GSP3000 HSM FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Document Version 1.19– January 2023
Futurex GSP3000 HSM Non-Proprietary Security Policy – Page 1
FUTUREX
GSP3000 Hardware Security Module
FIPS 140-2 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
GSP3000 HSM FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Document Version 1.19– January 2023
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Table of Contents
1. Module Overview......................................................................................................................................................................3
2. Security Level ..............................................................................................................................................................................4
3. Modes of Operation.................................................................................................................................................................5
3.1. FIPS Approved Mode of Operation ..........................................................................................................................5
3.1.1. AES GCM Considerations....................................................................................................................................8
3.2. PCI HSM Mode of Operation (non-Approved) ....................................................................................................9
3.3. General (non-approved) Mode of Operation....................................................................................................10
4. Installation................................................................................................................................................................................. 11
5. ENABLING FIPS AND PCI HSM MODES.........................................................................................................................11
5.1. ENABLING THROUGH THE WEB INTERFACE......................................................................................................11
5.2. COM SETUP..................................................................................................................................................................... 12
5.3. ENABLING THROUGH EXCRYPT MANAGER.......................................................................................................12
6. Reset to Factory Default......................................................................................................................................................12
6.1. Reset Cryptographic Module ...................................................................................................................................12
6.2. Restore Device to Factory Defaults – Hardware Method.............................................................................. 12
7. Ports and Interfaces...............................................................................................................................................................13
8. Identification and Authentication Policy.......................................................................................................................15
8.1. Assumption of Roles....................................................................................................................................................15
8.2. Roles and Required Identification and Authentication.................................................................................. 15
8.3. Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms...........................................................................................................16
9. Access Control Policy............................................................................................................................................................16
9.1. Unauthenticated Services ..........................................................................................................................................16
9.2. Authenticated Services ...............................................................................................................................................17
9.2.1. Specification of Service Inputs and Outputs............................................................................................19
9.3. Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)..............................................................................................20
9.4. Definition of Public Keys ............................................................................................................................................22
9.5. Modes of Access for CSPs .........................................................................................................................................23
10. Operational Environment....................................................................................................................................................27
11. Security Rules........................................................................................................................................................................... 27
11.1. Self-Tests.......................................................................................................................................................................... 28
12. Physical Security Policy ........................................................................................................................................................29
12.1. Physical Security Mechanisms..................................................................................................................................29
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12.2. Environmental Conditions and Partial Environmental Failure Protection............................................... 29
12.3. Operator Recommended Actions...........................................................................................................................30
13. Mitigation of Other Attacks ...............................................................................................................................................31
14. Design Assurance................................................................................................................................................................... 31
14.1. Configuration Management.....................................................................................................................................31
14.2. Guidance Documents..................................................................................................................................................31
14.3. System Identification and Authentication...........................................................................................................31
14.4. Audit Logs and Inspection Frequency .................................................................................................................. 31
15. Key Loading..............................................................................................................................................................................32
15.1. Key Loading (FIPS/PCI-HSM Modes).....................................................................................................................32
16. Product Identification...........................................................................................................................................................32
16.1. Hardware Identification..............................................................................................................................................32
16.2. Firmware Versioning Scheme and Identification..............................................................................................33
17. TLS Protocols............................................................................................................................................................................ 34
17.1. TLS Protocols Supported............................................................................................................................................34
18. References................................................................................................................................................................................. 35
19. Glossary......................................................................................................................................................................................36
20. CSP Abbreviations.................................................................................................................................................................. 36
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1. MODULE OVERVIEW
The GSP3000 (HW P/N 9800-2079 Rev7, Rev8, Rev8C, Rev8D0F
1
, Rev9A.A1F
2
, Rev9B.A, Rev9C.A, Rev9D.A,
Rev9A.B, Rev9B.B, Rev9C.B, Rev9D.B2F
3
, Rev11A.A, Rev11B.A, Rev11C.A, or Rev11D.A3F
4
, and FW Version
7.0.0.4) Hardware Security Module (HSM) is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module that
provides secure data storage and processing functionality. All sensitive components of the module
are physically protected by a tamper resistant, responsive, and evident casing where all cryptographic
operations are performed. Upon tamper detection, normal operations are halted, and critical security
parameters are erased. The module is assembled from production quality components and provides
high speed interfaces for control and data input, status, and data output. The image below depicts the
cryptographic module. The boundary is the entire PCB assembly and protective epoxy, as shown with
the red outline. Components not enclosed within the epoxy are non-sensitive and have been excluded
from the physical security requirements.
Figure 1 – GSP3000 Hardware Security Module
None of the components outside the epoxy are relevant to the security of the module. They are
excluded from the security requirements of FIPS 140-2.
1
HW P/Ns 9800-2079 Rev7 and Rev8 series uses the Intel i7-620UE processor. HW P/Ns 9800-2079 Rev9
and Rev11 series uses the Intel i3-6102E processor.
2
The non-security relevant changes between the various P/Ns include add/change of components, such
as LEDs and amplifier circuitry, moved certain components to either away from boundary edge to improve
manufacturability or to clear space for the heat spreader, and documentation changes.
3
DRAM size is as follows: HW P/Ns 9800-2079 Rev7/8 (8GB) Rev9A (4GB), Rev9B (8GB), Rev9C (16GB),
Rev9D (32GB).
4
DRAM size is as follows: HW P/Ns 9800-2079 Rev11A (4GB), Rev11B (8GB), Rev11C (16GB), Rev11D
(32GB).
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2. SECURITY LEVEL
The cryptographic module meets the FIPS 140-2 overall security requirements applicable to Level 3.
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification
Module Ports and Interfaces
Roles, Services and Authentication
Finite State Model
Physical Security
Operational Environment
Cryptographic Key Management
EMI/EMC
Self-Tests
Design Assurance
Mitigation of Other Attacks
3
3
3
3
3
N/A
3
3
3
3
3
Table 1 - Module Security Level Specification
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3. MODES OF OPERATION
The cryptographic module may be configured for FIPS Approved mode, PCI-HSM (Non-Approved
for FIPS 140) Mode of Operation, or General (Non-Approved) Mode of Operation by accessing
the System tab on the module’s web interface. A drop-down menu is shown for FIPS mode (“On”
or “Off”) and another for PCI HSM mode. Once a selection is chosen and confirmed, the module
automatically reboots into the chosen mode. The System tab will than show FIPS mode enabled.
When used in the Vectera Plus parent device, the mode of operation is also displayed on its LCD
screen. When transitioning between modes, the module will zeroize CSPs before entering the
selected mode of operation and restart. The user can determine which mode the cryptographic
module is in by accessing the Status tab on the module’s web interface.
