Apple Inc.
©2019 Apple Inc.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Apple CoreCrypto Cryptographic Module v9.0 for
ARM
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
March, 2019
Prepared for:
Apple Inc.
One Apple Park Way
Cupertino, CA 95014
www.apple.com
Prepared by:
atsec information security Corp.
9130 Jollyville Road, Suite 260
Austin, TX 78759
www.atsec.com
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 PURPOSE............................................................................................................................................................ 5
1.2 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION / COPYRIGHT................................................................................................................. 5
1.3 EXTERNAL RESOURCES / REFERENCES....................................................................................................................... 5
1.3.1 Additional References ...................................................................................................5
1.4 ACRONYMS ......................................................................................................................................................... 7
2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION ...................................................................................................... 8
2.1 MODULE DESCRIPTION.......................................................................................................................................... 8
2.1.1 Module Validation Level................................................................................................8
2.1.2 Module Components.....................................................................................................8
2.1.3 Tested Platforms ...........................................................................................................9
2.2 MODES OF OPERATION.......................................................................................................................................... 9
2.2.1 Approved or Allowed Security Functions....................................................................10
2.2.2 Non-Approved Security Functions: .............................................................................14
2.3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE BOUNDARY ................................................................................................................... 16
2.4 MODULE USAGE CONSIDERATIONS ........................................................................................................................ 16
3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE PORTS AND INTERFACES.......................................................................................17
4 ROLES, SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION........................................................................................................18
4.1 ROLES .............................................................................................................................................................. 18
4.2 SERVICES .......................................................................................................................................................... 18
4.3 OPERATOR AUTHENTICATION ................................................................................................................................ 23
5 PHYSICAL SECURITY ........................................................................................................................................24
6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT........................................................................................................................25
6.1 APPLICABILITY.................................................................................................................................................... 25
6.2 POLICY ............................................................................................................................................................. 25
7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT.............................................................................................................26
7.1 RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION........................................................................................................................... 26
7.2 KEY / CSP GENERATION ...................................................................................................................................... 26
7.3 KEY / CSP ESTABLISHMENT .................................................................................................................................. 26
7.4 KEY / CSP ENTRY AND OUTPUT ............................................................................................................................ 26
7.5 KEY / CSP STORAGE ........................................................................................................................................... 26
7.6 KEY / CSP ZEROIZATION ...................................................................................................................................... 27
8 ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE/ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY (EMI/EMC) ....................................28
9 SELF-TESTS......................................................................................................................................................29
9.1 POWER-UP TESTS .............................................................................................................................................. 29
9.1.1 Cryptographic Algorithm Tests....................................................................................29
9.1.2 Software / Firmware Integrity Tests ...........................................................................29
9.1.3 Critical Function Tests .................................................................................................30
9.2 CONDITIONAL TESTS ........................................................................................................................................... 30
9.2.1 Continuous Random Number Generator Test ............................................................30
9.2.2 Pair-wise Consistency Test ..........................................................................................30
9.2.3 SP 800-90A Assurance Tests........................................................................................30
9.2.4 Critical Function Test...................................................................................................30
10 DESIGN ASSURANCE ...................................................................................................................................31
10.1 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT........................................................................................................................... 31
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10.2 DELIVERY AND OPERATION................................................................................................................................... 31
10.3 DEVELOPMENT .................................................................................................................................................. 31
10.4 GUIDANCE ........................................................................................................................................................ 31
10.4.1 Cryptographic Officer Guidance..................................................................................31
10.4.2 User Guidance .............................................................................................................31
11 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS.................................................................................................................32
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List of Tables
Table 1: Module Validation Level...............................................................................................................................8
Table 2: Tested Platforms ............................................................................................................................................9
Table 3: Approved, Allowed and Vendor Affirmed Security Functions ..............................................................13
Table 4: Non-Approved or Non-Compliant Security Functions............................................................................15
Table 5: Roles ..............................................................................................................................................................18
Table 6: Approved and Allowed Services in Approved Mode..............................................................................22
Table 7: Non-Approved Services in Non-Approved Mode....................................................................................23
Table 8: Cryptographic Algorithm Tests...................................................................................................................29
List of Figures
Figure 1: Logical Block Diagram................................................................................................................................16
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This document is a non-proprietary Security Policy for the Apple CoreCrypto Cryptographic
Module v9.0 for ARM. The module’s version is v9. It describes the module and the FIPS 140-2
cryptographic services it provides. This document also defines the FIPS 140-2 security rules for
operating the module.
This document was prepared in fulfillment of the FIPS 140-2 requirements for cryptographic
modules and is intended for security officers, developers, system administrators, and end-users.
FIPS 140-2 details the requirements of the Governments of the U.S. and Canada for
cryptographic modules, aimed at the objective of protecting sensitive but unclassified information.
For more information on the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program please refer to the
NIST website at https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program.
Throughout the document “Apple CoreCrypto Cryptographic Module v9.0 for ARM.”
“cryptographic module”, “CoreCrypto” or “the module” are used interchangeably to refer to the
Apple CoreCrypto Cryptographic Module v9.0 for ARM. Throughout the document “OS” refers to
“iOS”, “tvOS”, “watchOS” and “TxFW” unless specifically noted.
1.2 Document Organization / Copyright
This non-proprietary Security Policy document may be reproduced and distributed only in its
original entirety without any revision, ©2019 Apple Inc.
1.3 External Resources / References
The Apple website (http://www.apple.com) contains information on the full line of products from
Apple Inc. For a detailed overview of the operating system iOS and its security properties refer to
[iOS] and [SEC]. For details on the OS releases with their corresponding validated modules and
Crypto Officer Role Guides refer to the Apple Knowledge Base Article HT202739 - “ Product
security certifications, validations, and guidance for iOS” (https://support.apple.com/en-
us/HT202739).
