Cisco Firepower Next-Generation IPS Virtual (NGIPSv)
Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-2 Non Proprietary Security Policy
Level 1 Validation
Version 0.3
August 16, 2018
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................. 3
1.1 PURPOSE............................................................................................................................. 3
1.2 MODULE VALIDATION LEVEL ............................................................................................ 3
1.3 REFERENCES....................................................................................................................... 3
1.4 TERMINOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 4
1.5 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................... 4
2 CISCO FIREPOWER NEXT-GENERATION IPS VIRTUAL (NGIPSV) ..................... 5
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY............................................................................................. 6
2.2 MODULE INTERFACES......................................................................................................... 6
2.3 ROLES AND SERVICES......................................................................................................... 6
2.4 USER SERVICES .................................................................................................................. 7
2.5 CRYPTO OFFICER SERVICES................................................................................................ 7
2.6 NON-FIPS MODE SERVICES ................................................................................................ 8
2.7 UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICES ........................................................................................... 9
2.8 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY/CSP MANAGEMENT........................................................................ 9
2.9 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS ........................................................................................ 12
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms ................................................................................................................................ 12
Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode ................................................................................................. 12
Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 13
2.10 SELF-TESTS ...................................................................................................................... 13
3 SECURE OPERATION ...................................................................................................... 14
3.1 CRYPTO OFFICER GUIDANCE - SYSTEM INITIALIZATION/CONFIGURATION....................... 14
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 3
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is the non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for Cisco Firepower Next-
Generation IPS Virtual (NGIPSv) Cryptographic Module running software version 6.2. This
security policy describes how this module meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 1
and how to run the module in a FIPS 140-2 mode of operation. This Security Policy may be
freely distributed.
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for
cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program
is available on the NIST website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/index.html.
1.2 Module Validation Level
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.
No. Area Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security N/A
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Cryptographic Key management 1
8 Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility 1
9 Self-Tests 1
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall module validation level 1
Table 1 Module Validation Level
1.3 References
This document deals only with the operations and capabilities of the Cisco Firepower Next-
Generation IPS Virtual (NGIPSv) Cryptographic Module outlined in Table 1 above as it relates
to the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module. Additional information can be
found at the following Cisco sites:
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/index.html
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/security/firepower-7000-series-
appliances/datasheet-c78-733165.html
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/firepower/60/quick_start/ngips_virtual/NGIPSv-
quick/setup-ngipsv.html
For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts listed on the Cisco
Systems website at www.cisco.com.
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 4
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The NIST Validated Modules website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html)
contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.
1.4 Terminology
In this document, the Cisco Firepower Next-Generation IPS virtual (NGIPSv) Cryptographic
Module is referred to as NGIPS virtual, NGIPSv, Module or the System.
1.5 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
Vendor Evidence document
Finite State Machine
Other supporting documentation as additional references
This document provides an overview of the Cisco Firepower Next-Generation IPS Virtual
(NGIPSv) Cryptographic Module identified in section 1.1 above and explains the secure layout,
configuration and operation of the module. This introduction section is followed by Section 2,
which details the general features and functionality of the module. Section 3 specifically
addresses the required configuration for the FIPS-mode of operation.
With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation
Submission Documentation is Cisco-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non-
disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Cisco Systems.
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 5
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2 Cisco Firepower Next-Generation IPS Virtual (NGIPSv)
The NGIPS Virtual Cryptographic Module is the virtualized offering of the industry-leading
threat protection Cisco Firepower Next-Generation IPS (NGIPS) solution. This highly effective
intrusion prevention system provides reliable performance and a low total cost of ownership.
Threat protection can be expanded with optional subscription licenses to provide Advanced
Malware Protection (AMP), application visibility and control, and URL filtering capabilities.
Cisco FirePOWER module sets the industry benchmark for threat detection effectiveness,
inspected throughput, and value as measured by studies conducted by NSS Labs, the world's
leading information security research and advisory company.
NGIPS virtual provides cryptographic functionality and services for TLSv1.2 and SSHv2.
