

FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

Oracle Linux 9 OpenSSL FIPS Provider

FIPS 140-3 Level 1 Validation

Software Version: 3.0.7-b27cdeb3ba51be46

Last Updated: 2024-08-06

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Title: Oracle Linux 9 OpenSSL FIPS Provider Security Policy

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Hardware and Software, Engineered to Work Together



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1 General

1.1 Overview

This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for software version 3.0.7-b27cdeb3ba51be46 of the Oracle Linux 9 OpenSSL FIPS Provider. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for an overall Security Level 1 module.

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1.1.1 How this Security Policy Was Prepared

In preparing the Security Policy document, the laboratory formatted the vendor-supplied documentation for consolidation without altering the technical statements therein contained. The further refining of the Security Policy document was conducted iteratively throughout the conformance testing, wherein the Security Policy was submitted to the vendor, who would then edit, modify, and add technical contents. The vendor would also supply additional documentation, which the laboratory formatted into the existing Security Policy, and resubmitted to the vendor for their final editing.

1.2 Security Levels

Table 1 describes the individual security areas of FIPS 140-3, as well as the security levels of those individual areas.

ISO/IEC 24759 Section 6 Subsections	FIPS 140-3 Section Title	Security Level
1	General	1
2	Cryptographic Module Specification	1
3	Cryptographic Module Interfaces	1
4	Roles, Services, and Authentication	1
5	Software/Firmware Security	1
6	Operational Environment	1
7	Physical Security	Not Applicable
8	Non-invasive Security	Not Applicable
9	Sensitive Security Parameter Management	1
10	Self-tests	1
11	Life-cycle Assurance	1
12	Mitigation of Other Attacks	1
Overall	Level	1

Table 1 - Security Levels



2 Cryptographic Module Specification

2.1 Description

Purpose and Use: The Oracle Linux 9 OpenSSL FIPS Provider (hereafter referred to as "the module") is defined as a software module in a multi-chip standalone embodiment. It provides a C language application program interface (API) for use by other applications that require cryptographic functionality. The module consists of one software component, the "FIPS provider", which implements the FIPS requirements, and the cryptographic functionality provided to the operator.

Module Type: Software

Module Embodiment: Multi-chip standalone

Module Characteristics: N/A

Cryptographic Boundary: Figure 1 shows the cryptographic boundary of the module, its interfaces with the operational environment and the flow of information between the module and operator (depicted through the arrows).

Tested Operational Environment's Physical Perimeter (TOEPP): The TOEPP of the module is defined as the general-purpose computer on which the module is installed.






Figure 1 - Block Diagram

2.2 Operating Environments

Hardware Operating Environments: N/A

Software, Firmware, Hybrid Tested Operating Environments:

Operating System	Hardware Platform	Processor(s)	PAA/PAI	Hypervisor and Host OS
Oracle Linux 9	ORACLE SERVER X9-2c	Intel(R) Xeon(R) Platinum 8358	AES-NI and SHA Extensions	KVM on Oracle Linux 8
	ORACLE SERVER E4-2c	AMD EPYC 7J13	AES-NI and SHA Extensions	
	ORACLE SERVER A1-2c	Ampere(R) Altra(R) Q80- 30	NEON and Cryptography Extensions (CE)	

Table 2 - Software, Firmware, Hybrid Tested Operating Environments

Executable Code Sets:

Package or File Names	Software/ Firmware Versions	Features	Hybrid Hardware Version	Integrity Test
fips.so	3.0.7-b27cdeb3ba51be46	N/A	N/A	HMAC-SHA-256

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Table 3 - Executable Code Sets

Vendor Affirmed Operating Environments:

Operating Systems	Hardware Platforms	Virtual Platforms
Oracle Linux 9	Oracle X Series Servers	Oracle Linux KVM
	Oracle E Series Servers	VmWare ESXi
	Oracle A Series Servers	
	Marvell T93 LiquidIO III (ARM v8.x) SmartNIC	
	Pensando DSC-200-R (ARM v8.x) SmartNIC	

Table 4 - Vendor Affirmed Operational Environments

Note: the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated SSPs when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.

2.3 Excluded Components

There are no components within the cryptographic boundary excluded from the FIPS 140-3 requirements.

2.4 Modes of Operation

Modes List and Description:

Name	Description	Туре	Status Indicator
Approved mode	Automatically entered whenever an	Approved	Equivalent to the indicator of the
	approved service is requested		requested service
Non-approved mode	Automatically entered whenever a non- approved service is requested	Non-approved	Equivalent to the indicator of the requested service

Table 5 - Modes List and Description

After passing all pre-operational self-tests and cryptographic algorithm self-tests executed on start-up, the module automatically transitions to the approved mode.

Mode change instructions and status indicators:

The module automatically switches between the approved and non-approved modes depending on the services requested by the operator. The status indicator of the mode of operation is equivalent to the indicator of the service that was requested.

Degraded Mode Description:

The module does not implement a degraded mode of operation.

2.5 Algorithms

Approved Algorithms:

Algorithm Name		Algorithms Capabilities	OE (Implementation)	Reference
	# <u>A4327</u> , # <u>A4328</u> , # <u>A4329</u>	Decryption using	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC TM 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: AESNI, BAES_CTASM, AESASM	FIPS 197, SP 800-38A, SP 800-38A Addendum
AES-CBC-CTS-CS1			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on	
AES-CBC-CTS-CS2			Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: CE, VPAES, AES_C	
AES-CBC-CTS-CS3				

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Algorithm Name	CAVP Numbers	Algorithms Capabilities	OE (Implementation)	Reference
AES-CCM		Authenticated Encryption, Authenticated Decryption, Key Wrapping, Key Unwrapping (compliant to IG D.G) using 128, 192, 256-bit keys	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: AESNI, BAES_CTASM, AESASM	
AES-CFB1		Encryption,		
AES-CFB8		Decryption using 128, 192, 256-bit		
AES-CFB128		keys		
AES-CMAC		Message Authentication Code Generation, Message Authentication Code Verification using 128, 192, 256-bit keys		FIPS 197, SP 800-38B
AES-CTR		Encryption, Decryption using 128, 192, 256-bit keys		FIPS 197, SP 800-38A, SP 800-38A Addendum
AES-ECB	# <u>A4320</u> , # <u>A4327</u> , # <u>A4328</u> , # <u>A4329</u> , # <u>A4331</u> , # <u>A4332</u> , # <u>A4333</u> , # <u>A4334</u>	Encryption, Decryption using 128, 192, 256-bit keys	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC TM 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: SSH_ASM, AESNI, BAES_CTASM, AESASM, SSH_SHANI, SSH_AVX2, SSH_AVX, SSH_SSSE3 Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on	
			Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: SSH_ASM, CE, VPAES, AES_C	
			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: SSH_ASM, AESNI, BAES_CTASM, AESASM, SSH_SHANI, SSH_AVX2, SSH_AVX, SSH_SSSE3	
150 0014/1: 1::3				FID: 407
AES-GCM (internal IV)	#A4316, #A4321, #A4322, #A4323, #A4335, #A4336, #A4337, #A4338, #A4339, #A4340, #A4341, #A4342, #A4343	Authenticated Encryption, Key Wrapping using 128, 192, 256-bit keys	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC TM 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: AESNI_AVX, AESNI_CLMULNI, AESNI_ASM, BAES_CTASM_AVX, BAES_CTASM_CLMULNI, BAES_CTASM_ASM, AESASM_AVX, AESASM_CLMULNI, AESASM_ASM	FIPS 197 SP 800-38D FIPS 140-3 IG D.G Additional comment 8
AES-GCM (external IV)		Authenticated Decryption, Key Unwrapping using	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30:	



Algorithm Name	CAVP Numbers	Algorithms Capabilities	OE (Implementation)	Reference
		128, 192, 256-bit keys	CE_GCM_UNROLL8_EOR3, CE_GCM, VPAES_GCM, AES_C_GCM	
AES-GMAC		Message Authentication Code Generation, Message Authentication Code Verification using 128, 192, 256-bit keys	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: AESNI_AVX, AESNI_CLMULNI, AESNI_ASM, BAES_CTASM_AVX, BAES_CTASM_CLMULNI, BAES_CTASM_ASM, AESASM_AVX, AESASM_CLMULNI, AESASM_ASM	
AES-OFB	# <u>A4313</u> , # <u>A4314</u> , # <u>A4315</u> , # <u>A4327</u> , # <u>A4328</u> , # <u>A4329</u>	Encryption, Decryption using 128, 192, 256-bit keys	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC TM 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: AESNI, BAES_CTASM, AESASM Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on	FIPS 197, SP 800-38A, SP 800-38A Addendum
AES-KW		Key Wrapping, Key Unwrapping	Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: CE, VPAES, AES_C Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on	FIPS 197, SP 800-38F
AES-KWP		(compliant to IG	Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: AESNI, BAES_CTASM, AESASM	
AES-XTS		Encryption, Decryption using 128 and 256-bit keys		FIPS 197, SP 800-38E
ANS X9.42 KDF (CVL) with AES KW-128, AES KW-192, AES KW-256 and SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,		Key Derivation	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC TM 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3 Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on	SP 800-135r1
SHA2-512, SHA2- 512/224, SHA2- 512/256,			Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: SHA_ASM, SHA_CE Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3	
ANS X9.42 KDF (CVL) with AES KW-128, AES KW-192, AES KW-256			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC [™] 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: SHA3_ASM	
with SHA3-224, SHA3- 256, SHA3-384, SHA3-			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: SHA3_CE	
512			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: SHA3_ASM	
with SHA2-224, SHA2- 256, SHA2-384, SHA2- 512, SHA2-512/224,	# <u>A4317</u> , # <u>A4326</u> , # <u>A4330</u> , # <u>A4344</u> , # <u>A4345</u> , # <u>A4346</u>		Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC TM 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3	
SHA2-512/256,			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: SHA_ASM, SHA_CE	
			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: SHA_ASM,	