The Cryptographic Module Validation Program website
(https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program) contains links to the
FIPS 140-2 certificate and Apple Inc. contact information.
1.3.1 Additional References
FIPS 140-2 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, “FIPS PUB 140-2 Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules,” Issued May-25-2001, Effective 15-Nov-
2001, Location: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-
program/standards
FIPS 140-2
IG
NIST, “Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic
Module Validation Program,” November, 2018
Location: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Cryptographic-Module-
Validation-Program/documents/fips140-2/FIPS1402IG.pdf
FIPS 180-4 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, March 2012, Secure
Hash Standard (SHS)
FIPS 186-4 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July 2013, Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS 197 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001
Announcing the ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES)
FIPS 198 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198, July, 2008 The Keyed-
Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
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SP800-38 A NIST Special Publication 800-38A, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation”, December 2001
SP800-38 C NIST Special Publication 800-38C, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality”, May 2004
SP800-38 D NIST Special Publication 800-38D, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC”, November 2007
SP800-38 E NIST Special Publication 800-38E, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices”, January
2010
SP800-38 F NIST Special Publication 800-38E, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping”, December 2012
SP800-57P1NIST Special Publication 800-57, “Recommendation for Key Management – Part 1:
General (Revised),” July 2012
SP 800-90A NIST Special Publication 800-90A, “Recommendation for Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators,” January 2012
SP800-132 NIST Special Publication 800-132, “Recommendation for Password-Based Key
Derivation”, December 2010
SEC Security Overview
Location:
http://developer.apple.com/library/ios/#documentation/Security/Conceptual/Securit
y_Overview/Introduction/Introduction.html
iOS iOS Technical Overview
Location:
http://developer.apple.com/library/ios/#documentation/Miscellaneous/Conceptual/i
PhoneOSTechOverview/Introduction/Introduction.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP4000
7898
UG User Guide
Location: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202739
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1.4 Acronyms
Acronyms found in this document are defined as follows:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
BS Block Size
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining mode of operation
CFB Cipher Feedback mode of operation
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter mode of operation
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellmann
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Codebook mode of operation
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
EC Diffie-Hellman DH based on ECC
ECDSA DSA based on ECC
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FIPS PUB FIPS Publication
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
HMAC Hash-Based Message Authentication Code
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
KS Key Size (Length)
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OFB Output Feedback (mode of operation)
OS Operating System
PBKDF Password-based Key Derivation Function
PCT Pair-wise Consistency Test
RNG Random Number Generator
SHS Secure Hash Standard
Triple-DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TLS Transport Layer Security
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Module Description
The Apple CoreCrypto Cryptographic Module v9.0 for ARM is a software cryptographic module
running on a multi-chip standalone device.
The cryptographic services provided by the module are:
 Data encryption and decryption  Random number generation
 Generation of hash values  Key generation
 Key wrapping  Digital signature generation and
verification
 Message authentication  Key derivation
2.1.1 Module Validation Level
The module is intended to meet requirements of FIPS 140-2 security level 1 overall. The
following table shows the security level for each of the eleven requirement areas of the
validation.
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirement Area Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 1
Mitigation of Other Attacks 1
Table 1: Module Validation Level
2.1.2 Module Components
In the following sections the components of the Apple CoreCrypto Cryptographic Module v9.0 for
ARM are listed in detail. There are no components excluded from the validation testing.
2.1.2.1 Software components
CoreCrypto has an API layer that provides consistent interfaces to the supported algorithms.
These implementations include proprietary optimizations of algorithms that are fitted into the
CoreCrypto framework.
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2.1.3 Tested Platforms
The module has been tested with and without PAA1
on the following platforms :
Manufacturer Model Operating System
Apple Inc. iPhone 5S with Apple A7 CPU iOS 12
Apple Inc. iPhone 6 with Apple A8 CPU
(iPhone 6 and iPhone 6 Plus)
iOS 12
Apple Inc. iPhone 6S with Apple A9 CPU
(iPhone 6S and iPhone 6S Plus)
iOS 12
Apple Inc. iPhone 7 with Apple A10
2
Fusion CPU
(iPhone 7 and iPhone 7 Plus)
iOS 12
Apple Inc. iPhone 8 and iPhone X with Apple A11
3
Bionic CPU
(iPhone 8, iPhone 8 Plus, iPhone X)
iOS 12
Apple Inc. iPhone XS (XR / iPhone XS / iPhone XS Max) with
Apple A12 Bionic
3
CPU
iOS 12
Apple Inc. iPad Air 2 with Apple A8X CPU iOS 12
Apple Inc. iPad Pro with Apple A9X CPU iOS 12
Apple Inc. iPad Pro with Apple A10X
2
Fusion CPU iOS 12
Apple Inc. iPad Pro with Apple A12X
3
Bionic CPU iOS 12
Apple Inc. Apple TV 4K with Apple A10X
2
Fusion CPU tvOS 12
Apple Inc. Apple Watch Series 1 with Apple S1P CPU watchOS 5
Apple Inc. Apple Watch Series 3 with Apple S3 CPU watchOS 5
Apple Inc. Apple Watch Series 4 with Apple S4 CPU watchOS 5
Apple Inc. iMac Pro with Apple T2 TxFW 16P374
Apple Inc. MacBook Pro (13-inch and 15-inch) with Apple T2 TxFW 16P374
Table 2: Tested Platforms
2.2 Modes of Operation
The Apple CoreCrypto Cryptographic Module v9.0 for ARM has an Approved and non-Approved
modes of operation. The Approved mode of operation is configured by default and cannot be
changed. If the device starts up successfully then CoreCrypto framework has passed all self-
tests and is operating in the Approved mode. Any calls to the non-Approved security functions
listed in Table 4 will cause the module to assume the non-Approved mode of operation.
