SonicWall, Inc.
SonicWALL TZ270, TZ270W, TZ370, TZ370W, TZ470, TZ470W,
TZ570, TZ570W, TZ570P, TZ670, NSa 2700 and NSa 3700
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Document Version: 1.0
Date: February 17, 2022
Level 2
SonicWALL FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
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Copyright Notice
Copyright © 2022 SonicWall, Inc. Public Material
May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
SonicWALL FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................6
1.1 Module Description and Cryptographic Boundary ......................................................................7
1.2 Ports and Interfaces .....................................................................................................................7
1.3 Modes of Operation...................................................................................................................17
1.3.1 FIPS 140-2 Approved mode of Operation.....................................................................................17
1.3.2 Non-Approved mode of Operation...............................................................................................18
1.3.3 Non-Approved Algorithms with No Security Claimed ..................................................................18
2. Cryptographic Functionality ......................................................................................... 19
2.1 Critical Security Parameters.......................................................................................................22
2.2 Public Keys..................................................................................................................................23
3. Roles, Authentication and Services .............................................................................. 24
3.1 Assumption of Roles...................................................................................................................24
3.2 Authentication Methods............................................................................................................25
3.3 Services.......................................................................................................................................26
3.3.1 User Role Services.........................................................................................................................26
3.3.2 Crypto Officer Services..................................................................................................................26
3.3.3 Unauthenticated services .............................................................................................................27
4. Self-tests ..................................................................................................................... 32
5. Physical Security Policy................................................................................................ 34
6. Operational Environment ............................................................................................ 38
7. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy................................................................................ 39
8. Security Rules and Guidance ........................................................................................ 40
8.1 Crypto-Officer Guidance ............................................................................................................40
8.2 Transition of module to and from Approved mode of operation..............................................41
9. References and Definitions .......................................................................................... 42
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module List ............................................................................................................6
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements.......................................................................................6
Table 3 – Front view Physical ports/Logical interfaces description for the TZ270/TZ270W/TZ370/TZ370W
......................................................................................................................................................................8
Table 4 – Rear view Physical Ports/Logical Interfaces description for TZ270/270W/370 and TZ370W......9
Table 5 – List of Physical ports/Logical interfaces description for the TZ470 and TZ470W ......................10
Table 6 – Rear view of Physical ports/Logical Interfaces description for the TZ470 and TZ470W............11
Table 7 – Front Panel Physical Ports/Logical Interfaces description of TZ570/TZ570W/TZ570P and TZ670
....................................................................................................................................................................13
Table 8 – Rear Panel Physical Ports/Logical Interfaces description of TZ570/TZ570W/TZ570P and TZ670
....................................................................................................................................................................14
Table 9 – Front view of Physical ports/Logical interfaces description for NSa 2700 and NSa 3700.........15
Table 10 – Rear view of Physical ports/Logical interfaces description for NSa 2700 and NSa 3700.........17
Table 11 – Approved Algorithms ................................................................................................................19
Table 12 - Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions...............................................................21
Table 13 - Security Relevant Protocols Used in FIPS Mode ........................................................................21
Table 14 – Role Description ........................................................................................................................24
Table 15 – Authentication Description .......................................................................................................25
Table 16 – Authenticated Services..............................................................................................................28
Table 17 – Unauthenticated Services .........................................................................................................28
Table 18 – Security Parameters Access Rights within Services and CSPs...................................................29
Table 19 – Security Parameters Access Rights within Services and Public Keys.........................................30
Table 20 – Number of Tamper Evident Seals..............................................................................................34
Table 21 - References..................................................................................................................................42
Table 22 – Acronyms and Definitions .........................................................................................................43
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List of Figures
Figure 1. Front view of the physical ports on TZ270....................................................................................7
Figure 2. Front view of the physical ports on TZ270W.................................................................................8
Figure 3. Front view of the physical ports on TZ370.....................................................................................8
Figure 4. Front view of the physical ports on TZ370W.................................................................................8
Figure 5. Rear view of the physical ports of the TZ270, TZ270W, TZ370 and TZ370W ...............................9
Figure 6. Front View of the physical ports of the TZ470.............................................................................10
Figure 7. Front View of the physical ports of the TZ470W .........................................................................10
Figure 8. Rear View of the physical ports of the TZ470 and TZ470W.........................................................11
Figure 9. Front view of TZ570 .....................................................................................................................12
Figure 10. Front view of TZ570W................................................................................................................12
Figure 11. Front view of TZ570P .................................................................................................................12
Figure 12. Front view of TZ670 ...................................................................................................................13
Figure 13. Rear view of TZ570/TZ 570P/TZ670...........................................................................................14
Figure 14. Rear view of TZ570W.................................................................................................................14
Figure 15. Front View of the physical ports of NSa 2700............................................................................15
Figure 16. Front View of the physical ports of NSa 3700............................................................................15
Figure 17. Rear View of NSa 2700...............................................................................................................16
Figure 18. Rear view of NSA 3700...............................................................................................................17
Figure 19. Tamper seal placements for TZ270/ TZ270W/ TZ370/ TZ370W/ TZ470/ TZ470W (Bottom View)
....................................................................................................................................................................35
Figure 20. Tamper seal placements for TZ570/ TZ570W/ TZ570P (Bottom View).....................................35
Figure 21. Tamper seal placements for TZ670 (Bottom View) ...................................................................36
Figure 22. Tamper seal placement for NSa 2700/ NSa 3700 (Left View)....................................................36
Figure 23. Tamper seal placement for NSa 2700/ NSa 3700 (Bottom View)..............................................37
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1. Introduction
This document defines the Security Policy for the SonicWALL TZ270, TZ270W, TZ370, TZ370W, TZ470,
TZ470W, TZ570, TZ570W, TZ570P, TZ670, NSa 2700 and NSa 3700 models, hereafter denoted as the
Module. The Module is an Internet security appliance, which provides stateful packet filtering firewall,
deep packet inspection, virtual private network (VPN), and traffic shaping services.
