Copyright © 2020 by Ceragon Networks Ltd. All rights reserved.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security
Policy:
FibeAir® IP-20C
FibeAir® IP-20C-HP
FibeAir® IP-20C 2E2SX
FibeAir® IP-20S
FibeAir® IP-20N
FibeAir® IP-20A
FibeAir® IP-20G
FibeAir® IP-20GX
Firmware: CeraOS 10.9.6b74
Hardware:
▪ IP-20N and IP-20A with components:
▪ IP-20-TCC-B-MC+SD-AF: 24-T009-1|A, IP-20-TCC-B-MC+SD-AF: 24-T009-
1|B, IP-20-TCC-B-MC+SD-AF: 24-T009-1|C
▪ IP-20-TCC-B2+SD-AF: 24-T010-1|A, IP-20-TCC-B2+SD-AF: 24-T010-1|B
▪ IP-20-TCC-B2-XG-MC+SD-AF: 24-T011-1|A, IP-20-TCC-B2-XG-MC+SD-
AF: 24-T011-1|B, IP-20-TCC-B2-XG-MC+SD-AF: 24-T011-1|C
▪ IP-20-RMC-B-AF: 24-R010-0|A, IP-20-RMC-B-AF: 24-R010-1|A, IP-20-
RMC-B-AF: 24-R010-1|B
▪ IP-20GX with components:
▪ IP-20-RMC-B-AF: 24-R010-0|A, IP-20-RMC-B-AF: 24-R010-1|A, IP-20-
RMC-B-AF: 24-R010-1|B
▪ IP-20C, IP-20C-HP, IP-20C 2E2SX, IP-20S, IP-20G
Ceragon Networks, Ltd.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
v1.1
Prepared By:
Acumen Security
2400 Research Boulevard
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy v1.3
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Notice
This document contains information that is proprietary to Ceragon Networks Ltd. No part of this publication
may be reproduced, modified, or distributed without prior written authorization of Ceragon Networks Ltd.
This document is provided as is, without warranty of any kind.
Trademarks
Ceragon Networks®, FibeAir® and CeraView® are trademarks of Ceragon Networks Ltd., registered in the
United States and other countries.
Ceragon® is a trademark of Ceragon Networks Ltd., registered in various countries.
CeraMap™, PolyView™, EncryptAir™, ConfigAir™, CeraMon™, EtherAir™, CeraBuild™, CeraWeb™, and
QuickAir™, are trademarks of Ceragon Networks Ltd.
Other names mentioned in this publication are owned by their respective holders.
Statement of Conditions
The information contained in this document is subject to change without notice. Ceragon Networks Ltd. shall
not be liable for errors contained herein or for incidental or consequential damage in connection with the
furnishing, performance, or use of this document or equipment supplied with it.
Open Source Statement
The Product may use open source software, among them O/S software released under the GPL or GPL alike
license ("Open Source License"). Inasmuch that such software is being used, it is released under the Open
Source License, accordingly. The complete list of the software being used in this product including their
respective license and the aforementioned public available changes is accessible at:
Network element site:
ftp://ne-open-source.license-system.com
NMS site:
ftp://nms-open-source.license-system.com/
Information to User
Any changes or modifications of equipment not expressly approved by the manufacturer could void the user’s
authority to operate the equipment and the warranty for such equipment.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy v1.3
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 7
1.1 Purpose...........................................................................................................................7
1.2 Document Organization ..................................................................................................7
1.3 Notices ............................................................................................................................8
2. FibeAir® IP-20C, FibeAir® IP-20C-HP, FibeAir® IP-20C 2E2SX, FibeAir® IP-20S,
FibeAir® IP-20N, FibeAir® IP-20A, FibeAir® IP-20G and FibeAir® IP-20GX . 9
2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification ...............................................................................9
2.1.1 Cryptographic Boundary ...............................................................................................10
2.1.2 Modes of Operation ......................................................................................................14
2.2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces .................................................................17
2.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication .............................................................................26
2.3.1 Authorized Roles...........................................................................................................26
2.3.2 Authentication Mechanisms..........................................................................................26
2.3.3 Services ........................................................................................................................27
2.4 Physical Security...........................................................................................................31
2.5 Operational Environment ..............................................................................................31
2.6 Cryptographic Key Management ..................................................................................32
2.6.1 Key Generation.............................................................................................................35
2.6.2 Key Entry/Output...........................................................................................................35
2.6.3 Zeroization Procedures.................................................................................................35
2.7 Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) ..................35
2.8 Self-Tests......................................................................................................................35
2.8.1 Power-On Self-Tests.....................................................................................................35
2.8.2 Conditional Self-Tests...................................................................................................36
2.8.3 Self-Tests Error Handling .............................................................................................36
2.9 Mitigation Of Other Attacks...........................................................................................36
3. Secure Operation............................................................................................ 37
3.1 Installation.....................................................................................................................37
3.2 Initialization ...................................................................................................................44
3.3 Management .................................................................................................................45
3.3.1 SSH Usage ...................................................................................................................45
3.3.2 TLS Usage ....................................................................................................................46
3.4 Additional Information ...................................................................................................46
4. Appendix A: Acronyms.................................................................................. 47
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Table of Figures
Figure 1 - FibeAir® IP-20C........................................................................................................10
Figure 2 - FibeAir® IP-20C-HP..................................................................................................10
Figure 3 - FibeAir® IP-20C 2E2SX............................................................................................11
Figure 4 - FibeAir® IP-20S........................................................................................................11
Figure 5 - FibeAir® IP-20N and FibeAir® IP-20A ......................................................................12
Figure 6 - FibeAir® IP-20G .......................................................................................................12
Figure 7 - FibeAir® IP-20GX .....................................................................................................12
Figure 8 - IP-20-TCC-B-MC+SD-AF Interfaces .........................................................................17
Figure 9 - IP-20-TCC-B2+SD-AF and IP-20-TCC-B2-XG-MC+SD-AF Interfaces ......................17
