Copyright © Ceragon Networks Ltd. 2006.
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FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
FibeAir®
1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit
__________________________________________________________________
Ceragon Networks Ltd.
24 Raoul Wallenberg St.
Tel-Aviv 69719
Israel
May 25, 2006
Revision Version 4.0
Copyright © Ceragon Networks Ltd. 2006.
May be reproduced only in its entirety without revision.
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FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit
1. Introduction
The following document describes the security policy for “FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit”
product and has been created as part of the process of submitting this product to the FIPS 140-2
validation for security level 2. The security policy involves a specification of the security rules under
which a cryptographic module shall operate.
FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit’s cryptographic module operation is based on
encryption/decryption processes using symmetric block cipher (AES algorithm) and the asymmetric
key establishment technique (Diffie-Hellman Key Establishment). The AES standard was
implemented using a hardware AES core. The system provides FIPS-validated operator
authentication, secure key storage and management, and performs secure authentication for all
firmware and software files downloaded to the cryptographic module.
The user controls the cryptographic module either via Ceragon's Network Element Management
application (CeraView) installed directly to the host computer or via craft terminal menus.
1.1 Purpose
This document covers the secure operation of FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit including
the initialization, roles, and responsibilities of operating the product in a secure, FIPS-compliant
manner.
1.2 Glossary
Term/Acronym Description
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Alarm Indication Signal
CO Crypto-officer
BER Bit Error Ratio
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
DEA Data Encryption Algorithm
DH Diffie-Hellman key establishment protocol
DSS Digitally Signed Signature
EOW Engineering Order Wire
FE Fast Ethernet
FPGA Field-Programmable Gate Array
ID Identification Number
IDC/IDU Indoor Controller/Unit
IF Intermediate Frequency Cable
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KAT Known Answer Test
KEP Key Exchange Protocol
LOC Loss of Carrier
LOF Loss of Frame
LOS Loss of Signal
MUX Multiplexing Unit
ODU Outdoor Unit
PDH Plesiochronous Digital Hierarchy
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
RF Radio Frequency
RS232 Serial Interface Data communication Standard
Rx Receive Direction
SRDI Security Relevant Data Item
SD Card Secure Digital Card
T1 PDH Standard Protocol
Tx Transmit Direction
WSC Wayside Channel
1.3 Product Overview and Physical Interfaces
The FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit product is part of Ceragon’s FibeAir1500P® product
family of broadband wireless systems. It was developed to provide a FIPS compliant secure
operating mode using special hardware, software, and state-of-the-art technology.
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Drawer
IDC
Figure 1. FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit’s Physical Interface Ports
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Figure 2. FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit with Interface Ports Connected:
Radio, Fast Ethernet and 8xT1;
The following table presents the FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit’s physical interface
ports.
Interface name Interface type Description
Power Receptacle Power Receptacle for 45-70 VDC power connector
Radio IF connector Data I/O Used for communication between IDU and ODU
via the IF cable.
RJ45 Fast Ethernet
communication port
Data I/O Fast Ethernet 10/100 Mbps interface for the data
that is sent to the radio in encrypted form.
8xT1 connector Data I/O T1 interface connector provides access for eight
T1 ports. Data is sent to the radio in encrypted
form.
RJ45 Management
Network Port (x2)
Control input,
Status output
Provides 10 Mbps network port for the device
management interface.
RS232 Management
Serial Port
Control input,
Status output
Provides terminal access to the module's
command line interface.
Serial Line Internet
Protocol Port (SLIP)
Control input,
Status output
Provides device management interface over
serial line.
RS232 Communication Control input, Used for external alarms input/output.
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Serial Port Status output
RJ45 Protection Port None Since this is N/A for FIPS
RJ45 Wayside Channel
Port
Data I/O 64 Kbps used for Wayside Channel
communication.
Engineering Order Wire
Port
Data I/O 64 Kbps interface for the data sent to the radio
in encrypted form.
The following table presents the FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit’s LED indicators.
Please note that the LEDs do not provide a unique identifier to the State or Problem, but rather
provide the operator with an indication that they should check the current alarm/alarm log for
further details.
LED location LED name Color/ Description
Drawer POWER Green LED indicates that the device is powered on.
Gray LED indicates that the device is powered off.
During normal operation, the LED is green.
Drawer SIG Indicates the T1 traffic status. During normal operation,
the LED is green or gray (if no T1 port is enabled).
Red LED indicates about:
• LOS on T1 port
• Excessive BER (EXBER) on T1 port
Yellow LED indicates about:
• Unexpected signal on T1 port
• Signal degraded on T1 port
Gray LED indicates that no T1 port is enabled.
Drawer DRAWER Shows the status of cryptographic module and other
system alarm indications. During normal operation, the
LED is green.
For cryptographic “Module Show Status” see the table in
the chapter 2.2 Services.