The Module is a multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module, in 11 configurations with hardware part
numbers and versions as follows:
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module List
Module Hardware P/N and
Version
Firmware Version
1 TZ270 101-500665-50 SonicOS 7.0
2 TZ270W 101-500666-50 SonicOS 7.0
3 TZ370 101-500649-50 SonicOS 7.0
4 TZ370W 101-500648-50 SonicOS 7.0
5 TZ470 101-500643-50 SonicOS 7.0
6 TZ470W 101-500629-50 SonicOS 7.0
7 TZ570 101-500594-51 SonicOS 7.0
8 TZ570W 101-500593-51 SonicOS 7.0
9 TZ570P 101-500640-50 SonicOS 7.0
10 TZ670 101-500592-51 SonicOS 7.0
11 NSa 2700 101-500661-50 SonicOS 7.0
12 NSa 3700 101-500663-50 SonicOS 7.0
The Module firmware version for all models is SonicOS 7.0. Note that the different hardware versions vary
only in form factor, CPU, number of ports, presence of wireless interfaces, and memory.
The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies and other markets that require FIPS 140-2
validated cryptographic modules. The appliance Encryption technology uses Suite B algorithms. Suite B
algorithms are approved by the U.S. government for protecting both Unclassified and Classified data.
The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows:
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
Finite State Model 2
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Security Requirement Security Level
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall 2
The overall FIPS validation level for the module is Security Level 2.
1.1 Module Description and Cryptographic Boundary
The physical form of the Module is depicted in Figure 1 through Figure 18. The Module is a multi-chip
standalone embodiment. The cryptographic boundary is the surfaces and edges of the device enclosure,
inclusive of the physical ports.
1.2 Ports and Interfaces
The Module’s ports and associated FIPS defined logical interface categories are listed in the tables in this
section.
Figure 1. Front view of the physical ports on TZ270
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Figure 2. Front view of the physical ports on TZ270W
Figure 3. Front view of the physical ports on TZ370
Figure 4. Front view of the physical ports on TZ370W
Table 3 – Front view Physical ports/Logical interfaces description for the
TZ270/TZ270W/TZ370/TZ370W
Physical Ports Quantity
(Label in
Figure)
Description Logical Interfaces
USB Interfaces 2 Allows the attachment of an
external device. Security Guidance
is “not to be used in FIPS Mode”
N/A
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Status LEDs Varies One Power LED: Indicate TZ is
receiving power.
One Test LED: Indicates module is
initializing and performing self-
tests.
One Security LED: Indicates security
services monitored by this LED.
One Storage LED: Indicates status of
extended storage.
One U0 WWAN LED indicated for
5G/LTE activity.
One Wireless W0 WLAN LED
(TZ270W & TZ370W only): indicates
WLAN status.
Status output
Ethernet Interface LED 8 Ethernet interface LEDs (X0-X7): 1G
link activity.
In general, these LEDs indicates the
status of the Ethernet interface.
Status output
Figure 5. Rear view of the physical ports of the TZ270, TZ270W, TZ370 and TZ370W
Table 4 – Rear view Physical Ports/Logical Interfaces description for TZ270/270W/370 and TZ370W
Physical Ports Quantity
(Label in
Figure)
Description Logical Interfaces
Power Interface 1 AC power interfaces Power
Console Interface 1 One RJ-45 Console port. Data Input, Control
Input and status output
Safe Mode/Reset
Button
1 Used to manually reset the
appliance to Safe Mode.
Control Input
1G Ethernet Interface 8 1G Ethernet ports (X0-X7). Data Input, data
output, status output,
and control input (via
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the external GUI
Administration
interface)
Figure 6. Front View of the physical ports of the TZ470
Figure 7. Front View of the physical ports of the TZ470W
Table 5 – List of Physical ports/Logical interfaces description for the TZ470 and TZ470W
Physical Ports Quantity
(Labels in
Figure)
Description Logical Interfaces
USB Interfaces 2 Allows the attachment of an
external device. Security Guidance
is “not to be used in FIPS Mode”
N/A
Status LED 6 One Power LED: Indicate TZ is
receiving power.
One Test LED: Indicates module is
initializing and performing self-
tests.
One Security LED: Indicates security
services monitored by this LED.
Status output
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One Storage LED: Indicates status
of extended storage.
One U0 WWAN LED indicated for
5G/LTE activity.
One Wireless W0 WLAN LED
(TZ470W only): indicates WLAN
status.
Ethernet/SFP/SFP+
LEDs
10 Ethernet interface LEDs (X0-X7): 1G
link activity
SFP/SFP+ interface LEDs (X8-X9):
2.5G or 1G link activity.
In general, these LEDs indicates the
status of the Ethernet/SFP/SFP+
interface.
Status output
Figure 8. Rear View of the physical ports of the TZ470 and TZ470W
Table 6 – Rear view of Physical ports/Logical Interfaces description for the TZ470 and TZ470W
Physical Ports Quantity (Labels
in Figure)
Description Logical Interfaces
Power Interface 1 AC power interface Power
Serial Console
Interface
2 One RJ-45 and One Micro USB
Console port.
Data input, control
input and status
output
Safe Mode/Reset
Button
1 Used to manually reset the
appliance to Safe Mode.
Control Input
SFP/SFP+ Interface 2 2x SFP/SFP+ interfaces with LINK
and ACT LEDs.
TZ470 and TZ470W support 1G
and 2.5G on interface X8/X9
Data input, data
output, status output,
and control input (via
the external GUI
Administration
interface)
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1G Ethernet
interface
8 8x 1G Ethernet interfaces (X0-
X7) with LINK and ACT LEDs.
Data input, data
output, status output,
and control input (via
the external GUI
Administration
interface)
Figure 9. Front view of TZ570
Figure 10. Front view of TZ570W
Figure 11. Front view of TZ570P
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Figure 12. Front view of TZ670
Table 7 – Front Panel Physical Ports/Logical Interfaces description of TZ570/TZ570W/TZ570P and
TZ670
Physical Ports Quantity Description Logical Interfaces
USB Interfaces 2 Allows the attachment of an external
device. Security Guidance is “not to be used
in FIPS Mode”
N/A
Status LED Varies Two Power LEDs: one indicating the
primary power LED and another indicating
the redundant power LED.
One Test LED: Indicates module is
initializing and performing self-tests.
One Security LED: Indicates security
services monitored by this LED.
One Storage LED: Indicates status of
extended storage.
One U0 WWAN LED indicated for 5G/LTE
activity.
One Wireless W0 WLAN LED (TZ570W
only): indicates WLAN status.
Status output
Ethernet/SFP/SFP+
LEDs
10 Ethernet interface LEDs (X0-X7): 1G link
activity
SFP/SFP+ interface LEDs (X8-X9): 5G or
2.5G link activity (TZ 570, TZ 570W and TZ
570P) and 10G, 5G or 2.5G link activity (TZ
670).
In general, these LEDs indicates the status
of the Ethernet/SFP/SFP+ interface.
