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Cisco Catalyst 3850 Series Switches and Cisco Catalyst 3650 Series
Switches by Cisco Systems, Inc.
FIPS 140-2 Non Proprietary Security Policy
Level 1 Validation
Version 0.3
March 17, 2015
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................. 3
1.1 PURPOSE............................................................................................................................. 3
1.2 MODELS ............................................................................................................................. 3
1.3 MODULE VALIDATION LEVEL ............................................................................................ 3
1.4 REFERENCES....................................................................................................................... 4
1.5 TERMINOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 4
1.6 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................... 4
2 CISCO CATALYST 3850 SERIES SWITCHES AND CISCO CATALYST 3650
SERIES SWITCHES ................................................................................................................... 5
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS .................................................. 5
2.2 MODULE INTERFACES......................................................................................................... 5
2.3 ROLES, SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION .......................................................................... 9
2.4 UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICES ......................................................................................... 12
2.5 SERVICES AVAILABLE IN A NON-FIPS MODE OF OPERATION .......................................... 12
2.6 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS ........................................................................................ 12
2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY/CSP MANAGEMENT...................................................................... 13
2.8 SELF-TESTS ...................................................................................................................... 17
3 SECURE OPERATION ...................................................................................................... 18
3.1 SYSTEM INITIALIZATION AND CONFIGURATION................................................................ 18
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Cisco Catalyst 3850
Series Switches and Cisco Catalyst 3650 Series Switches with firmware version IOS XE
03.06.00aE, that form part of the NGWC (Next Generation Wiring Closet) product portfolio,
referred to in this document as switches, controllers or the module. This security policy
describes how the modules meet the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 1 and how to run
the modules in a FIPS 140-2 mode of operation and may be freely distributed.
1.2 Models
 Cisco Catalyst 3650 Series Switches
 Cisco Catalyst 3850 Series Switches
 Cisco Field Replaceable Uplink network modules for the 3850 switches
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for
cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program
is available on the NIST website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/index.html.
1.3 Module Validation Level
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.
No. Area Title 3650/3850
Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security 1
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key management 1
8 Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility 1
9 Self-Tests 1
10 Design Assurance 1
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall module validation level 1
Table 1 - Module Validation Level
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1.4 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the Cisco Catalyst 3850 Series
Switches and Cisco Catalyst 3650 Series Switches by Cisco Systems, Inc. in the technical terms
of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the
routers from the following sources:
The Cisco Systems website contains information on the full line of Cisco Systems
Security. Please refer to the following website:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/
For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts listed on
the Cisco Systems website at www.cisco.com.
The NIST Validated Modules website
(http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html) contains contact information
for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.
1.5 Terminology
In this document, the Cisco Systems Catalyst 3650 and 3850 are referred to as switches,
controllers, or the modules.
1.6 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
Vendor Evidence document
Finite State Machine
Other supporting documentation as additional references
This document provides an overview of the Cisco Catalyst 3850 Series Switches and Cisco
Catalyst 3650 Series Switches and explains the secure configuration and operation of the
module. This introduction section is followed by Section 2, which details the general features
and functionality of the appliances. Section 3 specifically addresses the required configuration
for the FIPS-mode of operation.
With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation
Submission Documentation is Cisco-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non-
disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Cisco Systems.
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2 Cisco Catalyst 3850 Series Switches and Cisco Catalyst 3650 Series
Switches
The Next Generation Wiring Closet (NGWC) program is a game changing architecture for
converged services at the access layer. Wireless is one of the many services being integrated
within the switch. The wireless service ensures that the access layer terminates the data plane,
delivering on the promise of Cisco’s unified architecture. Unification implies that services are
provided to both wireless and wired stations. The introduction of wireless in the system means
that the system must also support an integrated mobility architecture.
The 3650 and the 3850 are the first set of NG3k switches, the next-generation of the successful
Catalyst 3k switching product line - the first Doppler ASIC-based switch family that will be a
component of the NGWC architecture and instrumental in making the vision of NGWC a reality.