Other system alarm indications:
Red LED indicates about:
• Radio Link ID mismatch
• Drawer internal power failure
Yellow LED indicates about:
• Hardware configuration problem
• Drawer temperature out of range
Drawer ODU Indicates the status of connected ODU. During normal
operation is green.
Red LED indicates about:
• ODU power failure
• No signal from ODU
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Yellow LED indicates about:
• Transmit or receive level out of range
• ODU temperature out of range
• Transmit is muted
• Drawer – ODU communication failure
Drawer CBL Red LED indicates about any communication problems
between IDU and ODU. During normal operation, the LED
is green.
Drawer LPBK Indicates system loopbacks. During normal operation, the
LED is gray.
Red LED indicates about:
• ODU internal loopback
• Drawer internal loopback
• External or internal loopback on T1
port
Drawer RADIO Indicates a problem in the radio interface. During normal
operation, the LED is green.
Red LED indicates about:
• LOF in the radio interface
• EXBER in the radio interface
Yellow LED indicates that signal is degraded in the radio
interface.
IDC IDC Shows the status of cryptographic module and other
system alarm indications. During normal operation, the
LED is green.
For cryptographic “Module Show Status” see the table in
the chapter 2.2 Services.
Other system alarm indications:
Red LED indicates about remote communication failure.
Yellow LED indicates about IDC hardware problems.
IDC CH1 Indicates the WSC traffic status. During normal
operation, the LED is green or gray (if WSC port is
disabled).
Red LED indicates about LOC on WSC port.
Yellow LED indicates about WSC loopback.
IDC RMT Red LED indicates about remote communication failure.
During normal operation, the LED is green.
2. Roles, Services, and Authentication
The FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit provides five different roles and a set of
services particular to each of the roles. The system will authenticate an operator’s
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identity by verifying his PIN and will then implicitly assign him one of the roles:
Monitor, User, Maintenance, or Crypto-officer depending on the password.
2.1 Roles
The roles of the cryptographic module are: Crypto-officer, Maintenance, User and
Monitor.
User Role
This role performs the general security services in both encrypted and non-encrypted
working mode: general system management (except cryptographic operations),
PDH/FE ports configuration and management for transmitting and receiving data,
radio resource configuration and management, alarms, performance monitoring,
download/upload SW/FW and configuration files. The user role is not allowed to
activate the maintenance and Crypto-officer role operations.
Monitor Role
This role permits monitoring of the configurations and status of the FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit. The access policy of this role is read-only for all general
security services and configurations in both encrypted and non-encrypted working
mode that are accessed by the user role.
Maintenance Role
Authorized for all the operations related to the User role. In addition, it is authorized
to perform operations related to the maintenance (loop-backs, clear disk
configuration, etc). The maintenance role is not allowed to activate the Crypto officer
role operations.
Crypto-officer Role
This role performs the cryptographic initialization and management operations and
has all maintenance and user role permissions. The Crypto-officer controls the
encryption menu: setting and changing PIN values for all other roles and enabling or
disabling encryption mode.
Unauthenticated Role
This role performs FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit management via IP
connection by special Ceragon’s application (Ceraview).
Authorized for Ceraview application users for some operations, related to Monitor,
User and Maintenance roles.
2.2 Services
The following table provides brief descriptions of all the security services supported by
the module.
Service name Service description
Authentication Each role (monitor, user, maintenance and crypto-officer)
must be authenticated by the relevant PIN.
Module self-tests and initialization
(during IDC SW reset, IDC/Drawer
HW reset, button reset)
At power up (cold or warm) resets all CSPs stored in RAM,
clears information about authenticated operators, performs
power-up self-tests, and if successful, branches to DH key
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establishment. After the secret key has been successfully
established the module enters its Ready state. This is also
the service used to recover from the Error state (if the
Drawer/IDC module enters the self-test error state or initial
key exchange protocol error state, the FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure
Basic Indoor Unit is not initialized, and the only way to
resume normal operation is to reset or power-on the
drawer).
Module Show Status Displays indication of module state (Uninitialized, Ready or
Error) and the module mode via craft terminal or
management application. The module status can be
displayed via the current alarm/alarm log via the CeraView
application. The state is also indicated via the LEDs on the
drawer and IDC front panels:
State Problem LED
IDC Drawer
Uninitialized
Uninitialized
Uninitialized
Uninitialized
Uninitialized
Uninitialized
Uninitialized
Uninitialized
Error
Power-up self-tests
SW AES KAT
SW DSS KAT
HW AES KAT
PRNG KAT
Seed and Seed Key Check
SW/FW Integrity
Bypass
Continuous PRNG
Crypto-officer password
validation
Green
Red
Green
Red
Red
Red
Green
Red
Yellow
Red
Green
Red
Green
Green
Green
Red
Green
Green
Error
Error
Error
Conditional self-tests
Seed and Seed Key Check
Continuous PRNG
Digital Signature
Verification
Yellow
Yellow
Yellow
Green
Green
Green
Uninitialized Key Establishment Green Yellow
Error Encryption validation or
loss of sync problem
Green Red
Error Session key exchange Green Yellow
Ready Change encryption mode
off/on (on next reset)
Green Yellow
Radio Resource management Display and configure radio parameters including transmitter
power, receiver sensitivity and RF channel and frequency.
