### Nokia Corporation Infinera G42 ## FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## Table of Contents | 1 General | ...................................................................................................................................... 5 | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 1.1 Overview | ............................................................................................................................. 5 | | 1.2 Security Levels | .................................................................................................................... 5 | | 2 Cryptographic Module Specification .......................................................................................... | 5 | | 2.1 Description | .......................................................................................................................... 5 | | 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ......................................... | 7 | | 2.3 Excluded Components ........................................................................................................ | 8 | | 2.4 Modes of Operation ............................................................................................................. | 8 | | 2.5 Algorithms ........................................................................................................................... | 8 | | 2.6 Security Function Implementations ................................................................................... | 15 | | 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information ........................................................................................... | 21 | | 2.8 RBG and Entropy .............................................................................................................. | 21 | | 2.9 Key Generation | ................................................................................................................. 21 | | 2.10 Key Establishment ........................................................................................................... | 22 | | 2.11 Industry Protocols ............................................................................................................ | 22 | | 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ............................................................................................. | 23 | | 3.1 Ports and Interfaces | .......................................................................................................... 23 | | 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ........................................................................................ | 23 | | 4.1 Authentication Methods ..................................................................................................... | 23 | | 4.2 Roles | ................................................................................................................................. 26 | | 4.3 Approved Services ............................................................................................................ | 27 | | 4.4 Non-Approved Services .................................................................................................... | 93 | | 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded ................................................................................. | 93 | | 4.6 Bypass Actions and Status | ................................................................................................ 93 | | 4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status | ......................................................................... 93 | | 4.8 Additional Information | ........................................................................................................ 94 | | 5 Software/Firmware Security ..................................................................................................... | 94 | | 5.1 Integrity Techniques | .......................................................................................................... 94 | | 5.2 Initiate on Demand ............................................................................................................ | 94 | | 6 Operational Environment ......................................................................................................... | 94 | | 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements | ........................................................... 94 | | 7 Physical Security | ...................................................................................................................... 94 | | 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required ................................................................................... | 94 | | 7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals | ............................................................................................... 95 | | 7.3 Filler Panels ..................................................................................................................... | 100 | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 2 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | 8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................ | 100 | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| | 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ......................................................................... | 101 | | 9.1 Storage Areas ................................................................................................................. | 101 | | 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ............................................................................................. | 101 | | 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods ................................................................................................ | 102 | | 9.4 SSPs ............................................................................................................................... | 102 | | 9.5 Transitions ....................................................................................................................... | 129 | | 10 Self-Tests ............................................................................................................................. | 129 | | 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................ | 129 | | 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests ................................................................................................... | 131 | | 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ....................................................................................... | 138 | | 10.4 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests ..................................................................................... | 145 | | 10.5 Error States ................................................................................................................... | 145 | | 11 Life-Cycle Assurance ........................................................................................................... | 145 | | 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ........................................................ | 145 | | 11.2 Administrator Guidance ................................................................................................. | 147 | | 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance ......................................................................................... | 147 | | 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ................................................................................................... | 147 | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 3 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. ### List of Tables | Table 1: Security Levels | ................................................................................................................ 5 | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Hardware | ....................................................................... 7 | | Table 3: Modes List and Description ............................................................................................. | 8 | | Table 4: Approved Algorithms | ..................................................................................................... 13 | | Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms .......................................................................................... | 14 | | Table 6: Security Function Implementations | ............................................................................... 21 | | Table 7: Entropy Certificates | ....................................................................................................... 21 | | Table 8: Entropy Sources | ........................................................................................................... 21 | | Table 9: Ports and Interfaces | ...................................................................................................... 23 | | Table 10: Authentication Methods | .............................................................................................. 25 | | Table 11: Roles | ........................................................................................................................... 27 | | Table 12: Approved Services | ...................................................................................................... 93 | | Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required | ............................................................................ 95 | | Table 14: Storage Areas ........................................................................................................... | 101 | | Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods ....................................................................................... | 101 | | Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods ......................................................................................... | 102 | | Table 17: SSP Table 1 | .............................................................................................................. 112 | | Table 18: SSP Table 2 .............................................................................................................. | 129 | | Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests ....................................................................................... | 131 | | Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests ............................................................................................... | 138 | | Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information ........................................................................ | 140 | | Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information ............................................................................... | 145 | | Table 23: Error States | ............................................................................................................... 145 | | List of Figures | | | Figure 1 : Infinera G42 Module Front View .................................................................................... | 6 | | Figure 2 : Infinera G42 IOP Card | ................................................................................................... 6 | | Figure 3 : Infinera G42 XMM4 Card | ............................................................................................... 6 | | Figure 4 : Infinera G42 CHM6 Card | ............................................................................................... 7 | | Figure 5 : Infinera G42 Module Back View | .................................................................................... 7 | | Figure 6 : TELs on top of chassis | ................................................................................................ 96 | | Figure 7 : TELs on rear of chassis | ............................................................................................... 96 | | Figure 8 : TELs on front of chassis - IOP card (slot 2) | ................................................................. 97 | | Figure 9 : TELs on front of chassis - XMM4 card (slot 1) ............................................................. | 97 | | Figure 10 : TELs on front of chassis - XMM4 card (slot 3) ........................................................... | 97 | | Figure 11 : TELs on front of chassis - CHM6 card (slot | ........................................................... 98 | | 4) Figure 12 : TELs on front of chassis - CHM6 card (slot 4) and Blank card (slot 6) | ...................... 98 | | Figure 13 : TELs on front of chassis - CHM6 card (slot 5) ........................................................... | 99 | | Figure 14 : TELs on front of chassis - CHM6 card (slot 5) and Blank card (slot 7) ...................... | 99 | | Figure 15 : TELs on front of chassis - CHM6 card (slot 4 and slot 5) and Blank card (slot | and | | slot 7) ........................................................................................................................................ | 100 | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 4 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. ## 1 General ### 1.1 Overview This is a non-proprietary cryptographic module security policy for the Infinera G42 with the firmware version R6.2.2 or R6.2.3 (hereinafter calls the Module). The following details how this module meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-3, SP 800-140 and ISO/IEC 19790 for a Security Level 2 hardware cryptographic module. ### 1.2 Security Levels | Section | Title | Security Level | |-----------|-----------------------------------------|------------------| | 1 | General | 2 | | 2 | Cryptographic module specification | 2 | | 3 | Cryptographic module interfaces | 2 | | 4 | Roles, services, and authentication | 3 | | 5 | Software/Firmware security | 2 | | 6 | Operational environment | N/A | | 7 | Physical security | 2 | | 8 | Non-invasive security | N/A | | 9 | Sensitive security parameter management | 2 | | 10 | Self-tests | 2 | | 11 | Life-cycle assurance | 2 | | 12 | Mitigation of other attacks | N/A | | | Overall Level | 2 | Table 1: Security Levels ## 2 Cryptographic Module Specification ### 2.1 Description ##### Purpose and Use: The Infinera G42 is a next-generation compact modular transport network elements deployed as part of a point-to-point, point-to-multipoint network for terrestrial and/or subsea applications. The G42 chassis provides multi-service client access (e.g. Ethernet, Optical Transport Network (OTN), etc.) to the Dense Wavelength Division Multiplexing (DWDM) transport bandwidth. The module is operated in a limited operational environment. Module Type : Hardware Module Embodiment : MultiChipStand Module Characteristics : Cryptographic Boundary: © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 5 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. The module is a multiple-chip standalone hardware cryptographic module. The cryptographic boundary is defined as the entire chassis unit's physical perimeter encompassing the "top," "front," "left," "right," 'rear' and "bottom" surfaces of the case and shown in the figures below and in the Physical Security section. These modules are described in more detail further below in this section. Figure 1 : Infinera G42 Module Front View Figure 2 : Infinera G42 IOP Card Figure 3 : Infinera G42 XMM4 Card © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 6 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Figure 4 : Infinera G42 CHM6 Card Figure 5 : Infinera G42 Module Back View ### 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ##### Tested Module Identification - Hardware: Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Hardware | Model and/or Part Number | Hardware Version | Firmware Version | Processors | Features | |----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------| | G42 | Chassis G42, Controller Card XMM4, GX-IOP, Line Card [CHM6- C8, CHM6S-C14, CHM6S-C15 or CHM6-L8], and Filler Plate (GX-BLANK) | R6.2.2 or R6.2.3 | Intel Atom C3558, EFR32MG21B010F1024IM32, Zynq UltraScale+, and NXP LS1012 | | ##### Tested Module Identification - Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets): © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 7 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. N/A for this module. ##### Tested Module Identification - Hybrid Disjoint Hardware: N/A for this module. ##### Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module. ##### Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module. CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate. ### 2.3 Excluded Components N/A for this module. ### 2.4 Modes of Operation ##### Modes List and Description: | Mode Name | Description | Type | Status Indicator | |---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Approved Mode | The module is only operated in Approved mode of operation after initial operations are performed | Approved | Approved mode message is displayed via the module's status output interface | Table 3: Modes List and Description By default, the module is delivered with a non-compliant state but supports an Approved mode of operation. Once the module is configured to operate in the Approved mode of operation by following the steps in section "Secure Operation" of this document by the Crypto Officer, the module can only operate in the Approved mode. The module does not claim implementation of a degraded mode of operation. The tables in section 2.5 below list all Approved security functions of the module, including specific key size(s) (in bits unless noted otherwise) employed for Approved services, and implemented modes of operation. There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module. Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown in these tables. ### 2.5 Algorithms ##### Approved Algorithms: © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 8 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |--------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | AES-CBC | A4956 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-CBC | A4958 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-CBC | A4959 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-CCM | A4956 | Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38C | | AES-CCM | A4958 | Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38C | | AES-CMAC | A4958 | Direction - Generation, Verification Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38B | | AES-CTR | A4956 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-CTR | A4958 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-ECB | A4958 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-ECB | C482 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-GCM | A4956 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38D | | AES-GCM | A4958 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - Internal IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38D | | AES-GCM | A4959 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - Internal IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38D | | AES-GCM | C501 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External Key Length - 256 | SP 800-38D | | Counter DRBG | A4958 | Prediction Resistance - Yes Mode - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - Yes | SP 800-90A Rev. 1 | | Counter DRBG | A4959 | Prediction Resistance - Yes Mode - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - Yes | SP 800-90A Rev. 1 | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) | A4958 | Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Secret Generation Mode - Testing Candidates | FIPS 186-4 | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) | A4959 | Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Secret Generation Mode - Testing Candidates | FIPS 186-4 | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) | A4958 | Component - No Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 | FIPS 186-4 | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 9 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |--------------------------|-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | | | Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2- 384, SHA2-512, SHA2-512/224, SHA2-512/256 | | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) | A4959 | Component - No Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2- 384, SHA2-512, SHA2-512/224, SHA2-512/256 | FIPS 186-4 | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | A3366 | Component - No Curve - P-192, P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 | FIPS 186-4 | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | A4948 | Component - No Curve - P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-512 | FIPS 186-4 | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | A4949 | Component - No Curve - P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-512 | FIPS 186-4 | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | A4952 | Component - No Curve - P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-512 | FIPS 186-4 | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | A4953 | Component - No Curve - P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-512 | FIPS 186-4 | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | A4955 | Component - No Curve - P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-512 | FIPS 186-4 | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | A4956 | Component - No Curve - P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-512 | FIPS 186-4 | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | A4958 | Component - No Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA2-512/224, SHA2- 512/256 | FIPS 186-4 | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | A4959 | Component - No Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA2-512/224, SHA2- 512/256 | FIPS 186-4 | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | A4960 | Component - No Curve - P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-512 | FIPS 186-4 | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | A4961 | Component - No Curve - P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-512 | FIPS 186-4 | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | A4962 | Component - No Curve - P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-512 | FIPS 186-4 | | HMAC-SHA-1 | A4956 | Key Length - Key Length: 128-512 Increment 128 | FIPS 198-1 | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 10 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |-------------------------|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | HMAC-SHA-1 | A4958 | Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2- 256 | A4956 | Key Length - Key Length: 128-512 Increment 128 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2- 256 | A4957 | Key Length - Key Length: 64-2048 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2- 256 | A4958 | Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2- 256 | A4959 | Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2- 384 | A4956 | Key Length - Key Length: 384-1024 Increment 320 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2- 384 | A4958 | Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2- 512 | A4956 | Key Length - Key Length: 512-1024 Increment 256 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2- 512 | A4958 | Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2- 512 | A4959 | Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 | A4958 | Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256, P-384, P-521 Scheme - ephemeralUnified - KAS Role - initiator, responder | SP 800-56A Rev. 3 | | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 | A4959 | Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256, P-384, P-521 Scheme - ephemeralUnified - KAS Role - initiator, responder | SP 800-56A Rev. 3 | | KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 | A4958 | Domain Parameter Generation Methods - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP- 4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192 Scheme - dhEphem - KAS Role - initiator, responder | SP 800-56A Rev. 3 | | KDF IKEv2 (CVL) | A4958 | Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie- Hellman Shared Secret Length: 384-2048 Increment 1664 Derived Keying Material Length - Derived Keying Material Length: 1056, 2432 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 | SP 800-135 Rev. 1 | | KDF IKEv2 (CVL) | A4959 | Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie- Hellman Shared Secret Length: 384-2048 Increment 1664 Derived Keying Material Length - Derived Keying Material Length: 1056, 2432 | SP 800-135 Rev. 1 | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 11 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |----------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | | | Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 | | | KDF SNMP (CVL) | A4958 | Password Length - Password Length: 64, 96 | SP 800-135 Rev. 1 | | KDF SSH (CVL) | A4958 | Cipher - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 | SP 800-135 Rev. 1 | | PBKDF | A4958 | Iteration Count - Iteration Count: 10-10000 Increment 1 Password Length - Password Length: 8-128 Increment 8 | SP 800-132 | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) | A4958 | Key Generation Mode - B.3.6 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Primality Tests - Table C.2 Private Key Format - Standard | FIPS 186-4 | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) | A4959 | Key Generation Mode - B.3.6 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Primality Tests - Table C.2 Private Key Format - Standard | FIPS 186-4 | | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) | A4958 | Signature Type - PKCS 1.5 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 | FIPS 186-4 | | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) | A4959 | Signature Type - PKCS 1.5 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 | FIPS 186-4 | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | A4958 | Signature Type - PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 | FIPS 186-4 | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | A4959 | Signature Type - ANSI X9.31, PKCSPSS Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 | FIPS 186-4 | | Safe Primes Key Generation | A4958 | Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP- 8192 | SP 800-56A Rev. 3 | | SHA-1 | A4956 | Message Length - Message Length: 8-51200 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA-1 | A4958 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-256 | A3366 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-256 | A4956 | Message Length - Message Length: 8-51200 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-256 | A4957 | Message Length - Message Length: 8-51200 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-256 | A4958 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-256 | A4959 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-384 | A4956 | Message Length - Message Length: 8-51200 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 12 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |----------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | SHA2-384 | A4958 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-512 | A4948 | Message Length - Message Length: 8-51200 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-512 | A4949 | Message Length - Message Length: 8-51200 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-512 | A4952 | Message Length - Message Length: 1536-4096 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-512 | A4953 | Message Length - Message Length: 1536-4096 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-512 | A4954 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-512 | A4955 | Message Length - Message Length: 8-51200 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-512 | A4956 | Message Length - Message Length: 8-51200 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-512 | A4958 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-512 | A4959 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-512 | A4960 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-512 | A4961 | Message Length - Message Length: 1536-65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-512 | A4962 | Message Length - Message Length: 8-51200 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (CVL) | A4958 | Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2- 512 | SP 800-135 Rev. 1 | | TLS v1.3 KDF (CVL) | A4958 | HMAC Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384 KDF Running Modes - DHE, PSK, PSK-DHE | SP 800-135 Rev. 1 | Table 4: Approved Algorithms ###### Notes: - The IV for AES-GCM is constructed in compliance with IG C.H scenario 1a (TLSv1.2). For TLS 1.2, the module offers the AES-GCM implementation and uses the context of Scenario 1a of IG C.H. The module is compliant with SP 800-52r2 section 3.3.1 and the mechanism for IV generation is compliant with RFC5288. The module's implementation of AES-GCM is compliant to IG C.H option i) where module implements TLS protocol. The design of the TLS protocol implicitly ensures that the counter (the nonce_explicit part of the IV) does not exhaust the maximum number of possible values for a given session key. In the event the module's power is lost and restored, the consuming application must ensure that a new key for use with the AES-GCM key encryption or decryption under this scenario shall be established. © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 13 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. - For TLS 1.3, the Module offers the AES-GCM implementation and uses the context of Scenario #5 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H. The protocol that provides this compliance is TLS 1.3, defined in RFC8446 of August 2018, using the cipher suites that explicitly select AES-GCM as the encryption/decryption cipher (Appendix B.4 of RFC8446). The Module supports acceptable AES-GCM cipher suites from Section 3.3.1 of SP800-52 Rev2. The Module implements, within its boundary, an IV generation unit for TLS 1.3 that keeps control of the 64-bit counter value within the AES-GCM IV. If the exhaustion condition is observed, the Module will return an error indication to the calling application, who will then need to either trigger a re-key of the session (i.e., a new key for AES-GCM), or terminate the connection. - The IV for AES-GCM is constructed in compliance with IG C.H scenario 1a (IPsec-v3). This IV generation of IPsec AES-GCM implementation is compliant with RFC 4106 and an IKEv2 protocol RFC7296 shall be used to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which the AES GCM encryption keys are derived. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. The IPsec AES-GCM IV is only be used in the context of the AES GCM mode encryptions within the IPsec protocol. In case the Module's power is lost and then restored, the key used for IPsec AES-GCM shall be regenerated. - The PBKDF aligns with Option 1a in Section 5.4 of SP 800-132. The PBKDF algorithm parameters are: Password length 512 bits long, Salt length 256 bits long, and the number of iterations is 598502. The resulting key material is only used for storage applications. - The module was algorithm tested based on the FIPS 186-4 standard for Digital Signatures. According to IG C.K, this module is 186-5 compliant as all 186-4 CAVP tests performed are mathematically identical to the 186-5 CAVP tests. The Module does not support 186-4 DSA or RSA X9.31 for Signature Generation or Signature Verification. - In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic Module performs Cryptographic Key Generation as per section 5 in SP800-133 Rev2. The resulting generated seed used in the asymmetric key generation is the unmodified output from SP800-90A Rev1 DRBG. ##### Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms | Name | Properties | Implementation | Reference | |--------|---------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | CKG | Key Type:Asymmetric | N/A | The cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys as per sections 4 and 5 in SP800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed) and FIPS 140-3 IG D.H. A seed (i.e., the random value) used in asymmetric key generation is a direct output from SP800-90Arev1 CTR_DRBG (A4958) or CTR_DRBG (A4959) | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 14 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. ##### Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. ##### Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: N/A for this module. ##### Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. ### 2.6 Security Function Implementations | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |----------------------------------------------------|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | KAS-ECC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | CKG KAS-KeyGen | KAS ECC KeyGen in SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2 services | | Counter DRBG CKG | | KAS-FFC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | CKG KAS-KeyGen | KAS FFC KeyGen in SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2 services | | Counter DRBG Safe Primes Key Generation CKG | | KAS-ECC- KeyGen (Data Plane IKEv2) | CKG KAS-KeyGen | KAS ECC KeyGen in Data Plane Encryption service | | Counter DRBG CKG | | KAS-ECC (SSHv2) | KAS-Full | KAS-ECC for SSHv2 service | Bit-strength Caveat:Provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 KDF SSH | | KAS-FFC (SSHv2) | KAS-Full | KAS-FFC for SSHv2 service | Bit-strength Caveat:Provides between 112 and 200 bits of encryption strength | KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 Domain Parameter Generation Method : MODP- 2048, MODP- 4096, and MODP-8192 KDF SSH | Page 15 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2/v1.3) | KAS-Full | KAS-ECC for TLSv1.2/v1.3 service | Bit-strength Caveat:Provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 TLS v1.3 KDF | | KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2/v1.3) | KAS-Full | KAS-FFC for TLSv1.2/v1.3 service | Bit-strength Caveat:Provides 112 bits of encryption strength | KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 Domain Parameter Generation Method: ffdhe2048 TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 TLS v1.3 KDF | | KAS-ECC (Control Plane IKEv2) | KAS-Full | KAS-ECC for Control Plane IKEv2 service | Bit-strength Caveat:Provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 KDF IKEv2 | | KAS-FFC (Control Plane IKEv2) | KAS-Full | KAS-FFC for Control Plane IKEv2 service | Bit-strength Caveat:Provides between 112 and 200 bits of encryption strength | KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 Domain Parameter Generation Method: MODP- 2048, MODP- 3072, MODP- 4096, MODP- 6144 and MODP-8192 KDF IKEv2 | | KAS-ECC (Data Plane IKEv2) | KAS-Full | KAS-ECC for Data Plane IKEv2 service | Bit-strength Caveat:Provides 256 bits of encryption strength | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 Curve: P-521 KDF IKEv2 | | ECDSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | AsymKeyPair- KeyGen CKG | RSA Keypair generation for SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2 services | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) Counter DRBG CKG | | ECDSA SigGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | DigSig-SigGen | ECDSA SigGen for SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2 services | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) | Page 16 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------------------| | ECDSA SigVer (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | DigSig-SigVer | ECDSA SigVer for SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2 services | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | | RSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | AsymKeyPair- KeyGen CKG | RSA Keypair generation for SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2 services | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) Counter DRBG CKG | | RSA SigGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | DigSig-SigGen | RSA SigGen for SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2 services | | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) | | RSA SigVer (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | DigSig-SigVer | RSA SigVer for SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2 services | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | | ECDSA KeyGen (Data Plane IKEv2) | AsymKeyPair- KeyGen CKG | ECDSA Keypair generation for Data Plane IKEv2 services | | Counter DRBG ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) CKG | | ECDSA SigGen (Data Plane IKEv2) | DigSig-SigGen | ECDSA SigGen for Data Plane IKEv2 service | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) | | ECDSA SigVer (Data Plane IKEv2) | DigSig-SigVer | ECDSA SigVer for Data Plane IKEv2 service | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | | RSA KeyGen (Data Plane IKEv2) | AsymKeyPair- KeyGen CKG | RSA Keypair generation for Data Plane IKEv2 services | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) Counter DRBG CKG | | RSA SigGen (Data Plane IKEv2) | DigSig-SigGen | RSA SigGen for Data Plane IKEv2 service | | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) | | RSA SigVer (Data Plane IKEv2) | DigSig-SigVer | RSA SigVer for Data Plane IKEv2 service | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | | TLS Keying Materials Development | KAS-135KDF | Keying materials, used to derive TLS session keys | | TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 TLS v1.3 KDF | | IPsec/IKEv2 Keying Materials Development | KAS-135KDF | Keying materials, used to derive IPSec/IKE session keys | | KDF IKEv2 | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 17 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | SNMPv3 Keying Materials Development | KAS-135KDF | Keying materials, used to derive SNMP session keys | | KDF SNMP | | Block Ciphers (SNMPv3) | BC-UnAuth MAC | Block Ciphers used for SNMPv3 service | | AES-ECB HMAC-SHA-1 KDF SNMP SHA-1 | | Block Ciphers (SSHv2) | BC-Auth BC-UnAuth MAC | Block Cipher for SSHv2 serivce | | AES-CBC AES-CTR HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA2- 256 HMAC-SHA2- 512 SHA-1 SHA2-256 SHA2-512 AES-GCM | | Block Ciphers (TLSv1.2/v1.3) | BC-Auth BC-UnAuth MAC | Block Cipher used for TLSv1.2/v1.3 service | | AES-CBC AES-GCM HMAC-SHA2- 256 HMAC-SHA2- 384 HMAC-SHA2- 512 SHA2-256 SHA2-384 | | Block Ciphers (Control Plane IKEv2) | BC-Auth BC-UnAuth MAC | Block Ciphers for Control Plane IKEv2 service | | SHA2-512 AES-CBC AES-CCM AES-GCM AES-CBC AES-CCM AES-GCM AES-CTR AES-CTR HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA2- 256 HMAC-SHA2- 384 HMAC-SHA2- 512 HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA2- 256 HMAC-SHA2- | Page 18 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |---------------------------------|----------|----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Block Cipher (Data Plane IKEv2) | BC-Auth | Block Cipher for Data Plane IKEv2 service | | SHA2-512 AES-GCM AES-GCM AES-CBC HMAC-SHA2- 256 HMAC-SHA2- 512 SHA2-256 SHA2-512 AES-ECB | | SSH KTS (AES and HMAC) | KTS-Wrap | KTS via SSHv2 service by using AES and HMAC | Bit-strength Caveat:Provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength | AES-CBC AES-CTR HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA2- 256 HMAC-SHA2- 512 SHA-1 SHA2-256 SHA2-512 | | SSH KTS (GCM) | KTS-Wrap | KTS via SSHv2 service by using AES-GCM | Bit-strength Caveat:Provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength | AES-GCM | | TLS KTS (AES and HMAC) | KTS-Wrap | KTS via TLSv1.2/v1.3 service