Status output
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Figure 13. Rear view of TZ570/TZ 570P/TZ670
Figure 14. Rear view of TZ570W
Table 8 – Rear Panel Physical Ports/Logical Interfaces description of TZ570/TZ570W/TZ570P and TZ670
Physical Ports Quantity Description Logical Interfaces
Safe Mode/Reset
Button
1 Used to manually reset the
appliance to Safe Mode.
Control Input
Power Interface 2 Power interfaces Power
Console Interface 2 One RJ-45 and One Micro USB
Console port.
Data Input, Control input
and status output
SFP/SFP+ Interface 2 SFP/SFP+ ports:
TZ570/TZ570P/TZ570W support
5G or 2.5G on interfaces X8 and
X9
TZ670 supports 10G,5G or 2.5G
on interfaces X8 and X9
Data input, data output,
status output, and control
input (via the external GUI
Administration interface)
1G Ethernet interface 8 1G Ethernet ports (X0-X7). Data input, data output,
status output, and control
input (via the external GUI
Administration interface)
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Figure 15. Front View of the physical ports of NSa 2700
Figure 16. Front View of the physical ports of NSa 3700
Table 9 – Front view of Physical ports/Logical interfaces description for NSa 2700 and NSa 3700
Physical Ports Quantity (Labels in
Figure)
Description Logical Interfaces
Safe Mode/Reset
Button
1 Used to manually reset the
appliance to Safe Mode.
Control Input
USB Interfaces 2 Allows the attachment of
an external device.
Security Guidance is “not
to be used in FIPS Mode”
N/A
Serial Console Interface 1 DB-9/RJ-45 serial
connector. Provides a
serial console which can
be used for basic
administration functions.
Data input, control
input and status output
MGMT 1 1G RJ45 isolated out-of-
band management
(MGMT) port, with
integral LINK and ACT
LEDs
Control input, status
output, data input and
data output
SFP/SFP+ Interface Varies NSa 2700 supports 3
x10/2.5/1GE SFP/SFP+
interfaces (X16-X18) with
LINK and ACT LEDs.
Data input, data
output, status output,
and control input (via
the external GUI
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NSa 3700 supports 6
x10/2.5/1GE (X28-33) and
4 x5/2.5/1GE SFP/SFP+
(X24-X27) interfaces with
LINK and ACT LEDs.
Administration
interface)
Status LED Varies Two Power LED: Two
Power LEDs: one
indicating the primary
power LED and another
indicating the redundant
power LED.
Test LED: Indicates NSa
booting up status.
Security LED: Indicates
security status on the NSa.
Storage LED: Indicates
status of extended
storage.
Status output
Ethernet Interface Varies NSa 2700 consists of 16x
1G Ethernet ports (X0-
X15) with LINK and ACT
LEDs.
NSa 3700 consists of 24x
1G Ethernet ports (X0-
X23) with LINK and ACT
LEDs.
Data input, data
output, status output,
and control input (via
the external GUI
Administration
interface)
Figure 17. Rear View of NSa 2700
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Figure 18. Rear view of NSA 3700
Table 10 – Rear view of Physical ports/Logical interfaces description for NSa 2700 and NSa 3700
Physical Ports Qty. Description Logical Interfaces
Power Interface 1 AC power interfaces Power
Redundant power 1 Slot for redundant power supply Power
Fan Interface Varies 1x Fan component (NSa 2700)
2x Fan component (NSa 3700)
N/A
1.3 Modes of Operation
1.3.1 FIPS 140-2 Approved mode of Operation
The module is not configured to operate in FIPS-mode by default. The operator is responsible for updating
the following settings appropriately during setup and will be prompted by the compliance tool if a setting
has been modified taking the module out of compliance. The following steps must be taken during set-up
of the module to enable FIPS-mode of operation:
1. The default Administrator and User passwords shall be immediately changed and be at least
eight (8) characters.
2. The RADIUS/TACACS+ shared secrets must be at least eight (8) characters.
3. Traffic between the module and the RADIUS/TACACS+ server must be secured via an IPSec
tunnel.
• Note: this step need only be performed if RADIUS or TACACS+ is supported.
• LDAP cannot be enabled in FIPS mode without being protected by TLS
• LDAP cannot be enabled in FIPS mode without selecting 'Require valid certificate from
server'
• LDAP cannot be enabled in FIPS mode without valid local certificate for TLS
4. IKE must be configured with 3rd
Party Certificates for IPsec Keying Mode when creating VPN
tunnels.
o RSA Certificates lengths must be 2048-bit or greater in size
5. When creating VPN tunnels, ESP must be enabled for IPSec.
6. FIPS-approved algorithms must be used for encryption and authentication when creating VPN
tunnels.
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7. Group 14, 19, 20 or 21 must be used for IKE Phase 1 DH Group. SHA-256 and higher must be
used for Authentication.
8. “Advanced Routing Services” must not be enabled.
9. “Group VPN management” must not be enabled.
10. SNMP or SSH must not be enabled.
The module does not enforce but as a policy, a user should not enable the below features while in FIPS
mode of operation:
• Do not use USB interface.
• Do not use TLS 1.3/TLS 1.3 KDF.
• Do not use Wireless interface.
• 802.11i wireless security
Note: Once FIPS mode of operation is enabled SonicOS enforces all of the above items. Operators will
not be allowed to enable these features while in FIPS mode of operation.
Note: In case the module's power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM
encryption/decryption must be established.
1.3.2 Non-Approved mode of Operation
The Cryptographic Module provides the same set of services in the non-Approved mode as in the
Approved mode but allows the following additional administration options and non FIPS-approved
algorithms which are not used in the FIPS mode of operation. The following services must be disabled
before placing the module in FIPS mode. The module does not transition to FIPS mode until the following
services are disabled.
• AAA server authentication (the Approved mode requires operation of RADIUS or TACACS+ only
within a secure VPN tunnel).
• SSH1
• SNMP2
1.3.3 Non-Approved Algorithms with No Security Claimed
The module supports the following non-Approved but allowed algorithms and protocols with no
security claimed:
• Triple-DES (non-compliant)
• MD5 (non-compliant)
• PBKDF (non-complaint)
The operator must also follow the rules outlined in Section 1.3.1 and consult FIPS 140-2 IG 1.23 for
further understanding of the use of functions where no security is claimed. Section 3.3 indicates the
module services associated with these functions.
1
Keys derived using the SSH KDF are not allowed for use in the Approved mode.