This service does not use a cryptographic algorithm.
Transmit PDH/FE data The PDH/FE data from the input interfaces (one FE port,
eight T1 ports, WSC, EOW) is multiplexed into proprietary
frame and encrypted before sending to the radio.
Receive PDH/FE data Received from the radio, PDH/FE data is decrypted and after
demultiplexing is sent to the relevant output interface
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(FE/T1/ WSC/ EOW)
Download FW/SW files All downloaded SW and FW files are authenticated by digital
signature verification key (they must be properly signed by
Ceragon).
Configuration changes that request a
reinitialization (IP number, in-band,
set default configuration).
FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit has the several
configuration parameters that can have effect only after HW
or SW reset to the IDC or the drawer. During the reset the
CSPs and SRDIs are recreated automatically – see Access
Control Policy table.
Maintenance related operations The service is used for HW and SW diagnostics, internal and
external traffic loop-backs (the data is encrypted by randomly
generated HW session key value stored to FPGA registers
when entering the role) and returning to factory defaults.
Zeroize CSP This service is performed in the following scenarios:
- zeroize all CSPs stored in RAM and EEPROM including
resetting the passwords to their default values when
entering/exiting the maintenance role;
- zeroize all PRNG CSPs stored in RAM during IDC SW reset;
Set/Change PIN Only CO has the authority to set and change authentication
PINs.
When entering/exiting the maintenance role all PINs are
reset to their default values, so each time CO should renew
PIN per role.
Set encryption mode Set encryption mode on/off is authorized only to the CO. The
IDU will be initialized in the new working mode after HW
reset only.
2.3 Services by Role Policy
The following table lists all the security services and indicates whether an operator in
each role can perform that service.
Service name Monitor User Mainten. Crypto-
officer
Unauthent.
Authentication Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Module self-tests and
initialization (during
IDC SW reset,
IDC/Drawer HW reset,
button reset)
Automatic
during power
up (button
reset only)
Automatic
during power
up
Automatic
during power up
Automatic
during power
up (including
change
encryption
mode)
Automatic
during power up
Module Show Status Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Radio Resource
management
Display only Yes Yes Yes Yes
Transmit PDH/FE data Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Receive PDH/FE data Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Download FW/SW files No Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Configuration changes
that require a
reinitialization (IP
address, in-band, set
default configuration).
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Maintenance related
operations
No No Yes Yes Partially
Zeroize CSP No No When
entering/exiting
the role
No No
Set/Change PIN No No No Yes No
Set encryption mode No No No Yes No
2.4 Authentication Mechanisms and Strength
When initialised to operate in FIPS level 2 mode, the FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic
Indoor Unit supports PIN authentication and role-based authentication. The system
enforces a minimum PIN length and maximum number attempts per minute to ensure
a secure authentication mechanism.
Operator Authentication
All operator role passwords have at least six alphanumeric characters, which are case
sensitive. In this case, the authentication mechanism is much stronger than FIPS 140-
2 level 2 requirements for a single attempt.
To achieve the FIPS 140-2 level 2 multiple attempt requirement, the FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit limits the maximum of attempts per minute. The craft
terminal access using serial RS-232 communication (19200 bit/sec baud rate)
complies with this requirement. The 19200 bit/sec baud rate equates to approximately
400 authentications per second, which is less than the ~9466 authentications per
second required to violate the requirement.
Firmware and Software Authentication
The FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit authenticates firmware and software
downloads by using an Approved authentication technique. The system only allows
downloading digitally signed (by Ceragon) firmware and software files. Each file
should have a special digital signature, which is verified by RSA Digital Signature
Verification Key as part of the download process. Download of unauthorized files will
fail, with a suitable alarm indication. The system will continue working with previously
downloaded and verified files without any traffic disruption or any other changes.
3. Secure Operation and Security Rules
In order to operate the FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit product securely, the
operator should be aware of security rules enforced by the cryptographic module and
should adhere to the physical security rules and secure operation rules required.
The Crypto-officer must know how to configure the system to encryption mode. Once
FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit is setup to operate in encryption mode, all
secure processes are executed automatically at power-up. The embedded software
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initiates self-tests, secret key establishment and session key exchange with the
remote side of the radio link.
3.1 Security Rules
The security rules enforced by the FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit include
both the security rules that Ceragon Networks has imposed and the security rules that
result from the security requirements of FIPS 140-2.
