© 2013 Hewlett-Packard Company
This document may be freely reproduced in its original entirety.
Enterprise Secure Key Manager
FIPS 140-2
Security Policy
Level 2 Validation
Document Version 1.1
May 7, 2013
On November 5, 2018, the Atalla business was acquired by Utimaco Inc. For
aspects of this Security Policy document, the rest of this document will refer
to the HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager. However, the Vendor is now
Utimaco Inc.
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................................................5
1.1 PURPOSE.........................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 REFERENCES...................................................................................................................................................5
2 HP ENTERPRISE SECURE KEY MANAGER...............................................................................................6
2.1 OVERVIEW......................................................................................................................................................6
2.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION ....................................................................................................6
2.3 MODULE INTERFACES ....................................................................................................................................8
2.4 ROLES, SERVICES, AND AUTHENTICATION ...................................................................................................11
2.4.1 Crypto-Officer Role .............................................................................................................................11
2.4.2 User Role .............................................................................................................................................13
2.4.3 HP User Role.......................................................................................................................................14
2.4.4 Cluster Member Role...........................................................................................................................14
2.4.5 Authentication......................................................................................................................................14
2.4.6 Unauthenticated Services ....................................................................................................................15
2.5 PHYSICAL SECURITY ....................................................................................................................................15
2.6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT......................................................................................................................16
2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT..........................................................................................................16
2.7.1 Keys and CSPs.....................................................................................................................................16
2.7.2 Key Generation....................................................................................................................................20
2.7.3 Key/CSP Zeroization............................................................................................................................20
2.8 SELF-TESTS ..................................................................................................................................................20
2.9 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS.................................................................................................................21
3 SECURE OPERATION....................................................................................................................................22
3.1 INITIAL SETUP ..............................................................................................................................................22
3.2 INITIALIZATION AND CONFIGURATION .........................................................................................................22
3.2.1 First-Time Initialization.......................................................................................................................22
3.2.2 FIPS Mode Configuration ...................................................................................................................22
3.3 PHYSICAL SECURITY ASSURANCE ................................................................................................................23
3.4 KEY AND CSP ZEROIZATION ........................................................................................................................25
3.5 ERROR STATE...............................................................................................................................................25
ACRONYMS..............................................................................................................................................................26
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Table of Figures
FIGURE 1 – DEPLOYMENT ARCHITECTURE OF THE HP ENTERPRISE SECURE KEY MANAGER ........................................6
FIGURE 2 – BLOCK DIAGRAM OF ESKM ........................................................................................................................7
FIGURE 3 – FRONT PANEL LEDS ....................................................................................................................................9
FIGURE 4 – REAR PANEL COMPONENTS .........................................................................................................................9
FIGURE 5 – REAR PANEL LEDS....................................................................................................................................10
FIGURE 6 – FIPS COMPLIANCE IN CLI .........................................................................................................................23
FIGURE 7 – FIPS COMPLIANCE IN WEB ADMINISTRATION INTERFACE.........................................................................23
FIGURE 8 – TAMPER-EVIDENCE LABELS ON ESKM .....................................................................................................24
FIGURE 9 – TAMPER-EVIDENCE LABEL ON TOP OF ESKM ...........................................................................................24
FIGURE 10 – TAMPER-EVIDENCE LABELS ON SIDE OF ESKM......................................................................................24
FIGURE 11 – TAMPER-EVIDENCE LABELS ON REAR OF ESKM.....................................................................................25
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Table of Tables
TABLE 1 – SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION .....................................................................................6
TABLE 2 – LOGICAL INTERFACE AND PHYSICAL PORTS MAPPING .......................................................................8
TABLE 3 – FRONT PANEL LED DEFINITIONS......................................................................................................9
TABLE 4 – REAR PANEL COMPONENTS DESCRIPTIONS....................................................................................10
TABLE 5 – REAR PANEL LED DEFINITIONS .....................................................................................................10
TABLE 6 – CRYPTO OFFICER SERVICES..........................................................................................................11
TABLE 7 – USER SERVICES............................................................................................................................13
TABLE 8 – HP USER SERVICES ......................................................................................................................14
TABLE 9 – CLUSTER MEMBER SERVICES ........................................................................................................14
TABLE 10 – ROLES AND AUTHENTICATIONS ....................................................................................................14
TABLE 11 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS FOR SSH .........17
TABLE 12 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS FOR TLS..........18
TABLE 13 – CIPHER SUITES SUPPORTED BY THE MODULE’S TLS IMPLEMENTATION IN FIPS MODE ...................18
TABLE 14 – OTHER CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS .........................19
TABLE 15 – ACRONYMS .................................................................................................................................26
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This document is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the HP Enterprise Secure
Key Manager (ESKM) from Hewlett-Packard Company. Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)
140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, specifies the U.S. and Canadian Governments’
requirements for cryptographic modules. The following pages describe how HP’s ESKM meets these
requirements and how to use the ESKM in a mode of operation compliant with FIPS 140-2. This policy
was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation of the HP ESKM 3.0 (Hardware P/N AJ585A,
Version 3.0; Firmware Version: 5.0.0) and ESKM 3.1 (Hardware P/N C8Z51AA, Version 3.1; Firmware
Version: 5.1.0).
