Nokia-SONiC-MACsec
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Nokia
Nokia-SONiC-MACsec
Version: 1.0
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document prepared by:
http://www.lightshipsec.com
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Table of Contents
1.1 Overview ......................................................................................................................... 6
1.2 Security Levels ............................................................................................................... 6
2 Cryptographic Module Specification ................................................................................... 6
2.1 Description...................................................................................................................... 6
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ................................ 8
2.5 Algorithms .....................................................................................................................10
2.6 Security Function Implementations .............................................................................10
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information ....................................................................................11
2.8 RBG and Entropy...........................................................................................................11
2.9 Key Generation..............................................................................................................11
2.10 Key Establishment ......................................................................................................11
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces .......................................................................................12
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ......................................................................................................12
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication...................................................................................13
4.1 Authentication Methods................................................................................................13
4.2 Roles ..............................................................................................................................13
4.3 Approved Services ........................................................................................................13
4.4 Non-Approved Services................................................................................................15
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded............................................................................15
5 Software/Firmware Security................................................................................................16
5.1 Integrity Techniques......................................................................................................16
5.2 Initiate on Demand ........................................................................................................16
6 Operational Environment ....................................................................................................17
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements.....................................................17
7 Physical Security .................................................................................................................18
8 Non-Invasive Security..........................................................................................................19
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management .....................................................................20
9.1 Storage Areas ................................................................................................................20
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ...........................................................................................20
9.3 SSP Zeroisation Methods .............................................................................................20
9.4 SSPs...............................................................................................................................20
10 Self-Tests............................................................................................................................22
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests..........................................................................................22
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests.................................................................................................22
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information....................................................................................23
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10.4 Error States..................................................................................................................23
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests .................................................................................23
11 Life-Cycle Assurance.........................................................................................................25
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ...................................................25
11.2 Administrator Guidance..............................................................................................25
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance......................................................................................25
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...............................................................................................26
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 6
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets).... 9
Table 3: Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware.............................................. 9
Table 4: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid .................................. 9
Table 5: Modes List and Description .........................................................................................10
Table 6: Approved Algorithms...................................................................................................10
Table 7: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................11
Table 8: Ports and Interfaces ....................................................................................................12
Table 9: Roles...........................................................................................................................13
Table 10: Approved Services ....................................................................................................14
Table 11: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................20
Table 12: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................20
Table 13: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................20
Table 14: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................21
Table 15: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................21
Table 16: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................22
Table 17: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................23
Table 18: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................23
Table 19: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................23
Table 20: Error States...............................................................................................................23
List of Figures
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 6
Figure 1: Broadcom BCM88852 physical perimeter. .................................................................. 7
Figure 2: Representation of Nokia-IXR7250E-36x400G device TOEPP..................................... 7
Figure 3: Module cryptographic boundary and TOEPP. ............................................................. 8
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets).... 9
Table 3: Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware.............................................. 9
Table 4: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid .................................. 9
Table 5: Modes List and Description .........................................................................................10
Table 6: Approved Algorithms...................................................................................................10
Table 7: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................11
Table 8: Ports and Interfaces ....................................................................................................12
Table 9: Roles...........................................................................................................................13
Table 10: Approved Services ....................................................................................................14
Table 11: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................20
Table 12: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................20
Table 13: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................20
Table 14: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................21
Table 15: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................21
Table 16: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................22
Table 17: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................23
Table 18: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................23
Table 19: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................23
Table 20: Error States...............................................................................................................23
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the Nokia-SONiC-MACsec, version 1.0
describes how the module meets the security requirements specified in FIPS 140-3 for an
overall security level 1 module and outlines the security rules and operating procedures required
to maintain compliance.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 1
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security 1
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The TOE is used in DC interconnect with MACsec security for the DC interconnect interfaces.
Module Type: Software-hybrid
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
Cryptographic Boundary:
The cryptographic boundary of the Nokia-SONiC-MACsec consists of a hardware and a software
component, which is represented by the red dash line in Figure 3, below. The physical perimeter
of the module is defined as the entire MACsec ASIC. The sole software component of the module
consists of the entire module's software.
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The MACsec ASIC shown below represents the entire physical perimeter of the module itself and
implements the core cryptographic functionality of the module, AES-GCM encryption and
decryption used within the MACsec protocol.
Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):
The Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter consists of the Nokia-IXR7250E-
36x400G device that the module resides within, which is represented in Figure 2, below. The
tested operational environments are listed in Table Tested Operational Environments - Software,
Firmware, Hybrid, below.