2
Keys derived using the SNMP KDF are not allowed for use in the Approved mode.
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2. Cryptographic Functionality
The Module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed
in the tables below.
Table 11 – Approved Algorithms
Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions/Caveats
C1861 AES [197]
CBC [38A] Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
CTR [38A] Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt
GMAC [38D] Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
GCM [38D]3 Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256
Tag Len: 128
Authenticated
Encrypt,
Authenticated
Decrypt,
Message
Authentication
Vendor
Affirmed
CKG [IG D.12]
[133 rev2] Section 5.1 Asymmetric signature key
generation using unmodified DRBG output
Key Generation
[133 rev2] Section 5.2 Asymmetric key
establishment key generation using unmodified
DRBG output
[133 rev2] Section 6.1 Direct symmetric key
generation using unmodified DRBG output
[133 rev2] Section 6.2.1 Derivation of symmetric
keys from a key agreement shared secret.
[133 rev2] Section 6.2.2 Derivation of symmetric
keys from a pre-shared key
[133 rev2] Section 6.3 Combining multiple keys and
other data
Vendor
Affirmed
DH
KAS-SSC (SP 800-
56Arev3 Shared
Secret Calculation
per Scenario X1 of IG
D.8 and IG D.1rev3.
Key Derivation per
SP 800-135 (CVL
DH group 14 (dhEphem
scheme per section 6.1.2.1
of SP800-56Arev3)
Key Agreement
ECDH
ECDH P-256, P-384 and P-
521 (Ephemeral Unified
scheme per section 6.1.2.2
of SP800-56Arev3)
3
The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG A.5 scenario #1 following RFC 5288 for TLS v1.2.
Per RFC 5246, if the module is the party that encounters this condition it will trigger a handshake to
establish a new encryption key. The module’s support for acceptable AES GCM ciphersuites from Section
3.3.1 of SP800-52 rev1 or SP800-52 rev2.
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Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions/Caveats
Cert. #C1861) and
RFC 8446)
C1861
CVL: IKEv1
[135]
DSA, PSK[135] SHA (256, 384, 512)
Key Derivation
CVL: IKEv2
[135]
DH 224-521 bits SHA (256, 384, 512)
CVL: TLS [135]4
v1.0, v1.1, v1.2 SHA (256, 384, 512)
CVL: SSH [135] v2 SHA-1
CVL: SNMP
[135]
SHA-1
C1861
DRBG
[90Arev1]
Hash SHA-256
Deterministic
Random Bit
Generation
C1861 ECDSA [186-4]
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 KeyGen
P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384,
P-521
PKV
P-224 5
SHA(256, 384, 512)
P-256 SHA(256, 384, 512)
P-384 SHA(256, 384, 512)
P-521 SHA(256, 384, 512)
SigGen
P-192 SHA(1, 256, 384, 512)
P-224 SHA(1, 256, 384, 512)
P-256 SHA(1, 256, 384, 512)
P-384 SHA(1, 256, 384, 512)
P-521 SHA(1, 256, 384, 512)
SigVer
C1861 HMAC [198]
SHA-1
Key Sizes: KS < BS
λ = 12
Message
Authentication, KDF
Primitive, Password
Obfuscation
SHA-256
Key Sizes: KS = BS
λ = 32
SHA-384
Key Sizes: KS = BS
λ = 48
SHA-512
Key Sizes: KS = BS
λ = 64
C1861
KTS [IG G.13
and D.9]
AES (Cert. # C1861);
HMAC (Cert. #
C1861)
AES (Key Sizes: 128, 192,
256); HMAC SHA(1, 256,
384, 512)
Encryption, Key
Transport,
Authentication using
within TLS
C1861 RSA [186-4] X9.31 Key Generation Mode:B.3.6 KeyGen
4
SSH, SNMP, TLS 1.0 and 1.1 KDFs were CAVP tested but are not supported/used in the Approved mode
of operation.
5
ECDSA P-224 was CAVP tested but is not supported/used in the Approved mode of operation.
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Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions/Caveats
n = 2048
n = 3072
PKCS1_v1.5
n = 2048 SHA(256, 384, 512)
n = 3072 SHA(256, 384, 512)
SigGen
PKCS1_v1.5 [186-2
Legacy]
n = 1024 SHA-1
n = 1536 SHA-1
n = 2048 SHA-1
SigVer
PKCS1_v1.5 [186-4]
n = 1024 SHA(1, 256, 384,
512)
n = 2048 SHA(1, 256, 384,
512)
n = 3072 SHA(256, 384, 512)
SigVer
C1861 SHS [180-4]
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
Message Digest
Generation,
Password
Obfuscation
Note: There are few algorithms, modes, moduli and key sizes that have been CAVP tested but are not
implemented/used by the module. Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes shown in this table are
implemented by the module.
Table 12 - Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description
RSA RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption
strength)
NDRNG (used only
to seed the
Approved DRBG)
NDRNG (internal entropy source) for seeding the Hash DRBG. The module generates
a minimum of 256 bits of entropy for key generation.
The following service/security function is non-approved and not allowed to be used in FIPS mode of
operation.
- TLS 1.3 KDF
By policy, the operators in FIPS mode of operation shall not use TLS 1.3. Usage of the above
algorithm/function results in non-conformance as the TLS 1.3 KDF is not CAVP tested, and module does
not implement self-test for the algorithm/function specified above.
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The following table provides the security relevant protocols used in Approved mode of operation.
Table 13 - Security Relevant Protocols Used in FIPS Mode
Protocol Key Exchange Auth Cipher Integrity
IKEv1 DH Group 14, 19, 20, 21 RSA and ECDSA digital
signature
AES CBC 128/192/256 HMAC-SHA-256-128
HMAC-SHA-384-192
HMAC-SHA-512-256
IKEv2 DH Group 14, 19, 20, 21 RSA and ECDSA Digital
Signature
Shared Key Message
Integrity Code
AES CBC 128/192/256 HMAC-SHA-256-128
HMAC-SHA-384-192
HMAC-SHA-512-256
IPsec ESP IKEv1 or IKEv2 with optional:
Diffie-Hellman (L=2048, N=224, 256)
EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384 and
P-521
IKEv1,
IKEv2
AES CBC 128/192/256 HMAC-SHA-256-128
HMAC-SHA-384-192
HMAC-SHA-512-256
TLS 1.2 or SSL
3.1
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Note: no parts of these protocols, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
2.1 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All usage of these CSPs by the Module (including
all CSP lifecycle states) is described in the services detailed in Section 3.3.
