



Cisco ASA Cryptographic Module

**FIPS 140-2 Non Proprietary Security Policy
Level 1 Validation**

Version 0.5

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1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose

This is the non-proprietary Security Policy for the Cisco ASA Cryptographic Module, henceforth referred to as ASA-CM, running firmware 9.8. This security policy describes how this module meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 1 and how to run the module in a FIPS 140-2 mode of operation. This Security Policy may be freely distributed.

FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — *Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules*) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST website at <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/index.html>.

1.2 Module Validation Level

The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.

No.	Area Title	Level
1	Cryptographic Module Specification	1
2	Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	1
3	Roles, Services, and Authentication	3
4	Finite State Model	1
5	Physical Security	1
6	Operational Environment	N/A
7	Cryptographic Key management	1
8	Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility	1
9	Self-Tests	1
10	Design Assurance	2
11	Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A
	Overall module validation level	1

Table 1 Module Validation Level

1.3 References

This document deals only with the operations and capabilities of the Cisco ASA-CM blade listed in section 1.1 above as it relates to the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available from the following sources:

The Cisco Systems website contains information on the full line of Cisco Systems security. Please refer to the following websites:

<http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/index.html>

<http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/firepower/fxos/roadmap/fxos-roadmap.html>

For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts listed on the Cisco Systems website at www.cisco.com.

The NIST Validated Modules website (<http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html>) contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.

1.4 Terminology

In this document, the Cisco ASA Cryptographic Module is referred to as Cisco ASA-CM, ASA-CM blade, blade, module, CM or the System.

1.5 Document Organization

The Security Policy document is part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the Submission Package contains:

- Vendor Evidence document
- Finite State Machine
- Other supporting documentation as additional references

This document provides an overview of the Cisco ASA Cryptographic Module identified in section 1.1 above and explains the secure layout, configuration and operation of the module. This introduction section is followed by Section 2, which details the general features and functionality of the module. Section 3 specifically addresses the required configuration for the FIPS-mode of operation.

With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Submission Documentation is Cisco-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Cisco Systems.

2 Cisco ASA Cryptographic Module

The Cisco ASA-CM is a cryptographic module that delivers enterprise-class firewall for businesses. Improving security at the Internet edge, high performance and throughput for demanding enterprise data centers. Now it's available in a blade form factor that can be integrated into the Cisco Firepower 4100 and 9300 Series.

The ASA solution offers the combination of the industry's most deployed stateful firewall with a comprehensive range of next-generation network security services, intrusion prevention system (IPS), content security, secure unified communications, TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IKEv2 and Suite B all using the ASA-CM.

The versions of the ASA-CM blade that integrate with the Cisco Firepower 4100 and 9300 Series are the focus of this 140-2 validation. The specific part numbers of the ASA-CM blades subjected to 140-2 conformance testing include the following seven models:

- FPR4110-ASA-K9
- FPR4120-ASA-K9
- FPR4140-ASA-K9
- FPR4150-ASA-K9
- FPR9K-SM-24 (SM-24)
- FPR9K-SM-36 (SM-36)
- FPR9K-SM-44 (SM-44)

2.1 Cryptographic Module Physical Characteristics

The Cisco ASA-CM is an integrated network security module housed in a single blade architecture, which is designed to integrate into the Cisco Firepower 4100 or 9300 Series Appliances. Once integrated, the ASA-CM provides enhanced security, reliability, and performance. Delivering industry-leading firewall data rates, this module provides exceptional scalability to meet the needs of today's dynamic organizations.




Image 1: ASA Blade

2.2 Cryptographic Boundary

The Cisco ASA-CM is a multiple-chip embedded cryptographic module with the cryptographic boundary defined as the physical perimeter of the blade as outlined in a red dashed line below.