Figure 1: Broadcom BCM88852 physical perimeter.
Figure 2: Representation of Nokia-IXR7250E-36x400G device TOEPP.
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Figure 3: Module cryptographic boundary and TOEPP.
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
Package or File Name Software/
Firmware
Version
Features Integrity Test
libfips_integrity_self_test.so BCM/ Integrity
self test version
2
Integrity self-test
library which
implements the
SHA algorithm.
SHA2-256
libfips_sa_j2p.so BCM/ J2P DNX
FIPS SA 3
Secure
association
library
implementing
the APIs.
SHA2-256
libmini_access_cmicx_gen1.so BCM/ Mini
access CMICX
gen1 version 2
Used for the
PCIE driver to
access the
hardware and
other
components
SHA2-256
libfips_integrity_self_test.sha256 BCM/ Integrity
self test version
2
SHA digest SHA2-256
libfips_sa_j2p.sha256 BCM/ J2P DNX
FIPS SA 3
SHA digest SHA2-256
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Package or File Name Software/
Firmware
Version
Features Integrity Test
libmini_access_cmicx_gen1.sha256 BCM/ Mini
access CMICX
gen1 version 2
SHA digest SHA2-256
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
Model
and/or
Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
BCM88852 rev A2 macsecip_gen2 BCM88852 rev A2 Single chip
Table 3: Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Operating
System
Hardware
Platform
Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor
or Host OS
Version(s)
Debian
GNU/Linux 12
(bookworm)
Nokia-
IXR7250E-
36x400G
AMD EPYC
3251 8-Core
Processor
Yes BCM/ Integrity
self test version
2
BCM/ J2P DNX
FIPS SA 3
BCM/ Mini
access CMICX
gen1 version 2
Table 4: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of
the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the
validation certificate.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
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Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
mode
The approved mode of
operation
Approved Log ("Switch MACSec POST
passed")
Table 5: Modes List and Description
Once these self-tests have completed successfully, the module transitions into the approved
mode of operation. There are no other modes of operation implemented by the module.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-ECB C894 Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM C894 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38D
AES-XPN C894 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
IV Generation - External
SP 800-38D
SHA2-256 A7797 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 6: Approved Algorithms
The Approved Algorithms tables above list the approved algorithms implemented by Nokia-
SONiC-MACsec.
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
The module does not implement any vendor-affirmed algorithms.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
The module does not implement any non-approved, allowed algorithms.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
The module does not implement any non-approved, allowed algorithms with no security
claimed.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
The module does not implement any non-approved, not allowed algorithms.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Software/Firmware
Integrity Test
SHA Integrity test for
chip firmware
and module
software
SHA2-256:
(A7797)
Encrypt Data BC-Auth Encryption of
data in MACsec
protocol
Publication:NIST
SP 800-38D
IG:C.H
AES-ECB:
(C894)
AES-GCM:
(C894)
AES-XPN:
(C894)
Decrypt Data BC-Auth Decryption of
data in MACsec
protocol
Publication:NIST
SP 800-38D
IG:C.H
AES-ECB:
(C894)
AES-GCM:
(C894)
AES-XPN:
(C894)
Table 7: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
The AES-GCM Initialization Vector (IV) generation is compliant with IG C.H, resolution 1(c).
The module generates IVs deterministically following the guidance in IEEE 802.1AE.
While operating the approved mode of operation, the module should only be used to form a
MACsec link with another FIPS 140 validated module operating in the approved mode. The
device at each end of the MACsec link plays the role of either Peer or the Authenticator. No
authentication server is involved.
In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, the key used for AES-GCM encryption
and decryption operations shall be redistributed.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
The module only generates SSPs used in the MACsec protocol deterministically. Therefore, the
module does not implement DRBG and does not require an entropy source.
2.9 Key Generation
The module only generates the AES-GCM Initialization Vector deterministically, following the
guidance given in IG C.H (path 1, c) and IEEE 802.1AE.
2.10 Key Establishment
The module does not implement any key establishment schemes.
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
PCIE_RX, NIF50_RX, FAB50_RX Data Input Plaintext data to be encrypted, Encrypted
data to be decrypted
PCIE_TX, NIF50_TX, FAB50_TX Data Output Plaintext data that has been decrypted,
Encrypted data that has been encrypted
PCIE_RX Control
Input
Command signal invoking cryptographic
services
PCIE_TX Status
Output
Status information regarding the module
and the invoked service/function.
