Apple corecrypto Module 18.3 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2025 Apple Inc., All rights reserved.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.
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Apple Inc.
Apple corecrypto Module 18.3 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Prepared for:
Apple Inc.
One Apple Park Way
Cupertino, CA 95014
Prepared by:
atsec information security corporation
4516 Seton Center Parkway, Suite 250
Austin, TX 78759
Apple corecrypto Module 18.3 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.
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Table of Contents
1 General............................................................................................................................................................................5
1.1 Overview.................................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 Security Levels ......................................................................................................................................................5
1.3 Additional Information......................................................................................................................................5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification ...................................................................................................................6
2.1 Description.............................................................................................................................................................6
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification.....................................................7
2.3 Excluded Components ................................................................................................................................... 13
2.4 Modes of Operation........................................................................................................................................ 13
2.5 Algorithms........................................................................................................................................................... 14
2.6 Security Function Implementations........................................................................................................... 22
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information................................................................................................................... 29
2.8 RBG and Entropy .............................................................................................................................................. 30
2.9 Key Generation.................................................................................................................................................. 31
2.10 Key Establishment.......................................................................................................................................... 32
2.11 Industry Protocols.......................................................................................................................................... 32
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ...................................................................................................................... 32
3.1 Ports and Interfaces......................................................................................................................................... 32
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication................................................................................................................... 33
4.1 Authentication Methods................................................................................................................................ 33
4.2 Roles...................................................................................................................................................................... 33
4.3 Approved Services ........................................................................................................................................... 33
4.4 Non-Approved Services................................................................................................................................. 41
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded......................................................................................................... 42
5 Software/Firmware Security ................................................................................................................................. 43
5.1 Integrity Techniques........................................................................................................................................ 43
5.2 Initiate on Demand.......................................................................................................................................... 43
6 Operational Environment...................................................................................................................................... 44
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements............................................................................. 44
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6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions.................................................................................................. 44
7 Physical Security........................................................................................................................................................ 45
8 Non-Invasive Security............................................................................................................................................. 46
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management.................................................................................................. 47
9.1 Storage Areas..................................................................................................................................................... 47
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods.......................................................................................................................... 47
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods.............................................................................................................................. 47
9.4 SSPs ....................................................................................................................................................................... 48
9.5 Transitions........................................................................................................................................................... 53
10 Self-Tests................................................................................................................................................................... 54
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ......................................................................................................................... 54
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests .................................................................................................................................. 54
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information.................................................................................................................. 57
10.4 Error States....................................................................................................................................................... 59
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests............................................................................................................... 59
11 Life-Cycle Assurance............................................................................................................................................. 60
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures............................................................................ 60
11.2 Administrator Guidance .............................................................................................................................. 60
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance.................................................................................................................... 60
11.4 Design and Rules ........................................................................................................................................... 60
11.5 End of Life......................................................................................................................................................... 61
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ............................................................................................................................... 62
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels.................................................................................................................................................5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets) ..........7
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid.............................................. 12
Table 4: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid......................... 13
Table 5: Modes List and Description..................................................................................................................... 13
Table 6: Approved Algorithms ................................................................................................................................ 21
Table 7: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms.................................................................................................................. 21
Table 8: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed............................................... 21
Table 9: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms .......................................................................................... 22
Table 10: Security Function Implementations................................................................................................... 29
Table 11: Entropy Certificates.................................................................................................................................. 30
Table 12: Entropy Sources ........................................................................................................................................ 31
Table 13: Ports and Interfaces................................................................................................................................. 32
Table 14: Roles .............................................................................................................................................................. 33
Table 15: Approved Services.................................................................................................................................... 41
Table 16: Non-Approved Services......................................................................................................................... 42
Table 17: Storage Areas............................................................................................................................................. 47
Table 18: SSP Input-Output Methods .................................................................................................................. 47
Table 19: SSP Zeroization Methods ...................................................................................................................... 48
Table 20: SSP Table 1.................................................................................................................................................. 51
Table 21: SSP Table 2.................................................................................................................................................. 53
Table 22: Pre-Operational Self-Tests.................................................................................................................... 54
Table 23: Conditional Self-Tests............................................................................................................................. 57
Table 24: Pre-Operational Periodic Information .............................................................................................. 57
Table 25: Conditional Periodic Information ....................................................................................................... 58
Table 26: Error States.................................................................................................................................................. 59
List of Figures
Figure 1: Block Diagram................................................................................................................................................7
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for Apple corecrypto Module
18.3 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] cryptographic module. It contains the security rules
under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements
as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for
a Security Level 1 module.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 1
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security N/A
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
1.3 Additional Information
In preparing the Security Policy document, the laboratory formatted the vendor-supplied
documentation for consolidation without altering the technical statements therein contained.
The further refining of the Security Policy document was conducted iteratively throughout the
conformance testing. The vendor reviewed the intermediate and final Security Policy and
approved all of its content.
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The Apple corecrypto Module 18.3 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] cryptographic module
(hereafter referred to as “the module”) provides implementations of low-level cryptographic
primitives to the Device OS’s (iOS, iPadOS, watchOS, tvOS, visionOS, MacOS) Security Framework
and Common Crypto. The module provides services intended to protect data in transit and at
rest.
The module is optimized for library use within the Device OS user space and does not contain
any terminating assertions or exceptions. It is implemented as a Device OS dynamically loadable
library. After the library is loaded, its cryptographic functions are made available to the Device
OS application.
Any internal error detected by the module is returned to the caller with an appropriate return
code. The calling Device OS application must examine the return code and act accordingly. The
module communicates any error status synchronously through the use of its documented return
codes, thus indicating the module’s status. Caller-induced or internal errors do not reveal any
sensitive material to callers.
Module Type: Software
Module Embodiment: MultiChipStand
Module Characteristics:
Cryptographic Boundary:
The module cryptographic boundary is delineated by the dotted green rectangle in the Figure 1.
The module executes within the user space of the computing platforms and operating systems
listed in the Tested Operational Environments Table section 2.2.
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Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):
The physical perimeter is represented by the most exterior black line in the block diagram Figure
1. The cryptographic boundary represented by the dotted green line includes the corecrypto
component which forms the module.
Common crypto acts as a wrapper layer located outside of the module boundary, that provides
a common interface for component within the TOEPP to access the module.
Figure 1: Block Diagram
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
Package or File Name Software/ Firmware
Version
Features Integrity Test
corecrypto-1736.80.2 18.3 N/A HMAC-SHA256
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)
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Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
N/A for this module.