More information about FIPS 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) is
available at the website of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST):
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.
In this document, the HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager is referred to as the ESKM, the module, or the
device.
1.2 References
This document deals only with the operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a
FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the
following sources:
• The HP website (http://www.hp.com) contains information on the full line of products from HP.
• The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html) contains contact information
for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.
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2 HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager
2.1 Overview
HP provides a range of security products for banking, the Internet, and enterprise security applications.
These products use encryption technology—often embedded in hardware—to safeguard sensitive data,
such as financial transactions over private and public networks and to offload security processing from
the server.
The HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager is a hardened server that provides security policy and key
management services to encrypting client devices and applications. After enrollment, clients, such as
storage systems, application servers and databases, make requests to the ESKM for creation and
management of cryptographic keys and related metadata.
Client applications can access the ESKM via its Key Management Service (KMS) server. Configuration
and management can be performed via web administration, Secure Shell (SSH), or serial console.
Status-monitoring interfaces include a dedicated FIPS status interface, a health check interface, and
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
The deployment architecture of the HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager is shown in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1 – Deployment Architecture of the HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager
2.2 Cryptographic Module Specification
The HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager is validated at FIPS 140-2 section levels shown in Table 1.
Table 1 – Security Level per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 3
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key Management 2
8 EMI/EMC 2
Web Server Application Server Database Storage System
HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager
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Section Section Title Level
9 Self-Tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
The block diagram of the module is given in Figure 2. The cryptographic boundary is clearly shown in the
figure. Notice that the power supplies are not included in the boundary.
Figure 2 – Block Diagram of ESKM
In the FIPS mode of operation, the module implements the following Approved algorithms:
• Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption and decryption: 128, 192, and 256 bits, in
Electronic Codebook (ECB) and Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) modes (Certificate #2069)
• Triple Data Encryption Standard (Triple-DES or TDES) encryption and decryption: 168 bits (3-
key), in ECB and CBC modes (Certificate #1328)
• Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 (Certificate #1802)
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• Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-SHA-1 and HMAC-SHA-256 (Certificate
#1254)
• Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA) American National Standard Institute (ANSI) X9.31 key
generation, signature generation, and signature verification: 1024 (signature verification only) and
2048 bits (Certificate #1073)
• Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) using AES in CTR mode (Certificate #207)
• Diffie-Hellman key agreement (CVL Certificate #23)
• Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) key generation (required for Diffie-Hellman KAS): 1024 bits
(Certificate #653)
In the FIPS mode of operation, the module implements the following non-Approved algorithms:
• A non-Approved Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator (NDRNG) to seed the DRBG
• The following commercially-available protocols for key establishment:
o Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.0/Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 3.1 protocol using RSA
2048 bits for key transport (key wrapping: key establishment methodology provides 112
bits of encryption strength)
In the non-FIPS mode of operation, the module also implements the non-Approved algorithms DES, MD5,
RC4, and RSA-512, RSA-768, and RSA-1024 for signature generation and verification, and key
establishment as well as the above listed protocols for key establishment.
2.3 Module Interfaces
FIPS 140-2 defines four logical interfaces:
• Data Input
• Data Output
• Control Input
• Status Output
The module features the following physical ports and LEDs:
• Serial port (RS232 DB9)
• Ethernet 10/100/1000 RJ-45 ports (Network Interface Card [NIC], quantity: 2)
• Monitor port (VGA DB15)
• Power input (100-240VAC)
• LEDs (four on the front panel and three on the rear panel)
The logical interfaces and their physical port mappings are described in Table 2.
