Juniper Networks EX4600, QFX5100 and QFX5200 Ethernet Switches
with JUNOS 18.1R1
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy
Version 1.0
12 July 2019
Juniper Networks, Inc.
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, California 94089
USA
408.745.2000
1.888 JUNIPER
www.juniper.net
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................................ 5
1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary............................................................................................. 8
1.2 Mode of Operation........................................................................................................................................... 12
1.3 Zeroization......................................................................................................................................................... 12
2 Cryptographic Functionality...............................................................................................................................13
2.1 Approved Algorithms........................................................................................................................................ 13
2.2 Allowed Algorithms .......................................................................................................................................... 16
2.3 Allowed Protocols............................................................................................................................................. 16
2.4 Disallowed Algorithms...................................................................................................................................... 16
2.5 Critical Security Parameters............................................................................................................................. 17
3 Roles, Authentication and Services....................................................................................................................20
3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles............................................................................................ 20
3.2 Authentication Methods.................................................................................................................................. 20
3.3 Services.............................................................................................................................................................. 21
3.4 Non-Approved Services.................................................................................................................................... 24
4 Self-Tests ...........................................................................................................................................................25
5 Security Rules and Guidance..............................................................................................................................27
6 References and Definitions................................................................................................................................28
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List of Figures
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations......................................................................................................................... 5
Table 2 - Security Level of Security Requirements ...................................................................................................................... 6
Table 3 - Ports and Interfaces..................................................................................................................................................... 10
Table 4 - Ports and Interfaces..................................................................................................................................................... 11
Table 5 – Kernel Cryptographic Functions.................................................................................................................................. 13
Table 6 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions............................................................................................................ 14
Table 7 – LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions................................................................................................................ 15
Table 8 - Allowed Cryptographic Functions................................................................................................................................ 16
Table 9 - Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode.................................................................................................................................. 16
Table 10 - Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)........................................................................................................................... 17
Table 11 – Public keys.................................................................................................................................................................. 19
Table 12 - Authenticated Services .............................................................................................................................................. 21
Table 13 – Unauthenticated Traffic ............................................................................................................................................ 21
Table 14 - CSP Access Rights within Services............................................................................................................................. 22
Table 15: Public Key Access Rights within Services ................................................................................................................... 23
Table 16 - Authenticated Services .............................................................................................................................................. 24
Table 17 - Unauthenticated traffic.............................................................................................................................................. 24
Table 18– References................................................................................................................................................................... 28
Table 19 – Acronyms and Definitions......................................................................................................................................... 30
Table 20 – Datasheets.................................................................................................................................................................. 31
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List of Figures
Figure 1 QFX5100-24Q................................................................................................................................................................... 8
Figure 2 QFX5100-48S and QFX5100-48SH.................................................................................................................................. 8
Figure 3 QFX5100-48T and QFX5100-TH...................................................................................................................................... 8
Figure 4 QFX5100-96S.................................................................................................................................................................... 9
Figure 5 EX4600-40F ...................................................................................................................................................................... 9
Figure 6 QFX5200-32C ................................................................................................................................................................... 9
Figure 7 QFX5200-48y.................................................................................................................................................................. 10
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1 Introduction
The Juniper Networks QFX series switches are high performance, high density data center switches. The QFX switches
provide high performance, wire speed switching with low latency and jitter. The QFX series switches provide the
universal building blocks for multiple data center fabric architectures.
This Security Policy covers the following Ethernet switch models:
• QFX5100
• EX4600
• QFX5200
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Juniper Networks EX4600, QFX5100 and QFX5200
Ethernet Switches Cryptographic Modules from Juniper Networks. It provides detailed information relating to each of
the FIPS 140-2 security requirements relevant to Juniper Networks EX4600, QFX5100 and QFX5200 Ethernet Switches
Cryptographic Modules along with instructions on how to run the modules in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode.
All three models run Junos OS firmware. The validated version of firmware is Junos OS 18.1 R1; the image for the
hardware platforms is:
• jinstall-host-qfx-5e-x86-64-18.1R1.9-secure-signed.tgz
The Juniper Networks EX4600, QFX5100 and QFX5200 Ethernet Switches are cryptographic modules defined as
multiple-chip standalone modules that execute JUNOS 18.1 R1 firmware on the EX4600, QFX5100 and QFX5200 Ethernet
Switches listed in Table 1. The cryptographic boundary is defined as the outer edge of the switch. The cryptographic
modules’ operational environment is a limited operational environment.