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Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Operating
System
Hardware Platform Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor
or Host
OS
Version(s)
iPadOS 18 iPad (9th generation) Apple A Series
A13 Bionic
Yes NA 18.3
iPadOS 18 iPad (9th generation) Apple A Series
A13 Bionic
No NA 18.3
iPadOS 18 iPad Air (4th generation) Apple A Series
A14 Bionic
Yes NA 18.3
iPadOS 18 iPad Air (4th generation) Apple A Series
A14 Bionic
No NA 18.3
iPadOS 18 iPad mini (6th
generation)
Apple A Series
A15 Bionic
Yes NA 18.3
iPadOS 18 iPad mini (6th
generation)
Apple A Series
A15 Bionic
No NA 18.3
iPadOS 18 iPad mini (7th
generation)
Apple A Series
A17 Pro
Yes NA 18.3
iPadOS 18 iPad mini (7th
generation)
Apple A Series
A17 Pro
No NA 18.3
iPadOS 18 iPad Pro 11-inch (3rd
generation)
Apple M Series
M1
Yes NA 18.3
iPadOS 18 iPad Pro 11-inch (3rd
generation)
Apple M Series
M1
No NA 18.3
iPadOS 18 iPad Pro 12.9-inch (6th
generation)
Apple M Series
M2
Yes NA 18.3
iPadOS 18 iPad Pro 12.9-inch (6th
generation)
Apple M Series
M2
No NA 18.3
iPadOS 18 iPad Pro 11-inch M4 Apple M Series
M4
Yes NA 18.3
iPadOS 18 iPad Pro 11-inch M4 Apple M Series
M4
No NA 18.3
iOS 18 iPhone 11 Pro Max Apple A Series
A13 Bionic
Yes NA 18.3
iOS 18 iPhone 11 Pro Max Apple A Series
A13 Bionic
No NA 18.3
iOS 18 iPhone 12 Apple A Series
A14 Bionic
Yes NA 18.3
iOS 18 iPhone 12 Apple A Series
A14 Bionic
No NA 18.3
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Operating
System
Hardware Platform Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor
or Host
OS
Version(s)
iOS 18 iPhone 13 Pro Max Apple A Series
A15 Bionic
Yes NA 18.3
iOS 18 iPhone 13 Pro Max Apple A Series
A15 Bionic
No NA 18.3
iOS 18 iPhone 15 Plus Apple A Series
A16 Bionic
Yes NA 18.3
iOS 18 iPhone 15 Plus Apple A Series
A16 Bionic
No NA 18.3
iOS 18 iPhone 15 Pro Max Apple A Series
A17 Pro
Yes NA 18.3
iOS 18 iPhone 15 Pro Max Apple A Series
A17 Pro
No NA 18.3
iOS 18 iPhone 16 Apple A Series
A18
Yes NA 18.3
iOS 18 iPhone 16 Apple A Series
A18
No NA 18.3
iOS 18 iPhone 16 Pro Apple A Series
A18 Pro
Yes NA 18.3
iOS 18 iPhone 16 Pro Apple A Series
A18 Pro
No NA 18.3
watchOS
11
Apple Watch Series S9 Apple S Series S9 Yes NA 18.3
watchOS
11
Apple Watch Series S9 Apple S Series S9 No NA 18.3
watchOS
11
Apple Watch Series S10 Apple S Series
S10
Yes NA 18.3
watchOS
11
Apple Watch Series S10 Apple S Series
S10
No NA 18.3
tvOS 18 Apple TV 4K (3rd
generation)
Apple A Series
A15 Bionic
Yes NA 18.3
tvOS 18 Apple TV 4K (3rd
generation)
Apple A Series
A15 Bionic
No NA 18.3
macOS 15 MacBook Pro (13-inch,
2020)
Apple M Series
M1
Yes NA 18.3
macOS 15 MacBook Pro (13-inch,
2020)
Apple M Series
M1
No NA 18.3
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Operating
System
Hardware Platform Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor
or Host
OS
Version(s)
macOS 15 MacBook Pro (16-inch,
M1 Pro, 2021)
Apple M Series
M1 Pro
Yes NA 18.3
macOS 15 MacBook Pro (16-inch,
M1 Pro, 2021)
Apple M Series
M1 Pro
No NA 18.3
macOS 15 MacBook Pro (16-inch,
M1 Max, 2021)
Apple M Series
M1 Max
Yes NA 18.3
macOS 15 MacBook Pro (16-inch,
M1 Max, 2021)
Apple M Series
M1 Max
No NA 18.3
macOS 15 Mac Studio Apple M Series
M1 Ultra
Yes NA 18.3
macOS 15 Mac Studio Apple M Series
M1 Ultra
No NA 18.3
macOS 15 MacBook Pro (13-inch,
M2, 2020)
Apple M Series
M2
Yes NA 18.3
macOS 15 MacBook Pro (13-inch,
M2, 2020)
Apple M Series
M2
No NA 18.3
macOS 15 MacBook Pro (16-inch,
M2 Pro, 2023)
Apple M Series
M2 Pro
Yes NA 18.3
macOS 15 MacBook Pro (16-inch,
M2 Pro, 2023)
Apple M Series
M2 Pro
No NA 18.3
macOS 15 MacBook Pro (16-inch,
M2 Max, 2023)
Apple M Series
M2 Max
Yes NA 18.3
macOS 15 MacBook Pro (16-inch,
M2 Max, 2023)
Apple M Series
M2 Max
No NA 18.3
macOS 15 Mac Studio (2023) Apple M Series
M2 Ultra
Yes NA 18.3
macOS 15 Mac Studio (2023) Apple M Series
M2 Ultra
No NA 18.3
macOS 15 MacBook Air (13-inch,
2024)
Apple M Series
M3
Yes NA 18.3
macOS 15 MacBook Air (13-inch,
2024)
Apple M Series
M3
No NA 18.3
macOS 15 MacBook Pro (14-inch,
M3 Pro, Nov 2023)
Apple M Series
M3 Pro
Yes NA 18.3
macOS 15 MacBook Pro (14-inch,
M3 Pro, Nov 2023)
Apple M Series
M3 Pro
No NA 18.3
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Operating
System
Hardware Platform Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor
or Host
OS
Version(s)
macOS 15 MacBook Pro (14-inch,
M3 Max, Nov 2023)
Apple M Series
M3 Max
Yes NA 18.3
macOS 15 MacBook Pro (14-inch,
M3 Max, Nov 2023)
Apple M Series
M3 Max
No NA 18.3
macOS 15 Mac Mini (2024) Apple M Series
M4
Yes NA 18.3
macOS 15 Mac Mini (2024) Apple M Series
M4
No NA 18.3
macOS 15 MacBook Pro (16-inch,
M4 Pro, 2024)
Apple M Series
M4 Pro
Yes NA 18.3
macOS 15 MacBook Pro (16-inch,
M4 Pro, 2024)
Apple M Series
M4 Pro
No NA 18.3
macOS 15 MacBook Pro (16-inch,
M4 Max, 2024)
Apple M Series
M4 Max
Yes NA 18.3
macOS 15 MacBook Pro (16-inch,
M4 Max, 2024)
Apple M Series
M4 Max
No NA 18.3
visionOS 2 Apple Vision Pro Apple M Series
M2
Yes NA 18.3
visionOS 2 Apple Vision Pro Apple M Series
M2
No NA 18.3
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Operating
System
Hardware Platform
iPadOS 18 iPad 7th gen with Apple A Series A10
iPadOS 18 iPad Air 3rd gen with Apple A Series A12 Bionic
iPadOS 18 iPad Mini 5th gen with Apple A Series A12 Bionic
iPadOS 18 iPad 8th gen with Apple A Series A12 Bionic
iPadOS 18 iPad Pro 12.9 in 3rd gen with Apple A Series A12X Bionic
iPadOS 18 iPad Pro 11 in 1st gen with Apple A Series A12X Bionic
iPadOS 18 iPad Pro 12.9 in 4th gen with Apple A Series A12Z Bionic
iPadOS 18 iPad Pro 11 in 2nd gen with Apple A Series A12Z Bionic
iOS 18 iPhone XR with Apple A Series A12 Bionic
iOS 18 iPhone XS with Apple A Series A12 Bionic
iOS 18 iPhone XS Max with Apple A Series A12 Bionic
tvOS 18 Apple TV 4K with Apple A Series A12 Bionic
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Operating
System
Hardware Platform
macOS 15 Apple Security Chip T2 with Apple T Series T2
watchOS 11 Apple Watch Series S6 with Apple S Series S6
watchOS 11 Apple Watch Series S7 with Apple S Series S7
watchOS 11 Apple Watch Series S8 with Apple S Series S8
Table 4: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths
of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the
validation certificate.
2.3 Excluded Components
None for this module.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode
Name
Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
mode
Approved mode of operation
is entered when the module
utilizes the services that use
the security functions listed
in the Approved Algorithms
Table and the Vendor
Affirmed Algorithms Table.
Approved return a '0' from
fips_allowed_mode() for block cipher
functions and fips_allowed() for all
other services to indicate the
executed cryptographic algorithm
was approved
Non-
Approved
mode
Non-Approved mode of
operation is entered when
the module utilizes non-
approved security functions
in the Table Non-Approved
Algorithms Not Allowed in
the Approved Mode of
Operation.