3.1. FIPS APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION
In FIPS Approved mode, the module supports the following algorithms:
Approved Functions
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Key Lengths/Curves/Moduli Use
C2004
AES
NIST SP 800-38A CTR 128 and 256-bit Encryption
NIST SP 800-38A
ECB, CBC, CFB1, CFB8,
CFB128, OFB
128, 192, and 256-bits Encryption and
Decryption
NIST SP 800-38B
CMAC 128, 192, and 256-bits MAC Generation and
Verification
NIST SP 800-38D
GCM 128, 192, and 256-bits Encryption and
Decryption
C2005 NIST SP 800-38F AES KWP 128, 192, and 256-bits Key Wrap
Vendor
Affirmed
CKG4F
5 SP 800-133 rev2
N/A N/A Symmetric Key
Generation
C2004 CVL NIST SP 800-135
TLS v1.0, v1.1 and
v1.2 KDF
N/A Key Derivation
C2004 DRBG NIST SP 800-90A
CTR
Mode: AES-256
Derivation Function
Enabled: Yes
Additional Input: 0-256
Entropy Input: 256
Nonce: 128
AES-256 Random Number
Generation
C2004 ECDSA FIPS 186-4
ECDSA KeyGen (184-4) P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521 Key generation
ECDSA SigGen (186-4) P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521 Digital signature
generation
ECDSA SigVer (186-4) P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384 and
P-521
Digital signature
verification
5
NOTE: In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation as per scenario 1 of
section 4 in SP800-133 rev2. The resulting generated symmetric key and the seed used in the asymmetric key generation are the
unmodified output from SP800-90A DRBG.
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C2004 HMAC FIPS 198-1
SHA-1, SHA2-224,
SHA2-256, SHA2-384 and
SHA2-512
Key sizes: minimum 128-bits,
maximum 256-bits.
Keyed Message
Authentication
Vendor
Affirmed
KAS-SSC SP 800-56A rev3
ECC Ephemeral Unified
Scheme
Key Establishment methodology
provides between 112 and 256-
bits of encryption strength
All NIST Defined ECC Curves
except 192 (P-224, P-256, P-
384, and P-521)
EC Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret
Computation
ECC One-Pass Diffie-
Hellman scheme
FFC dhEphem scheme
2048, 3072, 4096 Safe Primes as
defined by SP800-56A Rev3
Appendix D and RFC7919
Key Establishment methodology
provides between 112 and 150-
bits of encryption strength
Diffie-Hellman Shared
Secret Computation
FCC dhOneFlow
scheme
C2005 KBKDF SP 800-108
Counter Mode, using
AES-CMAC
128, 192, and 256-bits Key Based KDF
Vendor
Affirmed
KDA SP 800-56C rev2
ECC Ephemeral Unified
Scheme
RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3) and SP800-
56C rev2 Section 5 HKDF
Implementation
Key Derivation
Two-Step Key Derivation using
implementation dependent
Auxilary PRF based KDF Option
A. Used for TLS 1.0-1.2
(Cert#C2004)
ECC One-Pass Diffie-
Hellman Scheme
RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3) and SP800-
56C rev2 Section 5 HKDF
Implementation
FFC dhEphem Scheme
Cert #C2004
Two-Step Key Derivation using
implementation-dependent
Auxiliary PRF-based KDF Option A
FFC dhOneFlow
Scheme
One-Step Key Derivation Option
1 (Hash (SHS FIPS 180-4)
C2005
KTS NIST SP 800-38F
AES KWP
key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256
bits of encryption strength
Encryption and
Decryption
C2004
AES CBC / AES CMAC Encryption and
Authentication
AES CBC / HMAC Encryption and
Authentication (See
TLS Cipher Suite
Listing)
C2003 RSA FIPS 186-4
RSA KeyGen (186-4) Modulo 2048 and 3072 Key Generation Mode
B.3.3 and B.3.6
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RSA SigGen (186-4) Modulo 2048, 3072, and 4096* ANSI X9.31, PKCS 1.5
and PKCSPSS,
Signature Generation
RSA SigVer (186-4) Modulo 1024, 2048, and 3072 ANSI X9.31, PKCS 1.5
and PKCSPSS,
Signature
C2003 SHS FIPS 180-4
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-
256, SHA-384 and SHA-
512
- Message Digest
Note: SHA-1 is not
available for digital
signature creation.
Table 2 – Approved Functions
* Note: 186-4 RSA 4096 SigGen was not available for CAVP testing; however, per IG G.18, it is approved
for use because 186-2 RSA 4096 SigGen was tested.
Allowed Non-Approved Functions
Algorithm Caveat/Use
MD5 Message digest used in TLS 1.0/1.1 ONLY
NDRNG Entropy input of 256-bits provided to the DRBG for Seed Data.
RSA Key wrapping: key establishment methodology which provides 112-bits of encryption strength. RSA
algorithm may be used for encryption or decryption of keys. No claim is made for SP 800-56B
compliance, and no CSPs are established into or exported out of the module using these services.
Shamir Secret Sharing Split Knowledge Procedures: Polynomial method used only for secret-sharing and recombination.
Note: As per NISTIR 8214, Section 6.2, implementation of Shamir Secret Sharing is used to satisfy Section 4.7.4 of the FIPS 140-2
standard which defines security requirements for split-knowledge procedures.
Table 3 – Allowed Non-Approved Functions
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3.1.1.AES GCM Considerations
AES GCM encryption and decryption are used in the context of the TLS protocol version 1.2 (compliant to
Scenario 1 path (i) in FIPS 140-2 A.5). The module is compliant with NIST SP 800-52 rev2 and the
mechanism for IV generation is compliant with RFC 5288. The module ensures that it is strictly increasing
and thus cannot repeat. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given
session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition may either trigger a handshake to
establish a new encryption key in accordance with RFC 5246, or fail. In either case, the module prevents IV
duplication and thus enforces the security property.
AES GCM encryption and decryption are used in the context of the TLS protocol version 1.3 (compliant to
Scenario 5 in FIPS 140-2 IG A.5). The module is compliant with NIST SP 800-52 rev2 and the mechanism
for IV generation is compliant with RFC 8446. The module ensures that it is strictly increasing and thus
cannot repeat. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the
first party, client or server, to encounter this condition may either trigger a handshake to establish a new
encryption key in accordance with RFC 8446, or fail. In either case, the module prevents IV duplication and
thus enforces the security property.
The module requires there to be a fixed field of 32-bits and defaults a value based on the HSM’s unique
serial number.
In approved mode, the module shall not allow the user to utilize GCM with an externally generated IV; a
fresh key is always used. The module supports internal IV generation by the module’s Approved DRBG.
The DRBG seed is generated inside the module’s physical boundary. The minimum IV length is 96-bits per
NIST SP 800-38D. On module power on, the next IV available is calculated by taking the previously stored
invocation value and adding an additional 8,000,000 to ensure the IV field is not reused, even after power
cycling. This is following the guidance of SP800-38D section 9.1 which recommends that after a power
loss the stored IV is always one or more values ahead of the operational invocation value.