The module transitions back into FIPS mode immediately when invoking one of the approved
ciphers as all keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSP) handled by the module are ephemeral
and there are no keys and CSPs shared between any functions. A re-invocation of the self-tests
or integrity tests is not required.
Even when using this FIPS 140-2 non-approved mode, the module configuration ensures that the
self-tests are always performed during initialization time of the module.
The module contains multiple implementations of the same cipher as listed below. If multiple
implementations of the same cipher are present, the module selects automatically which cipher is
used based on internal heuristics.
The Approved security functions are listed in Table 3. Column four (Algorithm Certificate
Number) lists the validation numbers obtained from NIST for successful validation testing of the
implementation of the cryptographic algorithms on the platforms as shown in Table 2 under
CAVP.
1
PAA provided here is the ARM NEON present in Apple A and S series processors.
2
Apple A10 and A10X are also known as Apple A10 Fusion and Apple A10X Fusion.
3
Apple A11, A12, A12X and are also known as Apple A11 Bionic and Apple A12 Bionic.
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Refer to https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-algorithm-validation-program for the current
standards, test requirements, and special abbreviations used in the following table.
2.2.1 Approved or Allowed Security Functions
Cryptographic
Function
Algorithm Modes/Options Algorithm Certificate
Number
Random Number
Generation;
Symmetric Key
Generation
[SP 800-90]
DRBG
Generic Software (C) Implementation
Modes:
CTR_DRBG
AES-128, AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled
HMAC_DRBG
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224,
HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384,
HMAC-SHA-512
Without Prediction Resistance
2449, C95, C96, C97, C98, C99, C100,
C101, C102, C107, C148, C239, C242,
C243, C245
Generic Software (C) Implementation
using Assembler Implementation of ECB
Modes:
CTR_DRBG
AES-128, AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled
2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317,
2318, 2319, 2429, 2432, 2443, C106,
C145, C240, C241
VNG Implementation using (C)
Implementation of ECB:
Modes:
HMAC_DRBG
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224,
HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384,
HMAC-SHA-512
Without Prediction Resistance
2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333,
2334, 2335, 2431, 2434, 2445, C13,
C16, C29, C30
VNG Implementation using Assembler
Implementation of ECB
Modes:
CTR_DRBG
AES-128, AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled
2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325,
2326, 2327, 2430, 2433, 2444, C105,
C146, C246, C247
Symmetric
Encryption and
Decryption
[FIPS 197]
AES
SP 800-38 A
SP 800-38 D
SP 800-38 E
SP 800-38 F
Generic Software (C) Implementation
(Based on LibTomCrypt):
Modes:
ECB CFB128 OFB
CBC CTR XTS
4
CCM GCM
CFB8 KW
5886, C95, C96, C97, C98, C99, C100,
C101, C102, C107, C148, C239, C242,
C243, C245
4
XTS approved with 128-bit and 256-bit key size only;
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Cryptographic
Function
Algorithm Modes/Options Algorithm Certificate
Number
Generic Software (C) Implementation
using Assembler Implementation of
ECB:
Modes:
ECB CFB128 OFB
CBC CTR XTS
4
CCM GCM
CFB8 KW
5701, 5702, 5703, 5704, 5705, 5706,
5707, 5716, 5836, 5841, 5879, C106,
C145, C240, C241
Generic Software (C) Implementation
(Based on Gladman):
Modes:
CBC
5708, 5709, 5710, 5711, 5712, 5713,
5714, 5715, 5838, 5842, C10, C11, C14,
C25, C26
VNG Implementation using (C)
Implementation of ECB:
Modes:
ECB
CTR
CCM
5733, 5734, 5735, 5736, 5737, 5738,
5739, 5740, 5840, 5845, 5882, C13,
C16, C29, C30
VNG Implementation using Assembler
Implementation of ECB:
Modes:
ECB GCM
CTR
CCM
5725, 5726, 5727, 5728, 5729, 5730,
5731, 5732, 5837, 5844, 5880, C105,
C146, C246, C247
Assembler Implementation with ARM
PAA:
Modes:
ECB OFB
CBC XTS
4
CFB128
5717, 5718, 5719, 5720, 5721, 5722,
5723, 5724, 5839, 5843, 5881, C12,
C15, C27, C28
[SP 800-67]
Triple-DES
Triple-DES
(Keying Option: 1; All Keys Independent)
Modes:
ECB CFB64
CBC CTR
CFB8 OFB
2866, C95, C96, C97, C98, C99, C100,
C101, C102, C107, C148, C239, C242,
C243, C245
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Cryptographic
Function
Algorithm Modes/Options Algorithm Certificate
Number
Digital Signature
and Asymmetric
Key Generation
[FIPS186-4]
RSA
PKCS#1
v1.5
Key Generation (ANSI X9.31),
Signature Generation (PKCS#1 v1.5)
Key Sizes:
2048
3072
Signature Verification (PKCS#1 v1.5)
Key Sizes:
1024
2048
3072
3084, C95, C96, C97, C98, C99, C100,
C101, C102, C107, C148, C239, C242,
C243, C245
[FIPS 186-4]
ECDSA
ANSI X9.62
Key Pair Generation (PKG):
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Public Key Validation (PKV):
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Signature Generation:
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Signature Verification:
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
1567, C95, C96, C97, C98, C99, C100,
C101, C102, C107, C148, C239, C242,
C243, C245
ECDSA Signature Generation
Component:
CVL:
2180, C95, C96, C97, C98, C99, C100,
C101, C102, C107, C148, C239, C242,
C243, C245
[FIPS 186-4]
DSA
5
used
for
Diffie-
Hellman key
generation
only
Asymmetric Key Generation
Key Sizes:
L=2048, N=256
1481, C95, C96, C97, C98, C99, C100,
C101, C102, C107, C148, C239, C242,
C243, C245
Message Digest [FIPS 180-4]
SHS
Generic Software (C) Implementation:
SHA-1 SHA-384
SHA-224 SHA-512
SHA-256
4638, C95, C96, C97, C98, C99, C100,
C101, C102, C107, C148, C239, C242,
C243, C245
VNG Implementation using (C)
Implementation of ECB:
SHA-1 SHA-384
SHA-224 SHA-512
SHA-256
4571, 4572, 4573, 4574, 4575, 4576,
4577, 4578, 4631, 4632, 4636, C13,
C16, C29, C30
Keyed Hash [FIPS 198]
HMAC
Generic Software (C) Implementation:
HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA-384
HMAC-SHA-224 HMAC-SHA-512
HMAC-SHA-256
3863, C95, C96, C97, C98, C99, C100,
C101, C102, C107, C148, C239, C242,
C243, C245
5
The DSA key pair generation is not available as an explicit service. It is used to create Diffie-Hellman Keys in the
SP800-56A Key Establishment.