by using AES and HMAC | Bit-strength Caveat:Provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength | AES-CBC HMAC-SHA2- 256 HMAC-SHA2- 384 HMAC-SHA2- 512 SHA2-256 SHA2-384 SHA2-512 | | TLS KTS (GCM) | KTS-Wrap | KTS via TLSv1.2/v1.3 | Bit-strength Caveat:Provides | AES-GCM | Page 19 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |--------------------------|---------------|----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | service by using GCM | between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength | | | OSPFv2 Authentication | MAC | OSPFv2 authentication | | HMAC-SHA2- 256 SHA2-256 | | LUKS Database Protection | MAC | Database integrity protection using HMAC-SHA2- 512 | | SHA2-512 HMAC-SHA2- 512 PBKDF | | Firmware Load Test | DigSig-SigVer | ECDSA SigVer for firmware load test | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) Curve: P-521 | | NTP Authentication | MAC | NTP authentication | | SHA-1 SHA2-256 AES-CMAC | | DRBG Function | DRBG | Used for DRBG generation | | Counter DRBG Counter DRBG | | Firmware Integrity Test | DigSig-SigVer | Used for firmware integrity test | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) SHA2-512 ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) SHA2-256 SHA2-512 SHA2-512 SHA2-512 SHA2-512 SHA2-512 | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 20 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |--------|--------|---------------|--------------|----------------------------------------------| | | | | | SHA2-512 SHA2-512 SHA2-512 SHA2-512 SHA2-512 | Table 6: Security Function Implementations ### 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information No specific algorithm information. ### 2.8 RBG and Entropy | Cert Number | Vendor Name | |---------------|----------------------| | E156 | Silicon Laboratories | Table 7: Entropy Certificates | Name | Type | Operational Environment | Sample Size | Entropy per Sample | Conditioning Component | |------------------------|----------|-----------------------------------|---------------|----------------------|--------------------------| | EFR32MG21B010F1024IM32 | Physical | B with SE Firmware Version 1.2.13 | 128 bits | Full Entropy | A3366 (AES- CBC-MAC) | Table 8: Entropy Sources The module implements two approved CTR_DRBGs based on SP800-90Arev1, with Algo Certs. #A4958 and #A4959. Each DRBG is used internally by the module (e.g. to generate symmetric keys, seeds for asymmetric key pairs, and random numbers for security functions). The DRBG is seeded by the entropy source described in the table above. The CTR_DRBG (AES-128/192/256) enables Derivation Function capability. The DRBG is instantiated with a 384-bits long entropy input (corresponding to 384 bits of entropy) and provides at least 256 bits security strength for the following cryptographic keys generation. The entropy source implementation generates an output that is considered to have full entropy. More information can be found in the public use document for ESV cert #E156. ### 2.9 Key Generation The module generates RSA, ECDSA, EC Diffie-Hellman, and Diffie-Hellman asymmetric key pairs compliant with FIPS 186-4, using a NIST SP 800-90A CTR DRBG for random number generation. In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic module performs CKG for asymmetric keys as per section 5 of NIST SP 800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed) by obtaining a random bit string directly from an approved DRBG. The random bit string supports the required security strength requested by the calling application (without any V, as described in Additional Comments 2 of IG D.H.). © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 21 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. ### 2.10 Key Establishment The module provides the following key/SSP establishment services in the approved mode of operation: - KAS-FFC Shared Secret Computation: - o The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-FFC shared secret computation. The shared secret computation provides between 112 and 200 bits of encryption strength. - o The module supports the use of the safe primes defined in RFC 4419 (SSH), RFC 7919 (TLS) and RFC 3526 (IKE). -SSH (RFC 4419): - MODP-2048 (ID = 14) MODP-4096 (ID = 16) MODP-8192 (ID = 18) -TLS (RFC 7919): ffdhe2048 (ID = 256) -IKE (RFC 3526): MODP-2048 (ID = 14) MODP-3072 (ID = 15) MODP-4096 (ID = 16) MODP-6144 (ID = 17) MODP-8192 (ID = 18) - KAS-ECC Shared Secret Computation: - o The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-ECC shared secret computation. The shared secret computation provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength. ### 2.11 Industry Protocols The module supports SSHv2, TLS v1.2, TLSv1.3, SNMPv3 and IPsec/IKEv2 industrial protocols. No parts of SSH, TLS, SNMP and IKEv2 protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. Please refer to SSPs Table for more information. © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 22 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. ## 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ### 3.1 Ports and Interfaces | Physical Port | Logical Interface(s) | Data That Passes | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Ethernet Ports and Optical Ports on CHM6 Card; DCN, CRAFT, CONSOLE, AUX 1 & AUX 2 Ports on XMM4 Card | Data Input | Plaintext/Ciphertext Data input to the module for all approved services defined in Table 16 | | Ethernet Ports and Optical Ports on CHM6 Card; DCN, CRAFT, CONSOLE, AUX 1 & AUX 2 Ports on XMM4 Card | Data Output | Plaintext/Ciphertext Data output from the module for all approved services defined in Table 16 | | DCN, CRAFT, CONSOLE, AUX 1 & AUX 2 Ports on XMM4 Card; Lamp Test on IOP Card | Control Input | Control information input into the module for all the services defined in Tables 16 | | DCN, CRAFT, CONSOLE, AUX 1 & AUX 2 Ports on XMM4 Card, and LEDs | Status Output | Status Information output from the module | | Power Interface | Power | Power supply | Table 9: Ports and Interfaces The module's physical perimeter encompasses the case of the tested platform mentioned in Table 2. The module provides physical ports which are mapped to logical interfaces provided by the module (data input, data output, control input, control output and status output) as above. The module's data output interface will be disabled when performing pre-operational self-tests, loading new firmware, zeroizing keys, or when in an error state. ## 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ### 4.1 Authentication Methods | Method Name | Description | Security Mechanism | Strength Each Attempt | Strength per Minute | |--------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Password- based Authentication | The minimum length is eight (8) characters (94 possible characters). The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 1/(94^8) which is less than 1/1,000,000. | Password Based | The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 1/(94^8). Please refer | The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is 10/(94^8). Please refer to Description section in this table for more details | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 23 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Method Name | Description | Security Mechanism | Strength Each Attempt | Strength per Minute | |--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | As the module supports at most ten failed attempts to authenticate in a one- minute period, the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is 10/(94^8), which is less than 1/100,000. This calculation is based on the assumption that the typical standard American QWERTY computer keyboard has 10 Integer digits, 52 alphabetic characters, and 32 special characters providing 94 characters to choose from in total. | | to Description section in this table for more details | | | RSA-based Authentication | The modules support RSA public-key based authentication mechanism using a minimum of RSA 2048 bits, which provides 112 bits of security strength. The probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/(2^112) which is less than 1/1,000,000. For multiple attacks during a one-minute period, as the module at its highest can support at most 17,000 new sessions per second to authenticate in a one-minute period, the probability of successfully authenticating to the | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A4958) | The probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/(2^112). Please refer to Description section in this table for more details | the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 17,000 * 60 = 1,020,000/(2^112). Please refer to Description section in this table for more details | Page 24 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Method Name | Description | Security Mechanism | Strength Each Attempt | Strength per Minute | |-----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | module within a one minute period is 17,000 * 60 = 1,020,000/(2^112), which is less than 1/100,000. | | | | | ECDSA- based Authentication | The modules support ECDSA public-key based authentication mechanism using a minimum of curve P- 256, which provides 128 bits of security strength. The probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/(2^128) which is less than 1/1,000,000. For multiple attacks during a one-minute period, as the module at its highest can support at most 17,000 new sessions per second to authenticate in a one-minute period, the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 17,000 * 60 = 1,020,000/(2^128), which is less than 1/100,000. | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A4958) | The probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/(2^128) which is less than 1/1,000,000. Please refer to Description section in this table for more details | the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 17,000 * 60 = 1,020,000/(2^128). Please refer to Description section in this table for more details | Table 10: Authentication Methods The module supports identity-based authentication mechanism. The module supports the multiple Crypto Officer roles and User roles. Each role is authenticated by the module upon initial access to the module, as detailed below. Crypto Officer Roles: - Security Admin (SA): This role performs all security functions provided by the module. This role has read and write access to all security related operations, full access to security management model, remote server configurations. Implements all operations to Page 25 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. manage the creation, enabling / disabling of new Users and Passwords, User session monitoring, and configuration. - Network Admin (NA): This role has read and write access to overall system configuration. For example, DCN / networking infrastructure / software and firmware configuration and upgrade schedules or management interface configurations. - Encryption Admin (EA): This role has permissions to configure the data and control plane encryption functions. ###### User Roles: - Network Engineer (NE): This role has basic non-security related read and write access to equipment and traffic management model. For example, PM data, connectivity, provisioning status. - Monitoring Access (MA): This role has read-only access to equipment and traffic management model. For example, PM data, connectivity, provisioning status. - Provisioning (PR): This role has permissions to monitor the module, configure facility endpoints, and provision services. For example, provisioning of equipment and facility end-points. - Turn-up and Test (TT): This role has required permissions for monitor, turn-up, and troubleshoot the module fix network problems. The module also allows the concurrent operators. ### 4.2 Roles | Name | Type | Operator Type | Authentication Methods | |-----------------------|----------|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Security Admin (SA) | Identity | Crypto Officer | Password-based Authentication RSA-based Authentication ECDSA-based Authentication | | Network Admin (NA) | Identity | Crypto Officer | Password-based Authentication RSA-based Authentication ECDSA-based Authentication | | Encryption Admin (EA) | Identity | Crypto Officer | Password-based Authentication RSA-based Authentication ECDSA-based Authentication | | Network Engineer (NE) | Identity | User | Password-based Authentication RSA-based Authentication | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 26 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Table 11: Roles | Name | Type | Operator Type | Authentication Methods | |------------------------|----------|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | ECDSA-based Authentication | | Monitoring Access (MA) | Identity | User | Password-based Authentication RSA-based Authentication ECDSA-based Authentication | | Provisioning (PR) | Identity | User | Password-based Authentication RSA-based Authentication ECDSA-based Authentication | | Turn-up and Test (TT) | Identity | User | Password-based Authentication RSA-based Authentication ECDSA-based Authentication | ### 4.3 Approved Services | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------------|---------------------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Show Version | Show module's ID and versioning information | N/A | Command used to show module's version | Module's ID and versioning informatio n | None | Security Admin (SA) Network Admin (NA) Encryption Admin (EA) Network Engineer (NE) Monitoring Access (MA) Provisionin g (PR) Turn-up and Test (TT) | | Show Status | Show module's operational status | N/A | Command used to show Module's Status | Module's operation al status | None | Security Admin (SA) Network Admin (NA) Encryption Admin (EA) Network | Page 27 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Engineer (NE) Monitoring Access (MA) Provisionin g (PR) Turn-up and Test (TT) | | User Account Manageme nt | User account manageme nt | N/A | Command to manage the User account | Status of User account | None | Security Admin (SA) - Operator Password: G,R,W,Z - SSH RSA Public Key: G,R,W,Z - SSH ECDSA Public Key: | | Certificates Manageme nt | Certificates Manageme nt | N/A | Command s used to manage the certificates | Status of the completio n of network configurati on status | None | G,R,W,Z Security Admin (SA) - SSH ECDSA Private Key: G,R,W,E,Z - SSH ECDSA Public Key: G,R,W,E,Z - SSH RSA Private Key: G,R,W,E,Z - SSH RSA Public Key: G,R,W,E,Z - TLS ECDSA Private Key: G,R,W,E,Z - TLS ECDSA Public Key: G,R,W,E,Z | Page 28 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | Access - TLS RSA Private Key: G,R,W,E,Z - TLS RSA Public Key: G,R,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key: G,R,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key: G,R,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key: G,R,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key: G,R,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Private Key: G,R,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Public Key: G,R,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption RSA Private Key: G,R,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption RSA Public | Page 29 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |-------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Key: G,R,W,E,Z | | Setup Network (non- security relevant) | Commands to configure the non- security relevant network | N/A | Command s to configure the network | Status of the completio n of network configurati on status | None | Network Admin (NA) Provisionin g (PR) Turn-up and Test (TT) | | Enable/disa ble approved mode | Enable/disa ble approved mode | N/A | Command used to enable or disable approved mode | Module's approved mode status | None | Security Admin (SA) | | Configure Network Access Control List | Configure network access control list | N/A | Command s used to configure network access control list | Network access control list configurati on status | None | Security Admin (SA) | | Configure Performanc e Monitoring Service | Configure Performanc e Monitoring Service | N/A | Command s used to configure performan ce monitoring service | performan ce monitoring service configurati on status | None | Network Admin (NA) Turn-up and Test (TT) | | Configure Equipment | Provision equipment | N/A | Command s used to configue equipment | Equipmen t configurati on status | None | Network Admin (NA) Network Engineer (NE) | | Configure Facilities (physical or logical Interfaces) | Configure Facilities (physical or logical interfaces) | N/A | Command s to configure the module's physical or logical interfaces | Module's physical or logical interfaces configruait on status | None | Network Admin (NA) Provisionin g (PR) Turn-up and Test (TT) | | Perform Self-Test | Perform self-tests | N/A | Command to trigger self-tests | Self-tests completio n status | Firmware Integrity Test | Security Admin (SA) Network Admin (NA) Encryption Admin (EA) Network | Page 30 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |---------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Engineer (NE) Monitoring Access (MA) Provisionin g (PR) Turn-up and Test (TT) | | Firmware Update | Perform firmware update | Firmware update service completio n status | Command to trigger firmware update | Firmware update status | Firmware Load Test | Network Admin (NA) - Firmware Load Test Key: R,E | | Perform Zeroization | Zeroize all SSPs in the module | N/A | Command to zeroize the module | SSPs zeroizatio n status | None | Security Admin (SA) - DRBG Entropy Input: Z - DRBG Seed: Z - DRBG Internal State V value: Z - DRBG Key: Z - Operator Password: Z - LUKS DB Password: Z - LUKS DB Salt : Z - LUKS DB Integrity Key : Z - SSH DH Private Key: Z - SSH DH Public Key: Z - SSH Peer DH Public Key: Z - SSH DH | Page 31 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | Shared Secret: Z - SSH ECDH Private Key: Z - SSH ECDH Public Key: Z - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: Z - SSH ECDSA Private Key: Z - SSH ECDSA Public Key: Z - SSH RSA Private Key: Z - SSH RSA Public Key: Z - SSH Encryption Key: Z - SSH Integrity Key: Z - TLS DH Private Key: Z - TLS DH Public Key: Z - TLS Peer DH Public Key: Z - TLS DH Shared | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 32 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | Secret: Z - TLS ECDH Private Key: Z - TLS ECDH Public Key: Z - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: Z - TLS ECDSA Private Key: Z - TLS ECDSA Public Key: Z - TLS RSA Private Key: Z - TLS RSA Public Key: Z - TLS Master Secret: Z - TLS Encryption Key: Z - TLS Integrity Key: Z - IPSec/IKE DH Private Key: Z - IPSec/IKE DH Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key: | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 33 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | Z - IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key: Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret: Z - IPSec/IKE SKEYSEE D: Z - IPSec/IKE Encryption Key: Z - IPSec/IKE Integrity Key: Z - SNMPv3 | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 34 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | Encryption Key: Z - SNMPv3 Integrity Key: Z - Data Plane Encryption Pre-shared Secret: Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Private Key: Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Public Key: Z - Data Plane Encryption Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Shared Secret: Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Private Key: Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Public Key: Z - Data Plane | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 35 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP | |-------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Access Encryption RSA Private Key: Z - Data Plane Encryption RSA Public Key: Z - Data Plane Encryption IKE-SA Session Key: Z - Data Plane Encryption Child-SA Session Key: Z - SNMPv3 Authenticat ion Secret: | | Configure SSHv2 service | Configure SSHv2 service | Global approved mode indicator and SSHv2 service configurati on status | Commman ds used to configure SSHv2 service | SSHv2 service configurati on status | KAS-ECC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) KAS-FFC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) KAS-ECC (SSHv2) KAS-FFC (SSHv2) ECDSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen | Z Security Admin (SA) - SSH DH Private Key: W,Z - SSH DH Public Key: W,Z - SSH Peer DH Public Key: W,Z - SSH DH Shared Secret: W,Z - SSH ECDH Private Key: W,Z - SSH ECDH Public Key: W,Z - SSH Peer | Page 36 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) ECDSA SigVer (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) RSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) RSA SigGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) RSA SigVer (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) Block Ciphers (SSHv2) SSH KTS (AES and HMAC) SSH KTS (GCM) DRBG Function | ECDH Public Key: W,Z - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: W,Z - SSH ECDSA Private Key: W,Z - SSH ECDSA Public Key: W,Z - SSH RSA Private Key: W,Z - SSH RSA Public Key: W,Z - SSH Encryption Key: W,Z - SSH Integrity Key: W,Z - DRBG Entropy Input: W,Z - DRBG Seed: W,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: W,Z - DRBG | | Configure TLS (v1.2/v1.3) Service | Configure TLS (v1.2/v1.3) service | Global approved mode indicator and OSPF service configurati on status | Commman ds used to configure TLS (v1.2/v1.3) service | TLS (v1.2/v1.3 ) service configurati on status | KAS-ECC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) KAS-FFC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control | Key: W,Z Security Admin (SA) - TLS DH Private Key: W,Z - TLS DH Public Key: W,Z - TLS Peer DH Public | This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 37 of 147 | Name | Descriptio | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP | |--------|--------------|-------------|----------|-----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | n | | | | Plane IKEv2) KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2/v 1.3) KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2/v 1.3) ECDSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) ECDSA SigVer (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) RSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) RSA SigGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) RSA SigVer (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) Block Ciphers (TLSv1.2/v 1.3) TLS KTS (AES and | Access Key: W,Z - TLS DH Shared Secret: W,Z - TLS ECDH Private Key: W,Z - TLS ECDH Public Key: W,Z - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: W,Z - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: W,Z - TLS ECDSA Private Key: W,Z - TLS ECDSA Public Key: W,Z - TLS RSA Private Key: W,Z - TLS RSA Public Key: W,Z - TLS Master Secret: W,Z - TLS Encryption Key: W,Z - TLS Integrity Key: W,Z - DRBG Entropy Input: W,Z | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 38 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | HMAC) TLS KTS (GCM) DRBG Function TLS Keying Materials Developme nt | - DRBG Seed: W,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: W,Z - DRBG Key: W,Z | | Configure SNMP service | Configure SNMP service | Global approved mode indicator and SNMP service configurati on status | Commman ds used to configure SNMP service | SNMP service configurati on status | Block Ciphers (SNMPv3) SNMPv3 Keying Materials Developme nt | Security Admin (SA) - SNMPv3 Authenticat ion Secret: W,Z - SNMPv3 Encryption Key: W,Z - SNMPv3 Integrity | | Configure Control Plane IPSec/IKEv 2 Service | Configure Control Plane IPSec/IKEv 2 Service | Global approved mode indicator and Control Plane IPSec/IKE v2 service configurati on status | Commman ds used to configure Control Plane IPSec/IKE v2 service | Control Plane IPSec/IKE v2 service configurati on status | KAS-ECC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) KAS-FFC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) KAS-ECC (Control Plane IKEv2) KAS-FFC (Control Plane IKEv2) ECDSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen | Key: W,Z Security Admin (SA) - IPSec/IKE DH Private Key: W,Z - IPSec/IKE DH Public Key: W,Z - IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key: W,Z - IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret: W,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key: W,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key: W,Z - IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key: | Page 39 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | n | | | | Functions (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) ECDSA SigVer (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) RSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) RSA SigGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) RSA SigVer (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) Block Ciphers (Control Plane IKEv2) DRBG Function IPsec/IKEv 2 Keying Materials Developme nt | W,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret: W,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key: W,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key: W,Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key: W,Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key: W,Z - IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret: W,Z - IPSec/IKE SKEYSEE D: W,Z - IPSec/IKE Encryption Key: W,Z - IPSec/IKE Integrity Key: W,Z - DRBG Entropy Input: W,Z - DRBG Seed: W,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: W,Z - DRBG Key: W,Z | | Configure Data Plane Encryption Service | Configure Data Plane Encryption Service | Global approved mode indicator | Commman ds used to configure Data Plane | Data Plane Encryptio n service | KAS-ECC- KeyGen (Data Plane IKEv2) | Encryption Admin (EA) - Data Plane | Page 40 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. ####### © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. | Name | Descriptio | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------|--------------|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | n | and Data Plane Encryptio n service configurati on status | Encryption service | configurati on status | KAS-ECC (Data Plane IKEv2) ECDSA KeyGen (Data Plane IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen (Data Plane IKEv2) ECDSA SigVer (Data Plane IKEv2) RSA KeyGen (Data Plane IKEv2) RSA SigGen (Data Plane IKEv2) RSA SigVer (Data Plane IKEv2) Block Cipher (Data Plane IKEv2) DRBG Function | Encryption ECDH Private Key: W,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Public Key: W,Z - Data Plane Encryption Peer ECDH Public Key: W,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Shared Secret: W,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Private Key: W,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Public Key: W,Z - Data Plane Encryption RSA Private Key: W,Z - Data Plane Encryption RSA Public Key: W,Z - Data Plane | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 41 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP | |--------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Access Encryption Pre-shared Secret: W,Z - Data Plane Encryption IKE-SA Session Key: W,Z - Data Plane Encryption Child-SA Session Key: W,Z - DRBG Entropy Input: W,Z - DRBG Seed: W,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: W,Z - DRBG Key: W,Z | | Configure OSPF Service | Configure OSPF Service | Global approved mode indicator and OSPF service configurati on status log | Command s used to configure OSPF service | OSPF configurati on status | OSPFv2 Authenticati on | Security Admin (SA) - OSPFv2 Authenticat ion Key : W,Z Network Admin (NA) - OSPFv2 Authenticat ion Key : | | Configure LUKS Database Protection Service | Configure LUKS Database protection service | Global approved mode indicator and LUKS Database service configurati on status | Command s to configure LUKS database service | Status of completio n of LUKS database service configurati on | LUKS Database Protection | Security Admin (SA) - LUKS DB Password: G,W,Z | Page 42 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP | |-------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Run SSHv2 service | Run SSHv2 service | Global approved mode indicator and SSHv2 service running status | Initiate SSHv2 service establishm ent request | SSHv2 service running status | KAS-ECC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) KAS-FFC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) KAS-ECC (SSHv2) KAS-FFC (SSHv2) ECDSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) ECDSA SigVer (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) RSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) RSA SigGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) RSA SigVer (SSH, TLS and Control | Access Security Admin (SA) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH DH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Peer DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: | Page 43 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP | |--------|--------------|-------------|----------|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | n | | | | Plane IKEv2) Block Ciphers (SSHv2) SSH KTS (AES and HMAC) SSH KTS (GCM) DRBG Function | Access G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z Network Admin (NA) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH DH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z | Page 44 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|--------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | n | | | | Functions | - SSH Peer DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Integrity Key: | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 45 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | G,W,E,Z Encryption Admin (EA) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH DH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Peer DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Shared | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 46 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | Access Secret: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z Network Engineer (NE) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH DH Private Key: G,W,E,Z | Page 47 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Peer DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH | Page 48 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z Monitoring Access (MA) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH DH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Peer DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z | Page 49 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|--------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | n | | | | Functions | - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z Provisionin g (PR) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH DH Private Key: | Page 50 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|--------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | n | | | | Functions | G,W,E,Z - SSH DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Peer DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Encryption Key: | Page 51 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|--------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | n | | | | Functions | G,W,E,Z - SSH Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z Turn-up and Test (TT) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH DH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Peer DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Peer ECDH | Page 52 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP | |-----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Access Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Integrity Key: | | Run TLS (v1.2/v1.3) Service | Run TLS (v1.2/v1.3) Service | Global approved mode indicator and TLS (v1.2/v1.3 ) service running status | Initiate TLS (v1.2/v1.3) service establishm ent request | TLS (v1.2/v1.3 ) service running status | KAS-ECC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) KAS-FFC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2/v 1.3) KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2/v 1.3) | G,W,E,Z Security Admin (SA) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS DH | Page 53 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | ECDSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) ECDSA SigVer (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) RSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) RSA SigGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) RSA SigVer (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) Block Ciphers (TLSv1.2/v 1.3) TLS KTS (AES and HMAC) TLS KTS (GCM) DRBG Function TLS Keying Materials | Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Peer DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 54 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------|--------------|-------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | n | | | | Developme nt | Master Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z Network Admin (NA) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS DH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Peer DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS | Page 55 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Master Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z Encryption Admin (EA) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z | Page 56 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS DH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Peer DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDSA Public Key: | Page 57 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | G,W,E,Z - TLS RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Master Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z Network Engineer (NE) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS DH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Peer DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z | Page 58 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | - TLS DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Master Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Integrity Key: | Page 59 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | G,W,E,Z Monitoring Access (MA) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS DH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Peer DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDH | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 60 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Master Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z Provisionin g (PR) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS DH | Page 61 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Peer DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS | Page 62 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | Master Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z Turn-up and Test (TT) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS DH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Peer DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z | Page 63 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP | |----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | Access - TLS ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Master Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z | | Run Control Plane IPsec/IKEv 2 Service | Run Control Plane IPsec/IKEv 2 Service | Global approved mode indicator and Run IPsec/IKE v2 service completio | Command to run Run Control Plane IPsec/IKEv 2 service | Control Plane IPsec/IKE v2 service running status | KAS-ECC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) KAS-FFC- KeyGen | Security Admin (SA) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: | Page 64 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. | Name | Descriptio | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP | |--------|--------------|--------------|----------|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | n | n status log | | | Functions (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) KAS-ECC (Control Plane IKEv2) KAS-FFC (Control Plane IKEv2) ECDSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) ECDSA SigVer (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) RSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) RSA SigGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) RSA SigVer (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) Block Ciphers | Access G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE DH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 65 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | (Control Plane IKEv2) DRBG Function IPsec/IKEv 2 Keying Materials Developme nt | Access - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE SKEYSEE D: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z Network Admin (NA) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE DH Private Key: G,W,E,Z | Page 66 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | - IPSec/IKE DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 67 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|--------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | n | | | | Functions | - IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE SKEYSEE D: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z Encryption Admin (EA) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE DH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE | Page 68 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE SKEYSEE D: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Integrity | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 69 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | Access Key: G,W,E,Z Network Engineer (NE) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE DH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key: | Page 70 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE SKEYSEE D: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z Provisionin g (PR) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG | Page 71 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE DH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA | Page 72 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | Access Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE SKEYSEE D: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z Turn-up and Test (TT) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE DH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE | Page 73 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 74 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Pre-shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE SKEYSEE D: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z Monitoring Access (MA) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE DH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE | Page 75 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE SKEYSEE D: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - IPSec/IKE Integrity | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 76 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |------------------|------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Key: G,W,E,Z | | Run SNMP Service | Run SNMP Service | Global approved mode indicator and SNMP service running status | Initiate SNMP service establishm ent request | SNMP service running status | Block Ciphers (SNMPv3) SNMPv3 Keying Materials Developme nt | Security Admin (SA) - SNMPv3 Authenticat ion Secret: G,W,E,Z - SNMPv3 Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - SNMPv3 Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z Network Admin (NA) - SNMPv3 Authenticat ion Secret: G,W,E,Z - SNMPv3 Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - SNMPv3 Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z Encryption Admin (EA) - SNMPv3 Authenticat ion Secret: G,W,E,Z - SNMPv3 Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - SNMPv3 Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z Network Engineer (NE) - SNMPv3 Authenticat | Page 77 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | ion Secret: G,W,E,Z - SNMPv3 Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - SNMPv3 Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z Monitoring Access (MA) - SNMPv3 Authenticat ion Secret: G,W,E,Z - SNMPv3 Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - SNMPv3 Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z Provisionin g (PR) - SNMPv3 Authenticat ion Secret: G,W,E,Z - SNMPv3 Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - SNMPv3 Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z Turn-up and Test (TT) - SNMPv3 Authenticat ion Secret: G,W,E,Z - SNMPv3 Encryption Key: | Page 78 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | G,W,E,Z - SNMPv3 Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z | | Run Data Plane Encrypiton Service | Run Data Plane Encrypiton Service | Global approved mode indicator and Data Plane Encryptio n service completio n status log | Command to run OSPF service | Data Plane Encryptio n service running status | KAS-ECC- KeyGen (Data Plane IKEv2) KAS-ECC (Data Plane IKEv2) ECDSA KeyGen (Data Plane IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen (Data Plane IKEv2) ECDSA SigVer (Data Plane IKEv2) RSA KeyGen (Data Plane IKEv2) RSA SigGen (Data Plane IKEv2) RSA SigVer (Data Plane IKEv2) Block Cipher (Data Plane IKEv2) DRBG Function | Security Admin (SA) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z | Page 79 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | - Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption Pre-shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption IKE-SA Session Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption Child-SA Session Key: G,W,E,Z Network Admin (NA) - DRBG | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 80 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | Access Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 81 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Plane Encryption ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption Pre-shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption IKE-SA Session Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption Child-SA Session Key: G,W,E,Z Encryption Admin (EA) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 82 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | Access State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 83 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | Access RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption Pre-shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption IKE-SA Session Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption Child-SA Session Key: G,W,E,Z Network Engineer (NE) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - Data | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 84 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | Plane Encryption ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 85 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | Access RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption Pre-shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption IKE-SA Session Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption Child-SA Session Key: G,W,E,Z Monitoring Access (MA) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - Data | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 86 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Plane Encryption ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption Pre-shared | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 87 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | Access Secret: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption IKE-SA Session Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption Child-SA Session Key: G,W,E,Z Provisionin g (PR) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 88 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption Pre-shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption IKE-SA Session Key: | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 89 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | Access G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption Child-SA Session Key: G,W,E,Z Turn-up and Test (TT) - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption Peer ECDH Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 90 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Functions | ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption RSA Private Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption RSA Public Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption Pre-shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption IKE-SA Session Key: G,W,E,Z - Data Plane Encryption Child-SA Session | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 91 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |------------------|------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Key: G,W,E,Z | | Run OSPF Service | Run OSPF Service | Global approved mode indicator and OSPF service completio n status log | Command to run OSPF Function | OSPF running status | OSPFv2 Authenticati on | Security Admin (SA) - OSPFv2 Authenticat ion Key : W,E Network Admin (NA) - OSPFv2 Authenticat ion Key : W,E Encryption Admin (EA) - OSPFv2 Authenticat ion Key : W,E Network Engineer (NE) - OSPFv2 Authenticat ion Key : W,E Monitoring Access (MA) - OSPFv2 Authenticat ion Key : W,E Provisionin g (PR) - OSPFv2 Authenticat ion Key : W,E Turn-up and Test (TT) - OSPFv2 Authenticat ion Key : W,E | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 92 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Table 12: Approved Services | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------| | Configure NTP Authenticati on | Configure NTP Authenticati on Scheme and Key | Global approved mode indicator and NTP service configurati on status | Command s to configure NTP service | Status of the completio n of NTP configurati on | NTP Authenticati on | Security Admin (SA) - NTP Authenticat ion Key : G,W,Z | | Run LUKS Database Protection Service | Run LUKS database protection service | Global approved mode indicator and LUKS service completio n status log | Command to run LUKS protection service | LUKS running status | LUKS Database Protection | Security Admin (SA) - LUKS DB Password: W,E,Z - LUKS DB Salt : W,E,Z | ### 4.4 Non-Approved Services N/A for this module. ### 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded The module supports the firmware load test by using ECDSA with Curve P-521 and SHA2-512 (ECDSA Cert. #A4956) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module. A Firmware Load Test Key was preloaded to the module's binary at the factory and used for firmware load test. In order to load new firmware, the Crypto Officer must authenticate to the module before loading the firmware. This ensures that unauthorized access and use of the module is not performed. The module will load the new update upon reboot. The update attempt will be rejected if the verification fails. Any firmware loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate, is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. ### 4.6 Bypass Actions and Status N/A for this module. ### 4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status The module implements Self-initiated cryptographic output capability without external operator request. The Security Admin (SA) shall configure self-initiated cryptographic output capability. Prior to executing the self-initiated cryptographic output capability, the module conducts two independent internal actions to activate the capability to prevent the inadvertent output due to a single error. Page 93 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. ### 4.8 Additional Information The module supports unauthenticated service. The unauthenticated User/Operators can trigger the self-test service by power-cycling the module, and is able to observe the module's LEDs status. ## 5 Software/Firmware Security ### 5.1 Integrity Techniques The module is provided in the form of binary executable code. To ensure firmware security, the module is protected by conducting multiple layers firmware integrity tests. Please refer to section 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests of this Security Policy document for more details. If the firmware integrity test fails, the module would enter to an Error state with all crypto functionality inhibited. ### 5.2 Initiate on Demand Integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed at power-on. The operator can power-cycle or reboot the module to initiate the firmware integrity test on-demand. ## 6 Operational Environment ### 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements N/A for this module. ###### Type of Operational Environment : Limited ## 7 Physical Security ### 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required | Mechanism | Inspection Frequency | Inspection Guidance | |-----------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Tamper Evidence Labels (P/N 550- 0158-001 and P/N 550-0159-001) | 90 days | Tamper evidence labels should be checked for nicks and scratches that make the metal case visible through the nicked or scratched seal. Tamper Evidence Label (TEL) may show any of the following as evidence of tampering or removal: TEL is not preset in the positions prescribed (as shown above); TEL has been cut; TEL is not stuck | Page 94 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required | Mechanism | Inspection Frequency | Inspection Guidance | |-----------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | down well, or is loose; Self-destruction of the TEL (broken bits or shreds) present as from an attempt of removal; Tracking numbers do not match those recorded. | | Production grade components | N/A | N/A | ###### Appling Tamper Evidence Labels The tamper evident labels shall be installed on the security devices containing the module prior to operating in Approved mode. TELs shall be applied as depicted in the figures below. Any unused TELs must be securely stored, accounted for, and maintained by the Security Admin (SA) in a protected location. Should the Security Admin (SA) have to remove, change or replace TELs for any reason, the Security Admin (SA) must examine the location from which the TEL was removed and ensure that no residual debris is still remaining on the chassis or card. If residual debris remains, the CO must remove the debris using a damp cloth. Any deviation of the TELs placement by unauthorized operators such as tearing, misconfiguration, removal, change, replacement or any other change in the TELs from its original configuration as depicted below shall mean the module is no longer in Approved mode of operation. Returning the system back to Approved mode of operation requires the replacement of the TELs as depicted below and any additional requirement per the site security policy which are out of scope of this Security Policy. The Security Admin (SA)checks the integrity of the label by following the guidance listed above. In case of notification of tamper evidence, the Security Admin (SA) shall not power on this module and shall contact Infinera Support team. The picture below shows the physical interface side of the module's enclosure with tamperevident labels. ### 7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals Number: Twenty-one (21) Small Tamper Evident Labels (P/N 550-0158-001) and Two (2) Large Tamper Evident Labels (P/N 550-0159-001). ##### Placement: Page 95 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Figure 6 : TELs on top of chassis Figure 7 : TELs on rear of chassis © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 96 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Figure 8 : TELs on front of chassis - IOP card (slot 2) Figure 9 : TELs on front of chassis - XMM4 card (slot 1) Figure 10 : TELs on front of chassis - XMM4 card (slot 3) © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 97 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Figure 11 : TELs on front of chassis - CHM6 card (slot 4) Figure 12 : TELs on front of chassis - CHM6 card (slot 4) and Blank card (slot 6) © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 98 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Figure 13 : TELs on front of chassis - CHM6 card (slot 5) Figure 14 : TELs on front of chassis - CHM6 card (slot 5) and Blank card (slot 7) © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 99 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Figure 15 : TELs on front of chassis - CHM6 card (slot 4 and slot 5) and Blank card (slot 6 and slot 7) Surface Preparation: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper evident labels. Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose. Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: Must be stored in a secure location under controlled access ### 7.3 Filler Panels The module uses the filler panels with Hardware number: GX-BLANK while in the approved mode. ## 8 Non-Invasive Security N/A for this module. © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 100 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. ## 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ### 9.1 Storage Areas Table 14: Storage Areas | Storage Area Name | Description | Persistence Type | |---------------------|---------------------|--------------------| | DRAM | Volatile memory | Dynamic | | Flash | Non-Volatile memory | Static | ### 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods | Name | From | To | Format Type | Distribution Type | Entry Type | SFI or Algorithm | |-------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|---------------|---------------------|--------------|------------------------| | Module Public Key Output | Module | External (Outside the Module's Boundary) | Plaintext | Automated | Electronic | | | Peer Public Key Input | External (Outside the Module's Boundary) | Module | Plaintext | Automated | Electronic | | | SSPs Input/Output protected by TLS KTS (GCM) | External (Outside the Module's Boundary) | Module | Encrypted | Automated | Electronic | TLS KTS (GCM) | | SSPs Input/Output protected by TLS KTS (AES and HMAC) | External (Outside the Module's Boundary) | Module | Encrypted | Automated | Electronic | TLS KTS (AES and HMAC) | | SSPs Input/Output protected by SSH KTS (GCM) | External (Outside the Module's Boundary) | Module | Encrypted | Automated | Electronic | SSH KTS (GCM) | | SSPs Input/Output protected by SSH KTS (AES and HMAC) | External (Outside the Module's Boundary) | Module | Encrypted | Automated | Electronic | SSH KTS (AES and HMAC) | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 101 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. ### 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods | Zeroization Method | Description | Rationale | Operator Initiation | |----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------| | Zeroization command | CO issues zeroization service: "fips zeroize" to zeroize all SSPs | The zeroization command will erase all SSPs stored in the RAM and in the Flash of the module. | Module Reboot | | Session termination | Zeroization upon session termination | Session termination will automatically zeroize all session based temporary SSPs | Terminate session | | Reboot | Zeroization upon rebooting the module | Reboot to zeroize all temporary SSPs stored in Module's DRAM | Reboot | Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods Please note that the Firmware Load Test Key is only used for Firmware Load Test Authentication and not subject to the zeroization requirement. ### 9.4 SSPs | Name | Descriptio n | Size - Strengt h | Type - Category | Generat ed By | Establishe d By | Used By | |-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|--------------------------| | DRBG Entropy Input | Used to seed the DRBG | 384 bits - At least 256 bits | Entropy Inputs - CSP | | | DRBG Function | | DRBG Seed | Used for DRBG generation | 256 bits - 256 bits | DRBG Seed - CSP | | | DRBG Function | | DRBG Internal State V value | Used for DRBG generation | 256 bits - 256 bits | DRBG Internal State V value - CSP | | | DRBG Function | | DRBG Key | Used for DRBG generation | 256 bits - 256 bits | DRBG Key - CSP | | | DRBG Function | | Operator Password | Used for operator authenticati on | 8-30 characte rs - N/A | Authenticati on Data - CSP | | | | | LUKS DB Password | Used for LUKS DB Integrity Key derivation | 512 bits - 512 bits | HMAC key - CSP | DRBG Function | | LUKS Database Protection | | LUKS DB Salt | Used for LUKS DB Integrity | 256 bits - 256 bits | Salt - CSP | DRBG Function | | LUKS Database Protection | Page 102 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Size - Strengt h | Type - Category | Generat ed By | Establishe d By | Used By | |------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------| | | Key derivation | | | | | | | LUKS DB Integrity Key | Used for LUKS Database integrity protection | 512 bits - 512 bits | Authenticati on - CSP | | PBKDF (A4958) | LUKS Database Protection | | Firmware Load Test Key | Used for firmware load test | P-521 - 256 bits | Public Key - PSP | | | Firmware Load Test | | SSH DH Private Key | Used to derive SSH DH Shared Secret | MODP- 2048, MODP- 4096, and MODP- 8192 - 112-200 bits | Private Key - CSP | KAS- FFC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | KAS-FFC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | SSH DH Public Key | Used to derive SSH DH Shared Secret | MODP- 2048, MODP- 4096, and MODP- 8192 - 112-200 bits | Public Key - PSP | | KAS-FFC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | | SSH Peer DH Public Key | Used to derive SSH DH Shared Secret | MODP- 2048, MODP- 4096, and MODP- 8192 - N/A | Public Key - PSP | | | KAS-FFC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | SSH DH Shared Secret | Used to derive SSH Encryption Key and SSH Integrity Key | MODP- 2048, MODP- 4096, and MODP- 8192 - 112-200 bits | Shared Secret - CSP | | KAS-FFC (SSHv2) | KAS-FFC (SSHv2) | | SSH ECDH Private Key | Used to derive SSH | P-256, P-384, | Private Key - CSP | KAS- ECC- | | KAS-ECC- KeyGen | Page 103 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Size - Strengt h | Type - Category | Generat ed By | Establishe d By | Used By | |--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------| | | ECDH Shared Secret | P-521 - 128-256 bits | | KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | SSH ECDH Public Key | Used to derive SSH ECDH Shared Secret | P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128-256 bits | Public Key - PSP | | KAS-ECC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | | SSH Peer ECDH Public Key | Used to derive SSH ECDH Shared Secret | P-256, P-384, P-521 - N/A | Public Key - PSP | | | KAS-ECC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | SSH ECDH Shared Secret | Used to derive SSH Encryption Key and SSH Integrity Key | P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128-256 bits | Shared Secret - CSP | | KAS-ECC (SSHv2) | KAS-ECC (SSHv2) | | SSH ECDSA Private Key | Used for SSH authenticati on | P-256, P-384 and P- 521 - 128-256 bits | Private Key - CSP | ECDSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | ECDSA SigGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | SSH ECDSA Public Key | Used for SSH authetnicati on | P-256, P-384 and P- 521 - 128-256 bits | Public Key - PSP | | ECDSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | ECDSA SigVer (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | SSH RSA Private Key | Used for SSH authetnicati on | 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits - 112 -152 bits | Private Key - CSP | RSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | RSA SigGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | SSH RSA Public Key | Used for SSH | 2048, 3072 | Public Key - PSP | | RSA KeyGen | RSA SigVer (SSH, TLS | Page 104 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Size - Strengt h | Type - Category | Generat ed By | Establishe d By | Used By | |------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------| | | authetnicati on | and 4096 bits - 112 -152 bits | | | (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | and Control Plane IKEv2) | | SSH Encryption Key | Used for SSH traffic protection | 128-256 bits - 128-256 bits | Symmetric Key - CSP | | KAS-ECC (SSHv2) KAS-FFC (SSHv2) | Block Ciphers (SSHv2) | | SSH Integrity Key | Used for SSH traffic integrity protection | at least 112 bits - at least 112 bits | Authenticati on Key - CSP | | KAS-ECC (SSHv2) KAS-FFC (SSHv2) | Block Ciphers (SSHv2) | | TLS DH Private Key | Used to drive TLS DH Shared Secret | ffdhe204 8 - 112 bits | Private Key - CSP | KAS- FFC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | KAS-FFC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | TLS DH Public Key | Used to drive TLS DH Shared Secret | ffdhe204 8 - 112 bits | Public Key - PSP | | KAS-FFC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | | TLS Peer DH Public Key | Used to derive TLS DH Shared Secret | ffdhe204 8 - 112 bits | Public Key - PSP | | | KAS-FFC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | TLS DH Shared Secret | Used to derive TLS encryption Key and TLS Integrity Key | ffdhe204 8 - 112 bits | Shared Secret - CSP | | KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2/v1 .3) | KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2/v1 .3) | | TLS ECDH Private Key | Used to drive TLS ECDH Shared Secret | P-256, P-384 and P- 521 - 128-256 bits | Private Key - CSP | KAS- ECC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control | | KAS-ECC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | Page 105 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Size - Strengt h | Type - Category | Generat ed By | Establishe d By | Used By | |--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------| | | | | | Plane IKEv2) | | | | TLS ECDH Public Key | Used to drive TLS ECDH Shared Secret | P-256, P-384 and P- 521 - 128-256 bits | Public Key - PSP | | KAS-ECC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | | TLS Peer ECDH Public Key | Used to derive TLS ECDH Shared Secret | P-256, P-384 and P- 521 - N/A | Public Key - PSP | | | KAS-ECC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | TLS ECDH Shared Secret | Used to derive TLS Encryption Key and TLS Integrity Key | P-256, P-384 and P- 521 - 128-256 bits | Shared Secret - CSP | | KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2/v1 .3) | KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2/v1 .3) | | TLS ECDSA Private Key | Used for TLS authenticati on | P-256, P-384 and P- 521 - 128-256 bits | Private Key - CSP | ECDSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | ECDSA SigGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | TLS ECDSA Public Key | Used for TLS authenticati on | P-256, P-384 and P- 521 - 128-256 bits | Public Key - PSP | | ECDSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | ECDSA SigVer (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | TLS RSA Private Key | Used for TLS authenticati on | 2048 bits - 112 bits | Private Key - CSP | RSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | RSA SigGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | TLS RSA Public Key | Used for TLS peer authenticati on | 2048 bits - 112 bits | Public Key - PSP | | RSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | RSA SigVer (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | Page 106 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Size - Strengt h | Type - Category | Generat ed By | Establishe d By | Used By | |--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------| | TLS Master Secret | Used to derive TLS Encryption Key and TLS Integrity Key | 384 bits - 384 bits | TLS Master Secret - CSP | | TLS Keying Materials Developme nt | TLS Keying Materials Developme nt | | TLS Encryption Key | Used to protect TLS traffic confidentiali ty. | 128-256 bits - 128-256 bits | Encryption Key - CSP | | KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2/v1 .3) KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2/v1 .3) | Block Ciphers (TLSv1.2/v1 .3) | | TLS Integrity Key | Used to protect traffic confidentiali ty. | at least 112 bits - at least 112 bits | Authenticati on Key - CSP | | KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2/v1 .3) KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2/v1 .3) | Block Ciphers (TLSv1.2/v1 .3) | | IPSec/IKE DH Private Key | Used for IPsec/IKE DH Shared Secret derivation | MODP- 2048, MODP- 3072, MODP- 4096, MODP- 6144 and MODP- 8192 - 112-200 bits | Private Key - CSP | KAS- FFC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | KAS-FFC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4958) | | IPSec/IKE DH Public Key | Used for IPsec/IKE DH Shared Secret derivation | MODP- 2048, MODP- 3072, MODP- 4096, MODP- 6144 and MODP- 8192 - 112-200 bits | Public Key - PSP | | KAS-FFC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 107 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Size - Strengt h | Type - Category | Generat ed By | Establishe d By | Used By | |--------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------| | IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key | Used for IPsec/IKE DH Shared Secret derivation | MODP- 2048, MODP- 3072, MODP- 4096, MODP- 6144 and MODP- 8192 - N/A | Public Key - PSP | | | KAS-FFC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret | Used for IPSec/IKE Encryption Key and IPSec/IKE Integrity key derivation | MODP- 2048, MODP- 3072, MODP- 4096, MODP- 6144 and MODP- 8192 - 112-200 bits | Shared Secret - CSP | | KAS-FFC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | KAS-FFC (Control Plane IKEv2) | | IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key | Used for IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret derivation | P-256, P-384 and P- 521 - 128-256 bits | Private Key - CSP | KAS- ECC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | KAS-ECC (Control Plane IKEv2) | | IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key | Used for IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret derivation | P-256, P-384 and P- 521 - 128-256 bits | Public Key - PSP | | KAS-ECC- KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | | IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key | Used for IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret derivation | P-256, P-384 and P- 521 - 128-256 bits | Public Key - PSP | | | KAS-ECC (Control Plane IKEv2) | Page 108 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Size - Strengt h | Type - Category | Generat ed By | Establishe d By | Used By | |------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------| | IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret | Used for IPSec/IKE Encryption Key and IPSec/IKE Integrity Key derivation | P-256, P-384 and P- 521 - 128-256 bits | Shared Secret - CSP | | KAS-ECC (Control Plane IKEv2) | KAS-ECC (Control Plane IKEv2) | | IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key | Used for IPSec/IKE peer authenticati on | P-256, P-384 and P- 521 - 128-256 bits | Private Key - CSP | ECDSA SigGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | ECDSA SigGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key | Used for IPSec/IKE peer authenticati on | P-256, P-384 and P- 521 - 128-256 bits | Public Key - PSP | | ECDSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | ECDSA SigVer (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key | Used for IPSec/IKE peer authenticati on | 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits - 112-152 bits | Private Key - CSP | RSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | RSA SigGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key | Used for IPSec/IKE peer authenticati on | 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits - 112-152 bits | Public Key - PSP | | RSA KeyGen (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | RSA SigVer (SSH, TLS and Control Plane IKEv2) | | IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret | Used for IPSec/IKE peer authenticati on | 256 bits - N/A | Shared Secret - CSP | | | IPsec/IKEv2 Keying Materials Developme nt | | IPSec/IKE SKEYSEED | Keying material used to derive the IPSec/IKE Encryption Key and | 160 bits - N/A | Keying Material - CSP | | | IPsec/IKEv2 Keying Materials Developme nt | Page 109 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Size - Strengt h | Type - Category | Generat ed By | Establishe d By | Used By | |----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------| | | IPSec/IKE Integrity Key | | | | | | | IPSec/IKE Encryption Key | Used for IPSec/IKE traffic confidentiali ty protection | 128-256 bits - 128-256 bits | Encryption Key - CSP | | IPsec/IKEv2 Keying Materials Developme nt | Block Ciphers (Control Plane IKEv2) | | IPSec/IKE Integrity Key | Used for IPSec/IKE traffic integrity protection | At least 112 bits - At least 112 bits | Authenticati on Key - CSP | | Block Ciphers (Control Plane IKEv2) | Block Ciphers (Control Plane IKEv2) | | SNMPv3 Authenticati on Secret | Used to SNMPv3 authenticati on | 64 characte rs - N/A | Authenticati on Secret - CSP | | | SNMPv3 Keying Materials Developme nt | | SNMPv3 Encryption Key | Used to secure SNMPv3 traffic confidentiali ty | 128-256 bits - 128-256 bits | Symmetric Key - CSP | | SNMPv3 Keying Materials Developme nt | Block Ciphers (SNMPv3) | | SNMPv3 Integrity Key | Used to secure SNMPv3 traffic integrity | At least 112 bits - At least 112 bits | Authenticati on Key - CSP | | SNMPv3 Keying Materials Developme nt | Block Ciphers (SNMPv3) | | Data Plane Encryption ECDH Private Key | Used to derive Data Plane Encryption ECDH Shared Secret | P-521 - 256 bits | Private Key - CSP | KAS- ECC- KeyGen (Data Plane IKEv2) | | KAS-ECC (Data Plane IKEv2) | | Data Plane Encryption ECDH Public Key | Used to derive Data Plane Encryption ECDH Shared Secret | P-521 - 256 bits | Public Key - PSP | | KAS-ECC- KeyGen (Data Plane IKEv2) | | | Data Plane Encryption ECDH | Used to derive Data Plane | P-521 - 256 bits | Shared Secret - CSP | | KAS-ECC (Data Plane IKEv2) | KAS-ECC (Data Plane IKEv2) | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 110 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Size - Strengt h | Type - Category | Generat ed By | Establishe d By | Used By | |--------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------| | Shared Secret | Encryption IKE-SA Session Key and Data Plane Encryption Child-SA Session Key | | | | | | | Data Plane Encryption Peer ECDH Public Key | Used to derive Data Plane Encryption ECDH Shared Secret | P-521 - 256 bits | Public Key - PSP | | | KAS-ECC (Data Plane IKEv2) | | Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Private Key | Used for Data Plane Encryption authenticati on | P-256, P-384 and P- 521 - 128-256 bits | Private Key - CSP | ECDSA KeyGen (Data Plane IKEv2) | | ECDSA SigGen (Data Plane IKEv2) | | Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Public Key | Used for Data Plane Encryption authenticati on | P-256, P-384 and P- 521 - 128-256 bits | Public Key - PSP | | ECDSA KeyGen (Data Plane IKEv2) | ECDSA SigVer (Data Plane IKEv2) | | Data Plane Encryption RSA Private Key | Used for Data Plane Encryption authenticati on | 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits - 112- 152 bits | Private Key - CSP | RSA KeyGen (Data Plane IKEv2) | | RSA SigGen (Data Plane IKEv2) | | Data Plane Encryption RSA Public Key | Used for Data Plane Encryption authenticati on | 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits - 112- 152 bits | Public Key - PSP | | RSA KeyGen (Data Plane IKEv2) | RSA SigVer (Data Plane IKEv2) | | Data Plane Encryption Pre-shared Secret | Used for Data Plane Encryption service | Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 - | Shared Secret - CSP | | | KAS-ECC (Data Plane IKEv2) | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 111 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Descriptio n | Size - Strengt h | Type - Category | Generat ed By | Establishe d By | Used By | |--------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------| | | authenticati on | 128-256 bits | | | | | | Data Plane Encryption IKE-SA Session Key | Used to secure Data Plane Encryption traffic confidentiali ty | 256 bits - 256 bits | Authenticat ed Symmetric Key - CSP | | KAS-ECC (Data Plane IKEv2) | Block Cipher (Data Plane IKEv2) | | Data Plane Encryption Child-SA Session Key | Used to secure Data Plane Encryption Child-SA traffic confidentiali ty | 256 bits - 256 bits | Authenticat ed Symmetric Key - CSP | | KAS-ECC (Data Plane IKEv2) | Block Cipher (Data Plane IKEv2) | | NTP Authenticati on Key | Used for NTP authenticati on | 8-40 characte rs - N/A | Authenticati on - CSP | | | NTP Authenticati on | | OSPFv2 Authenticati on Key | Used for OSPFv2 authenticati on | 8-25 characte rs - N/A | Authenticati on - CSP | | | OSPFv2 Authenticati on | Table 17: SSP Table 1 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |-----------------------------|------------------|----------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | DRBG Entropy Input | | DRAM:Plaintext | Until Reboot | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | DRBG Seed:Used With DRBG Internal State V value:Used With DRBG Key:Used With | | DRBG Seed | | DRAM:Plaintext | Until Reboot | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | DRBG Entropy Input:Used With DRBG Internal State V value:Used With DRBG Key:Used With | | DRBG Internal State V value | | DRAM:Plaintext | Until Reboot | Zeroizatio n command Session | DRBG Entropy Input:Used With DRBG Seed:Used With | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 112 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |-------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | terminatio n Reboot | DRBG Key:Used With | | DRBG Key | | DRAM:Plaintext | Until Reboot | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | DRBG Entropy Input:Used With DRBG Seed:Used With DRBG Internal State V value:Used With | | Operator Password | SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (AES and HMAC) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (AES and HMAC) | Flash:Obfuscat ed | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | | | LUKS DB Password | | Flash:Plaintext | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | LUKS DB Salt :Used With | | LUKS DB Salt | | Flash:Plaintext | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | LUKS DB Password:Used With | Page 113 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | LUKS DB Integrity Key | | Flash:Plaintext | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | LUKS DB Password:Derived From LUKS DB Salt :Derived From | | Firmware Load Test Key | | Flash:Plaintext | N/A. This PSP is only used for Firmware Load Test, which is not subject to the zeroization requirement s. | N/A | | | SSH DH Private Key | | DRAM:Plaintext | while SSH session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | SSH DH Public Key:Paired With | | SSH DH Public Key | Module Public Key Output | DRAM:Plaintext | while SSH session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | SSH DH Private Key:Paired With | | SSH Peer DH Public Key | Peer Public Key Input | DRAM:Plaintext | while SSH session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | SSH DH Private Key:Used With | | SSH DH Shared Secret | | DRAM:Plaintext | while SSH session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | SSH Encryption Key:Derived To SSH Integrity Key:Derived To SSH DH Private Key:Derived From SSH Peer DH Public Key:Derived From | Page 114 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | SSH ECDH Private Key | | DRAM:Plaintext | while SSH session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | SSH ECDH Public Key:Paired With | | SSH ECDH Public Key | Module Public Key Output | DRAM:Plaintext | while SSH session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | SSH ECDH Private Key:Paired With | | SSH Peer ECDH Public Key | Peer Public Key Input | DRAM:Plaintext | while SSH session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | SSH ECDH Private Key:Used With | | SSH ECDH Shared Secret | | DRAM:Plaintext | while SSH session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | SSH ECDH Private Key:Derived From SSH Peer ECDH Public Key:Derived From SSH Encryption Key:Derive To SSH Integrity Key:Derive To | | SSH ECDSA Private Key | | Flash:Plaintext | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | SSH ECDSA Public Key:Paired With | | SSH ECDSA Public Key | SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (AES and | Flash:Plaintext | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | SSH ECDSA Private Key:Paired With | Page 115 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|--------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------| | | HMAC) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (AES and HMAC) | | | | | | SSH RSA Private Key | | Flash:Plaintext | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | SSH RSA Public Key:Paired With | | SSH RSA Public Key | SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (AES and HMAC) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (AES and HMAC) | Flash:Plaintext | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | SSH RSA Private Key:Paired With | Page 116 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------| | SSH Encryption Key | | DRAM:Plaintext | while SSH session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | SSH Integrity Key:Used With | | SSH Integrity Key | | DRAM:Plaintext | while SSH session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | SSH Encryption Key:Used With | | TLS DH Private Key | | DRAM:Plaintext | while TLS session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | TLS DH Public Key:Paired With | | TLS DH Public Key | Module Public Key Output | DRAM:Plaintext | while TLS tunnel is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | TLS DH Private Key:Paired With | | TLS Peer DH Public Key | Peer Public Key Input | DRAM:Plaintext | while TLS tunnel is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | TLS DH Private Key:Used With TLS DH Shared Secret:Derived To | | TLS DH Shared Secret | | DRAM:Plaintext | while TLS tunnel is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | TLS DH Private Key:Derived From TLS Peer DH Public Key:Derived From | | TLS ECDH Private Key | | DRAM:Plaintext | while TLS tunnel is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio | TLS ECDH Public Key:Paired With | Page 117 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | n Reboot | | | TLS ECDH Public Key | Module Public Key Output | DRAM:Plaintext | while TLS tunnel is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | TLS ECDH Private Key:Paired With | | TLS Peer ECDH Public Key | Peer Public Key Input | DRAM:Plaintext | while TLS tunnel is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | TLS ECDH Private Key:Used With | | TLS ECDH Shared Secret | | DRAM:Plaintext | while TLS tunnel is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | TLS ECDH Private Key:Derived From TLS Peer ECDH Public Key:Derived From | | TLS ECDSA Private Key | | Flash:Plaintext | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | TLS ECDSA Public Key:Paired With | | TLS ECDSA Public Key | SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (AES and HMAC) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (GCM) | Flash:Plaintext | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | TLS ECDSA Private Key:Paired With | Page 118 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------| | | SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (AES and HMAC) | | | | | | TLS