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Motorola Solutions, Inc.
ASTRO CDEM Motorola Advanced Crypto Engine (MACE)
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version: R01.00.00
Date: January 16, 2025
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Table of Contents
1 – General................................................................................................................................ 4
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 4
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5
2 – Cryptographic Module Specification ..................................................................................... 6
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 6
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 8
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 8
2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 8
2.5 Algorithms .......................................................................................................................10
2.6 Security Function Implementations..................................................................................12
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................14
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................14
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................14
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................14
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................14
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................15
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................15
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................17
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................17
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................18
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................18
4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................26
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................26
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................27
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................27
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................27
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................28
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................28
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................29
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required..................................................................................29
7.2 EFP/EFT Information.......................................................................................................29
7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges ..........................................................................30
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................31
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................32
9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................32
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9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................32
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................32
9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................34
10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................38
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................38
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................38
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................40
10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................42
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................43
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................43
11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................43
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................43
11.4 Design and Rules ..........................................................................................................43
Rules of Operation.............................................................................................................43
11.5 Maintenance Requirements...........................................................................................44
11.6 End of Life .....................................................................................................................44
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................44
References and Definitions .......................................................................................................45
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ..................................................................... 8
Table 3 – Approved Mode Drop-in Algorithms............................................................................ 8
Table 4: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 9
Table 5: Approved Algorithms...................................................................................................10
Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ........................................................................................10
Table 7: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed.....................................11
Table 8: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................13
Table 9: Entropy Certificates.....................................................................................................14
Table 10: Entropy Sources........................................................................................................14
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................16
Table 12: Authentication Methods.............................................................................................18
Table 13: Roles.........................................................................................................................18
Table 14: Approved Services ....................................................................................................25
Table 15: Mechanisms and Actions Required ...........................................................................29
Table 16: EFP/EFT Information.................................................................................................29
Table 17: Hardness Testing Temperatures ...............................................................................30
Table 18: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................32
Table 19: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................32
Table 20: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................33
Table 21: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................35
Table 22: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................37
Table 23: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................38
Table 24: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................40
Table 25: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................40
Table 26: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................41
Table 27: Error States...............................................................................................................42
Table 28 References.................................................................................................................45
Table 29 Acronyms and Definitions...........................................................................................45
List of Figures
Figure 1 – ASTRO CDEM MACE IC (Top)................................................................................. 6
Figure 2 – ASTRO CDEM MACE IC (Interfaces)........................................................................ 7
Figure 3 – Cryptographic Boundary............................................................................................ 7
1 – General
1.1 Overview
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for version R03.01.02 of the ASTRO
CDEM Motorola Advanced Crypto Engine (MACE) (Also referred to as ASTRO CDEM MACE). It contains
the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the
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requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-
3) for an overall Security Level 3 module.
1.2 Security Levels
The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the Module are as follows from Table 1:
Section Title Security Level
1 General 3
2 Cryptographic module specification 3
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 3
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 3
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 3
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 3
10 Self-tests 3
11 Life-cycle assurance 3
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 3
Table 1: Security Levels
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2 – Cryptographic Module Specification
This document covers the Motorola Solutions ASTRO CDEM MACE module, hereafter denoted as the
Module. The Module is implemented as a single-chip cryptographic module to meet FIPS 140-3 level 3
physical security requirements as defined by FIPS 140-3. The ASTRO CDEM MACE provides key storage
and generation and performs all crypto processing for the Motorola Solutions ASTRO CDEM product.
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies or other markets that require FIPS 140-3
validated overall Security Level 3. The Module is intended to be used in ASTRO CDEM unit.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: SingleChip
Cryptographic Boundary:
The physical form of the Module is depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 2. The Module is a single-chip
embedded embodiment. The cryptographic boundary is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 1 – ASTRO CDEM MACE IC (Top)
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Figure 2 – ASTRO CDEM MACE IC (Interfaces)
Figure 3 – Cryptographic Boundary
ASTRO CDEM MACE
SSI
Interface
Ethernet
Port
RS232
Interface
KVL
Interface
Front Panel LED Indicators: Alarm,
Power, Ready, Tx Clear, Status
Power
IRQ/FIQ
Reset
Interface
Tamper
Interface
Clock
RAM
Interface
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2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
The ASTRO CDEM MACE cryptographic module is tested on the following operational environment.
Model
and/or Part
Number
Hardware Version Firmware Version Processors Features
ASTRO
CDEM
MACE
5185912Y03,
5185912Y05,
5185912T05
R03.01.02 with
AES-256 DIA
R01.00.07
Motorola Advanced
Crypto Engine
(MACE)
N/A
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
The ASTRO CDEM MACE cryptographic module supports the following approved algorithms which may
be installed separately from the MACE base firmware using the program update service. While the
installation of AES may be done separately, for the purposes of this validation the MACE includes this
firmware
Table 3 – Approved Mode Drop-in Algorithms
Algorithm* Algorithm FW Version Base FW Version Cert. #
AES256 R01.00.07 R03.01.02 A5275
N/A for this module.
N/A for this module.
N/A for this module.
N/A for this module.
2.3 Excluded Components
The module does not exclude any components from the cryptographic boundary.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
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Mode
Name
Description Type
Status
Indicator
approved Operating in approved mode Approved Display output
Table 4: Modes List and Description
The ASTRO CDEM MACE is originally non-compliant and must be configured to operate in an approved
mode of operation. The MACE must be installed, initialized and configured, including a required change
of the factory-default password in order to be in an approved mode. Documented below are the
additional configuration settings that are required for the MACE to be used in an Approved Mode of
operation at overall Security Level 3.
The approved mode is indicated by using the “Set FIPS Mode” service. The result from this service will
display:
Encrypted only Key fill is Enabled.