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3.2. PCI HSM MODE OF OPERATION (NON-APPROVED)
In PCI HSM Mode of Operation, the module supports the following algorithms in addition to the
FIPS Approved Mode algorithms:
• AKB/TR-31: key bundling techniques
• DUKPT: key management technique
• PIN generation: random and derived
• RSA with additional, non-compliant key sizes (full selection is 2048 + n*8 [n = 0 to 256],
up to 4096 bits) for key generation, digital signature generation, and verification
• RSA with additional, non-compliant key sizes (full selection is 2048 + n*8 [n = 0 to 256]
up to 4096 bits), encrypt/decrypt for key transport
• Triple-DES (keying option 2) for decryption, including key wrapping (non-compliant)
• Triple-DES (keying option 1) for encryption and decryption, including key wrapping (non-
compliant)
Note: The use of two-key Triple-DES for encryption is restricted. The total number of
blocks of data encrypted with the same cryptographic key shall not be greater than 2^20.
• When configured for operation in an issuer environment*
o Clear PIN processing
o *The HSM cannot be configured for both PIN processing and clear PIN operations
in this mode of operation.
• When configured for PIN processing, the following pin block format translation will be
allowed or disallowed.
Destination
Source
ISO Format 0 ISO Format 1 ISO Format 2 ISO Format 3 ISO Format 4 IBM3624 PIN Pad
ISO Format 0 Yes No No Yes Yes No No
ISO Format 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
ISO Format 2 No No Yes No No No No
ISO Format 3 Yes No No Yes Yes No No
ISO Format 4 Yes No No Yes Yes No No
IBM3624 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PIN Pad Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 4 - PIN Block Translation in PCI Mode of Operation
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3.3. GENERAL (NON-APPROVED) MODE OF OPERATION
In General (non-approved) Mode of Operation, the module supports the following algorithms in
addition to the FIPS Approved Mode and PCI-HSM Mode algorithms:
• DES for encryption and decryption
• ECC with 192-bit keys for key generation, digital signature generation and verification (non-
compliant)
• HMAC MD5, HMAC RIPEMD-160 for keyed message authentication
• MD5, RIPEMD-160 for hashing
• RSA with additional, non-compliant key sizes (full selection is 512 + n*8 [n = 0 to 256] up to
4096 bits) for key generation, digital signature generation, and verification
• RSA with additional, non-compliant key sizes (full selection is 512 + n*8 up to 4096 bits),
encrypt/decrypt for key transport
• Triple-DES (2-key) for all usages without restriction (non-compliant)
• When configured for operation in an issuer environment*
o Clear PIN processing
o *The HSM cannot be configured for both PIN processing and clear PIN operations in this
mode of operation
• When configured for PIN processing, the following PIN block format translation will be
allowed:
Destination
Source
ISO Format 0 ISO Format 1 ISO Format 2 ISO Format 3 ISO Format 4 IBM3624 PIN Pad
ISO Format 0 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ISO Format 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ISO Format 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ISO Format 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ISO Format 4 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IBM3624 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PIN Pad Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 5 - PIN Block Translation in Non-Approved Mode of Operation
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4. INSTALLATION
Each Futurex GSP3000 secure cryptographic device (SCD) contains a processor and system memory. The
SCD stores keys and performs cryptographic processing tasks. GSP3000 units are FIPS 140-2 Level 3
certified under certificate number 3373.
Each SCD arrives with certificates loaded at the point of manufacture. These certificates are unique
Certificate Authorities (CAs) specific to the customer, allowing the device to incorporate into that
customer's architecture.
For security, the SCD comes encased in a hard, opaque epoxy barrier and sensor wires that protect the
SCD from a physical attack. If the SCD is physically tampered with, the unit will enter a tampered state.
INSTALL PREPARATION
To facilitate installation, Futurex recommends that all shipment materials and at least two
Administrators/Key Officers be present to maintain dual control.
EXCRYPT MANAGER APPLICATION INSTALLATION
Note This setup process is not required if the Excrypt Touch will be used to connect to the HSM.
This application is needed to load the Master File Key (MFK) and configure the HSM.
1. Power on the setup computer and insert the Excrypt Manager Application CD and run the Excrypt
Manager installer. Follow the instructions given by the Excrypt Manager Setup Wizard.
2. Once the Excrypt Manager Application is running on the setup computer, power on the HSM.
3. Locate the power switch on the back of the device and turn it on.
4. Connect the USB setup cable after the HSM has completed the initial power-on process.
5. ENABLING FIPS AND PCI HSM MODES
The primary manner to configure the HSM is through the secure web interface. All configuration changes
to the device are made through this TLS-secured interface.
FIPS and PCI HSM modes disable the non-secure management of the HSM and require that all
configuration activity, including firmware updates, are completed using the Excrypt Manager.
Note: Port 443 or the HSM IP must be used to connect to the HSM while in PCI mode.
5.1. ENABLING THROUGH THE WEB INTERFACE
1. Connect the HSM to the network and log in the two Crypto Officers.
2. Change either FIPS Mode or PCI HSM Mode to Enabled.
3. Click Update Mode. The HSM will reset, clear all keys, and resetting users to factory defaults.
Once the device has rebooted, it is in the selected mode.
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Note When switching between modes of operation, all sensitive information will be cleared, including all
keys, critical security parameters (CSP), and user credentials.
Once PCI HSM mode has been activated, connection to the HSM may only be made via the Securus or
through a web browser-based SSL/TLS (https) connection. Anonymous connections are disabled when in
FIPS or PCI HSM mode.
Settings for these connections may be modified through the SSL/TLS tab in the Web Configuration Panel.
5.2. COM SETUP
Once FIPS or PCI Mode of Operations has been activated, all serial ports will be disabled and the HSM
must be connected to via a TLS-secured web connection. The COM Setup tab on the Dashboard will
automatically have the normal contents removed in this situation.
FIGURE 4: WEB INTERFACE - COM SETUP PANEL
5.3. ENABLING THROUGH EXCRYPT MANAGER
1. Log into Excrypt Manager using two Crypto-Officer identities for dual control.
1. Go to the Maintenance tab.
2. Under the Tools heading, use the drop-down menus next to the FIPS Mode and PCI-HSM
Mode lines to choose between Off and On.
3. Click the Update Modes button.
4. A warning window will open to warn the user that enabling these modes will clear all keys and
critical security parameters, remove all users, reset to factory defaults, and restart the HSM. To
continue, click OK.
5. After enabling PCI or FIPS mode, the HSM will display a visual indicator in the bottom-right
corner of the Excrypt Manager application.
6. RESET TO FACTORY DEFAULT
Futurex HSMs have two recessed switches, located on either side of the device's front plate. These
switches allow users to reset the cryptographic module inside of the device, restore the unit to factory
defaults, or to completely decommission the unit.
6.1. RESET CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE
To reset the cryptographic module located inside the HSM:
1. Ensure the device is powered on.
2. Locate the switch inside the left-hand lock port.
3. Push the switch downwards and hold for one second and then release the switch.
4. After approximately five minutes and multiple automatic restarts, the cryptographic module will
be reset.
Note During the reset process, the device will stop processing all API calls, including performing
cryptographic operations.
6.2. RESTORE DEVICE TO FACTORY DEFAULTS – HARDWARE METHOD
To restore the device to its factory default settings:
1. Ensure the device is powered on.
2. Locate the switch inside the left-hand lock port.
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3. Push the switch downwards and hold for one second and then push the switch upwards and
hold for 60 seconds.