Figure 10 - IP-20-RMC-B-AF Interfaces ....................................................................................18
Figure 11 - IP-20G Interfaces....................................................................................................19
Figure 12 - IP-20GX Interfaces .................................................................................................20
Figure 13 - IP-20C Interfaces (Front and Back).........................................................................21
Figure 14 - IP-20S Interfaces (Front and Back).........................................................................21
Figure 15 - IP-20C and IP-20S Interfaces Side .........................................................................22
Figure 16 - IP-20C 2E2SX Interfaces (Front and Back).............................................................23
Figure 17 - IP-20C 2E2SX Interfaces Side................................................................................23
Figure 18 - IP-20C-HP Interfaces (Front and Back)...................................................................24
Figure 19 - IP-20C-HP Interfaces Side......................................................................................25
Figure 20 - TEL Placement for IP-20C and IP-20S Models (1 of 5) ...........................................37
Figure 21 - TEL Placement for IP-20C and IP-20S Models (2 of 5) ...........................................38
Figure 22 - TEL Placement for IP-20C and IP-20S Models (3 of 5) ...........................................38
Figure 23 - TEL Placement for IP-20C and IP-20S Models (4 of 5) ...........................................38
Figure 24 - TEL Placement for IP-20C and IP-20S Models (5 of 5) ...........................................39
Figure 25 - TEL Placement for IP-20C-HP (1 of 5) ....................................................................39
Figure 26 - TEL Placement for IP-20C-HP (2 of 5) ....................................................................39
Figure 27 - TEL Placement for IP-20C-HP (3 of 5) ....................................................................40
Figure 28 - TEL Placement for IP-20C-HP (4 of 5) ....................................................................40
Figure 29 - TEL Placement for IP-20C-HP (5 if 5) .....................................................................40
Figure 30 - TEL Placement for IP-20G (1 of 3)..........................................................................41
Figure 31 - TEL Placement for IP-20G (2 of 3)..........................................................................41
Figure 32 - TEL Placement for IP-20G (3 of 3)..........................................................................41
Figure 33 - TEL Placement for IP-20GX (1 of 5)........................................................................42
Figure 34 - TEL Placement for IP-20GX (2 of 5)........................................................................42
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Figure 35 - TEL Placement for IP-20GX (3 of 5)........................................................................42
Figure 36 - TEL Placement for IP-20GX (4 of 5)........................................................................42
Figure 37 - TEL Placement for IP-20GX (5 of 5)........................................................................43
Figure 38 - TEL Placement for IP-20N and IP-20A (1 of 4) .......................................................43
Figure 39 - TEL Placement for IP-20N and IP-20A (2 of 4) .......................................................43
Figure 40 - TEL Placement for IP-20N and IP-20A (3 of 4) .......................................................44
Figure 41 - TEL Placement for IP-20N and IP-20A (4 of 4) .......................................................44
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Table of Tables
Table 1 - Security Levels............................................................................................................ 9
Table 2 - Tested Configurations................................................................................................13
Table 3 - Supported Algorithms.................................................................................................14
Table 4 - Module Interface Mapping for IP-20-TCC-B-MC+SD-AF (IP-20N and IP-20A) ...........17
Table 5 - Module Interface Mapping for IP-20-TCC-B2+SD-AF and IP-20-TCC-B2-XG-MC+SD-
AF (IP-20N and IP-20A)............................................................................................................18
Table 6 - Module Interface Mapping for IP-20-RMC-B-AF (IP-20N and IP-20A)........................18
Table 7 - Module Interface Mapping for IP-20G.........................................................................19
Table 8 - Module Interface Mapping for IP-20GX ......................................................................20
Table 9 - Module Interface Mapping for IP-20C and IP-20S......................................................22
Table 10 - Module Interface Mapping for IP-20C 2E2SX...........................................................23
Table 11 - Module Interface Mapping for IP-20C-HP.................................................................25
Table 12 - Authentication Mechanism Details ...........................................................................26
Table 13 - Services, Roles and Key/CSP access......................................................................27
Table 14 – Non-Security Relevant Services..............................................................................30
Table 15 - Details of Cryptographic Keys and CSPs .................................................................32
Table 16 - Acronyms.................................................................................................................47
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1. Introduction
This is a non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for Ceragon Networks, Ltd and the
following Ceragon products: FibeAir® IP-20C, FibeAir® IP-20C-HP, FibeAir® IP-20C
2E2SX, FibeAir® IP-20S, FibeAir® IP-20N, FibeAir® IP-20A, FibeAir® IP-20G and
FibeAir® IP-20GX . Below are the details of the certified products:
Hardware Version #:
▪ IP-20N and IP-20A with components:
- IP-20-TCC-B-MC+SD-AF: 24-T009-1|A, IP-20-TCC-B-MC+SD-AF: 24-T009-1|B, IP-
20-TCC-B-MC+SD-AF: 24-T009-1|C
- IP-20-TCC-B2+SD-AF: 24-T010-1|A, IP-20-TCC-B2+SD-AF: 24-T010-1|B
- IP-20-TCC-B2-XG-MC+SD-AF: 24-T011-1|A, IP-20-TCC-B2-XG-MC+SD-AF: 24-
T011-1|B, IP-20-TCC-B2-XG-MC+SD-AF: 24-T011-1|C
- IP-20-RMC-B-AF: 24-R010-0|A, IP-20-RMC-B-AF: 24-R010-1|A, IP-20-RMC-B-AF:
24-R010-1|B
▪ IP-20GX with components:
- IP-20-RMC-B-AF: 24-R010-0|A, IP-20-RMC-B-AF: 24-R010-1|A, IP-20-RMC-B-AF:
24-R010-1|B
▪ IP-20C, IP-20C-HP, IP-20C 2E2SX, IP-20S, IP-20G
Firmware Version #: CeraOS 10.9.6b74
FIPS 140-2 Security Level: 2
1.1 Purpose
This document was prepared as part of the Federal Information Processing Standard
(FIPS) 140-2 validation process. The document describes how FibeAir® IP-20C, FibeAir®
IP-20C-HP, FibeAir® IP-20C 2E2SX, FibeAir® IP-20S, FibeAir® IP-20N, FibeAir® IP-20A,
FibeAir® IP-20G and FibeAir® IP-20GX meet the security requirements of FIPS 140-2. It
also provides instructions to individuals and organizations on how to deploy the product
in a secure FIPS-approved mode of operation. The target audience of this document is
anyone who wishes to use or integrate any of these products into a solution that is meant
to comply with FIPS 140-2 requirements.
1.2 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In
addition to this document, the Submission Package contains:
• Vendor Evidence document
• Finite State Machine
• Other supporting documentation as additional references
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This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were produced
by Acumen Security, under contract to Ceragon Networks, Ltd. With the exception of this
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package is proprietary to
Ceragon Networks and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements.
1.3 Notices
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without
modification.