Module is operating in FIPS 140-3 Level 3 approved mode
When the module is in the approved operating mode, the “Module Status” service can be used to verify
the firmware version matches an approved version listed on NIST’s website:
https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/validated-modules
Mode Change Instructions and Status:
The module can be configured to operate in a FIPS 140-3 Approved mode of operation at overall
Security Level 3. To configure the module to operate in Approved mode, the operator must log in as the
CO using the default password and:
1. Change the default password
2. Activate and configure the periodic self-test timer
3. Type the command “fips enable” to configure the Module into approved mode(Level 3).
Additionally, the Module supports a “drop-in algorithm” via the Program Update service. Drop-in
algorithms may be added or removed from the Module independent of the base FW. In order to remain
in the Approved Mode, only Approved algorithms may be loaded into the Module, in particular AES-256
(Cert. # A5275). The loading and unloading of any firmware within the validated cryptographic module
invalidates the Module’s validation and zeroizes all SSPs except those entered at manufacturing. The
Module is then in a non-compliant state.
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2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
The Module implements the Approved cryptographic algorithms listed in the table below.
Algorithm
CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A5273
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CBC A5275
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB8 A5273
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A5275
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-KW A5438
Direction - Decrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38F
AES-OFB A5273
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-OFB A5275
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
Counter DRBG A5437
Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A5253
Modulo - 2048
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
FIPS 186-5
SHA2-256 SHS 817
Message Length - Message Length: 0-
51200 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 5: Approved Algorithms
ApprovedAlgorithmsTable From Web Cryptik ApprovedAlgorithmsTable
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
The Module implements the FIPS Vendor Affirmed cryptographic algorithms listed.
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG
Key
Type:Symmetric
N/A
SP800-133rev2 Sections 4 example 1
and IG D.H
CKG -
IDK
Key
Type:Symmetric
N/A
SP800-133rev2 Sections 6.3 #2 and IG
C.I
Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
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Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
The Module implements the FIPS Non-Approved, Allowed cryptographic Algorithms with No Security
Claimed.
Name Caveat Use and Function
AES
MAC
No Security Claimed. AES
MAC is used as part of
OTAR but is considered
obfuscation.
[IG 2.4.A] P25 AES OTAR. AES MAC is applied
directly to the plaintext OTAR key components and
then KTS encryption is performed on the OTAR key
components and decrypted within the module using
AES KW Cert #5438
Table 7: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
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2.6 Security Function Implementations
The following table shows the Security Function Implementations that the module implements:
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
AES A5275 Encryption BC-UnAuthEncrypt Block Cipher
AES-CBC: (A5275)
AES-OFB: (A5275)
AES-ECB: (A5275)
AES A5275 Decryption BC-UnAuthDecrypt Block Cipher
AES-CBC: (A5275)
AES-OFB: (A5275)
AES-ECB: (A5275)
Key Generation CKG
Symmetric Key
Generation
Counter DRBG:
(A5437)
CKG : ()
Signature Verification DigSig-SigVer
Digital Signature
Verification
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-
5): (A5253)
Entropy ENT-ESV Entropy Source
KTS-Unwrap KTS-Unwrap
Key Transport
Unwrapping
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology provides
256 bits strength
Standard:SP 800-38F
IG D.G:Approved
method in KW mode
AES-KW: (A5438)
AES MAC: ()
SHA SHA Secure Hash Standard SHA2-256: (SHS 817)
AES A5273 Encryption BC-UnAuthEncrypt Block Cipher
AES-CFB8: (A5273)
AES-CBC: (A5273)
AES-OFB: (A5273)
AES A5273 Decryption BC-UnAuthDecrypt Block Cipher
AES-CFB8: (A5273)
AES-CBC: (A5273)
AES-OFB: (A5273)
IDK Generation CKG
Symmetric Key
Generation
CKG - IDK: ()
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
DRBG DRBG
AES-256 CTR
Deterministic RBG
Counter DRBG:
(A5437)
Table 8: Security Function Implementations
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2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
The module does not have any algorithm specific information.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert
Number
Vendor Name
E132 Motorola Solutions Inc
Table 9: Entropy Certificates
The Module uses the following entropy sources:
Name Type
Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
Motorola Solutions Advanced
Crypto Engine Entropy
Source
Physical
Atmel
5186912
1 bit 0.13862 N/A
Table 10: Entropy Sources
2.9 Key Generation
For Key Generation methods, see Section 2.6 Security Function Implementations above.
2.10 Key Establishment
For Key Establishment methods, see Section 2.6 Security Function Implementations above.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The module does not implement any Industry Protocols
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
The Module’s ports and associated FIPS defined logical interface categories are listed below.
Physical Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
Synchronous
Interface (SSI)
Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
Status
Output
Provides an interface to the unprotected network and entry of
the Crypto Officer password in encrypted form.
Ethernet Port
(EP)
Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
Status
Output
This interface routes packets between subnets. The IP stack
of this interface will use the subnet information to determine
how to route packets between physical network interfaces.
RS232
Interface
Data Output
Control
Input
Status
Output
Provides an interface for factory programming and execution
of RS232 shell commands.
Key Variable
Loader (KVL)
Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
Status
Output
Provides an interface to the Key Variable Loader. The Traffic
Encryption Key (TEK) is entered in encrypted form over the
KVL interface.
RAM
Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
Status
Output
This interface provides storage for non-security related stack
information.
Power Power This interface powers all circuitry.
Tamper
Interface
Control
Input
The interface is used for zeroization of Traffic Encryption
Keys (TEKs), KPK.
Reset Interface
Control
Input
This interface forces a reset of the module.
Alarm LED
output
Status
Output
The Alarm LED output is used to drive the external Alarm
LED red to indicate a fatal error has been detected.
Power LED
output
Status
Output
The Power LED output is used to drive the external Power
LED green when power is supplied to the module.
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Physical Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
Ready LED
output
Status
Output
The Ready LED output is used to drive the external Ready
LED green when the module is ready to communicate with a
KVL.