Algorithm Name	CAVP Numbers	Algorithms Capabilities	OE (Implementation)	Reference
		Capabilities	SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3	
ANS X9.63 KDF (CVL) with SHA3-224, SHA3- 256, SHA3-384, SHA3-	# <u>A4312</u> , # <u>A4319</u>		Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC TM 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: SHA3_ASM	
512			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: SHA3_CE	
			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: SHA3_ASM	
CTR_DRBG	# <u>A4311</u>	Random Number Generation using 128, 192, 256-bit	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC [™] 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: DRBG_3	SP 800-90Ar1
		keys, with/without PR, with/without DF	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: DRBG_3	
		DI .	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: DRBG_3	
ECDSA with SHA2- 224, SHA2-256, SHA2- 384, SHA2-512, SHA2- 512/224, SHA2-	# <u>A4317</u> , # <u>A4326</u> , # <u>A4330</u> , # <u>A4344</u> , # <u>A4345</u> , # <u>A4346</u>	Signature Generation, Signature Verification using P-	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC [™] 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3,	FIPS 186-4
512/256		224, P-256, P-384, P-521 elliptic curves	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: SHA_ASM, SHA_CE	
			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3,	
ECDSA with SHA3- 224, SHA3-256, SHA3- 384, SHA3-512	# <u>A4312</u> , # <u>A4319</u>	Signature Generation, Signature	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC™ 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: SHA3_ASM	
		Verification P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: SHA3_CE	
		elliptic curves	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: SHA3_ASM	
ECDSA	# <u>A4317</u> , # <u>A4326</u> , # <u>A4330</u> , # <u>A4344</u> , # <u>A4345</u> , # <u>A4346</u>	using P-224, P-256,	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC TM 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3,	FIPS 186-4 Appendix B.4.2 Testing Candidates
			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: SHA_ASM, SHA_CE	
		Key Pair Verification using P- 224, P-256, P-384, P-521 elliptic curves	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3,	FIPS 186-4
HKDF with SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA2-512/224, SHA2-	# <u>A4310</u>	Key Derivation	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC™7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: TLS v1.3	SP800-56Cr1
512/256, SHA3-224,			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: TLS v1.3	



Algorithm Name	CAVP Numbers	Algorithms Capabilities	OE (Implementation)	Reference
SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: TLS v1.3	
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC- SHA2-224, HMAC- SHA2-384, HMAC- SHA2-512, HMAC- SHA2-512/224, HMAC-SHA2-512/256	# <u>A4317</u> , # <u>A4326</u> , # <u>A4330</u> , # <u>A4344</u> , # <u>A4345</u> , # <u>A4346</u>	Message Authentication Code Generation, Message Authentication Code Verification using 112-524288- bit keys	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC TM 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3, Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: SHA_ASM, SHA_CE Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256	#A4317, #A4318, #A4326, #A4330, #A4344, #A4345, #A4346		Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC TM 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3,	
			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: SHA_ASM, SHA_CE, NEON	
			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3	
HMAC-SHA3-224, HMAC-SHA3-256, HMAC-SHA3-384,	# <u>A4312</u> , # <u>A4319</u>		Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC [™] 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: SHA3_ASM	FIPS 202
HMAC-SHA3-512			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: SHA3_CE	
			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: SHA3_ASM	
HMAC_DRBG	# <u>A4311</u>	Random Number Generation using 112-524288-bit	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC™ 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: DRBG_3	SP 800-90Ar1
		keys, with/without PR	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: DRBG 3	
Hash_DRBG		Random Number Generation, with/without PR	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: DRBG_3	
KAS-ECC-SSC	# <u>A4317</u> , # <u>A4326</u> , # <u>A4330</u> , # <u>A4344</u> , # <u>A4345</u> , # <u>A4346</u>	Shared Secret Computation with P-256, P-384, P-521 elliptic curves	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC TM 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3,	SP 800-56Ar3 FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (1)
			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: SHA_ASM, SHA_CE	
			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3,	



Algorithm Name	CAVP Numbers	Algorithms Capabilities	OE (Implementation)	Reference
KAS-FFC-SSC	# <u>A4325</u>	Shared Secret Computation with MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192, ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC™ 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: FFC_DH Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: FFC_DH Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: FFC_DH	
KBKDF with CMAC- AES128, CMAC- AES192, CMAC- AES256 and HMAC SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA2- 512/224, SHA2- 512/256, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512	# <u>A4324</u>	Key Derivation	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYCTM 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: KBKDF Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: KBKDF Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: KBKDF	SP 800-108r1
KDA OneStep¹ with HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC- SHA2-224, HMAC- SHA2-256, HMAC- SHA2-384, HMAC- SHA2-512, HMAC- SHA2-512/224, HMAC-SHA2-512/256, HMAC-SHA3-224, HMAC-SHA3-256, HMAC-SHA3-384, HMAC-SHA3-512	# <u>A4309</u>		Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYCTM 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: KDA Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: KDA Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: KDA	SP 800-56Cr2
PBKDF2 with SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA2-512/224, SHA2- 512/256,	# <u>A4317</u> , # <u>A4326</u> , # <u>A4330</u> , # <u>A4344</u> , # <u>A4345</u> , # <u>A4346</u>		Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYCTM 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3 Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: SHA_ASM, SHA_CE Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3	Option 1a SP 800-132
PBKDF2 with SHA3- 224, SHA3-256, SHA3- 384, SHA3-512	# <u>A4312</u> , # <u>A4319</u>	-	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC TM 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: SHA3_ASM	

 $^{^{\}rm 1}\,\mbox{This}$ algorithm is referred to as "Single Step KDF" or "SSKDF" by OpenSSL.



Algorithm Name	CAVP Numbers	Algorithms Capabilities	OE (Implementation)	Reference
			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: SHA3_CE	
			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: SHA3_ASM	
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS with SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA2-	# <u>A4317</u> , # <u>A4326</u> , # <u>A4330</u> , # <u>A4344</u> , # <u>A4345</u> , # <u>A4346</u>	Signature Generation using 2048, 3072, 4096- bit keys	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC [™] 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_SSSE3	FIPS 186-4
512/224, SHA2- 512/256			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: SHA_ASM, SHA_CE	
			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_SSSE3	
		Signature Verification using 1024, 2048, 3072,	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC [™] 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI	
		4096-bit keys	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: SHA_ASM	
			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI	
RSA	# <u>A4317</u> , # <u>A4326</u> , # <u>A4330</u> , # <u>A4344</u> , # <u>A4345</u> , # <u>A4346</u>	Key Pair Generation using 2048-15360- bit keys	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC [™] 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_SSSE3	FIPS 186-4 Appendix B.3.6 Probable Primes with Conditions Based on Auxiliary Probable
			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: SHA_ASM, SHA_CE	Primes
			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_SSSE3	
Safe Primes	# <u>A4325</u>	Key Generation using MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144,	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC TM 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: FFC_DH Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: FFC_DH	SP 800-56Ar3 Section 5.6.1.1.4 Testing Candidates
		MODP-8192, ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: FFC_DH	
Safe Primes		Key Verification using MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192, ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096,		SP 800-56Ar3 Sections 5.6.2.1.2 and 5.6.2.1.4



Algorithm Name	CAVP Numbers	Algorithms	OE (Implementation)	Reference
		Capabilities		
		ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192		
SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA2-512/224, SHA2- 512/256	# <u>A4317</u> , # <u>A4326</u> , # <u>A4330</u> , # <u>A4344</u> , # <u>A4345</u> , # <u>A4346</u>	Hashing	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC [™] 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_SSSE3 Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on	
			Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: SHA_ASM, SHA_CE Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_SSSE3	
SHA2-256	# <u>A4317</u> , # <u>A4318</u> , # <u>A4326</u> , # <u>A4330</u> , # <u>A4344</u> , # <u>A4345</u> , # <u>A4346</u>		Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC™ 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_SSSE3	
			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: SHA_ASM, SHA_CE, NEON	
			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_SSSE3	
SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512	# <u>A4312</u> , # <u>A4319</u>		Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC™ 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: SHA3_ASM	FIPS 202
SHAKE128, SHAKE256		XOFs	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: SHA3_CE Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on	
			Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: SHA3_ASM	
SSH KDF (CVL) with AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 and SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	# <u>A4320</u> , # <u>A4331</u> , # <u>A4332</u> , # <u>A4333</u> , # <u>A4334</u>	Key Derivation	Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC [™] 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: SSH_ASM, SSH_SHANI, SSH_AVX2, SSH_AVX, SSH_SSSE3 Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on	
·			Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: SSH_ASM	
			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: SSH_ASM, SSH_SHANI, SSH_AVX2, SSH_AVX, SSH_SSSE3	
TLS 1.2 KDF (RFC 7627) (CVL) with SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 using RFC	# <u>A4317</u> , # <u>A4326</u> , # <u>A4330</u> , # <u>A4344</u> , # <u>A4345</u> , # <u>A4346</u>		Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC™ 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_SSSE3	
7627 Extended Master Secret			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: SHA ASM, SHA CE	
			Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_SSSE3	