Table 2 – Logical Interface and Physical Ports Mapping
Logical Interface Physical Ports
Data Input Serial, Ethernet
Data Output Monitor, serial, Ethernet
Control Input Serial, Ethernet
Status Output Monitor, serial, Ethernet, LEDs
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There are no ports on the front panel. There are four LEDs on the front panel. See Figure 3.
Figure 3 – Front Panel LEDs
Descriptions of the LEDs are given in Table 3.
Table 3 – Front Panel LED Definitions
Item Description Status
1
Unit Identifier (UID)
LED/button
Blue = Identification is activated.
Off = Identification is deactivated.
2 Power/Standby LED
Green = System is on.
Amber = System is in standby, but power is still applied.
Off = Power cord is not attached, power supply failure has occurred,
no power supplies are installed, facility power is not available.
3 Aggregate Network LED
Solid green = Link to network
Flashing green = Network activity
Off = No network connection
4 System Health LED
Green = System health is normal.
Amber = System health is degraded. Red = System health is critical.
Off = System health is normal (when in standby mode).
The components on the rear panel are illustrated in
Figure 4.
Figure 4 – Rear Panel Components
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Descriptions of components on the rear panel are given in Table 4.
Table 4 – Rear Panel Components Descriptions
Item Definition
1 Slot 2 PCIe 3.0 x 16 (Blocked)
2
NIC 4 connector (Disabled)
NIC 3 connector (Disabled)
NIC 2 connector
NIC 1 connector
3 Video connector
4 Serial connector
5 Slot 1 PCIe 3.0 x 8 (Blocked)
6 iLO 3/NIC connector (Blocked)
7 USB connectors (4) (Blocked)
8 Power supply bay 2
9 Power supply bay 1
The three LEDs on the rear panel are illustrated in Figure 5.
Figure 5 – Rear Panel LEDs
Descriptions of LEDs on the rear panel are given in Table 5.
Table 5 – Rear Panel LED Definitions
Item Description Status
1
Standard NIC activity LED
for NIC 1 and NIC 2
Green = Activity exists.
Flashing green = Activity exists.
Off = No activity exists.
2
Standard NIC link LED for
NIC 1 and NIC 2
Green = Link exists.
Off = No link exists.
3 UID LED/button
Solid blue = Identification is activated.
Off = Identification is deactivated.
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2.4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
The module supports four authorized roles:
• Crypto-Officer
• User
• HP User
• Cluster Member
All roles require identity-based authentication.
2.4.1 Crypto-Officer Role
The Crypto-Officer accesses the module via the Web Management Console and/or the Command Line
Interface (CLI). This role provides all services that are necessary for the secure management of the
module. Table 6 shows the services for the Crypto-Officer role under the FIPS mode of operation. The
purpose of each service is shown in the first column (“Service”), and the corresponding function is
described in the second column (“Description”). The keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) in the
rightmost column correspond to the keys and CSPs introduced in Section 2.7.1.
Table 6 – Crypto-Officer Services
Service Description Keys/CSPs
Authenticate to ESKM Authenticate to ESKM with a username and
the associated password
Crypto-Officer passwords – read;
TLS/SSH keys – read
Perform first-time
initialization
Configure the module when it is used for the
first time
Crypto-Officer (admin) password
– write;
Krsa private – write;
Krsa private – write;
Log signing RSA key – write;
Log signature verification RSA
key – write;
KRsaPub – write;
KRsaPriv – write.
Upgrade firmware Upgrade firmware (firmware must be FIPS-
validated)
Firmware upgrade key – read
Configure FIPS mode Enable/disable FIPS mode None
Manage keys Manage all client keys that are stored within
the module. This includes the generation,
storage, export (only public keys), import, and
zeroization of keys.
Client keys – write, read, delete;
PKEK – write, read, delete.
Manage clusters Manage all clusters that are defined within
the module. This includes the creation,
joining, and removal of a cluster from the
module.
Cluster Member passwords –
write, delete
Cluster key –write, read, delete
Manage services Manage all services supported by the
module. This includes the starting and
stopping of all services.
None
Manage operators Create, modify, or delete module operators
(Crypto-Officers and Users).
