

Google, LLC

Tensor G2 UFS Inline Storage Encryption Cryptographic Module

FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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1 General

1.1 Overview

This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the Tensor G2 UFS Inline Storage Encryption Cryptographic Module. It contains a specification of the rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for a Security Level 1 Software-Hybrid cryptographic module. This security policy is for the validation of the Tensor G2 UFS Inline Storage Encryption Cryptographic Module.

In this document, the terms “Tensor G2 UFS Inline Storage Encryption Cryptographic Module”, “cryptographic module” or “module” are used interchangeably to refer to the Tensor G2 UFS Inline Storage Encryption Cryptographic Module with Software version 1.2.0 and Hardware version 4.1.0.

1.2 Security Levels

Section	Title	Security Level
1	General	1
2	Cryptographic module specification	1
3	Cryptographic module interfaces	1
4	Roles, services, and authentication	1
5	Software/Firmware security	1
6	Operational environment	1
7	Physical security	1
8	Non-invasive security	N/A
9	Sensitive security parameter management	1
10	Self-tests	1
11	Life-cycle assurance	1
12	Mitigation of other attacks	N/A
	Overall Level	1

Table 1: Security Levels

2 Cryptographic Module Specification

2.1 Description

Purpose and Use:

The module is a multi-chip standalone Software-Hybrid module designed for on-the-fly hardware encryption for a flash storage device. The module’s cryptographic boundary includes the following components:

- UFS Pixel FIPS CMVP Module (Module’s Software Component, version 1.2.0)
- UFS ISE (Module’s Hardware Component, version 4.1.0)

The UFS Pixel FIPS CMVP Module (hereafter referred to as ISE Driver) is the software component of the cryptographic module running in the Linux Kernel, which calls the

cryptographic algorithms for the module's pre-operational self-tests, and also sets the FIPS status of the entire cryptographic module once the pre-operational self-test is completed successfully.

The UFS ISE is the hardware component of the cryptographic module that supports AES-XTS encryption and decryption. This hardware resides in the Google Tensor G2 processor, located between the device's DRAM and the Flash Storage Device so it can provide inline encryption/decryption while maintaining device performance (such as responsiveness and power consumption). Please see Figures 1, 2 and 3 below for more information.

Module Type: Software-hybrid

Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone

Cryptographic Boundary:

Tensor G2 UFS Inline Storage Encryption Cryptographic Module is defined as a multi-chip standalone software-hybrid module, with the boundary of the Tested Operational Environment's Physical Perimeter (TOEPP) being defined as the physical perimeter of the tested platform enclosure around which everything runs. Figure 1 below illustrates a logical cryptographic boundary and physical boundary of the module. The module's cryptographic boundary contains module's executable file ufs-pixel-fips140.ko. The module is intended only for single-process execution.

Tested Operational Environment's Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):

The boundary of the TOEPP is defined as the entire chassis unit's physical perimeter encompassing the "top," "front," "left," "right," "rear" and "bottom" surfaces of the tested platform.

In the following figures, the bidirectional arrows depict the flow of the status, control and data within the device's Tested Operational Environment's Physical Perimeter (TOEPP). The TOEPP in the block diagram contains the module (the blue dotted region). The operations within the module's cryptographic boundary (the blue dotted region) use the cipher from the UFS ISE (Module's hardware component) that is included in the module's cryptographic boundary. The UFS Pixel FIPS CMVP Module (Module's software component) is only used at module's initialization to perform the pre-operational self-tests.

Tested Operational Environment Physical Perimeter (TOEPP)




Figure 1. Module's Block Diagram




Figure 2. Tested Platform Physical Perimeter




Figure 3. Module's Hardware Block Diagram

2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification

Tested Module Identification – Hardware:

N/A for this module.

Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):

Package or File Name	Software/ Firmware Version	Features	Integrity Test
ufs-pixel-fips140.ko	1.2.0		HMAC-SHA-256

Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)

Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:

Model and/or Part Number	Hardware Version	Firmware Version	Processors	Features
Google Pixel 7	4.1.0		Google Tensor G2	

Table 3: Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware

Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:

Operating System	Hardware Platform	Processors	PAA/PAI	Hypervisor or Host OS	Version(s)
Linux Kernel 5.10	Google Pixel 7	Google Tensor G2	Yes	N/A	1.2.0

Table 4: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid

Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:

N/A for this module.

CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.