TX Clear LED
output
Status
Output
The TX Clear LED output is used to drive the external TX
Clear LED orange when a "Bypass Rule" is programmed.
Status LED
output
Status
Output
The Status LED output is used to drive the external Status
LED green to indicate a good battery, and a Traffic
Encryption Key (TEK) has been loaded. The Status LED
output is used to drive the external Status LED yellow to
indicate a good battery, but no Traffic Encryption Key (TEK)
has been loaded. The Status LED output is used to drive the
external Status LED red to indicate a low or dead battery.
IRQ/FIQ
Control
Input
External interrupts.
Clock
Control
Input
Clock input
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces
Note: The module does not support Control Output.
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Metho
d
Name
Description
Security
Mechanis
m
Strength Each Attempt Strength per Minute
AM1
Identity-
based.
Crypto-Officer
Password: a
15-16 ASCII
(printable)
characters
password is
authenticated
to gain access
to Crypto-
Officer
services
assocaited to
the RS232
Interface. It
should be
noted that
after
authenticating
, this
password may
be changed at
any time.
SHA2-256
(SHS 817)
The password requires a
minimum of 1 Upper
case, 1 Lower case, 1
Numerical and 1 special
character. Since the
minimum password
length is 15 ASCII
printable characters and
there are 95 ASCII
printable characters, the
probability of a
successful random
attempt is 1 in
{(10)*(262)*(32)*(9511)},
The password requires a
minimum of 1 Upper
case, 1 Lower case, 1
Numerical and 1 special
character. Since the
minimum password
length is 15 ASCII
printable characters and
there are 95 ASCII
printable characters, the
probability of a
successful random
attempt is 1 in
{(10)*(262)*(32)*(95^11)
}
After the CO password
has been incorrectly
entered 10 consecutive
times, the Module will
erase all CSPs, reset
the CO password back
to the default and set an
alarm, at which time the
module must be power
cycled to become
operational again. The
strength per minute is 10
in
{(10)*(262)*(32)*(95^11)
}
AM2
Identity
based.
Crypto-Officer
Password: a
10
hexadecimal
digit long
password is
authenticated
to gain access
to Crypto
SHA2-256
(SHS 817)
The minimum password
length is 10 hex digits.
The probability of a
successful random
attempt is 10^16
After the CO password
has been incorrectly
entered 15 consecutive
times, the Module will
erase all CSPs, and set
an alarm, at which time
the module must be
power cycled to become
operational again. The
strength per minute is
15x10^16.
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Metho
d
Name
Description
Security
Mechanis
m
Strength Each Attempt Strength per Minute
Officer
services
associated to
the
Synchronous
Interface (SSI)
port. It should
be noted that
after
authenticating
, this
password may
be changed at
any time.
Table 12: Authentication Methods
4.2 Roles
The Module supports one distinct operator role, the Cryptographic Officer (CO). The authentication
method and services available to the CO will depend on the physical port used. The CO may be logged
into both ports at the same time. In addition, the Module supports services which do not require
authentication (UA).
The Roles Table below lists all operator roles supported by the Module.
The Module does not support concurrent operators.
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto-Officer (AM1) Identity CO AM1
Crypto-Officer (AM2) Identity CO AM2
Table 13: Roles
4.3 Approved Services
All approved services implemented by the Module are listed in the table below:
The SSPs modes of access shown in the table below are defined as:
• G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the Module (e.g., the SSP is output).
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the Module (SSP is input).
• E = Execute: The Module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
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• Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the SSP
Name
Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Security
Functio
ns
SSP Access
Program
Update
Update the
ASTRO
CDEM
MACE
firmware.
Firmware
upgrades
are
authenticat
ed using a
digital
signature.
The
Program
Update
Public
Signature
Key is used
to validate
the
signature of
the
firmware
image
being
loaded
before it is
allowed to
be
executed
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
Firmware
Image
The ASTRO
CDEM
MACE is
upgraded to
new
firmware.
AES
A5273
Decrypti
on
IDK
Generati
on
Crypto-
Officer
(AM2)
- FW-LD-
Pub: Z
- BKK: Z
- IDK: Z
- PEK: Z
- KPK: Z
- KEK: Z
- TEK: Z
- IDK-ROM:
Z
- IDK-Block:
Z
- CO PWD
(AM1): Z
- CO PWD
(AM2): Z
- PWD Hash:
Z
Generate
Entropy
Generate
Entropy into
the ASTRO
CDEM
MACE
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
DRBG Seed
The DRBG
is seeded
and
initialized.
Success/fail
ure status
Entropy
Crypto-
Officer
(AM2)
- DRBG-
EI/Seed: G
- DRBG-
State: G
- DRBG-
nonce: G
OTEK
Load keys
into the
ASTRO
CDEM
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
Encrypted
Keys
Decrypted
keys that
were
imported
encrypted
AES
A5273
Decrypti
on
Crypto-
Officer
(AM2)
- KEK: E
- TEK: E
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Name
Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Security
Functio
ns
SSP Access
MACE
using AM2.
service
status
output
into the
ASTRO
CDEM
MACE.
Success/fail
ure status.
Change
CO
Password
(AM1)
Modify the
current
password
used to
identify and
authenticat
e the CO
role using
AM1.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
Password
Updated the
CO
password.
Success/fail
ure status
SHA
AES
A5273
Encrypti
on
AES
A5273
Decrypti
on
Crypto-
Officer
(AM1)
- PEK: E
- KPK: G,E,Z
- KEK: Z
- TEK: Z
- CO PWD
(AM1):
G,E,Z
- PWD Hash:
G,E,Z
Change
CO
Password
(AM2)
Modify the
current
password
used to
identify and
authenticat
e the CO
role using
AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
Password
Updated the
CO
password.
Success/fail
ure status.