Crypto-Officer passwords –
write, delete; User passwords –
write, delete
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Service Description Keys/CSPs
Manage certificates Create/import/revoke certificates KRsaPub – write, read, delete;
KRsaPriv – write, read, delete;
CARsaPub – write, read, delete;
CARsaPriv – write, read, delete;
Client RSA public keys – read.
Reset factory settings Rollback to the default firmware shipped with
the module
All keys/CSPs – delete
Restore default
configuration
Delete the current configuration file and
restores the default configuration settings
None
Restore configuration
file
Restore a previously backed up configuration
file
None
Backup configuration
file
Back up a configuration file None
Zeroize all keys/CSPs Zeroize all keys and CSPs in the module All keys and CSPs – delete
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2.4.2 User Role
The User role is associated with external applications or clients that connect to the KMS via its XML
interface. Users in this role may exercise services—such as key generation and management—based on
configured or predefined permissions. See Table 7 for details. The keys and CSPs in the rightmost
column correspond to the keys and CSPs introduced in Section 2.7.1.
Table 7 – User Services
Service Description Keys/CSPs
Authenticate to ESKM Authenticate to ESKM with a username and
the associated password
User passwords – read
Generate key Generate a cryptographic key Client keys – write;
PKEK – write.
Modify key meta data Change the key owner or update/add/delete
the custom attributes
None
Delete key Delete a cryptographic key Client keys – delete;
PKEK – delete.
Query key meta data Output key names and meta data that the
User is allowed to access
Client keys – read;
PKEK – read.
Import key Import key Client keys – write;
PKEK – write.
Export key Export a cryptographic key Client keys – read;
PKEK – read.
Export certificate Export a certificate Client certificate – read
Get certificate info Return a list of local CAs including the
certificate status
None
Clone key Clone an existing key under a different key
name
Client keys – write, read;
PKEK – write, read.
Generate random
number
Generate a random number DRBG seed – write, read, delete
Manage operators Only users with administration permission can
create, modify, or delete module operators
User passwords – write, delete
Sign certificate request Only users with administration permission can
sign certificate requests
Client RSA public key;
CARsaPub – read;
CARsaPriv – read.
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2.4.3 HP User Role
The HP User role can reset the module to an uninitialized state in the event that all Crypto-Officer
passwords are lost, or when a self-test permanently fails. See Table 8. The keys and CSPs in the
rightmost column correspond to the keys and CSPs introduced in Section 2.7.1.
Table 8 – HP User Services
Service Description Keys/CSPs
Authenticate to the
module
Authenticate to ESKM with a signed token HP User RSA public key – read
Reset factory settings Rollback to the default firmware shipped with
the module
All keys/CSPs – delete
Restore default
configuration
Delete the current configuration file and
restores the default configuration settings
None
Zeroize all keys/CSPs Zeroize all keys/CSPs in the module All keys/CSPs – delete
2.4.4 Cluster Member Role
The Cluster Member role is associated with other ESKMs that can connect to this ESKM and access
cluster services. See Table 9. The keys and CSPs in the rightmost column correspond to the keys and
CSPs introduced in Section 2.7.1.
Table 9 – Cluster Member Services
Service Description Keys/CSPs
Authenticate Cluster
Member
Authenticate to ESKM via TLS Cluster Member passwords –
read; Cluster key – read; Cluster
Member RsaPub – read
Receive Configuration
File
Update the module’s configuration settings None
Zeroize Key Delete a specific key Cluster key – delete
Backup Configuration
File
Back up a configuration file None
2.4.5 Authentication
The module performs identity-based authentication for the four roles. Two authentication schemes are
used: authentication with certificate in TLS and authentication with password. See Table 10 for a detailed
description.
Table 10 – Roles and Authentications
Role Authentication
Crypto-Officer Username and password with optional digital certificate
User Username and password and/or digital certificate
HP User Digital certificate
Cluster Member Digital certificate
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The 1024-bit RSA signature on a digital certificate provides 80-bits of security. There are 280
possibilities.
The probability of a successful random guess is 2-80
. Since 10-6
» 2-80
, a random attempt is very unlikely to
succeed. At least 80 bits of data must be transmitted for one attempt. (The actual number of bits that
need to be transmitted for one attempt is much greater than 80. We are considering the worst case
scenario. Note also that the 1024-bit signature verification option is only available to the User role; all
other roles require 2048-bit digital certificates.) The processor used by the module has a working
frequency of 2.5 gigabytes, hence, at most 60×2.5×109
bits of data can be transmitted in 60 seconds.