Table 1 provides a list of the hardware versions that are part of the module validation and the basic configuration of the
hardware.
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations
Model Hardware Versions Network Ports
QFX5100 QFX5100-24Q-AFO/AFI
QFX5100-24Q-DC-AFO/AFI
24x40GE QSFP+ ports
QFX5100-48S-AFO/AFI
QFX5100-48S-DC-AFO/AFI
48x10GE SFP+ ports
6x40GE QSFP+ ports
QFX5100-48SH-AFO/AFI
QFX5100-48SH-DC-AFO/AFI
48x10GE SFP+ ports
6x40GE QSFP+ ports
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Model Hardware Versions Network Ports
QFX5100-48T-AFO/AFI
QFX5100-48T-DC-AFO/AFI
48x10GBASE-T ports
6xQSFP+ ports
QFX5100-48TH-AFO/AFI
QFX5100-48TH-DC-AFO/AFI
48x10GBASE-T ports
6xQSFP+ ports
QFX5100-96S-AFO/AFI
QFX5100-96S-DC-AFO/AFI
96x10GE SFP+ ports
8x40GE QSFP+ ports
EX4600 EX4600-40F-AFO/AFI
EX4600-40F-DC-AFO/AFI
24x10GE SFP/SFP+ ports
4x40GE QSFP+ ports
QFX5200 QFX5200-32C-AFO/AFI
QFX5200-32C-DC-AFO/AFI
32x100GE QSFP28 ports
QFX5200-48Y-AFO/AFI
QFX5200-48Y-DC-AFO/AFI
48x25GE SFP28 ports
6x100GE QSFP28 ports
The modules are designed to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 1 overall:
Table 2 - Security Level of Security Requirements
Area Description Level
1 Module Specification 1
2 Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles and Services 3
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security 1
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC 1
9 Self-test 1
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall 1
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The module has a limited operational environment as per the FIPS 140-2 definitions. It includes a firmware load service
to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the
FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into the module is out of the scope of this validation and require a
separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
The module does not implement any mitigation of other attacks as defined by FIPS 140-2.
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1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary
The physical forms of the module’s various models and supported uplink modules are depicted in Figure 1 to Figure 7
below. The module is completely enclosed in a rectangular nickel or clear zinc coated, cold rolled steel, plated steel and
brushed aluminium enclosure. For all models, the cryptographic boundary is defined as the outer edge of the switch
chassis. The modules do not rely on external devices for input and output.
Figure 1 QFX5100-24Q
Figure 2 QFX5100-48S and QFX5100-48SH
Figure 3 QFX5100-48T and QFX5100-TH
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Figure 4 QFX5100-96S
Figure 5 EX4600-40F
Figure 6 QFX5200-32C
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Figure 7 QFX5200-48y
The following table maps each logical interface type defined in the FIPS 140-2 standard to one or more physical
interfaces.
Table 3 - Ports and Interfaces
Port Description Logical Interface Type
Ethernet LAN Communications Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
Serial Console serial port Control in, Status out
MGMT
Out-of-band
management port
Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
Power Power connector Power in
Reset Reset button Control in
LED Status indicator lighting Status out
USB Firmware load port Control in, Data in
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The following table provides a detailed description of the ports and interfaces available for each model.
Table 4 - Ports and Interfaces
Router model Power supply
port
Fan modules Console port Management
port
USB port Built-In Ports Pluggable
EX4600-40F-AFO/AFI 2 5 1 2 1 32 2 expansion slots
EX4600-40F-DC-AFO/AFI 2 5 1 2 1 32 2 expansion slots
QFX5100-24Q-AFO/AFI 2 5 1 2 1 24 2 expansion slots
QFX5100-24Q-DC-AFO/AFI 2 5 1 2 1 24 2 expansion slots
QFX5100-48S-AFO/AFI 2 5 1 2 1 54 0
QFX5100-48S-DC-AFO/AFI 2 5 1 2 1 54 0
QFX5100-48SH-AFO/AFI 2 5 1 2 1 54 0
QFX5100-48SH-DC-AFO/AFI 2 5 1 2 1 54 0
QFX5100-48T-AFO/AFI 2 5 1 2 1 54 0
QFX5100-48T-DC-AFO/AFI 2 5 1 2 1 54 0
QFX5100-48TH-AFO/AFI 2 5 1 2 1 54 0
QFX5100-48TH-DC-AFO/AFI 2 5 1 2 1 54 0
QFX5200-32C 2 5 1 2 1 32 0
QFX5200-48Y 2 5 1 2 1 48 0
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1.2 Mode of Operation
The cryptographic module provides a non-Approved mode of operation in which non-Approved cryptographic
algorithms are supported. The module supports non-Approved algorithms when operating in the non-Approved mode of
operation as described in Sections 2.4 and 3.4. When transitioning between the non-Approved mode of operation and
the Approved mode of operation, the CO must zeroize all CSPs by following the instructions in Section 1.3.