2.3 Excluded Components

There are no components within the cryptographic boundary excluded from the FIPS 140-3 Requirements.

2.4 Modes of Operation

Modes List and Description:

Mode Name	Description	Type	Status Indicator
Approved Mode of Operation	The module is always in the approved mode of operation.	Approved	Equivalent to the indicator of the requested service as defined in section 4.3

Table 5: Modes List and Description

The module always runs in the Approved Mode of Operation and does not implement any Non-Approved Security Functions. The module doesn't support degraded operational mode.

2.5 Algorithms

Approved Algorithms:

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-CBC	A2937	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0	A2937	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 256 Payload Length - Payload Length: 128-32768 Increment 128 Tweak Mode - Number Data Unit Length Matches Payload Length - Yes	SP 800-38E
HMAC-SHA2-256	A2938	MAC - MAC: 32-256 Increment 8 Key Length - Key Length: 8-2048 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
SHA2-256	A2938	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4

Table 6: Approved Algorithms

Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:

N/A for this module.

Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:

N/A for this module.

Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:

N/A for this module.

Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:

N/A for this module.

2.6 Security Function Implementations

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
AES-XTS encrypt/decrypt	BC-UnAuth	Perform AES-XTS encryption or decryption		AES-CBC: (A2937) AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0: (A2937)
Firmware Integrity	MAC	Firmware Integrity Test		HMAC-SHA2-256: (A2938) SHA2-256: (A2938)

Table 7: Security Function Implementations

2.7 Algorithm Specific Information

The length of a single data unit encrypted with the XTS-AES shall not exceed 2^{20} AES blocks, that is, 16 MiB of data.

To meet the requirement stated in IG C.I, the module implements a check that ensures, before performing any cryptographic operation, that the two AES keys used in AES XTS mode are not identical. As the module does not generate symmetric keys, the check is performed when keys are input the service APIs. Key_1 and Key_2 shall be generated and/or established independently according to the rules for component symmetric keys from NIST SP 800-133rev2, Sec. 6.3.

The XTS mode shall only be used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices. It shall not be used for other purposes, such as the encryption of data in transit.

2.8 RBG and Entropy

N/A for this module.

2.9 Key Generation

The module does not provide any key generation service or perform any key generation for any of its Approved algorithms. Keys are instead provided by third party applications and stored in memory location outside of the cryptographic module boundary (i.e., within a DMA descriptor located in memory within the Tested Operational Environment's Physical Perimeter (TOEPP) of the tested platform). The module does not support any key establishment methods or asymmetric algorithms and hence no key generation services for them.

2.10 Key Establishment

The module does not support manual key entry or key output. SSP (AES-XTS Key is the only SSP) can only be exchanged via the TOEPP of the device. SSP is entered to module per the request from the module's calling application running on the same tested platform. Keys/SSPs are electronically entered into the module via Module's API in plaintext form. The Module doesn't output the SSPs.

2.11 Industry Protocols

The module doesn't implement Industry Protocols.

3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces

3.1 Ports and Interfaces

Physical Port	Logical Interface(s)	Data That Passes
DMA FIFO Interface, DMA CTRL Interface	Data Input	Arguments for an API call that provide the data to be used or processed by the module
DMA FIFO Interface, DMA CTRL Interface	Data Output	Output data returned to calling function

Physical Port	Logical Interface(s)	Data That Passes
DMA CTRL Interface	Control Input	Arguments for an API call used to control and configure module operation
DMA CTRL Interface	Status Output	Return values from the Module's API used to obtain information on the status of the module. The Status Output Interface also includes the log file where the module messages are output
Power Interface	Power	Module's hardware component power supply
N/A	Control Output	N/A

Table 8: Ports and Interfaces

The module provides its logical interfaces via Application Programming Interface (API) calls. The logical interfaces provided by the module are mapped onto the FIPS 140-3 interfaces (data input, data output, control input, control output and status output).

4 Roles, Services, and Authentication

4.1 Authentication Methods

N/A for this module.

N/A for this module. The module does not implement authentication.

4.2 Roles

Name	Type	Operator Type	Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer	Role	Crypto Officer	None

Table 9: Roles

The module supports Crypto Officer (CO). The cryptographic module does not provide any authentication methods. The module does not allow concurrent operators. The Crypto Officer is implicitly assumed based on the service requested.