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Cryptographic
Function
Algorithm Modes/Options Algorithm Certificate
Number
VNG Implementation using (C)
Implementation of ECB:
HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA-384
HMAC-SHA-224 HMAC-SHA-512
HMAC-SHA-256
3798, 3799, 3800, 3801, 3802, 3803,
3804, 3805, 3856, 3857, 3861, C13,
C16, C29, C30
Key Agreement
and
Establishment
[SP800-56A]
DLC
Primitive
Diffie-
Hellman
Public key size: 2048-bits or larger and
Private key size: 256-bits
CVL:
2180, C95, C96, C97, C98, C99, C100,
C101, C102, C107, C148, C239, C242,
C243, C245
[SP800-56A]
DLC
Primitive
EC Diffie-
Hellman
NIST Curves: P-256, P-384 CVL:
2115, C95, C96, C97, C98, C99, C100,
C101, C102, C107, C148, C239, C242,
C243, C245
Key Derivation [SP 800-132]
PBKDF
Password Based Key Derivation using
HMAC with SHA-1 or SHA-2
Vendor Affirmed
RSA Key
Wrapping
SP800-56B KTS-OAEP Vendor Affirmed
[FIPS 186-4] PKCS#1 v1.5, PKCS#1 v2.1
Modulus size: 2048-bits or 3072-bits
Non-Approved, but Allowed6
Key Agreement ANSI X9.63
SP 800-56A
EC Diffie-
Hellman
ECC curves P-256, P-384 Non-Approved, but Allowed
7
ANSI X9.42
SP 800-56A
Diffie-
Hellman
Key sizes:
2048-bits
3072-bits
Non-Approved, but allowed
8
MD5 Message
Digest
Digest Size: 128-bit Non-Approved, but Allowed
9
NDRNG Random
Number
Generation
N/A Non-Approved, but Allowed: provided by
the underlying operational environment
Table 3: Approved, Allowed and Vendor Affirmed Security Functions
CAVEAT: The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available
entropy – 128-bits. The encryption strength for the AES Key Wrapping using 192 and 256-bit
keys is limited to 128 bits due to the entropy of the seed source.
6
RSA key wrapping is used for key establishment. Methodology provides 112 bits or 128 bits of encryption strength.
7
EC Diffie-Hellman is used for key establishment. Methodology provides 128 bits of encryption strength - the
encryption strength is limited by the entropy of the seed source as specified in the caveat.
8
Diffie-Hellman is used for key establishment. Methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength.
9
MD5 Used as part of the TLS key establishment scheme only.
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The encryption strengths included in Table 3 for the key establishment methods are determined
in accordance with FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance [IG] section 7.5 and NIST Special
Publication 800-57 (Part1) [SP800-57P1].
2.2.2 Non-Approved Security Functions:
Cryptographic
Function
Usage / Description Caveat
RSA
Signature
Generation /
Signature
Verification /
Asymmetric Key
Generation
ANSI X9.31
Signature Generation
Key Pair Generation
Key Size < 2048
Signature Verification
Non-Approved
PKCS#1 v1.5
Signature Generation
Key Size < 2048
Signature Verification
Key Size < 1024
RSA Key Wrapping PKCS#1 v1.5
Key Size < 2048
Non-Approved
ECDSA
Asymmetric Key
Generation
Key Pair Generation for compact point
representation of points
Non-Approved
ECDSA
Signature
Generation /
Signature
Verification /
Asymmetric Key
Generation
PKG: Curve P-192
PKV: Curve P-192
Signature Generation: Curve P-192
Non-Approved
Integrated
Encryption Scheme
on elliptic curves
Encryption / Decryption Non-Approved
Diffie-Hellman Key
Agreement
Key agreement scheme using key sizes <
2048-bits
Non-Approved
Ed25519 Key Agreement
Signature Generation
Signature Verification
Non-Approved
ANSI X9.63 KDF ANSI X9.63 Hash based KDF Non-Approved
RFC6637 KDF KDF based on RFC6637 Non-Approved
DES Encryption / Decryption
Key Size: 56-bits
Non-Approved
CAST5 Encryption / Decryption:
Key Sizes: 40 to 128 bits in 8-bit
increments
Non-Approved
RC4 Encryption / Decryption:
Key Sizes: 8 to 4096-bits
Non-Approved
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Cryptographic
Function
Usage / Description Caveat
RC2 Encryption / Decryption:
Key Sizes: 8 to 1024-bits
Non-Approved
MD2 Message Digest
Digest Size: 128-bits
Non-Approved
MD4 Message Digest
Digest Size: 128-bits
Non-Approved
RIPEMD Message Digest
Digest Sizes: 128, 160, 256, 320 -bits
Non-Approved
Blowfish Encryption / Decryption Non-Approved
OMAC (One-Key
CBC MAC)
MAC generation Non-Approved
SP800-56C Key Derivation Function Non-Compliant
SP800-108
KBKDF
Key Based Key Derivation Function
Mode(s): CTR, Feedback
Non-Compliant
Triple-DES Encryption / Decryption
Two Key Implementation
Non-Compliant
Optimized Assembler Implementation
Encryption / Decryption
Mode: CTR
AES-CMAC AES-128 MAC generation Non-Compliant
Table 4: Non-Approved or Non-Compliant Security Functions
Note: A Non-Approved function in Table 4 is that the function implements a non-Approved
algorithm, while a Non-Compliant function is that the function implements an Approved algorithm
but the implementation is not validated by the CAVP.