For the purposes of this validation, the module was tested in the lab on the following operational
environment:
Platform Hypervisor Processor
Cisco C220 M4 VMware ESXi 5.5 Intel Xeon
Cisco C220 M4 VMware ESXi 6.0 Intel Xeon
Table 2 Module Validation Level
The module can execute in additional operational environments, each composed from a
combination of the following Cisco UCS platforms and Hypervisors. Cisco has tested each
combination and Vendor affirms that the module operates correctly in each.
The following Cisco UCS platforms are Vendor affirmed:
UCSB-B200-M4
UCSB-C220-M4S
UCSB-C240-M4SX
UCSB-C240-M4L
UCSB-C460-M4
UCS-EN120S-M2
UCS-EN120E-208
USC-E140S-M2
UCS-E180D-M2
UCS-E160S-M3
UCSB-B200-M5
UCSC-C220-M5
UCSC-C240-M5
UCSC-C480-M5
ENCS-5406
ENCS-5408
ENCS-5412
The following Hypervisors are Vendor affirmed:
ESXi 5.0
ESXi 5.5
ESXi 6.0
NFVIS
Note that while the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the
security strengths of the generated keys when ported to an operational environment which is not
listed on the validation certificate, Cisco has tested the module in these environments and vendor
affirms the module’s continued compliance. Thus, the module maintains its validation on these
vendor-affirmed operational environments.
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 6
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2.1 Cryptographic Boundary
The cryptographic module is a multi-chip standalone software module. The NGIPSv’s logical
boundary (represented by the red dash square) encompasses its virtual guest image, while its
physical boundary is defined as the hard case enclosure around the Server on which all software
executes (including the NGIPS virtual module, hypervisor, API and processor).
Diagram 1 Block Diagram
2.2 Module Interfaces
The module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical
interfaces provided by the module are mapped to the following FIPS 140-2 defined logical
interfaces: data input, data output, control input, status output, and power. The module provides
no power to external devices and takes in its power through normal power input/cord. The
logical interfaces and their mapping are described in the following table:
Physical Port/Interface Virtual Ports FIPS 140-2 Interface
Host System Ethernet (10/100/1000)
Ports; Host System Serial Port
Virtual Ethernet Ports,
Virtual Serial Port
Data Input
Interface
Host System Ethernet (10/100/1000)
Ports; Host System Serial Port
Virtual Ethernet Ports,
Virtual Serial Port
Data Output
Interface
Host System Ethernet (10/100/1000)
Ports; Host System Serial Port
Virtual Ethernet Ports,
Virtual Serial Port
Control Input
Interface
Host System Ethernet (10/100/1000)
Ports; Host System Serial Port
Virtual Ethernet Ports,
Virtual Serial Port
Status Output
Interface
Table 3 Hardware/Physical Boundary Interfaces
2.3 Roles and Services
The virtual appliance can be accessed in one of the following ways:
• SSHv2
• TLSv1.2
Authentication is identity-based. Each user is authenticated by the module upon initial access to
the module. As required by FIPS 140-2, there are two roles in the security module that operators
may assume: Crypto Officer role and User role. The administrator of the security module
Host Hardware
Host Operating System
Hypervisor
Guest OS / NGIPS
API
FOM
Host Application
Processor
API
Physical boundary
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 7
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assumes the Crypto Officer role in order to configure and maintain the module using Crypto
Officer services, while the Users exercise only the basic User services.
The User and Crypto Officer passwords and all shared secrets must each be at a minimum eight
(8) characters long. There must be at least one special character and at least one number
character (enforced procedurally) along with six additional characters taken from the 26 upper
case, 26 lower case, 10 numbers and 32 special characters. See the Secure Operation section for
more information. If six (6) special/alpha/number characters, one (1) special character and one
(1) number are used without repetition for an eight (8) digit value, the probability of randomly
guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in 187,595,543,116,800. This is calculated by
performing 94 x 93 x 92 x 91 x 90 x 89 x 32 x 10. In order to successfully guess the sequence in
one minute would require the ability to make over 3,126,592,385,280 guesses per second, which
far exceeds the operational capabilities of the module.