Diagram 1 Block Diagram

2.3 Module Interfaces

The module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical interfaces provided by the module are mapped to the following FIPS 140-2 defined logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, status output, and power. The logical interfaces and their mapping are described in the following table:

FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface	4100 and 9300 Physical Interface
Data Input	SFP Ethernet Ports PCI port
Data Output	SFP Ethernet Ports PCI port
Control Input	SFP Ethernet Ports PCI port
Status Output	SFP Ethernet Ports PCI port LED

Table 2 Hardware/Physical Boundary Interfaces

2.4 Roles and Services

The appliances can be accessed in one of the following ways:

- SSHv2
- HTTPS/TLSv1.2
- IPSec/IKEv2

Authentication is identity-based. As required by FIPS 140-2, there are two roles that operators may assume: a Crypto Officer role and User role. The module upon initial access to the module authenticates both of these roles. The module also supports RADIUS and TACACS+ as another means of authentication, allowing the storage of usernames and passwords on an external server as opposed to using the module's internal database for storage.

The User and Crypto Officer passwords and all shared secrets must each be at a minimum eight (8) characters long. There must be at least one special character and at least one number character (enforced procedurally) along with six additional characters taken from the 26 upper case, 26 lower case, 10 numbers and 32 special characters. See the Secure Operation section for more information. If six (6) special/alpha/number characters, one (1) special character and one (1) number are used without repetition for an eight (8) digit value, the probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in 187,595,543,116,800. This is calculated by performing $94 \times 93 \times 92 \times 91 \times 90 \times 89 \times 32 \times 10$. In order to successfully guess the sequence in one minute would require the ability to make over 3,126,592,385,280 guesses per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the module.

Additionally, when using RSA based authentication, RSA key pair has modulus size of 2048 bits, thus providing 112 bits of strength, which means an attacker would have a 1 in 2^{112} chance of randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the one in a million chances required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 8.65×10^{31} ($2^{112}/60 = 8.65 \times 10^{31}$) attempts per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the module to support.

2.5 User Services

A User enters the system by either SSH or HTTPS/TLS. The module prompts the User for username and password. If the password is correct, the User is allowed entry to the module management functionality. The other means of accessing the console is via an IPSec session. This session is authenticated either using a shared secret or RSA digital signature authentication mechanism. The services available to the User role accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read (r), write (w) and zeroized/delete (d) – and which role accesses the CSPs are listed below:

Services	Description	Keys and CSPs Access
Status Functions	View state of interfaces and protocols, version of firmware currently running.	Operator password (r, w, d)
Terminal Functions	Adjust the terminal session (e.g., lock the terminal, adjust flow control).	Operator password (r, w, d)
Directory Services	Display directory of files kept in flash memory.	Operator password (r, w, d)
Self-Tests	Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand.	N/A
IPSec VPN	Negotiation and encrypted data transport via IPSec VPN.	Operator password, keyid, keyid_d, SKEYSEED, IKE session encrypt key, IKE session authentication key, ISAKMP preshared, IKE authentication private Key, IKE authentication public key, IPSec encryption key, IPSec authentication key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed, DRBG V, DRBG C and DRBG key (r, w, d)

Services	Description	Keys and CSPs Access
SSHv2 Functions	Negotiation and encrypted data transport via SSHv2.	Operator password, SSHv2 Private Key, SSHv2 Public Key and SSHv2 session key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed, DRBG V, DRBG C and DRBG key (r, w, d)
HTTPS Functions (TLSv1.2)	Negotiation and encrypted data transport via HTTPS/TLS (TLSv1.2).	Operator password, ECDSA private key, ECDSA public key, TLS RSA private key, TLS RSA public key, TLS pre-master secret, TLS master secret, TLS encryption keys, TLS integrity key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed, DRBG V, DRBG C and DRBG key (r, w, d)

Table 3 User Services

2.6 Crypto Officer Services

A Crypto Officer (CO) enters the system by accessing the console port with a terminal program or SSH v2 session to a LAN port or the 10/100/1000 management Ethernet port. The Crypto Officer authenticates in the same manner as a User. A Crypto Officer may assign permission to access the Crypto Officer role to additional accounts, thereby creating additional Crypto Officers.