Non-
Approved
return any non-zero value from
fips_allowed_mode() for block cipher
functions and fips_allowed() for all
other services to indicate the
executed cryptographic algorithm
was non- approved
Table 5: Modes List and Description
Mode Change Instructions and Status
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The Module has an Approved and non-Approved mode of operation. The Approved mode of
Operation is assumed automatically without any specific configuration. If the device starts up
successfully then the module has passed all self-tests and is operating in the Approved mode.
Any calls to the non-Approved security functions listed in the Non-Approved Services Table will
cause the module to assume the non-Approved mode of operation.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A6507 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CBC A6508 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CBC A6509 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CBC A6510 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CCM A6508 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38C
AES-CCM A6510 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38C
AES-CCM A6511 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38C
AES-CFB128 A6507 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB128 A6508 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB128 A6510 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB8 A6508 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB8 A6510 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CMAC A6510 Direction - Generation, Verification
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38B
AES-CTR A6508 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A6510 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A6511 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-ECB A6507 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A6508 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A6510 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A6511 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A6508 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A6510 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A6511 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38D
AES-KW A6508 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38F
AES-KW A6510 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38F
AES-OFB A6507 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-OFB A6508 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-OFB A6510 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-XTS
Testing
Revision 2.0
A6507 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38E
AES-XTS
Testing
Revision 2.0
A6508 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38E
AES-XTS
Testing
Revision 2.0
A6510 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38E
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
Counter DRBG A6508 Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - AES-128, AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
Counter DRBG A6510 Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - AES-128, AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
Counter DRBG A6511 Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - AES-128, AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6510 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6512 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6510 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6512 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6510 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384,
SHA3-512
Component - No
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6512 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384,
SHA3-512
Component - No
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A6510 Component - No
Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-512
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A6512 Component - No
Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-512
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6510 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
FIPS 186-5
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384,
SHA3-512
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6512 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384,
SHA3-512
FIPS 186-5
HMAC-SHA-1 A6510 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA-1 A6512 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
224
A6510 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
224
A6512 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A6510 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A6512 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A6513 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
384
A6510 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
384
A6512 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
384
A6513 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512
A6510 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512
A6512 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512
A6513 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512/256
A6510 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512/256
A6512 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512/256
A6513 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-
224
A6510 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
HMAC-SHA3-
224
A6512 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-
256
A6510 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-
256
A6512 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-
384
A6510 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-
384
A6512 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-
512
A6510 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-
512
A6512 Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A6510 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-224,
P-256, P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A6510 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - MODP-
2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144,
MODP-8192
Scheme -
dhEphem -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDA HKDF
SP800-56Cr2
A6510 Derived Key Length - 2048
Shared Secret Length - Shared Secret Length: 224-
8192 Increment 8
HMAC Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-512
SP 800-56C
Rev. 2
KDA HKDF
SP800-56Cr2
A6512 Derived Key Length - 2048
Shared Secret Length - Shared Secret Length: 224-
8192 Increment 8
HMAC Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-512
SP 800-56C
Rev. 2
KDA HKDF
SP800-56Cr2
A6513 Derived Key Length - 2048
Shared Secret Length - Shared Secret Length: 224-
SP 800-56C
Rev. 2
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
8192 Increment 8
HMAC Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512, SHA2-512/256
KDF SP800-108 A6510 KDF Mode - Counter
Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 8-4096
Increment 8
SP 800-108
Rev. 1
KDF SP800-108 A6512 KDF Mode - Counter
Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 8-4096
Increment 8
SP 800-108
Rev. 1
PBKDF A6510 Iteration Count - Iteration Count: 1000-10000
Increment 1
Password Length - Password Length: 8-128
Increment 1
SP 800-132
PBKDF A6512 Iteration Count - Iteration Count: 1000-10000
Increment 1
Password Length - Password Length: 8-128
Increment 1
SP 800-132
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6510 Key Generation Mode - probableWithProbableAux
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Primality Tests - 2powSecStr
Private Key Format - standard
FIPS 186-5
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6512 Key Generation Mode - probableWithProbableAux
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Primality Tests - 2powSecStr
Private Key Format - standard
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6510 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6512 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A6510 Signature Type - PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Modulo - 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A6512 Signature Type - PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Modulo - 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6510 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pss
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6512 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pss
FIPS 186-5
Safe Primes Key
Generation
A6510 Safe Prime Groups - MODP-2048, MODP-3072,
MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
SHA-1 A6510 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA-1 A6512 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224 A6510 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224 A6512 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A6510 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A6512 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A6513 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A6510 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A6512 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A6513 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A6510 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A6512 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A6513 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512/256 A6510 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512/256 A6512 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512/256 A6513 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA3-224 A6510 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 202
SHA3-224 A6512 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 202
SHA3-256 A6510 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 202
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Page 21 of 62
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
SHA3-256 A6512 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 202
SHA3-384 A6510 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 202
SHA3-384 A6512 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 202
SHA3-512 A6510 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 202
SHA3-512 A6512 Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768
Increment 8
FIPS 202
SHAKE-128 A6512 Output Length - Output Length: 16-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 202