SHA
AES
A5273
Encrypti
on
AES
A5273
Decrypti
on
Crypto-
Officer
(AM2)
- PEK: E
- KPK: G,E,Z
- KEK: Z
- TEK: Z
- CO PWD
(AM2):
G,E,Z
- PWD Hash:
G,E,Z
Validate
CO
Password
(AM1)
Validate the
current
password
used to
identify and
authenticat
e the CO
role using
AM1.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
Password
Successful
authenticatio
n will allow
access to
the services
allowed for
CO role
(AM1).
SHA
AES
A5273
Encrypti
on
AES
A5273
Decrypti
on
Crypto-
Officer
(AM1)
- PEK: E
- KPK: G,E,Z
- KEK: Z
- TEK: Z
- CO PWD
(AM1): Z
- CO PWD
(AM2): Z
- PWD Hash:
Z
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Name
Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Security
Functio
ns
SSP Access
Validate
CO
Password
(AM2)
Validate the
current
password
used to
identify and
authenticat
e the CO
role using
AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
Password
Successful
authenticatio
n will allow
access to
the services
allowed for
CO role
(AM2).
SHA
AES
A5273
Encrypti
on
AES
A5273
Decrypti
on
Crypto-
Officer
(AM2)
- PEK: E
- KPK: G,E,Z
- KEK: Z
- TEK: Z
- CO PWD
(AM1): Z
- CO PWD
(AM2): Z
- PWD Hash:
Z
Logout
CO (AM1)
Exits
command
shell
interface
using AM1.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
Command In
Logout
CO/Exits
command
shell
interface
None
Crypto-
Officer
(AM1)
Logout
CO (AM2)
CO Logout
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
Reboot/Comm
and In
Logout CO None
Crypto-
Officer
(AM2)
Encrypt
Encrypt
data using
AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
Plaintext
Ciphertext.
Success/fail
ure status.
AES
A5275
Encrypti
on
Crypto-
Officer
(AM2)
- TEK: E
- KEK: E
- KPK: E
- DRBG-
EI/Seed: E
- DRBG-
State: E
- DRBG-
nonce: E
Decrypt
Decrypt
data using
AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
Ciphertext
Plaintext.
Success/fail
ure status.
AES
A5275
Decrypti
on
Crypto-
Officer
(AM2)
- TEK: E
- KEK: E
- KPK: E
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Name
Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Security
Functio
ns
SSP Access
status
output
Module
Status
Provide
firmware
version,
current
FIPS status
using AM1.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
Command in
Module HW
version,
version
information,
and FIPS
status.
None
Crypto-
Officer
(AM1)
Self-Tests
Perform
module
self-tests
comprised
of
cryptograph
ic algorithm
tests,
firmware
integrity
test, and
critical
functions
test.
Initiated by
module
reset or
transition
from power
off state to
power on
state using
AM1 or UA.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
Power
on/Command
In
Success/Re
set.
AES
A5275
Encrypti
on
AES
A5275
Decrypti
on
Key
Generati
on
Signatur
e
Verificati
on
Entropy
KTS-
Unwrap
SHA
AES
A5273
Encrypti
on
AES
A5273
Decrypti
on
IDK
Generati
on
DRBG
Crypto-
Officer
(AM1)
- FW-LD-
Pub: E
Unauthentic
ated
- FW-LD-
Pub: E
Module
Configurat
ion
Set
configuratio
n
parameters
used to
specify
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
Configuration
parameters
Updated
module
configuratio
n.
Success/fail
ure status.
None
Crypto-
Officer
(AM1)
- KPK: G,E,Z
- KEK: Z
- TEK: Z
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Name
Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Security
Functio
ns
SSP Access
module
behavior
using AM1.
status
output
- CO PWD
(AM1): W,Z
- PWD Hash:
W,Z
- CO PWD
(AM2): W,Z
Set FIPS
Mode
Update
module
approved
mode using
AM1.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
Configuration
parameters
Updated
module
approved
mode/Displa
y current
approved
mode
None
Crypto-
Officer
(AM1)
Configure
OTEK
Set
configuratio
n
parameters
used for
communicat
ion with the
KMF for
OTEK using
AM1.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
Configuration
parameters
Updated
OTEK
configuratio
n.
Success/fail
ure status.
None
Crypto-
Officer
(AM1)
Version
Query
Provides
module
firmware
and
hardware
version
numbers
using AM1.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
Command In
Show
module
version info
None
Crypto-
Officer
(AM1)
Delete
Key
Mark key
for deletion
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
Command In
Key is
marked for
deletion.
Success/fail
ure status.
None
Crypto-
Officer
(AM2)
Perform
Key
Transport
Process
Perform a
key
transport
process for
OTEK
service
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
Command In
Keys
imported
into the
MACE.
Success/fail
ure status.
KTS-
Unwrap
AES
A5273
Decrypti
on
Crypto-
Officer
(AM2)
- KEK: W
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Name
Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Security
Functio
ns
SSP Access
status
output
KVL
Transfer
Key
Imports
keys to the
ASTRO
CDEM
MACE via
KVL using
AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
Encrypted
Keys
Keys
imported
into the
ASTRO
CDEM
MACE.
Success/fail
ure status.
KTS-
Unwrap
Crypto-
Officer
(AM2)
- BKK: E
- KPK: E
- KEK: W
- TEK: W
KVL
Delete
Key
Zeroize
selected
key
variables
from the
ATRO
CDEM
MACE
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
Command In
Keys
deleted from
the ASTRO
CDEM
MACE.
Success/fail
ure status.
None
Crypto-
Officer
(AM2)
- KEK: Z
- TEK: Z
KVL
Check
Key
Obtain
status
information
about a
specific
key/keyset
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
Command In
Show key
status
None
Crypto-
Officer
(AM2)
- BKK: E
KVL
Query
Algorithm
List
Provides
algorithm
version
numbers
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
Command In
Show list of
supported
algorithms
None
Crypto-
Officer
(AM2)
KVL
Query
Version
Provides
module
firmware
version
numbers
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
Command In
Show
module
version info
None
Crypto-
Officer
(AM1)
Extract
Error Log
Provide the
history of
error events
using AM1.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
Command In
Error logs
out.
