuscated Factory Reset
Operator RSA public key SSP Input 1 Flash:Plaintext Factory Reset
Firmware Integrity Key Flash:Plaintext Factory Reset
DRBG Entropy Input String
and Nonce
VRAM:Plaintext Power Cycle
DRBG Seed VRAM:Plaintext Power Cycle DRBG Entropy Input String and
Nonce:Derived From
DRBG Internal State (V,
Key)
VRAM:Plaintext Power Cycle DRBG Seed:Derived From
Diffie-Hellman Public Key SSP Input 3
(Peer)
SSP Output
2
VRAM:Plaintext After Use Diffie-Hellman Private Key:Paired
With
Diffie-Hellman Private Key VRAM:Plaintext After Use Diffie-Hellman Public Key:Paired
With
Diffie-Hellman Shared
Secret
VRAM:Plaintext After Use Diffie-Hellman Public
Key:Computed Using
Diffie-Hellman Private
Key:Computed Using
ECDH Public Key SSP Input 3
(Peer)
SSP Output
2
VRAM:Plaintext After Use ECDH Private Key:Paired With
ECDH Private Key VRAM:Plaintext After Use ECDH Public Key:Paired With
ECDH Shared Secret VRAM:Plaintext After Use ECDH Public Key:Computed Using
ECDH Private Key:Computed
Using
SNMPv3 Passwords
(Privacy and Auth)
SSP Input 1
SSP Input 2
SSP Output
1
Flash:Plaintext Factory Reset
SNMP Privacy Key VRAM:Plaintext Session
Termination
SNMPv3 Passwords (Privacy and
Auth):Derived From
SNMP Authentication Key VRAM:Plaintext Session
Termination
SNMPv3 Passwords (Privacy and
Auth):Derived From
SRTP Master Key SSP Input 1 VRAM:Plaintext Session
Termination
SRTP Session Key VRAM:Plaintext Session
Termination
SRTP Master Key:Derived From
SRTP Authentication Key VRAM:Plaintext Session
Termination
SRTP Master Key:Derived From
SSH Authentication Public
Key
SSP Output
1
SSP Output
3
Flash:Plaintext Factory Reset SSH Authentication Private
Key:Paired With
SSH Authentication Private
Key
Flash:Plaintext Factory Reset SSH Authentication Public
Key:Paired With
SSH Session Keys VRAM:Plaintext Session
Termination
Diffie-Hellman Shared
Secret:Derived From
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
SSH Integrity Keys VRAM:Plaintext Session
Termination
Diffie-Hellman Shared
Secret:Derived From
TLS Authentication Public
Key
SSP Output
1
SSP Output
3
Flash:Plaintext Factory Reset TLS Authentication Private
Key:Paired With
TLS Authentication Private
Key
Flash:Plaintext Factory Reset TLS Authentication Public
Key:Paired With
TLS Premaster Secret VRAM:Plaintext After Use
TLS Master Secret VRAM:Plaintext Session
Termination
TLS Premaster Secret:Derived
From
TLS Session Keys VRAM:Plaintext Session
Termination
TLS Master Secret:Derived From
TLS Integrity Keys VRAM:Plaintext Session
Termination
TLS Master Secret:Derived From
Web UI Certificate SSP Output
3
Flash:Plaintext Factory Reset
Bypass Key Flash:Plaintext Factory Reset
Table 20: SSP Table 2
9.5 Transitions
Please see the latest revision of SP 800-131A and CMVP Programmatic Transitions page for transitions that may affect this module.
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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10 Self-Tests
The modules include an array of self-tests that are run during startup and during operations to prevent any secure data from being
released and to ensure all components are functioning correctly.
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6582)
pss Modulus: 2048
Hash: SHA2-256
Approved
Integrity
Technique
SW/FW
Integrity
Status Applied to all firmware components
Bypass Test - - Bypass Status Ensures the correct operation of the
logic governing activation of the bypass
capability.
Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Pre-Operational Self-Tests are run upon the power up/initialization of the module. The module transitions to the operational state
only after the pre-operational self-tests (and the cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs)) are passed successfully. The design of the
modules ensures that all data output, via the data output interface, is inhibited whenever the module is in a pre-operational self-test
condition.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6577)
pkcs Modulus:
2048 Hash: SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Status Sign Power Up
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6577)
pkcs Modulus:
2048 Hash: SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Status Verify Power Up
AES-CTR
(A6578)
128-bit KAT CAST Status Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
HMAC-SHA-1
(A6578)
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT CAST Status MAC Power Up
KDF SRTP
(A6578)
- KAT CAST Status SP 800-135 Key Derivation Power Up
SHA-1 (A6578) SHA-1 KAT CAST Status Message Digest Power Up
AES-CTR
(A6579)
128-bit KAT CAST Status Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
HMAC-SHA-1
(A6579)
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT CAST Status MAC Power Up
KDF SRTP
(A6579)
- KAT CAST Status SP 800-135 Key Derivation Power Up
SHA-1 (A6579) SHA-1 KAT CAST Status Message Digest Power Up
AES-CCM
(A6582)
128-bit KAT CAST Status Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
AES-GCM
(A6582)
128-bit KAT CAST Status Separate Encrypt and Decrypt Power Up
Counter DRBG
(A6582)
AES-256 KAT CAST Status SP 800-90Arev1 Section 11.3 Power Up
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6582)
P-256, P-384
SHA2-256
PCT PCT Status Sign, Verify Key Pair
Generation
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6582)
P-256 SHA2-256 KAT CAST Status Sign Power Up
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6582)
P-256 SHA2-256 KAT CAST Status Verify Power Up
HMAC-SHA-1
(A6582)
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT CAST Status MAC Power Up
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A6582)
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT CAST Status MAC Power Up
HMAC-SHA2-
512 (A6582)
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT CAST Status MAC Power Up
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A6582)
P-256 KAT CAST Status Ephemeral Unified Shared Secret (Z)
Computation
Power Up
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A6582)
FFDHE2048 KAT CAST Status dhEphem Shared Secret (Z)
Computation
Power Up
KDF SNMP
(A6582)
SHA-1 KAT CAST Status SP 800-135 Key Derivation Power Up
KDF SSH
(A6582)
Key Length: 256-
bit, Hash: SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Status SP 800-135 Key Derivation Power Up
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6582)
Modulus: 2048,
3072, 4096 Hash:
SHA2-256
PCT PCT Status Sign, Verify Key Pair
Generation
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6582)
pkcs Modulus:
2048 Hash: SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Status Sign Power Up
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6582)
pkcs Modulus:
2048 Hash: SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Status Verify Power Up
Safe Primes
Key Generation
(A6582)
FFDHE2048,
MODP-2048,
MODP-4096,
MODP8192
PCT PCT Status SP 800-56A Rev3 Section 5.6.2.1.4 Key Pair
Generation
SHA-1 (A6582) SHA-1 KAT CAST Status Message Digest Power Up
SHA2-256
(A6582)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Status Message Digest Power Up
SHA2-512
(A6582)
SHA2-512 KAT CAST Status Message Digest Power Up
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627
(A6582)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Status SP 800-135 Key Derivation Power Up
TLS v1.3 KDF
(A6582)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Status SP 800-135 Key Derivation Power Up
RCT - FD CAST Status SP 800-90B Section 4 Power Up, On
Demand and
Continuously
APT - FD CAST Status SP 800-90B Section 4 Power Up, On
Demand and
Continuously
Bypass Test HMAC-SHA2-256 - Bypass Status Ensures the correct operation of the
services providing cryptographic
processing when the mechanism
governing the switching procedure is
modified.
Bypass
modification
Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)
(A6582)
Approved Integrity
Technique
SW/FW Integrity On Demand Power Cycle
Bypass Test - Bypass On Demand Power Cycle
Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)
(A6577)
KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)
(A6577)
KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
AES-CTR (A6578) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
HMAC-SHA-1 (A6578) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
KDF SRTP (A6578) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
SHA-1 (A6578) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
AES-CTR (A6579) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
HMAC-SHA-1 (A6579) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
KDF SRTP (A6579) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
SHA-1 (A6579) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
AES-CCM (A6582) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
AES-GCM (A6582) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
Counter DRBG (A6582) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5) (A6582)
PCT PCT N/A N/A
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5) (A6582)
KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-
5) (A6582)
KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
HMAC-SHA-1 (A6582) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A6582)
KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
HMAC-SHA2-512
(A6582)
KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 (A6582)
KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 (A6582)
KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
KDF SNMP (A6582) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
KDF SSH (A6582) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-
5) (A6582)
PCT PCT N/A N/A
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)
(A6582)
KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)
(A6582)
KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
Safe Primes Key
Generation (A6582)
PCT PCT On Demand Power Cycle
SHA-1 (A6582) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
SHA2-256 (A6582) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
SHA2-512 (A6582) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627
(A6582)
KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
TLS v1.3 KDF (A6582) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
RCT FD CAST On Demand Power Cycle
APT FD CAST On Demand Power Cycle
Bypass Test - Bypass On Demand Power Cycle
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery Method Indicator
Hard
Error
The module halts operation,
where all data output is
inhibited.
