L3Harris Technologies, Inc.
Harris AES Load Module
Version: R07A01
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS Security Level: 1
Document Version: 0.1
Prepared for: Prepared by:
L3Harris Technologies Corsec Security, Inc.
221 Jefferson Ridge Parkway 12600 Fair Lakes Circle, Suite 210
Lynchburg, VA 24501 Fairfax, VA 22033
United States of America United States of America
Phone: +1 434 316-7181 Phone: +1 703 267 6050
http://www.l3harris.com www.corsec.com
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.1 September 22, 2026
Harris AES Load Module
©2026 L3Harris Technologies
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
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Table of Contents
1. General..................................................................................................................................................5
1.1 Overview.................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 Security Levels.........................................................................................................................................5
2. Cryptographic Module Specification .......................................................................................................7
2.1 Description..............................................................................................................................................7
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ..........................................................9
2.3 Excluded Components ......................................................................................................................... 10
2.4 Modes of Operation............................................................................................................................. 10
2.5 Algorithms............................................................................................................................................ 11
2.6 Security Function Implementations..................................................................................................... 12
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information............................................................................................................ 13
2.8 RBG and Entropy.................................................................................................................................. 13
2.9 Key Generation .................................................................................................................................... 13
2.10 Key Establishment................................................................................................................................ 13
2.11 Industry Protocols................................................................................................................................ 13
3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces .........................................................................................................14
3.1 Ports and Interfaces............................................................................................................................. 14
4. Roles, Services, and Authentication......................................................................................................15
4.1 Authentication Methods...................................................................................................................... 15
4.2 Roles..................................................................................................................................................... 15
4.3 Approved Services ............................................................................................................................... 15
4.4 Non-Approved Services ....................................................................................................................... 18
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................................... 18
4.6 Additional Information ........................................................................................................................ 19
5. Software/Firmware Security ................................................................................................................20
5.1 Integrity Techniques ............................................................................................................................ 20
5.2 Initiate on Demand .............................................................................................................................. 20
6. Operational Environment.....................................................................................................................21
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements............................................................................. 21
7. Physical Security ..................................................................................................................................22
8. Non-Invasive Security ..........................................................................................................................23
9. Sensitive Security Parameters Management.........................................................................................24
9.1 Storage Areas....................................................................................................................................... 24
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods.................................................................................................................. 24
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods..................................................................................................................... 24
9.4 SSPs...................................................................................................................................................... 24
9.5 Additional Information ........................................................................................................................ 25
10. Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................................26
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests................................................................................................................... 26
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.1 September 22, 2026
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10.2 Conditional Self-Tests .......................................................................................................................... 26
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information............................................................................................................. 27
10.4 Error States .......................................................................................................................................... 27
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests .......................................................................................................... 27
11. Life-Cycle Assurance.............................................................................................................................28
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ............................................................................. 28
11.2 Administrator Guidance....................................................................................................................... 28
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance............................................................................................................... 29
11.4 Design and Rules.................................................................................................................................. 29
11.5 End of Life ............................................................................................................................................ 29
12. Mitigation of Other Attacks..................................................................................................................30
Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations ....................................................................................................31
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.1 September 22, 2026
Harris AES Load Module
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels ..............................................................................................................................................6
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets) .................................9
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid............................................................. 10
Table 4: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid............................................. 10
Table 5: Modes List and Description ....................................................................................................................... 11
Table 6: Approved Algorithms................................................................................................................................. 11
Table 7: Security Function Implementations........................................................................................................... 12
Table 8: Ports and Interfaces................................................................................................................................... 14
Table 9: Roles........................................................................................................................................................... 15
Table 10: Approved Services ................................................................................................................................... 18
Table 11: Storage Areas........................................................................................................................................... 24
Table 12: SSP Input-Output Methods...................................................................................................................... 24
Table 13: SSP Zeroization Methods......................................................................................................................... 24
Table 14: SSP Table 1............................................................................................................................................... 25
Table 15: SSP Table 2............................................................................................................................................... 25
Table 16: Pre-Operational Self-Tests....................................................................................................................... 26
Table 17: Conditional Self-Tests .............................................................................................................................. 26
Table 18: Pre-Operational Periodic Information..................................................................................................... 27
Table 19: Conditional Periodic Information ............................................................................................................ 27
Table 20: Error States.............................................................................................................................................. 27
Table 21. Acronyms and Abbreviations................................................................................................................... 31
List of Figures
Figure 1. Module Block Diagram ................................................................................................................................8
Figure 2. Radio Terminal Block Diagram.....................................................................................................................9
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.1 September 22, 2026
Harris AES Load Module
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1. General
1.1 Overview
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Harris AES Load Module (version: R07A01)
from L3Harris Technologies (L3Harris). This Security Policy describes how the Harris AES Load Module meets the
security requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-3, which details the U.S.
and Canadian government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-3
standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website at
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp.