4. After approximately five minutes and multiple automatic restarts, the HSM will reset to the
original firmware and factory default settings.
7. PORTS AND INTERFACES
The cryptographic module provides the following physical ports and logical interfaces. All physical
ports are within the boundary, but outside the epoxy material.
• Ethernet ports (x2): Control input, data input, data output, status output
 Ethernet ports provide encrypted communication sessions established with the
TLS protocol for control input, data input, data output, and status output.
 These ports include connection status LEDs.
• PCIe connector (x1): Control input, data input, data output, status output
 Provides logical signals for x4 additional Ethernet connections.
• Single-row 4-pin headers (x7): Disabled in FIPS and PCI-HSM modes.
 Provides USB functionality in the General Non-Approved mode.
• USB Port (x1): Disabled in FIPS and PCI-HSM modes.
 Provides USB functionality by converting the dual-row 5-pin header to USB in the
General Non-Approved mode.
• DB-9 Serial Port (x1): Disabled in FIPS and PCI-HSM modes.
 Provides serial connection in the General Non-Approved mode.
• Tamper status LED (x1): Status output
 Reports a module tamper.
• Dual-row 26-pin header (x1): Control input, Power
 RPM signals
 Battery sense
 Main power supply
 Battery power supply
 “Power good” signal
• Single-row 3-pin header (x1): Control input
 Reset signal
 Reset default port
• Dual-row 5-pin header (x1): Disabled in FIPS and PCI-HSM modes
 Provides serial connection in the General Non-Approved mode.
• Single-row 2-pin header (x1): Control Input
 Case Switch
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The ports and interfaces can be identified as indicated below:
Figure 2 – Ports and Interfaces
1. Ethernet Port
2. PCIe Connector
3. 4-pin USB Headers (x7)
4. USB Port
5. DB 9 Serial Port
6. Tamper LED
7. Dual-row 26-pin header
8. Single-row 3-pin header
9. Dual row 5-pin header
10. Single-row 2-pin header
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8. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY
8.1. ASSUMPTION OF ROLES
The cryptographic module shall support Crypto-Officer and Crypto-User Identities. In FIPS or PCI
HSM mode, a Crypto-Officer or Crypto-User identity may communicate with the cryptographic
module via an established TLS session. The cryptographic module shall enforce the separation of
roles using identity-based authentication for all roles.
For Crypto-Officer and Crypto-Users, an operator must enter their username and password to log
in. The username is an alphanumeric string of 4 to 16 characters, and the password is an
alphanumeric string of 8 to 64 characters chosen from the 95 printable and human-readable
ASCII characters (0x20 to 0x7E) excluding the following: ‘[ ]<>;’ (thus, 90 characters are possible).
Default passwords are only used for the default identities and must be updated upon initial login.
An identity that provides a valid username and password will be identified as a Crypto-Officer or
Crypto-User and must re-authenticate to change identity or role. The operator may end the
session by logging out or power cycling the module, or the session shall automatically timeout
after a fixed duration or transaction limit. To re-establish communication, an operator must re-
authenticate.
All cryptograms used while processing transactions contain authentication data for the
Transaction Processing role, which take the form of key parity bits for KWP for AES. In either case,
the symmetric key (AES) which is used to encrypt the cryptogram corresponds to the operator’s
identity. For AES-wrapped keys, the key is auth-decrypted according to SP800-38F (KWP); if this
operation fails, the command is rejected.
8.2. ROLES AND REQUIRED IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
Role Type of Authentication Authentication Mechanism
Crypto-Officer Identity-based
Username and password
ID of wrapping key and wrapped key
(KWP/Key Parity)
Crypto-User Identity-based
Username and password
ID of wrapping key and wrapped key
(KWP/Key Parity)
Customizable User Identity Identity-based
Username and password
ID of wrapping key and wrapped key
(KWP/Key Parity)
Table 6 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
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8.3. STRENGTHS OF AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS
Authentication
Mechanism
Strength of Mechanism
Username and
Password
The probability that a random attempt will succeed, or a false acceptance will
occur is 1 / 4,304,672,100,000,000(1/908
).
The module allows for three (3) failed attempts and then times out for 20
seconds before retrying. The worst-case scenario is that there are nine (9)
attempts in a one-minute period. The probability of successful authenticating to
the module within one minute is 1 / 478,296,900,000,000 (9/908
).
AES-KWP AES-KWP (SP800-38F) provides 64 bits of authentication strength to a wrapped
key. Thus, the probability that a random attempt will succeed, or a false
acceptance will occur is 1/18,446,744,073,709,551,616 (1/264
).
The module allows for 50 failed attempts over 24 hours and then times out for 20
seconds before retrying. The worst-case scenario is that there are 150 attempts in
a one-minute period. The probability of successfully authenticating to the
module within one minute is 1/122,978,293,824,730,344 (150/264
).
Key Parity (3-key
Triple-DES)
3-key Triple-DES has 24 parity bits. Thus, the probability that a random attempt
will succeed, or a false acceptance will occur is 1/16,777,216 (1/224
)
The module allows for 50 failed attempts over 24 hours and then times out for 20
seconds before retrying. The worst-case scenario is that there are 150 attempts in
a one-minute period. The probability of successfully authenticating to the
module within one minute is 1/111,848 (150/224
)
*Note: TDES operations are not permitted in FIPS Mode of Operation, likewise Key
Parity with 3-key Triple DES is not permitted in FIPS Mode of Operation.
Table 7 - Strength of Authentication Mechanisms
9. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY
9.1. UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICES
The cryptographic module supports the following unauthenticated services:
• Status: This service provides the status of the cryptographic module via the LCD or
Ethernet port.
• Self-Tests: This service will enable an operator to initiate the suite of self-tests via power
cycling the module.
• Factory Reset: This service resets the module back to factory default and returns the
device to the General (non-approved) Mode of Operation. (Zeroize CSPs, including all
username/password combinations and restoring default identities. Firmware is also
restored to version shipped with HSM)
• Tamper: There are pins on the HSM that will allow the user to force a tamper event by
shorting them. This will zeroize all CSPs to include default TLS pairs.
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9.2. AUTHENTICATED SERVICES
Identity Authorized Service
Crypto-
Officer:
• Create Session: This allows an operator to create a secure session to the HSM.
• Authenticate: This service allows an operator to send credentials to be authenticated
by the cryptographic module. Sessions will timeout after one minutes of inactivity,
fifteen minutes of use, or 7,500 transactions.
• Destroy Session: This service allows a Crypto-Officer to transition the cryptographic
module into or out of an Approved mode. This service shall zeroize the module and
restart. If the module is already in an Approved mode, it will remain in that Approved
mode.
• Initialization: This service zeroizes and generates Server Private and Public Key
• Zeroize: This service shall enable a Crypto-Officer to destroy critical security parameters
by zeroization.
• Key Loading: This service allows a Crypto-Officer to load keys into the module.