SHAKE-256 A6512 Output Length - Output Length: 16-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 202
Table 6: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Key Type:Asymmetric
Implementations:c_ltc, vng_ltc
N/A SP800-133rev2 section 4 example 1
Table 7: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
Name Caveat Use and Function
MD5 Allowed in Approved mode with no security
claimed per IG 2.4.A Digest Size: 128-bit
Message Digest (used as part of
the TLS KDF v1.0, v1.1 only)
Table 8: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
Name Use and Function
ANSI X9.63 KDF Hash based Key Derivation Function
Blowfish Encryption / Decryption
CAST5 Encryption / Decryption Key Sizes: 40 to 128 bits in 8-bit
increments
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Name Use and Function
DES Encryption / Decryption Key Size: 56-bits
Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Computation using key size < 2048
ECDSA PKG: Curve P-192; PKV: Curve P-192; compact point representation
of points; Signature Generation: Curve P-192; Signature
Verification: Curve P-192
EC Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Computation using curves < P-224
EdDSA with Ed25519 Key Generation, Signature Generation, Signature Verification
X25519 Key Agreement Key agreement on X25519 curve
Integrated Encryption
Scheme on elliptic
curves
Encryption / Decryption
MD2 Message Digest size: 128-bit
MD4 Message Digest size: 128-bit
RC2 Encryption / Decryption Key Sizes 8 to 1024-bits
RC4 Encryption / Decryption Key Sizes 8 to 4096-bits
RFC6637 Key Derivation Function
RIPEMD Message Digest size: 160-bits
RSA Keygen Key Pair Generation; keys < 2048-bits
RSA Digital Signature PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS; Signature Generation Key Size < 2048;
Signature Verification Key Size < 1024
RSA Key Wrapping OAEP, PKCS#1 v1.5 and -PSS schemes
Triple-DES [SP 800-67] Encrypt/Decrypt; CBC, CTR, CFB64, ECB, CFB8, OFB
HPKE (Hybrid Public Key
Encryption) [RFC9180]
Hybrid encryption scheme
ML-KEM Key Encapsulation
Keccak Message Digest
Table 9: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Symmetric
Encryption and
Decryption
BC-UnAuth
BC-Auth
Symmetric
Encryption and
Decryption
AES-CBC:Key
Size / Key
Strength: 128,
192, 256 bits
AES-CFB128:Key
Size / Key
Strength: 128,
192, 256 bits
AES-CBC:
(A6507, A6508,
A6509, A6510)
AES-CFB128:
(A6507, A6508,
A6510)
AES-ECB: (A6507,
A6508, A6510,
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
AES-ECB:Key
Size / Key
Strength: 128,
192, 256 bits
AES-OFB:Key
Size / Key
Strength: 128,
192, 256 bits
AES-XTS Testing
Revision 2.0:Key
Size/ Key
Strength: 128,
256 bits
AES-CCM:Key
Size / Key
Strength: 128,
192, 256 bits
AES-CFB8:Key
Size / Key
Strength: 128,
192, 256 bits
AES-CTR:Key
Size / Key
Strength: 128,
192, 256 bits
AES-GCM:Key
Size / Key
Strength: 128,
192, 256 bits
A6511)
AES-OFB:
(A6507, A6508,
A6510)
AES-XTS Testing
Revision 2.0:
(A6507, A6508,
A6510)
AES-CCM:
(A6508, A6510,
A6511)
AES-CFB8:
(A6508, A6510)
AES-CTR: (A6508,
A6510, A6511)
AES-GCM:
(A6508, A6510,
A6511)
Key Wrapping KTS-Wrap
BC-Auth
Key Wrapping Standard:SP
800-38F
IG D.G:approved
Caveat:Key
establishment
provides
between 128
and 256 bits of
security strength
AES-KW: (A6508,
A6510)
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Page 24 of 62
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Random
Number
Generation
DRBG Random
Number
Generation
Counter
DRBG:Key Size/
Key Strength:
128, 256 bits
Counter DRBG:
(A6508, A6510,
A6511)
Message
authentication
(MAC)
MAC Message
authentication
(MAC)
AES-CMAC:Key
Size / Key
Strength: 128,
192, 256 bits
HMAC-SHA-
1:Key Size: 128 -
262144 bits; Key
Strength: 128
bits
HMAC-SHA2-
224:Key Size:
224 - 262144
bits; Key
Strength: 224
bits
HMAC-SHA2-
256:Key Size:
256 - 262144
bits; Key
Strength: 256
bits
HMAC-SHA2-
384:Key Size:
384 - 262144
bits; Key
Strength: 384
bits
HMAC-SHA2-
512:Key Size:
512 - 262144
bits; Key
Strength: 512
bits
HMAC-SHA2-
512/256:Key
Size: 512 -
AES-CMAC:
(A6510)
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A6510, A6512)
HMAC-SHA2-
224: (A6510,
A6512)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A6510,
A6512, A6513)
HMAC-SHA2-
384: (A6510,
A6512, A6513)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A6510,
A6512, A6513)
HMAC-SHA2-
512/256: (A6510,
A6512, A6513)
HMAC-SHA3-
224: (A6510,
A6512)
HMAC-SHA3-
256: (A6510,
A6512)
HMAC-SHA3-
384: (A6510,
A6512)
HMAC-SHA3-
512: (A6510,
A6512)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
262144 bits; Key
Strength: 256
bits
HMAC-SHA3-
224:Key Size:
224 - 262144
bits; Key
Strength: 224
bits
HMAC-SHA3-
256:Key Size:
256 - 262144
bits; Key
Strength: 256
bits
HMAC-SHA3-
384:Key Size:
384 - 262144
bits; Key
Strength: 384
bits
HMAC-SHA3-
512:Key Size:
512 - 262144
bits; Key
Strength: 512
bits
Asymmetric Key
Generation
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
Asymmetric Key
Generation
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):Key
Size(Curve): P-
224, P-256, P-
384, P-521; Key
Strength: from
112 to 256 bits
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):Key
Size: 2048, 3072,
4096 bits; Key
Strength: from
112 to 150 bits
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6510, A6512)
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6510, A6512)
Safe Primes Key
Generation:
(A6510)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Asymmetric
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Safe Primes
Generation:Safe
Prime Groups:
MODP-2048,
MODP-3072,
MODP-4096,
MODP-6144,
MODP-8192;
Key Strength:
from 112 to 256
bits
Implementations:
c_ltc, vng_ltc
Asymmetric Key
Validation
AsymKeyPair-
KeyVer
Asymmetric Key
Validation
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5):Key
Size(Curve): P-
224, P-256, P-
384, P-521; Key
Strength: from
112 to 256 bits
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6510, A6512)
Digital Signature
Generation
DigSig-SigGen Digital Signature
Generation
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):Key
Size(Curve): P-
224, P-256, P-
384, P-521; Key
Strength: from
112 to 256 bits
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):Key
Size: 2048, 3072,
4096 bits; Key
Strength: from
112 to 150 bits
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6510, A6512)
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6510, A6512)
Digital Signature
Verification
DigSig-SigVer Digital Signature
Verification
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):Key
Size(Curve): P-
224, P-256, P-
384, P-521; Key
Strength: from
112 to 256 bits
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):Key
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6510, A6512)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6510, A6512)
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Page 27 of 62
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Size: 2048, 3072,
4096 bits; Key
Strength: from
128 to 150 bits
Digital Signature
Verification
(Legacy)
DigSig-SigVer Digital Signature
Verification
IG:C.M
Key Size:1024
bits
Security
Strength:112
bits
Message
Digest:SHA-1
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A6510, A6512)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A6510, A6512)
SHA-1: (A6510,
A6512)
Shared Secret
Computation
KAS-SSC Shared Secret
Computation
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-
56Ar3:Key
Size(Curve): P-
224, P-256, P-
384, P-521; Key
Strength: from
112 to 256 bits
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-
56Ar3:Key Size:
2048, 3072,
4096, 6144, 8192
bits; Key
Strength: from
112 to 200 bits
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6510)
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6510)
Key Derivation
(KBKDF)
KBKDF Key Derivation -
SP800-108
KBKDF
Key Size:128,
192, 256 bits
Key
Strength:128,
192, 256 bits
Supported
Lengths:8-4096
Increment 8
Fixed Data
Order:Before
Fixed Data
Counter
KDF SP800-108:
(A6510, A6512)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Length:8, 16, 24,
32
Key Derivation
(PBKDF)
PBKDF Key Derivation -
SP800-132
PBKDF
PBKDF:Key Size:
112 - 4096; Key
Strength: 128 -
256; Password
length: 8- 128
bytes Increment
1; Salt Length:
128-4096
Increment 8;
Iteration Count:
1000-100000
Increment 1
PBKDF: (A6510,
A6512)
Key Derivation
(HKDF)
KAS-56CKDF Key Derivation -
SP800-56Crev2
HKDF
KDA
HKDF:Shared
Secret Length:
224-8192
Increment 8;
Derived Key
Length: 2048
KDA HKDF
SP800-56Cr2:
(A6510, A6512,
A6513)
Message Digest SHA
XOF
Message Digest Hashes:SHA-1,
SHA2-224,
SHA2-256,
SHA2-384,
SHA2-512,
SHA2-512/256,
SHA3-224,
SHA3-256,
SHA3-384,
SHA3-512
XOFs:SHAKE-
128, SHAKE-256
SHA-1: (A6510,
A6512)
SHA2-224:
(A6510, A6512)
SHA2-256:
(A6510, A6512,
A6513)
SHA2-384:
(A6510, A6512,
A6513)
SHA2-512:
(A6510, A6512,
A6513)
SHA2-512/256:
(A6510, A6512,
A6513)
SHA3-224:
(A6510, A6512)
SHA3-256:
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
(A6510, A6512)
SHA3-384:
(A6510, A6512)
SHA3-512:
(A6510, A6512)
SHAKE-128:
(A6512)
SHAKE-256:
(A6512)
Table 10: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
GCM IV
AES-GCM IV is constructed in compliance with IG C.H scenario 1 (TLS 1.2 and IPsec-v3).
The GCM IV generation follows RFC 5288 shall only be used for the TLS protocol version 1.2.
This implementation is compatible with acceptable AES-GCM ciphersuites from SP800-52r2
Section 3.3.1. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic
boundary. The module does not implement the TLS protocol. The module’s implementation of
AES-GCM is used together with an application that runs outside the module’s cryptographic
boundary. The design of the TLS protocol implicitly ensures that the nonce_explicit, or counter
portion of the IV will not exhaust all of its possible values.
The GCM IV generation follows RFC 4106 and shall only be used for the IPsec-v3 protocol
version 3. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary.
The module does not implement the IPsec protocol. The module’s implementation of AES-GCM
is used together with an application that runs outside the module’s cryptographic boundary. The
design of the IPsec protocol implicitly ensures that the nonce_explicit, or counter portion of the
IV will not exhaust all of its possible values.
In compliance with IG C.H section 3, if the module's power is lost and then restored, the key
used for the AES GCM encryption/ decryption shall be re-distributed.