This document also describes how to run the module in a secure Approved mode of operation. This policy was
prepared as part of the Level 1 FIPS 140-3 validation of the module. The Harris AES Load Module is referred to in
this document as HALM or the module.
1.1.1 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-3
cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources:
• The L3Harris website https://www.l3harris.com/ contains information on the full line of services and
solutions from L3Harris.
• The validated modules search page on the CMVP website (https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-
module-validation-program/Validated-Modules/Search) can be used to locate and obtain vendor contact
information for technical or sales-related questions about the module.
1.1.2 Document Organization
ISO/IEC 19790 Annex B uses the same section naming convention as ISO/IEC 19790 section 7 - Security
requirements. For example, Annex B section B.2.1 is named “General” and B.2.2 is named “Cryptographic module
specification,” which is the same as ISO/IEC 19790 section 7.1 and section 7.2, respectively. Therefore, the format
of this Security Policy is presented in the same order as indicated in Annex B, starting with “General” and ending
with “Mitigation of other attacks.” If sections are not applicable, they have been marked as such in this document.
1.2 Security Levels
The Harris AES Load Module is validated at the FIPS 140-3 section levels shown in the table below.
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.1 September 22, 2026
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Section Title Security Level
4 Roles, services, and authentication 1
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security 1
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.1 September 22, 2026
Harris AES Load Module
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2. Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
2.1.1 Purpose and Use
L3Harris Technologies is a leading supplier of systems and equipment for public safety, federal, utility, commercial,
and transportation markets. Their products range from the most advanced IP1
voice and data networks, to
industry-leading multiband/multimode radios, and even public safety-grade broadband video and data solutions.
Their comprehensive line of software-defined radio products and systems support the critical missions of
countless public and private agencies, federal and state agencies, and government, defense, and peacekeeping
organizations throughout the world.
The Harris AES Load Module supports secure voice and data communications by providing AES 2
encryption/decryption as specified in FIPS PUB 197. The module ensures data integrity using a Cipher-based
Message Authentication Code (CMAC) algorithm as specified in NIST SP 800-38B. The module interacts with a
Digital Signal Processor (DSP) application executing on the L3Harris XL family of radios and other terminal products
in order to provide its services to those terminals. The Module Software Interface (MSI) is the mechanism by which
the DSP can (a) request the HALM to perform specific processing, (b) provide the HALM with specific parameter
values, or (c) request a particular status response from the HALM.
The application code running on the host radio terminal sends any requests for specific HALM processing, status,
or parameter updates to the DSP application. The DSP application then communicates these requests to the HALM
via the MSI. If any information needs to be sent from the HALM to the host, the HALM returns an appropriate
status value to the DSP Application along with any relevant data in the Data Output port of the interface. The DSP
Application then forms the appropriate message and sends the message to the host.
2.1.2 Module Type
The Harris AES Load Module R07A01 is a Firmware module.
2.1.3 Module Embodiment
The Harris AES Load Module has a Multi-Chip Standalone embodiment.
2.1.4 Cryptographic Boundary
Figure 1 below is a logical block diagram showing the module’s cryptographic boundary and physical perimeter,
as well as its interactions with surrounding firmware components as it executes in the DSP’s SRAM.
1
IP – Internet Protocol
2 AES – Advanced Encryption Standard
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.1 September 22, 2026
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Page 8 of 33
DSP Application
GPP Application
HALM
Key Store
TEKs
UKEKs
KEY:
Cryptographic Boundary
TOEPP
Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status Output
Data Flows
FLASH Key
Store
Keys
Key Sets
FLASH Store
HALM
PC Applications
RPM/DM
Key Admin
UKEK Loader
MSI
Figure 1. Module Block Diagram
The L3Harris terminals do not employ an operating system (OS). Rather, L3Harris terminals rely on the L3Harris
BIOS3
Kernel version 1.0 to act as the module’s “operating system”, providing the low-level interface to the
underlying hardware. The kernel executes on an internal Blackfin BF707 DSP4
(with a Blackfin+ core embedded
processor) from Analog Devices, Inc. The module provides cryptographic services directly to the DSP application.