The following Critical Security Parameters (CSP) are contained in the cryptographic module:
• IKE Shared Secret – Shared secret used during IKE Phase 1 (length 4 ~ 128 bytes).
• SKEYID – Secret value used to derive other IKE secrets.
• SKEYID_d – Secret value used to derive keys for security associations.
• SKEYID_a – Secret value used to derive keys to authenticate IKE messages.
• SKEYID_e – Secret value used to derive keys to encrypt IKE messages.
• IKE Session Encryption Key – AES (CBC) 128, 192, 256 key used to encrypt data.
• IKE Session Authentication Key – HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384 and HMAC-SHA-512 bit key
used for data authentication.
• IKE Private Key – RSA 2048 bit and ECDSA P-256, P-384 and P-521 key used to authenticate the
module to a peer during IKE.
• IPsec Session Encryption Key – AES (CBC) 128, 192, 256 key used to encrypt data.
• IPsec Session Authentication Key – HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384 and HMAC-SHA-512 bit key
used for data authentication for IPsec traffic.
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• TLS 1.2 Master Secret– used for the generation of TLS Session Keys and TLS Integrity Key (384-
bits).
• TLS 1.2 Premaster Secret – used for the generation of Master Secret (384 bits).
• TLS 1.2 Private Key– used in the TLS 1.2 signature algorithm (RSA 2048 bit).
• TLS 1.2 Session Key – AES CBC 128/256 bit and AES GCM 128/256 bit key used to protect TLS 1.2
connection.
• TLS 1.2 Integrity Key – HMAC-SHA-1/256/384 bit key used to check the integrity of TLS 1.2
connection.
• Diffie-Hellman/EC Diffie-Hellman – Diffie-Hellman Private Key (N = 224, 256) or EC DH P-256/P-
384/P-521 used within IKE key agreement and EC DH P-256/P-384 used within TLS key
agreement.
• DRBG V and C values – Used to seed the Approved DRBG.
• Entropy Input: 256 bits entropy (min) input used to instantiate the DRBG.
• DRBG Seed: Seed material used to seed or reseed the DRBG .
• RADIUS Shared Secret – Used for authenticating the RADIUS server to the module and vice
versa. Type: A minimum of 8 characters for RADIUS authentication.
• Passwords – Authentication data. Type: A minimum 8 ASCII characters.
2.2 Public Keys
The following Public Keys are contained in the cryptographic module:
• Root CA Public Key – Used for verifying a chain of trust for receiving certificates.
• Peer IKE Public Key – RSA 2048 bit and ECDSA P-256, P-384 and P-521 key for verifying digital
signatures from a peer device.
• IKE Public Key – RSA 2048 bit and ECDSA P-256, P-384 and P-521 key for verifying digital
signatures from a peer device.
• Firmware Verification Key – P-256 ECDSA key used for verifying firmware during firmware load.
• EC Diffie-Hellman Public Key – ECDH P-256/P-384 is used within TLS key agreement.
• Diffie-Hellman/EC Diffie-Hellman Public Key – Diffie-Hellman 2048-bit key, EC DH P-256/P-
384/P-5216
used within IKE key agreement.
• Authentication Public Key – 2048-bit RSA public key used to authenticate the User.
• TLS 1.2 Public Key – RSA – 2048-bit public key used in the TLS handshake.
6
P-521 curve only available for IKEv1 and IKEv2
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3. Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Assumption of Roles
The cryptographic module provides the roles described in Table 14. The cryptographic module does not
provide a Maintenance role. The built-in “Administrator” is a member of “SonicWALL Administrators”
group on the SonicWALL appliance, and the name used to login may be configured by the Cryptographic
Officer role; the default username for the “Administrator” user is “admin”. The User role is authenticated
using the credentials of a member of the “Limited Administrators” user group. The User role can query
status and non-critical configuration. The user group, “SonicWALL Read-Only Admins,” satisfies neither
the Cryptographic Officer nor the User Role and should not be used in FIPS mode operations. The
configuration settings required to enable FIPS mode are specified in Section 1.3.1 of this document.
The built-in administrator for which the default username is “admin” which is a member of “SonicWALL
Administrators” group has the full control privilege to query status and configure all firewall configurations
including configure other user privilege. Other members (users) of “SonicWALL Administrators” group
have the same full control privilege as built in administrator (part of “SonicWALL Administrators” group) .
There is another group called “Limited Administrators”. Members of “limited Administrators” user group
can query status and non-critical configuration. A User is authenticated by username and password. User
is granted privilege by the membership of user group after login.
Table 14 – Role Description
Role ID Role Description Authentication Type Authentication Data
CO Referred to as “SonicWALL Administrators”
group (Administrator and as well as other
members (users)) in the vendor documentation
Identity-based Username and
Password
User Referred to as “Limited Administrators” (user
group) in the vendor documentation
Identity-based Username and
Password or Digital
Signature
The Module supports concurrent operators. Separation of roles is enforced by requiring users to
authenticate using either a username and password, or digital signature verification. The User role
requires the use of a username and password or possession of a private key of a user entity belonging to
the “Limited Administrators” group. The Cryptographic Officer role requires the use of the
“Administrator” username and password, or the username and password of a user entity belonging to the
“SonicWALL Administrators” group.
Multiple users may be logged in simultaneously, but only a single user-session can have full configuration
privileges at any time, based upon the prioritized preemption model described below:
1. The Admin user (SonicWALL Administrators) has the highest priority and can preempt any users.
2. The additional users who are members of the “SonicWALL Administrators” group can preempt
any users except for the Admin user.
3. A user that is a member of the “Limited Administrators” user group can only preempt other
members of the “Limited Administrators” group.
Session preemption may be handled in one of two ways, configurable from the System > Administration
page, under the “On admin preemption” setting:
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1. “Drop to non-config mode” – the preempting user will have three choices:
a. “Continue” – this action will drop the existing administrative session to a “non-config
mode” and will impart full administrative privileges to the preempting user.
b. “Non-Config Mode” – this action will keep the existing administrative session intact, and
will login the preempting user in a “non-config mode”
c. “Cancel” – this action will cancel the login and will keep the existing administrative
session intact.
2. “Log-out” – the preempting user will have two choices:
a. “Continue” – this action will log out the existing administrative session and will impart
full administrative privileges to the preempting user.
b. “Cancel” – this action will cancel the login and will keep the existing administrative
session intact.