Additionally, when using RSA based authentication, RSA key pair has modulus size of 2048 bits,
thus providing 112 bits of strength. Assuming the low end of that range, an attacker would have a
1 in 2112
chance of randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the one in a million
chance required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random
key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 8.65x1031
attempts per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the module to support.
2.4 User Services
A User accesses the system by using either SSH or virtual serial port. The module prompts the
User for username and password. If the password is correct, the User is allowed entry to the
module management functionality. This session is authenticated either using a shared secret or
RSA digital signature authentication mechanism. The services available to the User role
accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read (r), write (w) and zeroized/delete (d) – and which
role accesses the CSPs are listed below:
Services and Access Description Keys and CSPs
Status Functions View state of interfaces and protocols, version of NGIPSv Operator password (r, w ,d)
Terminal Functions Adjust the terminal session (e.g., lock the terminal, adjust
flow control)
Operator password (r, w, d)
Directory Services Display directory of files kept in flash memory Operator password (r, w, d)
Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand N/A
SSHv2 Functions Negotiation and encrypted data transport via SSHv2 Operator password, DH private DH public key, DH
Shared Secret, ECDH private ECDH public key,
ECDH Shared Secret, SSH RSA private key, SSH
RSA public key, SSH session key, DRBG Seed,
DRBG entropy input, DRBG V, DRBG Key (r, w, d)
TLSv1.2 Functions Negotiation and encrypted data transport via TLS ECDSA private key, ECDSA public key, TLS RSA
private key, TLS RSA public key, TLS pre-master
secret, TLS traffic keys DRBG entropy input, DRBG
Seed, DRBG V, DRBG Key (r, w, d)
Table 4 Crypto Officer Services
2.5 Crypto Officer Services
The Crypto Officer (CO) role is responsible for the configuration and maintenance of the
security. The services available to the Crypto Officer role accessing the CSPs, the type of access
– read (r), write (w) and zeroized/delete (d) – and which role accesses the CSPs are listed below:
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 8
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Services Description Keys/CSPs Access
Configure the Security Define network interfaces and settings, create command aliases,
manage the connection between the module and the external
Firepower Management Center, set the protocols the module will
support, enable interfaces and network services, set system date
and time, and load authentication information.
ECDSA private key, ECDSA public key, TLS
RSA private key, TLS RSA public key, TLS
pre-master secret, TLS master secret, TLS
encryption key, TLS integrity key, DRBG
Seed, DRBG entropy input, DRBG V, DRBG
Key (r, w, d)
Define Rules and Filters Create packet Filters that are applied to User data streams on each
interface. Each Filter consists of a set of Rules, which define a set
of packets to permit or deny based on characteristics such as
protocol ID, addresses, ports, TCP connection establishment, or
packet direction.
Operator password, Enable password (r, w, d)
Software Installation Software installation. Integrity test key (r, w, d)
View Status Functions View the module configuration, routing tables, active sessions
health, temperature, memory status, voltage, packet statistics,
review accounting logs, and view physical interface status.
Operator password, Enable password (r, w, d)
TLSv1.2 Functions
Configure TLSv1.2 parameters, provide entry and output of CSPs.
The CO, through the FMC can securely, remotely administer the
NGIPSv through its dedicated, TLS-protected FMC
communication channel. Thus, the TLS service was used to protect
the traffic between the module and the external firepower
management center. Please refer to section 3 for more information.
ECDSA private key, ECDSA public key, TLS
RSA private key, TLS RSA public key, TLS
pre-master secret, TLS master secret, TLS
encryption key, TLS integrity key, DRBG
entropy input, DRBG Seed, DRBG V, DRBG
Key (r, w, d)
SSHv2 Functions Configure SSHv2 parameter, provide entry and output of CSPs.
DH private DH public key, DH Shared Secret,
ECDH private ECDH public key, ECDH
Shared Secret, SSH RSA private key, SSH
RSA public key, SSH session key, DRBG
entropy input, DRBG Seed, DRBG V, DRBG
Key (r, w, d)
Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand. N/A
User services The Crypto Officer has access to all User services. Operator password (r, w, d)
Zeroization Zeroize cryptographic keys/CSPs by running the zeroization
methods classified in table 7, Zeroization column.