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2. FibeAir® IP-20C, FibeAir® IP-20C-HP, FibeAir® IP-20C
2E2SX, FibeAir® IP-20S, FibeAir® IP-20N, FibeAir® IP-
20A, FibeAir® IP-20G and FibeAir® IP-20GX
FibeAir® IP-20C, FibeAir® IP-20C-HP, FibeAir® IP-20C 2E2SX, FibeAir® IP-20S,
FibeAir® IP-20N, FibeAir® IP-20A, FibeAir® IP-20G, FibeAir® IP-20GX (the module) are
multi-chip standalone modules validated at FIPS 140-2 Security Level 2. Specifically the
modules meet that following security levels for individual sections in FIPS 140-2
standard:
Table 1 - Security Levels
# Section Title Security Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key Management 2
8 EMI/EMC 3
9 Self-Tests 2
10 Design Assurances 3
11 Mitigation Of Other Attacks N/A
2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification
The FibeAir® IP-20 series is a service-centric microwave platform for HetNet hauling. The
platform includes a full complement of wireless products that provide innovative, market-
leading backhaul and fronthaul solutions.
Powered by a software-defined engine and sharing a common operating system, CeraOS,
the IP-20 platform, delivers ultra-high capacities while supporting any radio transmission
technology, any network topology, and any deployment configuration.
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2.1.1 Cryptographic Boundary
The cryptographic boundary for the modules is defined as encompassing the "top,"
"front," "left," "right," and "bottom" surfaces of the case and all portions of the "backplane"
of the case. The following figures provide a physical depiction of the cryptographic
modules:
Figure 1 - FibeAir® IP-20C
Figure 2 - FibeAir® IP-20C-HP
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Figure 3 - FibeAir® IP-20C 2E2SX
Figure 4 - FibeAir® IP-20S
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Figure 5 - FibeAir® IP-20N and FibeAir® IP-20A
Figure 6 - FibeAir® IP-20G
Figure 7 - FibeAir® IP-20GX
The IP-20G, IP-20C, IP-20C 2E2SX, IP-20C-HP and IP-20S are fixed configuration.
The IP-20GX has slots for Radio Modem Card RNC-B (IP-20-RMC-B-AF). The IP-20-RMC-
B-AF provides the modem interface between the Indoor Unit (IDU) and the Radio
Frequency Unit (RFU).
Finally, the IP-20N and IP-20A have slots to insert the following cards:
• Traffic and Control Card (TCC): The Traffic Control Card (TCC) provides the control
functionality for the IP-20N and IP-20A units. It also provides Ethernet management
and traffic interfaces. There are three variants of this card:
IP-20-TCC-B2-XG-MC+SD-AF: Required for Multi-Carrier ABC configurations.
Provides 2 x FE Ethernet management interfaces, 2 x GbE optical interfaces, 2 x
GbE electrical interfaces, and 2 x dual mode electrical or cascading interfaces.
IP-20-TCC-B-MC+SD-AF: Required for Multi-Carrier ABC configurations. Provides
2 x FE Ethernet management interfaces and 2 x GbE combo interfaces (electrical or
optical) for Ethernet traffic.
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IP-20-TCC-B2+SD-AF: Provides 2 x FE Ethernet management interfaces, 2 x GbE
optical interfaces, 2 x GbE electrical interfaces, and 2 x dual mode electrical or
cascading interfaces.
• Radio Modem Card-B (IP-20-RMC-B-AF): The Radio Modem Card (RMC) provides the
modem interface between the Indoor Unit (IDU) and the Radio Frequency Unit (RFU).
Additionally, the following cards can be configured on IP-20GX, IP-20N, and IP-20A
modules. These cards provide port density but do not contain any security-relevant
functionality:
• Ethernet/Optical Line Interface Card (E/XLIC)
• STM-1/OC3
• STM-1 RST
• E1/T1
• 10Gb Ethernet/Optical Line Interface Card (LIC-X-E10)
• Radio Interface Card (RIC-D)
The models included in this FIPS validation have been tested in the following
configurations:
Table 2 - Tested Configurations
Model Cards
IP-20N • Single or dual TCC
• Dual IP-20-RMC-B-AF
• Dual Power supplies
IP-20A • Single or dual TCC
• Dual IP-20-RMC-B-AF
• Dual Power supplies
IP-20G Fixed configuration
IP-20GX Dual IP-20-RMC-B-AF
IP-20C Fixed configuration
IP-20C-HP Fixed configuration
IP-20C 2E2SX Fixed configuration
IP-20S Fixed configuration
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2.1.2 Modes of Operation
The modules have a single mode of operation which is the FIPS-Approved mode (when
configured as per the instructions in Section 3: Secure Operation). Any usage of the Non-
FIPS Approved services described in Table 13 would result in non-Approved operation.
The following table lists the FIPS approved algorithms supported by the modules:
Table 3 - Supported Algorithms
1
GCM IV generation tested in accordance with IG A.5, scenario 1 (TLS). The IV is generated only for use with GCM
encryption within the TLSv1.2 protocol. The ciphersuites supported by the module are identified in section
3.3.2 of this document.
Cryptographic Algorithm CAVP
Cert. #
Usage
Firmware Cryptographic Implementation
AES
CBC ( e/d; 128, 256 ); ECB ( e/d; 128 ); CTR ( int only; 256 ); CFB128 (
e/d; 128 )
GCM1
( e/d; 128, 256; 192 tested but not used )
KW ( AE , AD , AES-256 , INV , 128 , 256 , 192 , 320 , 4096 )
3865 Used for
control/management
plane
encryption/decryption
SHS
SHA-1 (BYTE-only)
SHA-224 (BYTE-only, tested but not used)
SHA-256 (BYTE-only)
SHA-384 (BYTE-only)
SHA-512 (BYTE-only)
3185 Used for
control/management
plane message digests.
SHA-1 is permitted
within SSH and IPsec
protocols, and legacy
signature verification
only.
HMAC
HMAC-SHA1 (Key Size Ranges Tested: KS<BS KS=BS KS>BS)
HMAC-SHA256 (Key Size Ranges Tested: KS<BS KS=BS KS>BS)
HMAC-SHA384 (Key Size Ranges Tested: KS<BS KS=BS KS>BS)
HMAC-SHA512 (Key Size Ranges Tested: KS<BS KS=BS KS>BS)
2509 Used for
control/management
plane message
authentication
SP 800-90A DRBG (HMAC-SHA-256)
HMAC_Based DRBG: Prediction Resistance Tested: Enabled and Not
Enabled ( SHA-256 )
1099 Used for
control/management
plane random bit
generation
FIPS 186-4 RSA Key Generation, Signature Generation and Signature
Verification
186-4KEY(gen): FIPS186-4_Random_e
PGM(ProbPrimeCondition): 2048 PPTT:( C.3 )
ALG[ANSIX9.31] Sig(Gen): (2048 SHA( 256 , 384 , 512 )) (3072 SHA(
256 , 384 , 512 ))
1973 Used for
control/management
plane key generation,
signature generation,
and signature verification
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2
Note that CAVP and CMVP does not review or test the SSH, SNMPv3, IKEv1 and TLS protocols
3
The management plane implements KTS using both AES (CBC and GCM modes) and optionally HMAC. If
negotiating a GCM-based TLS cipher suite, then only GCM is used for the KTS function.