Ceragon Security Rules
The following are Ceragon’s Security Rules:
1. The default initialization mode of FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit
shall be encryption enable mode. The alternative mode is bypass mode
(encryption disable mode).
2. The FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit shall perform encryption mode
changing as part of power-up initialization.
3. The FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit shall perform the special Crypto-
officer PIN test during power-up. The Crypto-officer PIN value should be
different from its default value, otherwise a suitable alarm indicates this error.
4. The FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit shall perform session key
exchange at 7.5-minute intervals. These key exchanges are not required by
security level 2 and should be considered as continuous pseudo random
generator tests from FIPS 140-2 point of view. It also increases the security of
the system.
5. The FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit shall never output the Diffie-
Hellman secret key or HW session keys.
6. The FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit shall use a random generated
value for seed key derivation (used for further PRNG ANSI X.931 Appendix A
section A.2.4 implementation).
7. During the IDC SW reset, the FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit shall
zeroize the PRNG related CSPs. The secret and HW keys that were used
previously, are kept safe.
8. During either the IDC or the drawer HW reset, the FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure
Basic Indoor Unit shall zeroize all CSPs, excluding authentication PINs.
FIPS 140-2 Security Rules
The following are security rules that stem from the requirements of FIPS PUB 140-2.
The module enforces these requirements when initialized in FIPS level 2 mode:
1. When initialized to operate in level 2 mode, the FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic
Indoor Unit only supports FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithms.
2. The FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit shall employ the FIPS-approved
pseudo random number generator specified in ANSI X.931 Appendix A section
A.2.4 whenever generating keys.
3. The FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit shall provide role-based
authentication of operators by verifying the operator’s PIN.
4. When initialized to operate in FIPS level 2 mode, the FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure
Basic Indoor Unit shall only allow internal generation of cryptographic keys.
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The FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit shall not allow input of
cryptographic keys in both plaintext or chipper form.
5. When initialized to operate in FIPS level 2 mode, the FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure
Basic Indoor Unit shall only allow password authentication of operators. The
FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit shall not allow entry of plaintext
PINs for authentication.
6. The FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit shall provide the Crypto-officer
the capability to zeroize the plaintext CSPs contained within the system. See
for reference the CSPs and SRDIs table.
7. The FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit shall allow loading and running
of only digitally signed files added by Ceragon firmware and software.
8. The FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit shall perform self-tests and
known-answer tests of all cryptographic components during power-up. If
upon any failure, the unit becomes non-functional: FE ports are shut down,
AIS is sent to the line (T1 ports) and radio directions, no signal in EOW.
9. The FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit shall validate the on-board
firmware and software files using 32-bit CRC checksum algorithm.
10. The FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit shall perform conditional self-
tests. See for reference Self-tests chapter.
11. The FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit shall zeroize all CSPs (including
authentication PINs) when entering or exiting the maintenance role.
3.2 Physical Security Rules
The physical security of the cryptographic module is designed to meet requirements of
FIPS 140-2 level 2. The physical boundary of the module is the same as the physical
boundary of the FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit: the hard metal enclosure
with airflow mesh holes.
In order eliminate visibility to underlying circuitry, the IDU enclosure is opaque. The
mechanical baffling plates must be used and installed in order to comply with the FIPS
mode of operation. This baffling installation is performed at the vendor's (Ceragon)
facilities, and the module will come with this baffling pre-installed. These plates with
special ventilation holes (on the IDU chassis) close the view of the inner components
via the airflow mesh holes, see the figures below.
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Figure 3. FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit’s Baffling Plates
The eight tamper evident stickers are placed on the IDC and drawer screws, bottom
and front panels, for detection of tamper to the chassis, and the attempt of
IDC/drawer removal. For sticker placements see the figure 2 and the figures below.
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Figure 4. FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit’s Sticker Placements
All maintenance operations that request chassis disassembling or IDC/drawer removal
must be carried out at Ceragon’s facility. After the maintenance operation is
completed, new stickers will be placed.
The recommended inspection process is provided in the following table:
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Physical security
mechanism
Recommende
d frequency of
inspection
Inspection details
Tamper evident stickers Once per month Examine stickers for signs of removal,
replacement or tearing. The stickers location:
2 stickers are placed on each side of the chassis
on the seam (right and left side);
3 stickers on the bottom side front of the chassis
and wrap around the corner;
1 sticker on the bottom side rear of the chassis
on the middle screw;
1 sticker on the front panel of the drawer that
locks the front panel;
1 sticker on the front panel of the IDC that
closes the open slot on the upper left hand side.
Hard opaque production
grade enclosure
Once per month Examine enclosure for signs of any new
openings that might have been cut into the
device
3.3 Multi-Chip Standalone
The FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit module is being validated as a “multi-
chip standalone” cryptographic module. The physical boundary of the FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit cryptographic module is the same as the physical boundary
of the device.