Algorithm Name	CAVP Numbers	Algorithms Capabilities	OE (Implementation)	Reference
TLS 1.3 KDF (CVL) with SHA2-256, SHA2-384	# <u>A4310</u>		Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on AMD EPYC TM 7001 Series AMD EPYC 7J13: TLS v1.3 Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Ampere® Altra® Q80-30: TLS v1.3 Oracle Linux 9 on KVM on Oracle Linux 8 on Intel® Xeon® Platinum 8358: TLS v1.3	

Table 6 - Approved Algorithms

Vendor Affirmed Algorithms:

Algorithm Name	Algorithm Capabilities	OE (Implementation)	References
Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG)	FIPS 186-4 Key generation RSA KeyGen: 2048, 3072, 4096 bits with 112, 128, 149 bits of key strength. ECDSA KeyGen: P-224, P-256, P 384, P- 521 elliptic curves with 112-256 bits of key strength	Same as in Table 6	SP 800-133Rev2 Section 4, 5.1, 5.2 FIPS 140-3 IG D.H
	Safe Primes Key Generation: MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192 with 112-200 bits of key strength		

Table 7 - Vendor Affirmed Algorithms

Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:

The module does not implement non-approved algorithms allowed in the approved mode of operation.

Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:

The module does not implement non-approved algorithms allowed in the approved mode of operation with no security claimed.

Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:

Name	Use and Function	
AES GCM with external IV	Encryption	
ANS X9.42 KDF (SHAKE128, SHAKE256)	Key Derivation	
ANS X9.63 KDF (SHA-1, SHAKE128, SHAKE256)		
Hash_DRBG (SHA-224, SHA-384)	Random Number Generation	
HMAC_DRBG (SHA-224, SHA-384)		
ECDSA with curve P-192	Key Pair Generation, Key Pair Verification	
HMAC (< 112-bit keys)	Message Authentication Code Generation, Message	
	Authentication Code Verification	
KAS1, KAS2	Shared Secret Computation	
KBKDF, KDA OneStep, HKDF, ANS X9.42 KDF, ANS X9.63 KDF (< 112-bit keys)	Key Derivation	
KDA OneStep, HKDF (SHAKE128, SHAKE256)		
PBKDF2 (short password; short salt; insufficient iterations; < 112-bit keys)	Password-Based Key Derivation	
RSA and ECDSA (pre-hashed message), ECDSA with curve P-192	Signature Generation, Signature Verification	
RSA-PSS (invalid salt length)		
RSA-OAEP	Asymmetric Encryption, Asymmetric Decryption	
SSH KDF (SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256, SHA-3, SHAKE128, SHAKE256)	Key Derivation	
TLS 1.2 KDF (SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256, SHA-3)	7	

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Name	Use and Function
TLS 1.2 KDF using master secret non-compliant with RFC 7627	
TLS 1.3 KDF (SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256, SHA-3)	

Table 8 - Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms

2.6 Security Function Implementations

Name	Туре	Description	SF Capabilities	Algorithms
KAS-ECC-SSC	KAS	SP 800-56Arev3. KAS-ECC-	Ephemeral Unified scheme	KAS-ECC-SSC: # <u>A4317</u> ,
		SSC per IG D.F scenario	Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521	# <u>A4326</u> , # <u>A4330</u> , # <u>A4344</u> ,
		2(1)	elliptic curves with 112-256 bits of	# <u>A4345</u> , # <u>A4346</u>
			key strength	
KAS-FFC-SSC		SP 800-56Arev3. KAS-FFC-	Ephemeral Unified scheme	KAS-FFC-SSC: # <u>A4325</u>
		SSC per IG D.F scenario	Keys: 2048, 3072, 4096,	
		2(1)	6144, 8192-bit keys with 112-200	
			bits of key strength	
AES-CCM	KTS	SP 800-38C and SP 800-	128, 192, 256 bits with	AES: # <u>A4313</u> , # <u>A4314</u> ,
		38F. KTS (Key wrapping	128-256 bits of key strength	# <u>A4315</u> , # <u>A4327</u> , # <u>A4328</u> ,
		and unwrapping) per IG		# <u>A4329</u>
		D.G		
AES-GCM		SP 800-38D and SP 800-	128, 192, 256 bits with	AES: # <u>A4316</u> , # <u>A4321</u> ,
		38F. KTS (Key wrapping	128-256 bits of key strength	# <u>A4322</u> , # <u>A4323</u> , # <u>A4335</u> ,
		and unwrapping) per IG		# <u>A4336</u> , # <u>A4337</u> , # <u>A4338</u> ,
		D.G, Additional Comment		# <u>A4339</u> , # <u>A4340</u> , # <u>A4341</u> ,
		8		# <u>A4342</u> , # <u>A4343</u>
AES-KW		SP 800-38F. KTS (Key	128, 192, 256 bits with	AES: # <u>A4313</u> , # <u>A4314</u> ,
		wrapping and	128-256 bits of key strength	# <u>A4315</u> , # <u>A4327</u> , # <u>A4328</u> ,
AES-KWP		unwrapping) per IG D.G		# <u>A4329</u>

Table 9 - Security Function Implementation

2.7 Algorithm Specific Information

2.7.1 AES GCM IV

The Crypto Officer shall consider the following requirements and restrictions when using the module.

For TLS 1.2, the module offers the AES GCM implementation and uses the context of Scenario 1 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H. The module is compliant with SP 800-52r2 Section 3.3.1 and the mechanism for IV generation is compliant with RFC 5288 and 8446.

The module does not implement the TLS protocol. The module's implementation of AES GCM is used together with an application that runs outside the module's cryptographic boundary. The design of the TLS protocol implicitly ensures that the counter (the nonce_explicit part of the IV) does not exhaust the maximum number of possible values for a given session key.

In the event the module's power is lost and restored, the consuming application must ensure that a new key for use with the AES GCM key encryption or decryption under this scenario shall be established.

Alternatively, the Crypto Officer can use the module's API to perform AES GCM encryption using internal IV generation. These IVs are always 96 bits and generated using the approved DRBG internal to the module's boundary, compliant with Scenario 2 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H.

The module also provides a non-approved AES GCM encryption service which accepts arbitrary external IVs from the operator. This service can be requested by invoking the EVP_EncryptInit_ex2 API function with a non-NULL iv value. When this is the case, the API will set a non-approved service indicator.

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Finally, for TLS 1.3, the AES GCM implementation uses the context of Scenario 5 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H. The protocol that provides this compliance is TLS 1.3, defined in RFC8446 of August 2018, using the cipher-suites that explicitly select AES GCM as the encryption/decryption cipher (Appendix B.4 of RFC8446). The module supports acceptable AES GCM cipher suites from Section 3.3.1 of SP800-52r2. The module's implementation of AES GCM is used together with an application that runs outside the module's cryptographic boundary. The design of the TLS protocol implicitly ensures that the counter (the nonce_explicit part of the IV) does not exhaust the maximum number of possible values for a given session key.

2.7.2 Key Derivation using SP 800-132 PBKDF2

The module provides password-based key derivation (PBKDF2), compliant with SP 800-132. The module supports option 1a from Section 5.4 of SP 800-132, in which the Master Key (MK) or a segment of it is used directly as the Data Protection Key (DPK). In accordance with SP 800-132 and FIPS 140-3 IG D.N, the following requirements shall be met:

- Derived keys shall only be used in storage applications. The MK shall not be used for other purposes. The length of the MK or DPK shall be of 112 bits or more.
- Passwords or passphrases, used as an input for the PBKDF2, shall not be used as cryptographic keys.
- The length of the password or passphrase shall be at least 8 characters, and shall consist of lowercase, uppercase, and numeric characters. The probability of guessing the value is estimated to be at most 10⁻⁸. Combined with the minimum iteration count as described below, this provides an acceptable trade-off between user experience and security against brute-force attacks.
- A portion of the salt, with a length of at least 128 bits (this is verified by the module to determine the service is approved), shall be generated randomly using the SP 800-90Ar1 DRBG provided by the module.
- The iteration count shall be selected as large as possible, as long as the time required to generate the key using the entered password is acceptable for the users. The module only allows minimum iteration count to be 1000.