4
In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic KeyGeneration (CKG) as
per SP800-133 (vendor affirmed). The resulting generated symmetric keys and the seed used in the asymmetric key
generation are the unmodified output from an NIST SP 800-90A DRBG.
5
Vendor affirmed in accordance with SP 800-56Ar3 as per IG D.1rev3, D.3, and D.8 X1. Safe primes are
implemented in accordance with RFC 4492, 7919, and 3526.
Sig(Ver): (1024 SHA( 1 , 256 , 384 , 512 )) (2048 SHA( 1 , 256 , 384 , 512
)) (3072 SHA( 1 , 256 , 384 , 512 ))
ALG[RSASSA-PKCS1_V1_5] SIG(gen) (2048 SHA( 224 , 256 , 384 , 512
)) (3072 SHA( 224 , 256 , 384 , 512 ))
SIG(Ver) (1024 SHA( 1 , 224 , 256 , 384 )) (2048 SHA( 1 , 224 , 256 , 384
, 512 )) (3072 SHA( 1 , 224 , 256 , 384 , 512 ))
[RSASSA-PSS]: Sig(Gen): (2048 SHA( 224 , 256 , 384 , 512 )) (3072
SHA( 224 , 256 , 384 , 512 ))
Sig(Ver): (1024 SHA( 1 SaltLen( 128 ) , 224 SaltLen( 128 ) , 256 SaltLen(
128 ) , 384 SaltLen( 128 ) , 512 SaltLen( 128 ) )) (2048 SHA( 1 , 224 , 256
, 384 , 512 )) (3072 SHA( 1 SaltLen( 128 ) , 224 SaltLen( 128 ) , 256
SaltLen( 128 ) , 384 SaltLen( 128 ) , 512 SaltLen( 128 ) ))
CVL (SNMPv3, SSH and TLS)2
TLSv1.2 (SHA-256)
SSH (SHA-1, 256)
SNMP (SHA-1)
742 Used for key derivation
within management
protocols
CVL (IKEv1 SHA-256; tested but not used on Freescale P1012 based
platforms)
C1199 Used for key derivation
within IPsec
KTS (key establishment methodology provides 256 bits of encryption
strength)
AES: 3865 Used for key transport
on the data plane
KTS3
(key establishment methodology provides 128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength)
AES: 3865
HMAC:
2509
User for key transport on
the management plane
CKG4
(vendor affirmed) N/A Symmetric key and
asymmetric seed
generation
KAS-SSC5
(vendor affirmed)
•dhEphem (2048- and 3072-bit safe primes)
•Ephemeral Unified (P-256 curve)
N/A Diffie-Hellman and
Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman Key Agreement
Kernel Cryptographic Implementation
AES-CBC ( e/d; 256; tested but not used on Freescale P1012 based
platforms )
C1200 Used for data
encryption/decryption
within IPsec
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Note that there are algorithms, modes, and keys that have been CAVS tested but not
implemented by the module. Only the algorithms, modes, and keys shown in this table are
implemented by the module.
Additionally the module implements the following non-Approved algorithms that are
allowed for use with FIPS-approved services:
- RSA (key unwrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of
encryption strength)6
- Non-approved NDRNG for seeding the DRBG. The NDRNG generates a minimum of
256 bits of entropy for use in key generation.
The module supports the following algorithms in a non-Approved mode of operation.
- MD5
When configured to operate in the FIPS-Approved mode of operation as described in
Section 3, the module does not provide any non-Approved algorithms. Usage of the Non-
FIPS Approved services described in Table 13 will result in the module operating in a
non-Approved mode.
6
The module supports PKCS#1-v1.5 padding
HMAC-SHA-256 (Key Size Ranges Tested: KS<BS; tested but not used
on Freescale P1012 based platforms)
C1200 Used for message
authentication within
IPsec
SHA-256 (BYTE-only; tested but not used on Freescale P1012 based
platforms)
C1200 Used for message
digests within IPsec
Hardware Cryptographic Implementation
AES-OFB ( e/d; 256 ) 3867 Used for data plane
encryption/decryption
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2.2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
The modules provide a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the
physical interfaces provided by the module are mapped to four FIPS 140-2-defined logical
interfaces: data input, data output, control input, and status output. The logical interfaces
and their mapping are described in the following tables:
Figure 8 - IP-20-TCC-B-MC+SD-AF Interfaces
Table 4 - Module Interface Mapping for IP-20-TCC-B-MC+SD-AF (IP-20N and IP-20A)
FIPS Interface Physical Interface
Data Input (2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces or GbE Optical Interfaces
Data Output (2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces or GbE Optical Interfaces
Control Input (1x) Synchronization Interface
(1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface
(2x) FE Management Interfaces
(2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces or GbE Optical Interfaces
Status Output (1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface
(2x) FE Management Interfaces
(1x) ACT LED
(1x) DB9 External Alarms
(2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces or GbE Optical Interfaces
Figure 9 - IP-20-TCC-B2+SD-AF and IP-20-TCC-B2-XG-MC+SD-AF Interfaces
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy v1.3
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Table 5 - Module Interface Mapping for IP-20-TCC-B2+SD-AF and IP-20-TCC-B2-XG-MC+SD-
AF (IP-20N and IP-20A)
FIPS Interface Physical Interface
Data Input (2x) GbE Optical Interfaces
(2x) Dual Mode GbE Electrical or Cascading
(2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces
Data Output (2x) GbE Optical Interfaces
(2x) Dual Mode GbE Electrical or Cascading
(2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces
Control Input (1x) Synchronization Interface
(1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface
(2x) FE Management Interfaces
Status Output (1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface
(2x) FE Management Interfaces
(1x) ACT LED
(1x) DB9 External Alarms
Figure 10 - IP-20-RMC-B-AF Interfaces
Table 6 - Module Interface Mapping for IP-20-RMC-B-AF (IP-20N and IP-20A)
FIPS Interface Physical Interface
Data Input (1x) TNC RFU Interface
Data Output (1x) TNC RFU Interface
Control Input (1x) TNC RFU Interface
Status Output (1x) ACT LED
(1x) Link LED
(1x) RFU LED
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Figure 11 - IP-20G Interfaces
Table 7 - Module Interface Mapping for IP-20G
FIPS Interface Physical Interface
Data Input (2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces
(2x) Dual Mode GbE Electrical or Cascading
(2x) GbE Optical Interfaces
(16x) E1/DS1s
Data Output (2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces
(2x) Dual Mode GbE Electrical or Cascading
(2x) GbE Optical Interfaces
(2x) TNC Radio Interfaces
Control Input (1x) Sync In/Out RJ-45 Interface
(1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface
(2x) FE Management Interfaces
Status Output (1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface
(2x) FE Management Interfaces
(1x) DB9 External Alarms
LEDs
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Figure 12 - IP-20GX Interfaces
Table 8 - Module Interface Mapping for IP-20GX
FIPS Interface Physical Interface
Data Input (2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces
(2x) Dual Mode GbE Electrical or Cascading
(2x) GbE Optical Interfaces
(16x) E1/DS1s
(2x) IP-20-RMC-B-AF (optional)
Data Output (2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces
(2x) Dual Mode GbE Electrical or Cascading
(2x) GbE Optical Interfaces
(2x) TNC Radio Interfaces
(2x) IP-20-RMC-B-AF (optional)
Control Input (1x) Sync In/Out RJ-45 Interface
(1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface
(2x) FE Management Interfaces
Status Output (1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface
(2x) FE Management Interfaces
(1x) DB9 External Alarms
LEDs
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Figure 13 - IP-20C Interfaces (Front and Back)
Figure 14 - IP-20S Interfaces (Front and Back)
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Figure 15 - IP-20C and IP-20S Interfaces Side
Table 9 - Module Interface Mapping for IP-20C and IP-20S
FIPS Interface Physical Interface
Data Input (1x) RJ-45 Data Port (PoE)
(2x) Data port (Electrical or Optical)
(2x) Antenna Ports (Only 1 port on IP-
20S)
Data Output (1x) RJ-45 Data Port (PoE)
(2x) Data port (Electrical or Optical)
(2x) Antenna Ports (Only 1 port on IP-
20S)
Control Input (1x) Source Sharing (only on IP-20C)
(1x) RJ-45 Management Interface
Status Output (1x) RSL Indication
(1x) RJ-45 Management Interface
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Figure 16 - IP-20C 2E2SX Interfaces (Front and Back)
Figure 17 - IP-20C 2E2SX Interfaces Side
Table 10 - Module Interface Mapping for IP-20C 2E2SX
FIPS Interface Physical Interface
Data Input (2x) Data port (Electrical) - via a single
DisplayPort connector (one with PoE)
(2x) Data port (Electrical or Optical)
(2x) Antenna Ports
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FIPS Interface Physical Interface
Data Output (2x) Data port (Electrical) - via a single
DisplayPort connector (one with PoE)
(2x) Data port (Electrical or Optical)
(2x) Antenna Ports
Control Input (1x) Source Sharing
(1x) RJ-45 Management Interface
Status Output (1x) RSL Indication
(1x) RJ-45 Management Interface
Figure 18 - IP-20C-HP Interfaces (Front and Back)
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Figure 19 - IP-20C-HP Interfaces Side
Table 11 - Module Interface Mapping for IP-20C-HP
FIPS Interface Physical Interface
Data Input (1x) RJ-45 Data Port
(2x) Data port (Electrical or Optical)
(2x) Antenna Ports
Data Output (1x) RJ-45 Data Port
(2x) Data port (Electrical or Optical)
(2x) Antenna Ports
Control Input (1x) Source Sharing
(1x) RJ-45 Management Interface
Status Output (1x) RSL Indication
(1x) RJ-45 Management Interface
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2.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication
The following sections provide details about roles supported by the module, how these
roles are authenticated, and the services the roles are authorized to access.
2.3.1 Authorized Roles
The module supports several different roles, including multiple Cryptographic Officer
roles and a User role.
Configuration of the module can occur over several interfaces and at different levels
depending upon the role assigned. There are multiple levels of access for a Cryptographic
Officer as follows:
• Security Officer, admin, SNMP User: Entities assigned this privilege level have
complete access to configure and manage the module.
• Tech, Operator, Viewer: These entities have more limited access to manage the
module. For example, they can only manage the configuration of the data traffic
interface.
The Users of the module are the remote peers to and from which backhaul traffic is
transmitted. The Users are connected over a secure session protected using a Session key.
2.3.2 Authentication Mechanisms
The module supports role-based authentication. Module operators must authenticate to
the module before being allowed access to services, which requires the assumption of an
authorized role. The module employs the authentication methods described in the table
below to authenticate Crypto-Officers and Users.
Unauthenticated users are only able to access the module LEDs and power cycle the
module.
Table 12 - Authentication Mechanism Details
Role Type Of Authentication Authentication Strength
Admin Password/Username All passwords must be at least 8 characters and may include letters, numbers,
and special characters. If (8) integers are used for an eight digit password, the
probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is less than one (1) in
1,000,000 (this calculation is based on the assumption that the typical
standard American QWERTY computer keyboard has 10 integer digits, 33
special characters, and 52 letter characters. The calculation should be 958 =
6,634,204,312,890,625). Therefore, the associated probability of a successful
random attempt is less than 1 in 1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2. In order to
successfully guess the sequence in one minute would require the ability to
make over 110,570,071,881,510 guesses per second, which far exceeds the
operational capabilities of the module.
Tech
Viewer
Operator
Security Officer
SNMP User
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Role Type Of Authentication Authentication Strength
Users AES 256-bit Session Key When using AES key based authentication, the key has a size of 256-bits.
Therefore, an attacker would have a 1 in 2256 chance of randomly obtaining the
key, which is much stronger than the one in a million chance required by FIPS
140-2. For AES based authentication, to exceed a 1 in 100,000 probability of a
successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be
capable of approximately 3.25x1032 attempts per minute, which far exceeds
the operational capabilities of the modules to support.
2.3.3 Services
The services (approved and non-approved, but allowed) that require operators to assume
an authorized role (Crypto-Officer or User) as well as unauthenticated services are listed
in the table below. Please note that the keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) listed
below use the following indicators to show the type of access required:
• R (Read): The CSP is read
• W (Write): The CSP is established, generated, or modified,
• Z (Zeroize): The CSP is zeroized
Table 13 - Services, Roles and Key/CSP access
Service Description Role Key/CSP and Type of Access
CO User
FIPS Approved Services
Show Status Provides status of the module X N/A
Perform Self-Tests Used to initiate on-demand self-tests
(via power-cycle)
X X N/A
Change Password Update password with a new value X Crypto Officer Password (R/W)
Transmit/Receive Data Encrypt/Decrypt data passing through
the module
X Session Key Tx (R/W/Z)
Session Key Rx (R/W/Z)
Master Key (R)
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Service Description Role Key/CSP and Type of Access
CO User
Administrative access
over SSH
Secure remote command line
appliance administration over an SSH
tunnel.