PCIE_VDDHRX1P5,
PCIE_VDDHTX1P5: Voltage=1.5V
Power Electrical power to the module
Table 8: Ports and Interfaces
The Ports and Interfaces table above specifies the cryptographic module interfaces. The
physical interfaces are defined as the data input/output pins of the MACsec chips. The logical
interfaces are logically separated from one another by the firmware design. The power interface
is physically separate from the other physical interfaces as the voltage pins are distinct from the
data input/output pins of the chips.
The module does not implement a control output interface.
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
The module does not implement any authentication mechanisms. The sole role (Crypto Officer)
is assumed implicitly.
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Role CO None
Table 9: Roles
The module supports the Crypto Officer role only. This sole role is implicitly assumed by the
operator of the module when performing a service.
4.3 Approved Services
Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Acce
ss
Show
status
Output
approved
mode status
Global
(complet
ion of
service)
Command Check
syslog(/var/log/sy
slog)
Status
Output
("Switch
MACSec
POST
passed"
OR
"Implicit -
Module
becomes
non-
operation
al")
None Crypt
o
Office
r
Show
module'
s
versioni
ng info
Output the
module name
and version
identifiers
Global
(complet
ion of
service)
Command (show
macsec --fips-
module)
Status
Output
("Nokia-
SONiC-
MACsec-
Version
1.0")
None Crypt
o
Office
r
Perform
self-
tests on
demand
Runs the
software/firm
ware integrity
check and
cryptographic
algorithm self
Global
(complet
ion of
service)
Procedure/Rebo
ot
Status
Output
(pass/fail)
Software/Firm
ware Integrity
Test
Crypt
o
Office
r
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Name Description Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Acce
ss
tests on
demand
Zeroisati
on
Zeroise SSPs
stored
temporarily in
RAM and in
the chip
registers
Global
(complet
ion of
service)
Procedure/Rebo
ot
Status
Output
None Crypt
o
Office
r
-
AES-
GCM
Key:
Z
-
AES-
GCM
IV: Z
Encrypt
data
Encrypt
plaintext data
Global
(complet
ion of
service)
Function
call/plaintext
packets
Encrypte
d packets
Encrypt Data Crypt
o
Office
r
-
AES-
GCM
Key:
W,E
-
AES-
GCM
IV:
G,E
Decrypt
data
Decrypt
ciphertext
data
Global
(complet
ion of
service)
Function
call/encrypted
packets
Plaintext
packets
Decrypt Data Crypt
o
Office
r
-
AES-
GCM
Key:
W,E
-
AES-
GCM
IV:
G,E
Table 10: Approved Services
The abbreviations of the access rights to SSPs have the following interpretation:
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G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).
W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP.
The module provides approved services to the operator who assumes the Crypto Officer role as
defined in this document.
The approved services defined in this section implement the security function implementations
defined in section 2.6 of this document.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
The module does not implement any non-approved services.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module does not allow the loading of external software or firmware.
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5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The approved integrity technique is implemented by the cryptographic module itself. The
approved software integrity technique consists of a self-test, run pre-operationally.
Software integrity test:
The entire module software is covered with an approved integrity technique (SHA2-256) which
is implemented in the module itself. If the calculated integrity value does not match the
reference value embedded into the software, the module enters the Error state and terminates
execution of module.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The conditional algorithm self-tests are run at module startup in addition to the firmware integrity
test. The crypto officer can initiate the self-tests on demand by power-cycling the host platform
(TOEPP).
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable
The Crypto Officer should confirm that the module is operating in the approved mode by
checking for the approved mode indicator per the instructions in Section 11.2 of this document.
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7 Physical Security
The module’s hardware consists of a single chip made with production grade components,
protected by a conformal coating as a standard passivation technique. As the software portion of
the hybrid module executes within a modifiable operational environment, the module is defined
as a multi-chip standalone embodiment.
The module itself provides no additional physical security techniques. However, the module will
reside inside of a Nokia-IXR7250E-36x400G device which is installed within a secure facility. The
module will therefore inherit these additional physical characteristics and protections.
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8 Non-Invasive Security
The module does not implement any security mechanisms which protect against non-invasive
attacks.
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
Volatile
Memory
Stored temporarily in memory within MACsec module. Dynamic
External Stored temporarily in memory location associated with the
calling application.
Dynamic
Table 11: Storage Areas
The module stores keys and input/output data temporarily in volatile memory. The module does
not store keys or data persistently.