The Doppler ASIC is the most important component of the NG3K solution enabling new
switching features, providing higher scalability for a large set of switching features and enabling
new services such as wireless and context based networking in the wiring closet. The Doppler
ASIC provides 24 ports of 1 GE downlinks, 2 ports of 10 GE/1GE uplinks and 2 ports of 1GE
uplinks with an integrated 240G stack.
The switches include cryptographic algorithms implemented in IOS software as well as hardware
ASICs. The module supports RADIUS, TACACS+, IKE/IPSec, TLS, DTLS, SESA (Symmetric
Early Stacking Authentication), SNMPv3, 802.11i, and SSHv2.
In addition to features relevant to the wired network, the 3650 and the 3850 switches also
provide functionality that supports the wired-wireless convergence. These features provide the
ability to terminate Access Point (AP) tunnels at the access switch port that enables common
wired-wireless policies and high capacity for ubiquitous wireless deployments.
2.1 Cryptographic Module Physical Characteristics
The module is a multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module. The cryptographic boundary is
defined as encompassing the “top,” “front,” “left,” “right,” and “bottom” surfaces of the chassis
for the switches and the casing for the switch.
2.2 Module Interfaces
The module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical
interfaces provided by the module are mapped to the following FIPS 140-2 defined logical
interfaces: data input, data output, control input, status output, and power. The logical interfaces
and their mapping are described in the following tables.
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Figure 1 - Catalyst 3650 Front Panel, Rear Panel diagrams
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Physical Interface FIPS 140-2 Logical
Interface
10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet Ports
Management port
Console port
USB port
Data Input Interface
10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet Ports
Management port
Console port
USB port
Data Output Interface
10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet Ports
Management port
Console port
Reset switch
Control Input
Interface
10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet Ports
Management port
Console port
USB port
LED Displays for system and port status
Status Output
Interface
Power/RPS (Redundancy Power Supply)
AC/DC Power
Power Interface
Table 2 - Catalyst 3650 Physical Interface/Logical Interface Mapping
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Figure 2 - Catalyst 3850 Front Panel, Rear Panel diagrams
Physical Interface FIPS 140-2 Logical
Interface
10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet Ports
FRUlink 1G SFP Ports,
FRUlink 10G SFP+ Ports
Stack Interfaces
Management port
Console port
USB port
Data Input Interface
10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet Ports
FRUlink 1G SFP Ports,
FRUlink 10G SFP+ Ports
Stack Interfaces
Management port
Console port
USB port
Data Output Interface
10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet Ports
Management port
Stack Interfaces
Console port
Reset switch
Control Input
Interface
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Physical Interface FIPS 140-2 Logical
Interface
10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet Ports
FRUlink 1G SFP Ports,
FRUlink 10G SFP+ Ports
Stack Interfaces
Management port
Console port
USB port
LEDs
Status Output
Interface
Power/RPS (Redundancy Power Supply)
AC/DC Power
Power Interface
Table 3 - Catalyst 3850 Physical Interface/Logical Interface Mapping
2.3 Roles, Services and Authentication
The module supports these four roles:
 AP Role—This role is filled by an access point associated with the controller.
 Client Role—This role is filled by a wireless client associated with the controller.
 User Role—This role performs general security services including cryptographic
operations and other approved security functions. The product documentation refers to
this role as a management user with read-only privileges.
 Crypto Officer (CO) Role—This role performs the cryptographic initialization and
management operations. In particular, it performs the loading of optional certificates and
key-pairs and the zeroization of the module. The product documentation refers to this role
as a management user with read-write privileges.
Authentication is role-based. Each role is authenticated upon initial access to the module. The
module also supports RADIUS or TACACS+ for authentication.
All passwords must be 8 characters up to 25 characters with a minimum of one letter and one
number. If six (6) integers, one (1) special character and one (1) alphabet are used without
repetition for an eight (8) digit PIN, the probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is
one (1) in 251,596,800 (this calculation is based on the assumption that the typical standard
American QWERTY computer keyboard has 10 Integer digits, 52 alphabetic
characters, and 32 special characters providing 94 characters to choose from in total. The
calculation should be 10 x9 x 8 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 32 x 52 = 251, 596, 800 ). Therefore, the associated
probability of a successful random attempt is approximately 1 in 251,596,800, which is less than
1 in 1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2.