The Crypto Officer role is responsible for the configuration of the module. The services available to the Crypto Officer role accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read (r), write (w) and zeroized/delete (d) – and which role accesses the CSPs are listed below:

Services	Description	Keys and CSPs Access
Configure the Security	Define network interfaces and settings, create command aliases, set the protocols the router will support, enable interfaces and network services, set system date and time, and load authentication information.	ISAKMP preshared, Operator password, Enable password, IKE session encrypt key, IKE session authentication key, IKE authentication private Key, IKE authentication public key, IPSec encryption key, IPSec authentication key (r, w, d)
Firmware Installation	Install the firmware during the System Initialization	Integrity test key
Configure External Authentication Server	Configure Client/Server authentication	RADIUS secret, TACACS+ secret
Define Rules and Filters	Create packet Filters that are applied to User data streams on each interface. Each Filter consists of a set of Rules, which define a set of packets to permit or deny based on characteristics such as protocol ID, addresses, ports, TCP connection establishment, or packet direction.	Operator password, Enable password (r, w, d)
View Status Functions	View the router configuration, routing tables, active sessions health, temperature, memory status, voltage, packet statistics, review accounting logs, and view physical interface status.	Operator password, Enable password (r, w, d)
Configure Encryption/Bypass	Set up the configuration tables for IP tunneling. Set preshared keys and algorithms to be used for each IP range or allow plaintext packets to be set from specified IP address.	ISAKMP preshared, Operator password, Enable password, IKE session encrypt key, IKE session authentication key, IKE authentication private Key, IKE authentication public key, IPSec encryption key, IPSec authentication key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed, DRBG V, DRBG C and DRBG key (r, w, d)
TLS VPN (TLSv1.2)	Configure TLS VPN parameters, provide entry and output of CSPs.	ECDSA private key, ECDSA public key, TLS RSA private key, TLS RSA public key, TLS pre-master secret, TLS master secret, TLS encryption keys, TLS integrity key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed, DRBG V, DRBG C and DRBG key (r, w, d)
IPSec VPN Functions	Configure IPSec VPN parameters, provide entry and output of CSPs.	ISAKMP preshared, skeyid, skeyid_d, SKEYSEED, IKE session encrypt key, IKE session authentication key, IKE authentication private Key, IKE authentication public key, IPSec encryption key, IPSec authentication key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed, DRBG V, DRBG C and DRBG key (r, w, d)
SSHv2 Functions	Configure SSHv2 parameter, provide entry and output of CSPs.	SSHv2 private key, SSHv2 public key and SSHv2 session key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed, DRBG V, DRBG C and DRBG key (r, w, d)

Self-Tests	Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand.	N/A
User services	The Crypto Officer has access to all User services.	Operator password (r, w, d)
Zeroization	Zeroize cryptographic keys/CSPs by running the zeroization methods classified in table 6, Zeroization column.	All CSPs (d)

Table 4 Crypto Officer Services

2.7 Non-FIPS mode Services

The cryptographic module in addition to the above listed FIPS mode of operation can operate in a non-FIPS mode of operation. This is not a recommended operational mode but because the associated RFC's for the following protocols allow for non-approved algorithms and non-approved key sizes a non-approved mode of operation exist. So those services listed above with their FIPS approved algorithms in addition to the following services with their non-approved algorithms and non-approved keys sizes are available to the User and the Crypto Officer. Prior to using any of the Non-Approved services in Section 2.7, the Crypto Officer must zeroize all CSPs which places the module into the non-FIPS mode of operation.