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2.3 Cryptographic Module Boundary
The physical boundary of the module is the physical boundary of the iOS, tvOS, watchOS or
TxFW device (iPhone, iPad, Apple TV, Apple Watch or iMac Pro) that contains the module.
Consequently, the embodiment of the module is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module.
The logical module boundary is depicted in the logical block diagram given in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Logical Block Diagram
2.4 Module Usage Considerations
A user of the module must consider the following requirements and restrictions when using the
module:

 AES-GCM IV is constructed in accordance with SP800-38D section 8.2.1.in compliance
with IG A.5 scenario 1. The GCM IV generation follows RFC 5288 and shall only be used
for the TLS protocol version 1.2. Users should consult SP 800-38D, especially section 8,
for all of the details and requirements of using AES-GCM mode. In case the module’s
power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption/decryption
shall be re-distributed.
 AES-XTS mode is only approved for hardware storage applications. The length of the
AES-XTS data unit does not exceed 220
blocks
 When using AES, the caller must obtain a reference to the cipher implementation via the
functions of ccaes_[cbc|ecb|…]_[encrypt|decrypt]_mode.
 When using SHA, the user must obtain a reference to the cipher implementation via the
functions ccsha[1|224|256|384|512]_di.
 In order to meet the IG A.13 requirement, the same Triple-DES key shall not be used to
encrypt more than 216
64-bit blocks of data.
Security Framework
CommonCrypto
Application
CoreCrypto
Crypto Functions FIPS Self
Tests
Logical Boundary
iOS/tvOS/watchOS/TxFW
Device Physical Boundary
Block Diagram of the Apple CoreCrypto Module v9.0 for ARM.
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3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
The underlying logical interfaces of the module are the C language Application Programming
Interfaces (APIs). In detail these interfaces are the following:
 Data input and data output are provided in the variables passed in the API and callable
service invocations, generally through caller-supplied buffers. Hereafter, APIs and
callable services will be referred to as “API”.
 Control inputs which control the mode of the module are provided through dedicated API
parameters and the mach-o header holding the HMAC check file
 Status output is provided in return codes and through messages. Documentation for each
API lists possible return codes. A complete list of all return codes returned by the C
language APIs within the module is provided in the header files and the API
documentation. Messages are documented also in the API documentation.
The module is optimized for library use within the OS user space and does not contain any
terminating assertions or exceptions. It is implemented as an OS dynamically loadable library.
The dynamically loadable library is loaded into the OS application and its cryptographic functions
are made available. Any internal error detected by the module is reflected back to the caller with
an appropriate return code. The calling OS application must examine the return code and act
accordingly. There is one notable exception: (i) ECDSA and RSA do not return a key if the pair-
wise consistency test fails.
The function executing FIPS 140-2 module self-tests does not return an error code but causes
the system to crash if any self-test fails – see Section 9.
The module communicates any error status synchronously through the use of its documented
return codes, thus indicating the module’s status. It is the responsibility of the caller to handle
exceptional conditions in a FIPS 140-2 appropriate manner.
Caller-induced or internal errors do not reveal any sensitive material to callers.
Cryptographic bypass capability is not supported by the module.
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4 Roles, Services and Authentication
This section defines the roles, services and authentication mechanisms and methods with
respect to the applicable FIPS 140-2 requirements.
4.1 Roles
The module supports a single instance of the two authorized roles: the Crypto Officer and the
User. No support is provided for multiple concurrent operators or a Maintenance operator.
Role General Responsibilities and Services (details see below)
User Utilization of services of the module.
Crypto Officer (CO) Utilization of services of the module.
Table 5: Roles
4.2 Services
The module provides services to authorized operators of either the User or Crypto Officer roles
according to the applicable FIPS 140-2 security requirements.
Table 6 contains the cryptographic functions employed by the module in the Approved and non-
Approved mode. For each available service it lists, the associated role, the Critical Security
Parameters (CSPs) and cryptographic keys involved, and the type(s) of access to the CSPs and
cryptographic keys.
CSPs contain security-related information (for example, secret and private cryptographic keys)
whose disclosure or modification can compromise the main security objective of the module,
namely the protection of sensitive information.