X DRBG entropy input (R)
DRBG Seed (R)
DRBG V (R/W/Z)
DRBG Key (R/W/Z)
Diffie-Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman
Shared Secret (R/W/Z)
Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman
private key (R/W/Z)
Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman public
key (R/W/Z)
SSH Private Key (R/W)
SSH Public Key (R/W)
SSH Session Key (R/W/Z)
SSH Integrity Key (R/W/Z)
Administrative access
over Web EMS
Secure remote GUI appliance
administration over a TLS tunnel.
X DRBG entropy input (R)
DRBG Seed (R)
DRBG V (R/W/Z)
DRBG Key (R/W/Z)
Diffie-Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman
Shared Secret (R/W/Z)
Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman
private key (R/W/Z)
Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman public
key (R/W/Z)
TLS Private Key (R/W)
TLS Public Key (R/W)
TLS Pre-Master Secret (R/W/Z)
TLS Session Encryption Key (R/W/Z)
TLS Session Integrity Key (R/W/Z)
SNMPv3 Secure remote SNMPv3-based
system monitoring.
X SNMPv3 Session Key (R/W/Z)
SNMPv3 Sesssion Authentication Key
(R/W/Z)
SNMPv3 password (R/W/Z)
Key Entry Enter key over management
interfaces
X Master Key (R/W)
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Service Description Role Key/CSP and Type of Access
CO User
IPsec7
Control plane traffic encryption using
IKEv1 for key exchange
X IKE session encrypt key (R/W/Z)
IKE session authentication key (R/W/Z)
ISAKMP preshared key (R/W)
IPsec encryption key (R/W/Z)
IPsec authentication key (R/W/Z)
Zeroize Zeroize all CSPs X All CSPs (Z)
Cycle Power Reboot of module Unauthenticated DRBG entropy input (Z)
DRBG Seed (Z)
DRBG V (Z)
DRBG Key (Z)
Diffie-Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman
Shared Secret (Z)
Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman
private key (Z)
Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman public
key (Z)
SSH Session Key (Z)
SSH Integrity Key (Z)
SNMPv3 session key (Z)
SNMPv3 session authentication key (Z)
TLS Pre-Master Secret (Z)
TLS Session Encryption Key (Z)
TLS Session Integrity Key (Z)
IKE session encrypt key (Z)
IKE session authentication key (Z)
IPsec encryption key (Z)
IPsec authentication key (Z)
Session Key Tx (Z)
Session Key Rx (Z)
Status LED Output View status via the modules’ LEDs Unauthenticated N/A
Non-FIPS Approved Services
SNMPv1/v2c Secure remote SNMPv1, v2c-based
system monitoring
X N/A
RADIUS RADIUS authentication (MD5) X N/A
7
Only available on MIPS CPU based models
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Service Description Role Key/CSP and Type of Access
CO User
HTTP Plaintext HTTP X N/A
Netconf Netconf X N/A
Hot Standby Hot Standby X N/A
R – Read, W – Write, Z – Zeroize
Table 14 – Non-Security Relevant Services
Service Description Role
CO User
View Summaries View unit summary information (Unit,
Radio, Security)
X
Platform Management Shelf management, unit configuration,
interfaces, software settings,
activation key, and statistics
X
Fault Management Alarm settings X
Radio Configuration Radio interface settings X
Ethernet Configuration Ethernet interface settings X
Sync Settings Manage synchronization X
Utilities Generic utilities X
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2.4 Physical Security
The appliances are multi-chip standalone cryptographic modules. The appliances are
contained in a hard metal chassis, which is defined as the cryptographic boundary of the
module. The appliances’ chassis is opaque within the visible spectrum. The enclosure of
the appliances has been designed to satisfy Level 2 physical security requirements.
Each of the appliances needs Tamper Evidence Labels to meet Security Level 2
requirements. These labels are installed at the factory before delivery to the customer.
The Crypto Officer shall periodically (defined by organizational security policy,
recommendation is once a month) monitor the state of all applied seals for evidence of
tampering. If tamper is detected, the CO must take the device out of commission, inspect it
and if deemed safe, return it to FIPS approved state.
2.5 Operational Environment
Section 4.6.1 (of FIPS 140-2 standard) requirements are not applicable since the module
is a hardware module with a non-modifiable operational environment.
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2.6 Cryptographic Key Management
The following table identifies each of the CSPs associated with the modules. For each CSP, the following information is provided:
• The name of the CSP/Key
• The type of CSP and associated length
• A description of the CSP/Key
• Storage of the CSP/Key
• The zeroization for the CSP/Key
Table 15 - Details of Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
Key/CSP Type Description Storage Generated/Entry/Output Zeroization
DRBG entropy input 256-bit This is the entropy for SP 800-90A RNG. RAM Generated using entropy source Device power cycle.
DRBG Seed 256-bit This DRBG seed is collected from the onboard
hardware entropy source.
RAM Generated using entropy source Device power cycle.
DRBG V 256-bit Internal V value used as part of SP 800-90A
DRBG
RAM Generated using entropy source Device power cycle.
DRBG Key 256-bit Internal Key value used as part of SP 800-90A
DRBG
RAM Generated using entropy source Device power cycle.
Diffie-Hellman / EC Diffie
Hellman Shared Secret
DH 2048 bits and 3072 bits
ECDH: P-256
The shared exponent used in Diffie-Hellman
(DH)/ECDH exchange. Created per the Diffie-
Hellman protocol.
RAM Established using DH/ECDH Device power cycle.
Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie
Hellman private key
DH 2048 bits and 3072 bits
ECDH: P-256
The private exponent used in Diffie-Hellman
(DH)/ECDH exchange.
RAM Generated using DRBG Device power cycle.
Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie
Hellman public key
DH 2048 bits and 3072 bits
ECDH: P-256
The p used in Diffie-Hellman (DH)/ECDH
exchange.
RAM Generated using DRBG Device power cycle.
SSH Private Key RSA (Private Key) 2048 bits The SSH private key for the module used for
session authentication.
Flash Generated using FIPS 186-4 /
Entered electronically in encrypted
form
Zeroization
command
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Key/CSP Type Description Storage Generated/Entry/Output Zeroization
SSH Public Key RSA (Public Key) 2048 bits The SSH public key for the module used for
session authentication.
Flash Generated using FIPS 186-4 /
Entered electronically in encrypted
form
Zeroization
command
SSH Session Key AES 256 bits The SSH session key. This key is created
through SSH key establishment.