Success/Fail
ure status.
None
Crypto-
Officer
(AM1)
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 25 of 47
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Name
Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Security
Functio
ns
SSP Access
or and
service
status
output
Reset
Crypto
Module
Reset/powe
r cycle the
ASTRO
CDEM
MACE.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
Reset Button
press/Cycle
power.
Reset the
MACE.
None
Unauthentic
ated
- DRBG-
EI/Seed: Z
- DRBG-
State: Z
- DRBG-
nonce: Z
- BKK: Z
- IDK: Z
- PEK: Z
- KPK: Z
- KEK: Z
- TEK: Z
- CO PWD
(AM1): Z
- CO PWD
(AM2): Z
- PWD Hash:
Z
- FW-LD-
Pub: Z
- IDK-ROM:
Z
- IDK-Block:
Z
Erase
Crypto
Module
Zeroize the
KPK and all
keys and
CSPs in the
key
database
and causes
a new KPK
to be
generated.
Resets the
password to
the factory
default.
Approv
ed
mode
indicat
or and
service
status
output
Erase Button
press
Zeroize all
CSPs
None
Unauthentic
ated
- KPK: G,Z
- KEK: Z
- TEK: Z
- CO PWD
(AM1): Z
- CO PWD
(AM2): Z
- PWD Hash:
Z
Table 14: Approved Services
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4.4 Non-Approved Services
There are no Non-Approved services available while the module is in the approved mode.
N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
This module supports loading of external firmware via the Program Update service. Execution of the
successfully loaded firmware is only effective after the next reset of the security module. Any firmware
loaded into the module other than that listed in section 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version
and Identification, is outside the scope of this Security Policy and requires a separate FIPS 140-3
validation.
The module validates the integrity of the externally loaded firmware via procedures described in section
5.1 Integrity Techniques
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 27 of 47
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5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The Module has a limited modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140-3 definitions. The
Module is composed of the following firmware components:
• Component 1: Executable - binary
• Component 2: Drop in Algorithms - binary
The firmware components are protected with the FW-LD-Pub key described in section 9.4 SSPs. The FW-
LD-Pub key is loaded into the module at manufacturing
The operator can initiate the integrity test on demand by power cycling the Module.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The operator can initiate the integrity test on demand by power cycling the Module.
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 28 of 47
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
The ASTRO CDEM MACE has a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-3 definitions with a
Physical Security at Level 3. Therefore, per the FIPS 140-3 Management Manual Section 7.5, partial
validations and non-applicable areas in this section are not applicable.
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 29 of 47
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7 Physical Security
The ASTRO CDEM MACE is a production grade, single-chip cryptographic module with standard
passivation over the modules circuitry as defined by FIPS 140-3 and is designed to meet level 3 physical
security requirements. The information below is applicable to cryptographic module hardware kit
numbers 5185912Y03, 5185912Y05, and 5185912T05, which have identical physical security
characteristics.
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
The ASTRO CDEM MACE is covered with a hard-opaque epoxy coating that provides evidence of
attempts to tamper with the ASTRO CDEM MACE. The security provided from the hardness of the ASTRO
CDEM MACE's epoxy encapsulate is claimed at the temperature range of -40 to 85 degrees Celsius. No
assurance of the epoxy hardness is claimed for this physical security mechanism outside of this range.
The ASTRO CDEM MACE does not contain any doors, removable covers, or ventilation holes or slits. No
maintenance access interface is available. No special procedures are required to maintain physical
security of the ASTRO CDEM MACE while delivering to operators.
Mechanism
Inspection
Frequency
Inspection Guidance
Covered with a hard-opaque epoxy coating that
provides evidence of attempts to tamper with
the ASTRO CDEM MACE.
Periodically
Look for signs of tampering.
Remove from service if
tampering found.
Table 15: Mechanisms and Actions Required
7.2 EFP/EFT Information
Temp/Voltage
Type
Temperature or
Voltage
EFP
or
EFT
Result
LowTemperature -38.1°C EFP
Shutdown - A tamper flag is raised, a
wake-up reset of the product is
triggered.
HighTemperature 101.4°C EFP
Shutdown - A tamper flag is raised, a
wake-up reset of the product is
triggered.
LowVoltage
1.65V - VDDCORE :
1.350V - VVDBU
EFP
Shutdown - A general reset of the chip is
asserted.
HighVoltage
2.04V - VDDCORE :
2.292V - VVDBU
EFP
Shutdown- A tamper flag is raised, a
wake-up reset of the product is
triggered.
Table 16: EFP/EFT Information
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 30 of 47
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7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges
Temperature
Type
Temperature
LowTemperature -40°C
HighTemperature 85°C
Table 17: Hardness Testing Temperatures
Notes: The module is hardness tested at the lowest and highest temperatures within the module's
intended temperature range of operation.
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 31 of 47
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8 Non-Invasive Security
The Module does not implement any mitigation method against non-invasive attack.
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 32 of 47
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage Area Name Description
Persistence
Type
System Memory (S1) Stored in the volatile memory (RAM). Dynamic
Flash Memory (S2)
Stored in the flash in plaintext, associated by
memory location (pointer).
Static
Flash Memory -
Encrypted (S3)
Stored in the flash in encrypted, associated by
memory location (pointer).