3.4 Secure Operation Initialization Rules
The FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit provides the following FIPS-approved
cryptographic algorithms:
Algorithm Type Key Sizes/Modes FIPS-approved/Certificate
Signature Algorithms
RSA (ANSI X9.31) 1024-bit modulus Yes (Certificate #141)
Symmetric Algorithms
Firmware AES 256-bit key ECB Yes (Certificate #396)
HW AES 256-bit key, OFB 128 bit Yes (Certificate #395)
Asymmetric Algorithms
Diffie-Hellman Key
Establishment
Secret key 256-bit size
(derived from 1024 bits)
Allowed for use in a FIPS-
approved mode (Annex D)
Hashing Algorithms
SHA-1 Byte-oriented Yes (Certificate #467)
RNG Algorithms
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PRNG ANSI X.931 standard Seed 128 bit, Seed key 256
bits, 128-bit random output
Yes (Certificate #192)
CRC Algorithms
CRC 32 Yes
The following applications are used in the FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit
access, control and management:
1. Craft terminal application (according to comm. port connected). This
application is used by all roles (except Unauthenticated role) with the relevant
access permissions.
2. The appropriate version of Ceragon’s management application (CeraView)
depending on OS of the host (Windows or Unix) is meant for the
Unauthenticated role only. This application should be installed using the
installation CD.
The FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit supports both FIPS-approved
(encryption enabled) and non-approved (encryption disabled) operation modes. The
default mode is encryption enabled. While operating in this mode, the Crypto-officer
should complete the following initialization rules to ensure FIPS level 2 compliance:
1. Power up the FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit
2. Establish the RS232 connection to the IDU via the serial port.
3. Open a terminal application (according to comm. port connected).
4. When the system enters the Un-initialized State (because of the Crypto-officer
PIN is in the default sate), the operator should authenticate to the system
using the default Crypto-officer PIN.
5. Upon entering the Uninitialized Crypto-officer state, the operator should go
through the terminal menus: Configuration/IDC/Advanced/Passwords and
change all PINs (per role) from their default values: [six to eight case
sensitive, alphanumeric characters]. A Crypto-officer should avoid setting the
same PIN values for different roles.
6. Save and exit the Crypto-officer role.
7. Power reset the system.
8. When the same operations are completed for the remote IDU of radio link,
enter the system using a user PIN that previously had been changed from its
default value, and configure all RF parameters (frequencies, channel, transmit
and receive levels and others).
The current status of operating mode (encryption enabled or disabled) can be
determined by each role performing the following steps:
Via craft terminal:
1. Establish the RS232 connection to the IDU via the serial port.
2. Open a terminal application (according the comm. port connected).
3. Login with the relevant PIN to the terminal menu.
4. Go through the terminal menus: Configuration/Right
Drawer/Advanced/General/Encryption Configuration.
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5. There are two fields to check for encryption status: “Encryption mode” and
“Current encryption mode”.
• “Encryption mode” field indicates the last value set.
• “Current encryption mode” field indicates the actual
working mode.
For example, if “Encryption mode” field value is enabled and “Current
encryption mode” field value is disabled, the system will switch the mode to
enable (last value that was set) only after power reset.
6. Check the status of encryption: Encryption mode and Current encryption
mode values.
Via management application:
1. The appropriate version of Ceragon’s management application (Ceraview)
should be installed on the host.
2. Establish an Ethernet connection to the IDU via the management port.
3. Open CeraView application according to the IDU IP address.
4. Login with Ceraview application user’s PIN.
5. The status can be checked either by clicking on the “AES” inscription on the
drawer’s application picture or via application pull-down menu: File/AES/Right.
4. Definition of SRDIs Modes of Access
This section specifies the FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit’s Security Relevant
Data Items as well as the access control policy enforced by the system.
4.1 Cryptographic Keys Management, CSPs and
SRDIs
While operating in a level 2 FIPS-compliant manner, the FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic
Indoor Unit contains the following security relevant data items:
Security Relevant Data
Item
SRDI Description
Seed Key This is a 256-bit length random value automatically
generated during power-up, stored to RAM. Used for PRNG
ANSI X.931 algorithm (Appendix A section A.2.4)
implementation. Zeroized* when entering/exiting the
maintenance role.
Seed Value This is a 128-bit random value, stored to RAM. Used for
PRNG ANSI X.931 algorithm (Appendix A section A.2.4)
implementation. Zeroized after use – after PRNG initiation.
Prime This number has a length of 1024 bits and is stored to RAM.
The prime number is needed for the DH algorithm (for each
DH key exchange initialized process). Zeroized after use –
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after creating the secret key.
See also Annex A, section 9.2
D-H Private Key The private key is PRNG (ANSI X.931 Appendix A section
A.2.4) 512-bit length output and used for the secret key
creation. Is stored to RAM and zeroized after use – after
creating the secret key.