RAM Established using SSH key
exchange and derived using SP
800-135rev1 KDF
Device power cycle.
SSH Integrity Key HMAC-SHA-1 The SSH data integrity key. This key is created
through SSH key establishment.
RAM Established using SSH key
exchange and derived using SP
800-135rev1 KDF
Device power cycle.
SNMPv3 password Shared Secret, at least eight
characters
This secret is used to derive HMAC-SHA1 key
for SNMPv3 Privacy or Authentication.
Flash Entered electronically in encrypted
form
Zeroization
command
SNMPv3 session key AES 128 bits SNMP symmetric encryption key used to
encrypt/decrypt SNMP traffic.
RAM Established as part of SNMPv3
session using SP 800-135rev1 KDF
Device power cycle.
SNMPv3 session
authentication key
HMAC-SHA-1 SNMP authentication key used to authenticate
SNMP payloads
RAM Established as part of SNMPv3
session using SP 800-135rev1 KDF
Device power cycle
TLS Private Key RSA (Private Key) 2048 bits This private key is used for TLS session
authentication.
Flash Generated using FIPS 186-4 Zeroization
command
TLS Public Key RSA (Public Key) 2048 bits This public key is used for TLS session
authentication.
Flash Generated using FIPS 186-4 Zeroization
command
TLS Pre-Master Secret Shared Secret, 384 bits Shared Secret created using asymmetric
cryptography from which new TLS session keys
can be created.
RAM Established using TLS exchange Device power cycle.
TLS Session Encryption
Key
AES 128 or 256 bits Key used to encrypt/decrypt TLS session data. RAM Established using TLS exchange
and derived using SP 800-135rev1
KDF
Device power cycle.
TLS Session Integrity Key HMAC SHA-256
HMAC SHA-384
HMAC used for TLS data integrity protection. RAM Established using TLS exchange
and derived using SP 800-135rev1
KDF
Device power cycle.
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Key/CSP Type Description Storage Generated/Entry/Output Zeroization
IKE session encrypt key AES 256 bits The IKE session encrypt key is created per the
Internet Key Exchange Key Establishment
protocol.
RAM Established using IKE exchange
and derived using SP 800-135rev1
KDF
Device power cycle.
IKE session
authentication key
HMAC-SHA-256 The IKE session authentication key is created
per the Internet Key Exchange Key
Establishment protocol.
RAM Established using IKE exchange
and derived using SP 800-135rev1
KDF
Device power cycle
ISAKMP preshared Secret
32 characters
The ISAKMP preshared key is used to derive
the IKE session encrypt and authentication keys
Flash Entered electronically in encrypted
form
Zeroization
command
IPsec encryption key AES 256 bits The IPsec encryption key is created per the
Internet Key Exchange Key Establishment
protocol.
RAM Established using IKE exchange Device power cycle.
IPsec authentication key HMAC-SHA-256 The IPsec authentication key is created per the
Internet Key Exchange Key Establishment
protocol.
RAM Established using IKE exchange Device power cycle.
Session key Tx AES 256 bits This is the symmetric session key to protect
transmission of back-haul data
RAM Generated using DRBG. Wrapped
and output using Master key
Device power cycle.
Session key Rx AES 256 bits This is the symmetric session key to decrypt
back-haul data received by the module
RAM Generated using DRBG. Input and
unwrapped using Master key
Device power cycle.
Master key AES 256 bits This is the CO configured key used to protect
transmission of session keys
Flash Electronically entered in encrypted
form
Zeroization
command
Crypto Officer Password Password Authentication password for CO role Flash Electronically entered in encrypted
form
Zeroization
command
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2.6.1 Key Generation
The module generates symmetric and asymmetric keys in compliance with the
requirements of the FIPS 140-2 standard. Specifically, symmetric keys are
generated using output of the FIPS approved SP 800-90A DRBG and in
compliance with IG 7.8. Asymmetric keys are generated as part applicable key
generation standards. See Table 15 - Details of Cryptographic Keys and CSPs for
details.
2.6.2 Key Entry/Output
See Table 15 - Details of Cryptographic Keys and CSPs for details. All keys are
entered into or output from the module in a secure manner. Specifically, the
Session Keys are output from the module encrypted with a Master Key with
the AES key wrap algorithm.
2.6.3 Zeroization Procedures
See Table 15 - Details of Cryptographic Keys and CSPs for details.
2.7 Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic
Compatibility (EMI/EMC)
The module conforms to FCC Part 15 Class B requirements for home use.
2.8 Self-Tests
Self-tests are health checks that ensure that the cryptographic algorithms
within the module are operating correctly. The self-tests identified in FIPS
140-2 broadly fall within two categories:
1 Power-On Self-Tests
2 Conditional Self-Tests
2.8.1 Power-On Self-Tests
The cryptographic module performs the following self-tests at Power-On:
Firmware (Management Security Algorithms):
• Firmware Integrity Test (HMAC-SHA-1)
• HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-384 Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Test
• AES-128 ECB Encrypt Known Answer Test
• AES-128 ECB Decrypt Known Answer Test
• AES KeyWrap Encrypt Known Answer Test
• AES KeyWrap Decrypt Known Answer Test
• AES-256 GCM Encrypt Known Answer Test
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• AES-256 GCM Decrypt Known Answer Test
• RSA Sign/Verify Known Answer Test
• DRBG Known Answer Test
• DRBG Health Tests
Firmware (Kernel Crypto):
• AES-256 CBC Encrypt Known Answer Test
• AES-256 CBC Decrypt Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• SHA-256 Known Answer Test
Hardware:
• AES-256 OFB Encrypt Known Answer Test
• AES-256 OFB Decrypt Known Answer Test
2.8.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The cryptographic module performs the following conditional self-tests:
• Continuous Random Number Generator Test (CRNGT) for FIPS-approved
DRBG
• Continuous Random Number Generator (CRNGT) for Entropy Source
• Firmware Load Test (RSA Signature Verification)
• Pairwise Consistency Test (PWCT) for RSA
• Bypass self-test
2.8.3 Self-Tests Error Handling
If any of the identified POSTs fail, the module will not enter an operational
state and will instead provide an error message. The module will then be
placed in a Default State (where all keys/CSPs are zeroized) and the FIPS
validated flag is reset.
If either of the CRNGTs fail, the repeated random numbers are discarded and
an error is reported. If the PWCT fails, the key pair is discarded and an error is
reported. If the Firmware Load Test fails, the new firmware is not loaded. If
the Bypass self-test fails, the error is reported and the module does not
transition into or out of bypass.