“Non-config mode” administrative sessions will have no privileges to cryptographic functions making
them functionally equivalent to User role sessions. The ability to enter “Non-config mode” may be
disabled altogether from the System > Administration page, under the “On admin preemption” setting
by selecting “Log out” as the desired action.
3.2 Authentication Methods
The cryptographic module provides authentication relying upon username/passwords or an RSA 2048-
bit (at a minimum) digital signature verification.
Table 15 – Authentication Description
Authentication Method Probability Justification
CO and User password The probability is 1 in 96^8, which
is less than one in 1,000,000 that a
random attempt will succeed or, a
false acceptance will occur for each
attempt (This is also valid for
RADIUS shared secret keys). After
three (3) successive unsuccessful
password verification tries, the
cryptographic module pauses for
one second before additional
password entry attempts can be
reinitiated. This makes the
probability approximately
180/96^8 = 2.5E-14, which is less
than one in 100,000, that a random
attempt will succeed or a false
acceptance will occur in a one-
minute period.
Passwords must be at least eight
(8) characters long each, and the
password character set is ASCII
characters 32-127, which is 96
ASCII characters, hence, the
probability is 1 in 96^8.
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Authentication Method Probability Justification
User RSA 2048-bit (minimum)
digital signature
The probability that a random
attempt will succeed or a false
acceptance will occur is 1/2^112,
which is less than 1 in 1,000,000.
Due to processing and network
limitations, the module can verify
at most 300 signatures in a one
minute period. Thus, the
probability that a random attempt
will succeed or a false acceptance
will occur in a one minute period is
300/2^112 = 5.8E-32, which is less
than 1 in 100,000.
A 2048-bit RSA digital signature
has a strength of 112-bits, hence
the probability is 1/2^112.
3.3 Services
3.3.1 User Role Services
• Show Status – Monitoring, pinging, traceroute, viewing logs.
• Show Non-critical Configuration – “Show” commands that enable the User to view VPN tunnel
status and network configuration parameters.
• Session Management – Limited commands that allow the User to perform minimal VPN session
management, such as clearing logs, and enabling some debugging events. This includes the
following services:
1. Log On
2. Monitor Network Status
3. Log Off (themselves and guest users)
4. Clear Log
5. Export Log
6. Filter Log
7. Generate Log Reports
8. Configure DNS Settings
• TLS 1.2 – TLS used for the https configuration tool or network traffic over a TLS VPN
• IPsec VPN – Network traffic over an IPsec VPN
3.3.2 Crypto Officer Services
The Cryptographic Officer role is authenticated using the credentials of the “Administrator” user which
is the member of “SonicWALL Administrators” group (also referred to as “Admin”), or the credentials of
a other members (users) of the “SonicWALL Administrators” group. The use of “SonicWALL
Administrators” provides identification of specific users (i.e., by username) upon whom full
administrative privileges are imparted. The Cryptographic Officer role can show all status and configure
cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic keys, certificates, and servers used for VPN tunnels. The Crypto
Officer sets the rules by which the module encrypts, and decrypts data passed through the VPN tunnels.
The authentication mechanisms are discussed in Section 3.1 and 3.2.
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• Show Status - Monitoring, pinging, traceroute, viewing logs.
• Show Non-critical Configuration – “Show” commands that enable the User to view VPN tunnel
status and network configuration parameters.
• Configuration Settings – System configuration7
, network configuration, User settings, Hardware
settings, Log settings, and Security services including initiating encryption, decryption, random
number generation, key management, and VPN tunnels. This includes the following services:
1. Configure VPN Settings
2. Set Content Filter
3. Import/Export Certificates
4. Upload Firmware8
5. Configure DNS Settings
6. Configure Access
• Session Management – Management access for VPN session management, such as setting and
clearing logs, and enabling debugging events and traffic management. This includes the
following services:
1. Log On
2. Import/Export Certificates
3. Clear Log
4. Filter Log
5. Export Log
6. Setup DHCP Server
7. Generate Log Reports
• Zeroize – Zeroizing cryptographic keys
• TLS 1.2 – TLS used for the https configuration tool or network traffic over a TLS VPN
• IPsec VPN 9
– Network traffic over an IPsec VPN
The cryptographic module also supports unauthenticated services, which do not disclose, modify, or
substitute CSP, use approved security functions, or otherwise affect the security of the cryptographic
module.
3.3.3 Unauthenticated services
• Module Reset - Firmware removal with configuration return to factory state.
• No Auth Function - Authenticates the operator and establishes secure channel.
• Show Status – LED activity and console message display.
• Self-test Initiation – power cycle
7
Non-compliant Triple-DES implementation associated with the configuration setting is used to encrypt/decrypt signature files
(internal to the module only). This function is considered obfuscation and cannot be used to compromise the module or
store/transmit sensitive information.
8
Note: Only validated firmware version shall be loaded using the firmware upload service. Any other firmware version that is not
listed in the module certificate is considered out of scope and requires separate FIPS 140-2 certificate.
9
MD5 (no security claimed) and keys derived from the non-conformant PBKDF are always encapsulated by the IPsec VPN service.
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Note 1: The same services are available in the non-Approved mode of operation. In the non-Approved
mode of operation, the non-Approved functions listed in Section 1.3.2 can be utilized.
Note 2: The module does not support a bypass capability.
The cryptographic module provides several security services including VPN and IPsec. The cryptographic
module provides the Cryptographic Officer role the ability to configure VPN tunnels and network settings.
All services implemented by the Module are listed in the table(s) below.
Table 16 – Authenticated Services
Service Description CO U
Status Information Viewing Logs, viewing network interface settings, viewing
system flag to check whether the module is running in the
FIPS Approved mode of operation (“Show fips”) and viewing
status of the module (i.e module configuration)
X X
Configuration
management
Setting up VPN, setup filters, upload firmware, Auth directory
configuration, creating user accounts
X
Session Management Audit configuration, Certificate management, DHCP setup X X
Zeroize Destroys all Keys and CSPs. Upon system Zeroize all Keys and
CSP which are permanent are erased
X
TLS 1.2 TLS used for HTTPS management of the module/network
traffic over TLS
X X
IPsec VPN Module can configure/run traffic over IPsec VPN using
certificates
X X
Table 17 – Unauthenticated Services
Service Description
Module Reset Reset the Module by activating the reset switch.
No Auth Function Authenticates the operator and establishes secure channel.
Show Status LED status activity and console message display.
Self-test Initiation Power Cycle.