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When using RSA based authentication, RSA key pair has modulus size of 2048 bit, thus
providing 112 bits of strength. Therefore, an attacker would have a 1 in 2^112 chance of
randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the one in a million chance required by
FIPS 140-2.
This Module does not support a Maintenance Role.
User Services
The services available to the User role consist of the following:
Services Description CSPs and Access - read (r)/write
(w)/delete (d)
System Status The LEDs show the network activity and
overall operational status and the command
line status commands output system status.
N/A
TACACS+ User & CO authentication to the module
using TACACS+.
User Password – r
TACACS+ secret – r
IPSec Secure communications between controller
and RADIUS
skeyid, skeyid_d, IKE session encryption
key, IKE session authentication key,
ISAKMP preshared, skeyid, skeyid_d,
IPSec session encryption key, IPSec session
authentication key - r
RADIUS Key Wrap Establishment and subsequent receive
802.11i PMK from the RADIUS server.
RADIUS secret, RADIUS Key wrap key – r
Table 4 - User Services
Crypto Officer Services
The Crypto Officer services consist of the following:
Services Description CSPs and Access – read (r) / write
(w) / delete (d)
Self-Test and
Initialization
Cryptographic algorithm tests, firmware
integrity tests, module initialization.
N/A
System Status The LEDs show the network activity and
overall operational status and the
command line status commands output
system status.
N/A
TACACS+ User & CO authentication to the module
using TACACS+.
User Password – r, w, d
TACACS+ secret – r, w, d
IPSec Secure communications between
controller and RADIUS.
skeyid, skeyid_d, IKE session encryption
key, IKE session authentication key,
ISAKMP preshared, skeyid, skeyid_d,
IPSec session encryption key, IPSec session
authentication key – r, w, d
Key Management Key and parameter entry, output, and
Zeroization
DH public key, DH private key, SSH RSA
public key, SSH RSA private key – r, w, d
TLS Establishment and subsequent data
transfer of a TLS session for use
TLS Server RSA public key, TLS Server
RSA private key, TLS pre-master secret,
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between the module and the CO.
Protection of syslog messages.
TLS session key – r, w, d
DTLS Data Encrypt Enabling optional DTLS data path
encryption for Office Extended APs.
DTLS Master Secret, CAPWAP session
keys, DTLS Session Integrity Keys – r, w, d
RADIUS Key Wrap Establishment and subsequent receipt of
802.11i PMK from the RADIUS server.
RADIUS secret, RADIUS Key wrap key –
r, w, d
SSH Establishment and subsequent data
transfer of a SSH session for use
between the module and the CO.
Diffie-Hellman (DH) public key, DH
private key, SSH RSA public key, SSH
RSA private key – r
DH Shared Secret, , SSH session key, SSH
session authentication key – r, w, d
SNMPv3 Non-security related monitoring by the
CO using SNMPv3
snmpEngineID, SNMPv3 Password, SNMP
session key – r, w, d
SESA (Symmetric
Early Stacking
Authentication)
Setting secure stacking. SESA Authorization Key, SESA Master
Session Key, SESA Derived Session Keys –
r, w, d
Module Configuration Selection of non-cryptographic
configuration settings.
N/A
Zeroization Zeroize cryptographic keys All Keys and CSPs will be destroyed
Table 5 - Crypto Officer Services
AP and Client Services
The AP and the client services are listed in tables 6 and 7, respectively. Both the roles make use
of 802.11i standard.
Services Description CSPs and Access – read (r) /
write (w) / delete (d)
MFP Generation and subsequent distribution of MFP
key to the AP over a CAPWAP session.
Management Frame Protection (MFP)
key – r
802.11i Establishment and subsequent data transfer of an
802.11i session for use between the client and
the access point
802.11i Pairwise Transient Key,
802.11i Pairwise Master Key, 802.11i
Temporal Key, 802.11i Group Master
Key, 802.11i Group Temporal Key –
r, w
RADIUS Key Wrap Establishment and subsequent receipt of 802.11i
PMK from the RADIUS server.
