## Micron Technology, Inc. Micron® MTC22-P4 Controller Sub Chip Security Subsystem ## FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## Document Version: 0.5 Date: 06/12/2025 Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 1 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 ## Table of Contents | 1 - General ................................................................................................................................ | 5 | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 1.1 Overview | .......................................................................................................................... 5 | | 1.2 Security Levels | ................................................................................................................. 5 | | 2 - Cryptographic Module Specification ..................................................................................... | 6 | | 2.1 Description | ....................................................................................................................... 6 | | 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ........................................ | 7 | | 2.3 Excluded Components | ...................................................................................................... 8 | | 2.4 Modes of Operation | .......................................................................................................... 8 | | 2.5 Algorithms | ........................................................................................................................ 8 | | 2.6 Security Function Implementations ..................................................................................12 | | | 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................14 | | | 2.8 RBG and Entropy | ............................................................................................................14 | | 2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................15 | | | 2.10 Key Establishment | .........................................................................................................15 | | 2.11 Industry Protocols | ..........................................................................................................16 | | 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................17 | | | 3.1 Ports and Interfaces | ........................................................................................................17 | | 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication .......................................................................................18 | | | 4.1 Authentication Methods | ...................................................................................................18 | | 4.2 Roles | ...............................................................................................................................18 | | 4.3 Approved Services | ..........................................................................................................18 | | 4.4 Non-Approved Services ...................................................................................................27 | | | 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded ................................................................................28 | | | 5 External Software/Firmware Loaded | ......................................................................................29 | | 5.1 Integrity Techniques | ........................................................................................................29 | | 5.2 Initiate on Demand | ..........................................................................................................29 | | 6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................30 | | | 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................30 | | | 7 Physical Security | ....................................................................................................................31 | | 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions | Required..................................................................................31 | | 8 Non-Invasive Security | ............................................................................................................32 | | 8.1 Mitigation Techniques | ......................................................................................................32 | | 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ..........................................................................33 | | | 9.1 Storage Areas | .................................................................................................................33 | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Micron Technology Public Material - Page 2 of 58 May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ..............................................................................................33 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods ................................................................................................34 9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................35 10 Self-Tests .............................................................................................................................46 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................46 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests ....................................................................................................46 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ........................................................................................49 10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................51 10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests .....................................................................................52 11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................53 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ..........................................................53 11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................53 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance ..........................................................................................54 11.4 Design and Rules ..........................................................................................................54 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................55 References and Definitions .......................................................................................................56 Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 3 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 List of Tables Table 1: Security Levels ............................................................................................................. 5 Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Hardware ..................................................................... 8 Table 3: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 8 Table 4: Approved Algorithms ...................................................................................................11 Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ........................................................................................11 Table 6: Security Function Implementations ..............................................................................14 Table 7: Entropy Certificates .....................................................................................................14 Table 8: Entropy Sources ..........................................................................................................15 Table 9: Ports and Interfaces ....................................................................................................17 Table 10: Authentication Methods .............................................................................................18 Table 11: Roles .........................................................................................................................18 Table 12: Approved Services ....................................................................................................27 Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required ...........................................................................31 Table 14: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................33 Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods ........................................................................................33 Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods ..........................................................................................34 Table 17: SSP Table 1 ..............................................................................................................39 Table 18: SSP Table 2 ..............................................................................................................45 Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests ........................................................................................46 Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................49 Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information .........................................................................49 Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information ................................................................................51 Table 23: Error States ...............................................................................................................51 Table 24: References ................................................................................................................57 Table 25: Acronyms and Definitions ..........................................................................................58 List of Figures Figure 1 - Cryptographic Boundary (red) and TOEPP ............................................................... 