Since 80 bits are necessary for one attempt, at most (60×2.5×109
)/80 = 1.875×109
attempts are possible
in 60 seconds. However, there exist 280
possibilities. (1.875×109
)/280
= 1.55×10-15
« 10-5
. The probability
of a successful certificate attempt in 60 seconds is considerably less than 10-5
.
Passwords in the module must consist of eight or more characters from the set of 90 human-readable
numeric, alphabetic (upper and lower case), and special character symbols. Excluding those
combinations that do not meet password constraints (see Section 2.7.1 – Keys and CSPs), the size of the
password space is about 608
. The probability of a successful random guess is 60-8
. Since 10-6
» 60-8
, a
random attempt is very unlikely to succeed. After five unsuccessful attempts, the module will be locked
down for 60 seconds; i.e., at most five trials are possible in 60 seconds. Since 10-5
» 5×60-8
, the
probability of a successful password attempt in 60 seconds is considerably less than 10-5
.
2.4.6 Unauthenticated Services
The following services do not require authentication:
• SNMP statistics
• FIPS status services
• Health check services
• Network Time Protocol (NTP) services
• Initiation of self-tests by rebooting the ESKM
• Negotiation of the XML protocol version for communications with the KMS
SNMP is used only for sending statistical information (SNMP traps). FIPS status and health check are
status-report services, unrelated to security or cryptography. NTP is a date/time synchronization service
that does not involve keys or CSPs. Initiation of self-tests and negotiation of the XML protocol version do
not involve keys or CSPs.
The services listed above for each role comprise the entire set of services available in non-FIPS mode.
2.5 Physical Security
The module was tested and found conformant to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by Title 47 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class A (that
is, for business use).
The HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The entire
contents of the module, including all hardware, software, firmware, and data, are enclosed in a metal
case. The case is opaque and must be sealed using tamper-evident labels in order to prevent the case
cover from being removed without signs of tampering. Two pick-resistant locks are installed on the
module’s front bezel to protect the front interfaces, including the power switch, from unauthorized access.
All circuits in the module are coated with commercial standard passivation. Once the bezel is locked and
the module has been configured to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements, the module cannot be
accessed without signs of tampering. See Section 3.3 – Physical Security Assurance of this document for
more information.
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2.6 Operational Environment
The operational environment requirements do not apply to the HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager—the
module does not provide a general purpose operating system and only allows the updating of image
components after checking an RSA signature on the new firmware image. Crypto-Officers can install a
new firmware image on the ESKM by downloading the image to the ESKM. This image is signed by an
RSA private key (which never enters the module). The ESKM verifies the signature on the new firmware
image using the public key stored in the module. If the verification passes, the upgrade is allowed.
Otherwise the upgrade process fails and the old image is reused.
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
2.7.1 Keys and CSPs
The SSH and TLS protocols employed by the FIPS mode of the module are security-related. Table 11
and
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Table 12 introduce cryptographic keys, key components, and CSPs involved in the two protocols,
respectively.
Table 11 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs for SSH
Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
DH
public
param
2048-bit Diffie-
Hellman public
parameters
Generated by DRBG
during session
initialization
In
plaintext
In volatile
memory
Upon session
termination
Negotiate SSH
Ks and SSH
Khmac
DH
private
param
256-bit Diffie-
Hellman private
parameters
Generated by DRBG
during session
initialization
Never In volatile
memory
Upon session
termination
Negotiate SSH
Ks and SSH
Khmac
Krsa
public
2048-bit RSA
public keys
Generated by DRBG
during first-time
initialization
In
plaintext
In non-volatile
memory
At operator delete
or zeroize request
Verify the
signature of the
server’s
message.
Krsa
private
2048-bit RSA
private keys
Generated by DRBG
during first-time
initialization
Never In non-volatile
memory
At operator delete
or zeroize request
Sign the
server’s
message.
SSH Ks SSH session
168-bit TDES key,
128-, 192-, 256-bit
AES key
Diffie-Hellman key
agreement
Never In volatile
memory
Upon session
termination or
when a new Ks is
generated (after a
certain timeout)
Encrypt and
decrypt data
SSH
Khmac
SSH session 512-
bit HMAC key
Diffie-Hellman key
agreement
Never In volatile
memory
Upon session
termination or
when a new
Khmac is
generated (after a
certain timeout)
Authenticate
data
Notice that SSH version 2 is explicitly accepted for use in FIPS mode, according to section 7.1 of the
NIST FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance.
