IMS3-SM
FIPS 140-2 Level 2
Validation
Non-proprietary Security Policy
Issue 6
IMS3-SM FIPS 140 Level 2 Validation
ii IMS.TD.5346.DRM; Issue 6
Dolby Laboratories, Inc.
Corporate Headquarters
Dolby Laboratories, Inc.
1275 Market Street
San Francisco, CA 94103-1410 USA
Telephone 415-558-0200
Fax 415-645-4000
http://www.dolby.com
Dolby and the double-D symbol are registered trademarks of Dolby Laboratories. All other trademarks
remain the property of their respective owners.
© 2017-2020 Dolby Laboratories. All rights reserved.
IMS3-SM FIPS 140 Level 2 Validation
IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6 iii
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction.................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Purpose ...............................................................................................................................1
1.2 References ..........................................................................................................................1
Chapter 2 IMS3-SM Overview....................................................................................... 2
Chapter 3 FIPS 140-2 Modes of Operation.................................................................. 6
3.1 Approved Algorithms...........................................................................................................6
3.2 Non-Approved Algorithms in FIPS Approved Mode............................................................7
3.3 Non-Approved Algorithm in Non-Approved Mode...............................................................8
Chapter 4 Security Levels ............................................................................................ 9
Chapter 5 Module Interfaces ...................................................................................... 10
Chapter 6 Critical Security Parameters..................................................................... 11
6.1 Secret and Private Keys and Other CSPs ........................................................................11
6.2 Public Keys........................................................................................................................11
Chapter 7 Roles and Services.................................................................................... 12
7.1 PCI User Service in FIPS Approved Mode .......................................................................12
7.2 SMS User Services in FIPS Approved Mode....................................................................12
7.3 SAS User Services in FIPS Approved Mode ....................................................................12
7.4 SOS (Crypto-Officer) User Services in FIPS Approved Mode..........................................13
7.5 Unauthenticated Services .................................................................................................13
7.6 Non-Approved Services ....................................................................................................14
7.7 Authentication Strength.....................................................................................................16
Chapter 8 Physical Security....................................................................................... 17
Chapter 9 Operational Environment.......................................................................... 19
Chapter 10 Self Tests.................................................................................................. 20
Chapter 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks..................................................................... 22
IMS3-SM FIPS 140 Level 2 Validation
iv IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6
Chapter 12 Security Rules.......................................................................................... 23
Chapter 13 Appendix A – CSPs and Public Keys..................................................... 24
Chapter 14 Appendix B – CKG as per SP800-133..................................................... 28
Chapter 15 Acronyms ................................................................................................. 29
Chapter 16 Document Revision History.................................................................... 31
IMS3-SM FIPS 140 Level 2 Validation
IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6 1
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This document is a non-proprietary cryptographic module security policy for the
IMS3-SM module. It describes how this module meets all the requirements specified
in the FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standards) 140-2 publication for security
Level 2, and some of the Level 3 requirements. This policy forms a part of the
submission package provided to the testing lab.
FIPS 140-2 specifies the security requirements for a cryptographic module protecting
sensitive information. Based on four security levels for cryptographic modules this
standard identifies requirements in eleven sections. For more information about the
standard, go to http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf.
1.2 References
This security policy describes how the IMS3-SM complies with the 11 sections of the
standard.
• For more information on the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program, go to
http://csrc.nist.gov/.
• For more information about Dolby Laboratories solutions, go to http://www.dolby.com/.
Chapter 1
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IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6
Chapter 2 IMS3-SM Overview
The IMS3-SM is the module that contains the security manager present in the Dolby®
IMS3000 (Product Model: CID1002) for hardware models IMS3-41, IMS3-42, IMS3-43,
IMS3C-11, IMS3C-12, and IMS3C-13. The Dolby®
IMS3000 can be hosted inside Digital
Cinema DLP projectors (for hardware models IMS3-41, IMS3-42, and IMS3-43) or inside a
LED display (for hardware models IMS3C-11, IMS3C-12, and IMS3C-13). It supports the
highest JPEG-2000 decoding capabilities and also accepts alternative content.
The figures below show the six IMS3-SM hardware models. All six IMS3-SM hardware
models require quantity 4 tamper labels. For details regarding label placement, see
Figure 1 through Figure 6.