2.7.3 AES XTS

The length of a single data unit encrypted or decrypted with AES XTS shall not exceed 2²⁰ AES blocks, that is 16MB, of data per XTS instance. An XTS instance is defined in Section 4 of SP 800-38E. The XTS mode shall only be used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices. It shall not be used for other purposes, such as the encryption of data in transit.

To meet the requirement stated in IG C.I, the module implements a check to ensure that the two AES keys used in AES XTS mode are not identical.

2.7.4 SP 800-56Ar3 Assurances

The module offers DH and ECDH shared secret computation services compliant to the SP 800-56Ar3 and meeting IG D.F scenario 2 path (1). To meet the required assurances listed in section 5.6 of SP 800-56Ar3, the module shall be used together with an application that implements the "TLS protocol" and the following steps shall be performed.

- The entity using the module, must use module's "Key pair generation" service for generating DH/ECDH ephemeral keys. This meets the assurances required by key pair owner defined in the section 5.6.2.1 of SP 800-56Ar3.
- As part of the module's shared secret computation (SSC) service, the module internally performs the public key validation the peer's public key passed in as input to the SSC function. This meets the public key validity assurance required by the sections 5.6.2.2.1/5.6.2.2.2 of SP 800-56Ar3.
- The module does not support static keys. Therefore, the "assurance of peer's possession of private key" is not applicable.

2.7.5 Legacy Algorithms

The module provides the following legacy uses as defined in SP 800-131rev2:



 RSA Signature Verification, under FIPS 186-4, allows verifying signatures with a bit size of 1024, along with the approved modulus sizes of 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits.

2.8 RNG and Entropy

Entropy Information:

Name	Туре	Operational Environment	Sample Size	Entropy Per Sample	Conditioning Component
Oracle OpenSSL CPU	Non-physical	See Table 2	64 bits	Full entropy	Linear-Feedback
Time Jitter RNG Entropy					Shift Register
Source (Cert. #E90)					(LFSR); HMAC-SHA-512
					DRBG (AVP cert <u>A3862</u> ,
					A4162); AES-256 CTR DRBG
					(CAVP cert <u>A4311</u>)

Table 10 - Entropy

RNG Information:

The module employs two Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) implementations based on SP 800-90Ar1. These DRBGs are used internally by the module (e.g. to generate seeds for asymmetric key pairs and random numbers for security functions). They can also be accessed using the specified API functions. The following parameters are used:

- 1. Private DRBG: AES-256 CTR_DRBG with derivation function. This DRBG is used to generate secret random values (e.g. during asymmetric key pair generation). It can be accessed using RAND_priv_bytes.
- 2. Public DRBG: AES-256 CTR_DRBG with derivation function. This DRBG is used to generate general purpose random values that do not need to remain secret (e.g. initialization vectors). It can be accessed using RAND_bytes.

For seeding, the DRBG that is seeded with 384 bits of seed material, corresponding to 384 bits of entropy, obtained from the SP800-90B compliant entropy source above in Table 10. During reseeding, the DRBG obtains 256 bits of seed material, corresponding to 256 bits of entropy. These DRBGs will always employ prediction resistance. More information regarding the configuration and design of these DRBGs can be found in the module's manual pages.

2.9 Key Generation

Name	Туре	Properties
Safe primes key pair generation	CKG	Key type: DH key pair
		Groups: MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072,
		ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192
		Security strength: 112-200 bits
		Method: SP 800-56Ar3 (safe primes) Section 5.6.1.1.4 Testing Candidates
		Compliant to FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, SP 800-133r2, Section 4, 5.2
ECDSA key pair generation		Key type: EC key pair
		Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
		Security strength: 112-256 bits
		Method: FIPS 186-4 Appendix B.4.2 Testing Candidates
		Compliant to FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, SP 800-133r2, Section 4, 5.1
RSA key pair generation		Key type: RSA key pair
		Modulus: 2048-15360 bits
		Security strength: 112-256 bits
		Method: FIPS 186-4 Appendix B.3.6 Probable Primes with Conditions Based on
		Auxiliary Probable Primes
		Compliant to FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, SP 800-133r2, Section 4, 5.1
KBKDF key derivation	Key Derivation	Key type: Symmetric key
		Security strength: 112-256 bits



	Method: Counter and feedback mode, using CMAC and HMAC SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-
	256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-
	384, SHA3-512
	Compliant to SP 800-108r1
I/DA On a Stair	·
KDA OneStep	Key type: Symmetric key
	Security strength: 112-256 bits
	Method: (HMAC) SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-
	512/256, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
	Compliant to SP 800-56Cr2
HKDF	Key type: Symmetric key
	Security strength: 112-256 bits
	Method: (HMAC) SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-
	512/256, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
	Compliant to SP 800-56Cr1
ANS X9.42 KDF (CVL)	Key type: Symmetric key
	Security strength: 112-256 bits
	Method: AES KW with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224,
	SHA-512/256, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
	Compliant to SP 800-135r1
ANS X9.63 KDF (CVL)	Key type: Symmetric key
	Security strength: 112-256 bits
	Method: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256, SHA3-
	224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
	Compliant to SP 800-135r1
SSH KDF (CVL)	Key type: Symmetric key
	Security strength: 112-256 bits
	Method: AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-
	512
	Compliant to SP 800-135r1
TLS 1.2 KDF (RFC 7627) (CVL)	Key type: Symmetric key
, , ,	Security strength: 112-256 bits
	Method: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
	Compliant to SP 800-135r1
TLS 1.3 KDF (CVL)	Key type: Symmetric key
	Security strength: 112-256 bits
	Method: SHA-256, SHA-384
	Compliant to SP 800-135r1
PBKDF2	Key type: Symmetric key
1 51312	Security strength: 112-256 bits
	Method: Option 1a with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224,
	SHA-512/256, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
	Compliant to option 1a of SP 800-132
	Combinant to obtion 19 on 24 one-125

Table 11 - Key Generation



2.10 Key Establishment

Name	Туре	Properties
KAS-FFC-SSC [SP800-56Arev3]	KAS (Shared Secret Computation)	Groups: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192,
		MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192
		Security strength: 112-200 bits
		Compliant with:
		Scenario 2 (1) of FIPS 140-3 IG D.F: Shared secret computation
KAS-ECC-SSC [SP800-56Arev3]		Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
		Security strength: 112-256 bits
		Compliant with:
		Scenario 2 (1) of FIPS 140-3 IG D.F: Shared secret computation
AES CCM [SP 800-38C]	KTS-Wrap (Key Wrapping, Key	Keys: 128, 192, or 256 bits
	Unwrapping)	Security strength: 128, 192, or 256 bits
		Compliant with IG D.G
AES GCM [SP 800-38D]	KTS-Wrap (Key Wrapping)	Keys: 128, 192, or 256 bits
		Security strength: 128, 192, or 256 bits
		IV generated internally
		Compliant with IG D.G Additional comment 8
	KTS-Wrap (Key Unwrapping)	Keys: 128, 192, or 256 bits
		Security strength: 128, 192, or 256 bits
		IV provided externally
		Compliant with IG D.G Additional comment 8
AES KW [SP 800-38F]	KTS-Wrap (Key Wrapping, Key	Keys: 128, 192, or 256 bits
AES KWP [SP 800-38F]	-Unwrapping)	Security strength: 128, 192, or 256 bits
ALS KVVF [SF 600-56F]		Compliant with IG D.G

Table 12 - Key Establishment

2.11 Industry Protocols

For DH, the module supports the use of the safe primes defined in RFC 3526 (IKE) and RFC 7919 (TLS) as listed in Table 12. Note that the module only implements key pair generation, key pair verification, and shared secret computation.

SSH KDF, TLS 1.2 KDF (RFC 7627), TLS 1.3 KDF implementations shall only be used to generate secret keys in the context of the SSH, TLS 1.2, or TLS 1.3 protocols, respectively. Note that TLS 1.2 KDF must be compliant with RFC 7627 to be considered approved.

ANS X9.42 KDF and ANS X9.63 KDF implementations shall only be used to generate secret keys in the context of an ANS X9.42-2001 resp. ANS X9.63-2001 key agreement scheme.

No other part of the IKE, SSH or TLS protocols, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs listed above, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.



3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces

3.1 Description

Physical Port	Logical Interface	Data That Passes Over the Port/Interface
As a software-only module, the module does not	Data Input	API data input parameters
have physical ports. Physical Ports are interpreted	Data Output	API output parameters
to be the physical ports of the hardware platform	Control Input	API function calls, API control input parameters
on which it runs.	Status Output	API return code, error queue

Table 13 - Ports and Interfaces

The logical interfaces are the APIs through which the applications request services. These logical interfaces are logically separated from each other by the API design.

3.2 Trusted Channel Specification

The module does not implement a trusted channel.

3.3 Control Interface Not Inhibited

The module does not implement a control output interface.



4 Roles, Services, and Authentication

4.1 Authentication Methods

The module does not implement authentication.