Then, the CO must run the following commands to configure the module into the Approved mode of operation:
co@fips-qfx# set system fips level 1
co@fips-qfx# commit
Once the JUNOS firmware image is installed on the device, and configured into Approved mode and rebooted, and
integrity and self-tests have run successfully on initial power-on, the module is operating in the Approved mode. This
prevents access to non FIPS approved functionality. Transitioning back to non-approved mode is only possible via
zeroising the module.
The operator can verify the module is operating in the Approved mode by verifying the following:
• The “show version local” command indicates that the module is running the Approved firmware (i.e. JUNOS
Software Release 18.1R1).
• The command prompt ends in “:fips”, which indicates the module has been configured in the Approved mode of
operation.
1.3 Zeroization
The following command allows the Cryptographic Officer to zeroize CSPs contained within the module:
co@fips-qfx> request system zeroize
Note: The Cryptographic Officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
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2 Cryptographic Functionality
The module implements the FIPS Approved, vendor affirmed, and non-Approved-but-Allowed cryptographic functions
listed in Table 5 through Table 8 below. Table 9 summarizes the high level protocol algorithm support.
2.1 Approved Algorithms
References to standards are given in square bracket [ ]; see the References table.
Items enclosed in curly brackets { } are CAVP tested but not used by the module in the Approved mode.
Table 5 – Kernel Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Mode Description Functions
#5388
#5518
{AES [197]} CBC [38A] Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
#3569
#3674
HMAC [198]
SHA-1 λ = 160
Message Authentication
SHA-256 λ = 256
#4322
#4429
SHS [180]
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
Message Digest Generation
#2715
#2780
{Triple-DES
[67]}1 TCBC [38A] Key Size: 192 Encrypt, Decrypt
#2086
#2182
DRBG [90A] HMAC SHA-256 Random Bit Generation
1
The module enforces a limit of 2
20
transforms per Triple-DES key.
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Table 6 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions
2
ECB and GCM modes are also included in the scope of certificates #5389 and 5520 but are not available to users of the module.
3
Vendor Affirmed.
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Mode Description Functions
#5389
#5520
AES [197]2
CBC [38A] Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
CTR [38A] Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
N/A3
CKG
[133] Section 6.1
[133] Section 6.2
Asymmetric key generation using
unmodified DRBG output
#1424
ECDSA [186]
P-256 (SHA-256)
P-384 (SHA-384)
P-521 (SHA-512)
KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer
#1484
P-256 (SHA-256)
P-384 (SHA-384)
P-521 (SHA-512)
KeyGen, SigGen
#3571
#3677
HMAC [198]
SHA-1 λ = 160
SSH Message Authentication
DRBG Primitive
SHA-256 λ = 256
{SHA-224} λ = 224
SHA-384 λ = 384
SHA-512 λ = 512
N/A KTS
AES Certs. #5389 and #5520 and HMAC
Certs. #3571 and #3677
Key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256
bits of encryption strength
Triple-DES Certs. #2716 and #2782 and
HMAC Certs. #3571 and #3677
Key establishment methodology
provides 112 bits of encryption
strength
#2882
#2961
RSA [186]
n=2048 (SHA 256, 384, 512)
n=3072 (SHA 256, 384, 512)
SigGen
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Table 7 – LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions
Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions
#4323
#4430
SHS [180]
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-512
Message Digest Generation
#3570
#3675
HMAC [198]
SHA-1 λ = 160 Message Authentication
SHA-256 λ = 256 Message Authentication
4
The module enforces a limit of 2
20
transforms per Triple-DES key.
n=2048 (SHA 256, 384, 512)
n=3072 (SHA 256, 384, 512)
SigVer
n=2048
n=3072
KeyGen
#4324
#4432
SHS [180]
SHA-1
{SHA224}
SHA-256
{SHA-384}
SHA-512
Message Digest Generation,
SSH KDF Primitive
#2716
#2782
Triple-DES4
[67]
TCBC [38A] Key Size: 192 Encrypt, Decrypt
#2087
#2184
DRBG [90A] HMAC SHA {1}, 256, {384},{512} Random Bit Generation
#1852
#1965
CVL SSH [135] SHA 1, 256, 384,512 Key Derivation
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2.2 Allowed Algorithms
Table 8 - Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Caveat Use
Diffie-Hellman [IG] D.8 Provides 112 bits of encryption strength. Key agreement; key establishment
Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman [IG] D.8
Provides 128 or 192 bits of encryption
strength.