The access types are denoted as follows:
 ‘R10
’: the item is read or referenced by the service
 ‘W’: the item is written or updated by the service
 ‘Z’: the persistent item is zeroized by the service
Service Roles CSPs & crypto keys Access
Type
USER CO
Triple-DES encryption and decryption
Encryption
Input: plaintext, IV, key
Output: ciphertext
Decryption
Input: ciphertext, IV, key
Output: plaintext
X X Triple-DES key R
AES encryption and decryption
Encryption
Input: plaintext, IV, key
Output: ciphertext
Decryption
Input: ciphertext, IV, key
Output: plaintext
X X AES key R
W
10
The R access type refers to Reading of the CSP. This access type can be thought as synonymous with
Execute CSP/key
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Service Roles CSPs & crypto keys Access
Type
USER CO
AES Key Wrapping
Encryption
Input: plaintext, key
Output: ciphertext
Decryption
Input: ciphertext, key
Output: plaintext
X X AES key R
W
RSA Key Wrapping
Encryption
Input: plaintext, the modulus n, the public
key e, the SHA algorithm (SHA-224/SHA-
256/SHA-384/SHA-512)
Output: ciphertext
Decryption
Input: ciphertext, the modulus n, the private
key d, the SHA algorithm (SHA-224/SHA-
256/SHA-384/SHA-512)
Output: plaintext
X X RSA private key R
W
RSA Key Wrapping Using PKCS#1 v1.5,
PKCS#1 v2.1 (non-approved but allowed)
Encryption
Input: plaintext, the modulus n, the public
key e, the SHA algorithm (SHA-224/SHA-
256/SHA-384/SHA-512)
Output: ciphertext
Decryption
Input: ciphertext, the modulus n, the private
key d, the SHA algorithm (SHA-224/SHA-
256/SHA-384/SHA-512)
Output: plaintext
X X RSA private key R
W
Secure Hash Generation using SHA1,
SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512
Input: message
Output: message digest
X X none N/A
Secure Hash Generation using MD5 (non-
approved but allowed)
X X none N/A
HMAC generation using HMAC-SHA1,
HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-
SHA-384, or HMAC-SHA-512
Input: HMAC key, message
Output: HMAC value of message
X X HMAC key R
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Service Roles CSPs & crypto keys Access
Type
USER CO
RSA signature generation and verification
Signature generation
Input: the modulus n, the private key d,
the SHA algorithm (SHA-224/SHA-
256/SHA-384/SHA-512),
a message m to be signed
Output: the signature s of the message
Signature verification
Input: the modulus n, the public key e,
the SHA algorithm (SHA-1/SHA-
224/SHA- 256/SHA-384/SHA-512),
a message m,
a signature for the message
Output: pass if the signature is valid,
fail if the signature is invalid
X X RSA private key R
W
ECDSA signature generation and
verification
Signature generation
Input: message m,
q, a, b, XG, YG, n,
the SHA algorithm (SHA
-224/SHA-256/SHA-384/SHA-512),
sender’s private key d
Output: signature of m as a pair of r
and s
Signature verification
Input: received message m’,
signature in form on r’ and s’
pair,
q, a, b, XG, YG, n,
sender’s public key Q,
the SHA algorithm (SHA-1/SHA
-224/SHA-256/SHA-384/SHA-512)
Output: pass if the signature is valid,
fail if the signature is invalid
X X ECDSA private key R
W
ECDSA key pair generation
Input: q, FR, a, b,
domain_parameter_seed,
G, n, h.
Output: private key d, public key Q
X X ECDSA private key R
W
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Service Roles CSPs & crypto keys Access
Type
USER CO
Random number generation
Input: Entropy Input, Nonce,
Personalization String
Output: Returned Bits
X X DRBG Entropy string,
Nonce, V and Key
R
W
Z
PBKDF Password-based key derivation
Input: encrypted key and password
Output: plaintext key
or
Input: plaintext key and password
Output: encrypted data
X X PBKDF key, password R
W
Z
RSA key pair generation
Input: modulus size, the public key,
random numbers: Xp1, Xp2, Xq1
and Xq2
Output: the private prime factor p,
the private prime factor q,
the value of the modulus n,
the value of the private
signature,
exponent d
X X RSA private key R
W
Diffie-Hellman key pair generation
Input: p, q, g
Output: private key, public key
X X Diffie-Hellman Key pair R
W
Diffie-Hellman Key agreement
Input: prime number (p), base (g),
secret integers(a,b)
Output: shared secret
X X Asymmetric keys
(RSA/ECDSA private key)
and secret session key
(AES/Triple-DES key)
R
W
EC Diffie-Hellman Key agreement
Input: domain parameter (p,a,b,G,n,h),
key pair (d, Q)
Output: shared secret
X X Asymmetric keys
(RSA/ECDSA private key)
and secret session key
(AES/Triple-DES key)
R
W
Release all resources of symmetric crypto
function context (i.e. Symmetric Key
Zeroization)
Input: context
Output: N/A
X X AES/Triple-DES key Z
Release all resources of hash context (i.e.
MAC Key Zeroization)
Input: context
Output: N/A
X X HMAC key Z
Release of all resources of Diffie-Hellman
context for Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-
Hellman (Symmetric, Asymmetric and MAC
Key Zeroization)
Input: context
Output: N/A
X X Asymmetric keys
(RSA/ECDSA private key)
and secret session key
(AES/Triple-DES key)
Z
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Service Roles CSPs & crypto keys Access
Type
USER CO
Release of all resources of asymmetric
crypto function context (Asymmetric Key
Zeroization)
Input: context
Output: N/A
X X RSA/ECDSA private keys Z
Reboot
Input: N/A
Output: N/A
X X N/A N/A
Self-test
Input: N/A
Output: pass if the Self-test is successful,
fail if the Self-test is unsuccessful
X X None R
Show Status
Input: N/A
Output: Status of module
X X None N/A
Table 6: Approved and Allowed Services in Approved Mode
Service Roles Access Type
USER CO
Integrated Encryption Scheme on elliptic curves encryption X X R
W
Integrated Encryption Scheme on elliptic curves decryption
DES Encryption X X R
W
DES Decryption
Triple-DES Encryption CTR mode (non-compliant) X X R
W
Two-Key Triple-DES
(non-approved)
Triple-DES Decryption CTR mode (non-compliant) X X R
Two-Key Triple-DES
(non-approved)
CAST5 Encryption X X R
W
CAST5 Decryption
Blowfish Encryption X X R
W
Blowfish Decryption
RC2 Encryption X X R
W
RC2 Decryption
RC4 Encryption X
X
X
X
RW
RW
RC4 Decryption
MD2 Message Digest Generation X X R
W
MD4 Message Digest Generation X X R
W
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Service Roles Access Type
USER CO
RIPEMD Message Digest Generation X X R
W
RSA ANSI X9.31 Signature Generation X X R
W
RSA ANSI X9.31 Signature Verification
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Generation
Key sizes: 1024-4096 bits in multiple of 32 bits not listed in table 3
X X R
W
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Verification
Key sizes: 1024-4096 bits in multiple of 32 bits not listed in table 3
X X R
W
RSA ANSI X9.31 Key Pair Generation
Key sizes (modulus): 1024-4096 bits in multiple of 32 bits not
listed in table 3
Public key exponent values: 65537 or larger
X X R
W
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Key Wrapping
Key sizes < 2048
X X R
W
ECDSA Key Pair Generation for compact point representation of
points
X X R
W
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement
Key Sizes < 2048 bits
X X R
W
ECDSA Key Generation: curve P-192 X X R
W
ECDSA Public Key Verification: curve P-192
ECDSA Signature Generation: curve P-192
ECDSA Signature Verification: curve P-192
Ed25519 Key agreement X X R
W
Ed25519 Signature Generation
Ed25519 Signature Verification
SP800-56C Key Derivation X X R
W
ANSI X9.63 Key Derivation X X R
W
RFC6637 Key Derivation X X R
W
SP800-108 Key Derivation X X R
W
AES-CMAC MAC Generation X X R
W
OMAC MAC Generation X X R
W
Table 7: Non-Approved Services in Non-Approved Mode
4.3 Operator authentication
Within the constraints of FIPS 140-2 level 1, the module does not implement an authentication
mechanism for operator authentication. The assumption of a role is implicit in the action taken.