RADIUS secret, RADIUS Key wrap
key – r
Table 6 - AP Services
Services Description CSPs and Access – read (r) /
write (w) / delete (d)
EAP Authenticator Establishment of EAP-TLS or EAP-FAST based
authentication between the client and the
Controller.
802.11i Pairwise Transient Key,
802.11i Pairwise Master Key, 802.11i
Temporal Key, 802.11i Group Master
Key, 802.11i Group Temporal Key –
r, w
RADIUS Key Wrap Establishment and subsequent receipt of 802.11i
PMK from the RADIUS server.
RADIUS secret, RADIUS Key wrap
key – r
Table 7 – Client Services
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2.4 Unauthenticated Services
An unauthenticated operator may observe the System Status by viewing the LEDs on the
module, which show network activity and overall operational status. A solid green LED indicates
normal operation and the successful completion of self-tests.
2.5 Services Available in a Non-FIPS Mode of Operation
 SSL 3.0
 IPSec/IKE with Diffie-Hellman 768-bit/1024-bit modulus
2.6 Cryptographic Algorithms
The module implements a variety of approved and non-approved algorithms.
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The switches support the following FIPS-2 approved algorithm implementations:
Algorithms IOS Common
Cryptographic
Module (IC2M)
CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module
(Assembler)
(Doppler ASIC) IOS XE
AES 2817 2685 2879 N/A
CVL 253 N/A N/A N/A
DRBG 481 435 N/A N/A
HMAC 1764 1672 1815 N/A
KBKDF N/A N/A N/A 28
RSA 1471 N/A N/A N/A
SHS 2361 2256 2420 N/A
Triple-DES 1688 N/A N/A N/A
Table 8 - Algorithm Certificates
Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode
 Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between
112 and 150 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of
encryption strength)
 RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 128
bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
 AES (Cert. #2817, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 128 bits
of encryption strength)
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Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms
The cryptographic module implements the following non-Approved algorithms:
 MD5
 HMAC-MD5
 RC4
2.7 Cryptographic Key/CSP Management
The module securely administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters
such as passwords. All keys are also protected by the password-protection on the CO role login,
and can be zeroized by the CO. Keys are exchanged and entered electronically. Persistent keys
are entered by the CO via the console port CLI, transient keys are generated or established and
stored in DRAM.
Note that the command ‘fips zeroize’ will zeroize all Keys/CSPs stored in DRAM. This
command essentially results in a device reboot and therefore forces a power cycle, zeroizing all
the CSPs/Keys listed below with “Power cycle” in the Zeroization Method column.
Table 8 lists the secret and private cryptographic keys and CSPs used by the module.
ID Algorithm Size Description Storage Zeroization Method
General Keys/CSPs
DRBG V 800‐90
CTR_DRBG
128‐bits Generated by entropy source via
the CTR_DRBG derivation function.
It is stored in DRAM with plaintext
form
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
DRBG key SP 800‐90
CTR_DRBG
256‐bits This is the 256‐bit DRBG key used
for SP 800‐90 CTR_DRBG
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
DRBG
entropy
input
SP 800‐90
CTR_DRBG
256‐bits HW based entropy source output
used to construct seed
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
DRBG seed SP 800‐90
CTR_DRBG
384‐bits Input to the DRBG that determines
the internal state of the DRBG
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
User
password
Password Variable (8+
characters)
Used to authenticate local users NVRAM (plaintext) Zeroized by
overwriting with new
password
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Enable
secret
Password Variable (8+
characters)
Used to authenticate local users at a
higher privilege level
NVRAM (plaintext) Zeroized by
overwriting with new
password
RADIUS
secret
Shared
Secret
Variable (8+
characters)
The RADIUS Shared Secret NVRAM (plaintext) ‘# no radius‐server
key’
RADIUS key
wrap key
AES 128 bits Used to protect SAK NVRAM (plaintext) Zeroized by
overwriting with new
key
TACACS+
secret
Shared
Secret
Variable (8+
characters)
The TACACS+ shared secret NVRAM (plaintext) ‘# no tacacs‐server
key’
Diffie‐
Hellman
public key
DH 2048‐4096 bits The public exponent used in Diffie‐
Hellman (DH) exchange.