Key agreement; key establishment
NDRNG [IG] 7.14
Scenario 1a
Provides 256 bits of entropy. Seeding the DRBG
2.3 Allowed Protocols
Table 9 - Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode
Protocol Key Exchange Auth Cipher Integrity
SSHv2
Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, N = 2047)
EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384
ECDSA P-256
ECDSA P-384
ECDSA P-521
RSA 2048
RSA 3072
Triple-DES CBC5
AES CBC 128/192/256
AES CTR 128/192/256
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-512
No parts of the SSHv2 protocol, other than the KDF, have been tested or reviewed by the CAVP or CMVP.
The SSH protocol allows independent selection of key exchange, authentication, cipher and integrity. In Table 9 -
Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode above, each column of options for a given protocol is independent, and may be used in
any viable combination. These security functions are also available in the SSH connect (non-compliant) service.
2.4 Disallowed Algorithms
These algorithms are non-Approved algorithms that are disabled when the module is operated in an Approved mode of
operation.
• ARCFOUR;
5
The Triple-DES key for the IETF SSHv2 protocol is generated according to RFCs 4253 and 4344.
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• Blowfish;
• CAST;
• DSA (SigGen, SigVer; non-compliant);
• HMAC-MD5;
• HMAC-RIPEMD160; and
• UMAC.
2.5 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs and public keys used by the module are described in this section.
Table 10 - Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
Name Description and usage Length CKG
DRBG_Seed Seed material used to seed or reseed the DRBG N/A N/A
DRBG_State V and Key values for the HMAC_DRBG N/A N/A
Entropy Input Entropy input string for the HMAC_DRBG N/A N/A
SSH PHK
SSH Private host key. 1st
time SSH is configured,
the keys are generated. ECDSA P-256 by default,
but also supports ECDSA P-384, ECDSA P-521, RSA
2048 and RSA 3072. Used to identify the host.
Key length is dependent on
chosen algorithm (see
Table 5, Table 6 and/or
Table 7).
[133] Section 6.1
SSH DH
SSH Diffie-Hellman private component.
Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman private key used in
SSH. Diffie-Hellman (N = 20476
), EC Diffie-Hellman
P-256, EC Diffie-Hellman P-384 or EC Diffie-
Hellman P-521
Key length is dependent on
chosen algorithm (see
Table 5, Table 6 and/or
Table 7).
[133] Section 6.2
SSH-SEK
SSH Session Key; Session keys used with SSH.
Triple-DES (3key), AES, HMAC.
Key length is dependent on
chosen algorithm (see
Table 5, Table 6 and/or
Table 7).
[133] Section 7.3
6
SSH generates a Diffie-Hellman private key that is 2x the bit length of the longest symmetric or MAC key negotiated.
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Name Description and usage Length CKG
CO-PW ASCII Text used to authenticate the CO. N/A N/A
User-PW ASCII Text used to authenticate the User. N/A N/A
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Table 11 – Public keys
Name Description and usage CKG
SSH-PUB
SSH Public Host Key used to identify the host. ECDSA P-256 by default, but
also supports ECDSA P-384, ECDSA P-521, RSA 2048 and RSA 3072
[133] Section 6.1
SSH-DH-PUB
Diffie-Hellman public component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman public key used
in SSH key establishment. DH (L = 2048 bit), EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, EC Diffie-
Hellman P-384 or EC Diffie-Hellman P-521
[133] Section 6.2
Auth-UPub
SSH User Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate users to the
module. ECDSA P-256, ECDSA P-384, ECDSA P-521, RSA 2048 or RSA 3072
N/A
Auth-COPub
SSH CO Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate CO to the module.
ECDSA P-256, ECDSA P-384, ECDSA P-521, RSA 2048 or RSA 3072
N/A
Root CA
Juniper Root CA. ECDSA P-256 or P-384 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the
validity of the Juniper Package CA at software load.