Services ¹	Non-Approved Algorithms
SSH	Hashing: MD5 MACing: HMAC MD5 Symmetric: DES Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
IPSec	Hashing: MD5 MACing: MD5 Symmetric: DES, RC4 Asymmetric: RSA (key transport), ECDSA, Diffie-Hellman
TLS	Symmetric: DES, RC4 Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman

Table 5 Non-approved algorithms in the Non-FIPS mode services

Neither the User nor the Crypto Officer are allowed to operate any of these services while in FIPS mode of operation.

All services available can be found at

<http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/firepower/60/configuration/guide/fpmc-config-guide-v60.pdf>. This site lists all configuration guides.

2.8 Unauthenticated Services

The services for someone without an authorized role are to view the status output from the module's LED pins and cycle power.

2.9 Cryptographic Key/CSP Management

The module administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters such as passwords. All keys and CSPs are protected by the password-protection of the Crypto Officer role login, and can be zeroized by the Crypto Officer. Zeroization consists of overwriting the memory

¹ These approved services become non-approved when using any non-approved algorithms or non-approved key or curve sizes. When using approved algorithms and key sizes these services are approved.

that stored the key or refreshing the volatile memory. Keys are both manually and electronically distributed but entered electronically. Persistent keys with manual distribution are used for pre-shared keys whereas protocols such as IKE, TLS and SSH are used for electronic distribution.

All pre-shared keys are associated with the CO role that created the keys, and the CO role is protected by a password. Therefore, the CO password is associated with all the pre-shared keys. The Crypto Officer needs to be authenticated to store keys. Only an authenticated Crypto Officer can view the keys. All Diffie-Hellman (DH) keys agreed upon for individual tunnels are directly associated with that specific tunnel only via the IKE protocol. RSA Public keys are entered into the module using digital certificates which contain relevant data such as the name of the public key's owner, which associates the key with the correct entity. The module provides approximately 347 bits entropy to instantiate the DRBG.

Name	CSP Type	Size	Description/Generation	Storage	Zeroization
DRBG entropy input	SP800-90A CTR_DRBG (AES-256) or HASH_DRBG (SHA-512)	384 bits/512bits	This is the entropy for SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG and HASH_DRBG. HW based entropy source used to construct seed.	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device
DRBG seed	SP800-90A CTR_DRBG (AES-256) or HASH_DRBG (SHA-512)	384 bits/888 bits	Input to the DRBG that determines the internal state of the DRBG. Generated using DRBG derivation function that includes the entropy input from hardware-based entropy source.	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device
DRBG V	SP800-90A CTR_DRBG (AES-256) or HASH_DRBG (SHA-512)	128 bits/888 bits	The DRBG V is one of the critical values of the internal state upon which the security of this DRBG mechanism depends. Generated first during DRBG instantiation and then subsequently updated using the DRBG update function.	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device
DRBG key	SP800-90A CTR_DRBG (using AES-256)	256 bits	Internal critical value used as part of SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG. Established per SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG.	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device
DRBG C	SP800-90A HASH_DRBG (SHA-512)	888 bits	Internal critical value used as part of SP 800-90A HASH_DRBG. Established per SP 800-90A HASH_DRBG.	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device
Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret	DH	2048-4096 bits	The shared secret used in Diffie-Hellman (DH) exchange (as part of SSH, IKE/IPSec, and TLS). Established per the Diffie-Hellman key agreement.	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device
Diffie-Hellman private key	DH	224-379 bits	The private key used in Diffie-Hellman (DH) exchange (as part of SSH, IKE/IPSec, and TLS). This key is generated by calling SP800-90A DRBG.	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device
Diffie-Hellman public key	DH	2048-4096 bits	The public key used in Diffie-Hellman (DH) exchange (as part of SSH, IKE/IPSec, and TLS). This key is derived per the Diffie-Hellman key agreement.	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device