7 Figure 2 - Physical Perimeter / boundary ................................................................................... 7 Figure 3 - Tamper Evidence .....................................................................................................31 Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 4 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 ## 1 - General ### 1.1 Overview This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for version MTC22-P4 of the Micron Technology, Inc. Micron® SSD Controller Sub Chip Security Subsystem. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for an overall Security Level 2 module. ### 1.2 Security Levels The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the Module are as follows from Table 1: | Section | Title | Security Level | |-----------|-----------------------------------------|------------------| | 1 | General | 2 | | 2 | Cryptographic module specification | 2 | | 3 | Cryptographic module interfaces | 2 | | 4 | Roles, services, and authentication | 2 | | 5 | Software/Firmware security | 2 | | 6 | Operational environment | N/A | | 7 | Physical security | 2 | | 8 | Non-invasive security | N/A | | 9 | Sensitive security parameter management | 2 | | 10 | Self-tests | 2 | | 11 | Life-cycle assurance | 2 | | 12 | Mitigation of other attacks | N/A | | | Overall Level | 2 | Table 1: Security Levels Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 5 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 ## 2 - Cryptographic Module Specification This Micron® MTC22-P4 Controller Sub Chip Security Subsystem module, hereafter denoted as the Module is a Single-Chip Hardware sub-chip cryptographic subsystem, as defined in FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance 2.3.B. ### Description ####### Purpose and Use: The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies or other markets that require FIPS 140-3 validated SSD Controllers. The Module is intended to be used in a SSD system. ####### Module Type : Hardware ####### Module Embodiment : Single Chip ####### Module Characteristics : SubChip ####### Cryptographic Boundary: The physical form of the Module is depicted in Figure 2. The Module is a single chip embodiment. The cryptographic boundary is the logical cryptographic boundary of the module as defined by the Security Subsystem and includes all cryptographic algorithm implementations. The physical cryptographic boundary is the Micron® MTC22-P4 ASIC and includes its package. The cryptographic boundary is depicted by the red outline line in Figure 1. ####### Tested Operational Environment's Physical Perimeter ( TOEPP): The Tested Operational Environment's Physical Perimeter is the physical boundary of the module which is the Micron® MTC22-P4 ASIC package. Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 6 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 Figure 1 - Cryptographic Boundary (red) and TOEPP Figure 2 - Physical Perimeter / boundary ### 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ####### Tested Module Identification - Hardware: The cryptographic module is tested on the following operational environment: Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 7 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Hardware | Model and/or Part Number | Hardware Version | Firmware Version | Processors | Features | |---------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------------| | Micron® MTC22-P4 Controller Sub Chip Security Subsystem | 0x20201112 | Function ROM v3.0 Boot ROM v1.0 Bootloader V2.0 Runtime SCCS v3.0 | Micron® MTC-22 P4 | NVMe interface at the physical boundary | ### 2.3 Excluded Components No components were excluded from the cryptographic boundary. ### 2.4 Modes of Operation ####### Modes List and Description: | Mode Name | Description | Types of Services | Status Indicator | |-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------| | NMO | Normal mode of operation. This is the only Approved mode of operation supported by the module | Approved | fipsApprovedMode: 1 | Table 3: Modes List and Description The Module only supports an Approved mode of operation and is configured to only operate in this Approved mode during manufacturing. To verify that the Module is in the Approved mode of operation, the operator may invoke the 'Get Status' service, which will indicate the Approved mode of operation, as well as the version information for the Module. The Module provides services to support NVMe industry standard commands as well as TCG commands. The Module provides these services to support the deployment of devices which support the TCG mode of operation but is not responsible for TCG management functions. ### 2.5 Algorithms ####### Approved Algorithms: The Module implements the Approved cryptographic algorithms listed the table below. Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 8 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |-------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | AES-CTR, AES-ECB | C1278 | Direction - Encrypt Key Length - 128, 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-ECB | A5543, A5545 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-KW | A5550 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Cipher - Cipher Key Length - 256 Payload Length - Payload Length: 256- 4096 Increment 64 | SP 800-38F | | AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 | A5543, A5545 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 256 Payload Length - Payload Length: 4096-32896 Increment 128 Tweak Mode - Number Data Unit Length Matches Payload Length - Yes | SP 800-38E | | Conditioning Component Block Cipher Derivation Function SP800-90B | A2272 | Key Length - 128 Payload Length - Payload Length: 512 | SP 800-90B | | Counter DRBG | C1278 | Prediction Resistance - No, Yes Supports Reseed - Yes Mode - AES-128, AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - No Additional Input - Additional Input: 0- 256, Additional Input: 0-384 Entropy Input - Entropy Input: 256, Entropy Input: 384 Nonce - Nonce: 0 Personalization String Length - Personalization String Length: 0-256, Personalization String Length: 0-384 Returned Bits - 512 | SP 800-90A Rev. 1 | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) | A5551 | Curve - P-384 Secret Generation Mode - extra bits | FIPS 186-5 | | ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5) | A5551 | Curve - P-384 | FIPS 186-5 | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) | A5551 | Curve - P-384 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384 Component - No | FIPS 186-5 | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) | A5551 | Component - No Curve - P-384 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384 | FIPS 186-5 | | HMAC-SHA2-384 | A5548 | MAC - MAC: 384 Key Length - Key Length: 384 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2-512 | A5548 | MAC - MAC: 512 Key Length - Key Length: 512 | FIPS 198-1 | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 9 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | HMAC-SHA2-512/256 | A5548 | MAC - MAC: 256 Key Length - Key Length: 256 | FIPS 198-1 | | KDF SP800-108 | A5546 | KDF Mode - Counter MAC Mode - HMAC-SHA2-384, HMAC- SHA2-512/256 Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 384 Fixed Data Order - Before Fixed Data Counter Length - 8 Supports Empty IV - No Requires Empty IV - No Custom Key In Length - 0 | SP 800-108 Rev. 1 | | KTS-IFC | A5549 | Function - partialVal IUT ID - 6500 Modulo - 3072, 4096 Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1- basic Fixed Public Exponent - 010001 Scheme - KTS-OAEP-basic - KAS Role - initiator Key Transport Method - Hash Algorithms - SHA2-384 Supports Null Associated Data - Yes Associated Data Pattern - uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo Associated Data Encoding - concatenation Key Length - 256 | SP 800-56B Rev. 2 | | PBKDF | A5552 | Iteration Count - Iteration Count: 100- 1000 Increment 1 HMAC Algorithm - SHA2-512/256 Password Length - Password Length: 8- 32 Increment 1 Salt Length - Salt Length: 128-3952 Increment 8 Key Data Length - Key Data Length: 256 | SP 800-132 | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) | A5547 | Hash Pair - Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384 Modulo - 3072, 4096 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss Mask Function - mgf1 Fixed Public Exponent - 010001 Public Exponent Mode - fixed | FIPS 186-5 | | SHA2-384 | A5544 | Message Length - Message Length: 384, 8-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1 | FIPS 180-4 | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 10 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |--------------|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | SHA2-512 | A5544 | Message Length - Message Length: 512, 8-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-512/256 | A5544 | Message Length - Message Length: 256, 8-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1 | FIPS 180-4 | Table 4: Approved Algorithms ####### Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: The Module implements the FIPS Vendor Affirmed cryptographic algorithms listed. | Name | Properties | Implementation | Reference | |---------------|-----------------------------------------------------|------------------|--------------------------------------------------| | CKG | Key Type:Asymmetric and Symmetric | N/A | SP800-133rev2 Section 4 example 1 and IG D.H | | CKG- Combined | Key Type:Symmetric Key Generation for AES-XTS usage | N/A | SP 800-133rev2 Section 6.3 example #1 and IG C.I | Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ####### Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. ####### Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: N/A for this module. ####### Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 11 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 ### 2.6 Security Function Implementations | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |--------|---------------------|----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | KTS1 | KTS-Unwrap KTS-Wrap | Key Transport Wrapping | IG D.G: Approved Key Wrapping Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides 256 bits of encryption strength | AES-KW: (A5550) | | KTS2 | KTS-Encap | Key Transport Encapsulation | IG:D.G Key confirmation:No Caveat:Caveat: Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 150 bits of encryption strength | KTS-IFC: (A5549) | | RNG | DRBG | DRBG | | Counter DRBG: (C1278) AES-CTR: (C1278) AES-ECB: (C1278) | | ENT | ENT-Cond ENT-ESV | Entropy Source | | Conditioning Component Block Cipher Derivation Function SP800-90B: (A2272) Counter DRBG: (C1278) AES-CTR: (C1278) AES-ECB: (C1278) | | SHS | SHA | Message hashing | | SHA2-384: (A5544) SHA2-512: (A5544) SHA2-512/256: (A5544) | | HMAC | MAC | Message authentication code generation | | HMAC-SHA2- 384: (A5548) HMAC-SHA2- 512: (A5548) HMAC-SHA2- | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 12 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms 512/256: (A5548) | |---------------|-----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | DPE | BC-UnAuth | User Data encryption | | AES-ECB: (A5543) AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0: (A5543, A5545) | | DPD | BC-UnAuth | User Data decryption | | AES-ECB: (A5543) AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0: (A5543, A5545) | | KDF | KBKDF | Key-Based Key Derivation | | KDF SP800- 108: (A5546) HMAC-SHA2- 384: (A5548) HMAC-SHA2- 512: (A5548) HMAC-SHA2- 512/256: (A5548) | | PBKDF | PBKDF | Password Based Key Derivation | | PBKDF: (A5552) | | RSAVer | DigSig-SigVer | Signature verification | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5547) | | ECDSASigVer | DigSig-SigVer | Signature verification | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5551) | | ECDSASigGen | DigSig- SigGen | Signature generation | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A5551) | | ECDSA- KeyGen | AsymKeyPair- KeyGen AsymKeyPair- KeyVer | Key generation | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5551) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5): (A5551) CKG: () Key Type: Asymmetric and Symmetric | | CKG | CKG | AES-256 Symmetric Key Generation from | | AES-ECB: (A5545) CKG: () | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Micron Technology Public Material - Version 0.5 Page 13 of 58 May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 Table 6: Security Function Implementations | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |----------------|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | the direct output of the DRBG | | Key Type: Asymmetric and Symmetric | | CKG - Combined | CKG | AES-256 Symmetric Key Generation combining 2 or more keys | | AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0: (A5543) CKG- Combined: () AES 256: Symmetric Key Generation for AES-XTS usage | ### 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information ###### AES-XTS: The module complies with FIPS 140-3 IG C.I by: - AES-XTS is only used for storage purposes. - T he XTS algorithm implementation includes a check to ensure Key_1 ≠ Key_2. Per IG C.I - AES-XTS Key_1 and Key_2 are generated independently according to the rules for component symmetric keys from NIST SP 800-133rev2, Sec. 6.3, for an approved use of AES-XTS. ###### PBKDF: - Keys derived from passwords may only be used in storage applications. - Per Option 2a, derived keys are used as input to AES-KW to wrap and unwrap sensitive data. - Password length and format are specified in the SSP table and are 32 bytes long. Use of the derived password in the associated unwrap process is limited to five (5) retries at which time the module will need to be reset. This effectively eliminates the possibility of determining the password through exhaustive methods. - The PBKDF iteration count (C) is chosen to be as high as can be tolerated without impacting the performance of the system boot up process. ### 2.8 RBG and Entropy | Cert Number | Vendor Name | |---------------|-------------------------| | E168 | Micron Technology, Inc. | Table 7: Entropy Certificates Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 14 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 The Module uses the following entropy source . | Name | Type | Operational Environment | Sample Size | Entropy per Sample | Conditioning Component | |-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|---------------------------|---------------|----------------------|--------------------------| | Micron ® MTC22- P4 SSD Controller Sub Chip Security Subsystem ENT | Physical | MTC22-P4 SSD Controller | 128 bit | Full entropy | A2272 (BlockCipher_DF) | Table 8: Entropy Sources ### 2.9 Key Generation The module generates RSA and ECDSA asymmetric key pairs compliant with FIPS 186-5, using a NIST SP 800-90Arev1 CTR_DRBG for random number generation. The module implements Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG, vendor affirmed), compliant with SP 800- 133r2. When random values are required, they are obtained from the SP 800-90Ar1 approved DRBG, compliant with Section 4 of SP 800-133r2. The following methods are implemented: - Direct generation of symmetric keys: compliant with SP 800-133rev2, Section 6.1. - Symmetric Keys Produced by Combining (Multiple) Keys: Compliant with SP 800-133rev2, Section 6.3. - RSA and ECDSA key pair generation: compliant with SP 800-133rev2, Section 5.1, which maps to FIPS 186-5. - RSA key pair generation (KTS-IFC): compliant with SP 800-133rev2, Section 5.2, which maps to FIPS 186-5. Additionally, the module implements the following key derivation methods: - KDF SP800108: compliant with section 4.1 'KDF in Counter Mode' of SP 800 -108rev1. - PBKDF: compliant with Section 5.4 ' Option 1a ' of SP800 -132 ### 2.10 Key Establishment ####### Key Agreement Information N/A - The module does not perform Key Agreement. Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 15 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 ####### Key Transport Information - The module implements a KTS in conformance with NIST SP 800-56Vr2 using KTS-OAEP-BASIC (Cert. #A5549) - The module implements KTS versions using AES-KW in conformance with SP800-38F and IG D.G. (Cert. #5550) ### 2.11 Industry Protocols The module does not implement any Industry Protocols Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 16 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 ## 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ### Ports and Interfaces The Module's ports and associated FIPS defined logical interface categories are listed below. | Physical Port | Logical Interface(s) | Data That Passes | |--------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------| | AESE (encryption engine) | Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output | User Data | | AESD (encryption engine) | Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output | User Data | | Mbox (Mailbox) | Control Input Status Output | Service info input | | Controller output (response to Mbox) | Data Output | Service info output | | Reset/Interrupt | Control Input | None | | BMG-128 (S-DMA Interface) | Data Input Data Output | Service info data (command/response) | | Power | Power | None | | LDPC Decoder | Data Input | Firmware Images | | UART | Status Output | Status Data | Table 9: Ports and Interfaces The module does not provide control output. Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 17 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 ## 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ### 4.1 Authentication Methods The Module's authentication methods are listed in the table below. Table 10: Authentication Methods | Method Name | Description | Security Mechanism | Strength Each Attempt | Strength per Minute | |---------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Controller authentication | The User role is authenticated to the msg in interface with cryptographic signature generation | RSAVer | RSA 3072/4096 has a key strength of 128/150 bits. The probability of a successful verification from a single random attempt is at least 1/2^128. This effectively eliminates the possibility of determining the private key through exhaustive methods. | This verification has an associated retry limit of 5. This controls the number of unsuccessful attempts before authentication is blocked until a system restart occurs. This results in a probability of 5/2^128 that multiple attempts in a given minute of time is successful. | ### 4.2 Roles The Module supports one distinct operator role, the Controller (Cryptographic Officer). One authentication is allowed per Module reset. The Roles Table below lists all operator roles supported by the Module. The Module does not support concurrent operators. Authentications are cleared on module reset. Table 11: Roles | Name | Type | Operator Type | Authentication Methods | |------------|--------|-----------------|---------------------------| | Controller | Role | CO | Controller authentication | ### 4.3 Approved Services Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 