4.2 Roles

Name Type		Operator Type	Authentication Methods	
Crypto Officer	Role	СО	N/A (Implicitly assumed)	

Table 14 - Roles

The module supports the Crypto Officer role only. This sole role is implicitly and always assumed by the operator of the module. No support is provided for multiple concurrent operators.

4.3 Approved Services

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	Roles	SSP Access
Mossago	Computo a	EVD DigostEinal ov roturns	Mossago	Digost		CO	N/A
Message Digest	Compute a message	. –	Message	Digest value	SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-	CO	IN/A
Digest	digest	1		value	384, SHA2-512,		
	uigest				SHA2-512/224,		
					SHA2-512/256,		
					SHA3-224, SHA3-		
					256, SHA3-384,		
					SHA3-512		
XOF	Compute	EVP DigestFinalXOF	Message	Digest	SHAKE128,		N/A
NO1	the output	returns 1	Wiessage	value	SHAKE256		1,4,7,
	of an XOF	returns 1		Value	31 // (KE230		
Encryption	Encrypt a	EVP_EncryptFinal_ex	AES Key,	Ciphertext	AES ECB, CBC,		AES Key: W, E
	plaintext	returns 1	plaintext		CBC-CTS-CS1,		
Decryption	Decrypt a	EVP_DecryptFinal_ex	AES Key,	Plaintext	CBC-CTS-CS2,		
	ciphertext	returns 1	ciphertext		CBC-CTS-CS3,		
					CFB1, CFB8,		
					CFB128, CTR,		
					OFB, XTS		
Authenticated	Encrypt a	AES GCM:	AES Key,	Ciphertext,	AES CCM, GCM		AES Key: W, E
Encryption	plaintext	EVP_CIPHER_*_FIPS_INDICA	plaintext,	MAC tag	(internal IV)		
		TOR_APPROVED	IV (for CCM				
			and GCM				
		Others:	only)				
		EVP_EncryptFinal_ex					
		returns 1					
Authenticated	Decrypt a	AES GCM:	AES Key,	Plaintext or	AES CCM, GCM		
Decryption	ciphertext	EVP_CIPHER_*_FIPS_INDICA	ciphertext,	failure	(external IV)		
		TOR_APPROVED	MAC tag				
		Others:					
		EVP_DecryptFinal_ex					
		returns 1					
Message	Compute a	HMAC:	AES Key,	MAC tag	AES CMAC, AES		AES Key: W, E
Authentication	MAC tag	EVP_MAC_*_FIPS_INDICAT	message		GMAC		
Code		OR_APPROVED					



Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	Roles	SSP Access
Generation		Others: EVP_MAC_final returns 1	HMAC Key, message		HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-224, HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-384,		HMAC Key: W, E
					HMAC-SHA2-512, HMAC-SHA2- 512/224, HMAC- SHA2-512/256,		
					HMAC-SHA3-224, HMAC-SHA3-256, HMAC-SHA3-384, HMAC-SHA3-512		
Message Authentication Code	Verify a MAC tag		AES Key, message, MAC tag	Pass/fail	AES CMAC, AES GMAC		AES Key: W, E
Verification			HMAC Key, message, MAC tag		HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-224, HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2-512, HMAC-SHA2- 512/224, HMAC- SHA2-512/256, HMAC-SHA3-224, HMAC-SHA3-256, HMAC-SHA3-384,		HMAC Key: W, E
Shared Secret	Compute a	EVP_PKEY_derive returns 1	DH Private	Shared	HMAC-SHA3-512 KAS-FFC-SSC		DH Private Key: W, E;
Computation	Shared Secret		Key, DH Public Key	Secret			DH Public Key: W, E; Shared Secret: G, R
			EC Private Key, EC Public Key		KAS-ECC-SSC		EC Private Key: W, E; EC Public Key: W, E; Shared Secret: G, R
Key Derivation	Derive a key	EVP_KDF_*_FIPS_INDICATO R_APPROVED	TLS Pre- Master Secret	Secret	TLS 1.2 KDF (RFC 7627) (CVL), TLS 1.3 KDF (CVL)		TLS Pre-Master Secret: G; TLS Master Secret: G
			TLS Master Secret	Derived Key	TLS 1.2 KDF (RFC 7627) (CVL), TLS 1.3 KDF (CVL)		TLS Master Secret: E; TLS Derived Key: G, R
			Shared Secret	Derived Key	KDA OneStep, KDA HKDF, KDF, ANS X9.42 KDF (CVL), ANS X9.63 KDF (CVL), SSH KDF (CVL)		Shared Secret: W, E; KDA HKDF Derived key: G, R; KDA OneStep Derived key: G, R; SSH KDF Derived Key: G, R ANS X9.42 KDF Derived key: G, R; ANS X9.63 KDF Derived key: G, R;
Key-Based Key Derivation	Derive a key from a key		Key- Derivation Key		KBKDF		Key-Derivation Key: W, E; KBKDF Derived Key: G, R
Password- Based Key Derivation	Derive a key from a password		Password	-	PBKDF2		Password: W, E; PBKDF2 Derived Key: G, R
Key Pair	Generate a	EVP_PKEY_generate	DH Group	Module	Safe Primes Key		Module Generated DH Private



Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	Roles	SSP Access
Generation	key pair	returns 1		Generated DH Private Key, Module Generated DH Public Key	Generation CKG		Key: G, R; Module Generated DH Public Key: G, R; Intermediate Key Generation Value: G, E, Z
			Curve	Module Generated EC Private Key, Module Generated EC Public Key	ECDSA KeyGen CKG		Module Generated EC Private Key: G, R; Module Generated EC Public Key: G, R; Intermediate Key Generation Value: G, E, Z
			Modulus	Module	RSA KeyGen CKG		Module Generated RSA Private Key: G, R; Module Generated RSA Public Key: G, R Intermediate Key Generation Value: G, E, Z
Key Pair Verification	pair. Safe	EVP_PKEY_public_check or EVP_PKEY_private_check or EVP_PKEY_check returns 1	DH Private Key, DH Public Key EC Private Key, EC Public Key	Pass/fail	Safe Prime KeyVer, ECDSA KeyVer		DH Public Key: W, E; DH Private Key: W, E; EC Private Key: W, E; EC Public Key: W, E
Key Wrapping		EVP_EncryptFinal_ex returns 1	AES Key, key to be wrapped	Wrapped key	AES CCM, GCM (internal IV), AES KW, AES KWP		AES Key: W, E
Key Unwrapping	Unwrap a key	EVP_DecryptFinal_ex returns 1	AES Key, key to be unwrapped	Unwrappe d key	AES CCM, GCM (external IV), AES KW, AES KWP		AES Key: W, E
Random Number Generation	Generate random bytes	EVP_RAND_generate returns 1	Output length	Random bytes	CTR_DRBG HMAC_DRBG Hash_DRBG		Entropy Input: W, E; DRBG Seed: E, G; Internal State (V, Key): E, G Entropy Input: W, E; DRBG Seed: E, G; Internal State (V, C): E, G
Signature Verification	Verify a digital signature	RSA: OSSL_*_FIPSINDICATOR_AP PROVED and EVP_SIGNATURE_*_FIPS_IN DICATOR_APPROVED ECDSA:	Message, EC public key or RSA Public Key, signature, hash algorithm	Pass/fail	RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS with SHA-224, SHA- 256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA- 512/224, SHA- 512/256		RSA Public Key: W, E; ECDSA Public Key: W, E
Signature Generation	Generate a digital signature		Message, EC Private Key or RSA Private	Signature	ECDSA (P-224, P- 256, P-384, P- 521) with SHA-		RSA Private Key: W, E; ECDSA Private Key: W, E



Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	Roles	SSP Access
			Key, hash algorithm		224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA- 512, SHA- 512/224, SHA- 512/256, SHA3- 224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3- 512		
Show Version	Return the module name and version information	None	N/A	Module name and version	N/A		N/A
Show Status	Return the module status	None	N/A	Module status	N/A		N/A
Self-Test	Perform the CASTs and integrity tests	None	N/A	Pass/fail	SHA-1, SHA-512, SHA3-256, AES ECB, AES GCM, KBKDF, KDA OneStep, HKDF, ANS X9.42 KDF (CVL), ANS X9.63 KDF (CVL), SSH KDF (CVL), TLS 1.2 KDF (RFC 7627) (CVL), TLS 1.3 KDF (CVL), PBKDF2, CTR_DRBG, Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, KAS-FFC-SSC, KAS-ECC-SSC, RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, ECDSA		N/A
Zeroization	Zeroize all SSPs	None	Any SSP	N/A	N/A	-	All SSPs: Z

Table 15 - Approved Services

Table 15 above lists the approved services. The following convention is used to specify access rights to SSPs:

- **Generate (G)**: The module generates or derives the SSP.
- Read (R): The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).
- Write (W): The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
- Execute (E): The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
- **Zeroize (Z)**: The module zeroizes the SSP.



