### Juniper Networks, Inc Juniper Networks SRX Series Services Gateways ## FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Version: Junos OS 22.2R3-S1 Prepared for: NETWORKS Juniper Networks, Inc. 1133 Innovation Way Sunnyvale, California 94089 USA 408.745.2000 1.888 JUNIPER www.juniper.net Prepared by: Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 1 of 63 ### Table of Contents | 1 General ........................................................................................................................................................... | 1 General ........................................................................................................................................................... | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 1.1 Overview ................................................................................................................................................ 7 | 1.1 Overview ................................................................................................................................................ 7 | | 1.2 Security Levels ....................................................................................................................................... 7 | 1.2 Security Levels ....................................................................................................................................... 7 | | 2 Cryptographic Module Specification ........................................................................................................ 8 | 2 Cryptographic Module Specification ........................................................................................................ 8 | | 2.1 Description ............................................................................................................................................. 8 | 2.1 Description ............................................................................................................................................. 8 | | 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ............................................. 13 | 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ............................................. 13 | | 2.3 Excluded Components ....................................................................................................................... 14 | 2.3 Excluded Components ....................................................................................................................... 14 | | 2.4 Modes of Operation ........................................................................................................................... 15 | 2.4 Modes of Operation ........................................................................................................................... 15 | | 2.5 Algorithms ............................................................................................................................................ 15 | 2.5 Algorithms ............................................................................................................................................ 15 | | 2.6 Security Function Implementations ................................................................................................ 18 | 2.6 Security Function Implementations ................................................................................................ 18 | | 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information ........................................................................................................ 21 | 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information ........................................................................................................ 21 | | 2.8 RBG and Entropy ................................................................................................................................ 21 | 2.8 RBG and Entropy ................................................................................................................................ 21 | | 2.9 Key Generation ................................................................................................................................... 22 | 2.9 Key Generation ................................................................................................................................... 22 | | 2.10 Key Establishment ............................................................................................................................ 22 | 2.10 Key Establishment ............................................................................................................................ 22 | | 2.11 Industry Protocols ............................................................................................................................ 22 | 2.11 Industry Protocols ............................................................................................................................ 22 | | 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ........................................................................................................... 23 | 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ........................................................................................................... 23 | | 3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................................... 23 | 3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................................... 23 | | 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ........................................................................................................ 24 | 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ........................................................................................................ 24 | | 4.1 Authentication Methods.................................................................................................................... 24 | 4.1 Authentication Methods.................................................................................................................... 24 | | 4.2 Roles ...................................................................................................................................................... 24 | 4.2 Roles ...................................................................................................................................................... 24 | | 4.3 Approved Services .............................................................................................................................. 25 | 4.3 Approved Services .............................................................................................................................. 25 | | 4.4 Non-Approved Services..................................................................................................................... 28 | 4.4 Non-Approved Services..................................................................................................................... 28 | | 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded .............................................................................................. 28 | 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded .............................................................................................. 28 | | 5 Software/Firmware Security .................................................................................................................... | 5 Software/Firmware Security .................................................................................................................... | | 29 | 29 | | 5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................................... 29 | 5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................................... 29 | | 5.2 Initiate on Demand ............................................................................................................................. 29 | 5.2 Initiate on Demand ............................................................................................................................. 29 | | 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..................................................................... 30 | 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..................................................................... 30 | | 6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions ......................................................................................... 30 | 6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions ......................................................................................... 30 | | ......................................................................................................................................... 31 | ......................................................................................................................................... 31 | | 7 Physical | Security | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 2 of 63 | 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required ................................................................................................. 31 | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals ................................................................................................................. 31 | | 8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................................... 47 | | 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ........................................................................................ 48 | | 9.1 Storage Areas ....................................................................................................................................... 48 | | 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods .............................................................................................................. 48 | | 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods .................................................................................................................. 48 | | 9.4 SSPs ....................................................................................................................................................... 49 | | 9.5 Transitions ............................................................................................................................................ 53 | | 10 Self-Tests ................................................................................................................................................... 54 | | 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................................. 54 | | 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests ..................................................................................................................... 54 | | 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ....................................................................................................... 