Both during execution of the self-tests and while in an error state, data output
is inhibited.
2.9 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not claim to mitigate any other attacks beyond those
specified in FIPS 140.
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3. Secure Operation
This section describes the configuration, maintenance, and administration of
the cryptographic module.
The Crypto Officer is responsible for ensuring that any of the plaintext
protocols in Section 2.3.3 are not used. When configured according to Section
3 in this Security Policy, the modules only run in their FIPS-Approved mode of
operation with the exception of the Services identified in Table 14. The non-
approved services described may make use of non-compliant cryptographic
algorithms or plaintext data transfers. Use of these services is prohibited in a
FIPS-approved mode of operation.
When the module is powered on, its power-up self-tests are executed without
any operator intervention.
3.1 Installation
IP-20G, IP-20C, IP-20C-HP, IP-20C 2E2SX, and IP-20S are fixed configuration
with TELs applied at factory. The Crypto Officer must verify at installation
time that the TELs are affixed and intact.
IP-20GX, IP-20N, and IP-20A are variable configuration and the CO must verify
that they are configured as per one of the approved configurations identified
in Section 2.1.1. Moreover for these as well the Crypto Officer must verify at
installation time that the TELs are affixed and intact.
Refer to the following figures for the proper placement of TELs.
Figure 20 - TEL Placement for IP-20C and IP-20S Models (1 of 5)
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy v1.3
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Figure 21 - TEL Placement for IP-20C and IP-20S Models (2 of 5)
Figure 22 - TEL Placement for IP-20C and IP-20S Models (3 of 5)
Figure 23 - TEL Placement for IP-20C and IP-20S Models (4 of 5)
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy v1.3
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Figure 24 - TEL Placement for IP-20C and IP-20S Models (5 of 5)
Figure 25 - TEL Placement for IP-20C-HP (1 of 5)
Figure 26 - TEL Placement for IP-20C-HP (2 of 5)
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Figure 27 - TEL Placement for IP-20C-HP (3 of 5)
Figure 28 - TEL Placement for IP-20C-HP (4 of 5)
Figure 29 - TEL Placement for IP-20C-HP (5 of 5)
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy v1.3
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Figure 30 - TEL Placement for IP-20G (1 of 3)
Figure 31 - TEL Placement for IP-20G (2 of 3)
Figure 32 - TEL Placement for IP-20G (3 of 3)
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Figure 33 - TEL Placement for IP-20GX (1 of 5)
Figure 34 - TEL Placement for IP-20GX (2 of 5)
Figure 35 - TEL Placement for IP-20GX (3 of 5)
Figure 36 - TEL Placement for IP-20GX (4 of 5)
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Figure 37 - TEL Placement for IP-20GX (5 of 5)
Figure 38 - TEL Placement for IP-20N and IP-20A (1 of 4)
Figure 39 - TEL Placement for IP-20N and IP-20A (2 of 4)
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy v1.3
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Figure 40 - TEL Placement for IP-20N and IP-20A (3 of 4)
Figure 41 - TEL Placement for IP-20N and IP-20A (4 of 4)
3.2 Initialization
The CO must follow these steps to place the module in a FIPS mode of
operation. For the exact CLI command syntax or GUI instructions, please refer
to the below referenced sections of the FIPS Security Configuration Guide.
1 Enable configuration to enforce password strength.
• 7.10 Configuring Login and Password Settings
2 Configure failure login attempts for wrong passwords to 3 attempts
(default value).
• 7.10 Configuring Login and Password Settings
3 For radio encryption mode, configure Master Key and enable Payload
Encryption.
• 7.5 Configuring AES-256 Payload Encryption
4 Enable SNMP v3 (default) and disable SNMPv1 and v2. Add SNMP users as
appropriate following the password complexity requirements specified in
section 2.3.2. Ensure that “AES” and “SHA” are selected for the privacy and
authentication ciphers, respectively.
• 7.9 Configuring SNMPv3
5 Disable Telnet
• 7.8 Blocking Telnet Access
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6 Disable HTTP and enable HTTPS
• 7.7 Configuring HTTPS
7 Enable FIPS Admin configuration, i.e., set FIPS mode of operation.
• 7.1 Enabling FIPS Mode
8 [Optional step] in case of External Protection configuration (relevant for
IP-20G, IP-20C, IP-20C 2E2SX, IP-20C-HP, IP-20S), enable Protection
Admin and supply a pre-shared key.
• 8.1 Changing the Protection Pre-Shared Key
9 [Optional step] In case of TCC Redundancy (relevant for IP-20A, IP-20N),
enable Protection Admin, and make sure TCC Protection switch mode is
set to Cold Switch Over
Note: Hot Switch Over (HSO) shall not be used in FIPS Mode
• Web GUI: Platform > Shelf Management > Main Card Redundancy
(In the TCC Protection switch mode field, select Cold Switch Over)
10 Change the default CO password
• 3.4 Changing Your Password
Once the final step is performed the module will prompt the CO to reboot.
Upon successful reboot the module will enter the approved mode of operation.
Once the module has been configured, the FIPS mode status can be verified:
• 6 Viewing the Security Parameters
3.3 Management
Protocols such as RADIUS, netconf, HTTP, SNMPv1, and SNMPv2 are not
approved for use and shall remain disabled.
When in FIPS 140-2 compliance mode, only the following algorithms are used
for SSH and TLS communications.
3.3.1 SSH Usage
When in FIPS mode, the module supports only the following symmetric
encryption algorithm:
• AES_256_CBC
The following Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm is supported in
FIPS mode:
• hmac-sha1
The following key exchange algorithms are supported in FIPS mode:
• diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
• diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
• diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
Only the password-based authentication mode is supported.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy v1.3
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3.3.2 TLS Usage
When in FIPS 140-2 compliance mode, only the following ciphersuites are
available for TLSv1.2 communications:
• ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
• ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384
• DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
• AES256-GCM-SHA384
• DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256
• AES256-SHA256
• ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
• ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256
• DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256
• DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
• AES128-GCM-SHA256
• AES128-SHA256
3.4 Additional Information
For additional information regarding FIPS 140-2 compliance, see the relevant
User Manuals.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy v1.3
Page 47 of 47
4. Appendix A: Acronyms
This section describes the acronyms used throughout the document.
Table 16 - Acronyms
Acronym Definition
TEL Tamper Evidence Labels
CO Crypto Officer
CRNGT Continuous Random Number Generator Test
CSEC Communications Security Establishment Canada
CVL Component Validation List
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
KDF Key Derivation Function
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
POST Power-On Self-Test
PWCT Pairwise Consistency Test