To interact with the module, a calling application must use the EVP API layer provided by OpenSSL. This layer will delegate the request to the FIPS provider, which will in turn perform the requested service. Additionally, this EVP API layer can be used to retrieve the approved service indicator for the module. The redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator() function indicates whether an EVP API function is approved. After a cryptographic service was performed by the module, the API context associated with this request can contain a parameter (listed below) which represents the approved service indicator.

- OSSL CIPHER PARAM * FIPS INDICATOR
- OSSL_MAC_PARAM_*_FIPS_INDICATOR
- OSSL_KDF_PARAM_*_FIPS_INDICATOR
- OSSL SIGNATURE PARAM * FIPS INDICATOR
- OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_*_FIPS_INDICATOR

4.4 Non-Approved Services

Name	Description	Security Functions	Role
Encryption	Encrypt a plaintext	AES GCM with external IV	СО
Message Authentication Code	Compute a MAC tag	HMAC with < 112-bit keys	
Generation			
Message Authentication Code	Verify a MAC tag		
Verification			
Key Derivation	Derive a key	KDA OneStep with < 112-bit keys	
		HKDF with < 112-bit keys	
		ANS X9.42 KDF with < 112-bit keys	
		ANS X9.63 KDF with < 112-bit keys	
		SSH KDF with < 112-bit keys	
		TLS 1.2 KDF < 112-bit keys	
		TLS 1.3 KDF < 112-bit keys	
		KDA OneStep with SHAKE128, SHAKE256	
		ANS X9.42 KDF with SHAKE128, SHAKE256	
		ANS X9.63 KDF with SHA-1, SHAKE128, SHAKE256	
		SSH KDF with SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256, SHA-3,	
		SHAKE128, SHAKE256	
		TLS 1.2 KDF using master secret non-compliant with RFC	
		7627	
		TLS 1.2 KDF with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-512/224, SHA-	
		512/256, SHA-3	
		TLS 1.3 KDF with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-512, SHA-512/224,	
		SHA-512/256, SHA-3	
Key-Based Key Derivation	Derive a key from a derivation key	KBKDF with < 112-bit keys	
Password-Based Key Derivation	Derive a key from a password	PBKDF2 with a short password; short salt; insufficient	
		iterations; < 112-bit keys	
Key Pair Generation	Generate a key pair	ECDSA with curve P-192	
Key Pair Verification	Verify a key		
Shared Secret Computation	Compute a shared secret	KAS1, KAS2	
Signature Generation	Generate a signature	ECDSA signature generation with a pre-hashed message,	
		ECDSA with curve P-192	
		RSA signature generation with a pre-hashed message	
Signature Verification	Verify a signature	ECDSA signature verification with a pre-hashed message,	
		ECDSA with curve P-192]
		RSA signature verification with a pre-hashed message	
Asymmetric Encryption	Encrypt a plaintext	RSA-OAEP encryption]
Asymmetric Decryption	Decrypt a plaintext	RSA-OAEP decryption	



Table 16 - Non-Approved Services

4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded

The module does not load external software or firmware.

4.6 Bypass Actions and Status

The module does not implement a bypass capability.

4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status

The module does not implement a self-initiated cryptographic output capability.



5 Software/Firmware Security

5.1 Integrity Techniques

The integrity of the module is verified by comparing a HMAC SHA-256 value calculated at run time with the HMAC SHA-256 value embedded in the fips.so file that was computed at build time. If the integrity test fails, the module enters the error state.

5.2 Initiate on Demand

Integrity tests are performed as part of the pre-operational self-tests, which are executed when the module is initialized. The integrity test may be invoked on-demand by unloading and subsequently re-initializing the module, or by calling the OSSL_PROVIDER_self_test function. This will perform (among others) the software integrity test.



6 Operational Environment

6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements

Type of Operating Environment: modifiable: the module executes on a general purpose operating system (Oracle Linux 9), which allows modification, loading, and execution of software that is not part of the validated module.

How Requirements are Satisfied: The operating system provides process isolation and memory protection mechanisms that ensure appropriate separation for memory access among the processes on the system. Each process has control over its own data and uncontrolled access to the data of other processes is prevented.

6.2 Configurable Settings and Restrictions

The module shall be installed as stated in Section 11.1.

There are no concurrent operators.

The module does not have the capability of loading software or firmware from an external source.

Instrumentation tools like the ptrace system call, gdb and strace, userspace live patching, as well as other tracing mechanisms offered by the Linux environment such as ftrace or systemtap, shall not be used in the operational environment. The use of any of these tools implies that the cryptographic module is running in a non-validated operational environment.



7 Physical Security

The module is comprised of software only and therefore this section is not applicable.



8 Non-Invasive Security

This module does not implement any non-invasive security mechanism and therefore this section is not applicable.



9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management

9.1 Storage Areas

Storage Area Name	Description	Persistence Type
RAM	Temporary storage for SSPs used by the module as part of service	Dynamic
	execution. The module does not perform persistent storage of SSPs.	

Table 17 - Storage Areas

9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods

Name	From	То	Format Type	Distribution Type	Entry Type	Related SFI
	Toperator canning	Cryptographic module	Plaintext (P)	Manual (MD)	Electronic (EE)	N/A
API output parameters	Cryptographic module	Operator calling application (TOEPP)				

Table 18 - SSP Input-Output

The module does not support entry and output of SSPs beyond the physical perimeter of the operational environment. The SSPs are provided to the module via API input parameters in the plaintext form and output via API output parameters in the plaintext form to and from the calling application running on the same operational environment.

9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods

Zeroization Method	Description	Rationale	Operator Initiation
Calling the zeroization API	Zeroizes the	Memory occupied by SSPs is	By calling the appropriate zeroization functions:
	SSPs	overwritten with zeroes, which	AES key: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free,
		renders the SSP values irretrievable.	EVP_MAC_CTX_free
		All data output is inhibited during	HMAC key: EVP_MAC_CTX_free
		zeroization.	Key-derivation key: EVP_KDF_CTX_free
			Shared secret: EVP_KDF_CTX_free
			PBKDF Password: EVP_KDF_CTX_free
			Derived key: EVP_KDF_CTX_free
			Entropy input: EVP_RAND_CTX_free
			DRBG seed: EVP_RAND_CTX_free
			DRBG Internal state: EVP_RAND_CTX_free
			DH private key: EVP_PKEY_free
			DH public key: EVP_PKEY_free
			EC private key: EVP_PKEY_free
			EC public key: EVP_PKEY_free
			RSA private key: EVP_PKEY_free
			RSA public key: EVP_PKEY_free
			TLS pre-master secret: EVP_KDF_CTX_free
			TLS master secret: EVP_KDF_CTX_free
			TLS derived secret: EVP_KDF_CTX_free
Automatic			Intermediate key generation value: zeroized
			automatically by the module (after the requested
			service completed)



Remove power from the	De-allocates	Volatile memory used by the module	By removing power
module	the volatile	is overwritten within nanoseconds	
	memory used	when power is removed	
	to store SSPs		

Table 19 - SSP Zeroization Methods

9.4 SSPs

Name	Description	Size	Strength	Туре	Generated By	Established By
AES Key	AES key used for encryption, decryption, authenticated encryption, authenticated decryption, key wrapping, key unwrapping, and computing MAC tags	128, 192, 256 bits	128-256 bits	Symmetric key	N/A	N/A
HMAC Key	HMAC key	112-524288 bits	112-256 bits	Authentication key	N/A	N/A
Shared Secret	Shared secret	ECDH: 128-256 bits		Shared secret	N/A	KAS-ECC-SSC
	established by DH/ECDH	DH: 112-200 bits	112-200 bits			KAS-FFC-SSC
Key-Derivation Key	Key-derivation key for KBKDF	112-256 bits	112-256 bits	Key-derivation key	N/A	N/A
Password	PBKDF2 password	At least 14 characters	N/A	Password	N/A	N/A
KBKDF Derived Key	KBKDF derived key	112-4096 bits	112-256 bits	Derived key	KBKDF	N/A
PBKDF2 Derived key	PBKDF2 derived key	112-4096 bits			PBKDF2	
KDA OneStep Derived key	KDA OneStep derived key	112-2048 bits			OneStep KDA	
KDA HKDF Derived key	KDA HKDF derived key	2048 bits			KDA HKDF	
ANS X9.42 KDF Derived key	ANS X9.42 KDF derived key	112-4096 bits			ANS X9.42 KDF (CVL)	
ANS X9.63 KDF Derived key	ANS X9.63 KDF derived key	128-4096 bits			ANS X9.63 KDF (CVL)	
SSH KDF Derived key	SSH KDF derived key	112-1024 bits			SSH KDF (CVL)	
Entropy Input	Entropy input used to seed the DRBGs	128-448 bits	128-256 bits	Entropy	Entropy Source (ESV cert. E90) See Table 10	N/A
DRBG Seed	DRBG seed derived from entropy input as defined in SP 800-	CTR_DRBG: 128, 192, 256 bits Hash_DRBG: 128, 256 bits	128-256 bits	Seed	CTR_DRBG, Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG	N/A