AES-XTS
AES-XTS mode is only approved for hardware storage applications. The length of the AES-XTS
data unit does not exceed 220
blocks. It is the responsibility of the Operator to ensure Key_1 and
Key_2 are generated independently according to the rules for component symmetric keys from
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NIST SP 800-133rev2, Section 6.3. In compliance with IG C.I, before using the keys in the XTS-
Algorithm, the module includes an explicit check to verify that Key_1 ≠ Key_2.
Key Derivation using SP 800-132 PBKDF2
The module implements a CAVP tested key derivation function compliant to SP800-132 and IG
D.N. The service returns the key derived from the provided password to the caller. The length of
the password used as input to PBKDFv2 shall be at least 8 characters and the worst-case
probability of guessing the value is 10^8 assuming all characters are digits only. The salt input
to PBKDFv2 is 128-bits in accordance with section 5.1 of SP800-132. As is recommended SP800-
132, PBKDFv2 is implemented to support a minimum iteration count of 1000, and is extended to
support up to 10,000 iterations. PBKDFv2 is implemented to support the option 1a specified in
section 5.4 of SP800-132. The derived keys may only be used in storage applications.
RSA
In compliance with IG C.F, all the RSA modulus sizes used by the cryptographic module have
been CAVP the certificates are listed in the Approved Algorithms Table of this security policy.
There are no untested RSA modulus sizes used by the cryptographic module.
KTS
The module does not establish SSPs using an approved key transport scheme (KTS). However, it
does offer approved authenticated algorithms that can be used by an external
operator/application as part of an approved KTS.
SHA-1
SHA-1 is only approved when used in approved mode for message digest and signature
verification. Digital signature generation using SHA-1 is non-approved and not allowed in
approved services. The SHA-1 algorithm, as implemented by the module, will be non-approved
for all purposes except signature verification, starting January 1, 2031.
Legacy Algorithms
Algorithms designated as “Legacy” can only be used on data that was generated prior to the
Legacy Date specified in FIPS 140-3 IG C.M. The FIPS 186-4 implementation of RSA and ECDSA
SigVer using 1024 bits key and SHA-1, is allowed for legacy use only.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert
Number
Vendor
Name
E113 Apple Inc.
Table 11: Entropy Certificates
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Name Type Operational Environment Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
Apple
corecrypto
physical
entropy
source
Physical Apple A Series A13 Bionic, Apple
A Series A14 Bionic, Apple A
Series A15 Bionic, Apple A Series
A16 Bionic, Apple A Series A17
Pro, Apple A Series A18, Apple A
Series A18 Pro, Apple S Series
S9, Apple S Series S10, Apple M
Series M1, Apple M Series M1
Pro, Apple M Series M1 Max,
Apple M Series M1 Ultra, Apple
M Series M2, Apple M Series M2
Pro, Apple M Series M2 Max,
Apple M Series M2 Ultra, Apple
M Series M3, Apple M Series M3
Pro, Apple M Series M3 Max,
Apple M Series M4, Apple M
Series M4 Pro, Apple M Series
M4 Max
256
bits
Full
Entropy
SHA-256
[ACVP cert.
#C1223]
Table 12: Entropy Sources
Entropy source: The module makes use of a physical entropy source listed in the above table,
which is located within the physical perimeter of the module (TOEPP) but outside the
cryptographic boundary of the module. The entropy source runs on all processors listed in the
above table, which accounts for and operates on all tested Operating Environments listed in the
section 2.2 above. The output of the entropy source provides full entropy to seed and reseed
SP800-90Arev1 DRBG during initialization and reseeding respectively.
DRBG: The NIST SP 800-90ARev1 approved deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) used for
random number generation is a CTR_DRBG using AES-256 with derivation function enabled and
without prediction resistance.
The module performs DRBG health tests according to SP800-90ARev1 section 11.3.
2.9 Key Generation
See vendor affirmed algorithms (CKG) in section 2.5. The module implements RSA, ECDSA, and
Safe Prime Key Generation in compliance with SP800-133rev2 section 4 example 1 and IG D.H.
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The module does not implement symmetric key generation.
2.10 Key Establishment
The module offers Key Agreement (shared secret computation) using SP800-56Ar3 KAS-ECC-
SSC or KAS-FFC-SSC compliant with IG D.F scenario 2(1). The module does not establish SSPs
using an approved key agreement scheme (KAS). However, it does offer some or all of the
underlying KAS cryptographic functionality to be used by an external operator/application as
part of an approved KAS.
To comply with the assurances found in Section 5.6.2 of SP 800-56A Rev. 3, the operator must
use the module’s approved key pair generation service (see Approved Services table in Section
4.3 Approved Services) to generate ephemeral Diffie-Hellman or EC Diffie-Hellman key pairs, or
the key pairs must be obtained from another FIPS-validated module. As part of key pair
generation service service, the module will internally perform the full public key validation of the
generated public key. The module’s shared secret computation service will internally perform
the full public key validation of the peer public key, complying with Sections 5.6.2.2.1 and
5.6.2.2.2 of SP 800-56A Rev. 3.
2.11 Industry Protocols
No parts of the TLS or IPsec protocols, other than those mentioned above, have been tested by
the CAVP and CMVP.
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
N/A Data Input Data inputs are provided in the variables passed in the API and
callable service invocations, generally through caller-supplied buffers
N/A Data
Output
Data outputs are provided in the variables passed in the API and
callable service invocations, generally through caller-supplied buffers
N/A Control
Input
Control inputs which control the mode of the module are provided
through dedicated parameters.
N/A Status
Output
Status output is provided in return codes and through messages.
Documentation for each API lists possible return codes. A complete
list of all return codes returned by the C language APIs within the
module is provided in the header files and the API documentation.
Messages are also documented in the API documentation.
Table 13: Ports and Interfaces
The module does not implement a Control Output Logical Interface.
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
N/A for this module.
FIPS 140-3 does not require an authentication mechanism for level 1 modules. Therefore, the
module does not support an authentication mechanism for Crypto Officer. The Crypto Officer
role is authorized to access all services provided by the module (see Table - Approved Services
and Table - Non-Approved Services).
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Role Crypto Officer None
Table 14: Roles
4.3 Approved Services
The module implements a dedicated API function to indicate if a requested service utilizes an
approved security function. The approved service indicator utilizes one of two functions
(fips_allowed and fips_allowed_mode) depending on the service in question. Calling
fips_allowed_mode with any approved AES mode will return a zero to indicate it is an approved
algorithm. Similarly, calling fips_allowed with any other approved algorithm will return zero.
Calling either of these with an algorithm not listed in the Approved Algorithms Table will return
a non-zero value, and as such indicates a non-approved service.
Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
AES
Encryption/Decrypti
on
Execute
AES-mode
encrypt or
decrypt
operation
0 plaintext
data and
key /
ciphertex
t data
and key
ciphertext
data /
plaintext
data (or
failure)
Symmetric
Encryption
and
Decryption
Crypto
Officer
- AES
key: W,E
AES Key Wrapping
/ Key unwrapping
Execute
AES-key
wrapping
or
unwrappi
ng
operation
0 AES key
wrapping
key, key
to be
wrapped
/
wrapped
wrapped
key /
unwrappe
d key (or
failure)
Key
Wrapping
Crypto
Officer
- AES
key-
wrapping
key: W,E
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
key, AES
key
wrapping
key
Secure Hash
Generation
Generate
a digest
for the
requested
algorithm
0 message digest Message
Digest
Crypto
Officer
Message
Authentication
Generation
Generate
a MAC
digest
using the
requested
SHA
algorithm
or AES
algorithm
0 message,
MAC key,
MAC
algorith
m
MAC Message
authenticati
on (MAC)
Crypto
Officer
- AES
key: W,E
- HMAC
key: W,E
Message
Authentication
Verification
Verify a
MAC
digest
0 MAC,
message,
MAC key,
MAC
algorith
m
pass/fail Message
authenticati
on (MAC)
Crypto
Officer
- AES
key: W,E
- HMAC
key: W,E
RSA signature
generation and
verification
Sign a
message
with a
specified
RSA
private
key. Verify
the
signature
of a
message
with a
specified
RSA
0 SigGen:
private
key,
message,
hash
function;
SigVer:
public
key,
digital
signature
,
message,
hash
function
SigGen:
computed
signature;
SigVer:
pass/fail
result of
digital
signature
verificatio
n
Digital
Signature
Generation
Digital
Signature
Verification
Digital
Signature
Verification
(Legacy)
Crypto
Officer
- RSA key
pair: W,E
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
public
key.