All CSPs (d)
Table 5 Crypto Officer Services
2.6 Non-FIPS mode Services
The cryptographic module in addition to the above listed FIPS mode of operation can operate in
a non-FIPS mode of operation. This is not a recommended operational mode but because the
associated RFC’s for the following protocols allow for non-approved algorithms and non-
approved key sizes a non-approved mode of operation exist. So those services listed above with
their FIPS approved algorithms in addition to the following services with their non-approved
algorithms and non-approved keys sizes are available to the User and the Crypto Officer. Prior
to using any of the Non-Approved services in Section 2.6, the Crypto Officer must zeroize all
CSPs which places the module into the non-FIPS mode of operation.
Services 1
Non-Approved Algorithms
SSH
Hashing: MD5
MACing: HMAC MD5
Symmetric: DES
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
TLS Symmetric: DES, RC4
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
Table 6 Non-approved algorithms in the Non-FIPS mode services
1
These approved services become non-approved when using any non-approved algorithms or non-approved key or
curve sizes. When using approved algorithms and key sizes these services are approved.
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 9
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Neither the User nor the Crypto Officer are allowed to operate any of these services while in
FIPS mode of operation.
All services available can be found at
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/firepower/610/configuration/guide/fpmc-config-
guide-v61.html.
2.7 Unauthenticated Services
The only service available to someone without an authorized role is to cycle the power.
2.8 Cryptographic Key/CSP Management
The module administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters such as
passwords. All keys and CSPs are protected by the password-protection of the Crypto Officer role
login, and can be zeroized by the Crypto Officer. Zeroization consists of overwriting the memory
that stored the key or refreshing the volatile memory.
The Crypto Officer needs to be authenticated to store keys. All Diffie-Hellman (DH)/ECDH keys
agreed upon for individual sessions are directly associated with that specific session. The
/dev/urandom device extracts bits from the urandom pool. This output is used directly to seed
the NIST SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG. A more detailed report on entropy is available. The module
provides at least 364 bits entropy to instantiate the DRBG.
Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
DRBG
entropy
input
SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
384-bits This is the entropy for SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG. Software based entropy source
used to construct seed.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG Seed SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
384-bits Input to the DRBG that determines the
internal state of the DRBG. Generated using
DRBG derivation function that includes the
entropy input from hardware-based entropy
source.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG V SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
128-bits The DRBG V is one of the critical values of
the internal state upon which the security of
this DRBG mechanism depends. Generated
first during DRBG instantiation and then
subsequently updated using the DRBG update
function.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG Key SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
256-bits Internal critical value used as part of SP 800-
90A CTR_DRBG. Established per SP 800-
90A CTR_DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Diffie-
Hellman
Shared
Secret
DH 2048, 3072,
4096 bits
The shared secret used in Diffie-Hellman
(DH) exchange. Established per the Diffie-
Hellman key agreement.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Diffie
Hellman
private key
DH 224, 256, or
384 bits
The private key used in Diffie-Hellman (DH)
exchange. This key is generated by calling
SP800-90A DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 10
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
Diffie
Hellman
public key
DH 2048, 3072,
4096 bits
The public key used in Diffie-Hellman (DH)
exchange. This key is derived per the Diffie-
Hellman key agreement.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
EC Diffie-
Hellman
Shared
Secret
EC DH Curves:
P-256, 384,
521
The shared secret used in Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) exchange.