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
SSP Input (GCM
encrypt)
External Volatile
Memory
Plaintext Automated Electronic Encrypt
Data
SSP Input (GCM
decrypt)
External Volatile
Memory
Plaintext Automated Electronic Decrypt
Data
Table 12: SSP Input-Output Methods
SSPs are only input from the calling applications within the module’s TOEPP. This method is
categorized as automated distribution, electronic entry (“CM Software from App via TOEPP
Path”).
9.3 SSP Zeroisation Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Power Cycle/
Re-instantiate
module
Remove power
from the host
platform
Keys are procedurally zeroized
by rebooting the host platform,
which is acceptable at Software
level 1.
Crypto Officer
reboots or removed
power from host
platform
Table 13: SSP Zeroization Methods
SSPs are zeroised procedurally by power-cycling the host platform.
9.4 SSPs
The following table summarizes the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the
cryptographic services implemented:
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used
By
AES-
GCM
Key
Encryption and
Decryption
128 or 256
bits - 128
or 256 bits
Authenticated
Symmetric Key
- CSP
Encrypt
Data
Decrypt
Data
AES-
GCM
IV
Initialization
Vector for
AES-GCM
MACsec
encryption
96 bits -
N/A
Initialization
Vector - PSP
Encrypt
Data
Decrypt
Data
Encrypt
Data
Decrypt
Data
Table 14: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related
SSPs
AES-
GCM
Key
SSP Input
(GCM
encrypt)
SSP Input
(GCM
decrypt)
Volatile
Memory:Plaintext
Until
zeroised
Power Cycle/ Re-
instantiate
module
AES-GCM
IV:Used With
AES-
GCM IV
Volatile
Memory:Plaintext
Until
zeroised
Power Cycle/ Re-
instantiate
module
AES-GCM
Key:Used
With
Table 15: SSP Table 2
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10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details
SHA2-256
(A7797)
SHA2-256 KAT SW/FW
Integrity
Log entry: "Switch
MACSec POST
passed" OR "Implicit -
Module becomes non-
operational"
Software
component
Integrity test using
an approved hash
(SHA2-256)
Table 16: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The startup integrity test is performed upon the module.
As the modules do not implement bypass capability or any FIPS-defined critical functions, no
additional pre-operational self-tests are required.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-XPN
(C894)
128 bits KAT CAST 'Ethernet<x/y>':
POST complete
Encrypt
(using
extended
packet
numbering
function),
MACsec
ASIC
Before first
operational
use of
encryption
service. /
Immediately
when the
module enters
the approved
mode of
operation.
SHA2-256
(A7797)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Log entry:
"Switch MACSec
POST passed"
OR "Implicit -
Module becomes
non-operational"
Hash
compare
KAT
Before first
operational
use of SHA2-
256
AES-XPN
Decrypt
(C894)
128 bits KAT CAST 'Ethernet<x/y>':
POST complete
Decrypt
(using
extended
packet
numbering
function),
MACsec
ASIC
Before first
operational
use of
decryption
service. /
Immediately
when the
module enters
the approved
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
mode of
operation.
Table 17: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
SHA2-256
(A7797)
KAT SW/FW Integrity Upon module
startup
Manual (reboot
host platform)
Table 18: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-XPN
(C894)
KAT CAST On Demand /
On Startup
Manually, by
reboot of host
device
SHA2-256
(A7797)
KAT CAST On Demand /
On Startup
Manually, by
reboot of host
device
AES-XPN
Decrypt (C894)
KAT CAST On Demand /
On Startup
Manually, by
reboot of host
device
Table 19: Conditional Periodic Information
The operator can perform pre-operational and conditional self-tests on demand by power-
cycling the host platform.
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Error Module terminates
operation, Host device
must be restarted
Module fails SHA2-256
CAST, or Software
Integrity Test
Reboot host
platform
Module
terminates
operation
Table 20: Error States
When the module fails any self-test, the module will immediately become unavailable to the host
system. When in the error state, the TOEPP’s interfaces will not be available and therefore, all
cryptographic operation is inhibited.
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
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The operator can perform the conditional self-tests on demand by power-cycling the host
platform.
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
The Nokia-SONiC-MACsec is pre-installed and configured at a facility and offered to the end
users as an integrated part of Nokia’s service offerings. As such, there are no installation,
initialization, or startup procedures to be performed by the Crypto Officer.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
The Crypto Officer should ensure that the module is running in the approved mode of operation
before use. This can be determined by checking the device log to confirm the output of the
‘Show Module’s Versioning Information’ and ‘Show Status’ services as listed in the ‘Approved
Services’ section of this document.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, the key used for MACsec encryption and
decryption shall be redistributed.
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not implement any security mechanisms which protect against other attacks.