N/A
Package CA
Package CA. ECDSA P-256 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity of
Juniper Images at software load and boot.
N/A
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3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles
The module supports two roles: Cryptographic Officer (CO) and User. The module supports concurrent operators, but
does not support a maintenance role and/or bypass capability. The module enforces the separation of roles using
identity-based operator authentication.
The Cryptographic Officer role configures and monitors the module via a console or SSH connection. As root or super-
user, the Cryptographic Officer has permission to view and edit secrets within the module.
The User role monitors the switch via the console or SSH. The user role may not change the configuration.
3.2 Authentication Methods
The module implements two forms of Identity-based authentication - username and password over the Console and SSH
as well as username and public key over SSH.
Password authentication: The module enforces 10-character passwords (at minimum) chosen from the 96 human
readable ASCII characters. The maximum password length is 20 characters.
The module enforces a timed access mechanism as follows: For the first two failed attempts (assuming 0 time to
process), no timed access is enforced. Upon the third attempt, the module enforces a 5-second delay. Each failed
attempt thereafter results in an additional 5-second delay above the previous (e.g. 4th
failed attempt = 10-second delay,
5th
failed attempt = 15-second delay, 6th
failed attempt = 20-second delay, 7th
failed attempt = 25-second delay).
This leads to a maximum of nine (9) possible attempts in a one-minute period for each getty. The best approach for the
attacker would be to disconnect after 4 failed attempts and wait for a new getty to be spawned. This would allow the
attacker to perform roughly 9.6 attempts per minute; this would be rounded down to 9 per minute, because there is no
such thing as 0.6 attempts. Thus the probability of a successful random attempt is 1/9610
, which is less than 1/1 million.
The probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is 9/(9610
), which is less than
1/100,000.
ECDSA signature verification: SSH public-key authentication. Processing constraints allow for a maximum of 5.6e7
ECDSA attempts per minute. The module supports ECDSA (P-256, P-384, and P-521), which has a minimum equivalent
computational resistance to attack of either 2128
depending on the curve. The probability of a successful random attempt
is 1/(2128
), which is less than 1/1,000,000. Processing speed (partial establishment of an SSH session) limits the number
of failed authentication attempts in a one minute period to 5.6e7 attempts. The probability of a success with multiple
consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is 5.6e7/(2128
), which is less than 1/100,000
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3.3 Services
All services implemented by the module are listed in the tables below. Table 14 - CSP Access Rights within Services lists
the access to CSPs by each service.
Table 12 - Authenticated Services
Service Description CO User
Configure security Security relevant configuration x
Configure Non-security relevant configuration x
Status Show status x x
Zeroize Destroy all CSPs x
SSH connect Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Console access Console monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Remote reset Software initiated reset x
Software load Firmware update x
Table 13 – Unauthenticated Traffic
Service Description
Local reset Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic Traffic requiring no cryptographic services
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Table 14 - CSP Access Rights within Services
Service
CSPs
DRBG_Seed
DRBG_State
Entropy
Input
SSH
PHK
SSH
DH
SSH-SEK
CO-PW
User-PW
Configure
security
--7
E -- GWR -- -- W W
Configure -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Status -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Zeroize -- Z -- Z -- -- Z Z
SSH connect -- E -- E GE GE E E
Console access -- -- -- -- -- -- E E
Remote reset GZE GZ GZE -- Z Z Z Z
Local reset GZE GZ GZE -- Z Z Z Z
Traffic -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Software load -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
7
G = Generate: The module generates the key.
R = Read: The key is read from the module (e.g. the key is output).
E = Execute: The module executes using the key.
W = Write: The key is written to persistent storage in the module.
Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the key.
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Table 15: Public Key Access Rights within Services
Service
Public key
SSH-PUB
SSH-DH-PUB
Auth-UPub
Auth-COPub
Root-CA
Package-CA
Configure
security
GWR8
-- W W -- --
Configure -- -- -- -- -- --
Secure traffic -- -- -- -- -- --
Status -- -- -- -- -- --
Zeroize Z -- Z Z -- --
SSH connect E GE E E -- --
Console access -- -- -- -- -- --
Remote reset -- Z Z Z -- E
Local reset -- Z Z Z -- E
Traffic -- -- -- -- -- --
Software load -- -- -- -- EW EW
8
G = Generate: The module generates the CSP
R = Read: The CSP is read from the module (e.g. the CSP is output)
E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP
W = Write: The CSP is written to persistent storage in the module
Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
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3.4 Non-Approved Services
The following services are available in the non-Approved mode of operation. The security functions provided by the non-
Approved services are identical to the Approved counterparts with the exception of SSH Connect (non-compliant).