Figure 1 Hardware Model IMS3-41
Tamper
Label #3
Hardware
Model Label
Back Side View
Left
Side
View
Top View
Front Side View
Right
Side
View
Bottom View
Tamper
Label #4
Tamper
Label #1
Tamper
Label #2
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Figure 2 Hardware Model IMS3-42
Figure 3 Hardware Model IMS3-43
Tamper
Label #3
Hardware
Model Label
Back Side View
Left
Side
View
Top View
Front Side View
Right
Side
View
Bottom View
Tamper
Label #4
Tamper
Label #1
Tamper
Label #2
Tamper
Label #3
Hardware
Model Label
Back Side View
Left
Side
View
Top View
Front Side View
Right
Side
View
Bottom View
Tamper
Label #4
Tamper
Label #1
Tamper
Label #2
4 IMS3-SM FIPS 140 Level 2 Validation
IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6
Figure 4 Hardware Model IMS3C-11
Figure 5 Hardware Model IMS3C-12
Tamper
Label #3
Hardware
Model Label
Back Side View
Left
Side
View
Top View
Front Side View
Right
Side
View
Bottom View
Tamper
Label #4
Tamper
Label #1
Tamper
Label #2
Tamper
Label #3
Hardware
Model Label
Back Side View
Left
Side
View
Top View
Front Side View
Right
Side
View
Bottom View
Tamper
Label #4
Tamper
Label #1
Tamper
Label #2
IMS3-SM FIPS 140 Level 2 Validation
IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6 5
Figure 6 Hardware Model IMS3C-13
The IMS3-SM block diagram is presented below:
Figure 7 IMS3-SM Block Diagram
Tamper
Label #3
Hardware
Model Label
Back Side View
Left
Side
View Top View
Front Side View
Right
Side
View
Bottom View
Tamper
Label #4
Tamper
Label #1
Tamper
Label #2
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IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6
Chapter 3 FIPS 140-2 Modes of Operation
The IMS3-SM module provides a FIPS Approved mode of operation. This mode of
operation makes use of Approved algorithms and also supports non-Approved
algorithms that are allowed in a FIPS Approved mode of operation.
At power up, the module enters FIPS Approved mode by default. This is verified by
successful completion of the self-tests listed in Chapter 10. Whenever any of the non-
Approved services listed in Table 7-5 are invoked, the module is now in the non-
Approved mode of operation.
In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs
Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) as per SP800-133 (vendor affirmed). The resulting
generated symmetric key is the unmodified output from SP800-90A DRBG.
3.1 Approved Algorithms
The IMS3-SM supports the following algorithms that are Approved for use in a FIPS
mode of operation:
Table 3-1 FIPS Approved Algorithms
CAVP
Cert #
Algorithm Standard Mode/
Method
Key Lengths,
Curves or
Moduli
Use
4418 AES FIPS 197,
SP800-38A
ECB 128, 256 Data Encryption and
Decryption
[NOTE: AES ECB 256 is not
used by any service in FIPS
mode; it is used only as a
prerequisite for the DRBG]
4419 AES FIPS 197,
SP800-38A
CBC 128 Data Encryption and
Decryption
4421 AES FIPS 197,
SP800-38F
KW 128 Key Wrapping
/Unwrapping
C 588 CVL SP800-56B - 2048 RSA Decryption Primitive
1427 DRBG SP 800-90A
Rev1
CTR-AES-256 - Key Generation
2934 HMAC FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA1 160 Firmware Load Test
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IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6 7
2407 RSA FIPS 186-4 SHA-256,
PKCS v1.5
2048 Digital Signature
Verification (see note below
the table)
3639 SHS FIPS 180-4 SHA-1,
SHA-256
- Message Digest
Note: RSA Signature Generation and Signature Verification 1024 with SHA-1 and
Signature Verification SHA-1 with 2048 that are also approved under Certificate #2407
are not used by the IMS3-SM module.
3.2 Non-Approved Algorithms in FIPS Approved Mode
The IMS3-SM also supports the following non-approved algorithms that are allowed for
use in the FIPS Approved mode of operation:
Table 3-2 Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Approved Mode
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IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6
Algorithm Caveat Use
NDRNG - Seeding for the DRBG; Provides 128
bits of entropy strength
RSA Key
Wrapping
RSA (CVL Cert. #C 588, key
wrapping)
Key wrapping; key establishment
3.3 Non-Approved Algorithm in Non-Approved Mode
The IMS3-SM supports the following non-Approved algorithms in the non-Approved
mode of operation:
Table 3-3 Non-Approved Algorithms in Non-Approved Mode
Algorithm Use
AES (non-compliant) Encryption and Decryption
DRBG (non-compliant) Random numbers generation
HMAC-MD5 TLS v1.0 key establishment
HMAC-SHA1 (non-compliant) Keyed hash
NDRNG RNG seed generation
RNG (FIPS 186-2) Random Number Generation
RSA (non-compliant) Digital Signature Generation and Verification;
Asymmetric Key generation
SP800-135 TLS v1.0 KDF (non-
compliant)
TLS v1.0 KDF
TI ECDH Non-security relevant data obfuscation to
support interoperability with legacy equipment
Note: Keys that are derived from using the non-compliant TLS cannot be used in the
Approved mode of operation.