• *Update Firmware: This service shall enable the Crypto-Officer to update the
cryptographic module’s firmware. Firmware authenticity is verified using an ECC
signature. If the authenticity of the firmware is not confirmed, the cryptographic
module will reject and delete the update.
• General Configuration: This service allows a Crypto-Officer to change all configuration
options for the module.
• View Configuration: Gives operator the ability to view configuration status to include
IP, COM, SSL, Time, Features, Users, IP tools, and Logs. This does not allow
configuration changes of these items.
• Configuration: Allows operator to change IP address, syslog level, and reboot the
device
• User Administration: This service will allow the Crypto-Officer to create, manage, and
delete users.
• Logout: This service will enable the Crypto-Officer to end authentication.
• Load Encrypted Key: This service allows a user to send in Encrypted Keys and have the
keys translated and stored in the key table or returned as a cryptogram encrypted
under the master key.
• Process Transactions: This service allows a user to use any of the commands listed in
the Futurex TRM. These commands must be unblocked by the Crypto-Officer for Use.
*Note: New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the
FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of scope of this validation
and require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
Crypto-User • Create Session: This service allows a user to create a secure session to the HSM.
• Destroy Session: This allows a user to end the session.
• Authenticate: This service allows a user to send credentials to be authenticated by the
cryptographic module.
• View Configuration: Gives operator the ability to view configuration status to include
IP, COM, SSL, Time, Features, Users, IP tools, and Logs. This does not allow
configuration changes of these items.
• Logout: This service will enable the Crypto-User to end authentication.
• Load Encrypted Key: This service allows a user to send in Encrypted Keys and have the
keys translated and stored in the key table or returned as a cryptogram encrypted
under the master key.
• Process Transactions: This service allows a user to use any of the commands listed in
Futurex TRM. These commands must be unblocked by the Crypto-Officer for use.
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• Configuration: Allows operator to change IP address, syslog level, and reboot the
device
Customizable
User Identity
• Configurable Services based on permissions that make up the identities.
• This Customizable Identity will always be able to perform the following services:
o Create Session: This service allows a user to create a secure session to the
HSM.
o Destroy Session: This allows a user to end the session.
o Authenticate: This service allows a user to send credentials to be authenticated
by the cryptographic module.
o Logout: This service will enable the Crypto-Officer to end authentication.
• These Crypto-User services may be given to the Customizable User Identity by
authenticated Crypto-Officers under dual-control.
o Load Encrypted Key: This service allows a user to send in Encrypted Keys and
have the keys translated and stored in the key table or returned as a
cryptogram encrypted under the master key (Commands must be unblocked
by Crypto-Officer).
o Process Transactions: This service allows a user to use any of the commands
listed in Futurex TRM. These commands must be unblocked by the Crypto-
Officer for use (Commands must be unblocked by Crypto-Officer. By default,
GHSH command for approved SHA security functions available).
• If any of the following services are present the Customizable User Identity assumes the
responsibility of Crypto Officer: Requiring dual-control, identity-based, authentication.
These services may only be given to the Customizable User Identity by authenticated
Crypto-Officers under dual-control.
o Zeroize: This service shall enable a Crypto-Officer to destroy critical security
parameters by zeroization.
o Key Loading: This service allows a Crypto-Officer to load keys into the module.
o *Update Firmware: This service shall enable the Crypto-Officer to update the
cryptographic module’s firmware. Firmware authenticity is verified using an
ECC signature. If the authenticity of the firmware is not confirmed, the
cryptographic module will reject and delete the update.
o General Configuration: This service allows a Crypto-Officer to change all
configuration options for the module.
o User Administration: This service will allow the Crypto-Officer to create,
manage, and delete users.
o Configuration: Allows operator to change IP address, syslog level, and reboot
the device
*Note: New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP.
Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140-2
validation.
Table 8 - Authorized Services by Role
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9.2.1. Specification of Service Inputs and Outputs
Service Control Input Data Input Data Output Status Output
Create Session Header Info Signed Plaintext Data Encrypted Data N/A
Authenticate Header Info Username & Password N/A Success / Fail
Destroy Session Header Info N/A N/A N/A
Process Transactions Header Info Encrypted Data Encrypted Data Plaintext Status Data
Logout Header Info N/A N/A N/A
Status N/A N/A N/A Plaintext Status Data
Initialization Header Info Encrypted Data Encrypted Data Success / Fail
Zeroize Header Info N/A N/A Success / Fail
Self-Tests N/A N/A N/A Success / Fail
User Administration Header Info Encrypted Data Encrypted Data Plaintext Status Data
Update Firmware Header Info Encrypted Data Encrypted Data Plaintext Status Data
Factory Reset Header Info N/A N/A Success
View Configuration Header Info N/A N/A Plaintext Status Data
Configuration Header Info N/A N/A Success/Fail
General Configuration Header Info and
Configuration Options
N/A N/A Success/Fail
Tamper Tamper Signal N/A N/A Tamper
Key Loading Header Info Encrypted Data Encrypted Data Plaintext Status Data
Load Encrypted Key Header Info Encrypted Data Encrypted Data Plaintext Status Data
Table 9 - Specification of Service Inputs & Outputs
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9.3. DEFINITION OF CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS (CSPS)
CSPs are secured within the cryptographic boundary. Operators do not have direct access to CSPs within
the device. The following are CSPs contained in the module:
CSP Type Description
Unique Device Keys AES-256 Encryption and Decryption of TLS Private Keys
Virtual UDKs AES-256 Encryption and Decryption of TLS Private Keys
Global Derivation Key AES-256 Used to derive Master Key Encryption Key
and Virtual Firmware Key
Virtual Global
Derivation Key
AES-256 Derivation key
Master Key Encryption
Key (MKEK)
AES-256 Encryption and Decryption of master keys
Server Private Keys5F
6
ECC-521
RSA-2048
Sign or Decrypt data sent to the device from an operator
during the creation of a TLS session.
Used during creation of a TLS session.
Session Encryption Key AES-128
AES-256
Encrypts / Decrypts data passed between an operator and
the device during an established TLS session
Session Hash Key HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-384
HMAC-SHA-512
Key size minimum of 128-bits and maximum of 256-bits
enforced in secure modes of operation. Used for hashing
data passed between an operator and the device during
an established TLS session.
Pre-Master Secret Keying Material Used to create the TLS session keys
Maser Secret AES-256 Used for TLS, destroyed at the end of each TLS Session
DHE/ECDHE Private
Key
ECC-521
DH-2048
Used for DHE/ECDHE TLS exchange
Ephemeral
Asymmetric Key
RSA 2048 or
ECC 521
Used to transfer Ephemeral Key between HSM’s for
component transfer
6
Server Private Keys in the CSP table represents a combination of Customer Admin, Customer Admin App,
Customer Prod App, Customer Prod Excrypt, and Customer Prod International Private Keys in one line
item to conserve space/paper.
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Ephemeral Symmetric
Key
AES 256 Used to encrypt key components
Crypto-Officer
Password
Passphrase Used to authenticate the identity of a Crypto-Officer.