2.1.5 Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter
(TOEPP)
Figure 2 below is a block diagram of the major hardware components in the L3Harris terminals that host the HALM
(including an NXP/Freescale processor), along with the terminal’s enclosure which comprises the TOEPP.
3
BIOS – Basic Input/Output System
4 DSP - Digital Signal Processor
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.1 September 22, 2026
Harris AES Load Module
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KEY:
TOEPP
Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status Output
Data Flow
Speaker Mic Serial PTT Keypad Knobs Antenna
Audio CODEC
NXP/Freescale
Vybrid
VF5xx GPP
Flash Memory
Digital 2 Analog
-----------------------
Analog 2 Digital
BlackFin
DSP with
BlackFin+ Core
SRAM
Battery
Figure 2. Radio Terminal Block Diagram
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and
Identification
2.2.1 Tested Module Identification – Hardware
The module is not a hardware module.
2.2.2 Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid
(Executable Code Sets)
The module has the following executable code sets shown in the table below.
Package or File Name Software/ Firmware Version Features Integrity Test
HALM.bin R07A01 256-bit AES-CMAC verification
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)
2.2.3 Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware
The module is not a hybrid module.
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.1 September 22, 2026
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2.2.4 Tested Operational Environments – Software, Firmware,
Hybrid
The module was tested and found to be compliant with FIPS 140-3 requirements on the environments listed in
the table below.
Operating System
Hardware
Platform
Processors PAA/PAI
Hypervisor
or Host OS
Version(s)
L3Harris BIOS Kernel 1.0 L3Harris XL-200P Blackfin BF707 DSP No N/A R07A01
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
2.2.5 Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments – Software,
Firmware, Hybrid
Module operators may perform post-validation porting of the module and affirm the module’s continued
validation compliance. The table below specifies the vendor-affirmed operational environments claimed.
Operating System
Hardware
Platform
L3Harris BIOS Kernel 1.0 XL-400P
L3Harris BIOS Kernel 1.0 XL-185P
L3Harris BIOS Kernel 1.0 XL-150P
L3Harris BIOS Kernel 1.0 XL-95P
L3Harris BIOS Kernel 1.0 XL-45P
L3Harris BIOS Kernel 1.0 XL-200M
L3Harris BIOS Kernel 1.0 XL-185M
L3Harris BIOS Kernel 1.0 XL-85M
L3Harris BIOS Kernel 1.0 XL-45M
Table 4: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the
generated keys when ported to an operational environment not listed on the validation certificate.
2.3 Excluded Components
The module does not exclude any components from the requirements.
2.4 Modes of Operation
2.4.1 Modes List and Description
The table below lists the modes of operation supported by the module.
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.1 September 22, 2026
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Page 11 of 33
Mode
Name
Description Type Status Indicator
Approved When all pre-operational self-
tests have successfully
completed
Approved Return from the HALM_SEND_STATUS message of any of the following
states indicates that the module is operating in its Approved mode of
operation:
• STATE_SELF_TEST
• STATE_USER_MODE
• STATE_KEY_ENTRY
• STATE_CRYPTO_OFR
• STATE_ERROR
Table 5: Modes List and Description
2.5 Algorithms
2.5.1 Approved Algorithms
The module employs cryptographic algorithm implementations from the following sources:
• L3Harris AES Load Module version R07A01 (Cert. A7422)
The module implements the Approved algorithms listed in the table below.
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CMAC A7422 Direction - Generation, Verification
Key Length - 256
MAC Length - MAC Length: 16-128 Increment 16, MAC Length: 8-128 Increment
8
Message Length - Message Length: 0-98296 Increment 8
SP 800-38B
AES-ECB A7422 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-KW A7422 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Cipher - Cipher
Key Length - 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 256
SP 800-38F
AES-OFB A7422 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
Table 6: Approved Algorithms
Note that there are algorithms, modes, and key/moduli sizes that have been CAVP-tested but are not used by any
Approved service of the module. Only the algorithms, modes/methods, and key lengths/curves/moduli shown in
the table above are used by an Approved service of the module.