See also Annex A, section 9.3
Tx D-H Public Key The public key is a calculated shared value, which is
transmitted to the remote side of the radio link and used for
a secret key creation during the Diffie-Hellman
establishment. Stored to RAM and zeroized after use – after
creating the secret key.
Rx D-H Public Key The public key is a calculated shared value, which is received
from the remote side of the radio link and used for a secret
key creation during the Diffie-Hellman establishment. Stored
to RAM and zeroized after use – after creating the secret key.
Tx D-H Secret key This 256-bit length value is a result of a key establishment
protocol (calculated value), which is stored in plaintext in the
hardware. Secret key will encrypt the HW session key before
sending to the remote side of the radio link - this encryption
will be done by SW AES core. Zeroized when entering/exiting
the maintenance role.
Rx D-H Secret key This 256-bit length value is a result of a key establishment
protocol (calculated value), which is stored in plaintext in the
hardware. Secret key will decrypt the HW session key after
receiving from the remote side of the radio link - this
decryption will be done by SW AES core. Zeroized when
entering/exiting the maintenance role.
Tx HW Session key This is a PRNG (ANSI X.931 Appendix A section A.2.4) 256-
bit length output used for encryption of the data to be
transmitted. Stored in RAM and loaded in the local FPGA
registers in plaintext form. In addition, this value is sent in
encrypted form (encrypted with a secret key) to the remote
side of radio link. Zeroized after use – after sending to
remote side and loading to local MUX FPGA, or when
entering/exiting the maintenance role.
Rx HW Session key This is a PRNG (ANSI X.931 Appendix A section A.2.4) 256-
bit length output used for decryption of the data to be
received. Stored in RAM and loaded in the local FPGA
registers in plaintext form. This value is received in decrypted
form (decrypted with a secret key) from the remote side of
radio link. Zeroized after use – after receiving from the
remote side and loading to local MUX FPGA, or when
entering/exiting the maintenance role.
RSA Digital Signature
Verification Key
The public key for the verification process will be
configuration value stored in plaintext in the hardware. This
key is used for verification of application/firmware files that
will be downloaded to the IDU.
Crypto-officer PIN At least 6 characters, case sensitive, alphanumeric string of
Copyright © Ceragon Networks Ltd. 2006.
May be reproduced only in its entirety without revision.
Page 20 of 27
the Crypto-officer. Stored in plaintext in the hardware.
Zeroized to the default value when entering/exiting the
maintenance role. The Crypto-officer PIN will be checked for
deviating from its default value upon each power up (a
suitable alarm will be initiated if the value is not the default)
Maintenance PIN At least 6 characters, case sensitive, alphanumeric string of
the Maintenance operator. Stored in plaintext in the
hardware. Zeroized to the default value when
entering/exiting the maintenance role.
User PIN At least 6 characters, case sensitive, alphanumeric string of
the User. Stored in plaintext in the hardware. Zeroized to the
default value when entering/exiting the maintenance role.
Monitor PIN At least 6 characters, case sensitive, alphanumeric string of
the Monitor user. Stored in plaintext in the hardware.
Zeroized to the default value when entering/exiting the
maintenance role.
* Zeroization means loading a randomly generated number value.
4.2 Clear CSPs
The purpose of the CSP clearing is to zeroize (set to 0 or regenerate) the secured elements
according to the FIPS-140-2 level 2 requirements. The following elements are zeroized:
CSP Location When is cleared Who does it
Seed Key RAM Cleared when entering/exiting the
maintenance role.
Maintenance user
Seed Value RAM Cleared after PRNG initiation. SW, after PRNG initiation
Prime RAM Cleared after creating the secret
key.
SW, after creating the
secret key.
D-H Private
Key
RAM Cleared after creating the secret
key.
SW, after creating the
secret key.
Tx D-H Public
Key
RAM Cleared after creating the secret
key.
SW, after creating the
secret key.
Rx D-H Public
Key
RAM Cleared after creating the secret
key.
SW, after creating the
secret key.
Tx D-H Secret
key
HW
registers
Cleared when entering/exiting the
maintenance role.
Maintenance user
Rx D-H Secret
key
HW
registers
Cleared when entering/exiting the
maintenance role.
Maintenance user
Tx HW
Session key
RAM, MUX
FPGA
Cleared after sending to remote
side and loading to local MUX
FPGA, or when entering/exiting the
maintenance role.
SW, after loading to local
MUX FPGA or by
maintenance user
Rx HW
Session key
RAM, MUX
FPGA
Cleared after receiving from the
remote side and loading to local
SW, after loading to local
MUX FPGA or by
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May be reproduced only in its entirety without revision.
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MUX FPGA, or when
entering/exiting the maintenance
role.
maintenance user
RSA Digital
Signature
Verification
Key
HW
registers
This key is used for verification of
application/firmware files that will
be downloaded to the IDU.