RSA Private Key | | Flash:Plaintext | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | TLS RSA Public Key:Paired With | | TLS RSA Public Key | SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (AES and HMAC) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (AES and HMAC) | Flash:Plaintext | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | TLS RSA Private Key:Paired With | | TLS Master Secret | | DRAM:Plaintext | while TLS session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | TLS DH Shared Secret:Derived From | Page 119 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------| | TLS Encryption Key | | DRAM:Plaintext | while TLS session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | TLS Integrity Key:Used With | | TLS Integrity Key | | DRAM:Plaintext | while TLS session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | TLS Encryption Key:Used With | | IPSec/IKE DH Private Key | | DRAM:Plaintext | while Control Panel IPSec/IKE session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | IPSec/IKE DH Public Key:Paired With | | IPSec/IKE DH Public Key | Module Public Key Output | DRAM:Plaintext | while Control Panel IPSec/IKE session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n | IPSec/IKE DH Private Key:Paired With | | IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key | Peer Public Key Input | DRAM:Plaintext | while Control Panel IPSec/IKE session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | IPSec/IKE DH Private Key:Used With | | IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret | | DRAM:Plaintext | while Control Panel IPSec/IKE session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | IPSec/IKE SKEYSEED:Deriv e TO | | IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key | | DRAM:Plaintext | while Control Panel IPSec/IKE session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio | IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key:Paired With | Page 120 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------| | | | | | n Reboot | | | IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key | Module Public Key Output | DRAM:Plaintext | while Control Panel IPSec/IKE session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key:Paired With | | IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key | Peer Public Key Input | DRAM:Plaintext | while Control Panel IPSec/IKE session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key:Used With | | IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret | | DRAM:Plaintext | while Control Panel IPSec/IKE session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | IPSec/IKE SKEYSEED:Deriv e To | | IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key | | Flash:Plaintext | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key:Paired With | | IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key | SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (AES and HMAC) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (GCM) | Flash:Plaintext | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key:Paired With | Page 121 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|--------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------| | | SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (AES and HMAC) | | | | | | IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key | | Flash:Plaintext | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key:Paired With | | IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key | SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (AES and HMAC) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (AES and HMAC) | Flash:Plaintext | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key:Paired With | | IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret | SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (GCM) | Flash:Plaintext | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | IPSec/IKE SKEYSEED:Deriv ed To | Page 122 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |-------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (AES and HMAC) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (AES and HMAC) | | | | | | IPSec/IKE SKEYSEED | | DRAM:Plaintext | while Control Panel IPSec/IKE session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | TLS ECDH Shared Secret:Derived From IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret:Derived From | | IPSec/IKE Encryption Key | | DRAM:Plaintext | while Control Panel IPSec/IKE session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | IPSec/IKE SKEYSEED:Deriv ed From | | IPSec/IKE Integrity Key | | DRAM:Plaintext | while Control Panel IPSec/IKE session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | IPSec/IKE SKEYSEED:Deriv ed From | | SNMPv3 Authenticati on Secret | SSPs Input/Outp ut | Flash:Plaintext | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | | Page 123 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | protected by TLS KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (AES and HMAC) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (AES and HMAC) | | | | | | SNMPv3 Encryption Key | | DRAM:Plaintext | while SNMPv3 session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | SNMPv3 Authentication Secret:Derived From SNMPv3 Integrity Key:Used With | | SNMPv3 Integrity Key | | DRAM:Plaintext | while SNMPv3 session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | SNMPv3 Authentication Secret:Derived From SNMPv3 Encryption Key:Used With | | Data Plane Encryption ECDH Private Key | | DRAM:Plaintext | while Data Plane Encryption session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | Data Plane Encryption ECDH Public Key:Paired With | Page 124 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |--------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Data Plane Encryption ECDH Public Key | Module Public Key Output | DRAM:Plaintext | while Data Plane Encryption session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key:Paired With | | Data Plane Encryption ECDH Shared Secret | | DRAM:Plaintext | while Data Plane Encryption session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | Data Plane Encryption ECDH Private Key:Derived From Data Plane Encryption Peer ECDH Public Key:Derived From Data Plane Encryption IKE-SA Session Key:Derived To Data Plane Encryption Child- SA Session Key :Derived To | | Data Plane Encryption Peer ECDH Public Key | Peer Public Key Input | DRAM:Plaintext | while Data Plane Encryption session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | Data Plane Encryption ECDH Private Key:Used With | | Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Private Key | | Flash:Plaintext | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Private Key:Paired With | | Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Public Key | SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (AES and | Flash:Plaintext | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | Data Plane Encryption ECDSA Private Key:Paired With | Page 125 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|--------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------| | | HMAC) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (AES and HMAC) | | | | | | Data Plane Encryption RSA Private Key | | Flash:Plaintext | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | Data Plane Encryption RSA Public Key:Paired With | | Data Plane Encryption RSA Public Key | SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (AES and HMAC) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (AES | Flash:Plaintext | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | Data Plane Encryption RSA Private Key:Paired With | Page 126 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |--------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | and | | | | | | Data Plane Encryption Pre-shared Secret | HMAC) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (AES and HMAC) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (AES and | Flash:Obfuscat ed | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | IPSec/IKE SKEYSEED:Used With IPSec/IKE Encryption Key:Derived to IPSec/IKE Authentication Key:Derived to | | Data Plane Encryption IKE-SA Session Key | | DRAM:Plaintext | while Data Plane Encryption session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | Data Plane Encryption ECDH Shared Secret:Derived From | | Data Plane Encryption Child-SA Session Key | | DRAM:Plaintext | while Data Plane Encryption session is on | Zeroizatio n command Session terminatio n Reboot | Data Plane Encryption ECDH Shared Secret:Derived From | Page 127 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Input - | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|--------------------|----------------------|----------------| | NTP Authenticati on Key | Output SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (AES and HMAC) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (AES and HMAC) | Flash:Plaintext | Until zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | | | OSPFv2 Authenticati on Key | SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by TLS KTS (AES and HMAC) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected | Flash:Plaintext | Until Zeroized | Zeroizatio n command | | Page 128 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|--------------------|----------------|----------------| | | by SSH KTS (GCM) SSPs Input/Outp ut protected by SSH KTS (AES and HMAC) | | | | | Table 18: SSP Table 2 ### 9.5 Transitions - SHA-1: The module includes an implementation of SHA-1 for hashing and digital signature verification. This implementation will be non-Approved for all uses starting January 1, 2031. At this time, the user should move to SHA2, which is available in this module. - FIPS 186-4/186-5: As of February 5, 2024, the CMVP does not accept module submissions that implement DSA or RSA X9.31 in the approved mode, other than for signature verification which is approved for legacy use. This module does not implement DSA or RSA X9.31 for signature generation and therefore is unaffected by the current transition from 186-4 to 186-5. As detailed in section 2.7, the CAVP testing performed on the 186-4 algorithms is mathematically similar to the testing performed on the 186-5 algorithms and therefore this module claims compliance with 186-5. This means that no timeline exists in which any of the implemented algorithms will transition from approved to non-approved. ## 10 Self-Tests ### 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | |-------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------| | Gecko Firmware Bootloader Integrity Test | ECDSA SigVer P-256 with SHA2-256 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Module is in normal state | ECDSA SigVer from ECDSA Cert. #A3366 | | Gecko Firmware Application Integrity Test | ECDSA SigVer P-256 with SHA2-256 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Module is in normal state | ECDSA SigVer from ECDSA Cert. #A3366 | Page 129 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | |-------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------| | CHM6_Zynq Firmware Bootloader Integrity Test | ECDSA SigVer P-521 with SHA2-512 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Module is in normal state | ECDSA SigVer from ECDSA Cert. #A4955 | | DCO_NXP Firmware Bootloader Integrity Test | ECDSA SigVer P-521 with SHA2-512 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Module is in normal state | ECDSA SigVer from ECDSA Cert. #A4955 | | DCO_Zynq Firmware Bootloader Integrity Test | ECDSA SigVer P-521 with SHA2-512 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Module is in normal state | ECDSA SigVer from ECDSA Cert. #A4955 | | XMM4_Intel Firmware Bootloader Integrity Test | ECDSA SigVer P-521 with SHA2-512 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Module is in normal state | ECDSA SigVer from ECDSA Cert. #A4955 | | CHM6_Zynq Firmware Kernel Integrity Test | ECDSA SigVer P-521 with SHA2-512 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Module is in normal state | ECDSA SigVer from ECDSA Cert. #A4952 | | CHM6_Zynq Firmware init script Integrity Test | ECDSA SigVer P-521 with SHA2-512 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Module is in normal state | ECDSA SigVer from ECDSA Cert. #A4948 | | CHM6_Zynq Firmware Application Manifest file Integrity Test | ECDSA SigVer P-521 with SHA2-512 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Module is in normal state | ECDSA SigVer from ECDSA Cert. #A4948 | | CHM6_Zynq Firmware Application Integrity Test | SHA2-512 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Module is in normal state | SHA2-512 from SHA Cert. #A4954 | | DCO_NXP Firmware Kernel Integrity Test | ECDSA SigVer P-521 with SHA2-512 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Module is in normal state | ECDSA from ECDSA Cert. #A4953 | | DCO_NXP Firmware init script Integrity | ECDSA SigVer P-521 with SHA2-512 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Module is in normal state | ECDSA SigVer from ECDSA Cert. #A4949 | | DCO_NXP Firmware Application Manifest file Integrity Test | ECDSA SigVer P-521 with SHA2-512 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Module is in normal state | ECDSA SigVer from ECDSA Cert. #A4949 | | DCO_NXP Firmware Application Integrity Test | SHA2-512 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Module is in normal state | SHA2-512 from SHA Cert. #A4954 | | DCO_Zynq Firmware Kernel Integrity Test | ECDSA SigVer P-521 with SHA2-512 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Module is in normal state | ECDSA SigVer from | Page 130 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | |--------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------| | | | | | | ECDSA Cert. #A4961 | | DCO_Zynq Firmware Application Integrity Test | ECDSA SigVer P-521 with SHA2-512 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Module is in normal state | ECDSA SigVer from ECDSA Cert. #A4960 | | XMM4_Intel Firmware Kernel Integrity Test | ECDSA SigVer P-521 with SHA2-512 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Module is in normal state | ECDSA SigVer from ECDSA Cert. #A4962 | | XMM4_Intel Firmware init script Integrity Test | ECDSA SigVer P-521 with SHA2-512 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Module is in normal state | ECDSA from ECDSA Cert. #A4956 | | XMM4 Intel Firmware Application Manifest file Integrity Test | ECDSA SigVer P-521 with SHA2-512 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Module is in normal state | ECDSA SigVer from ECDSA Cert. #A4956 | | XMM4 Intel Firmware Application Integrity Test | SHA2-512 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Module is in normal state | SHA2-512 from SHA Cert. #A4958 | Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests The module performs the following self-tests, including the pre-operational self-tests and Conditional self-tests. Prior to the module providing any data output via the data output interface, the module performs and passes the pre-operational self-tests. Following the successful pre-operational self-tests, the module executes the Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests (CASTs). If anyone of the self-tests fails, the module transitions into an error state and outputs the error message via the module's status output interface. While the module is in the error state, all data through the data output interface and all cryptographic operations are disabled. The error state can only be cleared by reloading the module. All self-tests must be completed successfully before the module transitions to the operational state. ### 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests | Algorithm or Test | Test Properti es | Test Method | Test Type | Indicat or | Details | Conditio ns | |--------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-----------|---------------| | SHA2-256 KAT (A3366) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A3366) | Curve: P-256 | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | Page 131 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Algorithm or Test | Test Properti es | Test Method | Test Type | Indicat or | Details | Conditio ns | |--------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-----------|---------------| | SHA2-512 KAT (A4955) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4955) | Curve: P-521 | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | SHA2-512 KAT (A4960) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4960) | Curve: P-521 | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | SHA2-512 KAT (A4961) | SHA2- 512 | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4961) | Curve: P-521 | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | SHA2-512 KAT (A4948) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4948) | Curve: P-521 | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | SHA2-512 KAT (A4952) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4952) | Curve: P-521 | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | SHA2-512 KAT (A4949) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4949) | Curve: P-521 | Known Answer | CAST | Module is in | N/A | Power up | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 132 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Algorithm or Test | Test Properti es | Test Method | Test Type | Indicat or | Details | Conditio ns | |-------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|---------------| | | | Test (KAT) | | normal state | | | | SHA2-512 KAT (A4953) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4953) | Curve: P-521 | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | SHA2-512 KAT (A4954) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | AES-CBC Encrypt KAT (A4959) | 128 bits | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | Encryption KAT | Power up | | AES-CBC Decrypt KAT (A4959) | 128 bits | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | Decryption KAT | Power up | | AES-GCM Authenticated Encrypt KAT (A4959) | 256 bits | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | Authenticat ed Encryption KAT | Power up | | AES-GCM Authenticated Decrypt KAT (A4959) | 256 bits | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | Authenticat ed Decryption KAT | Power up | | Counter DRBG Generate/Reseed/Insta ntiate KAT (A4959) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | Generate KAT, Reseed KAT, and Instantiate KAT | Power up | | KDF IKEv2 KAT (A4959) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 KAT (A4959) | Curve: P-521 | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | RSA SigGen (FIPS186- 4) KAT (A4959) | Modulus: 2048 bits | Known Answer | CAST | Module is in | N/A | Power up | Page 133 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Algorithm or Test | Test Properti es | Test Method | Test Type | Indicat or | Details | Conditio ns | |-------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------| | | | Test (KAT) | | normal state | | | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186- 4) KAT (A4959) | Modulus: 2048 bits | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | SHA2-512 KAT (A4959) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT (A4959) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4962) | Curve: P-521 | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | SHA2-512 KAT (A4962) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | AES-CBC Encrypt KAT (A4956) | 128, 192 and 256 bits | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | Encryption KAT | Power up | | AES-CBC Decrypt KAT (A4956) | 128, 192 and 256 bits | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | Decryption KAT | Power up | | AES-CCM Authenticated Encrypt KAT (A4956) | 256 bits | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | Authenticat ed Encryption KAT | Power up | | AES-CCM Authenticated Decrypt KAT (A4956) | 256 bits | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | Authenticat ed