Crypto-User Password Passphrase Used to authenticate the identity of a Crypto-User
Customizable User
Identity Password
Passphrase Used to authenticate the identity of a Customizable User
Identity
Platform Master Key AES 256 Used to encrypt User Keys and Ephemeral Asymmetric
keys
Pending Master File
Key
AES-256 Used for rotation of master keys. Not used to
encrypt/decrypt any data until it is ready to replace master
keys.
FTK Key AES 256 Used to encrypt AES keys for PKCS #11
Key Exchange Key AES 256 Used to load User Keys as part of Transaction Processing
(key transport)
Backup Key AES 256 Encrypts the User Keys for backup (key transport)
Smart Card Encryption
Key
AES 256 Wraps smart card fragments (keys and other sensitive
data) for storage on smart card.
User Keys RSA 1024*, 2048, 3072
AES 128, 192, 256
ECC 192***, 224, 256,
384, 521
HMAC
Data encryption, key exchange, CMAC, and HMAC keys
used by user
These keys are available to Crypto Officer and Crypto-User
roles.
Seed Value NDRNG value Seed for CTR DRBG.
Seed Key (DRBG State) Internal RNG state “V” and “Key” internal values for CTR DRBG.
HSM Signing Private
Key
RSA 2048 Used to sign the logs when output
Virtual Firmware Key AES-256 Unique Virtual HSM Firmware Key used to encrypt and
decrypt the UDK and GDK of individual virtual HSMs
Table 10 - Critical Security Parameters
*NOTE: RSA 1024 can only be used for verification.
***NOTE: ECC 192 can only be used for verification.
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9.4. DEFINITION OF PUBLIC KEYS
The following are the public keys contained in the module:
• Firmware Public Keys (ECC 521): These public keys are used for signature verification of
the firmware and firmware updates to protect against unauthorized modification.
• Customer Admin Public Keys (RSA 2048/ECC 521): The public keys components of the
Administration certificates used for verifying signatures. This corresponds to one of the
server private keys.
• Customer Production Excrypt Public Keys (RSA 2048/ECC 521): The public keys
components of the Production Excrypt certificates used for verifying signatures. This
corresponds to one of the server private keys.
• Customer Production International Public Keys (RSA 2048/ECC 521): The public keys
components of the Production International certificates used for verifying signatures. This
corresponds to one of the server private keys.
• Customer Production Web Public Keys (RSA 2048/ECC 521): The public keys components
of the Production Web certificates used for verifying signatures. This corresponds to one
of the server private keys.
• Customer App Administration Public keys (RSA 2048/ECC 521): The public keys
components of the Application Administration certificates used for verifying signatures.
This corresponds to one of the server private keys.
• Customer App Production Public Keys (RSA 2048/ECC 521): The public keys component of
the Application Production certificates used for verifying signatures. This corresponds to
one of the server private keys.
• User Public Keys (RSA 2048-4096, ECC 192/224/256/384/521): These public keys are
always used by the operator.
• HSM Signing Public Key (RSA 2048/ECC 521): Output to allow host to verify log signature.
• DH Public Key (DH 2048/ECC P-521): Used for TLS key exchange
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9.5. MODES OF ACCESS FOR CSPS
Table 11 provides a list of CSP operations supported by the cryptographic module. Per-service
access rights are shown in Table 12. Supported CSP operations are defined as follows:
• Generate: These operations generate a particular CSP within the cryptographic module.
• Load: These operations allow for a particular CSP to be loaded into the cryptographic
module.
• Wrap: These operations use a CSP to perform key wrapping.
• Un-wrap: These operations use a CSP to perform key unwrapping.
• Destroy: These operations erase the CSP from the cryptographic module.
CSP
Operation
Generate Load Wrap Un-wrap Destroy
Unique Device Keys x x x x
Virtual UDKs x x x x
Global Derivation Key x x
Virtual Global Derivation Key x x
Master Key Encryption Key x x x x
Server Private Keys x x
Session Encryption Key x x x x
Session Hash Key x x x x
Pre-Master Secret x x
Master Secret x x
DHE/ECDHE Private Key x x
Ephemeral Asymmetric Key x x x x
Ephemeral Symmetric Key x x x x
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Crypto-Officer Password x x
Crypto-User Password x x
Customizable User Identity Password X X
Platform Master Key (PMK) x x x x
FTK Key x x x x
Key Exchange Key (KEK) x x x x
Backup Key x x x x
Smart Card Encryption Key (SCEK) x x x x
User Keys x x x x
Seed Value x x
HSM Signing Private Key x x
Virtual Firmware Key x x x x
Seed Key (DRBG State) x x
Table 11 - Supported CSP Operations
Note: Unique Device Key is generated at time of manufacture or re-generated during tamper recovery
and is not associated with any operator roles.
Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Access Operation Service Crypto-
Officer
Crypto-
User
U/A*
Generate Session Encryption and Hash keys
(Session Encryption Key, Session Hash Key, Pre-Master
Secret, Server Private Keys, DHE/ECDHE Private Keys)
Create Session x x
Wrap and un-wrap with Session Encryption and Hash
keys
Process Transactions x x
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(Session Encryption Key, Session Hash Key, Pre-Master
Secret, Master Secret)
Destroy Session Encryption and Hash keys
(Session Encryption Key, Session Hash Key, Pre-Master
Secret, Master Secret)
Destroy Session x x
(No CSP access) Status x
Generate Ephemeral Keys; Wrap and un-wrap with
Ephemeral Keys
(Ephemeral Symmetric, Ephemeral Asymmetric)
Key Loading x
Destroy Ephemeral Keys
(Ephemeral Symmetric, Ephemeral Asymmetric)
Key Loading
(upon completion)
x
Destroy Keys
(Global Derivation Key, Virtual Global Derivation Key,
Master Key Encryption Key, Server Private Keys,
DHE/ECDHE Private Keys, Crypto-Officer Password,
Crypto-User Password, Customizable User Identity
Password, PMK, FTK, KEK, Backup Key, SCEK, User Keys,
HSM Signing Private Key, Virtual Firmware Key)
Zeroize x
Zeroize and generate Server Private and Public Key
(Unique Device Key, Virtual UDK, Global Derivation Key,
Virtual Global Derivation Key, Master Key Encryption Key,
Server Private Keys, DHE/ECDHE Private Keys, Seed Value,
Seed Key, HSM Signing Private Key)
Initialization x
Zeroize all CSPs
(All CSPs listed in table 11 are cleared and actively
zeroized upon detection of a tamper event)
Tamper x
(No CSP access) Self-Tests x
Load or Destroy Usernames/Passwords
(Crypto-Officer Password, Crypto-User Password,
Customizable User Identity Password)
User Administration x
Verify with Firmware Public Key Update Firmware x
Zeroize CSPs and restore factory defaults** Factory Reset x
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(Global Derivation Key, Virtual Global Derivation Key,
Master Key Encryption Key, Server Private Keys,
DHE/ECDHE Private Keys, Crypto-Officer Password,
Crypto-User Password, Customizable User Identity
Password, PMK, FTK, KEK, Backup Key, SCEK, User Keys,
HSM Signing Private Key, Virtual Firmware Key)
Send in authentication credentials
(Crypto-Officer Password, Crypto-User Password,
Customizable User Identity Password)
Authenticate x x
No CSP access Logout x x
No CSP access General
Configuration
x
No CSP access Configuration x
No CSP access View Configuration x x
Loading of PMK, FTK, KEK, Backup Key, SCEK, User Keys
(Global Derivation Key, Virtual Global Derivation Key,
Master Key Encryption Key, Crypto-Officer Password,
Customizable User Identity Password, PMK, FTK, KEK,
Backup Key, SCEK, User Keys)
Key Loading x
Loading of Encrypted User Keys
(Global Derivation Key, Virtual Global Derivation Key,
Master Key Encryption Key, Crypto-Officer Password,
Crypto-User Password, Customizable User Identity
Password, User Keys)
Load Encrypted Key x x
Table 12 - CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services
*NOTE 1: U/A = Unauthenticated services typically available with physical access (e.g., power cycle, view LCD)
**NOTE 2: The Factory Reset service does not zeroize the UDK (only a Tamper does that). If the UDK has
been previously zeroized by a tamper event, the Factory Reset service generates a new UDK.