Is updated by
manufacturer when
another pair of RSA digital
signature keys
(sign/verification) is
generated.
Crypto-officer
PIN
HW
registers
Cleared to the default value when
entering/exiting the maintenance
role.
Can be set by CO.
Crypto-officer,
maintenance user
Maintenance
PIN
HW
registers
Cleared to the default value when
entering/exiting the maintenance
role.
Can be set by CO.
Crypto-officer,
maintenance user
User PIN HW
registers
Cleared to the default value when
entering/exiting the maintenance
role.
Can be set by CO.
Crypto-officer,
maintenance user
Monitor PIN HW
registers
Cleared to the default value when
entering/exiting the maintenance
role.
Can be set by CO.
Crypto-officer,
maintenance user
4.3 Access Control Policy
FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit allows controlled access to the SRDIs contained within
it. The following table defines the access that an operator or application has to each SDRI while
operating the IDU in a given role performing a specific service (command). The permissions are
categorized as a set of four separate permissions: automatically created after reset (a), zeroize (d
- automatically deleted or set default value), write (w), use (u). If no permission is listed, an
operator outside the IDU has no access to the SRDI.
Copyright © Ceragon Networks Ltd. 2006.
May be reproduced only in its entirety without revision.
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FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure
Basic Indoor Unit
SRDI/Role/Service Access
Policy
Security
Relevant
Data
Item
Seed
Key
Seed
Value
Prime
D-H
Private
Key
Tx
D-H
Public
Key
Rx
D-H
Public
Key
Tx
D-H
Secret
key
Rx
D-H
Secret
key
Tx
HW
Session
key
Rx
HW
Session
key
RSA
Digital
Signature
Verification
Key
Crypto-officer
PIN
Maintenance
PIN
User
PIN
Monitor
PIN
Role/Service
Monitor
Authentication (via PIN) u
Module Show Status
Radio resource management
Transmit PDH/FE data (encrypted) u u
Receive PDH/FE data (encrypted) u u
Button reset a a a a a a a a a a
User role
Authentication (via PIN) u
Module Show Status
Radio resource management
Transmit PDH/FE data (encrypted) u u
Receive PDH/FE data (encrypted) u u
IDC/Drawer HW reset, button reset a a a a a a a a a a
IDC SW reset a a a
Download FW/SW files u
Change IP address (requests HW
reset)
a a a a a a a a a a
Change In-band Configuration
(requests HW reset)
a a a a a a a a a a
Copyright © Ceragon Networks Ltd. 2006.
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Maintenance role
FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure
Basic Indoor Unit
SRDI/Role/Service Access
Policy
Security
Relevant
Data
Item
Seed
Key
Seed
Value
Prime
D-H
Private
Key
Tx
D-H
Public
Key
Rx
D-H
Public
Key
Tx
D-H
Secret
key
Rx
D-H
Secret
key
Tx
HW
Session
key
Rx
HW
Session
key
RSA
Digital
Signature
Verification
Key
Crypto-officer
PIN
Maintenance
PIN
User
PIN
Monitor
PIN
Authentication (via PIN) d d d d d d d d d d d u
d
d d
Module Show Status
Radio resource management
Transmit PDH/FE data (encrypted) u u
Receive PDH/FE data (encrypted) u u
IDC/Drawer HW reset, button reset a a a a a a a a a a
IDC SW reset a a a
Download FW/SW files u
Change IP address (requests HW
reset)
a a a a a a a a a a
Change In-band Configuration
(requests HW reset)
a a a a a a a a a a
Maintenance related operations. a a a a a a a a a a
Zeroize CSP (when entering/exiting
the role)
d d d d d d d d d* d* d u
d
d d
Crypto-officer Role
Set/Change PIN u
w
w w w
Module Show Status
Radio resource management
Set encryption mode (requests HW
reset)
a a a a a a a a a a
Copyright © Ceragon Networks Ltd. 2006.
May be reproduced only in its entirety without revision.
Page 24 of 27
Transmit PDH/FE data (encrypted) u u
FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure
Basic Indoor Unit
SRDI/Role/Service Access
Policy
Security
Relevant
Data
Item
Seed
Key
Seed
Value
Prime
D-H
Private
Key
Tx
D-H
Public
Key
Rx
D-H
Public
Key
Tx
D-H
Secret
key
Rx
D-H
Secret
key
Tx
HW
Session
key
Rx
HW
Session
key
RSA
Digital
Signature
Verification
Key
Crypto-officer
PIN
Maintenance
PIN
User
PIN
Monitor
PIN
Receive PDH/FE data (encrypted) u u
IDC/Drawer HW reset, button reset a a a a a a a a a a
IDC SW reset a a a
Download FW/SW files u
Change IP address (requests HW
reset)
a a a a a a a a a a
Change In-band Configuration
(requests HW reset)
a a a a a a a a a a
Maintenance related operations a a a a a a a a a a
Unauthenticated Role
Authentication (optional)
Module Show Status
Radio resource management
Transmit PDH/FE data (encrypted) u u
Receive PDH/FE data (encrypted) u u
IDC/Drawer HW reset, button reset a a a a a a a a a a
IDC SW reset a a a
Download FW/SW files u
Change IP address (requests HW
reset)
a a a a a a a a a a
Maintenance related operations. a a a a a a a a a a
Copyright © Ceragon Networks Ltd. 2006.