2.5.2 Vendor Affirmed Algorithms
The module does not implement any vendor-affirmed algorithms.
N/A for this module.
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2.5.3 Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms
The module does not implement any non-Approved algorithms allowed in the Approved mode of operation.
N/A for this module.
2.5.4 Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed
The module does not implement any non-Approved algorithms allowed in the Approved mode of operation with
no security claimed.
N/A for this module.
2.5.5 Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms
The module does not implement any non-Approved algorithms not allowed in the Approved mode of operation.
N/A for this module.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
The table below lists the security function implementations for this module.
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
AES for Symmetric
Encryption
BC-UnAuthEncrypt AES (using ECB or OFB
mode) for symmetric
encryption of data
Publication:SP 800-38A AES-ECB: (A7422)
Direction: Encrypt
AES-OFB: (A7422)
Direction: Encrypt
AES for Symmetric
Decryption
BC-UnAuthDecrypt AES (using ECB or OFB
mode) for symmetric
decryption of data
Publication:SP 800-38A AES-ECB: (A7422)
Direction: Decrypt
AES-OFB: (A7422)
Direction: Decrypt
AES-CMAC for Firmware
Integrity
MAC AES (using CMAC mode)
for the verification of
the firmware image
MAC
Publication:SP 800-38B AES-CMAC: (A7422)
Direction: Verification
AES-KW for Key
Encryption
BC-AuthEncrypt AES (using KW mode)
for key encryption
Publication:SP 800-38F AES-KW: (A7422)
Direction: Encrypt
AES-KW for Key
Decryption
BC-AuthDecrypt AES (using KW mode)
for key decryption
Publication:SP 800-38F AES-KW: (A7422)
Direction: Decrypt
Table 7: Security Function Implementations
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2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
2.7.1 KTS
The module does not establish SSPs using Approved key transport schemes (KTS). However, it does offer Approved
algorithms that can be used by an external operator/application as part of an Approved KTS. Refer to section
2.10.2 below for additional details.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
The module does not have an internal DRBG or entropy source. All keys are generated externally and input into
the module in encrypted form.
2.9 Key Generation
The module does not support key generation.
2.10 Key Establishment
The cryptographic module provides the cryptographic primitives necessary to support key agreement schemes
and key transport methods for use by the calling application to establish keys.
2.10.1 Key Agreement Information
The module does not support key agreement methods.
2.10.2 Key Transport Information
The module offers as a service to a calling application CAVP-tested algorithms specified in the list below without
establishing a key/SSP to be used by the module for cryptographic protection.
• AES-KW
• AES-CMAC
2.11 Industry Protocols
The module does not offer support for any industry protocols.
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.1 September 22, 2026
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3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
The module supports the following logical interfaces:
• Data Input
• Data Output
• Control Input
• Status Output
As a firmware library, the cryptographic module has no direct access to any of the host platform’s physical ports;
it communicates only to the DSP application, and communications from the DSP application are accomplished via
the module’s well-defined API. The table below contains a mapping of the logical interfaces supported by the
module.
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
N/A Data Input Includes content passed from the DSP application to the module to be encrypted/decrypted
N/A Data Output Includes encrypted/decrypted content passed from the module to the DSP application
N/A Control
Input
Includes a message ID (which gets translated by the module into the HALM API) and additional data to be
used by the function (such as key size) passed from the DSP application to the module
N/A Status
Output
Includes status codes returned to the DSP application indicating the state of the module
Power Power Power
Table 8: Ports and Interfaces
The module does not output control information and has no specified control output interface.
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Page 15 of 33
4. Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
The module does not support authentication mechanisms.
4.2 Roles
The module supports the roles listed in the table below.
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Role Crypto Officer
User Role User
Table 9: Roles
Roles are implicitly assumed by the calling application based on the service selected. The calling application is the
module’s only operator, and the module does not support multiple concurrent operators.
4.3 Approved Services
Descriptions of the available services are provided in the table below. Access rights for each SSP are specified
using the following notation:
• G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
• E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP.
Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Security
Function
s
SSP
Acce
ss
Show Status
HALM_SEND_STATUS
Returns the status
of the last function
called from the
HALM_API
N/A API call Status code of the last function
called from the HALM_API
Crypt
o
Offic
er
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Security
Function
s
SSP
Acce
ss
Self-Test
HALM_INITIALIZE
Allocates memory
from the heap for
use by the module,
initiating the
execution of the
module’s CASTs and
integrity test
(The service is called
by the DSP
application’s
pre_main function
when the
application and
module are loaded
for execution)
N/A API call Status code:
· 0x01 (HALM_INITIALIZE_OK)
· 0x81
(HALM_INIT_INTEGRITY_TEST_F
AILED)
· 0x82
(HALM_INIT_AES_KAT_FAILED)
AES-
CMAC
for
Firmwar
e
Integrity
Crypt
o
Offic
er
HALM_LOAD_KEY Passes in the
plaintext AES key to
be used in
subsequent block
encryption
processing
Global
status
indicat
or +
Status
code
API call; key
length; key
Status code:
· 0x03 (HALM_LOAD_KEY_OK)
User
- AES
Key:
W
-
AES-
CMA
C
Key:
W
HALM_GEN_PRIVATE_
MI
Generates a
Message Indicator
(MI) from the
Initialization Vector
(IV) value specified
in the data input
buffer
Global
status
indicat
or +
API
status
code
API call; input IV Status code:
· 0x04
(HALM_GEN_PRIVATE_MI_OK)
User
HALM_GEN_KEYSTREA
M
Generates one or
more blocks of
Keystream data and
adds the data to its
internal Keystream
buffer
Global
status
indicat
or +
API
status
code
API call;
iteration count
Status code:
· 0x05
(HALM_GEN_KEYSTREAM_OK)
· 0x85
(HALM_GEN_KEYSTREAM_OVER
RUN)
User
HALM_P25_XOR Performs logical
Exclusive-Or (XOR)
operation of P25
Voice or Data
plaintext/ciphertext
octets for AES-OFB
encryptions/decrypt
ions
Global
status
indicat
or +
API
status
code
API call; number
of octets;
keystream table
starting offset;
plaintext/cipher
text octets
XOR’ed plaintext/ciphertext
octets
Status code:
· 0x06 (HALM_P25_XOR_OK)
· 0x86
(HALM_P25_XOR_KEYSTREAM_E
RROR)
User
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Security
Function
s
SSP
Acce
ss
HALM_AES_OFB_PASS
THRU
Encrypts one or
more blocks of
plaintext (or
decrypts one or
more blocks of
ciphertext)
Global
status
indicat
or +
API
status
code
API call; number
of iterations;
plaintext/cipher
text blocks to
encrypt or
decrypt
Encrypted/decrypted blocks
Status code:
· 0x07
(HALM_AES_OFB_PASSTHRU_OK
)
AES for
Symmetr
ic
Encrypti
on
AES for
Symmetr
ic
Decrypti
on
User
- AES
Key:
E
HALM_WRAP_KEY Wraps a temporary
key generated by
the DSP and passes
it to the DSP in
support of OTAR
operations by the
DSP
Global
status
indicat
or +
API
status
code
API call; key
encryption key;
IV; key to be
wrapped
Wrapped key
Status code:
· 0x0B (HALM_WRAP_KEY_OK)
AES-KW
for Key
Encrypti
on
User
-
AES-
KW
Key:
W,E
HALM_UNWRAP_KEY Unwraps a wrapped
key and passes it to
the DSP in support
of OTAR operations
by the DSP
Global
status
indicat
or +
API
status
code
API call; key
encryption key;
IV; wrapped key
Unwrapped key
Status code:
· 0x0A (HALM_UNWRAP_OK)
· 0x8A
(HALM_UNWRAP_FAILED)
AES-KW
for Key
Decrypti
on
User
-
AES-
KW
Key:
W,E
HALM_LOAD_TEST_IV Loads an
initialization vector
(IV) into an internal
HALM buffer for use
Global
status
indicat
or +
API
status
code
API call; IV value Status code:
· 0x0C
(HALM_LOAD_TEST_IV_OK)
User
HALM_AES_ECB Encrypts each block
of the plaintext
directly and
independently; used
for P25 link layer
authentication;
used as part of a
MAC generation
algorithm
implemented in the
DSP for P25 OTAR
Global
status
indicat
or +
API
status
code
API call; key
length; plaintext
block
ciphertext block
Status code:
· 0x0E (HALM_AES_ECB_OK)
AES for
Symmetr
ic
Encrypti
on
User
- AES
Key:
E
Show versioning
information
Returns the name
and version of the
module
N/A API call Status output Crypt
o
Offic
er
Cleanup Deallocates memory N/A API call Status output Crypt
o
Offic
er
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.1 September 22, 2026
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Security
Function
s
SSP
Acce
ss
Zeroize Zeroizes keys in
volatile memory via
manual reboot
N/A Manual reboot Crypt
o
Offic
er
- AES
Key:
Z
-
AES-
CMA
C
Key:
Z
-
AES-
KW
Key:
Z
User
- AES
Key:
Z
-
AES-
CMA
C
Key:
Z
-
AES-
KW
Key:
Z
Table 10: Approved Services
The module does not support a non-Approved mode of operation. Thus, as allowed by FIPS 140-3 IG 2.4.C, the
module provides indicators for the use of Approved security services through a combination of an explicit
indication (via a global Approved mode indicator) and an implicit indication (via the successful completion of the
service).