Name	CSP Type	Size	Description/Generation	Storage	Zeroization
skeyid	keying material	160 bits	keying material known only to IKE peers. It was established via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF and it will be used for deriving other keys in IKE protocol implementation.	DRAM (plaintext)	Automatically when IPsec session is terminated
skeyid_d	keying material	160 bits	keying material known only to IKE peers. It was derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2) and it will be used for deriving IKE session authentication key.	DRAM (plaintext)	Automatically when IPsec session is terminated
SKEYSEED	keying material	160 bits	keying material known only to IKE peers. It was derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2) and it will be used for deriving IKE session authentication key.	DRAM (plaintext)	Automatically when IPsec session is terminated
IKE session encrypt key	Triple-DES/AES	Triple-DES 192 bits or AES 128/192/256 bits	The IKE session (IKE Phase I) encrypt key. This key is derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2).	DRAM (plaintext)	Automatically when IPsec session is terminated
IKE session authentication key	HMAC-SHA-1/256/384/512	160-512 bits	The IKE session (IKE Phase I) authentication key. This key is derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2).	DRAM (plaintext)	Automatically when IPsec session is terminated
ISAKMP preshared	Pre-shared secret	Variable 8 plus characters	The secret used to derive IKE skeyid when using preshared secret authentication. This CSP is entered by the Crypto Officer.	NVRAM (plaintext)	By running '# no crypto isakmp key' command
IKE authentication private Key	RSA/ECDSA	RSA 2048 bits or ECDSA Curves: P-256/P-384/512	RSA/ECDSA private key used in IKE authentication. This key is generated by calling SP800-90A DRBG.	NVRAM (plaintext)	By running '#crypto key zeroize' command
IKE authentication public key	RSA/ECDSA	RSA 2048 bits or ECDSA Curves: P-256/P-384/512	RSA/ECDSA public key used in IKE authentication. Internally generated by the module.	NVRAM (plaintext)	By running '#crypto key zeroize' command
IPsec encryption key	Triple-DES/AES/AES-GCM	Triple-DES 192 bits or AES 128/192/256 bits	The IPsec (IKE phase II) encryption key. This key is derived via a key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2).	DRAM (plaintext)	Automatically when IPsec session is terminated
IPsec authentication key	HMAC-SHA-1/256/384/512	160-512 bits	The IPsec (IKE Phase II) authentication key. This key is derived via a key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2).	DRAM (plaintext)	Automatically when IPsec session is terminated

Name	CSP Type	Size	Description/Generation	Storage	Zeroization
Operator password	Password	8 plus characters	The password of the User role. This CSP is entered by the User.	NVRAM (plaintext)	Overwrite with new password
Enable password	Password	8 plus characters	The password of the CO role. This CSP is entered by the Crypto Officer.	NVRAM (plaintext)	Overwrite with new password
RADIUS secret	Shared Secret	16 characters	The RADIUS shared secret. Used for RADIUS Client/Server authentication. This CSP is entered by the Crypto Officer.	NVRAM (plaintext)	By running '# no radius-server key' command
TACACS+ secret	Shared Secret	16 characters	The TACACS+ shared secret. Used for TACACS+ Client/Server authentication. This CSP is entered by the Crypto Officer.	NVRAM (plaintext)	By running '# no tacacs-server key' command
SSHv2 private key	RSA	2048 bits modulus	The SSHv2 private key used in SSHv2 connection. This key is generated by calling SP 800-90A DRBG.	NVRAM (plaintext)	By running '# crypto key zeroize rsa' command
SSHv2 public key	RSA	2048 bits modulus	The SSHv2 public key used in SSHv2 connection. This key is internally generated by the module.	NVRAM (plaintext)	By running '# crypto key zeroize rsa' command
SSHv2 session key	Triple-DES/AES	Triple-DES 192 bits or AES 128/192/256 bits	This is the SSHv2 session key. It is used to encrypt all SSHv2 data traffics traversing between the SSHv2 Client and SSHv2 Server. This key is derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (SSH).	DRAM (plaintext)	Automatically when SSH session is terminated
ECDSA private key	ECDSA	Curves: P-256,384,521	Key pair generation, signature generation/Verification. The seed used in generating ECDSA parameters is generated by calling SP 800-90A DRBG.	NVRAM (plaintext)	Zeroized upon API call "#crypto key zeroize ecdsa"
ECDSA public key	ECDSA	Curves: P-256,384,521	Key pair generation, signature generation/Verification (used in IKE/IPSec and TLS). This key is derived in compliance with FIPS 186-4 ECDSA key pair generation method in the module.	NVRAM (plaintext)	Zeroized upon API call "#crypto key zeroize ecdsa"
Enable secret	Shared Secret	At least eight characters	The obfuscated password of the CO role. However, the algorithm used to obfuscate this password is not FIPS approved. Therefore, this password is considered plaintext for FIPS purposes. This password is zeroized by overwriting it with a new password. The Crypto Officer optionally configures the module to obfuscate the Enable password. This CSP is entered by the Crypto Officer.	NVRAM (plaintext)	Overwrite with new password