Static
Table 18: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To
Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Input
encrypted
on the IDK
(I1)
Application
Software
(outside)
Flash
Memory -
Encrypted
(S3)
Encrypted Manual Electronic
AES A5273
Decryption
Input
encrypted
on the
PEK(I2)
Application
Software
(outside)
Flash
Memory -
Encrypted
(S3)
Encrypted Manual Electronic
AES A5273
Decryption
Input
encrypted
on the KEK
(I3)
OTAR
Flash
Memory -
Encrypted
(S3)
Encrypted Automated Electronic
KTS-
Unwrap
Input
encrypted
on the BKK
(I4)
Application
Software
(outside)
Flash
Memory -
Encrypted
(S3)
Encrypted Manual Electronic
AES A5273
Decryption
Table 19: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale
Operator
Initiation
Z1
Zeroized by the "Program Update"
service by overwriting with a fixed
pattern of 0s. *
SSPs zeroized upon loading
of new firmware.
Yes
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 33 of 47
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Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale
Operator
Initiation
Z2
Zeroized by module power cycle or
hard reset by overwriting with a
fixed pattern of 0s. *
SSPs in volatile memory
zeroized.
Yes
Z3
Zeroized by the "Configure Module"
service by overwriting with a fixed
pattern of 0s.
CO zeroize module when
configuring into an Approved
mode.
Yes
Z4
Zeroized by the "Change CO
Password (AM1)" service by
overwriting with a fixed pattern of
0s.
Old CO password zeroized
as new CO password set
Yes
Z5
Zeroized by the "Validate CO
Password (AM1)" service by
overwriting with a fixed pattern of
0s.
CO password zeroized after
too many failed login
attempts
Yes
Z6
Zeroized by the "Change CO
Password (AM2)" service by
overwriting with a fixed pattern of
0s.
Old Crypto Officer password
zeroized as new Crypto
Officer password set
Yes
Z7
Zeroized by the "Validate CO
Password (AM2)" service by
overwriting with a fixed pattern of
0s.
Crypto Officer password
zeroized after too many
failed login attempts
Yes
Z8
Zeroized by Tamper event. (KPK) is
zeroized with a fixed pattern of 0s.
Zeroizes KPK N/A
Table 20: SSP Zeroization Methods
Note: For zeroization methods with an asterisk, once zeroization is complete the Module will reboot,
indicating successful zeroization. The output status of all other methods of success of zeroization are
implicit and any attempt to use previous keys/CSPs will trigger an error.
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 34 of 47
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9.4 SSPs
All usage of these SSPs by the Module are described in the services detailed in Section 4.3
Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated By
Established
By
Used By
DRBG-
EI/Seed
Internally generated by the
HWRNG
2770 -
N/A
N/A - CSP Entropy DRBG
DRBG-
State
CTR_DRBG internal state: V (128
bits) and Key (AES 256)
256 -
256
N/A - CSP DRBG DRBG
DRBG-
nonce
Internally generated by the
HWRNG
128 -
N/A
N/A - CSP Entropy DRBG
BKK
A 256-bit AES OFB (A5273) key
used to decrypt keys loaded from
KVL
256 -
256
Symmetric Key -
CSP
Other
AES A5273
Decryption
IDK
A 256-bit AES CBC key used to
decrypt downloaded firmware
images.
256 -
256
Symmetric Key -
CSP
IDK Generation
AES A5273
Decryption
PEK
256-bit AES-CFB8 key used for
decrypting passwords during
password validation
256 -
256
Symmetric Key -
CSP
Pre-loaded at
manufacturing
AES A5273
Decryption
KPK
256 bit AES CFB-8 key used to
encrypt all TEKs and KEKs stored
in the flash.
256 -
256
Symmetric Key -
CSP
Key Generation
Key
Generation
AES A5273
Decryption
KEK
256-bit AES-KW key used for
decryption of keys in key
transport operation
256 -
256
Symmetric Key -
CSP
KTS-Unwrap
AES A5273
Decryption
TEK
256-bit AES-KW key used for
enabling secure communication
with target devices.
256 -
256
Symmetric Key -
CSP
KTS-Unwrap
AES A5273
Decryption
CO
PWD
(AM1)
8-32 ASCII characters CO
password.
N/A -
N/A
Authentication -
CSP
AES A5273
Encryption
AES A5273
Decryption
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Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated By
Established
By
Used By
CO
PWD
(AM2)
8-32 ASCII characters Crypto
Officer password.
N/A -
N/A
Authentication -
CSP
AES A5273
Encryption
AES A5273
Decryption
PWD
Hash
256-bit password hash stored in
the non-volatile memory.
256 -
128
Authentication -
CSP
SHA SHA
FW-LD-
Pub
2048-bit RSA key used to validate
the signature of the firmware
image during FW integrity and
FW Loading before it is allowed to
be executed.