The module relies upon the operating system for any operator authentication.
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5 Physical Security
The FIPS 140-2 physical security requirements do not apply to the Apple CoreCrypto
Cryptographic Module v9.0 for ARM since it is a software module.
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6 Operational Environment
The following sections describe the ioperational environment of the Apple CoreCrypto
Cryptographic Module v9.0 for ARM.
6.1 Applicability
The Apple CoreCrypto Cryptographic Module v9.0 for ARM operates in a modifiable operational
environment per FIPS 140-2 level 1 specifications. It is part of a commercially available general-
purpose operating system executing on the hardware specified in section 2.1.3.
6.2 Policy
The operating system is restricted to a single operator (single-user mode; i.e. concurrent
operators are explicitly excluded).
When the operating system loads the module into memory, it invokes the FIPS Self-Test
functionality, which in turn runs the mandatory FIPS 140-2 tests.
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7 Cryptographic Key Management
The following section defines the key management features available through the Apple
CoreCrypto Cryptographic Module v9.0 for ARM.
7.1 Random Number Generation
A FIPS 140-2 approved deterministic random bit generator based on a block cipher as specified
in NIST SP 800-90A is used. The default Approved DRBG used for random number generation is
a CTR_DRBG using AES-256 with derivation function and without prediction resistance. The
module also employs a HMAC-DRBG for random number generation. The deterministic random
bit generators are seeded by /dev/random. The /dev/random generator is a true random number
generator that obtains entropy from interrupts generated by the devices and sensors attached to
the system and maintains an entropy pool. The NDRNG feeds entropy from the pool into the
DRBG on demand. The NDRNG provides 128-bits of entropy.
7.2 Key / CSP Generation
The following approved key generation methods are used by the module:
 The module does not implement symmetric key generation. In accordance with FIPS 140-
2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for
asymmetric keys as per SP800-133 (vendor affirmed), compliant with [FIPS186-4], and
using DRBG compliant with [SP800-90A]. A seed (i.e. the random value) used in
asymmetric key generation is obtained from [SP800-90A] DRBG. The generated seed is
an unmodified output from the DRBG. The key generation service for RSA, ECDSA and
Diffie-Hellman as well as the SP 800-90A DRBG have been CAVS tested with algorithm
certificates found in Table 3.
It is not possible for the module to output information during the key generating process. The
cryptographic strength of keys generated by the module are modified by the available entropy,
which is limited to 128-bits.
7.3 Key / CSP Establishment
The module provides AES Key wrapping, RSA key wrapping, Diffie-Hellman- and EC Diffie-
Hellman-based key establishment services.
The module also provides key establishment services in the Approved mode through the SP 800-
132 PBKDFv2 algorithm. The PBKDFv2 function returns the key derived from the provided
password to the caller. The keys derived from SP 800-132 map to section 4.1 of SP 800-133 as
indirect generation from DRBG. The caller shall observe all requirements and should consider all
recommendations specified in SP800-132 with respect to the strength of the generated key,
including the quality of the salt as well as the number of iterations. The implementation of the
PBKDFv2 function requires the user to provide this information.
7.4 Key / CSP Entry and Output
All keys are entered from, or output to, the invoking application running on the same device. All
keys entered into the module are electronically entered in plain text form. Keys are output from
the module in plain text form if required by the calling application. The same holds for the CSPs.
7.5 Key / CSP Storage
The Apple CoreCrypto Cryptographic Module v9.0 for ARM considers all keys in memory to be
ephemeral. They are received for use or generated by the module only at the command of the
calling kernel service. The same holds for CSPs.
The module protects all keys, secret or private, and CSPs through the memory protection
mechanisms provided by the OS. No process can read the memory of another process.
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7.6 Key / CSP Zeroization
Keys and CSPs are zeroized when the appropriate context object is destroyed or when the
device is powered down. Additionally, the user can zeroize the entire device directly (locally) or
remotely, returning it to the original factory settings.
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8 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic
Compatibility (EMI/EMC)
The EMI/EMC properties of the CoreCrypto are not meaningful for the software library. The
devices containing the software components of the module have their own overall EMI/EMC
rating. The validation test environments have FCC, part 15, Class B rating.
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9 Self-Tests
FIPS 140-2 requires that the module perform self-tests to ensure the integrity of the module and
the correctness of the cryptographic functionality at start up. In addition, the random bit generator
requires continuous verification. The FIPS Self Tests application runs all required module self-
tests. This application is invoked by the OS startup process upon device power on.