May be reproduced only in its entirety without revision.
Page 25 of 27
FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure
Basic Indoor Unit
SRDI/Role/Service Access
Policy
Security
Relevant
Data
Item
Seed
Key
Seed
Value
Prime
D-H
Private
Key
Tx
D-H
Public
Key
Rx
D-H
Public
Key
Tx
D-H
Secret
key
Rx
D-H
Secret
key
Tx
HW
Session
key
Rx
HW
Session
key
RSA
Digital
Signature
Verification
Key
Crypto-officer
PIN
Maintenance
PIN
User
PIN
Monitor
PIN
Change In-band Configuration
(requests HW reset)
a a a a a a a a a a
* Zeroization means loading a randomly generated number value.
5. Operational Environment
The module operates in a limited operational environment. The module only supports
the loading of digitally signed code using RSA. Any loading of invalidated code
invalidates the FIPS 140-2 validation. Given the limited operational environment, the
requirements of FIPS-140-2 section 4.6.1 (Operating system requirements) do not
apply.
6. Electromagnetic Interference and
Compatibility
For security level 2 the cryptographic module shall conform to EMI/EMC requirements,
specified by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional
Radiators, Digital Devices, Class A (i.e. for business use). The FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure
Basic Indoor Unit has been tested and certificated to FCC Part 15: 2002 Class B,
where the test conditions are more demanding than for Class A, therefore the FibeAir
1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit complies to the standard FIPS 140-2. The device is
labeled in accordance with FCC regulations.
7. Self-tests
This section describes the Power-up Self-tests and the Conditional Self-tests supported by the
module.
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7.1 Power-Up Tests
The following tests have to be completed during the FibeAir 1500PTM
Secure Basic Indoor Unit
power-up:
Test name
Software AES KAT
Software Digital Signature KAT
Seed and Seed Key Check
Hardware AES KAT
Approved PRNG KAT
Software/firmware files integrity test
Hardware Bypass self-test
Crypto-officer password validation
In case of any test (except Crypto-officer password validation) failing the system enters the Error
state, no cryptographic operation is performed and all data output is inhibited: FE ports are shut
down, AIS is sent to the line (T1 ports) and radio directions, no signal in EOW. The module
zeroizes all critical security parameters stored in RAM and clears all remembered authentication
results. The only way to resume the module initialization is via HW reset of the drawer upon re-
initiation of power-up self-tests.
The Crypto-officer password should be different from its default value, otherwise a suitable alarm
indicates this error (see chapter 3.1 Security Rules and the table in chapter 2.2 Services).
7.2 Conditional Tests
The following table lists the conditional self-tests that are performed by the module.
Test Name
Software/Firmware Digital Signature verification
Hardware Bypass self-test
Seed and Seed Key Check
Continuous PRNG self-test
Software/Firmware Digital Signature verification and Hardware Bypass self-tests are executed as
user command requests for SW/FW download and switching the encryption mode. Continuous
PRNG self-tests are performed internally.
As a conditional self-test, Seed and Seed Key Check is executed when reseeding the FIPS-
approved PRNG in case of entering/exiting the maintenance role.
Encryption mode enabling and disabling requires a drawer power reset, so that conditional
Hardware Bypass self-tests are always a part of the relevant power-up self-test.
Copyright © Ceragon Networks Ltd. 2006.
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During the tests triggered by the encryption mode switch, only the AIS and idle FE packets are
sent to the radio direction.
8. Mitigation of Other Attacks
This Section is not applicable.
9. Annex A: Key specification
9.1 Seed Key and Seed Value
The seed key K (256 bit) is generated at power up or by CSPs clearing. It is used to generate a
new seed value V (128 bit) during power up, CSPs clearing or whenever a new random number
generated is required.
9.2 Prime
The Prime is generated and checked for primality each time in the following manner:
1. Generate random number according to the Generate128bitRandom algorithm which is
based on X9.31 standard.
2. Test if this value is prime, using Miller-Rabin Probabilistic Primality Test technique.
3. If the number is prime then return it, otherwise go to step 1.
9.3 Diffie-Hellman Private Key generation
The private key of the D-H is generated using the Generate128bitRandom algorithm which is based
on the X9.31 standard.