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
Diffie‐
Hellman
private key
DH 224‐379 bits The private exponent used in Diffie‐
Hellman (DH) exchange.
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle.
Diffie‐
Hellman
shared
secret
DH 2048‐4096 bits This is the shared secret agreed
upon as part of DH exchange
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
SSH
SSH RSA
public key
RSA 2048‐3072
bits modulus
SSH public key used in SSH session
establishment
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
SSH RSA
private key
RSA 2048‐3072
bits modulus
SSH private key used in SSH session
establishment
NVRAM (plaintext) ‘# crypto key zeroize
rsa’
SSH session
key
Triple‐
DES/AES
168‐bits/256‐
bits
This is the SSH session symmetric
key.
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
TLS
TLS server
RSA public
key
RSA 2048‐3072 bits
modulus
RSA public key used in TLS
negotiations.
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
TLS server
RSA private
key
RSA 2048‐3072 bits
modulus
Identity certificates for module itself
and also used in TLS negotiations.
NVRAM (plaintext) ‘# crypto key zeroize
rsa’
TLS pre‐
master
secret
Shared
Secret
384‐bits Shared secret created using
asymmetric cryptography from
which new HTTPS session keys can
be created.
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
TLS session
key
Triple‐
DES/AES
168‐bits/256‐
bits
This is the TLS session key DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
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SESA
SESA
authorizatio
n key
AES 128 bits Used to authorize members of a
single stack on Incredible Units.
Used as input to SP800‐108
derivation methods to derive four
additional 128 fields to transfer the
Master Session Key and additional
aggressive exchange material
NVRAM (plaintext) ‘no fips authorization‐
key’
SESA master
session Key
AES 128 bits Used to derive SESA session key DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
SESA
derived
session key
AES 128 bits and
192 bits
Used to protect traffic over stacking
ports
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
DTLS
DTLS master
secret
DTLS 384‐bits Generated by approved DRBG for
generating the DTLS encryption key
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
DTLS session
encryption/
decryption
key
(CAPWAP
session key)
AES‐CBC 128‐256 bits Session Keys used to e/d CAPWAP
control messages
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
DTLS session
integrity key
HMAC‐SHA1 160 bits Session keys used for integrity
checks on CAPWAP control
messages
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
SNMPv3
snmpEngine
ID
Shared
secret
32‐bits Unique string to identify the SNMP
engine
NVRAM (plaintext) ‘# no snmp‐server
engineID local
engineid‐string’,
overwriitten with new
engine ID
SNMPv3
password
shared
secret
256 bits This secret is used to derive HMAC‐
SHA1 key for SNMPv3
Authentication
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
SNMPv3
session key
AES 128‐bit Encrypts SNMPv3 traffic DRAM (plaintext) P‘fips zerozie’
command or ower
cycle
802.11i
802.11i Pre‐
shared
Key (PSK)
Shared
secret
Variable (8+
characters)
The PSK is used to derive the PMK
for 802.11i
communications
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
overwriting with new
key
802.11i
Pairwise
Master Key
HMAC SHA‐
1
512‐bits The PMK is a secret shared between
an 802.11 supplicant and
authenticator, and is used to
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
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(PMK) establish the other 802.11i keys.
802.11i
Pairwise
Transient
Key (PTK)
AES‐CCM 256‐bits The PTK, also known as the CCMP
key, is the 802.11i session key for
unicast communications.
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
802.11i
Temporal
Key (TK)
AES‐CCM 128‐bits Encrypt/decrypt unicast traffic DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
802.11i
Group
Master Key
(GTK)
HMAC SHA‐
1
256 bits The secret shared between an
802.11 supplicant and authenticator
for broadcast or multicast
communications.