Note: The same services are available in the non-Approved mode of operation. In the non-Approved
mode of operation, the non-Approved functions listed in Section 1.3.2 can be utilized.
Table 18 defines the relationship between access to Security Parameters and the different module
services. Table 19 defines the relationship between access to Public Keys and the different module
services.
The modes of access shown in the tables are defined as:
• G = Generate: The module generates the CSP.
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• I = Import: The CSP is entered into the module from an external source.
• R = Read: The module reads the CSP for output.
• E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP.
• W = Write: The module writes the CSP to persistent storage.
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
In the tables below, TLS and IPsec listings are inclusive of functions that can be operated with IPsec or TLS
communications active.
Table 18 – Security Parameters Access Rights within Services and CSPs
Service
CSPs
IKE
Shared
Secret
SKEYID
SKEYID_d
SKEYID_a
SKEYID_e
IKE
Session
Encryption
Key
IKE
Session
Authentication
Key
IKE
Private
Key
IPsec
Session
Encryption
Key
IPsec
Session
Authentication
Key
TLS
1.2
Master
Secret
TLS
1.2
Premaster
Secret
TLS
1.2
Session
Key
TLS
1.2
Integrity
Key
TLS
1.2
Private
Key
DH/EC
DH
Private
Key
DRBG
Seed
DRBG
V
and
C
values
RADIUS
Shared
Secret
Entropy
Input
Passwords
Show Status - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Show Non-
critical
Configuration
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Monitor
Network
Status
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Log On - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E
Log Off - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Clear Log - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Export Log - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Import/Export
Certificates
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Filter Log - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Setup DHCP
Server10
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
10
DHCP setup does not use CSPs, but DHCP server setup is performed with IPsec active. See below for
IPsec VPN CSP usage.
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Service
CSPs
IKE
Shared
Secret
SKEYID
SKEYID_d
SKEYID_a
SKEYID_e
IKE
Session
Encryption
Key
IKE
Session
Authentication
Key
IKE
Private
Key
IPsec
Session
Encryption
Key
IPsec
Session
Authentication
Key
TLS
1.2
Master
Secret
TLS
1.2
Premaster
Secret
TLS
1.2
Session
Key
TLS
1.2
Integrity
Key
TLS
1.2
Private
Key
DH/EC
DH
Private
Key
DRBG
Seed
DRBG
V
and
C
values
RADIUS
Shared
Secret
Entropy
Input
Passwords
Generate Log
Reports
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Configure
VPN Settings
- - - - - IE - - IG - - - - - - G GE IG - - -
IPsec VPN GERW GE GE GE GE - GE GE GERW GE GE - - - - E GE GE GE GE -
TLS - - - - - - - - - - GE GE GE GEW GE GE GE GE - -
Set Content
Filter
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Upload
Firmware
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Configure
DNS Settings
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Configure
Access
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - IEW
Zeroize Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Table 19 – Security Parameters Access Rights within Services and Public Keys
Service
Public Keys
Root
CA
Public
Key
IKE
Public
Key
EC
Diffie-Hellman
Public
Key
(TLS)
Peer
IKE
Public
Key
Diffie-Hellman/EC
Diffie
Hellman
Public
Key
(IKE)
Authentication
Public
Key
Firmware
Verification
Key
TLS
1.2
Public
Key
Show Status - - - - - - - -
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11
DHCP setup does not use CSPs, but DHCP server setup is performed with IPsec active. See below for
IPsec VPN CSP usage.
Service
Public Keys
Root
CA
Public
Key
IKE
Public
Key
EC
Diffie-Hellman
Public
Key
(TLS)
Peer
IKE
Public
Key
Diffie-Hellman/EC
Diffie
Hellman
Public
Key
(IKE)
Authentication
Public
Key
Firmware
Verification
Key
TLS
1.2
Public
Key
Show Non-critical Configuration - - - - - - - -
Monitor Network Status - - - - - - - -
Log On - - - - - - - -
Log Off - - - - - - - -
Clear Log - - - - - - - -
Export Log - - - - - - - -
Import/Export Certificates - - - - - - - -
Filter Log - - - - -- - - -
Setup DHCP Server11 - - - - - - -
Generate Log Reports - - - - - - - -
Configure VPN Settings I IG - - G - - -
IPsec VPN E E - IE E IE - -
TLS - - GE - - IE - E
Set Content Filter - - - - - - - -
Upload Firmware - - - - - - E -
Configure DNS Settings - - - - - - - -
Configure Access - - - - - - - -
Zeroize Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
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4. Self-tests
The module performs self-tests to ensure the proper operation of the module. Per FIPS 140-2 these are
categorized as either power-up self-tests or conditional self-tests. Power up self–tests are available on
demand by power cycling the module.
The module performs the following algorithm KATs on power-up:
• Firmware Integrity: 256-bit EDC
• AES: KATs: Encryption, Decryption; Modes: CBC and GCM; Key sizes: 128 bits
• DRBG : KATs: HASH DRBG; Security Strengths: 256 bits
• ECDSA: PCT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification; Curves/Key sizes: P-256
• HMAC: KATs: Generation, Verification; SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
• RSA: KATs: Signature Generation, Signature Verification; Key sizes: 2048 and 3072 bits
• SHA: KATs: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
• TDES: KATs: Encryption, Decryption; Modes: CBC; Key sizes: 2-key, 3-key12
• DSA: KATs: Signature Generation, Signature Verification; Key sizes: 1024, 2048, 3072bits13
• KDFs: IKEv1, IKEv2, TLS, SSH, SNMP14
The module performs the following conditional self-tests as indicated.
• DRBG and NDRNG Continuous Random Number Generator Tests per IG 9.8
• RSA Pairwise Consistency Test on RSA key pair generation
• ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test on ECDSA key pair generation
• Firmware Load Test: ECDSA (P-256) signed SHA-256 hash
When a new firmware image is loaded, the cryptographic module verifies the ECDSA P-256 signed SHA-
256 hash of the image. If this verification fails, the firmware image loading is aborted.
If any of the tests described above fail, the cryptographic module enters the error state. No security
services are provided in the error state. Upon successful completion of the Diagnostic Phase, the
cryptographic module enters the Command and Traffic Processing State. Security services are only
provided in the Command and Traffic Processing State. No VPN tunnels are started until all tests are
successfully completed. This effectively inhibits the data output interface.
12
Triple-DES KATs are performed even if they are not implemented in any of the services that are available
in Approved mode of operation.
13
DSA KATs are performed even if they are not implemented in any of the services that are available in
Approved mode of operation.