2048 -
112
Asymmetric
Public Key -
PSP
Pre-loaded at
manufacturing
Signature
Verification
IDK-
ROM
A 256-bit AES CBC key used in
the re-construction of IDK per
SP800-133r2 (Section 6.3 #2) via
XOR using IDK Block
256 -
256
Symmetric -
CSP
Pre-loaded at
manufacturing
CKG - IDK
IDK-
Block
A 256-bit AES CBC key used in
the re-construction of IDK per
SP800-133r2 (Section 6.3 #2) via
XOR using IDK ROM
256 -
256
Symmetric Key -
CSP
Generated with an
approved RBG and
pre-loaded at
manufacturing
CKG - IDK
Table 21: SSP Table 1
Name Input - Output Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
DRBG-
EI/Seed
System Memory (S1):Plaintext
When module is
reset
Z2
DRBG-nonce:Used
With
DRBG-State:Generates
DRBG-State System Memory (S1):Plaintext
When the module
is rest
Z2
DRBG-EI/Seed:Derived
From
DRBG-nonce:Derived
From
DRBG-
nonce
System Memory (S1):Plaintext
When module is
reset
Z2
DRBG-EI/Seed:Used
With
DRBG-State:Generates
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Name Input - Output Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
BKK
Input encrypted on
the IDK (I1)
System Memory (S1):Plaintext
Flash Memory (S2):Plaintext
When module is
reset
Z1
Z2
KEK:Decrypts
TEK:Decrypts
IDK System Memory (S1):Plaintext
When module is
reset
Z2
IDK-ROM:Derived
From
IDK-Block:Derived
From
PEK:Decrypts
KEK:Decrypts
PEK
Input encrypted on
the IDK (I1)
System Memory (S1):Plaintext
Flash Memory (S2):Plaintext
When module is
reset
Z1
Z2
CO PWD
(AM1):Decrypts
CO PWD
(AM2):Decrypts
PWD Hash:Used With
KPK
System Memory (S1):Plaintext
Flash Memory (S2):Plaintext
When module is
reset
Z1
Z3
Z4
Z5
Z6
Z7
Z8
DRBG-State:Derived
From
KEK
Input encrypted on
the KEK (I3)
Input encrypted on
the BKK (I4)
System Memory (S1):Plaintext
Flash Memory (S2):Plaintext
When module is
reset
Z1
Z2
KPK:Encrypted by
TEK:Decrypts
TEK
Input encrypted on
the KEK (I3)
Input encrypted on
the BKK (I4)
System Memory (S1):Plaintext
Flash Memory - Encrypted
(S3):Encrypted
When module is
reset
Z1
Z2
KPK:Encrypted by
CO PWD
(AM1)
Input encrypted on
the PEK(I2)
System Memory (S1):Plaintext
Flash Memory - Encrypted
(S3):Encrypted
When module is
reset
Z1
Z3
Z4
Z5
Z6
Z7
PEK:Encrypted by
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Name Input - Output Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
CO PWD
(AM2)
Input encrypted on
the PEK(I2)
System Memory (S1):Plaintext
Flash Memory - Encrypted
(S3):Encrypted
When module is
reset
Z1
Z3
Z4
Z5
Z6
Z7
PEK:Encrypted by
PWD Hash
System Memory (S1):Plaintext
Flash Memory - Encrypted
(S3):Encrypted
When module is
reset
Z1
Z3
Z4
Z5
Z6
Z7
CO PWD (AM1):Hash
of
CO PWD (AM2):Hash
of
FW-LD-Pub
System Memory (S1):Plaintext
Flash Memory (S2):Plaintext
When module is
reset
Z1 IDK:Encrypted by
IDK-ROM
System Memory (S1):Plaintext
Flash Memory (S2):Plaintext
When module is
reset
Z1
Z2
IDK:Generates
IDK-Block:Paired With
IDK-Block
System Memory (S1):Plaintext
Flash Memory (S2):Plaintext
When module is
reset
Z1
Z2
IDK:Generates
IDK-ROM:Paired With
Table 22: SSP Table 2
-
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10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The ASTRO CDEM MACE performs self-tests to ensure the proper operation. Per FIPS 140-3 these are categorized as either pre-operational self-
tests or conditional self-tests.
Pre-operational self–tests are available on demand by power cycling the ASTRO CDEM MACE. In addition, pre-operational self–tests are
periodically performed by the ASTRO CDEM MACE as configured by the operator during the module configuration as shown in section 11.1
Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures The ASTRO CDEM MACE will not accept any commands when a periodic self-test is required;
the commands still in the I/O buffer will be processed by the ASTRO CDEM MACE after periodic self-test ends and will execute when the I/O
buffer is emptied. The ASTRO CDEM MACE logs the most recent self-test errors to the internal flash; the operator (CO) can extract the error logs
using Extract Error Log service.
The Module performs the following pre-operational self-tests in table below
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties
Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details
Firmware
Integrity
SHA2-256 (Cert. #817), RSA-
2048 (Cert. #A5253)
KAT
SW/FW
Integrity
E2 on
failure
When the ASTRO CDEM MACE is
powered up, the digital signature is verified.
Table 23: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The Module performs the following conditional self-tests in the table below
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-Encryption
(A5273)
AES-256 KAT CAST
ES1 on
failure
Encryption Bootup/Periodic
AES-Decryption
(A5273)
AES-256 KAT CAST
ES1 on
failure
Decryption Bootup/Periodic
AES-Encryption
(A5275)
AES-256 KAT CAST
ES1 on
failure
Encryption Bootup/Periodic
AES-Decryption
(A5275)
AES-256 KAT CAST
ES1 on
failure
Decryption Bootup/Periodic
AES-KW
(A5438)
AES-256 KAT CAST
ES1 on
failure
Decryption Bootup/Periodic
Counter DRBG
(A5437)
AES-256 CTR KAT CAST
ES1 on
failure
AES-256 CTR_DRBG
instantiation, generate KATs
performed before the first random
data generation
Bootup/Periodic
SHA2-256 (SHS
817)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST
E2 on
failure
SHA2, -256, KAT performed
before Pre-Operational FW
integrity tests.
Bootup
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A5253)
RSA-2048 SigVer KAT CAST
E2 on
failure
RSA-2048 SigVer, performed
before Pre-Operational FW
integrity tests.
Bootup
Entropy 90B
Start-up
Repetition
Count Test
(RCT)
Repetition Count Test RCT CAST
ES1 on
failure
Designed to quickly detect
catastrophic failures that cause
the noise source to become
"stuck" on a single output value
for a long period of time
Bootup
Entropy 90B
Start-up
Adaptive
Proportion Test
(ADP)
Adaptive Proportion
Test
ADP CAST
ES1 on
failure
Designed to detect a large loss of
entropy that might occur as a
result of some physical failure or
environment al change affecting
the noise source
Bootup
Firmware Load
2048-bit RSA
Signature
Verification/SHA2-256
KAT
SW/FW
Load
E2 on
failure
A digital signature is generated
over the code when it is built
using SHA-256 and RSA-2048.
loading a new
firmware image
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
The digital signature is verified
upon download into the ASTRO
CDEM MACE.