SSH Connect (non-compliant) supports the security functions identified in Section Disallowed Algorithms and Table 9
Table 16 - Authenticated Services
Service Description CO User
Configure security (non-compliant) Security relevant configuration x
Configure (non-compliant) Non-security relevant configuration x
Status (non-compliant) Show status x x
Zeroize (non-compliant) Destroy all CSPs x
SSH connect (non-compliant)
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
x x
Console access (non-compliant) Console monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Remote reset (non-compliant) Software initiated reset x
Table 17 - Unauthenticated traffic
Service Description
Local reset (non-compliant) Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic (non-compliant) Traffic requiring no cryptographic services
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4 Self-Tests
Each time the module is powered up, it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and that sensitive
data has not been damaged. Power-up self–tests are available on demand by power cycling the module.
On power up or reset, the module performs the self-tests described below (reset can be forced with the “request system
reboot” command). All KATs must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the module. If one
of the KATs fails, the module enters the Critical Failure error state.
The module performs the following power-up self-tests:
• Firmware Integrity check using ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256
• Kernel KATs
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o SHA-384 KAT
o SHA-512 KAT
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT

 Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate.
• OpenSSL KATs
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Sign KAT
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Verify KAT
o ECDSA P-256 w/ SHA-256 Sign/Verify PCT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
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o HMAC-SHA-224 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-384 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-512 KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT

 Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate.
o KDF-SSH KAT
• Libmd KATs
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o SHA-512 KAT
• Critical Function Test
o The cryptographic module performs a verification of a limited operational environment.
Upon successful completion of self-tests, the module outputs “FIPS self-tests completed.” to the local console. If a self-
test fails, the module outputs “<self-test name>: Failed” to the local console and automatically reboots.
The module also performs the following conditional self-tests:
• Continuous RNG Test on the SP 800-90A HMAC-DRBG
• Continuous RNG test on the NDRNG
• Pairwise consistency test when generating ECDSA and RSA key pairs.
• Firmware Load Test (ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256 signature verification)
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5 Security Rules and Guidance
The module design corresponds to the security rules below. The term must in this context specifically refers to a
requirement for correct usage of the module in the Approved mode; all other statements indicate a security rule
implemented by the module.
1. The module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
2. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any cryptographic
services.
3. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
4. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
5. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the
module.
6. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
7. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
8. The module does not support manual key entry.
9. The module does not output intermediate key values.
10. The module requires two independent internal actions to be performed prior to outputting plaintext CSPs.
11. The cryptographic officer must determine whether firmware being loaded is a legacy use of the firmware load
service (legacy being those Junos firmware images signed with RSA signatures instead of ECDSA).
12. The cryptographic officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
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6 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 18– References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[SP800-131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and
Key Lengths, January 2011
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program
[133] NIST Special Publication 800-133, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation,
December 2012
[135] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Existing Application-
Specific Key Derivation Functions, Special Publication 800-135rev1, December 2011.
[186] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July, 2013.
[186-2] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 186-2, January 2000.
[197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001
[38A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes
of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December 2001
[38D] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes
of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800-38D,
November 2007
[198] National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198-1, July, 2008
[180] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015
[67] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, Special Publication 800-67, May 2004
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Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[90A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A, June
2015.
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Table 19 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
EC Diffie-Hellman Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
ICV Integrity Check Value (i.e. Tag)
IOC Input/Output Card
MD5 Message Digest 5
NPC Network Processing Card
RE Routing Engine
RSA Public-key encryption technology developed by RSA Data Security, Inc.
SHA Secure Hash Algorithms
SPC Services Processing Card
SSH Secure Shell
Triple-DES Triple - Data Encryption Standard
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Table 20 – Datasheets
Model Title URL
EX4600 EX4600 Ethernet Switch https://www.juniper.net/us/en/local/pdf/datasheets/
1000511-en.pdf
QFX5100 QFX5100 Ethernet Switch https://www.juniper.net/us/en/local/pdf/datasheets/
1000480-en.pdf
QFX5200 QFX5200 Switch https://www.juniper.net/assets/uk/en/local/pdf/data
sheets/1000560-en.pdf