ECDSA signature
generation and
verification
Sign a
message
with a
specified
ECDSA
private
key Verify
the
signature
of a
message
with a
specified
ECDSA
public key
0 SigGen:
private
key,
message,
hash
function;
SigVer:
public
key,
digital
signature
,
message,
hash
function
SigGen:
computed
signature;
SigVer:
pass/fail
result of
digital
signature
verificatio
n
Digital
Signature
Generation
Digital
Signature
Verification
Crypto
Officer
- ECDSA
key pair:
W,E
Random Number
Generation
Generate
random
number
0 requeste
d
number
of bits
random
bit-string
Random
Number
Generation
Crypto
Officer
- Entropy
input
string:
W,E,Z
- DRBG
seed,
internal
state V
value,
and key
(IG D.L
complian
t): G,W,E
PBKDF Derive key
from
password
0 PBKDF
Password
PBKDF
derived
key
Key
Derivation
(PBKDF)
Crypto
Officer
- PBKDF
derived
key: G,R
- PBKDF
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
password
: W,E
KBKDF Derive key
from key
derivation
key
0 KBKDF
key
derivatio
n key
KBKDF
derived
key
Key
Derivation
(KBKDF)
Crypto
Officer
- KBKDF
key
derivatio
n key:
W,E
- KBKDF
derived
key: G,R
RSA key pair
generation
Generate
a keypair
for a
requested
modulus
0 key size key pair Random
Number
Generation
Asymmetric
Key
Generation
Crypto
Officer
- DRBG
seed,
internal
state V
value,
and key
(IG D.L
complian
t): W,E
- RSA key
pair: G,R
ECDSA key pair
generation
Generate
a keypair
for a
requested
elliptic
curve
0 curve
size
key pair Random
Number
Generation
Asymmetric
Key
Generation
Crypto
Officer
- DRBG
seed,
internal
state V
value,
and key
(IG D.L
complian
t): W,E
- ECDSA
key pair:
G,R
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Safe primes key
generation
Generate
a keypair
for a
requested
'safe'
domain
parameter
0 key size key pair Random
Number
Generation
Asymmetric
Key
Generation
Crypto
Officer
- DRBG
seed,
internal
state V
value,
and key
(IG D.L
complian
t): W,E
- Diffie-
Hellman
key pair:
G,R
Diffie-Hellman
shared secret
computation
Generate
a shared
secret
0 domain
paramete
r,
received
public
key and
private
key
shared
secret
Shared
Secret
Computatio
n
Crypto
Officer
- Diffie-
Hellman
key pair:
W,E
- Diffie-
Hellman
shared
secret:
G,R
EC Diffie-Hellman
shared secret
computation
Generate
a shared
secret
0 domain
paramete
r,
received
public
key and
private
key
shared
secret
Asymmetric
Key
Validation
Shared
Secret
Computatio
n
Crypto
Officer
- EC
Diffie
Hellman
key pair:
W,E
- EC
Diffie-
Hellman
shared
secret:
G,R
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Self-test execute
pre
operation
al self-
tests and
all
condition
al CASTs
from
section
10.2
N/A power pass/fail
results
Symmetric
Encryption
and
Decryption
Key
Wrapping
Random
Number
Generation
Message
authenticati
on (MAC)
Asymmetric
Key
Generation
Asymmetric
Key
Validation
Digital
Signature
Generation
Digital
Signature
Verification
Shared
Secret
Computatio
n
Key
Derivation
(PBKDF)
Key
Derivation
(KBKDF)
Key
Derivation
(HKDF)
Message
Digest
Crypto
Officer
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Show Status Return the
module
status
N/A N/A Status
output
None Crypto
Officer
Show module and
version info
Return
Module
Base
Name and
Module
Version
Number
N/A N/A Module
informati
on
None Crypto
Officer
Zeroization SSPs are
zeroised
when the
system is
powered
down,
when all
resources
of
symmetric
crypto
function
context,
all
resources
of hash
context,
all
resources
of Diffie-
Hellman
context
for Diffie-
Hellman
and EC
Diffie-
Hellman,
all
resources
0 length of
context
to
zeroize
and
address
of
context
to be
zeroized
N/A None Crypto
Officer
- AES
key: Z
- AES
key-
wrapping
key: Z
- HMAC
key: Z
- ECDSA
key pair:
Z
- RSA key
pair: Z
- Entropy
input
string: Z
- DRBG
seed,
internal
state V
value,
and key
(IG D.L
complian
t): Z
- PBKDF
derived
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
of
asymmetri
c crypto
function
context
and all
resources
of key
derivation
function
context
are
released
key: Z
- PBKDF
password
: Z
- KBKDF
key
derivatio
n key: Z
- KBKDF
derived
key: Z
- Diffie-
Hellman
key pair:
Z
- EC
Diffie
Hellman
key pair:
Z
- Diffie-
Hellman
shared
secret: Z
- EC
Diffie-
Hellman
shared
secret: Z
HKDF Derive key
from key
derivation
key from a
shared
secret
0 EC Diffie
Hellman
shared
secret
HKDF
derived
key
Key
Derivation
(HKDF)
Crypto
Officer
- EC
Diffie-
Hellman
shared
secret:
W,E
- HKDF
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
derived
key: G,R
Table 15: Approved Services
4.4 Non-Approved Services
Name Description Algorithms Role
ANSI X9.63 KDF Hash based Key Derivation Function ANSI X9.63 KDF CO
Blowfish Encryption / Decryption Blowfish CO
CAST5 Encryption / Decryption Key Sizes: 40 to 128
bits in 8-bit increments
CAST5 CO
DES Encryption / Decryption Key Size: 56-bits DES CO
Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Computation using key size <
2048
Diffie-Hellman CO
ECDSA PKG: Curve P-192; PKV: Curve P-192;
compact point representation of points;
Signature Generation: Curve P-192;
Signature Verification: Curve P-192
ECDSA CO
EC Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Computation using curves <
P-224
EC Diffie-Hellman CO
EdDSA with
Ed25519
Key Generation, Signature Generation,
Signature Verification
EdDSA with
Ed25519
CO
X25519 Key
Agreement
Key agreement on X25519 curve X25519 Key
Agreement
CO
Integrated
Encryption
Scheme on elliptic
curves
Encryption / Decryption Integrated
Encryption
Scheme on elliptic
curves
CO
MD2 Message Digest size: 128-bit MD2 CO
MD4 Message Digest size: 128-bit MD4 CO
RC2 Encryption / Decryption Key Sizes 8 to 1024-
bits
RC2 CO
RC4 Encryption / Decryption Key Sizes 8 to 4096-
bits
RC4 CO
RFC6637 Key Derivation Function RFC6637 CO
RIPEMD Message Digest size: 160-bits RIPEMD CO
RSA Keygen Key Pair Generation; keys < 2048-bits RSA Keygen CO
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Name Description Algorithms Role
RSA Digital
Signature
PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS; Signature Generation
Key Size < 2048; Signature Verification Key
Size < 1024
RSA Digital
Signature
CO
RSA Key Wrapping OAEP, PKCS#1 v1.5 and -PSS schemes RSA Key Wrapping CO
Triple-DES [SP
800-67]
Encrypt/Decrypt; CBC, CTR, CFB64, ECB,
CFB8, OFB
Triple-DES [SP
800-67]
CO
HPKE (Hybrid
Public Key
Encryption)
Hybrid encryption scheme HPKE (Hybrid
Public Key
Encryption)
[RFC9180]
CO
ML-KEM Key Encapsulation Mechanism ML-KEM CO
Keccak Message Digest Keccak CO
Table 16: Non-Approved Services
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module does not support the loading of external software/firmware.