Name	Description	Size	Strength	Туре	Generated By	Established By
	90Ar1	HMAC_DRBG: 128, 256 bits				
DRBG Internal State (V, Key)	Internal state of CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG	CTR_DRBG: 128, 192, 256 bits HMAC_DRBG: 128, 256 bits	128-256 bits	DRBG Internal state	HMAC_DRBG (derived from DRBG seed as defined in SP800-90Ar1)	N/A
DRBG Internal State (V, C)	Internal state of Hash_DRBG	Hash_DRBG: 128, 256 bits	128-256 bits		Hash_DRBG (derived from DRBG seed as defined in SP800- 90Ar1)	N/A
DH Public Key		ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096,	112-200 bits	Public key	N/A	KAS-FFC-SSC
DH Private Key	,	ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP- 2048, MODP-3072,		Private key		
Module Generated DH Public Key	DH public key	MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192		Public key	Safe primes (SP 800- 56Ar3 section 5.6.1.1.4 Testing Candidates)	N/A
Module Generated DH Private Key	DH private key generated by the module			Private key	CTR_DRBG (for generation of random values per SP 800- 90Ar1)	
EC Private Key	Private key used for ECDSA signature generation and Shared Secret Computation	P-224, P-256, P- 384, P-521	112, 128, 192, 256 bits	Private key	N/A	KAS-ECC-SSC
EC Public Key	Public key used for ECDSA signature verification and Shared Secret Computation			Public key		
Module Generated EC Private Key	EC private key generated by the module			Private key	ECDSA (FIPS 186-4 Appendix B.4.2 Testing Candidates)	N/A
Module Generated EC Public Key	EC public key generated by the module			Public key	CTR_DRBG (for generation of random values per SP 800-90Ar1)	
RSA Private Key	Private key used for RSA signature generation	2048, 3072, 4096 bits	112, 128, 150 bits	Private key	N/A	N/A
RSA Public Key	Public key used for RSA signature verification	1024, 2048, 3072, 4096 bits	80, 112, 128, 150 bits	Public key	N/A	N/A
Module Generated RSA	RSA private key generated by the	2048, 3072, 4096	112, 128, 150 bits	Private key	RSA (FIPS 186-4 Appendix B.3.6	N/A



Name	Description	Size	Strength	Туре	Generated By	Established By
Private Key	module	bits			Probable Primes with	
Module Generated RSA Public Key	RSA public key generated by the module			Public key	Conditions Based on Auxiliary Probable Primes) CTR_DRBG (random values generation per	N/A
					800-90Ar1)	
Intermediate Key Generation Value	Intermediate key generation value	224-4096 bits	112-256 bits	Intermediate key generation value	CKG	N/A
TLS Pre-Master Secret	TLS pre-master secret used for deriving the TLS master secret	112-256 bits	112-256 bits	TLS pre-master secret	N/A	KAS-FFC-SSC, KAS-ECC-SSC
TLS Master Secret	TLS master secret used for deriving the TLS derived secret	112-256 bits	112-256 bits	TLS master secret	TLS 1.2 KDF (RFC 7627) (CVL), TLS 1.3 KDF (CVL)	N/A
TLS Derived Key	TLS derived key, derived from TLS master secret	112-256 bits	112-256 bits	Shared secret		N/A

Table 20 - SSP Information First

Name	Used By	Inputs/Outputs	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Туре	Related SSPs
AES Key	Encryption,	API input	RAM	For the duration of	Free Cipher	CSP	None
	Decryption,	parameters		the service	Handle, Module		
	Authenticated	(input)			Reset		
	Encryption,						
	Authenticated						
	Decryption, Key						
	Wrapping, Key						
	Unwrapping						
	Message						
	Authentication						
	Code Generation,						
	Message						
	Authentication						
	Code Verification						
HMAC Key	Message						
	Authentication						
	Code Generation,						
	Message						
	Authentication						
	Code Verification						
Shared Secret	Key Derivation	API output					DH Public Key,
		parameters					DH Private Key,
		(output)					EC Public Key, EC
							Private Key, KDA
							OneStep Derived
							key, KDA HKDF



Name	Used By	Inputs/Outputs	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Туре	Related SSPs
							Derived key, ANS X9.63 KDF Derived key, SSH KDF Derived key
Key-Derivation	Key-Based Key	API input		For the duration of			KBKDF Derived
Key	Derivation	parameters		the service			Key
		(input)					-
Password	Password-Based Key Derivation	API input parameters (input)					PBKDF2 Derived Key
KBKDF Derived	Key-based Key	API output					Key-derivation
Key	Derivation	parameters					Key
PBKDF2 Derived	Password-based	(output)					Password
key	Key Derivation						
KDA OneStep	Key Derivation						Shared secret
Derived key							Chanada a anat
KDA HKDF Derived key							Shared secret
ANS X9.42 KDF							Shared secret
Derived key							Silai eu seci et
ANS X9.63 KDF							Shared secret
Derived key							
SSH KDF Derived							Shared secret
key							
Entropy Input	Random Number Generation	N/A		From generation until DRBG seed is created		CSP (Compliant with IG D.L)	DRBG Seed
DRBG Seed		N/A		While the DRBG is being instantiated			Entropy Input DRBG Internal State (V, C) DRBG Internal State (V, Key)
DRBG Internal State (V, Key)		N/A		From DRBG instantiation until			DRBG Seed
DRBG Internal		N/A		DRBG termination			DRBG Seed
State (V, C)							
DH Public Key	Shared Secret	API input		For the duration of		PSP	DH Private Key
DII Duimeta Kam	Computation,	parameters		the service		CCD	Shared Secret
DH Private Key	Key Pair Verification	(input)				CSP	DH Public Key Shared Secret
Module	Shared Secret	API output				PSP	Module
Generated DH	Computation	parameters					Generated DH
Public Key		(output)					Private Key
							Intermediate key
Modula	-					CCD	generation value
Module Generated DH						CSP	Module Generated DH
Private Key							Public Key
vate Rey							Intermediate key
							generation value
EC Public Key	Shared Secret	API input				PSP	EC Private Key
	Computation,	parameters					Shared Secret
	Signature Verification,	(input)					



Name	Used By	Inputs/Outputs	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Туре	Related SSPs
	Key Pair Verification						
EC Private Key	Shared Secret Computation, Signature Generation,					CSP	EC Public Key Shared Secret
	Key Pair Verification						
Module Generated EC Public Key	Shared Secret Computation	API output parameters (output)				PSP	Module Generated EC Private Key Intermediate key generation value
Module Generated EC Private Key						CSP	Module Generated EC Public Key Intermediate key generation value
RSA Private Key	Digital Signature Generation	API input parameters				CSP	RSA Public Key
RSA Public Key	Digital Signature Verification	-(input)				PSP	RSA Private Key
Module Generated RSA Private Key	N/A	API output parameters (output)				CSP	Module Generated RSA Public Key Intermediate key generation value
Module Generated RSA Public Key						PSP	Module Generated RSA Private Key Intermediate key generation value
Intermediate Key Generation Value	Key Pair Generation	N/A			Automatically	CSP	Module Generated RSA Public Key, Module Generated RSA Private Key, Module Generated DH Public Key, Module Generated DH Private Key, Module Generated EC Public Key, Module Generated EC Public Key, Module
TLS Pre-Master Secret	Key Derivation	N/A			Free Cipher Handle, Module	CSP	TLS Master



Name	Used By	Inputs/Outputs	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Туре	Related SSPs
					Reset		Secret
							DH Public Key
							DH Private Key
							EC Public Key
							EC Private Key
TLS Master		N/A				CSP	TLS Pre-Master
Secret							Secret
							TLS Derived
							Secret
TLS Derived Key		API output				CSP	TLS Master
		parameters					Secret
		(output)					

Table 21 - SSP Information Second

9.5 Transitions

The SHA-1 algorithm as implemented by the module will be non-approved for all purposes, starting January 1, 2030.

The RSA, ECDSA algorithm as implemented by the module conforms to FIPS 186-4, which has been superseded by FIPS 186-5. FIPS 186-4 will be withdrawn on February 3, 2024.



10 Self-Tests

10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests

Algorithm	Implementation	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details
HMAC-SHA2-256	SHA_CE, SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3, NEON	,	Message Authentication			Integrity test for fips.so

Table 22 - Pre-Operational Self-Tests

The pre-operational software integrity test is performed automatically (after the CASTs) when the module is powered on before the module transitions into the operational state. The algorithm used for the integrity test (i.e., HMAC-SHA2-256) is self-tested before the software integrity test is performed. While the module is executing the self-tests, services are not available, and data output (via the data output interface) is inhibited until the tests are successfully completed. The module transitions to the operational state only after the pre-operational self-test has passed successfully. If the pre-operational self-test fails, the module transitions to the error state.