57 | | 10.4 Error States ........................................................................................................................................ 59 | | 10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests ................................................................................................... 60 | | 11 Life-Cycle Assurance ............................................................................................................................... 61 | | 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures .................................................................... 61 | | 11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................................. 62 | | 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance ......................................................................................................... 62 | | 11.4 Design and Rules .............................................................................................................................. 62 | | 11.5 Maintenance Requirements ........................................................................................................... 62 | | 11.6 End of Life .......................................................................................................................................... 62 | | 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ................................................................................................................... 63 | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 3 of 63 #### List of Tables Table 1: Security Levels .................................................................................................................................. 7 Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Hardware ................................................................................ 14 Table 3: Modes List and Description ......................................................................................................... 15 Table 4: Approved Algorithms - OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions ............................... 17 Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Kernel Approved Cryptographic Functions .................................... 17 Table 6: Approved Algorithms - LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions ................................... 18 Table 7: Approved Algorithms - OpenSSH Approved Cryptographic Functions .............................. 18 Table 8: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ....................................................................................................... 18 Table 9: Security Function Implementations ............................................................................................ 21 Table 10: Entropy Certificates..................................................................................................................... 21 Table 11: Ports and Interfaces .................................................................................................................... 23 Table 12: Authentication Methods ............................................................................................................ 24 Table 13: Roles ............................................................................................................................................... 24 Table 14: Approved Services ....................................................................................................................... 28 Table 15: Mechanisms and Actions Required .......................................................................................... 31 Table 16: Storage Areas ................................................................................................................................ 48 Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods ....................................................................................................... 48 Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods ........................................................................................................... 49 Table 19: SSP Table 1 .................................................................................................................................... 51 Table 20: SSP Table 2 .................................................................................................................................... 53 Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests ........................................................................................................ 54 Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests ................................................................................................................. 57 Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information ..................................................................................... 57 Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information .............................................................................................. 59 Table 25: Error States ................................................................................................................................... 59 #### List of Figures Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 4 of 63 | Figure 1 - SRX1500 (front) ............................................................................................................................ 9 | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Figure 2 - SRX1500 (rear) .............................................................................................................................. 9 | | Figure 3 - SRX4100 (front) ............................................................................................................................ 9 | | Figure 4 - SRX4100 (rear) .............................................................................................................................. 9 | | Figure 5 - SRX4200 (front) ............................................................................................................................ 9 | | Figure 6 - SRX4200 (rear) ............................................................................................................................ 10 | | Figure 7 - SRX4600 (front) .......................................................................................................................... 10 | | Figure 8 - SRX4600 (rear) ............................................................................................................................ 10 | | Figure 9 - SRX5400 (front) .......................................................................................................................... 10 | | Figure 10 - SRX5400 (rear) ......................................................................................................................... 11 | | Figure 11 - SRX5600 (front) ........................................................................................................................ 11 | | Figure 12 - SRX5600 (rear) ......................................................................................................................... 12 | | Figure 13 - SRX5800 (front) ........................................................................................................................ 12 | | Figure 14 - SRX5800 (rear) ......................................................................................................................... 13 | | Figure 15 - SRX1500 Front View: TEL 1 - 6 ............................................................................................. 32 | | Figure 16 - SRX1500 Rear View: TEL 7 & 8 ............................................................................................. 32 | | Figure 17 - SRX1500 Top - Rear View: TEL 7 .......................................................................................... 33 | | Figure 18 - SRX1500 Bottom View: TEL 8, 9 & 10 ................................................................................. 33 | | Figure 19 - SRX1500 Right Side View: TEL 9 .......................................................................................... 34 | | Figure 20 - SRX1500 Left Side View: TEL 10 .......................................................................................... 34 | | Figure 21 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Top View: TEL 1, 2, 6, 8 & 10 ........................................................ 34 | | Figure 22 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Left-Side View: TEL 1 ...................................................................... 35 | | Figure 23 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Right-Side View: TEL 2 .................................................................... 35 | | Figure 24 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Bottom View: TEL 3, 4, 5 ................................................................ 35 | | 36 | | Figure 25 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Front View: TEL 6-11 ...................................................................... | | Figure 26 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Rear View: TEL 12-13 ..................................................................... 36 | | Figure 27 - SRX4600 Front View: TEL 1 - 8 ............................................................................................ 36 | | .............................................................................................. 37 | | Figure 29 - SRX4600 Rear View: TEL 9-15 | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 5 of 63 Figure 30 - SRX4600 Top Rear View: TEL 9 - 10 ................................................................................... 37 Figure 31 - SRX4600 Right Side View: TEL 12 ........................................................................................ 37 Figure 32 - SRX4600 Left Side View: TEL 11 .......................................................................................... 38 Figure 33 - SRX4600 Bottom View: TEL 2, 4, 11, 12 ............................................................................. 38 Figure 34 - SRX5400 Front View: TEL 1-10 ............................................................................................ 39 Figure 35 - SRX5400 Rear View: TEL 11-18 ............................................................................................ 40 Figure 36 - SRX5600 Front View: TEL 1-11 ............................................................................................ 41 Figure 37 - SRX5600 Rear View: TEL 12-20 ............................................................................................ 41 Figure 38 - SRX5600 USB Port: TEL 21 .................................................................................................... 42 Figure 39 - SRX5800 Front View: TEL 1-36 ............................................................................................ 