18 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 All approved services implemented by the Module are listed in the table below: In addition to the services listed, the Module also supports a Self-Test service, which is invoked by power cycling the Module. All services are associated with the Controller (Cryptographic Officer) role with a sub-set of Controller services requiring an additional layer of authentication describe t hese 'factory - restricted' services and requires a second signature verification. The SSPs modes of access shown in the table below are defined as: - G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the SSP. - R = Read: The SSP is read from the Module (e.g., the SSP is output). - W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the Module (SSP is input). - E = Execute: The Module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. - Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the SSP. | Name | Descriptio n | Indic ator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Function s | SSP Access | |------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|----------|---------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------| | Module Self-Test | Run KAT tests on all cryptograph ic algorithms and firmware integrity test | CCS | Power | Pass/Fail status | KTS1 KTS2 RNG ENT SHS HMAC DPE DPD KDF PBKDF RSAVer ECDSASi gVer ECDSASi gGen ECDSA- KeyGen CKG CKG - Combined | Controller | | Get Status | Get information about the operational state of the drive This includes Module identifier, hardware and firmware | CCS | Comma nd | Comman d response with module status informati on | None | Controller | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 19 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 | Name | Descriptio n | Indic ator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Function s | SSP Access | |---------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|---------------------|------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | revision values. | | | | | | | TCG Authenticat e | Unwrap TCG SSP using PBKDF derived key | CCS | Passwor d | Pass/Fail Status | KTS1 KDF PBKDF CKG | Controller - Password: E - SumRdsKey: W - RdsKey: W - PasswordWrapKey: G,E,Z - AuthenticatedUseH macKey: E - EphemeralSumRdsk WrapKey: E | | Clear TCG Authenticati ons | Remove status of all past authenticati on and their privileges | CCS | End Session | Pass/Fail Status | None | Controller | | NVMe Allocate and associate Key | Generate a key, wrap key and associate key with an entity | CCS | Access control list | Pass/Fail Status | KTS1 RNG CKG | Controller - SumRdsKey: G,E,R - RdsKey: G,E,R - DRBG-State: E - WrapKey: E - NamespaceDEK: G,R - AuthenticatedUseH macKey: E - EphemeralSumRdsk WrapKey: E | | NVMe Deallocate and disassociat e Key | Zeroize key and disassociat e key from an entity | CCS | Access control list | Pass/Fail Status | KTS1 DPE | Controller - WrapKey: E - NamespaceDEK: Z - AuthenticatedUseH macKey: E | | NVMe Update Key | Erase user data in a namespace by changing the | CCS | Access control list | Pass/Fail Status | KTS1 RNG CKG | Controller - SumRdsKey: W,E - RdsKey: E - DRBG-State: E - WrapKey: E - NamespaceDEK: | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 20 of 58 Template v1.0 | Name | Descriptio n | Indic ator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Function s | SSP Access | |--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|--------------|---------------------|------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | encryption key | | | | | G,R,Z - LockingObjectDEK: G,R,Z - AuthenticatedUseH macKey: E - EphemeralSumRdsk WrapKey: E | | Public HMAC Generation | Generate an HMAC over the prescribed content | CCS | Content | Mac of content | HMAC | Controller - RootPublicMacKey: E - PspHmacKey: E | | Load Range and Key | Load DEK into DPE for indicated range | CCS | Range and Keyinfo | Status Indicator | KTS1 | Controller - SumRdsKey: W,E - RdsKey: E - TweakKey: W - WrapKey: E - NamespaceDEK: W - LockingObjectDEK: W - EphemeralSumRdsk WrapKey: E | | AWOR | Save, restore security operational context | CCS | Content pointer | Status Indicator | KTS1 HMAC KDF CKG CKG - Combined | Controller - SumRdsKey: W,R - RdsKey: W,R - TweakKey: W,R - PspHmacKey: W,R - RootHmacKey: E - RootKeyWrapKey: G,E - RootPublicMacKey: E - EphemeralSumRdsk WrapKey: W,R | | TCG Allocate and associate Key | Generate a key, wrap key and associate | CCS | Access control list | Status Indicator | KTS1 RNG CKG | Controller - SumRdsKey: G,E,R - RdsKey: G,E,R - DRBG-State: E | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 21 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 | Name | Descriptio n | Indic ator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Function s | SSP Access | |--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|--------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | key with an entity | | | | | - WrapKey: E - LockingObjectDEK: G,R - AuthenticatedUseH macKey: E - EphemeralSumRdsk WrapKey: E | | TCG Deallocate and disassociat e Key | Zeroize key and disassociat e key from an entity | CCS | Access control list | Status Indicator | KTS1 | Controller - WrapKey: E - LockingObjectDEK: Z,R - AuthenticatedUseH macKey: E | | TCG Update Key | Erase user data in a namespace by changing the encryption key | CCS | Access control list | Status Indicator | KTS1 RNG CKG | Controller - SumRdsKey: W,E - RdsKey: E - DRBG-State: E - WrapKey: E - LockingObjectDEK: G,R,Z - AuthenticatedUseH macKey: E - EphemeralSumRdsk WrapKey: E | | TCG Set PIN | Set PIN which is used in generating a key to wrap a TCG credential | CCS | Passwor d and passwor d length | Status indicator | KTS1 RNG HMAC KDF PBKDF CKG | Controller - SumRdsKey: W,G - RdsKey: W,G - DRBG-State: E - WrapKey: E - Password: W,E,Z - PasswordWrapKey: G,E,Z - AuthenticatedUseH macKey: E - EphemeralSumRdsk WrapKey: E | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 22 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 | Name | Descriptio n | Indic ator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Function s | SSP Access | |----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|--------------|---------------------|------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | TCG Revert, Activate, Reactivate | Revert to FOB, Revert to FOB with TCG Activated | CCS | Access control list | Status Indicator | KTS1 RNG HMAC CKG | Controller - SumRdsKey: Z - RdsKey: Z - WrapKey: E - DRBG-State: E - NamespaceDEK: G,Z - RootHmacKey: E - LockingObjectDEK: G,Z - AuthenticatedUseH macKey: E | | CSP Load | Restore Persistent CSP | CCS | CSP List | Status Indicator | KTS1 HMAC | Controller - RootHmacKey: E - RootKeyWrapKey: E - WrapKey: W - DRBG-State: E - TweakKey: W - PspHmacKey: W | | Generate KeyDerivati onKey | Generate a new KeyDerivati onKey | CCS | Value | Status Indicator | KDF CKG | Controller - RootHmacKey: G,E - RootKeyWrapKey: G,E - RootPublicMacKey: G - WrapKey: G,E - KeyDerivationKey: G,E - Entropy Input and Seed: E - DRBG-State: G,E - TweakKey: G - PspHmacKey: G - AuthenticatedUseH macKey: G,E - EphemeralSumRdsk WrapKey: G,E | | Attestation | Device cryptograph ic identity | CCS | Index | Status Indicator | KTS1 RNG SHS | Controller - KDeviceIDPrivate: G,E,Z | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 23 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 | Name | Descriptio n | Indic ator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Function s | SSP Access | |-------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|-------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | and attestation | | | | ECDSASi gVer ECDSASi gGen ECDSA- KeyGen CKG - Combined | - KDeviceIDPublic: G - KAliasPrivate: G,E - KAliasPublic: G - KDeviceIDWrapKey: G,E,Z - DRBG-State: E - UDS: G,E,Z | | User Write/Read | Encryption / Decryption of user data to / from a user data range | CCS | Data packet | Data Packet | DPE DPD | Controller - NamespaceDEK: E - LockingObjectDEK: E - TweakKey: E | | SUP Generate | KTS-RSA wrap an internally generated random | CCS | None | Encrypte d password context Status | KTS1 KTS2 RNG KDF PBKDF CKG | Controller - KDeviceWrappingP ub: E - PasswordWrapKey: G,E,Z - SUP Seed: G,R - DRBG-State: E | | SUP Authenticat e | Unwrap SUP blob using KBKDF derived key | CCS | Passwor d | Authentic ation result | KTS1 KDF PBKDF | Controller - PasswordWrapKey: G,E - Password: W,E | | Random | Returns a 256-bit random number | CCS | Size | DRBG output | RNG | Controller - DRBG-State: E | | Zeroize | Destroys all keys. Must be performed under the direct control of the operator | CCS | None | None | None | Controller - AuthenticatedUseH macKey: Z - DRBG-State: Z - EphemeralSumRdsk WrapKey: Z - Entropy Input and Seed: Z - KeyDerivationKey: Z - | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 24 of 58 Template v1.0 | Name | Descriptio n | Indic ator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Function s | SSP Access | |--------------------|------------------------------------------|--------------|----------|-----------|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | LockingObjectDEK: Z - NamespaceDEK: Z - Password: Z - PasswordWrapKey: Z - PspHmacKey: Z - RdsKey: Z - RootHmacKey: Z - RootKeyWrapKey: Z - SumRdsKey: Z - SUP Seed: Z - TweakKey: Z - WrapKey: Z - KFWModuleVerify: Z - KFWControllerVerify : Z - KAuthPub: Z - KVSAuthPub: Z - KDeviceWrappingP ub: Z - KManifestPub: Z - KFWCBootloaderVe rify: Z - UDS: Z - KDeviceIDWrapKey: Z - KDeviceIDPrivate: Z - KAliasPrivate: Z - KDeviceIDPublic: Z - KAliasPublic: Z - RootPublicMacKey: Z | | Module Deprovision | Deprovision the device, zeroize all SSPs | CCS | None | None | None | Controller - AuthenticatedUseH macKey: Z | Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 25 of 58 Template v1.0 | Name | Descriptio n | Indic ator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Function | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|--------------|----------|-----------|---------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | s | - DRBG-State: Z - EphemeralSumRdsk WrapKey: Z - Entropy Input and Seed: Z - LockingObjectDEK: Z - NamespaceDEK: Z - Password: Z - PasswordWrapKey: Z - PspHmacKey: Z - RdsKey: Z - RootHmacKey: Z - RootKeyWrapKey: Z - SumRdsKey: Z - SUP Seed: Z - TweakKey: Z - WrapKey: Z - KFWModuleVerify: Z - KFWControllerVerify : Z - KAuthPub: Z - KVSAuthPub: Z - KDeviceWrappingP ub: Z - KManifestPub: Z - KFWCBootloaderVe rify: Z - KDeviceIDWrapKey: Z - KDeviceIDPrivate: Z - KAliasPrivate: Z - KDeviceIDPublic: Z - KAliasPublic: Z - | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 Page 26 of 58 Table 12: Approved Services | Name | Descriptio n | Indic ator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Function s | SSP Access | |--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|--------------|---------------------------|--------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | RootPublicMacKey: Z | | Factory Auth | Authenticati on for factory- restricted services | CCS | Authoriz ation signatur e | Random Value | RNG RSAVer | Controller - KAuthPub: E - KVSAuthPub: E - DRBG-State: E | | Firmware Signature Check | Verify firmware image signature | CCS | Firmwar e Image Location | Status | RSAVer | Controller - KFWModuleVerify: E - KFWControllerVerify : E - KFWCBootloaderVe rify: E | | Manifest Load | Verify and load trusted set of PKS | CCS | Manifest Location | Status | RSAVer | Controller - KManifestPub_ROM : E - KManifestPub: E - KDeviceWrappingP ub: R - KFWCBootloaderVe rify: R - KFWModuleVerify: R - KVSAuthPub: R - KAuthPub: R - KFWControllerVerify : R | ### 4.4 Non-Approved Services There are no Non-Approved services available. N/A for this module. Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 27 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 ### 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded This module supports the loading of external firmware via the Program Update service. Execution of the successfully loaded firmware is only effective after the next reset of the security module. Any firmware loaded into the module other than that listed in Section 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification, is outside the scope of this Security Policy and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. The module validates the integrity of the externally loaded firmware via procedures described in section 5.1 Integrity Techniques Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 28 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 ## 5 External Software/Firmware Loaded External firmware is loaded during the boot process. The firmware is validated using an RSA 3072 or 4096-bit signature verification after the image is copied into the module. It shall only be executed if the signature verification passes. Otherwise, it is removed from the module ' s Software/Firmware Security. The Module includes a firmware load service to support boot and any necessary updates. Firmware versions validated through the FIPS 140-3 CMVP will be explicitly identified on a validation certificate. Any firmware not identified in this Security Policy does not constitute the Module defined by this Security Policy or covered by this validation. ### 5.1 Integrity Techniques The Module contains the following firmware component(s): - Component 1: non reconfigurable Masked ROM per IG 5.A - Component 2: limited bootloader - binary - Component 3: limited run time firmware - binary The firmware components are protected with one of the following authentication techniques described in Section 10.1. - RSA 3072/4096 PKCS1_v1.5 (SHA2-384/SHA2-512) - RSA 3072/4096 PKCS1_PSS (SHA2-384/SHA2-512) Please note the module ROM is implemented in non-reconfigurable memory and is not subject to the firmware integrity test requirements per IG 5.A. ### 5.2 Initiate on Demand The integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed at power-on. The operator can initiate the integrity test on demand by resetting the device. Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 29 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 ## 6 Operational Environment ### 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ####### Type of Operational Environment : Limited The Module has a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-3 definitions therefore this section is N/A. Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 30 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 ## 7 Physical Security ### 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required The Module is a Single-Chip Hardware Sub-Chip cryptographic module and the embodiment is a single chip. The chip is encapsulated in a standard IC package. The IC packaging itself provides the necessary opacity and tamper evidence required for Level 2 conformance. Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required | Mechanism | Inspection Frequency | Inspection Guidance | |--------------|--------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | IC packaging | On initial receipt of the device and yearly afterwards | Inspect for evidence of prying or removal of the chip packaging. If tampering is suspected, then the device containing the IC should be removed from service and the site administrator should be contacted. See Example below. | Figure 3 - Tamper Evidence Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 31 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 ## 8 Non-Invasive Security ### Mitigation Techniques The Module does not implement any mitigation method against non-invasive attack. Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 32 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 ## 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ### 9.1 Storage Areas Table 14: Storage Areas | Storage Area Name | Description | Persistence Type | |--------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------| | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1) | Stored in volatile memory (RAM). | Dynamic | | Sub Chip security sub system e-Fuse (S2) | Stored in e-fuse in Plaintext | Static | | Sub Chip security sub system register (S3) | Stored in register in Plaintext | Dynamic | ### 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods | Name | From | To | Format Type | Distribution Type | Entry Type | SFI or Algorithm | |-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|---------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------------| | Input in Plaintext(IO1) | Outside the module boundary in ASIC Internal SRAM | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1) | Plaintext | Automated | Electronic | | | Input using SP800-38F AES key Transport (IO2) | Outside the module boundary in ASIC Internal SRAM | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1) | Encrypted | Automated | Electronic | KTS1 | | Output using SP800-38F Key Transport (IO3) | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1) | Outside the module boundary in ASIC Internal SRAM | Encrypted | Automated | Electronic | KTS1 | | Output encapsulated by RSA (IO4) | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1) | Outside the module boundary in ASIC Internal SRAM | Encrypted | Automated | Electronic | KTS2 | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 33 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 ### SSP Zeroization Methods | Zeroization Method | Description | Rationale | Operator Initiation | |----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------| | Z1 | Zeroized by Module power cycle or hard reset. | When module is reset, all data stored in volatile module memory (RAM) will be lost | Implicit | | Z2 | Zeroized by the zeroization service by overwriting with a fixed pattern of zeros. | Each SSP is overwritten with a fixed value of 1s or 0s | Explicit | Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 34 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 9.4 SSPs All usage of these SSPs by the Module are described in the services detailed in Section 4.3 | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generated By | Establishe d By | Used By | |--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|----------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------| | AuthenticatedUseHmacKey | Integrity checking of TCG table data | 256 - 256 | HMAC Key - CSP | CKG | | HMAC | | DRBG-State | CTR_DRBG internal state: V (128 bits) and Key (AES 256) | 256 - 256 | N/A - CSP | RNG | | HMAC ECDSA- KeyGen CKG CKG - Combined | | EphemeralSumRdskWrapKe y | Key wrap of: SumRdsKeys, | 256 - 256 | Transport Key - CSP | CKG | | KTS1 | | Entropy Input and Seed | CTR_DRBG entropy input. | 384 - N/A | N/A - CSP | ENT | | RNG | | KeyDerivationKey | Master key used to derive other keys | 256 - 256 | Key Derivation Key - CSP | CKG | | KDF | | LockingObjectDEK | User Data Encryption Key | 256 - 256 | Encryption Key - CSP | CKG | | DPE DPD | | NamespaceDEK | User Data Encryption Key | 256 - 256 | Encryption Key - CSP | CKG | | DPE DPD | | Password | Used with KDF to derive the PasswordWrapKey | 256 - 256 | Plaintext password - CSP | | | KDF | | PasswordWrapKey | Derived using KDF and Password and used to wrap/unwrap credential. | 256 - 256 | Transport Key - CSP | KDF | | KTS1 KTS2 | | PspHmacKey | Verify the integrity of public TCG content | 256 - 256 | HMAC Key - CSP | CKG | | HMAC | | RdsKey | CSP transport Key | 256 - 256 | Transport Key - CSP | CKG | | KTS1 | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 35 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generated By | Establishe d By | Used By | |---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------|-------------------|-----------| | RootHmacKey | Integrity checking | 256 - 256 | HMAC Key - CSP | KDF | | HMAC | | RootKeyWrapKey | key-wrap using SP800- 38F AES KTS persistent secret content stored outside of the boundary. | 256 - 256 | Transport Key - CSP | KDF | | KTS1 | | RootPublicMacKey | Integrity checking of TCG content | 256 - 256 | HMAC Key - CSP | KDF | | HMAC | | SumRdsKey | CSP transport Key | 256 - 256 | Transport Key - CSP | CKG | | KTS1 | | SUP Seed | Random value used to generate an internal password | 256 - 256 | Symmetric Key - CSP | CKG | | KTS2 | | TweakKey | Data encryption in conjuction with: LockingObjectDEK or NamespaceDEK | 256 - 256 | Data Encryption Key - CSP | CKG | | DPE DPD | | WrapKey | Key encryption of: LockingObjectDEK, NamespaceDEK | 256 - 256 | Symmetric Key - CSP | CKG | | KTS1 | | KFWModuleVerify | Module firmware verification key | Modulus: 3072/409 6 - RSA: 150,128, RSA- PKCS- 1.5, RSA-PSS | Signature verification - PSP | | | RSAVer | | KFWControllerVerify | Controller signature verification Key | Modulus: 3072/409 6 - RSA: 150,128, RSA- | Signature verification - PSP | | | RSAVer | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 36 of 58 Template v1.0 | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generated By | Establishe d By | Used By | |--------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|-----------| | | | PKCS- 1.5, RSA- PSS | | | | | | KAuthPub | Key for Factory- restricted services signature verification | Modulus: 3072/409 6 - RSA: 150,128, RSA- PKCS- 1.5, RSA-PSS | Signature verification - PSP | | | RSAVer | | KVSAuthPub | Key for Factory- restricted signature verification for SEE module | Modulus: 3072/409 6 - RSA: 150,128, RSA- PKCS- 1.5, RSA- PSS | Signature verification - PSP | | | RSAVer | | KDeviceWrappingPub | Public Key for SUP Generate | Modulus: 3072/409 6 - RSA: 150,128, RSA- PKCS- 1.5, RSA- PSS | Signature verification - PSP | | | KTS2 | | KManifestPub_ROM | Public Key for manifest signature verification | Modulus: 3072/409 6 - RSA: 150,128, RSA- PKCS- | Signature verification - PSP | Input at Manufacturin g | | RSAVer | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 37 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generated By | Establishe d By | Used By | |----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|--------------| | | | 1.5, RSA- PSS | | | | | | KManifestPub | Public Key for manifest signature verification | Modulus: 3072/409 6 - RSA: 150,128, RSA- PKCS- 1.5, RSA- PSS | Signature verification - PSP | Input at Manufacturin g | | RSAVer | | KFWCBootloaderVerify | Key for bootloader firmware signature verification | Modulus: 3072/409 6 - RSA: 150,128, RSA- PKCS- 1.5, RSA- PSS | Signature verification - PSP | | | RSAVer | | UDS | Unique Device Secret. Used to generate CDI | 384 - 256 | Key Derivation - CSP | RNG | | KDF | | KDeviceIDWrapKey | key used for -wrapping the DeviceIDPrivate ECDSA key | 256 - 256 | Transport Key - CSP | KDF | | KTS1 | | KDeviceIDPrivate | ECDSA signature generation to verify Alias Certificate | 384 - 192 | Asymmetri c Signature Key - CSP | ECDSA- KeyGen | | ECDSASigGe n | | KAliasPrivate | Signature generation to validate system measurements | 384 - 192 | Asymmetri c Signature Key - CSP | ECDSA- KeyGen | | ECDSASigGe n | | KDeviceIDPublic | External Signature verification/authenticatio n | 384 - 192 | Asymmetri c Signature | ECDSA- KeyGen | | ECDSASigVer | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 38 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generated By | Establishe d By | Used By | |--------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------------------------------|----------------|-------------------|-------------| | | | | Verification - PSP | | | | | KAliasPublic | External Signature verification/Authenticatio n | 384 - 192 | Asymmetri c Signature Verification - PSP | ECDSA- KeyGen | | ECDSASigVer | Table 17: SSP Table 1 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |-------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------------------|------------------------|---------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | AuthenticatedUseHmacKey | | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | RootKeyWrapKey:Wraps using KTS1 | | DRBG-State | | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot or reseed | Z1 | Entropy Input and Seed:Derived From KeyDerivationKey:directly generated from Drbg-State LockingObjectDEK:directly generated from DrbgState NamespaceDEK:directly generated from DrbgState RdsKey:directly generated from DrbgState PspHmacKey:directly generated from DrbgState AuthenticatedUseHmacKey:directly generated from DrbgState SumRdsKey:directly generated from DrbgState SUP Seed:directly generated from DrbgState | Version 0.5 Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Page 39 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs TweakKey:directly generated from DrbgState WrapKey:directly generated from DrbgState | |-------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | EphemeralSumRdskWrapKey | Input using SP800-38F AES key Transport (IO2) Output using SP800-38F Key Transport (IO3) | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | SumRdsKey:used to wrap/unwrap SumRdsKeys DRBG-State:directly generated by the DRBG | | Entropy Input and Seed | | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 | DRBG-State:Used With | | KeyDerivationKey | | Sub Chip security sub system e- Fuse (S2):Plaintext | | Z2 | RootHmacKey:Derived From RootKeyWrapKey:Derived From RootPublicMacKey:Derived From | | LockingObjectDEK | Input using SP800-38F AES key Transport (IO2) Output using SP800-38F Key Transport (IO3) | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext Sub Chip security sub system register (S3):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | WrapKey:Wrapped by RdsKey:Wrapped by SumRdsKey:Wrapped by DRBG-State:directly generated by the DRBG TweakKey:Used to perform the Write/Read service | | NamespaceDEK | Input in Plaintext(IO1) | Sub Chip security sub | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | WrapKey:Wrapped by RdsKey:Wrapped by | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 40 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | Input using SP800-38F AES key Transport (IO2) Output using SP800-38F Key Transport (IO3) | system RAM (S1):Plaintext Sub Chip security sub system register (S3):Plaintext | | | SumRdsKey:Wrapped by DRBG-State:directly generated by the DRBG TweakKey:Used to perform the Write/Read service | | Password | Input in Plaintext(IO1) | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 | PasswordWrapKey:used to generate using KDF | | PasswordWrapKey | | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 | Password:Derived From RdsKey:Wraps this key SumRdsKey:Wraps this key | | PspHmacKey | Input using SP800-38F AES key Transport (IO2) Output using SP800-38F Key Transport (IO3) | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | RootKeyWrapKey:wrapped by using KTS1 DRBG-State:directly generated by the DRBG | | RdsKey | Input in Plaintext(IO1) Input using SP800-38F AES key Transport (IO2) | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | LockingObjectDEK:key-wraps this key NamespaceDEK:key-wraps this key PasswordWrapKey:Import/export by RootKeyWrapKey:Import/export by DRBG-State:directly generated by the DRBG | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 41 of 58 Template v1.0 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | Output using SP800-38F Key Transport (IO3) | | | | | | RootHmacKey | | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | KeyDerivationKey:Derived From | | RootKeyWrapKey | | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | KeyDerivationKey:Derived From WrapKey:Wraps the SSP PspHmacKey:Wraps the SSP AuthenticatedUseHmacKey:Wraps the SSP TweakKey:Wraps the SSP RdsKey:Wraps the SSP | | RootPublicMacKey | | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | KeyDerivationKey:Derived From | | SumRdsKey | Input in Plaintext(IO1) Input using SP800-38F AES key Transport (IO2) Output using SP800-38F Key Transport (IO3) | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | LockingObjectDEK:wrapped by SumRdsKey under certain conditions using KTS1 NamespaceDEK:wrapped by SumRdsKey under certain conditions using KTS1 DRBG-State:directly generated by the DRBG | | SUP Seed | Output encapsulated by RSA (IO4) | Sub Chip security sub | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | KDeviceWrappingPub:Derived From DRBG-State:directly generated by the DRBG | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 42 of 58 Template v1.0 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |---------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | system RAM (S1):Plaintext | | | | | TweakKey | Input using SP800-38F AES key Transport (IO2) Output using SP800-38F Key Transport (IO3) | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext Sub Chip security sub system register (S3):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | LockingObjectDEK:Used With NamespaceDEK:Used With DRBG-State:directly generated by the DRBG | | WrapKey | | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | LockingObjectDEK:Encrypts NamespaceDEK:Encrypts DRBG-State:directly generated by the DRBG RootKeyWrapKey:Wrapped by | | KFWModuleVerify | Input in Plaintext(IO1) | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | | | KFWControllerVerify | Input in Plaintext(IO1) | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | KManifestPub:Used