Name	CSP Type	Size	Description/Generation	Storage	Zeroization
TLS RSA private key	RSA	2048 bits	Identity certificates for the security appliance itself and also used in TLS negotiation. The seed used in generating RSA parameters was generated by calling FIPS approved DRBG.	NVRAM (plaintext)	Zeroized by “#crypto key zeroize rsa”
TLS RSA public key	RSA	2048 bits	Identity certificates for the security appliance itself and also used in TLS negotiation. The seed used in generating RSA parameters was generated by calling FIPS approved DRBG.	NVRAM (plaintext)	Zeroized by “#crypto key zeroize rsa”
TLS pre-master secret	keying material	At least eight characters	Keying material used to derive TLS master key during the TLS session establishment. This key entered into the module in cipher text form, encrypted by RSA public key.	DRAM (plaintext)	Automatically when TLS session is terminated
TLS master secret	keying material	48 Bytes	Keying material used to derive other HTTPS/TLS keys. This key was derived from TLS pre-master secret during the TLS session establishment	DRAM (plaintext)	Automatically when TLS session is terminated
TLS encryption keys	Triple-DES/AES/AES-GCM	Triple-DES 192 bits or AES 128/192/256 bits	Used in HTTPS/TLS connections to protect the session traffic. This key was derived in the module.	DRAM (plaintext)	Automatically when TLS session is terminated
TLS integrity key	HMAC-SHA-256/384	256-384 bits	Used for TLS integrity to assure the traffic integrity. This key was derived in the module.	DRAM	Automatically when TLS session is terminated
Integrity test key	RSA-2048 Public key	2048 bits	A hard-coded key used for firmware power-up/load integrity verification.	Hard coded for firmware integrity testing	Zeroized by “#erase flash:” command, write to startup config, followed by a module reboot

Table 6 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs

2.10 Cryptographic Algorithms

The module implements a variety of approved and non-approved algorithms.

Approved Cryptographic Algorithms

The module supports the following FIPS 140-2 approved algorithm implementations:

Algorithms		
	Cisco Security Crypto (Firmware)	ASA on-board (Cavium Nitrox III)
AES (128/192/256 CBC, GCM)	4905	2034/2035
Triple-DES (CBC, 3-key)	2559	1311
SHS (SHA-1/256/384/512)	4012	1780
HMAC (SHA-1/256/384/512)	3272	1233
RSA (KeyGen, SigGen and SigVer; PKCS1_V1_5; 2048bits)	2678	
ECDSA (PKG, SigGen and SigVer; P-256, P-384, P-521)	1254	
CTR_DRBG (AES-256)	1735	
HASH_DRBG (SHA-512)		197
CVL Component (IKEv2, TLSv1.2, SSHv2)	1521	
CKG (vendor affirmed)		

Table 7 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms and Associated Certificate Numbers

Notes:

- There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module. Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown in this table.
- The module's AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG A.5 scenario #1 following RFC 5288 for TLS and RFC 7296 for IPsec/IKEv2. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2 and provides support for the acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1, Section 3.3.1. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. In case the module's power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established. The module uses RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which the AES GCM encryption keys are derived. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. In case the module's power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
- No parts of the SSH, TLS and IPsec protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
- Each of TLS, SSH and IPsec protocols governs the generation of the respective Triple-DES keys. Refer to RFC 5246 (TLS), RFC 4253 (SSH) and RFC 6071 (IPsec) for details relevant to the generation of the individual Triple-DES encryption keys. The user is responsible for ensuring the module limits the number of encryptions with the same key to 2^{20} .
- In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation as per scenario 1 of section 5 in SP800-133. The resulting generated symmetric key and the seed used in the asymmetric key generation are the unmodified output from SP800-90A DRBG.

Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode

The module supports the following non-FIPS approved algorithms which are permitted for use in the FIPS approved mode:

- Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength)
- RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)
- NDRNG (non-deterministic random number generator)

Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms

The module supports the following non-approved cryptographic algorithms that shall not be used in FIPS mode of operation:

- Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology less than 112 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant)
- RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology less than 112 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant)
- DES
- HMAC MD5
- MD5
- RC4
- HMAC-SHA1 is not allowed with key size under 112-bits

2.11 Self-Tests

The module includes an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically during operations to prevent any secure data from being released and to insure all components are functioning correctly. The FIPS power-on self-tests are run regardless of the FIPS mode setting.

Self-tests performed

- ASA Self Tests
 - POSTs – Cisco Security Crypto (Firmware)
 - AES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
 - AES-GCM KAT
 - DRBG KAT (Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP800-90A Section 11.3 are performed)
 - ECDSA (Sign and Verify) Power on Self-Test
 - Firmware Integrity Test (using SHA-512 and RSA 2048)
 - HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
 - HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
 - HMAC-SHA-384 KAT
 - HMAC-SHA-512 KAT
 - RSA (sign and verify) KATs
 - SHA-1 KAT
 - SHA-256 KAT
 - SHA-384 KAT
 - SHA-512 KAT

- Triple-DES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
- POSTs – ASA On-board (Hardware)
 - AES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
 - AES-GCM KAT
 - DRBG KAT (Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP800-90A Section 11.3 are performed)
 - HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
 - HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
 - HMAC-SHA-384 KAT
 - HMAC-SHA-512 KAT
 - SHA-1 KAT
 - SHA-256 KAT
 - SHA-384 KAT
 - SHA-512 KAT
 - Triple-DES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
- Conditional tests - Cisco Security Crypto (Firmware)
 - RSA pairwise consistency test (encrypt/decrypt and sign/verify)
 - ECDSA pairwise consistency test
 - Conditional IPsec Bypass test
 - Continuous Random Number Generator test for SP800-90A DRBG
 - Continuous Random Number Generator test for NDRNG
- Conditional tests - ASA On-board (Hardware)
 - Continuous Random Number Generator test for SP800-90A DRBG

Note: DRBGs will not be available should the NDRNG become unavailable. This will in turn make the associated security service/CSP outlined above in Table 6 non-available.

The module performs power-on self-tests automatically when the power is applied. All power-on self-tests must be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The power-on self-tests are performed after the cryptographic systems are initialized but prior to the initialization of the LAN's interfaces; this prevents the security appliances from passing any data during a power-on self-test failure. In the unlikely event that a power-on self-test fails, an error message is displayed on the console followed by a security appliance reboot.

3 Secure Operation

The module meets all the Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The module is shipped only to authorized operators by the vendor, and the module is shipped in Cisco boxes with Cisco adhesive, so if tampered with the recipient will notice. Follow the setting instructions provided below to place the module in FIPS-approved mode. Operating this module without maintaining the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS approved mode of operation.

3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance - System Initialization

The Cisco ASA Cryptographic Module was validated with ASA firmware version 9.8 (File cisco-asa.9.8.2.20.SPA.csp). This is the only allowable image for FIPS-approved mode of operation.

The Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the following initialization steps:

Step 1: Disable the console output of system crash information, using the following command:

```
(config) #crashinfo console disable
```

Step 2: Install Triple-DES/AES licenses to require the security appliances to use Triple-DES and AES (for data traffic and SSH).

Step 3: Enable “FIPS Mode” to allow the security appliances to internally enforce FIPS-compliant behavior, such as run power-on self-tests and bypass test, using the following command:

```
(config) #fips enable
```

Note: If command ‘fips disabled’ is entered, the module must be put back into factory setting (factory reset).

- Reboot system and while the system is booting, go into ROMMON
- Under the configuration mode, type admin-password erase, this will erase everything and bring the system back to factory defaults.

Step 4: Disable password recovery.

```
(config) #no service password-recovery
```

Step 5: If using a RADIUS/TACACS+ server for authentication, perform the following steps (see Operator manual for specific TACACS+ commands). Otherwise, skip to step 7

```
(config)# aaa-server radius-server protocol radius  
(config) #aaa-server radius-server host <IP-address>
```

Configure an IPsec tunnel to secure traffic between the ASA and the RADIUS server. The pre-shared key must be at least 8 characters long.

Note: The use of an IPsec tunnel is only a suggested means. What is actually used is up to the user as long as the means provides a secure tunnel using only FIPS algorithms.

Step 6: Enable AAA **authentication** for the console.

```
(config) #aaa authentication serial console LOCAL  
(config) #username <name> password <password>
```

Step 7: Enable AAA **authentication** for SSH.

```
(config) #aaa authentication ssh console LOCAL
```

Step 8: Enable AAA **authentication** for Enable mode.

```
(config) #aaa authentication enable console LOCAL
```

Step 9: Specify Privilege Level 15 for Crypto Officer and Privilege Level 1 for User and set up username/password for each role.

```
(config) #username <name> password <password> privilege 15  
(config) #username <name> password <password> privilege 1
```

Step 10: Ensure passwords are at least 8 characters long.

Step 11: All default passwords, such as enable and telnet, must be replaced with new passwords.

Step 12: Reboot the security appliances.

3.2 Crypto Officer Guidance - System Configuration

To operate in FIPS mode, the Crypto Officer must perform the following steps:

Step 1: Assign users a Privilege Level of 1.

Step 2: Define RADIUS and TACACS+ shared secret keys that are at least 8 characters long and secure traffic between the security appliances and the RADIUS/TACACS+ server via IPsec tunnel.

Note: Perform this step only if RADIUS/TACACS+ is configured, otherwise proceed to step 3.

Step 3: Configure the TLS protocol when using HTTPS to protect administrative functions. Due to known issues relating to the use of TLS with certain versions of the Java plugin, we require that you upgrade to JRE 1.5.0_05 or later. The following configuration settings are known to work when launching ASDM in a TLS-only environment with JRE 1.5.0_05:

a. Configure the device to allow only TLSv1.2 packets using the following command:

```
(config) #ssl server-version tlsv1.2
```

```
(config) #ssl client-version tlsv1.2
```

b. Uncheck SSL Version 2.0 in both the web browser and JRE security settings.

c. Check TLS V1.2 in both the web browser and JRE security settings.

Step 4: Configure the security appliances to use SSHv2. Note that all operators must still authenticate after remote access is granted.

```
(config) #ssh version 2
```

Step 5: Configure the security appliances such that any remote connections via Telnet are secured through IPsec.

Step 6: Configure the security appliances such that only FIPS-approved algorithms are used for IPsec tunnels.

Step 7: Configure the security appliances such that error messages can only be viewed by Crypto Officer.

Step 8: Disable the TFTP server.

Step 9: Disable HTTP for performing system management in FIPS mode of operation. HTTPS with TLS should always be used for Web-based management.

Step 10: Ensure that installed digital certificates are signed using FIPS approved algorithms.