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Table 12 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs for TLS
Key Key Type
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
Pre-MS TLS pre-master
secret
Input in
encrypted form
from client
Never In volatile
memory
Upon session
termination
Derive MS
MS TLS master secret Derived from Pre-
MS using FIPS
Approved key
derivation
function
Never In volatile
memory
Upon session
termination
Derive TLS Ks
and TLS
Khmac
KRsaPub Server RSA public
key (2048-bit)
Generated by
DRBG during
first-time
initialization
In plaintext
a X509
certificate.
In non-
volatile
memory
At operator
delete request
Client encrypts
Pre-MS. Client
verifies server
signatures
KRsaPriv Server RSA private
key (2048-bit)
Generated by
DRBG during
first-time
initialization
Never In non-
volatile
memory
At operator
delete or
zeroize request
Server
decrypts Pre-
MS. Server
generates
signatures
CARsaPub Certificate Authority
(CA) RSA public key
( 2048-bit)
Generated by
DRBG during
first-time
initialization
In plaintext In non-
volatile
memory
At operator
delete request
Verify CA
signatures
CARsaPriv CA RSA private key
( 2048-bit)
Generated by
DRBG during
first-time
initialization
Never In non-
volatile
memory
At operator
delete or
zeroize request
Sign server
certificates
Cluster
Member
RsaPub
Cluster Member
RSA public key (
2048-bit)
Input in plaintext Never In volatile
memory
Upon session
termination
Verify Cluster
Member
signatures
TLS Ks TLS session AES or
TDES symmetric
key(s)
Derived from MS Never In volatile
memory
Upon session
termination
Encrypt and
decrypt data
TLS Khmac TLS session HMAC
key
Derived from MS Never In volatile
memory
Upon session
termination
Authenticate
data
Table 13 details all cipher suites supported by the TLS protocol implemented by the module. The suite
names in the first column match the definitions in RFC 2246 and RFC 4346.
Table 13 – Cipher Suites Supported by the Module’s TLS Implementation in FIPS Mode
Suite Name Authentication
Key
Transport
Symmetric
Cryptography
Hash
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA RSA RSA AES (256-bit) SHA-1
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA RSA RSA AES (128-bit) SHA-1
TLS_RSA_WITH_TDES_EDE_CBC_SHA RSA RSA TDES (168-bit) SHA-1
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Other CSPs are tabulated in Table 14.
Table 14 – Other Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs
Key Key Type
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
Client AES
key
128, 192 or
256-bit AES
key
Generated by
DRBG
Via TLS in
encrypted form
(encrypted with
TLS Ks) per
client’s request
Encrypted in
non-volatile
memory
Per client’s
request or zeroize
request
Encrypt
plaintexts/decrypt
ciphertexts
Client
TDES key
TDES key Generated by
DRBG
Via TLS in
encrypted form
(encrypted with
TLS Ks) per
client’s request
Encrypted in
non-volatile
memory
Per client’s
request or zeroize
request
Encrypt
plaintexts/decrypt
ciphertexts
Client RSA
public keys
RSA public
key
Generated by
DRBG
Via TLS in
encrypted form
(encrypted with
TLS Ks) per
client’s request
Encrypted in
non-volatile
memory
At operator delete Sign
messages/verify
signatures
Client RSA
keys
RSA private
keys
Generated by
DRBG
Via TLS in
encrypted form
(encrypted with
TLS Ks) per
client’s request
Encrypted in
non-volatile
memory
Per client’s
request or zeroize
request
Sign
messages/verify
signatures
Client
HMAC keys
HMAC keys Generated by
DRBG
Via TLS in
encrypted form
(encrypted with
TLS Ks) per
client’s request
Encrypted in
non-volatile
memory
Per client’s
request or zeroize
request
Compute keyed-
MACs
Client
certificate
X.509
certificate
Input in
ciphertext
over TLS
Via TLS in
encrypted form
(encrypted with
TLS Ks) per
client’s request
In non-volatile
memory
Per client’s
request or by
zeroize request
Encrypt
data/verify
signatures
Crypto-
Officer
passwords
Character
string
Input in
ciphertext
over TLS
Never In non-volatile
memory
At operator delete
or by zeroize
request
Authenticate
Crypto-Officer
User
passwords
Character
string
Input in
ciphertext
over TLS
Never In non-volatile
memory
At operator delete
or by zeroize
request
Authenticate
User
Cluster
Member
password
Character
string
Input in
ciphertext
over TLS