to establish trust by checking signature on Key Manifest | | KAuthPub | Input in Plaintext(IO1) | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | KManifestPub:Used to establish trust by checking signature on Key Manifest | | KVSAuthPub | Input in Plaintext(IO1) | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | KManifestPub:Used to establish trust by checking signature on Key Manifest | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 43 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | KDeviceWrappingPub | Input in Plaintext(IO1) | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | SUP Seed:Encrypts KManifestPub:Used to establish trust by checking signature on Key Manifest | | KManifestPub_ROM | Input in Plaintext(IO1) | Sub Chip security sub system e- Fuse (S2):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | | | KManifestPub | Input in Plaintext(IO1) | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | KAuthPub:Verified as trusted by using MVK to verify signature of a Key Manifest KVSAuthPub:Verified as trusted by using MVK to verify signature of a Key Manifest KDeviceWrappingPub:Verified as trusted by using MVK to verify signature of a Key Manifest KFWCBootloaderVerify:Verified as trusted by using MVK to verify signature of a Key Manifest KFWControllerVerify:Verified as trusted by using MVK to verify signature of a Key Manifest | | KFWCBootloaderVerify | Input in Plaintext(IO1) | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | KManifestPub:Used to establish trust by checking signature on Key Manifest | | UDS | | Sub Chip security sub system e- Fuse (S2):Plaintext | | Z2 | | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 44 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | KDeviceIDWrapKey | | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 | KeyDerivationKey:Derived From KDeviceIDWrapKey:After KDF, the key wraps the KDeviceIDPrivate | | KDeviceIDPrivate | | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 | KDeviceIDWrapKey:Used to wrap/unwrap KDeviceIDPrivate KDeviceIDPublic:Used With | | KAliasPrivate | | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | KAliasPublic:Used With | | KDeviceIDPublic | | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | KDeviceIDPrivate:Used With | | KAliasPublic | | Sub Chip security sub system RAM (S1):Plaintext | Until reboot | Z1 Z2 | KAliasPrivate:Used With | Table 18: SSP Table 2 Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 45 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 ## 10 Self-Tests ### 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests The Module performs self-tests to ensure the proper operation of the Module. Per FIPS 140-3 these are categorized as either preoperational self-tests or conditional self-tests. Pre-operational self - tests are available on demand by power cycling the Module. The Module performs the following pre-operational self-tests in table below: | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | |-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------| | Bootloader Firmware integrity test | RSA SigVer PKCS1_v1.5 or PSS (FIPS186-5) (A5547) | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Success or Failure Code | Executed on the whole firmware stored in the Module | | Module run time firmware integrity test | RSA SigVer PKCS1_v1.5 or PSS (FIPS186-5) (A5547) | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Success or Failure Code | Executed on the whole firmware stored in the Module | Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests Note that the module ROM is implemented in non-reconfigurable-memory and are not subject to the firmware integrity test requirements per IG 5.A: ### 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests The Module performs the following conditional self-tests in the table below Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 46 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|---------------|-------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------| | AES-KW (A5550) - Encrypt | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Success or Failure Code | (Auxiliary) AES-256 KW Encrypt KAT | At boot up | | AES-KW (A5550) - Decrypt | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Success or Failure Code | (Auxiliary) AES-256 KW Decrypt KAT | At boot up | | AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 - Encryption | AES-256 | Comparison | CAST | Success or Failure Code | 256-bit AES-XTS encryption KAT | At boot up | | AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 - Decryption | AES-256 | Comparison | CAST | Success or Failure Code | 256-bit AES-XTS decryption KAT | At boot up | | Conditioning Component Block Cipher Derivation Function SP800- 90B (A2272) | AES 128 | KAT | CAST | Success or Failure Code | SP800-90B Conditioning Component (AES-128) | At boot up | | Counter DRBG (C1278) | Counter DRBG - AES 256 | KAT | CAST | Success or Failure Code | AES-256 CTR_DRBG KAT SP800-90A Health Tests. Instantiate, Reseed, Generate as a full test | At boot up | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5551) | ECDSA P-384 | PCT | PCT | Success or Failure Code | A pairwise consistency check is performed on ECDSA private/public key on | When a new ECDSA key pair is generated | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A5551) | ECDSA P-384 | KAT | CAST | Success or Failure Code | P-384 Signature Generation KAT with SHA-384 | At boot up | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5551) | ECDSA P-384 | KAT | CAST | Success or Failure Code | P-384 Signature Verification KAT with SHA-384 | At boot up | | HMAC-SHA2-384 (A5548) | HMAC SHA2-384 | KAT | CAST | Success or Failure Code | HMAC SHA2-384 KAT performed prior to Firmware Integrity test | At boot up | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 47 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |---------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------| | HMAC-SHA2-512 (A5548) | HMAC SHA2-512 | KAT | CAST | Success or Failure Code | HMAC SHA2-512 KAT | At boot up | | KDF SP800-108 (A5546) | HMAC-SHA2-384 | KAT | CAST | Success or Failure Code | Counter mode KBKDF KAT. Inclusive of HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT. | At boot up | | PBKDF (A5552) | HMAC SHA2- 512/256 | KAT | CAST | Success or Failure Code | Option 1a using HMAC SHA2-512/256 | At boot up | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5547) | 3072 RSA PKCS#1_v1.5 Verification with SHA-384 | KAT | CAST | Success or Failure Code | 3072 RSA PKCS#1_v1.5 Verification with SHA-384 KAT the Module only supports the public key operation for RSA Signature Verification and KTS-RSA Wrap | At boot up before Pre- Operational firmware integrity test. | | BootLoader Firmware Load test | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5547) | KAT | SW/FW Load | Success or Failure Code | A 3072/ 4096-bit RSA or ECDSA P384 Signature Verification is executed on the bootloader copied into the Module | At boot up | | Runtime Firmware Load test | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5547) | KAT | SW/FW Load | Success or Failure Code | A 3072/ 4096-bit RSA or ECDSA P384 Signature Verification is executed on the SEE firmware copied into the Module | At boot up | | XTS Duplicate Key | | CT | Critical Function | Success or Failure Code | Duplicate Key Test | Upon generation of XTS key | | Entropy 90B Start- up Repetition Count Test (RCT) | Repetition Count Test | Fault induction | CAST | Success or Failure Code | As specified in [90B] RCT startup health tests | At boot up | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 48 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |-------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------| | Entropy 90B Start- up Adaptive Proportion Test (APT) | Adaptive Proportion Test | Fault induction | CAST | Success or Failure Code | As specified in [90B] APT startup health tests | At boot up | | Entropy 90B Continuous Repetition Count Test (RCT) | Repetition Count Test | Fault induction | CAST | Success or Failure Code | As specified in [90B] RCT continuous health tests | Continuous when entropy is requested | | Entropy 90B Continuous Adaptive Proportion Test (APT) | Adaptive Proportion Test | Fault induction | CAST | Success or Failure Code | As specified in [90B] APT continuous health tests | Continuous when entropy is requested | ### 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |-----------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|-----------|-------------------| | Bootloader Firmware integrity test | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On Demand | Device Reset | | Module run time firmware integrity test | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On Demand | Device Reset | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 49 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------|-----------|-------------------| | AES-KW (A5550) - Encrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Device Reset | | AES-KW (A5550) - Decrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Device Reset | | AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 - Encryption | Comparison | CAST | On Demand | Device Reset | | AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 - Decryption | Comparison | CAST | On Demand | Device Reset | | Conditioning Component Block Cipher Derivation Function SP800-90B (A2272) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Device Reset | | Counter DRBG (C1278) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Device Reset | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5551) | PCT | PCT | N/A | N/A | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A5551) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Device