Decryption KAT | Power up | | AES-GCM Authenticated Encrypt KAT (A4956) | 256 bits | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | Authenticat ed Encryption KAT | Power up | | AES-GCM Authenticated Decrypt KAT (A4956) | 256 bits | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | Authenticat ed Decryption KAT | Power up | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 134 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Algorithm or Test | Test Properti es | Test Method | Test Type | Indicat or | Details | Conditio ns | |-------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------| | HMAC-SHA-1 KAT (A4956) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT (A4956) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT (A4956) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT (A4956) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4956) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | SHA2-256 KAT (A4957) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT (A4957) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | AES-ECB Encrypt KAT (A4958) | 128 bits | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | Encryption KAT | Power up | | AES-ECB Decrypt KAT (A4958) | 128 bits | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | Decryption KAT | Power up | | AES-GCM Authenticated Encrypt KAT (A4958) | 256 bits | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | Authenticat ed Encryption KAT | Power up | | AES-GCM Authenticated Decrypt KAT (A4958) | 256 bits | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | Authenticat ed Decryption KAT | Power up | | Counter DRBG Generate/Reseed/Insta ntiate KAT (A4958) | N/A | Known Answer | CAST | Module is in | Generate KAT, Reseed | Power up | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 135 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Algorithm or Test | Test Properti es | Test Method | Test Type | Indicat or | Details | Conditio ns | |--------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|---------------| | | | Test (KAT) | | normal state | KAT, and Instantiate KAT | | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4958) | Curve: P-521 | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4958) | Curve: P-521 | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT (A4958) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | KDF SSH KAT (A4958) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | KDF IKEv2 KAT (A4958) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | KDF SNMP KAT (A4958) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 KAT (A4958) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | TLS v1.3 KDF KAT (A4958) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | KAS-ECC-SSC KAT (A4958) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | KAS-ECC- SSC Primitive Z | Power up | | KAS-FFC-SSC KAT (A4958) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | KAS-FFC- SSC Primitive Z | Power up | | PBKDF KAT (A4958) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 136 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Algorithm or Test | Test Properti es | Test Method | Test Type | Indicat or | Details | Conditio ns | |---------------------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------| | RSA SigGen KAT (A4958) | Modulus: 2048 bits | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | RSA SigVer KAT (A4958) | Modulus: 2048 bits | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | SHA-1 KAT (A4958) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | SHA2-512 KAT (A4958) | N/A | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | AES-GCM Authenticated Encrypt KAT (C501) | 256 bits | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | Authenticat ed Encryption KAT | Power up | | AES-GCM Authenticated Decrypt KAT (C501) | 256 bits | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | Module is in normal state | Authenticat ed Decryption KAT | Power up | | Entropy Source Start-up Health Test (RCT) | N/A | RCT | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | Entropy Source Start-up Health Test (APT) | N/A | APT | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | Entropy Source Continuous Health Test (RCT) | N/A | RCT | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | Entropy Source Continuous Health Test (APT) | N/A | APT | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power up | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) PCT (A4958) | Curve: P-256 | Pair-Wise Consisten cy Test (PCT) | PCT | Module is in normal state | N/A | ECDSA Keypair generatio n | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 4) PCT (A4958) | Modulus: 2048 bits | Pair-Wise Consisten | PCT | Module is in | N/A | RSA Keypair | Page 137 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Algorithm or Test | Test Properti es | Test Method | Test Type | Indicat or | Details | Conditio ns | |--------------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-----------|------------------------------| | | | cy Test (PCT) | | normal state | | generatio n | | KAS-ECC-SSC (FIPS186-4) PCT (A4958) | Curve: P-256 | Pair-Wise Consisten cy Test (PCT) | PCT | Module is in normal state | N/A | KAS- ECC Keypair generatio n | | KAS-FFC-SSC (FIPS186-4) PCT (A4958) | MODP- 2048 | Pair-Wise Consisten cy Test (PCT) | PCT | Module is in normal state | N/A | KAS-FFC Keypair generatio n | | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 PCT (A4959) | Curve: P-256 | Pair-Wise Consisten cy Test (PCT) | PCT | Module is in normal state | N/A | ECDSA Keypair generatio n | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) PCT (A4959) | Curve: P-256 | Pair-Wise Consisten cy Test (PCT) | PCT | Module is in normal state | N/A | ECDSA Keypair generatio n | | Firmware Load Test | Curve: P-521 | ECDSA SigVer | SW/F W Load | Module is in normal state | N/A | Firmware Load Test | Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests The module performs on-demand self-tests initiated by the operator, by powering off and powering the module back on. The full suite of self-tests is then executed. The same procedure may be employed by the operator to perform periodic self-tests. ### 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |----------------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|-----------|-------------------| | Gecko Firmware Bootloader Integrity Test | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On-demand | Module Reboot | | Gecko Firmware Application Integrity Test | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On-demand | Module Reboot | | CHM6_Zynq Firmware Bootloader Integrity Test | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On-demand | Module Reboot | | DCO_NXP Firmware | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On-demand | Module Reboot | Page 138 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |-------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|-----------|-------------------| | Bootloader Integrity Test | | | | | | DCO_Zynq Firmware Bootloader Integrity Test | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On-demand | Module Reboot | | XMM4_Intel Firmware Bootloader Integrity Test | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On-demand | Module Reboot | | CHM6_Zynq Firmware Kernel Integrity Test | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On-demand | Module Reboot | | CHM6_Zynq Firmware init script Integrity Test | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On-demand | Module Reboot | | CHM6_Zynq Firmware Application Manifest file Integrity Test | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On-demand | Module Reboot | | CHM6_Zynq Firmware Application Integrity Test | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On-demand | Module Reboot | | DCO_NXP Firmware Kernel Integrity Test | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On-demand | Module Reboot | | DCO_NXP Firmware init script Integrity | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On-demand | Module Reboot | | DCO_NXP Firmware Application Manifest file | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On-demand | Module Reboot | | Integrity Test DCO_NXP Firmware Application Integrity Test | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On-demand | Module Reboot | | DCO_Zynq Firmware Kernel Integrity Test | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On-demand | Module Reboot | | DCO_Zynq Firmware Application Integrity Test | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On-demand | Module Reboot | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 139 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |--------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|-----------|-------------------| | XMM4_Intel Firmware Kernel Integrity Test | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On-demand | Module Reboot | | XMM4_Intel Firmware init script Integrity Test | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On-demand | Module Reboot | | XMM4 Intel Firmware Application Manifest file Integrity Test | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On-demand | Module Reboot | | XMM4 Intel Firmware Application Integrity Test | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On-demand | Module Reboot | Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |--------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------|-----------|-------------------| | SHA2-256 KAT (A3366) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A3366) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | SHA2-512 KAT (A4955) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4955) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | SHA2-512 KAT (A4960) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4960) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | SHA2-512 KAT (A4961) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4961) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | SHA2-512 KAT (A4948) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 140 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------|-----------|-------------------| | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4948) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | SHA2-512 KAT (A4952) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4952) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | SHA2-512 KAT (A4949) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4949) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | SHA2-512 KAT (A4953) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4953) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | SHA2-512 KAT (A4954) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | AES-CBC Encrypt KAT (A4959) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | AES-CBC Decrypt KAT (A4959) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | AES-GCM Authenticated Encrypt KAT (A4959) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | AES-GCM Authenticated Decrypt KAT (A4959) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | Counter DRBG Generate/Reseed/Instantiate KAT (A4959) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | KDF IKEv2 KAT (A4959) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 KAT (A4959) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4959) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | Page 141 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |-------------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------|-----------|-------------------| | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4959) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | SHA2-512 KAT (A4959) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT (A4959) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4962) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | SHA2-512 KAT (A4962) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | AES-CBC Encrypt KAT (A4956) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | AES-CBC Decrypt KAT (A4956) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | AES-CCM Authenticated Encrypt KAT (A4956) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | AES-CCM Authenticated Decrypt KAT (A4956) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | AES-GCM Authenticated Encrypt KAT (A4956) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | AES-GCM Authenticated Decrypt KAT (A4956) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | HMAC-SHA-1 KAT (A4956) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT (A4956) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT (A4956) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT (A4956) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4956) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | Page 142 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------|-----------|-------------------| | SHA2-256 KAT (A4957) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT (A4957) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | AES-ECB Encrypt KAT (A4958) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | AES-ECB Decrypt KAT (A4958) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | AES-GCM Authenticated Encrypt KAT (A4958) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | AES-GCM Authenticated Decrypt KAT (A4958) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | Counter DRBG Generate/Reseed/Instantiate KAT (A4958) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4958) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4958) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT (A4958) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | KDF SSH KAT (A4958) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | KDF IKEv2 KAT (A4958) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | KDF SNMP KAT (A4958) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 KAT (A4958) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | TLS v1.3 KDF KAT (A4958) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | KAS-ECC-SSC KAT (A4958) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | Page 143 of 147 © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |---------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------|-----------|-------------------| | KAS-FFC-SSC KAT (A4958) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | PBKDF KAT (A4958) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | RSA SigGen KAT (A4958) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | RSA SigVer KAT (A4958) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | SHA-1 KAT (A4958) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | SHA2-512 KAT (A4958) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | AES-GCM Authenticated Encrypt KAT (C501) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | AES-GCM Authenticated Decrypt KAT (C501) | Known Answer Test (KAT) | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | Entropy Source Start-up Health Test (RCT) | RCT | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | Entropy Source Start-up Health Test (APT) | APT | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | Entropy Source Continuous Health Test (RCT) | RCT | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | Entropy Source Continuous Health Test (APT) | APT | CAST | On-demand | Module Reboot | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 4) PCT (A4958) | Pair-Wise Consistency Test (PCT) | PCT | On-demand | Module Reboot | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) PCT (A4958) | Pair-Wise Consistency Test (PCT) | PCT | On-demand | Module Reboot | | KAS-ECC-SSC (FIPS186-4) PCT (A4958) | Pair-Wise Consistency Test (PCT) | PCT | On-demand | Module Reboot | | KAS-FFC-SSC (FIPS186-4) PCT (A4958) | Pair-Wise Consistency Test (PCT) | PCT | On-demand | Module Reboot | | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 PCT (A4959) | Pair-Wise Consistency Test (PCT) | PCT | On-demand | Module Reboot | © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 144 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------|-----------|-------------------| | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 4) PCT (A4959) | Pair-Wise Consistency Test (PCT) | PCT | On-demand | Module Reboot | | Firmware Load Test | ECDSA SigVer | SW/FW Load | On-demand | Module Reboot | ### 10.4 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests On demand and periodic self-tests are performed by powering off the module and powering it on again. This service performs the same cryptographic algorithm tests executed during pre-operational self-tests and CASTs. During the execution of the periodic and on-demand self-tests, crypto services are not available and no data output or input is possible. ### 10.5 Error States Table 23: Error States | Name | Description | Conditions | Recovery Method | Indicator | |-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------| | Error State | If self-test tests fail, the module is put into an error state | Self-tests failure | Reboot the module | System Halt | If any of the above-mentioned self-tests fail, the module reports the error and enters the Error state. In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited. The only method to recover from the error state is to reboot the module and perform the selftests, including the pre-operational firmware integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The module will only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre-operational firmware integrity test and the conditional CASTs. ## 11 Life-Cycle Assurance ### 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures The module meets all the Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-3. Follow the secure operations provided below to place the module in approved mode. Operating this module without maintaining the following settings would put module operated in a non-compliance state. ##### Secure Operation The Security Admin (SA) must configure and enforce the following initialization steps. Step 1. Strictly follow up the steps in section Physical Security to place the Opacity Shield and Tamper Evident Labels on the module. © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 145 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. Step 2. Ensure that the firmware version R6.2.2 or R6.2.3 is running on the module. To verify the firmware version, the Security Admin (SA) shall use the following command. >show sw-management software-load-active swload-version swload-label software-load-active swload-version 'R6.2.2' >show sw-management software-load-active swload-version swload-label software-load-active swload-version 'R6.2.3' Step 3. Enable approved mode. Execute the following steps to enable approved mode on the module: - To enable approved mode via CLI: Execute the following command from the CLI interface: 'fips mode-enable' A confirmation message is displayed. Enter y to proceed with the operation. This operation will cold reboot the system, delete the entire system configuration, including networking details, and may leave the system unreachable until the reboot is complete. - To enable approved mode via WebGUI: Navigate to Security > FIPS tab . Click 'FIPS Control'. A pop-up window is displayed, and select mode-enable against Action field and click 'Submit'. A success message is displayed Step 4. Create the User account and privileges for other roles defined in the Security Policy. Step 5. Ensuring that any of the deleted/deprecated algorithms by NIST SP800-140Cr2 and/or NIST SP800-131Ar2 are disabled as applicable in the FIPS certified version of the firmware. or © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 146 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice. ### 11.2 Administrator Guidance No specific Administrator guidance. ### 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance No specific Non-Administrator guidance. ## 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A for this module. © 2021-2025 Nokia Corporation. Page 147 of 147 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.