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5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
A software integrity test is performed on the runtime image of the module. The HMAC-SHA256
implemented in the module is used as the approved algorithm for the integrity test. If the test
fails, the module enters an error state where no cryptographic services are provided, and data
output is prohibited i.e. the module is not operational.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The module’s integrity test can be performed on demand by power-cycling the computing
platform. It is automatically executed at power-on.
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions
The module is supplied as part of Device OS, a commercially available general-purpose
operating system executing on the computing platforms specified in section 2.2.
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7 Physical Security
The FIPS 140-3 physical security requirements do not apply to the Apple corecrypto Module
18.3 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1] since it is a software module.
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8 Non-Invasive Security
Per IG 12.A, until the requirements of NIST SP 800-140F are defined, non-invasive mechanisms
fall under ISO/IEC 19790:2012 Section 7.12 Mitigation of other attacks.
The requirements of this area are not applicable to the module.
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
RAM The module stores ephemeral SSPs in RAM provided by the
operational environment. They are received for use or generated by
the module only at the command of the calling application. The
operating system protects all SSPs through the memory separation
and protection mechanisms. No process other than the module itself
can access the SSPs in its process' memory.
Dynamic
Table 17: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
API input
parameters
Operator
calling
application
(TOEPP)
Cryptographic
module
Plaintext Manual Electronic
API output
parameters
Cryptographic
module
Operator
calling
application
(TOEPP)
Plaintext Manual Electronic
Table 18: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
Context object
destruction
SSPs are zeroised when
the appropriate
context object is
destroyed
Zeroization when structure is
deallocated. The successful
completion of the destruction
routine indicates that the
zeroization was successful.
Invocation of
zeroization
function
cc_clear
Power down SSPs are zeroised when
the system is powered
down
SSPs are zeroised when the
system is powered down. The
successful removal of power
Operator can
initiate power
down
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Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
indicates that the zeroization was
successful.
Intermediate
value
zeroization
Intermediate keygen
values are zeroized
before the module
returns from the key
generation function.
Intermediate keygen values are
zeroized before the module
returns from the key generation
function. The completion of the
key generation routine indicates
that the zeroization was
successful
N/A
Table 19: SSP Zeroization Methods
Data output interfaces are inhibited while zeroisation is performed.
9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
AES key AES key 128 to
256 bits
- 128 to
256 bits
Symmetric
- CSP
Symmetric
Encryption
and
Decryption
Message
authenticatio
n (MAC)
AES key-
wrapping
key
AES KW 128 to
256 bits
- 128 to
256 bits
symmetric
- CSP
Key
Wrapping
HMAC
key
HMAC key 8 -
262144
bits -
112 to
256-bits
MAC - CSP Message
authenticatio
n (MAC)
ECDSA
key pair
ECDSA key
pair
(including
intermediat
e keygen
values)
P-224,
P-256,
P-384,
P-521 -
112 to
256 bits
Asymmetri
c - CSP
Asymmetri
c Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Generation
Digital
Signature
Verification
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
RSA key
pair
RSA key
pair
(including
intermediat
e keygen
values)
2048 -
4096
bits -
112 to
150 bits
Asymmetri
c - CSP
Asymmetri
c Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Generation
Digital
Signature
Verification
Entropy
input
string
Entropy
input string
512 bits
- 256
bits
Entropy
input
string -
CSP
Random
Number
Generation
DRBG
seed,
internal
state V
value, and
key (IG
D.L
compliant
)
DRBG input
parameters
384 bits
- 256
bits
DRBG -
CSP
Random
Number
Generation
Random
Number
Generation
PBKDF
derived
key
PBKDF
derived key
128 to
256 bits
- 128 to
256 bits
Storage
key - CSP
Key
Derivation
(PBKDF)
PBKDF
password
PBKDF
password
64 to
1024
bits -
N/A
Password -
CSP
Key
Derivation
(PBKDF)
KBKDF
key
derivation
key
KBKDF key
derivation
key
128 to
256 bits
- 128 to
256 bits
Derivation
key - CSP
Key
Derivation
(KBKDF)
KBKDF
derived
key
KBKDF
derived key
128 to
256 bits
- 128 to
256 bits
Derived
key - CSP
Key
Derivation
(KBKDF)
Diffie-
Hellman
key pair
Diffie-
Hellman key
pair
MODP-
2048,
MODP-
Asymmetri
c - CSP
Asymmetri
c Key
Generation
Shared Secret
Computation
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
(including
intermediat
e keygen
values)
3072,
MODP-
4096,
MODP-
6144,
MODP-
8192 -
112 to
200 bits
Diffie-
Hellman
shared
secret
Diffie-
Hellman
shared
secret
MODP-
2048,
MODP-
3072,
MODP-
4096,
MODP-
6144,
MODP-
8192 -
112 to
200 bits
Asymmetri
c - CSP
Shared
Secret
Computatio
n
Key
Derivation
(HKDF)
EC Diffie
Hellman
key pair
EC Diffie-
Hellman key
pair
(including
intermediat
e keygen
values)
P-224,
P-256,
P-384,
P-521 -
112-256
bits
Asymmetri
c - CSP
Asymmetri
c Key
Generation
Key
Derivation
(HKDF)
EC Diffie-
Hellman
shared
secret
EC Diffie-
Hellman
shared
secret
P-224,
P-256,
P-384,
P-521 -
112-256
bits
Asymmetri
c - CSP
Shared
Secret
Computatio
n
HKDF
derived
key
HKDF key
derived
from EC
Diffie-
2048 -
256
Derived
key - CSP
Key
Derivation
(HKDF)
Key
Derivation
(HKDF)
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
Hellman
shared
secret
Table 20: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
AES key API input
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From
service
invocation
to service
completion
Context
object
destruction
Power down
AES key-
wrapping
key
API input
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From
service
invocation
to service
completion
Context
object
destruction
Power down
HMAC key API input
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From
service
invocation
to service
completion
Context
object
destruction
Power down
ECDSA key
pair
API input
parameters
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From
service
invocation
to service
completion
Context
object
destruction
Power down
Intermediate
value
zeroization
DRBG seed, internal
state V value, and key
(IG D.L
compliant):Derived
From
RSA key
pair
API input
parameters
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From
service
invocation
to service
completion
Context
object
destruction
Power down
Intermediate
value
zeroization
DRBG seed, internal
state V value, and key
(IG D.L
compliant):Derived
From
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Entropy
input
string
RAM:Plaintext Storage
duration
during the
usage of
the CSP
Power down DRBG seed, internal
state V value, and key
(IG D.L
compliant):Generates
DRBG
seed,
internal
state V
value, and
key (IG D.L
compliant)
RAM:Plaintext Storage
duration
during the
usage of
the CSP
Power down Entropy input
string:Derived From
PBKDF
derived
key
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From
service
invocation
to service
completion
Context
object
destruction
Power down
PBKDF
password:Derived
From
PBKDF
password
API input
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From
service
invocation
to service
completion
Context
object
destruction
Power down
PBKDF derived
key:Derives
KBKDF key
derivation
key
API input
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From
service
invocation
to service
completion
Context
object
destruction
Power down
KBKDF derived
key:Derives
KBKDF
derived
key
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From
service
invocation
to service
completion
Context
object
destruction
Power down
KBKDF key derivation
key:Derived From
Diffie-
Hellman
key pair
API input
parameters
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From
service
invocation
to service
completion
Context
object
destruction
Power down
Intermediate
value
zeroization
Diffie-Hellman
shared
secret:Generates
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Diffie-
Hellman
shared
secret
API input
parameters
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From
service
invocation
to service
completion
Context
object
destruction
Power down
Diffie- Hellman key
pair:Derived From
EC Diffie
Hellman
key pair
API input
parameters
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From
service
invocation
to service
completion
Context
object
destruction
Power down
Intermediate
value
zeroization
EC Diffie-Hellman
shared
secret:Generates
EC Diffie-
Hellman
shared
secret
API input
parameters
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From
service
invocation
to service
completion
Context
object
destruction
Power down
EC Diffie Hellman key
pair:Derived From
HKDF
derived
key
API output
parameters
From
service
invocation
to service
completion
Context
object
destruction
Power down
EC Diffie-Hellman
shared secret:Derived
From
Table 21: SSP Table 2
9.5 Transitions
SHA-1 is disallowed for digital signature generation. When used for digital signature verification,
SHA-1 is allowed for legacy use. The use of SHA-1 is deprecated through December 31, 2030,
for applying protection in non-digital signature applications and disallowed thereafter. The use
of SHA-1 is acceptable for processing already-protected information through December 31,
2030, and allowed for legacy use thereafter.