4.4 Non-Approved Services
The module does not offer any non-Approved services.
N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module does not support the loading of software/firmware from external sources.
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4.6 Additional Information
The processing of specific HALM_API commands may be prohibited while the module is in a particular state.
Should the module receive a command that is prohibited in its current state, it will return the status code 0xFE
(HALM_REQUEST_DENIED). If the module is in the STATE_LOCKED state, the module responds with the current
Status Word (state and status code) for any valid message it receives. In addition, if the module receives a
HALM_API command that it does not recognize, it will return the status code 0xFF (HALM_INVALID_MSG).
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5. Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
All firmware components within the cryptographic boundary are verified using Approved integrity techniques
implemented within the cryptographic module itself. The module compares a 256-bit AES-CMAC digest calculated
at run-time with the 256-bit AES-CMAC digest computed at build-time. If the integrity tests fail, the module enters
a critical error state.
The module’s integrity check is performed automatically at module instantiation (i.e., when the module is loaded
into memory for execution) without action from the module operator. The key and the MAC digest are embedded
in the module binary.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The operator can initiate the pre-operational integrity test and conditional CASTs on demand by restarting the
host radio terminal (thereby restarting the module).
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6. Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
The Harris AES Load Module is a firmware cryptographic library that executes in a Non-Modifiable operational
environment.
The cryptographic module has control over its own SSPs. The process and memory management functionality of
the host terminal’s OS prevents unauthorized access to plaintext private and secret keys, intermediate key
generation values, and other SSPs by external processes during module execution. The module only allows access
to SSPs through its well-defined API. The operational environment provides the capability to separate individual
application processes from each other, thereby preventing uncontrolled access to CSPs and uncontrolled
modifications of SSPs regardless of whether this data is in the process memory or stored on persistent storage
within the operational environments. Processes that are spawned by the module are owned by the module and
are not owned by external processes/operators.
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7. Physical Security
The module executes on L3Harris radio terminal hardware meeting level 1 physical security requirements. All
components of the hardware are made of production-grade materials, and all integrated circuits are coated with
commercial standard passivation.
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8. Non-Invasive Security
This section is not applicable. There are currently no approved non-invasive mitigation techniques references in
Annex F of ISO/IEC 19790:2012.
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9. Sensitive Security Parameters
Management
9.1 Storage Areas
There is no mechanism within the module’s cryptographic boundary for the persistent storage of SSPs. SSPs are
held in volatile RAM during module operation.
The table below lists sensitive security parameters (SSPs) storage areas for this module. Section 9.4 selects from
the storage areas listed and specifies the appropriate storage area in the “Storage” column if applicable to a given
SSP.
Storage
Area
Name
Description
Persistence
Type
RAM SSPs stored in the RAM Dynamic
Table 11: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
The table below lists SSP input and output methods for this module. Section 9.4 selects from the input and output
methods listed and specifies the appropriate method in the “Inputs/Outputs” column if applicable to a given SSP.
Name From To
Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
External to RAM in plaintext External RAM Plaintext Automated Electronic
Table 12: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
The table below lists SSP zeroization methods for this module. Section 9.4 selects from the zeroization methods
listed and specifies the appropriate method in the “Zeroization” column if applicable to a given SSP.