10.2 Conditional Self-Tests

Algorithm	Implementation	Test Properties	Test Method	Туре	Indicator	Details	Conditions
ECDSA	SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3, SHA_ASM, SHA_CE	SHA2-256	PCT	Pair-Wise Consistency Test	Successful key generation	Signature generation and verification	EC key pair generation
RSA	SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3, SHA_ASM, SHA_CE	PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA2-256					RSA key pair generation
Safe Primes	С	N/A				Public key re- computation and comparison with the existing public key (per SP 800-56Ar3 Section 5.6.2.1.4)	Safe Primes key pair generation
SHA-1, SHA2-512	SHA_CE, SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3	24-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module is operational	Message Digest	Module initialization
SHA3-256	SHA3_ASM, SHA3_CE	32-bit message					
AES-ECB	SSH_ASM, AESNI, BAES_CTASM, AESASM, SSH_SHANI, SSH_AVX2, SSH_AVX, SSH_SSSE3, CE, VPAES, AES_C	128-bit keys, 128-bit ciphertext				Decryption	



Algorithm	Implementation	Test Properties	Test Method	Туре	Indicator	Details
AES-GCM	AESNI_AVX,	256-bit keys, 96-				Encryption
	AESNI_CLMULNI,	bit IVs, 128-bit				
	AESNI_ASM,	plaintext, 128-				
	BAES_CTASM_AVX, BAES_CTASM_CLMULNI,	bit additional				Decryption
	BAES_CTASM_ASM,	data				
	AESASM_AVX,					
	AESASM_CLMULNI,					
	AESASM_ASM,					
	CE_GCM_UNROLL8_EOR3,					
	CE GCM, VPAES GCM,					
	AES_C_GCM					
BKDF	KBKDF	Counter mode,				Key Derivation
	KBKBI	HMAC-SHA2-				
		256, 128-bit				
		input key				
CDA OneStep	KDA	SHA-224, 392-bit				
		input secret				
HKDF	TLS v1.3	SHA-256, 48-bit				
		input secret				
ANS X9.42 KDF (CVL)	SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI,	SHA-1 with AES-				
	SHA_AVX2, SHA_AVX,	128, KW, 160-bit				
	SHA_SSSE3, SHA_CE	input secret				
NS X9.63 KDF (CVL)	SHA3_ASM, SHA_CE,	SHA-256, 192-bit				
	SHA3_CE, SHA_ASM,	input secret				
	SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2,					
	SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3,					
	SHA_CE					
SH KDF (CVL)	SSH_ASM, SSH_SHANI,	SHA-1, 1056-bit				
	SSH_AVX2, SSH_AVX,	input secret				
	SSH_SSSE3					
TLS 1.2 KDF (CVL)	SHA_CE, SHA_ASM,	SHA-256, 84-bit				
	SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2,	input secret				
	SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3,					
	SHA_CE					
TLS 1.3 KDF (CVL)	TLS v1.3	Extract and				
	1 1 1	expand modes,				
		SHA-256				
BKDF2	SHA_CE, SHA_ASM,	SHA-256, 24-				
	SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2,	character				
	SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3,	password, 288-				
	SHA_CE	bit salt, Iteration				
	_	count: 4096				
TR_DRBG	DRBG_3	AES-128 with				Instantiate,
		prediction				Generate,
		resistance and				Reseed,
		derivation				Generate
						(compliant



Algorithm	Implementation	Test Properties	Test Method	Туре	Indicator	Details	Conditions
Hash_DRBG	DRBG_3	SHA-256 with prediction resistance				with SP 800- 90Ar1 Section 11.3)	
HMAC_DRBG	DRBG_3	SHA-1 with prediction resistance					
KAS-FFC-SSC	С	ffdhe2048				Shared Secret Computation	
KAS-ECC-SSC	С	P-256					
RSA	SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_SSSE3, SHA_CE, NEON	PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 and 2048-bit key				Signature Generation Signature Verification	
ECDSA	SHA_ASM, SHA_SHANI, SHA_AVX2, SHA_AVX, SHA_SSSE3, SHA_CE	SHA-256 and P- 224, P-256, P- 384, and P-521				Signature Generation Signature Verification	

Table 23 - Conditional Self-Tests

10.2.1 Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Tests

The module performs self-tests on all approved cryptographic algorithms as part of the approved services supported in the approved mode of operation, using the tests shown in Table 23. Services are not available, and data output (via the data output interface) is inhibited during the self-tests. If any of these tests fails, the module transitions to the error state.

10.2.2 Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Tests

Upon generation of a DH, EC or RSA key pair, the module will perform a pair-wise consistency test (PCT) as shown in Table 23, which provides some assurance that the generated key pair is well formed. The test for DH consists of the PCT described in Section 5.6.2.1.4 of SP 800-56Ar3. For EC or RSA key pairs, the tests consist of performing signature generation and verification using the generated key pairs. Services are not available, and data output (via the data output interface) is inhibited during execution of the PCT. If a PCT test fails, the module transitions to the error state.

10.3 Periodic Self-Tests

The module does not implement any periodic self-tests.

10.4 Error States

Name	Description	Conditions	Recovery Method	Indicator
Error State	The module immediately stops functioning due to	Software integrity test failure	Restart of the module	Module will not load
	a self-test failure	CAST failure		
		PCT failure		Module stops
				functioning

Table 24 - Error States

In the error state, the output interface is inhibited, and the module accepts no more inputs or requests (as the module is no longer running).



10.5 Operator Initiation

The software integrity tests and CASTs can be invoked on demand by unloading and subsequently re-initializing the module. Additionally, the integrity test may be invoked on-demand by calling the OSSL_PROVIDER_self_test function. The PCTs can be invoked on demand by requesting the Key Pair Generation service.



11 Life-Cycle Assurance

11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures

The module is distributed as a part of the Oracle Linux 9 (OL9) RPM package in the form of openssl-libs-3.0.7-24.0.3.el9_fips RPM package that is located in the "Oracle Linux 9 Security Validation (Update 3)" yum repository (ol9 u3 security validation).

The module can achieve the approved mode by:

- For installation add the fips=1 option to the kernel command line during the system installation. During the software selection stage, do not install any third-party software.
- Switching the system into the approved mode after the installation. Execute the fips-mode-setup —enable command. Restart the system.

In both cases, the Crypto Officer must verify the Oracle Linux 9 system operates in approved mode by executing the fips-mode-setup –check command, which should output "FIPS mode is enabled."

For more information on Oracle Linux 9 system FIPS validated environment, please see Oracle Linux 9 product documentation.

After installation of the openssl-libs-3.0.7-24.0.3.el9_fips RPM package, the Crypto Officer must execute the openssl list - providers command. The Crypto Officer must ensure that the FIPS provider is listed in the output as follows:

fips

name: Oracle Linux Linux 9 OpenSSL FIPS Provider

version: 3.0.7-b27cdeb3ba51be46

status: active

The cryptographic boundary consists only of the FIPS provider as listed. If any other OpenSSL or third-party provider is invoked, the user is not interacting with the module specified in this Security Policy.

11.2 Administrator Guidance

The Approved and Non-Approved modes of operation are specified in Section 2.4. The administrative functions are specified in the Approved Services table. All the logical interfaces are specified in Section 3.1.

11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance

The approved and non-approved security functions available to users are listed in Section 2. The physical ports and logical interfaces available to users are specified in Section 3.1. The approved and non-approved modes of operation are specified in Section 2.4. All the algorithm-specific information is listed in Section 2.7.

11.4 Maintenance Requirements

There are no maintenance requirements.

11.5 End of Life

As the module does not persistently store SSPs, secure sanitization of the module consists of unloading the module. This will zeroize all SSPs in volatile memory. Then, if desired, the openssl-libs-3.0.7-24.0.3.el9_fips RPM package can be uninstalled from the Oracle Linux 9 system.



12 Mitigation of Other Attacks

Certain cryptographic subroutines and algorithms are vulnerable to timing analysis. The module mitigates this vulnerability by using constant-time implementations. This includes, but is not limited to:

- Big number operations: computing GCDs, modular inversion, multiplication, division, and modular exponentiation (using Montgomery multiplication)
- Elliptic curve point arithmetic: addition and multiplication (using the Montgomery ladder)
- Vector-based AES implementations

In addition, RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, and DH employ blinding techniques to further impede timing and power analysis. No configuration is needed to enable the aforementioned countermeasures.



Glossary and Abbreviations

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
	Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions
	Application Programming Interface
CAST	Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test
CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
CCM	Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
CFB	Cipher Feedback
CMAC	Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
CTR	Counter
CTS	Ciphertext Stealing
DH	Diffie-Hellman
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB	Electronic Code Book
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ENT (NP)	Non-physical Entropy Source
FFC	Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
GCM	Galois Counter Mode
GMAC	Galois Counter Mode Message Authentication Code
HKDF	HMAC-based Key Derivation Function
HMAC	Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
KAT	Known Answer Test
KBKDF	Key-based Key Derivation Function
MAC	Message Authentication Code
NIST	National Institute of Science and Technology
PAA	Processor Algorithm Acceleration
PBKDF2	Password-based Key Derivation Function v2
PKCS	Public-Key Cryptography Standards
RSA	Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
	Shared Secret Computation
SSP	Sensitive Security Parameter
TOEPP	Tested Operational Environment's Physical Perimeter
XTS	XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with cipher text Stealing



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