Never In non-volatile
memory
At operator delete
or zeroize request
When a device
attempts to
become a
Cluster Member
HP User
RSA public
key
2048-bit RSA
public key
Input in
plaintext at
factory
Never In non-volatile
memory
At installation of a
patch or new
firmware
Authenticate HP
User
Cluster key Character
string
Input in
ciphertext
over TLS
Via TLS in
encrypted form
In non-volatile
memory
At operator delete
or by zeroize
request
Authenticate
Cluster Member
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Key Key Type
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
Firmware
upgrade
key
2048-bit RSA
public key
Input in
plaintext at
factory
Never In non-volatile
memory
When new
firmware upgrade
key is input
Used in firmware
load test
Log signing
keys
2048-bit RSA
public and
private keys
Generated by
DRBG at first-
time
initialization
Never In non-volatile
memory
When new log
signing keys are
generated on
demand by
Crypto-Officer
Sign logs and
verify signature
on logs
DRBG seed RNG seed Generated by
non-Approved
RNG
Never In non-volatile
memory
When module is
powered off
Initialize DRBG
PKEK 256-bit AES
key
Generated by
DRBG
In encrypted
form for backup
purposes only
In non-volatile
memory
At operator delete
or by zeroize
request
Encrypt client
keys
2.7.2 Key Generation
The module uses the DRBG (AES in CTR mode) as specified in SP 800-90A to generate cryptographic
keys. This DRBG is a FIPS 140-2 Approved RNG as specified in Annex C to FIPS 140-2.
2.7.3 Key/CSP Zeroization
All ephemeral keys are stored in volatile memory in plaintext. Ephemeral keys are zeroized when they are
no longer used. Other keys and CSPs are stored in non-volatile memory with client keys being stored in
encrypted form.
To zeroize all keys and CSPs in the module, the Crypto-Officer should execute the reset factory settings
zeroize command at the serial console interface. For security reasons, this command is available only
through the serial console.
2.8 Self-Tests
The device implements two types of self-tests: power-up self-tests and conditional self-tests.
Power-up self-tests include the following tests:
• Firmware integrity tests (CRC-16 and RSA 2048-bit signature verification)
• Known Answer Test (KAT) on TDES
• KAT on AES
• KAT on SHA-1
• KAT on SHA-256
• KAT on SHA-384
• KAT on SHA-512
• KAT on HMAC SHA-1
• KAT on HMAC SHA-256
• KAT on DRBG
• KAT on Diffie-Hellman
• KAT on SSH Key Derivation Function
• KAT on RSA signature generation and verification
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Conditional self-tests include the following tests:
• Pairwise consistency test for new RSA keys
• Continuous random number generator test on DRBG
• Continuous random number generator test on non-Approved RNG
• Firmware load test (RSA 2048-bit signature verification)
• Diffie-Hellman primitive test
The module has two error states: a Soft Error state and a Fatal Error state. When one or more power-up
self-tests fail, the module may enter either the Fatal Error state or the Soft Error State. When a conditional
self-test fails, the module enters the Soft Error state. See Section 3 of this document for more information.
2.9 Mitigation of Other Attacks
This section is not applicable. No claim is made that the module mitigates against any attacks beyond the
FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements for this validation.
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3 Secure Operation
The HP Enterprise Secure Key Manager meets Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below
describe how to place and keep the module in the FIPS mode of operation.
3.1 Initial Setup
The device should be unpacked and inspected according to the Installation Guide. The Installation Guide
also contains installation and configuration instructions, maintenance information, safety tips, and other
information.
3.2 Initialization and Configuration
3.2.1 First-Time Initialization
When the module is turned on for the first time, it will prompt the operator for a password for a default
Crypto-Officer. The module cannot proceed to the next state until the operator provides a password that
conforms to the password policy described in Section 2.7.1. The default username associated with the
entered password is “admin”.