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Power
cycle
Power cycling the module’s host
radio terminal zeroizes SSPs.
Power cycling the module’s host radio terminal
zeroizes SSPs, yielding them irretrievable.
Operator power cycles
the module
Table 13: SSP Zeroization Methods
9.4 SSPs
The module supports the keys and other SSPs listed in the tables below.
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Name Description
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
AES Key Symmetric key used for ECB and OFB
encryption and decryption operations
[AES-ECB]
128 or 256
bits
[AES-OFB]
256 bits -
[AES-ECB]
128 or 256
bits
[AES-OFB]
256 bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
AES for Symmetric
Encryption
AES for Symmetric
Decryption
AES-
CMAC
Key
Symmetric key used as input for CMAC
generate/verify operations
256 bits -
256 bits
MAC - CSP AES-CMAC for
Firmware Integrity
AES-KW
Key
Symmetric key used as input into the
key encryption and decryption
operations
256 bits -
256 bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
AES-KW for Key
Encryption
AES-KW for Key
Decryption
Table 14: SSP Table 1
Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization
Related
SSPs
AES Key External to RAM in plaintext RAM:Plaintext Until the module is power cycled Power cycle
AES-CMAC Key External to RAM in plaintext RAM:Plaintext Until the module is power cycled Power cycle
AES-KW Key External to RAM in plaintext RAM:Plaintext Until the module is power cycled Power cycle
Table 15: SSP Table 2
9.5 Additional Information
Maintenance, including protection and zeroization of any keys and CSPs that exist outside the module’s
cryptographic boundary, are the responsibility of the end-user.
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10. Self-Tests
The module performs pre-operational self-tests and conditional self-tests. Pre-operational tests are performed
when the cryptographic module is instantiated, before the module transitions to the operational state.
Conditional self-tests are performed by the module during module operation when certain conditions exist.
The pre-operational integrity tests and cryptographic algorithm self-tests are performed automatically via a
default entry point (DEP) when the module is loaded for execution, without any specific action from the calling
application or the end-user. End-users have no means to short-circuit or bypass these actions.
The following sections list the self-tests performed by the module, their expected error status, and the error
resolutions.
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The module performs the pre-operational self-tests listed in the table below.
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details
Firmware
Integrity Test
256-bit Firmware
integrity
SW/FW
Integrity
0x01 (HALM_INITIALIZE_OK)
0x81
(HALM_INIT_INTEGRITY_TEST_FAILED)
Firmware integrity test of the
binary verifying a 256-bit AES-
CMAC digest
Table 16: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The module performs the conditional self-tests listed in the table below.
Algorithm or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-ECB Encrypt KAT
(A7422) - Encrypt
128-bit KAT CAST 0x01 (HALM_INITIALIZE_OK)
0x82
(HALM_INIT_AES_KAT_FAILED)
Encrypt At module start-up, prior
to the integrity test
AES-ECB Decrypt KAT
(A7422) - Decrypt
128-bit KAT CAST 0x01 (HALM_INITIALIZE_OK)
0x82
(HALM_INIT_AES_KAT_FAILED)
Decrypt At module start-up, prior
to the integrity test
AES-CMAC Generate
KAT (A7422) - Generate
256-bit KAT CAST 0x01 (HALM_INITIALIZE_OK)
0x82
(HALM_INIT_AES_KAT_FAILED)
Generate At module start-up, prior
to the integrity test
AES-CMAC Verify KAT
(A7422) - Verify
256-bit KAT CAST 0x01 (HALM_INITIALIZE_OK)
0x82
(HALM_INIT_AES_KAT_FAILED)
Verify At module start-up, prior
to the integrity test
Table 17: Conditional Self-Tests
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10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Module operators can initiate self-tests on demand for periodic testing of the module. The tables below specify
the self-tests that are performed when periodic self-tests are initiated by the module operator.
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
Firmware Integrity Test Firmware integrity SW/FW Integrity On Demand Manually
Table 18: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-ECB Encrypt KAT
(A7422) - Encrypt
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-ECB Decrypt KAT
(A7422) - Decrypt
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CMAC Generate
KAT (A7422) - Generate
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CMAC Verify KAT
(A7422) - Verify
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
Table 19: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
The table below describes the module’s error states/conditions and error state recovery methods.