Table 24: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
Firmware Integrity KAT SW/FW Integrity On Demand Manually
Table 25: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-Encryption
(A5273)
KAT CAST
On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/Programmatically
AES-Decryption
(A5273)
KAT CAST
On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/Programmatically
AES-Encryption
(A5275)
KAT CAST
On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/Programmatically
AES-Decryption
(A5275)
KAT CAST
On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/Programmatically
AES-KW (A5438) KAT CAST
On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/Programmatically
Counter DRBG
(A5437)
KAT CAST
On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/Programmatically
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
SHA2-256 (SHS 817) KAT CAST
On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/Programmatically
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-
5) (A5253)
KAT CAST
On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/Programmatically
Entropy 90B Start-up
Repetition Count Test
(RCT)
RCT CAST On Demand Manually
Entropy 90B Start-up
Adaptive Proportion
Test (ADP)
ADP CAST On Demand Manually
Firmware Load KAT SW/FW Load On Demand Manually
Table 26: Conditional Periodic Information
Conditional self–tests are periodically performed by the ASTRO CDEM MACE every X hours, where X is configured by the operator during module
configuration (1 hour to 720 hours). The ASTRO CDEM MACE will not accept any commands when a periodic self-test is required; the commands
still in the I/O buffer will be processed by the ASTRO CDEM MACE end the periodic self-test executed when the I/O buffer is emptied.
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 42 of 47
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10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions
Recovery
Method
Indicator
ES1
The ASTRO
CDEMMACE fails a
KAT.
The ASTRO CDEM MACE
enters the critical error
state. In this state, the
ASTRO CDEM MACE
stores the status into the
internal flash memory and
then halts all further
operation by entering an
infinite loop.
Reboot/Power
cycle the module
Sets the
status
alarm
LED.
ES2
The ASTRO
CDEMMACE fails a
firmware loading
during program
upgrade and/or
firmware integrity
pre-operational self-
test.
The ASTRO CDEM MACE
enters the firmware
signature validation failure
state. In this state, the
ASTRO CDEM MACE halts
all further operations by
entering the flash
programming mode.
Reboot/Power
cycle the module
or re-flashing a
new image.
Sets the
status
alarm
LED.
Table 27: Error States
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
Installation and Initialization:
The Module is originally a non-compliant module and must be initialized to be in Approved mode. There
is no non-Approved mode. During initialization the operator shall configure the Module from the
instructions below:
1. Upon first access, the operator will use the default passwords provided by Motorola in a
separate communication.
2. The operator will then change the default passwords based on the requirements in the Roles
and Authentication table.
3. The operator will set the periodic self-tests timer as part of the Module configuration in every X
minutes, where X is a minimum value = 1 hour and maximum value = 720 hours. Note: the
default minimum = 0* but must be changed to a minimum of 1.
4. The operator will then complete Module configuration using the Module Configuration and
Configure OTEK services.
5. Finally, the operator will set the Module to the Approved mode using the Set FIPS Mode service.
* periodic self-tests will not perform if minimum = 0
Delivery:
The Module is used in multiple Motorola Solutions, Inc. products. Motorola uses commercially available
courier systems such as UPS, FedEx, and DHL with a tracking number and requires a signature at the end
from an authorized client.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
Use vendor provided product specific user guide for secure operations.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
N/A
11.4 Design and Rules
Rules of Operation
1. The Module provides one distinct operator role: Cryptographic Officer.
2. The Module provides identity-based authentication.
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3. The Module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
4. An operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role.
5. The Module allows the operator to initiate power-up self-tests by power cycling power or resetting
the Module.
6. All self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
8. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise
of the Module.
9. There are no restrictions on which keys or SSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
10. The Module does not support concurrent operators.
11. The Module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
12. The Module does not support manual SSP establishment method.
13. The Module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of
data.
14. The Module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs.
15. The Module does store some CSPs in plaintext.
16. The Module does not output intermediate key values.
The Module does not provide bypass services or ports/interfaces.
11.5 Maintenance Requirements
N/A
11.6 End of Life
After the end-of-life, the operator should zeroize all SSPs using “Erase Crypto Module“ service followed
by shredding the ASTRO CDEM MACE chip.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The Module does not implement any mitigation method against other attacks.
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References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 28 References
Abbreviation* Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-3] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, March 22, 2019
[ISO19790] International Standard, ISO/IEC 19790, Information technology — Security techniques —
Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Third edition, March 2017
[ISO24759] International Standard, ISO/IEC 24759, Information technology — Security techniques —
Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Second and Corrected version, 15
December 2015
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program, August 30, 2024
[133] NIST Special Publication 800-133, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation,
Revision 2, June 2020
[186-5] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-5, February 2023.
[197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001, Updated
May 9, 2023
[180] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015
[38A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December
2001
[38F] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, Special Publication 800-38F, December
2012
[90A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A,
Revision 1, June 2015.
[90B] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Entropy
Sources Used for Random Bit Generation, Special Publication 800-90B, January 2018.
[OTAR] Project 25 – Digital Radio Over-The-Air-Rekeying (OTAR) Messages and Procedures [TIA-
102.AACA-A], September 2014
Table 29 Acronyms and Definitions
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Acronym* Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BKK Black Keyloading Key
CAI Common Air Interface
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CDEM CAI Data Encryption Module
CFB Cipher Feedback
CKG Cryptographic Key Generation
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DRBG-El DRBG Entropy Input
ECB Electronic Code Book
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
FW Firmware
FW-LD-Pub Firmware Load Public Key
IC Integrated Circuit
IDK Image Decryption Key
IV Initialization Vector
KAT Known Answer Test
KPK Key Protection Key
KEK Key Encryption Key
KVL Key Variable Loader
MAC Message Authentication Code
MACE Motorola Advanced Crypto Engine
OFB Output Feedback
OTAR Over The Air Rekeying
PEK Password Encryption Key
PWD Hash Password Hash
RSA Rivest–Shamir–Adleman
SSI Synchronous Serial Interface
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter
TEK Traffic Encryption Key
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Acronym* Definition
UA Unauthenticated Service