Established per the Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman (ECDH) protocol.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
EC Diffie
Hellman
private key
EC DH Curves:
P-256, 384,
521
The private key used in EC Diffie-Hellman
(DH) exchange. This key is generated by
calling SP800-90A DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
EC Diffie
Hellman
public key
EC DH Curves:
P-256, 384,
521
The public key used in Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman (ECDH) exchange. This key is
established per the EC Diffie-Hellman key
agreement.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Operator
password
Password 8 plus
characters
The password of the User role. This CSP is
entered by the User.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new password
Enable
password
Password 8 plus
characters
The password of the CO role. This CSP is
entered by the Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new password
SSHv2 RSA
Private Key
RSA 2048 bits The SSHv2 private key used in SSHv2
connection. This key is generated by calling
SP 800-90A DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Uninstall the
module
SSHv2 RSA
Public Key
RSA 2048 bits The SSHv2 public key used in SSHv2
connection. This key is derived in compliance
with FIPS 186-4 RSA key pair generation
method in the module.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Uninstall the
module
SSHv2
Session Key
Triple-
DES/AES
Triple-DES
192 bits or
AES
128/192/256
bits
This is the SSHv2 session key. It is used to
encrypt all SSHv2 data traffics traversing
between the SSHv2 Client and SSHv2 Server.
This key is derived via key derivation function
defined in SP800-135 KDF (SSH).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when SSH session
is terminated
TLS RSA
private key
RSA 2048 bits Used for RSA signature signing in TLS
connection This key was generated by calling
FIPS approved DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Uninstall the
module
TLS RSA
public key
RSA 2048 bits Used for RSA signature verification in TLS
connection. This key is derived in compliance
with FIPS 186-4 RSA key pair generation
method in the module.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Uninstall the
module
ECDSA
private key
ECDSA Curves:
P-256, 384,
521
Signature generation used in TLS. This key is
generated by calling SP 800-90A DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
ECDSA keypair
deletion command
ECDSA
public key
ECDSA Curves:
P-256, 384,
521
Signature verification used in TLS. This key is
derived in compliance with FIPS 186-4
ECDSA key pair generation method in the
module.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
ECDSA keypair
deletion command
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
TLS pre-
master
secret
keying
material
8 plus
characters
Keying material used to derive TLS master
key during the TLS session establishment.
This key entered into the module in cipher text
form, encrypted by RSA public key.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS session
is terminated.
TLS master
secret
keying
material
48 Bytes Keying material used to derive other TLS
keys. This key was derived from TLS pre-
master secret during the TLS session
establishment.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS session
is terminated.
TLS
encryption
key
Triple-
DES/AES/
AES-GCM
Triple-DES
192 bits or
AES
128/192/256
bits
Used in TLS connections to protect the
session traffic. This key was derived in the
module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS session
is terminated
TLS
integrity key
HMAC-
SHA-
256/384
256-384 bits Used for TLS connections integrity to assure
the traffic integrity. This key was derived in
the module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS session
is terminated
Integrity test
key
HMAC-
SHA-512
512 bits A hard coded key used for software power-up
integrity verification.
Hard
coded for
software
integrity
testing
Uninstall the
module
Table 7 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
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2.9 Cryptographic Algorithms
The module implements a variety of approved and non-approved algorithms.
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module supports the following FIPS 140-2 approved algorithm implementations:
Algorithms Algorithm Implementation
NGIPS Virtual
AES (128/192/256 CBC, GCM) 4768
Triple-DES (CBC, 3-key) 2534
SHS (SHA-1/256/384/512) 3913
HMAC (SHA-1/256/384/512) 3181
RSA (PKCS1_V1_5; KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer; 2048 bits) 2609
ECDSA (KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer; P-256, P-384, P-521) 1197
DRBG (AES256_CTR) 1649
CVL Component (TLSv1.2, SSHv2) 1413
CKG (vendor affirmed)
Table 8 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms and Associated Certificate Number
Notes:
 There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module. Only the
algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown in this table.
 The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG A.5 scenario #1 following RFC
5288 for TLS. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2 and provides support for the
acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1, Section 3.3.1. The counter portion of
the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the
maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server,
to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. In
case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM
encryption/decryption shall be established.
 Each of TLS and SSH protocols governs the generation of the respective Triple-DES keys.
Refer to RFC 5246 (TLS) and RFC 4253 (SSH) for details relevant to the generation of the
individual Triple-DES encryption keys. The user is responsible for ensuring the module
limits the number of encryptions with the same key to 220
.
 No parts of SSH and TLS protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP
and CMVP.