43 Figure 40 - SRX5800 Rear View: TEL 37-41 ............................................................................................ 44 Figure 41 - SRX5800 Rear View: TEL 37,39,40-42 ................................................................................ 45 Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 6 of 63 ## 1 General ### 1.1 Overview This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Juniper Networks SRX Series Services Gateways consisting of the SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200, SRX4600, SRX5400, SRX5600 and SRX5800 models and running Junos OS 22.2R3-S1, hereafter referred to as the cryptographic module. ### 1.2 Security Levels The cryptographic module meets requirements applicable to Level 2 of FIPS 140-3. The table below shows the security levels claimed for each section of the security requirements. Table 1: Security Levels | Section | Title | Security Level | |-----------|-----------------------------------------|------------------| | 1 | General | 2 | | 2 | Cryptographic module specification | 2 | | 3 | Cryptographic module interfaces | 2 | | 4 | Roles, services, and authentication | 2 | | 5 | Software/Firmware security | 2 | | 6 | Operational environment | N/A | | 7 | Physical security | 2 | | 8 | Non-invasive security | N/A | | 9 | Sensitive security parameter management | 2 | | 10 | Self-tests | 2 | | 11 | Life-cycle assurance | 2 | | 12 | Mitigation of other attacks | N/A | | | Overall Level | 2 | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 7 of 63 ## 2 Cryptographic Module Specification ### 2.1 Description ####### Purpose and Use: The SRX Series Services Gateways are a series of secure routers that provide essential capabilities to connect, secure, and manage work force locations sized from handfuls to hundreds of users. By consolidating fast, highly available switching, routing, security, and applications capabilities in a single device, enterprises can economically deliver new services, safe connectivity, and a satisfying end user experience. ####### Module Type : Hardware Module Embodiment: MultiChipStand Module Characteristics: Cryptographic Boundary: This Security Policy covers the following models: - SRX1500, - SRX4100, - SRX4200, - SRX4600, - SRX5400, - SRX5600, and - SRX5800. All models run Juniper's JUNOS firmware. The JUNOS firmware is FIPS-compliant when configured in the Approved mode called JUNOS-FIPS-MODE, version 22.2R3-S1. The firmware images used in the different models are as follows: - SRX1500: junos-srxentedge-x86-64-22.2R3-S1.9.tgz; - SRX4100 and SRX4200: junos-srxmr-x86-64-22.2R3-S1.9.tgz; - SRX4600: junos-srxhe-x86-64-22.2R3-S1.9.tgz; and - SRX5400, SRX5600 and SRX5800: junos-vmhost-install-srx-x86-64-22.2R3-S1.9.tgz. The physical form of the module is depicted in Figure 1 to Figure 14 below. The cryptographic boundary encompasses the entire Tested Operational Environment Physical Perimeter (TOEPP), which is defined as the outer edge of the chassis. The module does not rely on external devices for input and output of security sensitive parameters (SSPs). Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 8 of 63 Figure 1 - SRX1500 (front) Figure 2 - SRX1500 (rear) Figure 3 - SRX4100 (front) Figure 4 - SRX4100 (rear) Figure 5 - SRX4200 (front) Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 9 of 63 Figure 6 - SRX4200 (rear) Figure 7 - SRX4600 (front) Figure 8 - SRX4600 (rear) Figure 9 - SRX5400 (front) Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 10 of 63 Figure 10 - SRX5400 (rear) Figure 11 - SRX5600 (front) Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 11 of 63 Figure 12 - SRX5600 (rear) Figure 13 - SRX5800 (front) Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 12 of 63 Figure 14 - SRX5800 (rear) ### 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ####### Tested Module Identification - Hardware: | Model and/or Part Number | Hardware Version | Firmware Version | Processors | Features | |----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | SRX1500 | SRX1500 | JUNOS 22.2R3-S1.9 | Intel Xeon E3-1200 v2 | 12x1GbE ports; 4x1GbE SFP ports; 4x10GbE SFP ports; 2 PIM slots (not used in validation) | | SRX4100 | SRX4100 | JUNOS 22.2R3-S1.9 | Intel Xeon E5-2640 v4 | 8 x 1GbE/10GbE ports | | SRX4200 | SRX4200 | JUNOS 22.2R3-S1.9 | Intel Xeon E5-2640 v4 | 8 x 1GbE/10GbE ports | | SRX4600 | SRX4600 | JUNOS 22.2R3-S1.9 | Intel Xeon E5-2658 v4 | 8 x 1GbE/10Gb Ethernet SFP ports, 4 x 40/100Gb Ethernet QSFP21 ports | | SRX5400 | SRX5400 | JUNOS 22.2R3-S1.9 | Intel Xeon C5518, Intel Xeon E5-2658 v4, Intel Xeon CPU E5-2608L v3 | Routing Engine: SRX5K-RE3-128G Switch Control Board: SRX5K-SCB3 Service Processing Card: SRX5K-SPC- 4-15-320, SRX5K-SPC3 | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 13 of 63 Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Hardware | Model and/or Part Number | Hardware Version | Firmware Version | Processors | Features | |----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | Module Interface Card: SRX5K-IOC4- 10G, SRX5K-MPC3-40G10G | | SRX5600 | SRX5600 | JUNOS 22.2R3-S1.9 | Intel Xeon C5518, Intel Xeon E5-2658 v4, Intel Xeon CPU E5-2608L v3 | Routing Engine: SRX5K-RE3-128G Switch Control Board: SRX5K-SCB3, SRX5K-SCB4 Service Processing Card: SRX5K-SPC- 4-15-320, SRX5K-SPC3 Module Interface Card: SRX5K-IOC4- 10G, SRX5K-MPC3-40G10G | | SRX5800 | SRX5800 | JUNOS 22.2R3-S1.9 | Intel Xeon C5518, Intel Xeon E5-2658 v4, Intel Xeon CPU E5-2608L v3 | Routing Engine: SRX5K-RE3-128n Switch Control Board: SRX5K-SCB3, SRX5K-SCB4 Service Processing Card: SRX5K-SPC- 4-15-320, SRX5K-SPC3 Module Interface Card: SRX5K-IOC4- 10G, SRX5K-MPC3-40G10G | ####### Tested Module Identification - Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets): N/A The module is not classified as software, firmware, or hybrid; thus, this section is not applicable. ####### Tested Module Identification - Hybrid Disjoint Hardware: N/A The module is not classified as hybrid disjoint hardware; thus, this section is not applicable. ####### Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A The module is not classified as software, firmware, or hybrid; thus, this section is not applicable. ####### Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A There are no vendor-affirmed operational environments claimed. CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate. ### 2.3 Excluded Components No components are excluded from the requirements of FIPS 140-3. Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 14 of 63 ### 2.4 Modes of Operation ####### Modes List and Description: | Mode Name | Description | Type | Status Indicator | |------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|---------------------------------------| | JUNOS-FIPS- MODE | Approved mode of operation enabled by following the configuration commands in Section 11.1 | Approved | Suffix string :fips in the cli prompt | Table 3: Modes List and Description Once the module has been securely initialized following the instructions provided in Section 11.1, the module is in approved mode of operation. Failure to follow the secure initialization instructions results in the module being in a non-compliant state which is out of scope of the validation. ### 2.5 Algorithms ####### Approved Algorithms: Although the module may have been tested for additional algorithms or modes, only those listed below are utilized by the module. OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |--------------------------|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | AES-CBC | A3693 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-CTR | A3693 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 Payload Length - Payload Length: 8-128 Increment 8 Supports Counter larger than maximum value - No Incremental Counter - Yes Counter Tests Performed - Yes | SP 800-38A | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) | A3693 | Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Secret Generation Mode - Testing Candidates | FIPS 186-4 | | ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4) | A3693 | Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 | FIPS 186-4 | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) | A3693 | Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 | FIPS 186-4 | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | A3693 | Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 | FIPS 186-4 | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 15 of 63 | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |--------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | HMAC-SHA-1 | A3693 | MAC - MAC: 160 Key Length - Key Length: 160 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2-256 | A3693 | MAC - MAC: 256 Key Length - Key Length: 256 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2-512 | A3693 | MAC - MAC: 512 Key Length - Key Length: 512 | FIPS 198-1 | | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 | A3610 | Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256, P- 384, P-521 Hash Function Z - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2- 512 Scheme - ephemeralUnified - KAS Role - initiator | SP 800-56A Rev. 3 | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 4) | A3693 | Key Generation Mode - B.3.3 Modulo - 2048, 4096 Primality Tests - Table C.2 Info Generated By Server - No Public Exponent Mode - Fixed Fixed Public Exponent - 010001 Private Key Format - Standard | FIPS 186-4 | | RSA SigGen (FIPS186- 4) | A3693 | Signature Type - PKCS 1.5 Modulo - 2048, 4096 Hash Pair - Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256 | FIPS 186-4 | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | A3693 | Signature Type - PKCS 1.5 Modulo - 2048, 4096 Hash Pair - Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256 Public Exponent Mode - Fixed Fixed Public Exponent - 010001 | FIPS 186-4 | | SHA-1 | A3693 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Function - SHA1 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-256 | A3693 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Function - SHA2 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-384 | A3693 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Function - SHA2 | FIPS 180-4 | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 16 of 63 Table 4: Approved Algorithms - OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |-------------|-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | SHA2-512 | A3693 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Function - SHA2 | FIPS 180-4 | ####### Kernel Approved Cryptographic Functions Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Kernel Approved Cryptographic Functions | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |----------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | HMAC DRBG | A3493 | Prediction Resistance - Yes Supports Reseed - No Mode - SHA2-256 Entropy Input - Entropy Input: 256 Nonce - Nonce: 128 Personalization String Length - Personalization String Length: 0, 256 Additional Input - Additional Input: 0, 256 Returned Bits - 1024 | SP 800-90A Rev. 1 | | HMAC-SHA2- 256 | A3493 | MAC - MAC: 256 Key Length - Key Length: 160, 