During the first-time initialization, the operator must configure minimum settings for the module to operate
correctly. The operator will be prompted to configure the following settings via the serial interface:
• Date, Time, Time zone
• IP Address/Netmask
• Hostname
• Gateway
• Management Port
3.2.2 FIPS Mode Configuration
In order to comply with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements, the following functionality must be disabled on
the ESKM:
• Global keys
• File Transfer Protocol (FTP) for importing certificates and downloading and restoring backup files
• Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) authentication
• Use of the following algorithms: RC4, MD5, DES, RSA-512, RSA-768, RSA-1024 (signature
generation)
• SSL 3.0
• RSA encryption and decryption operations (note, however, that RSA encryption and decryption
associated with TLS handshakes and Sign and Sign Verify are permitted)
These functions need not be disabled individually. There are two approaches to configuring the module
such that it works in the Approved FIPS mode of operation:
Through a command line interface, such as SSH or serial console, the Crypto-Officer should use the fips
compliant command to enable the FIPS mode of operation. This will alter various server settings as
described above. See Figure 6. The fips server command is used for the FIPS status server
configuration. The show fips status command returns the current FIPS mode configuration.
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Figure 6 – FIPS Compliance in CLI
In the web administration interface, the Crypto-Officer should use the “High Security Configuration” page
to enable and disable FIPS compliance. To enable the Approved FIPS mode of operation, click on the
“Set FIPS Compliant” button. See Figure 7. This will alter various server settings as described above.
Figure 7 – FIPS Compliance in Web Administration Interface
In the web administration interface, the User can review the FIPS mode configuration by reading the
“High Security Configuration” page.
The Crypto-Officer must zeroize all keys when switching from the Approved FIPS mode of operation to
the non-FIPS mode and vice versa.
3.3 Physical Security Assurance
Five (5) serialized tamper-evidence labels have been applied during manufacturing on the metal casing.
See Figure 8. The tamper-evidence labels have a special adhesive backing to adhere to the module’s
surface and have an individual, unique serial number. They should be inspected periodically and
compared to the previously-recorded serial number to verify that fresh labels have not been applied to a
tampered module. If the labels show evidence of tamper, the Crypto-Officer should assume that the
module has been compromised and contact HP Customer Support.
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Figure 8 – Tamper-Evidence Labels (Qty. 5) on ESKM
Figure 9 – Tamper-Evidence Label on top of ESKM
Figure 10 – Tamper-Evidence Labels on Side of ESKM
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Figure 11 – Tamper-Evidence Labels on Rear of ESKM
3.4 Key and CSP Zeroization
To zeroize all keys and CSPs in the module, the Crypto-Officer should execute reset factory settings
zeroize command in the serial console interface. Notice that, for security reasons, the command cannot
be initiated from the SSH interface.
When switching between different modes of operations (FIPS and non-FIPS), the Crypto-Officer must
zeroize all CSPs.
3.5 Error State
The module has two error states: a Soft Error state and a Fatal Error state.
When a power-up self-test fails, the module may enter either the Fatal Error state or the Soft Error State.
When a conditional self-test fails, the module will enter the Soft Error state. The module can recover from
the Fatal Error state if power is cycled or if the ESKM is rebooted. An HP User can reset the module when
it is in the Fatal Error State. No other services are available in the Fatal Error state. The module can
recover from the Soft Error state if power is cycled. With the exception of the firmware load test and Diffie-
Hellman primitive test, the only service that is available in the Soft Error state is the FIPS status output via
port 9081 (default). A User can connect to port 9081 and find the error message indicating the failure of
FIPS self-tests. Access to port 9081 does not require authentication.
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Acronyms
Table 15 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI American National Standard Institute
BIOS Basic Input/Output System
CA Certificate Authority
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CLI Command Line Interface
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DES Data Encryption Standard
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECB Electronic Codebook
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
ESKM Enterprise Secure Key Manager
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FTP File Transfer Protocol
HDD Hard Drive
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
HP Hewlett-Packard
IDE Integrated Drive Electronics
iLO Integrated Lights-Out
I/O Input/Output
IP Internet Protocol
ISA Instruction Set Architecture
KAT Known Answer Test
KMS Key Management Service
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LED Light Emitting Diode
MAC Message Authentication Code
N/A Not Applicable
NIC Network Interface Card
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Acronym Definition
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NTP Network Time Protocol
PCI Peripheral Component Interconnect
RFC Request for Comments
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
SSL Secure Socket Layer
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TLS Transport Layer Security
UID Unit Identifier
USB Universal Serial Bus
VGA Video Graphics Array
XML Extensible Markup Language