4.3 Approved Services

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
Show Version	API Command to get module's version	N/A	API Command to get module's version	Module's ID and component's versions (SW and HW)	None	Crypto Officer

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
Show Status	Provide Module's current status	N/A	API Command to check the status	Module's current operational status	None	Crypto Officer
Perform Self-Tests	perform Self-Tests (Pre-Operational self-tests and Conditional Self-Tests)	N/A	On-Demand Self-Test (Power cycling)	Pass/Fail status Note: Return value of 1 for success; Failure results in panic to kernel	Firmware Integrity	Crypto Officer
Perform AES-XTS encryption and decryption	Perform AES-XTS encryption and decryption	Symmetric encryption and decryption successful completion status	Key and message (plaintext message for Encryption or ciphertext for decryption)	Encrypted message or Decrypted message	AES-XTS encrypt/decrypt	Crypto Officer - AES-XTS Key: W,E
Perform Zeroization	Perform Zeroization	N/A	Power down the tested platform	Zeroized all SSPs stored in the hardware registers	None	Crypto Officer - AES-XTS Key: Z

Table 10: Approved Services

4.4 Non-Approved Services

N/A for this module. The module does not implement any non-approved, not allowed algorithms; therefore, it also does not provide any non-approved services.

4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded

The module doesn't support external software load service.

5 Software/Firmware Security

5.1 Integrity Techniques

To ensure software security, a software integrity test is performed on the runtime image of the module. The HMAC-SHA2-256 (HMAC Cert. #A2938) implemented in the module is used as an approved algorithm for the integrity test. If the test fails, the module enters an error state where no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited. The module is provided in the form of binary executable code.

5.2 Initiate on Demand

Software Integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-operational self-tests. It is automatically executed at power-on. Thus, it can be invoked by rebooting the tested platform.

6 Operational Environment

6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements

Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable

The module operates in a modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-3 Security Level 1 Specifications. The operating system is restricted to a single operator mode of operation. The procurement, build and configuring procedure are controlled. The module is installed into a commercial production grade mobile device. The external application that makes calls to the cryptographic module is the single instance of the cryptographic module, even when the application is serving multiple clients.

7 Physical Security

7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required

Mechanism	Inspection Frequency	Inspection Guidance
Production grade components	N/A	N/A

Table 11: Mechanisms and Actions Required

The Module is a software-hybrid module that operates on a multi-chip standalone platform, which conforms to the Level 1 requirements for physical security. All disjoint components of the module are entirely contained within the production-grade enclosure of the host platform, which blocks physical access to the module. The tested platform (mobile device) shall comprise production grade components with standard passivation (a sealing coat applied over the chip circuitry to protect it against environmental and other physical damage) and a production grade enclosure that completely surrounds the cryptographic module.

8 Non-Invasive Security

The requirements of this section are not applicable to the module.

9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management

9.1 Storage Areas

Storage Area Name	Description	Persistence Type
Hardware Register	Volatile Memory on the Module's hardware component	Dynamic

Table 12: Storage Areas

The module does not provide persistent keys/SSPs storage. After the SSP (AES-XTS Key is the only SSP) is entered to the module via the Module's API, the module temporarily stores it in the Module's hardware register. The Module's hardware register is internal to the hardware module and is not shared with any external component (operating system or other hardware). No process other than the module itself can access the keys/SSPs in its memory.

9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods

Name	From	To	Format Type	Distribution Type	Entry Type	SFI or Algorithm
API Input via TOEPP path	Calling Applications (App per IG 9.5.A)	Hardware Register	Plaintext	Manual	Electronic	

Table 13: SSP Input-Output Methods

The module does not support manual key entry or key output. SSP (AES-XTS Key is the only SSP) can only be exchanged via a DMA descriptor inside the TOEPP of the device. All SSPs are entered to module per the request from the module's calling application running on the same tested platform. Keys/SSPs are electronically entered into the module via Module's API in plaintext form. The Module doesn't output the SSPs.

9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods

Zeroization Method	Description	Rationale	Operator Initiation
Power Down	Power down the tested platform	Power down the tested platform will erase all SSPs stored within the module	Power down the tested platform

Table 14: SSP Zeroization Methods

All SSPs are zeroized when the system is powered down. Input and output interfaces are inhibited while zeroization is performed. The successful act of powering off the module serves as the implicit indicator of zeroization.