256 | FIPS 198-1 | | SHA2-256 | A3493 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200 Increment 8 Function - SHA2 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-512 | A3361 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200 Increment 8 Function - SHA2 | FIPS 180-4 | ####### LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |----------------|-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | HMAC-SHA-1 | A3367 | MAC - MAC: 160 Key Length - Key Length: 112, 160 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2- 256 | A3367 | MAC - MAC: 256 Key Length - Key Length: 160, 256 | FIPS 198-1 | | SHA-1 | A3367 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200 Increment 8 Function - SHA1 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-256 | A3367 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200 Increment 8 Function - SHA2 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-512 | A3367 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Function - SHA2 | FIPS 180-4 | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 17 of 63 Table 6: Approved Algorithms - LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions ####### OpenSSH Approved Cryptographic Functions Table 7: Approved Algorithms - OpenSSH Approved Cryptographic Functions | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |---------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | KDF SSH (CVL) | A4271 | Cipher - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2- 512 | SP 800-135 Rev. 1 | ####### Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: Table 8: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms | Name | Properties | Implementation | Reference | |--------|---------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------| | CKG | Key type:Asymmetric | Junos 22.2R1 - OpenSSL | SP 800-133 Rev.2 Section 4, example 1 direct output from DRBG. | ####### Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. ####### Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: N/A for this module. ###### Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. ### 2.6 Security Function Implementations The module implements the security functions listed in the following table. | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |--------------------|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------| | Enc/Dec (SSH) | BC-UnAuth | Unauthenticated encryption for SSH | | AES-CBC: (A3693) AES-CTR: (A3693) | | KAS-SSC (SSH) | KAS-SSC | Key Agreement Scheme Shared Secret Computation for SSH | | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A3610) | | ECDSA SigGen (SSH) | DigSig-SigGen | Signature Generation for peer authentication in SSH | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4): (A3693) SHA2-256: (A3693) | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 18 of 63 | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |---------------------|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | ECDSA SigVer (SSH) | DigSig-SigVer | Signature Verification for peer authentication in SSH | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A3693) SHA2-256: (A3693) SHA2-384: (A3693) SHA2-512: (A3693) | | MAC (SSH) | MAC | Message Authentication for SSH | | HMAC-SHA-1: (A3693) SHA2-256: (A3693) HMAC-SHA2-512: (A3693) | | KDF (SSH) | KAS-135KDF | Key derivation Function for SSH | | KDF SSH: (A4271) SHA-1: (A3693) SHA2-256: (A3693) SHA2-384: (A3693) | | SHA (LibMD) | SHA | Message Digest Generation | | SHA-1: (A3367) SHA2-256: (A3367) SHA2-512: (A3367) | | MAC (LibMD) | MAC | Message authentication | | HMAC-SHA-1: (A3367) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A3367) | | DRBG (Kernel) | DRBG | Random Bit Generation | | HMAC DRBG: (A3493) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A3493) SHA2-256: (A3493) | | SHA (Kernel) | SHA | Entropy source conditioning component | | SHA2-512: (A3361) | | ECDSA KeyGen (PKID) | AsymKeyPair- KeyGen AsymKeyPair- KeyVer | ECDSA Key Generation used for SSH when authentication keys are internally generated | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A3693) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4): (A3693) CKG: () Key type: | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 19 of 63 | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |----------------------|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | RSA KeyGen (PKID) | AsymKeyPair- KeyGen | RSA Key generation used for SSH when authentication keys are internally generated | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A3693) CKG: () Key type: Asymmetric HMAC DRBG: (A3493) | | RSA SigGen (SSH) | DigSig-SigGen | RSA Signature Generation for SSH | | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4): (A3693) | | RSA SigVer (SSH) | DigSig-SigVer | RSA Signature verification for SSH | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A3693) | | Verify image | DigSig-SigVer | Verification of software image | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A3693) SHA2-256: (A3693) SHA2-384: (A3693) | | Full KAS (SSH) | KAS-Full | Full Key Agreement for SSH | | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A3610) KDF SSH: (A4271) SHA-1: (A3693) SHA2-256: (A3693) SHA2-384: (A3693) | | KAS-ECC KeyGen (SSH) | AsymKeyPair- KeyGen AsymKeyPair- KeyVer | KAS-ECC Key Pair Generation for SSH | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A3693) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4): (A3693) CKG: () Key type: Asymmetric HMAC DRBG: (A3493) | | ENT | ENT-ESV | Entropy Source | | SHA2-512: (A3361) | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 20 of 63 Table 9: Security Function Implementations | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |-----------|----------|--------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | KTS (SSH) | KTS-Wrap | Key transport using SSH as per IG D.G provisions | KTS:128, 256, 384, 521, 2048, 3072 or 4096 bits keys provide between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength | AES-CBC: (A3693) AES-CTR: (A3693) HMAC-SHA-1: (A3693) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A3693) HMAC-SHA2-512: (A3693) | ### 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information The module includes RSA and ECDSA algorithms that have been validated using FIPS 186-4 CAVP tests, which are mathematically identical to FIPS 186-5 CAVP tests. Per IG C.K, all RSA and ECDSA algorithms implemented by the module are claimed compliant with FIPS 186-5. The module complies with IG C.F. RSA Key Generation, Signature Generation and Signature Verification have been tested and validated using CAVP testing for all implemented modulus lengths (2048, 3072 and 4096 bits). The number of Miller-Rabin tests used for primality testing as part of RSA Key Generation is consistent with Table C.3. The module implements the following Approved key agreement methods which have been CAVP tested and validated: - KAS-ECC per SP 800-56A Rev. 3 (FIPS 140-3 IG D.F Scenario 2, path 2). The module obtains the FIPS 140-3 IG D.F required key agreement assurances in accordance with Section 5.6.2 of SP800-56A Rev. 3. All the key agreement protocols implemented by the module are Diffie-Hellman based. The module includes approved KDF algorithms for the SSH protocols. No parts of these protocols, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. ### 2.8 RBG and Entropy | Cert Number | Vendor Name | |---------------|------------------| | E56 | Juniper Networks | Table 10: Entropy Certificates N/A for this module. Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 21 of 63 The entropy source is used to seed the module's HMAC DRBG with the minimum required 256bits of entropy. Each 512-bit block of conditioned output from the entropy source contains 448 bits of entropy. The HMAC DRBG is used for all random data required by the module, including key generation. There are no initialization procedures required by the users of the module to operate the entropy source in a compliant manner. The module complies to the ESV Public Use document of the validated entropy source (Cert. E56). ### 2.9 Key Generation The cryptographic module implements the key generation methods listed above in the Security Functions implementation table. ### 2.10 Key Establishment The cryptographic module implements the key establishment methods listed above in the Security Functions implementation table. ### 2.11 Industry Protocols The cryptographic module supports the protocols listed below. No part of these protocols, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. The SSH algorithms allow independent selection of key exchange, authentication, cipher, and integrity. In reference to the supported protocols table below, each column of options for a given protocol is independent and may be used in any viable combination. | Protocol | Key Exchange | Auth | Cipher | Integrity | |------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------| | SSHv2 | KAS-ECC (P-256, P-384, P-521) | RSA 2048 ECDSA P- 256 | AES CBC 128/192/256 AES CTR 128/192/256 | HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA2- 256 HMAC-SHA2- 512 | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 22 of 63 ## 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ### 3.1 Ports and Interfaces The following table maps each physical interface to one or more logical interface types defined in the FIPS 140-3 standard. Table 11: Ports and Interfaces | Physical Port | Logical Interface(s) | Data That Passes | |------------------|----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------| | Ethernet (data) | Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output | LAN communications | | Ethernet (mgmt.) | Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output | Remote management | | Serial | Control Input Status Output | Local management | | Reset Button | Control Input | Reset | | ToD | Control Input Status Output | RJ-45 Time of Day Port | | BITS | Control Input Status Output | BITS RJ-45 port | | GPS | Control Input Status Output | 10 Mhz clock synchronization | | PPS | Control Input Control Output | 1 pulse per second | | Offline | Control Input | Offline button | | LED | Status Output | Status indicator lighting | | Power | Power | Power | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 23 of 63 ## 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ### 4.1 Authentication Methods Table 12: Authentication Methods | Method Name | Description | Security Mechanism | Strength Each Attempt | Strength per Minute | |--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Password authentication | User and CO authentication via SSH or console. Minimum of 10 ASCII character passwords. | SHA (LibMD) | Probability of guessing: 1/(96^10) 1/1,000,000. | Timed access mechanism allows max of 10 attempts / min. Probability of guessing: 10/(96^10) 1/100,000. | | Signature authentication | User/CO authentication via SSH. | ECDSA SigVer (SSH) | Strength of signature algorithm, minimum 112-bits. Probability of success for random attempt: 1/(2^112) 1/1,000,000. | A rate of 1 CPU cycle per failed authentication for the Intel Xeon E3-1200 v2 processor (4 cores, 3.1 GHz) allows for the probability of success by brute- force attack: 60 x 4 x 3.1 x 10^9 x 1/(2^112) 1/100,000. | The module enforces the separation of roles using either password-based authentication or signature-based authentication. ### 4.2 Roles Table 13: Roles | Name | Type | Operator Type | Authentication Methods | |-----------------------|--------|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------| | User | Role | Monitor | Password authentication Signature authentication | | Cryptographic Officer | Role | CO | Password authentication Signature authentication | The module supports two roles: Cryptographic Officer (CO) and User. The module supports rolebased operator authentication for assuming these roles, using methods specified in Section 4.1. The module supports concurrent operators but does not support a maintenance role and/or bypass capability. The Cryptographic Officer role configures and monitors the module via a console or SSH connection. As root or super-user, the Cryptographic Officer has permission to view and edit secrets within the module. Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 24 of 63 The User role monitors the router via the console or SSH. The user role cannot change the configuration. ### 4.3 Approved Services | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Configure security | Security relevant configuration | :fips suffix in CLI prompt | CLI commands | Status | SHA (LibMD) MAC (LibMD) DRBG (Kernel) SHA (Kernel) ECDSA KeyGen (PKID) RSA KeyGen (PKID) ENT | Cryptographic Officer - HMAC DRBG V value: E - HMAC DRBG Key value: E - HMAC DRBG Entropy Input: E - HMAC DRBG Seed: E - CO-PW: W - User-PW: W - SSH-Priv: G,R,W | | Configure | Non-security relevant configuration | None | CLI commands | Status | None | Cryptographic Officer | | Show status | Show status | None | CLI command | Status | None | Cryptographic Officer User | | Zeroize | Zeroize / destroy all CSPs | None | CLI command | None (completion indicator is implicitly provided by the module rebooting) | None | Cryptographic Officer - HMAC DRBG V value: Z - HMAC DRBG Key value: Z - HMAC DRBG Seed: Z - HMAC DRBG Entropy Input: Z - SSH-DH- Shared-Secret: Z - SSH-Priv: Z - SSH-SEKs: Z - CO-PW: Z - User-PW: Z - SSH-PUB: Z - Auth-User Pub: | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 25 of 63 | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Z - Root-CA: Z - Package-CA: Z - SSH-DH-PUB (self): Z - SSH-DH-PUB (peer): Z | | SSH connect | Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and control (CLI) | :fips suffix in CLI prompt | SSH packets | SSH packets, status | Enc/Dec (SSH) KAS-SSC (SSH) ECDSA SigGen (SSH) ECDSA SigVer (SSH) MAC (SSH) KDF (SSH) DRBG (Kernel) RSA SigGen (SSH) RSA SigVer (SSH) Full KAS (SSH) KAS-ECC KeyGen (SSH) ENT KTS (SSH) | Cryptographic Officer - HMAC DRBG V value: E - HMAC DRBG Key value: E - HMAC DRBG Entropy Input: E - HMAC DRBG Seed: E - SSH-DH- Shared-Secret: G,E - SSH-DH-priv: G,E - SSH-SEKs: G,E - Auth-CO Pub: E - SSH-Priv: E - CO-PW: E - SSH-DH-PUB (self): G - SSH-DH-PUB (peer): E User - HMAC DRBG V value: E - HMAC DRBG Key value: E - HMAC DRBG Entropy Input: E - HMAC DRBG Seed: E - SSH-Priv: E - User-PW: E - SSH-DH- Shared-Secret: G,E - SSH-DH-priv: G,E | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 26 of 63 | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |----------------|--------------------------------------|-------------|--------------------|-----------|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | - SSH-SEKs: G - SSH-DH-PUB (self): G - SSH-DH-PUB (peer): E - Auth-User Pub: E | | Console access | Console monitoring and control (CLI) | None | CLI command | Status | None | Cryptographic Officer - CO-PW: E User - User-PW: R,E | | Remote reset | Software initiated reset | None | CLI command | Status | None | Cryptographic Officer - HMAC DRBG V value: Z - HMAC DRBG Key value: Z - HMAC DRBG Entropy Input: Z - HMAC DRBG Seed: Z - SSH-DH- Shared-Secret: Z - SSH-DH-priv: Z - SSH-SEKs: Z - SSH-DH-PUB (self): Z - SSH-DH-PUB (peer): Z | | Local reset | Hardware reset or power cycle | None | Manual power cycle | Status | None | Unauthenticated - HMAC DRBG V value: Z - HMAC DRBG Key value: Z - HMAC DRBG Entropy Input: Z - HMAC DRBG Seed: Z - SSH-DH- Shared-Secret: Z - SSH-SEKs: Z - SSH-DH-PUB (self): Z | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 27 of 63 Table 14: Approved Services | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|-------------|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | - SSH-DH-PUB (peer): Z | | Traffic | Traffic requiring no cryptographic services | None | Traffic in | Traffic out | None | Unauthenticated | | Load Image | Loading of firmware image | :fips suffix in CLI prompt | CLI command | status | Verify image | Cryptographic Officer - Root-CA: E - Package-CA: E | | Perform self-tests | On-demand self- tests of all pre- operational and conditional algorithm self- tests | None | Local or remote reset | status | None | Cryptographic Officer User Unauthenticated | | Show version | Show firmware version | None | CLI command | Status | None | Cryptographic Officer User | ### 4.4 Non-Approved Services N/A for this module. ### 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded The module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. Only the CO can install the new image using the CLI as described in Section 11.1. The loaded firmware is a complete image replacement and constitutes an entirely new module and version of Junos OS which would require a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 28 of 63 ## 5 Software/Firmware Security ### 5.1 Integrity Techniques The cryptographic module implements an approved firmware integrity self-test that uses ECDSA P-256 with SHA2-256 to ensure the integrity of all Junos OS firmware components. The selftest is automatically run on power-up. It can also be run on demand by the module's operator by power cycling the module. When the integrity check fails, the module enters an error state (kernel panic) which can only be exited by power-cycling the module. ### 5.2 Initiate on Demand The self-test is automatically run on power-up. It can also be run on demand by the module's operator by power cycling the module. Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 29 of 63 ## 6 Operational Environment ### 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ####### Type of Operational Environment: Non-Modifiable How Requirements are Satisfied: The module consists of hardware containing a non-modifiable operational environment as per the FIPS 140-3 definitions. It includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. The loaded firmware is a complete image replacement and constitutes an entirely new module and version of Junos OS which would require a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. ### 6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions There are no security rules, settings, or restrictions to the configuration of the operational environment beyond the initialization instructions to set the module in approved mode. Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 30 of 63 ## 7 Physical Security ### 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required Table 15: Mechanisms and Actions Required | Mechanism | Inspection Frequency | Inspection Guidance | |----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------| | Tamper seals (part # JNPR-FIPS- TAMPER-LBLS) | Once per month by the Cryptographic Officer | Seals should be free of any tamper evidence. | | Opaque metal enclosure. | n/a | n/a | The module's physical embodiment is that of a multi-chip standalone device that meets Level 2 Physical Security requirements. The module is completely enclosed in a rectangular nickel or clear zinc coated, cold rolled steel, plated steel, and brushed aluminum enclosure. There are no ventilation holes, gaps, slits, cracks, slots, or crevices that would allow for any sort of observation of any component contained within the cryptographic boundary. Tamper-evident seals allow the operator to tell if the enclosure has been breached. These seals are not factory-installed and must be applied by the Cryptographic Officer. (Seals are available for order from Juniper using part number JNPR-FIPS-TAMPER-LBLS.) The tamper-evident seals shall be installed for the module to operate in approved mode. The Cryptographic Officer is responsible for securing and having control at all times of any unused seals and the direct control and observation of any changes to the module such as reconfigurations where the tamper-evident seals or security appliances are removed or installed to ensure the security of the module is maintained during such changes and the module is returned to an approved mode of operation. If the Cryptographic Officer observes tamper evidence, it shall be assumed that the device has been compromised. The Cryptographic Officer shall retain control of the module and perform zeroization of the module's CSPs by following the steps in Section 9.3 and then follow the steps in Section 11.1 to place the module back into approved mode of operation. ### 7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals The number of seals that need to be applied depends on the module model, as follows: - SRX1500: 10 seals - SRX4100 and SRX 4200: 13 seals - SRX4600: 15 seals - SRX5400: 20 seals - SRX5600: 19 seals Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 31 of 63 - SRX5800: 42 seals ####### Placement: ####### SRX1500 Six tamper evident labels (TEL) must be applied to the following location: - The front of the SRX1500 has two slot covers. The slot covers should be secured with two screws each and then tamper evident labels (TEL #1 & #2) applied as shown by the red boxes in following two figures. The TEL go from the front of the SRX1500 to the top (Figures 4 & 5). 2 Tamper labels (#5 & #6) are used to cover the USB port and two tamper labels (#3 & #4) are used to cover the High Availability port (Figure 4). Figure 15 - SRX1500 Front View: TEL 1 - 6 - The rear of the SRX1500 has two TELs (TEL #7 and TEL #8). The TEL #7, at the top of the rear-view wraps to the top of the device and covers the fourth screw from side containing the power supply (see Figure 7). TEL #8 wraps from the rear of the SRX1500, on the SSD slot cover, to the bottom of the SRX1500 (see Figure 8). Figure 16 - SRX1500 Rear View: TEL 7 & 8 Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 32 of 63 Figure 17 - SRX1500 Top - Rear View: TEL 7 Figure 18 - SRX1500 Bottom View: TEL 8, 9 & 10 - TEL #9 and TEL #10 cover the indicated screw on the left and right side of the SRX1500 (Figure 19 and Figure 20) and wrap to the bottom of the SRX1500 as shown in Figure 8. Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 33 of 63 ####### SRX4100 & SRX4200 The placement of the tamper evident labels for the SRX4100 and SRX4200 are the same in that the outside of the devices is identical. Thirteen tamper-evident seals must be applied to the following locations: - The top of the chassis, covering one screw on the top-back left and one screw on the topback right (TEL #1 and TEL #2). The TELs cover the screws on the top of the chassis and wrap down each side of the chassis. Figure 21 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Top View: TEL 1, 2, 6, 8 & 10 Figure 19 - SRX1500 Right Side View: TEL 9 Figure 20 - SRX1500 Left Side View: TEL 10 Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 34 of 63 Figure 22 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Left-Side View: TEL 1 Figure 23 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Right-Side View: TEL 2 - Bottom chassis, covering 3 screws that secure the faceplates on the front of the chassis. TEL #3, #4, #5 are entirely on the bottom of the chassis they do not wrap around to any other portion of the chassis. - Tamper evident seals 6 & 7 cover the two USB ports on the front of the SRX4100 and the SRX4200 - Two tamper evident labels cover each HA port. Tamper evident labels #8 & #9 cover one HA port and tamper evident labels #10 & #11 cover the second HA port. Figure 24 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Bottom View: TEL 3, 4, 5 Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 35 of 63 Figure 25 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Front View: TEL 6-11 - The rear of the SRX4100 & SRX4200 require 2 tamper evident labels (TEL #12 and #13) as shown in Figure 26. Each label is applied on the power supply plate and wraps around the bottom. Figure 26 - SRX4100 & SRX4200 Rear View: TEL 12-13 ####### SRX4600 Fifteen tamper evident labels (TEL) must be applied to the following location: - The front of the SRX4600 has 4 HA ports, 1 USB port, and 2 Solid State Drives (SSDs) that must be protected with 8 tamper evident labels. - Referring to Figure 27 and Figure 28, the front panel requires 4 tamper evident labels (#1 - #4) cover the HA ports, 2 tamper evident labels cover the USB port and top screw (#5, #6), 1 tamper evident label (#7) to cover the first SSD, and 1 tamper evident label (#8) to cover the second SSD. Figure 27 - SRX4600 Front View: TEL 1 - 8 Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 36 of 63 Figure 28 - SRX4600 Top Front View: TEL 1, 3, 5, 7, 8 - The rear of the SRX4600 requires 7 tamper evident labels (TEL #9 -#15) as shown in Figure 29 TEL #9 and TEL #10 wrap over the top and cover the back plate of each power supply and the adjacent chassis edge. Each of TEL#11 to TEL #15 = wraps over the top and attaches to a fan cover. - The right and left sides have 1 TEL each (TEL 11 and 12) over the 4 th screw from the front and wrapping around to the bottom. Figures 6 & 7 show the placement of the side TELs. Figure 29 - SRX4600 Rear View: TEL 9-15 Figure 30 - SRX4600 Top Rear View: TEL 9 - 10 Figure 31 - SRX4600 Right Side View: TEL 12 Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 37 of 63 Figure 32 - SRX4600 Left Side View: TEL 11 - The bottom view (Figure 8) shows the TELs wrapping around from the front and sides of the SRX4600. Figure 33 - SRX4600 Bottom View: TEL 2, 4, 11, 12 Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 38 of 63 Tamper-evident seals shall be applied to the following locations: - Front Pane (10 seals, TEL 1-10). Two seals (2), Vertical Covering the screws on the information panel at the top of the device. Seven (7) seals, vertical, connection each expansion plane to its neighbors and the top and button plane to the chassis. One (1) seal, vertical covering the USB port. - Back Pane (8 seals TEL 11-18) Four (4) seals, vertical: one on each of the top four sub-panes, extending to the large chassis plate below. Two (2) seals, vertical: on the horizontal screwed-in plate resting on the large central chassis. Placed over screws. Two (2) seals, horizontal: placed on the low side sub-panes, extending to the large central chassis area and wrapping around to the neighbouring side panes. Figure 34 - SRX5400 Front View: TEL 1-10 Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 39 of 63 Figure 35 - SRX5400 Rear View: TEL 11-18 ####### SRX5600 Tamper-evident seals must be applied to the following locations: - Front Pane (11 seals, TEL 1-11) Nine (9) seals, vertical: one for each horizontal sub-pane (excluding the honeycomb plate on the top and the thin sub-pane a little below). The seals should attach to vertically adjacent subpanes. The extra on the bottom attaches to the lowermost sub-pane and wraps around attaching to the bottom pane. It should be ensured that one of the seals spans across the thin plate with ample extra distance on each side. Two (2) seals, horizontal attach to the uppermost sub-pane and wraps around attaching to the side panels of the chassis. - USB Port (1 seal, TEL 12) One (1) Seal, Vertical Covering the front USB port. - Back Pane (7 seals, TEL 13-18) Four (4) seals, vertical: one on each of the upper four sub-panes, attaching to the large plate below. Two (2) seals, horizontal: one on each of the vertical side sub-panes, extending to side the panes. One (1) Seal, Horizontal: connecting the small access pane on the lower right of the chassis to the main panel. Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 40 of 63 Figure 36 - SRX5600 Front View: TEL 1-11 Figure 37 - SRX5600 Rear View: TEL 12-20 Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 41 of 63 ####### SRX5800 Tamper-evident seals shall be applied to the following locations: - Front Panel (36 seals: TEL 1-36) Thirty (30) seals, horizontal: two on each of the long vertical sub-panes, extending to the neighboring two. If on an end sub-pane, seal should wrap around to the side. Three (3) seals, vertical: One over each of the thin panes - two near the bottom, one near the top of the lower half. Two (2) seals, vertical: both on the console area at the top of the module, one extending to the top and the other extending to the chassis area below. One (1) Seal, Diagonal covering the front USB port. - Back Pane (6 seals: TEL 37-42) Five (5) seals, horizontal: Three spanning the gaps between the vertical sub-panels, and then two more, one each on the far edges of the left and right panels. (These last two should wrap around to the sides.) Figure 38 - SRX5600 USB Port: TEL 21 Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 42 of 63 One (1) Seal, Vertical: At the top of the case connecting the DC system pane to the mesh fan cover. Figure 39 - SRX5800 Front View: TEL 1-36 Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 43 of 63 Figure 40 - SRX5800 Rear View: TEL 37-41 Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 44 of 63 Figure 41 - SRX5800 Rear View: TEL 37,39,40-42 ####### Surface Preparation: For all seal applications, the Cryptographic Officer should observe the following instructions: - Handle the seals with care. Do not touch the adhesive side. - Before applying a seal, ensure the location of application is clean, dry, and clear of any residue. - Place the seal on the module, applying firm pressure across it to ensure adhesion. Allow at least 1 hour for the adhesive to cure. Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 45 of 63 ####### Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: The Cryptographic Officer is responsible for securing and having control at all times of any unused seals. ## Part Numbers: Tamper seals have part number JNPR-FIPS-TAMPER-LBLS. Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 46 of 63 ## 8 Non-Invasive Security This section is not applicable, as there are currently no approved non-invasive mitigation techniques specified in ISO/IEC 19790:2012 Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 47 of 63 ## 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ### 9.1 Storage Areas The table below lists the areas within the module's cryptographic boundary where SSPs can be stored. Table 16: Storage Areas | Storage Area Name | Description | Persistence Type | |---------------------|----------------------|--------------------| | RAM | Random Access Memory | Dynamic | | SSD | Solid-Stated Drive | Dynamic | ### 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods The table below lists the method used by the module for the input and output of SSPs. Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods | Name | From | To | Format Type | Distribution Type | Entry Type | SFI or Algorithm | |-----------------------|--------------|-------------|---------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------------| | Entry via SSH | Remote CO | RAM | Encrypted | Automated | Electronic | KTS (SSH) | | Manual CLI entry | Local CO | RAM | Plaintext | Manual | Direct | | | Entry via console | Local CO | RAM | Plaintext | Manual | Electronic | | | Output via SSH | RAM | Remote CO | Encrypted | Automated | Electronic | KTS (SSH) | | Output via console | RAM | Local CO | Plaintext | Manual | Direct | | | Entry as part of KAS | Remote peer | RAM | Plaintext | Automated | Electronic | | | Output as part of KAS | RAM | Remote peer | Plaintext | Automated | Electronic | | | Pre-loaded | Manufacturer | SSD | Plaintext | Manual | Direct | | ### 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods | Zeroization Method | Description | Rationale | Operator Initiation | |----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Reset | Zeroisation of SSPs in RAM via invocation of local or remote reset service | RAM is volatile and all data is lost when power is taken off. Zeroisation is practically instantaneous. | Yes, both User and CO, via invocation of Local Reset or Remote Reset services | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 48 of 63 | Zeroization Method | Description | Rationale | Operator Initiation | |---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------| | Zeroize CLI command | These command wipe clean all the SSPs/configs as well as the disk and installs a factory default firmware image | This command overwrites all data on disk and forces a power cycle | Yes, CO via invocation of zeroize CLI command | | Explicit zeroize function | Zeroisation of SSPs in memory when no longer needed | Use of explicit zeroisation function destroys SSP information immediately by overwriting memory area with zeroes | No. The operator cannot directly initiate this method. | Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods The CO can run the following commands to zeroize the approved mode SSPs: - For the SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200 and SRX4600 models: user@host> request system zeroize hypervisor - For the SRX5400, SRX5600 and SRX5800 models: user@host> request vmhost zeroize These command wipe clean all the SSPs/configs as well as the disk and install a factory default firmware image. After zeroizing the system, the module is no longer in a FIPS compliant state. Installation and configuration as per section 11.1 is required to enter the FIPS compliant state and enable the Approved mode of operation. The Cryptographic Officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process. Zeroization commands, as described above, and power cycling are initiated by the operator. The module automatically zeroizes all SSPs when no longer required by calling explicit delete commands. Session termination is initiated by the operator or by environmental errors. The completion of zeroization is indicated