Name Description Conditions Recovery Method Indicator
Critical
Error
The module denies requests for service, returning the status
code 0xFE (HALM_REQUEST_DENIED) to the DSP application
while the error state persists. All data output via the data
output interface is blocked.
Upon failing
any self-test
The operator must
restart the host radio
terminal by power
cycling it.
STATE_LOCKED
Table 20: Error States
While in the critical error state, all data output via any data output interface is blocked. The only message that can
be used while in this state is the HALM_SEND_STATUS() message, which will return the status code indicating
the module’s current state (STATE_LOCKED). If restarting the terminal does not clear the error state, the
operator should contact L3Harris Technologies for support.
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
The operator can initiate the module’s start-up self-tests by restarting the host terminal, thereby executing the
HALM_INITIALIZE() message. The HALM_INITIALIZE() message can also be used during module
operation to initiate the module’s start-up self-tests on demand.
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11. Life-Cycle Assurance
The sections below describe how to ensure the module is operating in its validated configuration, including the
following:
• Procedures for secure installation, initialization, startup, and operation of the module
• Maintenance requirements
• Administrator and non-Administrator guidance
Operating the module without following the guidance herein (including the use of undocumented services) will
result in non-compliant behavior and is outside the scope of this Security Policy.
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
The module is initialized by the DSP when the host radio terminal is powered on. When the DSP loads into memory
for execution, its pre_main() function automatically executes the HALM’s HALM_INITIALIZE routine to run
the module’s conditional CASTs, followed by the pre-operational integrity self-test. The module is not considered
to be in an operational state until the integrity test has successfully completed. The module’s services are only
made available after the module performs and successfully passes its integrity test.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
The CO should monitor the module’s status regularly. If any irregular activity is noticed, or if the module is
consistently reporting errors, the CO should contact L3Harris customer support for assistance.
The following list provides additional guidance for the CO:
• The HALM_SEND_STATUS message can be used to determine the module’s current mode of operation.
Return of any of the following states indicates that the module is operating in its Approved mode of
operation:
o STATE_SELF_TEST
o STATE_USER_MODE
o STATE_KEY_ENTRY
o STATE_CRYPTO_OFR
o STATE_ERROR
• The requestStatus() function can be used to obtain the name and versioning information of the
module. When used with the parameter “type = 0”, the function will return a pointer to the version string.
The version string will include the module name and version, which can be correlated with the module’s
validation record.
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11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
Users can only access the module’s cryptographic functionalities that are available to them. The User should
report to the CO if any irregular activity is noticed.
11.4 Design and Rules
By design, the module follows or enforces the following rules of operation:
• Operators do not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role.
• The module performs all self-tests without any operator action required.
• The module inhibits data output during self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
• Status information output by the module does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could
lead to a compromise of the module.
• There are no restrictions on which keys or SSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
• The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
• The module does not support manual SSP establishment method.
• The module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
• The module does not store any plaintext CSPs
• The module does not output intermediate key values.
• The module does not provide bypass services or ports/interfaces.
11.5 End of Life
As the module does not persistently store SSPs, secure sanitization of the module consists of performing the
zeroization methods described in section 9.3 above. This will ensure that any SSPs in volatile memory are zeroized.
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.1 September 22, 2026
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12. Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-3 Level 1 requirements for this validation.
Therefore, per ISO/IEC 19790:2021 section 7.12, requirements for this section are not applicable.
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.1 September 22, 2026
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Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations
Table 21 provides definitions for the acronyms and abbreviations used in this document.
Table 21. Acronyms and Abbreviations
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
BIOS Basic Input/Output System
CAST Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
CMAC Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Cryptographic Officer
codec Coder/Decoder
CPU Central Processing Unit
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter
DEP Default Entry Point
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSP Digital Signal Processor
ECB Electronic Code Book
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GPP General Purpose Processor
IG Implementation Guidance
ISO/IEC International Organization for Standardization / International Electrotechnical Commission
KAT Known Answer Test
KTS Key Transport Scheme
KW Key Wrap
MAC Message Authentication Code
MSI Module Software Interface
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OFB Output Feedback
OS Operating System
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Acronym Definition
PTT Push-To-Talk
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
SP Special Publication
SRAM Static Random Access Memory
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter
TOEPP Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter
XOR Exclusive-Or
Prepared by:
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Email: info@corsec.com
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