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10.OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the
cryptographic module supports a non-modifiable operational environment.
11.SECURITY RULES
The cryptographic module’s design corresponds to the cryptographic module’s security rules. This
section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the
security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 3 module.
1. The cryptographic module shall provide two distinct operator roles. These are the
Crypto-Officer role, and the Crypto-User role.
i. Customizable rolls shall assume classification of one of the two roles mentioned
above and in section 6.2
2. The cryptographic module shall provide identity-based authentication.
3. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator shall not have access
to any cryptographic services.
4. The cryptographic module shall encrypt message data using an approved TLS cipher
suite when TLS is used.
5. The cryptographic module shall perform the Power-Up and Conditional self-tests as
specified in section 8.1 below.
6. The cryptographic module shall clear previous authentications on power off/cycle.
7. Any time the cryptographic module is in an idle state, the operator shall be capable of
commanding the module to perform the Power-Up self-test.
8. Prior to each use, the DRBG shall be tested using the conditional test specified in FIPS
140-2 §4.9.2.
9. Data output shall be logically inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and
error states using separate system processes.
10. Zeroization shall clear all CSPs in at most one-tenth of a second.
11. Status information shall not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
12. The module shall not support the update of the logical serial number or vendor ID.
13. If the cryptographic module remains inactive in any valid role for a maximum period of
five minutes, the module shall automatically log-out the operator.
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11.1. SELF-TESTS
In all Modes of Operation, the cryptographic module will perform power-up self-tests without
operator intervention. Self-tests may also be executed at the request of an operator by power
cycling the module. When power cycling the module, no operator intervention is required before
self-tests are performed. If a self-test fails, the device will transition to the Fatal Error state and
report an error which is observed on the LCD screen of the parent device. If all tests pass, the
module powers up normally and reports All Self-Tests Passed on the LCD screen of the parent
device.
Power-Up and Periodic Self Tests
The following tests shall be performed at power-up:
• Firmware integrity and authenticity tests (ECDSA P-521 signature) are performed in all
modes of operation.
• Known answer tests are executed in FIPS and PCI modes of operation for:
o AES-KWP (NIST AES-KWP Cert. #C2005)
 AES key sizes 128, 192, and 256-bits used for KWP self-tests
o AES Encrypt and Decrypt (NIST AES Cert. #C2004)
 AES key size of 256-bits used for AES self-tests
• Modes Tested: CBC, CFB1, CFB128, CFB8, ECB, OFB
 AES key size of 128-bits is used for the AES self-test
• Modes Tested: CTR
o AES-CMAC Generate and Verify (NIST AES-CMAC Cert. #C2004)
 AES key size of 128, 192, and 256-bits used for AES-CMAC self-tests
o AES-GCM Encrypt and Decrypt (NIST AES-GCM Cert. #C2004)
 AES key size 256-bits used for AES-GCM self-tests
o DRBG Known Answer (NIST Counter DRBG Cert. #C2004)
 DRBG KAT performed with 256-bit output.
o ECC Sign and Verify (NIST ECDSA Cert. #C2004)
 ECC key sizes of 224, 256, 384, and 521-bits used for ECC sign/verify self-tests
o HMAC SHA1/SHA224/SHA256/SHA384/SHA512 (NIST HMAC Cert.#C2004)
o KDF Counter Mode using CMAC (NIST KDF Cert. #C2005)
 AES key sizes of 128, 192, 256-bits used for KDF using CMAC self-tests
o RSA Sign and Verify (NIST RSA Cert. #C2003)
 RSA Modulus of 2048-bits used for self-test
o SHA1/SHA224/SHA256/SHA384/SHA512 (NIST SHS Cert. #C2003)
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o Triple-DES CMAC Generate and Verify6F
7
o Triple-DES Keying Option 1 and 2 Encrypt and Decrypt (NIST Triple-DES Cert.
#C2003)
Conditional Self-Tests
The device will perform the following conditional self-tests:
• Firmware load test (ECC signature verification) is performed in all modes of operation.
• The following conditional self-tests are executed in FIPS and PCI modes of operation
o Continuous random number generator tests for NDRNG and DRBG.
o DRBG Health Checks (SP800-90A §11.3)
o Pair-wise consistency test for RSA, ECC key generation
o Firmware load test (ECDSA signature verification)
12.PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY
12.1. PHYSICAL SECURITY MECHANISMS
The multi-chip embedded cryptographic module includes the following physical security
mechanisms:
• Hard, opaque potting material encapsulates the security relevant portion of the module,
and any attempt to physically intrude the device will result in serious damage which will
cause the module to stop functioning.
• The module is protected by a tamper detecting membrane, which responds to physical
tampering by immediately zeroizing CSPs and entering the Tamper State.
• Environmental monitoring sensors will trigger a tamper response and CSP zeroization to
prevent the module from being compromised from altering certain environmental or
operational conditions.
12.2. ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS AND PARTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL FAILURE PROTECTION
The following environmental conditions should be maintained for the module:
• Operating environment temperature: 10 to 35°C
• Storage temperature: -20 to 65°C
Partial Environmental Failure Protection will trigger a shutdown or tamper response should the
module detect environmental conditions outside of these specifications:
• Temperature: -20 to 65°C
• Voltage: 2.3 to 4.4 V DC on internal 3V line.
7
Triple-DES algorithms are only performed in FIPS Mode of Operation when executing a power-up, on-demand, or daily self-tests.
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12.3. OPERATOR RECOMMENDED ACTIONS
The operator may be required to periodically inspect the unit for forced entry.
Physical Security
Mechanisms
Recommended Frequency of
Inspection / Test
Inspection / Test Guidance Details
Tamper Evident Potting Monthly, and prior to module
Initialization
Inspect hard potting for
removal/penetration attempts.
Table 13 - Inspection / Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms
The figures below show the module with its tamper evident potting intact, and a sample of the potting
after a tamper attempt has been made.