9.4 SSPs

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
AES-XTS Key	Used for Symmetric Encryption and Decryption	256-bits - 256-bits	XTS Symmetric Key - CSP			AES-XTS encrypt/decrypt

Table 15: SSP Table 1

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
AES-XTS Key	API Input via TOEPP path	Hardware Register:Plaintext	While the module is active	Power Down	

Table 16: SSP Table 2

10 Self-Tests

10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A2938)	HAMC-SHA2-256	KAT	SW/FW Integrity	Module is in normal operation	Module performs HMAC-SHA2-256 self-test prior to firmware integrity test

Table 17: Pre-Operational Self-Tests

When the module is loaded or instantiated (after being powered off, rebooted, etc.), the module runs pre-operational self-tests. The operating system is responsible for the initialization process and loading of the library. The module is designed with a default entry point (DEP) which ensures that the self-tests are initiated automatically when the module is loaded. Prior to the module providing any data output via the data output interface, the module would perform and pass the pre-operational self-tests. Following the successful pre-operational self-tests, the module would execute the Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests (CASTs).

The self-test success or failure is output as a return value of the library load API call, which is functioning as the self-test status indicator. If one of the self-tests fails, the module transitions into an error state and outputs the error message via the module's status output interface. While the module is in the error state, all data through the data output interface and all cryptographic operations are disabled. The error state can only be cleared by reloading the module. All self-tests must be completed successfully before the module transitions to the operational state.

The module software integrity test parameters are configured at build time and then executed at runtime. As the module supports KASLR and is not loaded as a contiguous block, a series of

begin/end addresses (`__fips140_text_start/__fips140_text_end` and `__fips140_rodata_start/__fips140_rodata_end`) are used to determine the code that must be checked. The HMAC value (`ufs_pixel_fips_hmac_key`) of that code is then calculated when building the ELF, storing the calculated digest (`ufs_pixel_fips_hmac_expected`) in the module. The driver is a kernel loadable module included in the vendor image for the kernel and loaded once the ramdisk holding all the kernel modules has been unpacked into memory. Once the module is loaded, the HMAC-SHA2-256 is calculated over the entire area specified as part of the build process. This is then compared to the stored value (`ufs_pixel_fips_hmac_expected`) from the build time calculation. A non-match will place the module into the error state.

The Module conducts HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT self-test before the integrity test is performed.

10.2 Conditional Self-Tests

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
AES-XTS KAT (A2937)	256-bits	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	AES-XTS Encrypt/Decrypt	Power Up
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT (A2938)	HMAC-SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT	Power Up

Table 18: Conditional Self-Tests

The module conducts the CASTs before the first operational use of the cryptographic algorithm.

10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A2938)	KAT	SW/FW Integrity	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot the tested platform

Table 19: Pre-Operational Periodic Information

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
AES-XTS KAT (A2937)	KAT	CAST	Recommend every 60 Days	Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT (A2938)	KAT	CAST	Recommend every 60 Days	Reboot

Table 20: Conditional Periodic Information

The module performs on-demand self-tests initiated by the operator, by powering off and powering the module back on. The full suite of self-tests is then executed. The same procedure may be employed by the operator to perform periodic self-tests.

10.4 Error States

Name	Description	Conditions	Recovery Method	Indicator
Error State	If the self-test tests fail, the module is put into an error state	Self-test failure	Reboot the module	System Halt

Table 21: Error States

In the Error State, the output interface is inhibited, and the module accepts no more inputs or requests (as the module is no longer running).

11 Life-Cycle Assurance

11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures

The module is enabled by default (and hence used automatically) as part of the device without any user configuration. The module always runs in the Approved Mode of Operation and does not implement any Non-Approved Security Functions. When the module is loaded or instantiated (after being powered off, rebooted, etc.), the module runs pre-operational self-tests without any operator intervention. The Module will be operated in an approved mode of operation when pre-operational self-tests have completed successfully.

The module is provided directly to solution developers and is not intended for direct download by the general public. The module is installed on an operating system (Linux kernel 5.10) specified in Section 2.

Additional Rules of Operation:

1. The module does not support concurrent operators.
2. The operating system is responsible for multitasking operations so that other processes cannot access the address space of the process containing the module.
3. The end user of the operating system is also responsible for zeroizing SSPs via wipe/secure delete procedures.

11.2 Administrator Guidance

N/A for this module.

11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance

N/A for this module.

12 Mitigation of Other Attacks

The module does not support Mitigation of Other Attacks. Thus, the security requirements from Section Mitigation of Other Attacks in FIPS 140-3 are not applicable.