 In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic
Key Generation as per scenario 1 of section 5 in SP800-133. The resulting generated
symmetric key and the seed used in the asymmetric key generation are the unmodified
output from SP800-90A DRBG.
Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode
The module supports the following non-FIPS approved algorithms which are permitted for use in
the FIPS approved mode:
 Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #1413, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides
between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength)
 EC Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #1413, key agreement; key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
 RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 of encryption strength)
 NDRNG
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 13
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Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module supports the following non-approved cryptographic algorithms that shall not be used
in FIPS mode of operation:
 DES
 Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
 HMAC MD5
 HMAC-SHA-1 is not allowed with key size under 112-bits
 MD5
 RC4
 RSA (key wrapping; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
2.10 Self-Tests
The module includes an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically during
operations to prevent any secure data from being released and to insure all components are
functioning correctly.
Self-tests performed
 POST tests
o AES Known Answer Tests (Separate encrypt and decrypt)
o AES-GCM Known Answer Tests (Separate encrypt and decrypt)
o DRBG Known Answer Test (Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP800-
90A Section 11.3 are performed)
o ECDSA (Sign and Verify) Power on Self-Test
o HMAC Known Answer Tests
 HMAC-SHA1 Known Answer Test
 HMAC-SHA256 Known Answer Test
 HMAC-SHA384 Known Answer Test
 HMAC-SHA512 Known Answer Test
o RSA Known Answer Tests (Separate KAT for signing; Separate KAT for
verification)
o SHA-1 Known Answer Test
o Software Integrity Test (HMAC-SHA512)
o Triple-DES Known Answer Test (Separate encrypt and decrypt)
 Conditional tests
o RSA pairwise consistency test
o ECDSA pairwise consistency test
o CRNGT for SP800-90A DRBG
o CRNGT for NDRNG
The module performs all power-on self-tests automatically when the power is applied. All
power-on self-tests must be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The
power-on self-tests are performed after the module is initialized but prior to the initialization of
the virtual LAN’s interfaces; this prevents the security module from passing any data during a
power-on self-test failure. In the unlikely event that a power-on self-test fails, an error message is
displayed on the virtual serial port followed by a security module reboot.
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 14
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3 Secure Operation
The module meets all the Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The module is shipped only to
authorized operators by the vendor, and the module is shipped in Cisco boxes with Cisco
adhesive, so if tampered with the recipient will notice. Follow the setting instructions provided
below to place the module in FIPS-approved mode. Operating this module without maintaining
the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS approved mode of operation.
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance - System Initialization/Configuration
The Cisco Firepower Next-Generation IPS Virtual (NGIPSv) Cryptographic Module version 6.2
was validated with Cisco Firepower Management Center (Cisco_Firepower_NGIPSv_VMware-
6.2.2-81.tar.gz). These are the only allowable images for FIPS-approved mode of operation.
The Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the following steps:
Step 1: To complete the initial setup, the Crypto Officer needs to log into the external Firepower
Management Center’s web interface done using the FMC platform or with FMCv and specify the
initial configuration options on a setup page. The administrator password must be changed,
specifying network settings if not already completed, and accepting the EULA.
Log in using admin as the username and Admin123 as the password. Change the password - use
a strong password that is at least eight alphanumeric characters of mixed case and includes at
least one numeric character. Avoid using words that appear in a dictionary.
After completing the initial setup, the only user on the system is the admin user, which has the
Administrator role and access.
Step 2: Choose System > Configuration (Choose SSH or HTTPS or a combination of these options to
specify which ports you want to enable for these IP addresses). For more details, see
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/firepower/620/configuration/guide/fpmc-config-
guide-v62/system_configuration.html#ID-2241-00000370
Step 3: System>Licenses>Smart Licenses, add and verify licenses (Firepower Management
Center Configuration Guide provides more detailed information)
Install Triple-DES/AES SMART license to use Triple-DES and AES (for data traffic and SSH).
Step 4: System > Configuration; Devices > Platform Settings; STIG Compliance, choose Enable
STIG Compliance; Click on save.
Step 5: Reboot the security module.