Figure 3 – GSP3000 with its Tamper Potting Intact
Figure 4 – Examples of Tamper Attempts on the GSP3000 Potting
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13.MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS
The module mitigates the Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA)
attacks by emitting compromising emanations through suppression and containment of side
channel signals. The module’s physical enclosure functions as a Faraday cage to attenuate such
signals.
The module also provides Partial Environmental Failure Protection, as described in Section 9.
14.DESIGN ASSURANCE
14.1. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
Documentation for the cryptographic module, which includes hardware specifications, firmware
source code, guidance and FIPS specific documentation, is maintained using a version control
repository. All configuration management items are uniquely identified by a path and filename
within the repository. All configuration management items within the version control repository
are uniquely identifiable.
14.2. GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
Provided with the cryptographic module are all Crypto-Officer and user guidance documents that
specify the following:
• Administrative functions, physical ports, and interfaces
• Procedures describing how to securely administer the cryptographic module
• Approved security functions
• User responsibilities for securely operating the cryptographic module
14.3. SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
Procedures for system identification and authentication of the module are detailed in the Futurex
PCI HSM User Guide Addendum.
14.4. AUDIT LOGS AND INSPECTION FREQUENCY
Understanding of the operation and initialization of the module is requisite to configure logging.
Procedures to configure audit logging are detailed in the Futurex PCI HSM User Guide
Addendum.
• The module supports secure logging of transactions, data, and events to enable auditing.
• Operator restrictions for accessing, archiving, or deleting logs are configured by settings
and policies established by system administrators.
• Logs should be audited daily, and an appropriate notification tree should be established
for escalating and investigating any suspicious log activity
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15.KEY LOADING
15.1. KEY LOADING (FIPS/PCI-HSM MODES)
When operating in FIPS or PCI-HSM Modes, all key loading traffic to HSM must be encrypted. This
is accomplished by using a Futurex Excrypt Touch. The Excrypt Touch is a fully functional TRSM
that will encrypt all data between it and the HSM using TLS.
16.PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION
16.1. HARDWARE IDENTIFICATION
To identify a GSP3000 refer to the product identification label, as seen in Figure 4
Figure 5 - Product Identification Label
The GSP3000 is typically sold as an embedded component inside of other Futurex devices and its
product identification label is not visible without opening the chassis. Internal inspection is not
possible without specialized tools only available to authorized service technicians. As such,
Futurex places product identification labels on the exterior of the chassis that supports the
GSP3000. Figure 6 shows an example of a chassis label that references the existence of an
embedded GSP3000.
Figure 6 - Chassis Label
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Figure 7 and Figure 8 show typical placements of chassis labels.
Figure 7 - 1U Chassis Label Location
Figure 8 - 2U Chassis Label Location
16.2. FIRMWARE VERSIONING SCHEME AND IDENTIFICATION
The firmware version is made of four components concatenated with periods in the form of
Major.Audit.Branch.Release where:
• Major - The major number shall only be incremented when large scale changes have been
made to the release in question. Its value will be updated when Futurex believes the scope of
the changes warrants an update.
• Audit - The audit number shall only be incremented when changes have been made that
require a full 3rd party security audit. This would typically be necessary when new security
features are added or when branches are merged.
• Branch - This is incremented when a new branch is created. Branches are typically used to
distinguish unique packaging of existing security features, introduction of low-impact
security changes, or the introduction of new non-security features.
• Release - This is incremented when a new release happens off a branch. Changes to this
component represents either bug fixes or refinements to the functionality of existing
features. Releases typically represent non-impactful security changes but may have a low
impact.
The firmware version can be found on the LCD screen, web portal, or in Excrypt Manager. Please
refer to Figure 8 and Figure 9 for reference. Also provided in this view is the enabled feature
identifier that may be concatenated to the end of the firmware version and indicated by one or
more of the following characters: ‘i’ International Restriction Crypto, ‘c’ Clear PIN Support, or ‘k’
RSA Support.
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Figure 9 - Firmware Version through Web Portal
Figure 10 - Firmware Version through Excrypt Manager
17.TLS PROTOCOLS
17.1. TLS PROTOCOLS SUPPORTED
The list below contains all the TLS Protocols supported.
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GMC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GMC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Note: The TLS protocol, other than the KDF, have not been tested by the CMVP or CAVP as
per FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance D.11
Note: TLS ciphers that utilize FFC key agreement use the following Safe Prime Groups:
ffdhe2048 (ID = 256), ffdhe3072 (ID = 257), ffdhe4096 (ID = 258) as specified in SP800-56A
rev3 Appendix D and RFC 7919
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18.REFERENCES
1. FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 2001 May 25.
2. Annex A: Approved Security Functions for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules, Draft, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2019 June 10.
3. Annex B: Approved Protection Profiles for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules, Draft, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2019 June 10.
4. Annex C: Approved Random Number Generators for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules, Draft, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2019 June 10.
5. Annex D: Approved Key Establishment Techniques for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements
for Cryptographic Modules, Draft, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2020 August
10.
6. Derived Test Requirements for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules, Draft, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2004 March 24.
7. Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2020 August 28
8. NIST Special Publication 800-38D, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, National Institute of Standards and Technology,
November 2007
9. NIST Special Publication 800-38F, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Methods for Key Wrapping, National Institute of Standards and Technology, December 2012
10. NIST Special Publication 800-52 Rev2, Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, August 2019
11. NIST Special Publication 800-56A Rev3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment
Using Integer Factorization Cryptography, National Institute of Standards and Technology, April
2018
12. NIST Special Publication 800-56C Rev2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment
Using Integer Factorization Cryptography, National Institute of Standards and Technology, April
2018
13. NIST Special Publication 800-90A Rev.1, Recommendation for Random Number Generation
Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, National Institute of Standards and Technology,
June 2016
14. ANSI X9.31-1998, Digital Signature using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry (rDSA), Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc., 1998.
15. The RSA Validation System (RSAVS), National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2004
November 09.
16. FIPS PUB 180-2 with Change Notice 1, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 2004 February 25.
17. The Secure Hash Algorithm Validation System (SHAVS), National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 2004 July 22.
18. FIPS PUB 198-1, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 2002 March 06.
19. The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code Validation System (HMACVS), National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2004 December 03.
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19.GLOSSARY
Term Definition
ANSI American National Standards Institute
CA Certificate Authority
CO Cryptographic Officer
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DES Data Encryption Standard
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography (i.e. ECDH, ECDSA)
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FIPS PUB Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
HMAC-SHA-1 Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code using SHA-1
I2
C Inter-Integrated Circuit
IP Internet Protocol
LCD Liquid Crystal Display
MD5 Message Digest 5
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adelman public key algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
Table 14 - Glossary
20.CSP ABBREVIATIONS
Term Definition
KEK Key Exchange Key
PMK Platform Master Key
MKEK Master Key Encryption Key
GDK Global Derivation Key
BEK Backup Encryption Key
SCEK Smart Card Encryption Key
Table 15 - Abbreviations
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