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10 Self-Tests
While the module is executing the self-tests, services are not available, and input and output are
inhibited.
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The module performs a pre-operational software integrity automatically when the module is
loaded into memory (i.e., at power on) before the module transitions to the operational state. A
software integrity test is performed on the runtime image of the module with HMAC-SHA256
used to perform the approved integrity technique. Prior to using HMAC-SHA-256, a Conditional
Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests (CAST) is performed.
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test Method Test
Type
Indicator Details
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A5986)
112-bit
key
Message
Authentication
SW/FW
Integrity
Module
successful
execution
The HMAC-SHA2-256
value calculated at
runtime is compared
with the HMAC-SHA2-
256 value stored in the
module, computed at
compilation time.
Table 22: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-GCM
encrypt
128-bit key,
encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
encryption
Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity
test
AES-GCM
decrypt
128-bit key,
decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
decryption
Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity
test
AES-CBC 128-bit key
encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
encryption
Test runs at
power-on
before first
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
use of the
algorithm
AES-ECB 128-bit key
decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric
decryption
Test runs at
power-on
before first
use of the
algorithm
Counter
DRBG
128-bit key KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
SP 800-90Ar1
(instantiate,
reseed,
generate) health
test per section
11.3
Test runs at
power-on
before first
use of the
algorithm
HMAC-
SHA2-256
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message
authentication
Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity
test
HMAC-
SHA-1
SHA-1 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message
authentication
Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity
test
HMAC-
SHA2-512
SHA2-512 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message
authentication
Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity
test
HMAC-
SHA3-224
(A6510)
SHA3-224 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message
authentication
Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity
test
KAS-ECC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
P-224 curve KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Shared secret
computation
Test runs at
power-on
before first
use of the
algorithm
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
KAS-FFC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
MODP-2048 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Shared secret
computation
Test runs at
power-on
before first
use of the
algorithm
PBKDF SHA-1, SHA-
256, SHA-
512
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Password-based
key derivation
Test runs at
power-on
before first
use of the
algorithm
Safe Primes
Key
Generation
MODP-2048 PCT PCT Successful
key pair
generation
SP 800-56A Rev.
3 Section
5.6.2.1.4
Key pair
generation
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
P-224, P-256,
P-384, P-521
PCT PCT Successful
key pair
generation
Signature
generation &
verification
Key pair
generation
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
P-224 curve
with SHA-
224
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Signature
generation &
verification
Test runs at
power-on
before first
use of the
algorithm
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
P-224 curve
with SHA-
224
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Signature
generation &
verification
Test runs at
power-on
before first
use of the
algorithm
RSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
2048, 3072,
4096 - bit
modulus
PCT PCT Module
Successful
key pair
generation
becomes
operational
Signature
generation &
verification
Key pair
generation
RSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
2048-bit
modulus
with SHA-
256
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Signature
generation &
verification
Test runs at
power-on
before first
use of the
algorithm
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
2048-bit
modulus
with SHA-
256
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Signature
generation &
verification
Test runs at
power-on
before first
use of the
algorithm
KDA HKDF
SP800-
56Cr2
SHA-1,
SHA2-256,
SHA2-512,
SHA3-224,
SHA3-256,
SHA3-384,
SHA3-512.
with 256-bit
secret
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Shared secret
key derivation
Test runs at
power-on
before first
use of the
algorithm
KDF SP800-
108
SHA-1,
SHA2-256,
SHA2-512,
SHA3-224,
SHA3-256,
SHA3-384,
SHA3-512.
with 256-bit
secret
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
key based key
derivation
Test runs at
power-on
before first
use of the
algorithm
Table 23: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5986)
Message
Authentication
SW/FW Integrity Whenever
module is
powered on
Upon every
power on
Table 24: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-GCM
encrypt
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-GCM
decrypt
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CBC KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-ECB KAT CAST On Demand Manually
Counter DRBG KAT CAST On Demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-
256
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT CAST On Demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-
512
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
HMAC-SHA3-
224 (A6510)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
PBKDF KAT CAST On Demand Manually
Safe Primes Key
Generation
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KDA HKDF
SP800-56Cr2
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KDF SP800-108 KAT CAST On Demand Manually
Table 25: Conditional Periodic Information
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Page 59 of 62
10.4 Error States
Nam
e
Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Error
State
1) The HMAC-
SHA-256 value
computed
over the
module did
not match the
pre-
computed
value or 2) The
computed
value in the
invoked
Conditional
CAST did not
match the
known value
or 3) The
signature
failed to
generate/verif
y successfully
in the
Conditional
PCT. No
cryptographic
services are
provided, and
data output is
prohibited
1) Pre-
operationa
l Software
Integrity
Test failure
or
2)
Conditiona
l CAST
failure
3)
Conditiona
l PCT
failure
Power cycle
the device
which results
in the
module
being
reloaded
into memory
and
reperformin
g the pre-
operational
software
integrity test
and the
Conditional
CASTs.
1) Error message "FAILED:
fipspost_post_integrity" sent to caller or
2) Error message "FAILED:<event>"
sent to caller (<event> refers to any of
the cryptographic functions listed Table
-Conditional Self-Tests 3) Error code
"CCEC_GENERATE_KEY_CONSISTENCY"
returned for ECDSA and EC Diffie-
Hellman Error code
"CCRSA_GENERATE_KEY_CONSISTENCY
" returned for RSA Error code
"CCDH_GENERATE_KEY_CONSISTENCY"
returned for Diffie-Hellman
Table 26: Error States
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
The module permits operators to initiate the pre-operational or conditional self-tests on
demand for periodic testing of the module by rebooting the system (i.e., power-cycling).
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
Startup Procedures: The module is built into Device OS defined in section 2 and delivered/
installed with the respective Device OS. There is no standalone delivery of the module as a
software library.
Installation Process and Authentication Mechanisms: The vendor’s internal development process
guarantees that the correct version of module goes with its intended Device OS version. For
additional assurance, the module is digitally signed by vendor, and it is verified during the
integration into Host Device OS.
This digital signature-based integrity protection during the delivery/integration process is not to
be confused with the HMAC-256 based integrity check performed by the module itself as part of
its pre-operational self- tests.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
The Approved mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only be
transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved services listed in
Table - Non-Approved Services. If the device starts up successfully, then the module has passed
all self-tests and is operating in the Approved mode.
Apple Platform Certifications guide (platform certifications) and Apple Platform Security guide
(SEC) are provided by Apple which offers IT System Administrators with the necessary technical
information to ensure FIPS 140-3 Compliance of the deployed systems. This guide walks the
reader through the system’s assertion of cryptographic module integrity and the steps necessary
if module integrity requires remediation.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
None.
11.4 Design and Rules
The Crypto Officer shall consider the requirements and restrictions in above section 2.7 when
using the module.
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11.5 End of Life
The module secure sanitization is accomplished by first powering the module down, which will
zeroize all SSPs within volatile memory. Following the power-down, an uninstall by way of
system wipe or system update will zeroize the corecrypto-1736.80.2 binary file listed in Table 2.
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not claim mitigation of other attacks.