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
802.11i
Group
Temporal
Key (GTK)
AES‐CCM 128‐bits 802.11i session key for broadcast or
multicast traffic
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
IPSec
skeyid Shared
Secret
160 bits Used for key agreement in IKE. This
key was derived in the module
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
skeyid_d Shared
Secret
160 bits Used for key agreement in IKE DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
IKE session
encryption
key
TRIPLE‐
DES/AES
168‐bit
TRIPLE‐DES or
a 256‐bit AES
Derived in the module used for IKE
payload integrity verification
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
IKE session
authenticati
on key
HMAC‐SHA1 160 bits HMAC‐SHA1 key DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
ISAKMP
preshared
pre‐shared
key
Variable (8+
characters)
This key was configured by CO and
used for User role authentication
using IKE Pre‐shared key based
authentication mechanism
NVRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
IPSec
session
encryption
key
TRIPLE‐
DES/AES
168‐bit
TRIPLE‐DES or
a 256‐bit AES
Derived in the module used for IKE
payload integrity verification
DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
IPSec
session
authenticati
on key
HMAC‐SHA1 160 bits HMAC‐SHA1 key DRAM (plaintext) ‘fips zerozie’
command or Power
cycle
Table 9 - Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
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2.8 Self-Tests
The modules include an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically during
operations to prevent any secure data from being released and to insure all components are
functioning correctly.
2.7.1 Power-On Self-Tests (POSTs)
 IC2M Algorithm Implementation Known Answer Tests:
o AES (encrypt/decrypt) KATs
o AES-GCM KAT
o DRBG KAT
o Firmware Integrity Test (RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (2048 bits) signature
verification with SHA-256)
o HMAC (SHA-1/256) KATs
o RSA (sign/verify) KATs
o Triple-DES (encrypt/decrypt) KATs
 CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module Algorithm Implementation Known Answer Tests:
o AES (encrypt/decrypt) KATs
o DRBG KAT
o HMAC (SHA-1/256) KATs
 Doppler ASIC Hardware Algorithm Implementation Known Answer Tests:
o AES (encrypt/decrypt) KATs
o HMAC-SHA1 KAT
2.7.2 Conditional Tests
 Conditional Bypass test
 Conditional Random Number Generation test for approved RNGs
 Conditional Random Number Generation test for non-approved RNG
 Pairwise consistency test for RSA
The devices perform all power-on self-tests automatically at boot. All power-on self-tests must
be passed before each role starts to perform services. The power-on self-tests are performed after
the cryptographic systems are initialized but prior to the initialization of the LAN’s interfaces;
this prevents the AP’s from passing any data during a power-on self-test failure.
© Copyright 2014 Cisco Systems, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
18
3 Secure Operation
The switches meet all the overall Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-2. Follow the setup
instructions provided below to place the module in FIPS-approved mode. Operating this Switch
without maintaining the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS approved
mode of operation.
3.1 System Initialization and Configuration
1. The value of the boot field must be 0x0102. This setting disables break from the
console to the ROM monitor and automatically boots. From the “configure terminal”
command line, the CO enters the following syntax:
config-register 0x0F
2. The CO must create the “enable” password for the CO role. Procedurally, the
password must be at least 8 characters, including at least one letter and at least one
number, and is entered when the CO first engages the “enable” command. The CO
enters the following syntax at the “#” prompt:
Switch(config)# enable secret [PASSWORD]
3. The CO must always assign passwords (of at least 8 characters, including at least
one letter and at least one number) to users. Identification and authentication on the
console/auxiliary port is required for Users. From the “configure terminal” command
line, the CO enters the following syntax:
Switch(config)# line con 0
Switch(config)# password [PASSWORD]
Switch(config)# login local
4. To ensure all FIPS 140-2 logging is received, set the log level:
Switch(config)# logging console error
5. The CO enables secure stacking (SESA) but configuring the Authorization key:
Switch(config)# fips authorization-key <128 bit, i.e, 16 hex byte key>
6. The CO may configure the module to use RADIUS or TACACS+ for authentication. If
the module is configured to use RADIUS, the Crypto Officer must define RADIUS or
shared secret keys that are at least 8 characters long, including at least one letter
and at least one number.
7. The CO shall only assign users to a privilege level 1 (the default).
8. The CO shall not assign a command to any privilege level other than its default.