Reset | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5551) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Device Reset | | HMAC-SHA2-384 (A5548) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Device Reset | | HMAC-SHA2-512 (A5548) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Device Reset | | KDF SP800-108 (A5546) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Device Reset | | PBKDF (A5552) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Device Reset | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5547) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Device Reset | | BootLoader Firmware Load test | KAT | SW/FW Load | On Demand | Device Reset | | Runtime Firmware Load test | KAT | SW/FW Load | On Demand | Device Reset | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 50 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |-------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|-----------|------------------------------| | XTS Duplicate Key | CT | Critical Function | | | | Entropy 90B Start-up Repetition Count Test (RCT) | Fault induction | CAST | On Demand | by power cycling the Module. | | Entropy 90B Start-up Adaptive Proportion Test (APT) | Fault induction | CAST | On Demand | by power cycling the Module. | | Entropy 90B Continuous Repetition Count Test (RCT) | Fault induction | CAST | | | | Entropy 90B Continuous Adaptive Proportion Test (APT) | Fault induction | CAST | | | Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information ### 10.4 Error States | Name | Description | Conditions | Recovery Method | Indicator | |--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | ES1 | The ROM fails a KAT | Triggered by cryptographic KAT failure. | Reboot/Power cycle the module | A Cryptographic Self-test Failure status is indicated in response to any service request. | | ES2 | The Module fails the firmware load test or the Firmware Integrity test | Firmware load and integrity check fails when the firmware fails to verify | Reboot/Power cycle the module | The Module enters the ES2 error state and outputs a verification failure status in response to the firmware service. | | ES3 | The Module fails conditional KAT self-test. Non-operational state. No services beside status services are allowed | Triggered by cryptographic KAT failure. | Reboot/Power cycle the module | The Module enters the ES3 error state and will output a self-test failure status to any service request | Table 23: Error States Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 51 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 ### Operator Initiation of Self-Tests Self-tests can be initiated by the operator by resetting the module. Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 52 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 ## 11 Life-Cycle Assurance ### 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ####### Installation and Initialization: The device is shipped from the factory in the Approved mode of operation and no further initialization is required to operate in the Approved mode. Going further, it is not possible to configure the module in such a way that it would operate in a non-compliant state or non-Approved mode. ####### Delivery: On receipt of the Module, the CO should perform the following steps to ensure the integrity of the device before using the device. 1. Verify the product shipping packaging is intact and untampered. 2. Verify the product is FIPS validated as indicated in the product label. 3. Examine the module to ensure it has not been tampered with during shipping according to the procedures outlined in the module Security Policy. 4. Verify that the device indicates that it is a FIPs device and is in an Approved mode and state. This is accomplished by performing a Level 0 Discovery as defined by the TCG Core specification. The Level 0 Discovery Header Vendor specific bytes 22, 23 and 24 must contain: - a. FIPS Drive = 1, - b. FIPS Mode = 0x01, - c. FIPS State = 0x01. Any other values indicate the Module is not operating in an Approved mode. If physical or logical tampering with the device is detected or suspected the SSD should not be placed into use and returned to Micron for evaluation. The SSD operates in an approved mode and contains the services necessary to support both NVMe and TCG concurrently. It is not necessary to activate Opal unless its features are desired. ### 11.2 Administrator Guidance Micron Technology, Inc. provides the end user with the following documents: 1. Micron Technology Micron® MTC22-P4 based SSDs Drive Owner supplemental information Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 53 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 2. Micron Technical Note TN_FD-28: Installing Micron SEDs in Windows 8 and 10 ### Non-Administrator Guidance N/A ### Design and Rules Rules of Operation 1. The Module provides one distinct operator role, the controller : (Cryptographic Officer). 2. The Module provides role-based authentication. 3. The Module clears previous authentications on power cycle. 4. An operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role. 5. The Module allows the operator to initiate power-up self-tests by power cycling power or resetting the Module. 6. All self-tests do not require any operator action. 7. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states. 8. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the Module. ### There are no restrictions on which keys or SSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service. 10. The Module does not support concurrent operators. 11. The Module does not support a maintenance interface or role. 12. The Module does not support manual SSP establishment method. 13. The Module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of data. 14. The Module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs. 15. The Module does not output intermediate key values. 16. The Module does not provide bypass services for ports/interfaces. Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 54 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 ## 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks The Module does not implement any mitigation method against other attacks. Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 55 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0 ## References and Definitions The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy. | Abbreviation | Full Specification Name* | |----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | [FIPS140-3] | Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules , March 22, 2019 | | [ISO19790] | International Standard, ISO/IEC 19790, Information technology - Security techniques - Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Third edition, March 2017 | | [ISO24759] | International Standard, ISO/IEC 24759, Information technology - Security techniques - Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Second and Corrected version, 15 December 2015 | | [IG] | Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program, October 23 2024 | | [108] | NIST Special Publication 800-108r1-upd1, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions (Revised), August 2022 | | [131A] | Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths, Revision 2, March 2019 | | [132] | NIST Special Publication 800-132, Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation, Part 1: Storage Applications, December 2010 | | [133] | NIST Special Publication 800-133, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation, Revision 2, June 2020 | | [186] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-5, February 2023. | | [197] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001, Updated May 9, 2023 | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 56 of 58 Template v1.0 | Abbreviation | Full Specification Name* | |-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | [198] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198-1, July, 2008 | | [180] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015 | | [38A] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December 2001 | | [38D] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800-38D, November 2007 | | [38E] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices, Special Publication 800-38E, January 2010 | | [38F] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, Special Publication 800-38F, December 2012 | | [56Br2] | NIST Special Publication 800-56B Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Finite Field Cryptography, March 2019 | | [90A] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A, Revision 1, June 2015. | | [90B] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation, Special Publication 800-90B, January 2018. | | [ACS-3] | ACS-3 Reporting Security Compliance December 1,2009 | | [TCG-SSC- Opal] | TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal, Specification | | [TCG-SACS] | TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification | Table 24: References Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 57 of 58 Template v1.0 Table 25: Acronyms and Definitions | Acronym | Definition* | |-----------|-----------------------------------------------------| | CCS | Command Completion Status | | KAT | Known Answer Test | | SSP | Sensitive Security Parameter | | AK | Authentication key | | DEK | Data Encryption Key | | LBA | Logical Block Address | | SED | Self-Encrypting Drive | | SID | Security ID, PIN for drive owner CO role - TCG OPAL | | SSD | Solid State Drive | | TCG | Trusted Computing Group | Copyright Micron Technology, Inc. 2025 Version 0.5 Page 58 of 58 Micron Technology Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Template v1.0