Failed pre-operational
self-test or CAST.
Attempt reboot, if reboot does not
clear error, return to manufacturer.
Error Status and
module halts
operation
Soft
Error
The module continues
operation and repeats test.
Failed PCT Module returns to operational state
once error is logged.
Error Status returned
Table 25: Error States
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
This section describes the configuration, maintenance, and administration of the cryptographic module. If the steps outlined in
Section 11.1 below are not followed, the module will be operating in a non-compliant state that is out of scope of the validation.
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
Approved Mode is enabled by implementing the following steps:
1. Open CLI: type “setup entitlements”
2. Select “5 Data Integrity (FIPS 140-3)” option and type “enabled”
3. Type “s” to save the above modified entitlements.
4. Then reboot the module for Approved Mode to take effect.
Once the secure setup and the secure initialization and configuration is complete, the module is in Approved Mode. The steps outlined
in Section 11.2 can be performed to ensure that the Approved Mode was correctly configured.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
The crypto-officer can verify FIPS settings by following these steps:
• Verify that the firmware version of the module is S-Cz9.3 (“show version” section in Session Border Controller ACLI Configuration
Guide)
• A new account for the Crypto-Officer and User shall be created as part of Setup and Initialization process. Upon creation of the
new CO and User accounts the “default” accounts shipped with the module shall be disabled (“local-accounts” section in SBC
Guide).
• Ensure all management traffic is encapsulated within a trusted session by encapsulating in a TLS, SSH, or SRTP tunnel as
appropriate (“TLS-profile”, “SSH-config” and “Sdes-profile” sections in SBC Guide).
• HTTPS shall be enabled and configure the web server certificate prior to connecting to the WebUI over TLS (“http-config” section
in SBC Guide).
• Ensure that SNMP V3 is configured with AES-128/HMAC only (“SNMP-Group-Entry” section in SBC Guide).
• Ensure SSH is configured to use AES CTR/GCM mode for encryption (“Configure SSH Ciphers” section in SBC Guide).
• Ensure SSH uses at least Diffie-Hellman group 14 in Approved mode (“SSH-config” section in SBC Guide).
• Ensure RSA keys are at least 2048-bit keys for TLS. No 512-bit or 1024-bit keys can be used in Approved mode of operation
(“Certificate-record” section in SBC Guide - 2048 is the default RSA modulus).
• All operator passwords must be a minimum of 8 characters in length (“password-policy” section in SBC Guide).
• Ensure use of FIPS-approved algorithms for TLS (“TLS-profile” in SBC Guide):
o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256
o TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• Be aware that when configuring High Availability (HA), only a local HA configuration to a directly connected box via a physical
cable over the management port is allowed in Approved Mode. Remote HA is not allowed in Approved mode.
• Be aware that HA configuration data that contains SSPs must never be transported over an untrusted network. Ensure that the HA
ports used for the transport of HA data (including SSPs) are bound to a private IP address range during setup.
• Be aware that only the HA state transactions between the two devices over the direct physical connection are permitted over
those dedicated ports.
• RADIUS and TACACS+ shall not be used in Approved Mode.
For more details, please refer to the Session Border Controller ACLI Configuration Guide (SBC Guide).
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
The User does not have the ability to configure sensitive information on the module, with the exception of their password. The module
enforces a strong password, and the user must not reveal their password to anyone. Additionally, the User should be careful to protect
any secret or private keys in their possession.
Additional non-administrator guidance is available in the FIPS Compliance Guide.
11.4 End of Life
The procedure for secure sanitization of the module at the end of life is to factory reset the platform, which performs the zeroization
of the SSPs. This should be performed so that the module can be disposed or shipped back to Oracle.
Oracle Acme Packet 4600 and Acme Packet 6350
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not offer mitigation of other attacks and therefore this section is not applicable.