The execution of an independent application for invoking the self-tests in the libcorecrypto.dylib
makes use of features of the OS architecture: the module, implemented in libcorecrypto.dylib, is
linked by libcommoncrypto.dylib which is linked by libSystem.dylib. The libSystem.dylib is a
library that must be loaded into every application for operation. The library is stored in the kernel
cache and therefore is not available on the disk as directly visible files. iThe OS ensures that
there is only one physical instance of the library and maps it to all application linking to that
library. In this way the module always stays in memory. Therefore, the self-test during startup
time is sufficient as it tests the module instance loaded in memory which is subsequently used by
every application on the OS.
All self-tests performed by the module are listed and described in this section.
9.1 Power-Up Tests
The following tests are performed each time the Apple CoreCrypto Cryptographic Module v9.0
for ARM starts and must be completed successfully for the module to operate in the FIPS
approved mode. If any of the following tests fails the device powers itself off. To rerun the self-
tests on demand, the user must reboot the device.
9.1.1 Cryptographic Algorithm Tests
Algorithm Modes Test
Triple-DES CBC KAT (Known Answer Test)
Separate encryption / decryption
operations are performed
AES implementations selected by the
module for the corresponding environment
AES-128
ECB, CBC, GCM, XTS KAT
Separate encryption / decryption
operations are performed
DRBG (CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG;
tested separately)
N/A KAT
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-
SHA-512
N/A KAT
RSA Signature Generation,
Signature Verification
PCT
Encryption / Decryption KAT. Separate encryption
/decryption operations are
performed
ECDSA Signature Generation,
Signature Verification
PCT
Diffie-Hellman “Z” computation N/A KAT
EC Diffie-Hellman “Z” computation N/A KAT
Table 8: Cryptographic Algorithm Tests
9.1.2 Software / Firmware Integrity Tests
A software integrity test is performed on the runtime image of the Apple CoreCrypto
Cryptographic Module v9.0 for ARM. The CoreCrypto’s HMAC-SHA-256 is used as an Approved
algorithm for the integrity test. If the test fails, then the device powers itself off.
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9.1.3 Critical Function Tests
No other critical function test is performed on power up.
9.2 Conditional Tests
The following sections describe the conditional tests supported by the Apple CoreCrypto
Cryptographic Module v9.0 for ARM.
9.2.1 Continuous Random Number Generator Test
The Apple CoreCrypto Cryptographic Module v9.0 for ARM performs a continuous random
number generator test on the noise source (i.e. NDRNG), whenever it is invoked to seed the
SP800-90A DRBG.
9.2.2 Pair-wise Consistency Test
The Apple CoreCrypto Cryptographic Module v9.0 for ARM does generate asymmetric keys and
performs all required pair-wise consistency tests, the encryption/decryption as well as signature
verification tests, with the newly generated key pairs.
9.2.3 SP 800-90A Health Tests
The Apple CoreCrypto Cryptographic Module v9.0 for ARM performs the health tests as specified
in section 11.3 of SP 800-90A.
9.2.4 Critical Function Test
No other critical function test is performed conditionally.
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10 Design Assurance
10.1Configuration Management
Apple manages and records source code and associated documentation files by using the
revision control system called “Git”.
The Apple module hardware data, which includes descriptions, parts data, part types, bills of
materials, manufacturers, changes, history, and documentation are managed and recorded.
Additionally, configuration management is provided for the module’s FIPS documentation.
The following naming/numbering convention for documentation is applied.
<evaluation>_<module>_<os>_<mode>_<doc name>_<doc version (#.#)>
Example: FIPS_CORECRYPTO_IOS_tvOS_US_SECPOL_4.0
Document management utilities provide access control, versioning, and logging. Access to the
Git repository (source tree) is granted or denied by the server administrator in accordance with
company and team policy.
10.2Delivery and Operation
The CoreCrypto is built into the OS. For additional assurance, it is digitally signed. The Approved
mode is configured by default and can only be transitioned into the non-Approved mode by
calling one of the non-Approved algorithms listed in Table 4.
10.3Development
The Apple crypto module (like any other Apple software) undergoes frequent builds utilizing a
“train” philosophy. Source code is submitted to the Build and Integration group (B & I). B & I
builds, integrates and does basic sanity checking on the operating systems and apps that they
produce. Copies of older versions are archived offsite in underground granite vaults.
10.4Guidance
The following guidance items are to be used for assistance in maintaining the module’s validated
status while in use.
10.4.1 Cryptographic Officer Guidance
The Approved mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only be
transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved algorithms listed in
Table 4. If the device starts up successfully then CoreCrypto has passed all self-tests and is
operating in the Approved mode.
10.4.2 User Guidance
As above, the Approved mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only
be transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved algorithms listed
in Table 4. If the device starts up successfully then CoreCrypto has passed all self-tests and is
operating in the Approved mode.
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11 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module protects against the utilization of known Triple-DES weak keys. The following keys
are not permitted:
{0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01},
{0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE},
{0x1F,0x1F,0x1F,0x1F,0x0E,0x0E,0x0E,0x0E},
{0xE0,0xE0,0xE0,0xE0,0xF1,0xF1,0xF1,0xF1},
{0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE},
{0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01},
{0x1F,0xE0,0x1F,0xE0,0x0E,0xF1,0x0E,0xF1},
{0xE0,0x1F,0xE0,0x1F,0xF1,0x0E,0xF1,0x0E},
{0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xF1,0x01,0xF1},
{0xE0,0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xF1,0x01,0xF1,0x01},
{0x1F,0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE},
{0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE,0x0E},
{0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x0E,0x01,0x0E},
{0x1F,0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x0E,0x01,0x0E,0x01},
{0xE0,0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE},
{0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE,0xF1}.