implicitly. If the zeroization is initiated using a zeroization command or explicit delete command, completion of the command indicates that zeroization has successfully completed. If the zeroization is initiated by power cycling the module, then successful reboot of the module indicates that zeroization has completed successfully. In the case of zeroization initiated by session termination, SSPs are zeroized when the session terminates, and session termination is indicated in the log. ### 9.4 SSPs All SSPs used by the module are described in this section Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 49 of 63 | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generated By | Established By | Used By | |-------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------| | HMAC DRBG V value | A critical value of the internal state of DRBG per IG D.L | 256 - 256 | DRBG internal state - CSP | DRBG (Kernel) | | DRBG (Kernel) | | HMAC DRBG Key value | A critical value of the internal state of DRBG per IG D.L | 256 - 256 | DRBG internal state - CSP | DRBG (Kernel) | | DRBG (Kernel) | | HMAC DRBG Entropy Input | A critical value of the internal state of DRBG provided by entropy source | 256 - 256 | Entropy source output - CSP | ENT | | DRBG (Kernel) | | HMAC DRBG Seed | Seed material used to seed or reseed the HMAC DRBG | 256 - 256 | DRBG internal state - CSP | DRBG (Kernel) | | DRBG (Kernel) | | SSH-DH- Shared- Secret | Shared DH value computed from the ephemeral DH key-pairs as part of SSH and used to derive session keys. P-256, P-384 and P-521 | 256, 384, 521 - 128, 192, 256 | DH shared value - CSP | | KAS-SSC (SSH) | KDF (SSH) | | SSH-Priv | SSH host authentication key (ECDSA or RSA) | 2048, 256, 4096, 384, 521 - 112,128, 152, 192, 256 | Asymmetric private key - CSP | ECDSA KeyGen (PKID) RSA KeyGen (PKID) | | ECDSA SigGen (SSH) RSA SigGen (SSH) | | SSH-DH- priv | SSH DH private key used in SSH. P-256, P- 384 and P-521 | 256, 384, 521 - 128, 192, 256 | Asymmetric private key - CSP | KAS-ECC KeyGen (SSH) | | KAS-SSC (SSH) | | SSH-SEKs | Session keys used with SSH-2. | 128, 192, 256 - 128, 192, 256 | Symmetric Key - CSP | KDF (SSH) | | Enc/Dec (SSH) MAC (SSH) | | CO-PW | Password used to authenticate the CO | n/a - n/a | Authentication password - CSP | | KTS (SSH) | SHA (LibMD) | | User-PW | Password used to authenticate the User. | n/a - n/a | Authentication password - CSP | | KTS (SSH) | | | SSH-PUB | SSH Public Host Key | 2048, 256, 4096, 384, 521 - | Asymmetric key - PSP | ECDSA KeyGen (PKID) | | | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 50 of 63 Table 19: SSP Table 1 | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generated By | Established By | Used By | |--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------| | | | 112,128, 152, 192, 256 | | RSA KeyGen (PKID) | | | | Auth-User Pub | SSH User Authentication Public Key | 2048, 256, 4096, 384, 521 - 112,128, 152, 192, 256 | Asymmetric key - PSP | | KTS (SSH) | ECDSA SigVer (SSH) RSA SigVer (SSH) | | Root-CA | JuniperRootCA. Used to verify the validity of the PackagCA | 256, 384 - 128, 196 | Asymmetric key - PSP | | | Verify image | | Package- CA | Certificate that holds the public key of the signing key that was used to generate all the signatures used on the packages and signatures lists. | 256 - 128 | Asymmetric key - PSP | | | Verify image | | SSH-DH- PUB (self) | SSH DH public key used for key establishment. P-256, P-384 and P-521 | 256, 384, 521 - 128, 192, 256 | Asymmetric key - PSP | KAS-ECC KeyGen (SSH) | | KAS-SSC (SSH) | | SSH-DH- PUB (peer) | SSH DH public keys provided by protocol peer device and used with SSH for key establishment. P-256, P-384 and P-521. | 2048, 256, 4096, 384, 521 - 112,128, 152, 192, 256 | Asymmetric key - PSP | | | KAS-SSC (SSH) | | Auth-CO Pub | SSH CO Authentication Public Key | 2048, 256, 4096, 384, 521 - 112,128, 152, 192, 256 | Asymmetric key - PSP | | | ECDSA SigVer (SSH) RSA SigVer (SSH) | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 51 of 63 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |-------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------| | HMAC DRBG V value | | RAM:Plaintext | Until updated by HMAC_DRBG_Update() | Reset | | | HMAC DRBG Key value | | RAM:Plaintext | Until updated by HMAC_DRBG_Update() | Reset | | | HMAC DRBG Entropy Input | | RAM:Plaintext | Until HMAC_Instantiate_Update() or HMAC_DRBG_Reseed() complete | Reset Explicit zeroize function | | | HMAC DRBG Seed | | RAM:Plaintext | Until HMAC_Instantiate_Update() or HMAC_DRBG_Reseed() complete | Reset Explicit zeroize function | | | SSH-DH- Shared- Secret | | RAM:Plaintext | Until SSH session termination | Reset Explicit zeroize function | | | SSH-Priv | | RAM:Plaintext SSD:Plaintext | Until SSH session termination | Reset Zeroize CLI command Explicit zeroize function | | | SSH-DH- priv | | RAM:Plaintext | Until SSH session termination | Reset Explicit zeroize function | | | SSH-SEKs | | RAM:Plaintext | Until SSH session termination | Reset Explicit zeroize function | | | CO-PW | Manual CLI entry Entry via SSH Entry via console | SSD:Encrypted RAM:Plaintext | Until authentication session termination | Zeroize CLI command | | | User-PW | Manual CLI entry Entry via SSH Entry via console | RAM:Plaintext SSD:Obfuscated | Until authentication session termination | Zeroize CLI command | | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 52 of 63 Table 20: SSP Table 2 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |--------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------| | SSH-PUB | Output via console Output as part of | SSD:Plaintext | | Zeroize CLI command | | | Auth-User Pub | Entry via SSH Entry via console | SSD:Plaintext | | Zeroize CLI command | | | Root-CA | Pre-loaded | SSD:Plaintext | | Zeroize CLI command | | | Package-CA | Pre-loaded | SSD:Plaintext | | Zeroize CLI command | | | SSH-DH- PUB (self) | Output as part of KAS | RAM:Plaintext | Until SSH session termination | Reset Explicit zeroize function | | | SSH-DH- PUB (peer) | Entry as part of KAS | RAM:Plaintext | Until SSH session termination | Reset Explicit zeroize function | | | Auth-CO Pub | Entry via SSH Entry via console | | | Zeroize CLI command | | ### 9.5 Transitions The following transitions apply to algorithms used by this module: SHA-1: The SHA-1 hash algorithm will be non-Approved for all cryptographic purposes after December 31, 2030. Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 53 of 63 ## 10 Self-Tests On power up or reset, the module performs the pre-operational self-tests and the indicated conditional cryptographic algorithm self-tests described below. All KATs must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the module. The algorithms utilized in the pre-operational firmware integrity test must pass their own CASTs prior to the Integrity Test. ### 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | |--------------------------|----------------------------|---------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Firmware Integrity check | ECDSA P- 256 with SHA2-256 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | PASS/FAIL console output | ECDSA Verify | | Critical functions test | SHA2-256 | KAT | Critical Function | PASS/FAIL console output | The module implements a critical function that checks that any file that is executed is registered in a manifest of executable files that comes with the firmware. A pre- operational critical function test is implemented that verifies the integrity of the operational environment is being enforced by having the kernel attempt to run a specific executable file that does not contain a hash in the manifest file. The test is successful if it verifies that the specific file cannot be executed. | ### 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |-----------------------------|--------------------------|---------------|-------------|-------------------------------------------|------------|--------------| | Entropy Source (start- up) | n/a | APT, RCT | CAST | Console output / output of entropy source | Start-up | On power-up | | Entropy Source (continuous) | n/a | APT, RCT | CAST | Console output / output of entropy source | Continuous | On power-up | | AES-CBC (A3693) Encrypt | Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Encrypt | On power-up | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 54 of 63 | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------------|--------------| | AES-CBC (A3693) Decrypt | Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Decrypt | On power-up | | AES-CTR (A3693) Encrypt | Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Encrypt | On power-up | | AES-CTR (A3693) Decrypt | Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Decrypt | On power-up | | HMAC DRBG (A3693) | SHA2-256 | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Instantiate, reseed, and generate. | On power-up | | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A3610) | P-256 (SHA 256) P-384 (SHA 384) P- 521 (SHA 512) | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Derivation of the expected shared secret | On power-up | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (A3693) | P-256, P-384, P-521 | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Sign | On power-up | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A3693) | P-256, P-384, P-521 | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Verify | On power-up | | HMAC-SHA-1 (A3693) | Key size: 160 bits, = 160 | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | MAC | On power-up | | HMAC-SHA2- 256 (A3693) | Key size: 256 bits, = 256 | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | MAC | On power-up | | HMAC-SHA2- 512 (A3693) | Key size: 512 bits, = 512 | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | MAC | On power-up | | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (A3693) | RSA 2048 w/ SHA2-256, RSA 4096 w/ SHA2- 256 | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Sign | On power-up | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A3693) | RSA 2048 w/ SHA2-256, RSA 4096 w/ SHA2- 256 | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Verify | On power-up | | SHA-1 (A3693) | n/a | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Hash | On power-up | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 55 of 63 | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |-------------------------|----------------------------|---------------|-------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|--------------| | SHA2-256 (A3693) | n/a | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Hash | On power-up | | SHA2-384 (A3693) | n/a | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Hash | On power-up | | SHA2-512 (A3693) | n/a | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Hash | On power-up | | KDF SSH (A4271) | SHA-1, SHA2- 256, SHA2-384 | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Key derivation | On power-up | | SHA-1 (A3367) | n/a | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Hash | On power-up | | SHA2-256 (A3367) | n/a | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Hash | On power-up | | SHA2-512 (A3367) | n/a | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Hash | On power-up | | HMAC-SHA-1 (A3367) | Key size: 160 bits, = 160 | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | MAC | On power-up | | HMAC-SHA2- 256 (A3367) | Key size: 256 bits, = 256 | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | MAC | On power-up | | HMAC DRBG (A3493) | SHA2-256 | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Health-tests initialise, re- seed, and generate | On power-up | | AES-CBC (A3493) Encrypt | Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Encrypt | On power-up | | AES-CBC (A3493) Decrypt | Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Decrypt | On power-up | | HMAC-SHA-1 (A3493) | Key size:160 bits, = 160 | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | MAC | On power-up | | HMAC-SHA2- 256 (A3493) | Key size:256 bits, = 256 | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | MAC | On power-up | | SHA-1 (A3493) | n/a | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Hash | On power-up | | SHA2-256 (A3493) | n/a | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Hash | On power-up | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 56 of 63 Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |----------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|--------------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------| | SHA2-512 (A3361) | n/a | KAT | CAST | PASS/FAIL console output | Hash | On power-up | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (A3693) | P-256, P-384, P-521 | PCT | PCT | Returned key/transition soft error state | Generation and Verification of ECDSA signature | On key generation | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (A3693) | RSA 2048, RSA 4096 | PCT | PCT | Returned key/transition soft error state | Generation and Verification of signature | On key generation | | FW load | ECDSA P-256 with SHA2-256 | KAT | SW/FW Load | PASS/FAIL console output | Verification of ECDSA signature on FW | On FW load | | Manual SSP entry | - | Duplicate entry | Manual Entry | PASS/FAIL console output | Duplicate entry | On manual, direct entry of SSP | ### 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |--------------------------|---------------|-------------------|-----------|-------------------| | Firmware Integrity check | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On demand | Manually | | Critical functions test | KAT | Critical Function | On demand | Manually | Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |-----------------------------|---------------|-------------|------------|-------------------| | Entropy Source (start-up) | APT, RCT | CAST | On demand | Manually | | Entropy Source (continuous) | APT, RCT | CAST | Continuous | Automatically | | AES-CBC (A3693) Encrypt | KAT | CAST | On demand | Manually | | AES-CBC (A3693) Decrypt | KAT | CAST | On demand | Manually | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 57 of 63 | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |----------------------------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------| | AES-CTR (A3693) Encrypt | KAT | CAST | On demand | Manually | | AES-CTR (A3693) Decrypt | KAT | CAST | On demand | Manually | | HMAC DRBG (A3693) | KAT | CAST | On demand | Manually | | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A3610) | KAT | CAST | On demand | Manually | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (A3693) | KAT | CAST | On demand | Manually | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A3693) | KAT | CAST | On demand | Manually | | HMAC-SHA-1 (A3693) | KAT | CAST | On demand | Manually | | HMAC-SHA2-256 (A3693) | KAT | CAST | On demand | Manually | | HMAC-SHA2-512 (A3693) | KAT | CAST | On demand | Manually | | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (A3693) | KAT | CAST | On demand | Manually | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A3693) | KAT | CAST | On demand | Manually | | SHA-1 (A3693) | KAT | CAST | On demand | Manually | | SHA2-256 (A3693) | KAT | CAST | On demand | Manually | | SHA2-384 (A3693) | KAT | CAST | On demand | Manually | | SHA2-512 (A3693) | KAT | CAST | On demand | Manually | | KDF SSH (A4271) | KAT | CAST | On demand | Manually | | SHA-1 (A3367) | KAT | CAST | On demand | Manually | | SHA2-256 (A3367) | KAT | CAST | On demand | Manually | | SHA2-512 (A3367) | KAT | CAST | On demand | Manually | | HMAC-SHA-1 (A3367) | KAT | CAST | On power-up | Manually | | HMAC-SHA2-256 (A3367) | KAT | CAST | On power-up | Manually | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 58 of 63 Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |----------------------------------|-----------------|--------------|----------------------|-------------------| | HMAC DRBG (A3493) | KAT | CAST | On power-up | Manually | | AES-CBC (A3493) Encrypt | KAT | CAST | On power-up | Manually | | AES-CBC (A3493) Decrypt | KAT | CAST | On power-up | Manually | | HMAC-SHA-1 (A3493) | KAT | CAST | On power-up | Manually | | HMAC-SHA2-256 (A3493) | KAT | CAST | On power-up | Manually | | SHA-1 (A3493) | KAT | CAST | On power-up | Manually | | SHA2-256 (A3493) | KAT | CAST | On power-up | Manually | | SHA2-512 (A3361) | KAT | CAST | On power-up | Manually | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (A3693) | PCT | PCT | On condition trigger | Automatic | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (A3693) | PCT | PCT | On condition trigger | Automatic | | FW load | KAT | SW/FW Load | On FW load request | Automatic | | Manual SSP entry | Duplicate entry | Manual Entry | On condition trigger | Automatic | ### 10.4 Error States Table 25: Error States | Name | Description | Conditions | Recovery Method | Indicator | |------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------| | Critical Failure state | The cryptographic module ceases to perform cryptographic operations, inhibits all data output, and provides status of the error via syslog messages and console status output | On pre-operational self-test or CAST failure | Power cycle | Console status output | | Soft Error State | A non-critical self-test failure occurs, causing a failure of the triggering operation | PCT, firmware load test, continuous entropy health test failure | The module processes the error, and resumes normal operation | Console displays error | Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 59 of 63 The module enters Critical Failure State upon failure of any pre-operational self-tests or CAST, causing the kernel to 'panic' and all execution to halt. The only way to exit from this state is to reboot the module, which causes the self-tests to be repeated and pass successfully before the corresponding algorithms are usable. ### 10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests Self-tests that are performed at power-up are available on demand by power cycling the module. Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 60 of 63 ## 11 Life-Cycle Assurance ### 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures Before installation of module firmware, CO must first zeroize any module SSPs by following the instructions in Section 9.3. Once zeroization is complete, the CO must install the JUNOS firmware image on the device using the following CLI command: CO@host> request system software add /<image-path>/<image-filename> no-copy no-validate reboot. The image-filenames for the validated firmware are as follows: - SRX1500: junos-srxentedge-x86-64-22.2R3-S1.9.tgz; - SRX4100 and SRX4200: junos-srxmr-x86-64-22.2R3-S1.9.tgz; - SRX4600: junos-srxhe-x86-64-22.2R3-S1.9.tgz; and - SRX5400, SRX5600 and SRX5800: junos-vmhost-install-srx-x86-64-22.2R3-S1.9.tgz. Once the image is installed, the CO shall follow the instructions in Section 7.2 to apply the tamper seals to the module. Next, the CO shall proceed as follows: 1. Enable the approved mode on the device. 2. Set the root password. user@host# set system root-authentication plain-text-password 3. Commit and reboot the device. ``` CO@host> set system fips level 2 ``` ``` New password: ``` ``` CO@host# commit ``` Once the module is rebooted and the integrity and self-tests have run successfully on initial power-on in, the module is operating in the approved mode of operation. The CO must create a backup image of the firmware to ensure it is also a approved mode Junos OS image by issuing the request system snapshot command. The show version command will display the version of the Junos OS on the device so that the CO can confirm it is the FIPS validated version. The CO should also verify the presence of the suffix string ':fips' in the cli prompt, indicating the module is operating in approved mode. IPsec, High Availability and TLS features are not enabled by default and must not be enabled for FIPS compliant usage of the module. . Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 61 of 63 ### 11.2 Administrator Guidance The Cryptographic Officer is the person responsible for enabling, configuring, monitoring, and maintaining the module in approved mode. The Cryptographic Officer securely installs Junos OS on the device, enables the approved of operation, establishes keys and passwords for other users and software modules, and initializes the device before network connection. The Cryptographic Officer can configure and monitor the module through a console or SSH connection. ### 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance No specific non-administrator guidance is required to operate the module. ### 11.4 Design and Rules The module design corresponds to the security rules below. The term must in this context specifically refers to a requirement for correct usage of the module in the approved mode; all other statements indicate a security rule implemented by the module. 1. The module clears previous authentications on power cycle. 2. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action. 3. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states. 4. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module. 5. There are no restrictions on which SSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service. 6. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role. 7. The module does not output intermediate key values. 8. The module requires two independent internal actions to be performed prior to outputting plaintext CSPs. 9. The cryptographic officer must determine whether firmware being loaded is a legacy use of the firmware load service. 10. The cryptographic officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process. 11. IPsec, High Availability and TLS features must not be enabled. ### 11.5 Maintenance Requirements No special maintenance requirements apply. ### 11.6 End of Life When disposing of the cryptographic module, the CO shall perform the zeroize command described in Section 9.3. Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 62 of 63 ## 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks The module does not implement mechanisms to mitigate other attacks beyond what is described in this security policy. Juniper Networks Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy Page 63 of 63