14
The SSH and SNMP KDF KATs are performed even if they are not supported in the Approved mode of
operation.
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When all tests are completed successfully, the Test LED is turned off.
The module performs the following critical self-tests. These critical function tests are performed for the
SP 800-90A DRBG:
• SP 800-90A Instantiation Test
• SP 800-90A Generate Test
• SP 800-90A Reseed Test
• SP 800-90A Uninstantiate Test
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5. Physical Security Policy
The chassis of all the modules are sealed with one (1) or two (2) tamper-evident seals, applied during
manufacturing. The physical security of the module is intact if there is no evidence of tampering with the
seal. The locations of the tamper-evident seals are indicated by the red rectangles below in Figures 17 –
21. The Cryptographic Officer shall inspect the tamper seals for signs of tamper evidence once every six
months. If evidence of tamper is found, the Cryptographic Officer is requested to follow their internal IT
policies which may include contacting the SonicWALL for replacing the unit.
Table 20 below lists the number of tamper evident seals applied per module:
Table 20 – Number of Tamper Evident Seals
# Module Number of tamper
evident seal(s)/module
1 TZ270 1
2 TZ270W 1
3 TZ370 1
4 TZ370W 1
5 TZ470 1
6 TZ470W 1
7 TZ570 1
8 TZ570W 1
9 TZ570P 1
10 TZ670 2
11 NSa 2700 2
12 NSa 3700 2
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Figure 19. Tamper seal placements for TZ270/ TZ270W/ TZ370/ TZ370W/ TZ470/ TZ470W (Bottom
View)
Figure 20. Tamper seal placements for TZ570/ TZ570W/ TZ570P (Bottom View)
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Figure 21. Tamper seal placements for TZ670 (Bottom View)
Figure 22. Tamper seal placement for NSa 2700/ NSa 3700 (Left View)
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Figure 23. Tamper seal placement for NSa 2700/ NSa 3700 (Bottom View)
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6. Operational Environment
Area 6 of the FIPS 140-2 requirements does not apply to this module as the module only allows the loading
of firmware through the firmware load test, which ensures the image is appropriately ECDSA signed by
SonicWall, Inc. Hence, the module is classified as a Limited OE.
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7. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
Area 11 of the FIPS 140-2 requirements do not apply to this module as it has not been designed to mitigate
any specific attacks outside the scope of FIPS 140-2 requirements.
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8. Security Rules and Guidance
This section documents the security rules for the secure operation of the cryptographic module to
implement the security requirements of FIPS 140-2.
1. The module provides two distinct operator roles: User and Cryptographic Officer.
2. The module provides identity-based authentication for the crypto-officer, and for the user.
3. The module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
4. An operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role.
5. The module allows the operator to initiate power-up self-tests by power cycling power or resetting
the module.
6. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. Data output are inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
8. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise
of the module.
9. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
10. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
11. The module does not support manual key entry.
12. The module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of
data.
13. The module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs.
14. The module does not output intermediate key values.
15. The operators should not use TLS 1.3 as the TLS 1.3KDF is not CAVP tested and hence considered as
non-approved security function in FIPS mode of operation.
8.1 Crypto-Officer Guidance
The following steps must be performed by the Crypto-Officer (CO) to configure the required roles and
place the module in the FIPS Approved mode of operation:
1. During testing, the tester should apply power to the module's host appliance and tester can observe
that the network interface drivers or a login prompt will be available only upon initial boot up of all
power-up self-tests and successful completion of these self-tests .
2. As the CO, the tester should login using the vendor provided default login and password. The default
password and login should be changed/updated.
3. As the CO, management IP address and Gateway should be configured for the module.
4. Over the web interface, the tester should then proceed to system settings and update the settings to
be consistent with Section 1.3.1 of this document with the assistance of compliance checking procedure
and then enabling FIPS mode using a checkbox. The FIPS checkbox does not place the module in FIPS
mode until the settings of Section 1.3.1 of this document are met. Then click OK. The system
automatically restarts.
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5. The tester shall observe that the module self-tests executed automatically before a log in was
possible. The tester will observe that the “FIPS enabled checkbox” is enabled to indicate that the module
is in the Approved mode of operation. The tester can verify that in the system/settings page that FIPS
mode is enabled.
6. As the CO, the tester shall proceed to create the roles specified in Section 3.1 of this document.
Passwords and Digital signatures required for authentication to each should be configured or installed as
appropriate.
8.2 Transition of module to and from Approved mode of operation
The keys and CSPs generated in the cryptographic module during FIPS mode of operation cannot be used
when the module transitions to non-FIPS mode and vice versa. While the module transitions from FIPS to
non-FIPS mode or from non-FIPS to FIPS mode, all the keys and CSPs shall be zeroized by the Crypto Officer
using the “Zeroize” service.
While transition from non-FIPS to FIPS mode, the CO has to zeroize all plaintext key and CSPs by issuing
“Zeroize” service and then the CO has to follow Section 8.1 of the Security Policy to place the module in
Approved mode of operation.
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9. References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 21 - References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program
[108] NIST Special Publication 800-108, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
Pseudorandom Functions (Revised), October 2009
[131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms
and Key Lengths, March 2019
[132] NIST Special Publication 800-132, Recommendation for Password-Based Key
Derivation, Part 1: Storage Applications, December 2010
[133] NIST Special Publication 800-133rev2, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key
Generation, June 2020.
[135] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Existing
Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions, Special Publication 800-135rev1,
December 2011.
[186] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July, 2013.
[186-2] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-2, January 2000.
[197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001
[198] National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
198-1, July, 2008
[180] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015
[202] FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION, SHA-3 Standard:
Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions, FIPS PUB 202, August
2015
[38A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December
2001
[38B] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, Special Publication 800-38B,
May 2005
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Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[38C] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, Special
Publication 800-38C, May 2004
[38D] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800-
38D, November 2007
[56Arev3] NIST Special Publication 800-56Arev3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised), April 2018
[56Br1] NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 1, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography, September 2014
[67] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, Special Publication 800-67, May 2004
[90A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random
Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication
800-90A, June 2015.
Table 22 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CO Crypto Officer
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
CSP Critical Security Parameter
VPN Virtual Private Network
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
Triple-DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
DES Data Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman asymmetric algorithm
IKE Internet Key Exchange
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
IPSec Internet Protocol Security
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Acronym Definition
LAN Local Area Network
DH Diffie-Hellman
GUI Graphical User Interface
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code