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IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6 9
Chapter 4 Security Levels
The IMS3-SM design, development, tests and production has satisfied the requirements
to ensure a secure product. It is especially adapted to Digital Cinema security
requirements.
The IMS3-SM for hardware models IMS3-41, IMS3-42, and IMS3-43 and firmware
versions 1.2.9-0, 1.2.9 -3, 1.2.4-0 is tested to meet the FIPS security requirements for the
levels shown in the following table. The IMS3-SM for hardware models IMS3C-11,
IMS3C-12, and IMS3C-13 and firmware versions 3.3.43-0, 3.3.43-3, 3.3.43-0 is also tested
to meet the FIPS security requirements for the levels shown in the following table. These
configurations are identified as follows:
(Hardware Versions: IMS3-41 [A], IMS3-42 [A], and IMS3-43 [A]; Firmware Versions: (1.2.9-0,
1.2.9-3, and 1.2.4-0) [A]; Hardware)
(Hardware Versions: IMS3C-11 [B], IMS3C-12 [B], and IMS3C-13 [B]; Firmware Versions:
(3.3.43-0, 3.3.43-3 and 3.3.43-0) [B]; Hardware)
Table 4-1 FIPS 140-2 Security Levels
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements Section Level
1. Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3. Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4. Finite State Model 2
5. Physical Security 3
6. Operational Environment N/A
7. Cryptographic Key Management 2
8. EMI/EMC 2
9. Self-Tests 2
10. Design Assurance 3
11. Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
FIPS Overall Level 2
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IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6
Chapter 5 Module Interfaces
The following table shows the logical interfaces of the IMS3-SM module and how they
map to physical ports.
Table 5-1 FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces
FIPS 140-2 Logical
Interface
Module Physical Ports
Data Input Interface Ethernet1, PCI-express, GPIO, HDMI, Ethernet2, Aux
Audio Input
Data Output Interface LVDS, PCI-express, GPIO, Audio, LTC (time code),
Ethernet1, Ethernet2, Aux Audio Output, AES67
Control Input Interface Ethernet1, Ethernet2, PCI-express, Service door and
marriage monitoring, System reset
Status Output Interface Ethernet1, Ethernet2, PCI-express, Serial Port, Service door
and marriage monitoring, Status LED, Test Debug
Power Interface Power traces
No maintenance access interface is present.
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IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6 11
Chapter 6 Critical Security Parameters
6.1 Secret and Private Keys and Other CSPs
Following are the secret and private keys that exist within the cryptographic module in
the Approved Mode of Operation:
1. Device Secondary Master Key – AES key used to protect the Secondary CSP Secret
Key and the AES Binary Update Key.
2. Update Private Key – Private RSA key used for key wrapping.
3. Secondary CSP Secret Key – AES key used to protect the Dolby HMAC Key.
4. AES Binary Update Key – AES key used to decrypt binaries being imported into the
module.
5. DRBG Internal State Values – Used by the FIPS Approved DRBG.
6. DRBG Seed Values – Used to seed the FIPS Approved DRBG.
7. Dolby HMAC Key – HMAC key used for Firmware Load Test.
6.2 Public Keys
Public keys are not considered as critical security parameters because of their public
status. The public keys contained in the module are listed here for consistency:
1. Update Public Key – Public RSA key used within Digital Certificate.
2. SMS User Public Key – Public RSA key used for TLS and within Digital Certificate.
3. SAS User Public Key – Public RSA key used for TLS and within Digital Certificate.
4. SOS (Crypto-Officer) User Public Key – Public RSA key used for TLS and within
Digital Certificate.
5. Cinema Equipment Public Keys – Public RSA keys used for TLS and within Digital
Certificate.
6. Signers Public Keys – Public RSA keys used to verify XML files signature and within
Digital Certificate.
Chapter 2
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IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6
Chapter 7 Roles and Services
The cryptographic module supports four distinct operator roles: PCI User, SMS User,
SAS User, and SOS (Crypto-officer) User. No maintenance role is supported. The services
for each user are shown in the following tables.
7.1 PCI User Service in FIPS Approved Mode
None.
7.2 SMS User Services in FIPS Approved Mode
The following table shows all the services available to the SMS User – Screen Manager.
Table 7-1 SMS User Services
Services Description CSPs and Public Keys Possibly
Involved
Type of
access to
CSPs and
Public Keys
Update Allows to perform firmware
update related operations
AES Binary Update Key Write
AES Binary Update Key, Dolby
HMAC Key, Update Private Key
Read
7.3 SAS User Services in FIPS Approved Mode
The following table shows all the services available to the SAS User – Security Agent.
Table 7-2 SAS User Services
Services Description CSPs and Public Keys Possibly
Involved
Type of
access to
CSPs and
Public Keys
All the services listed in Table 7-1 for the SMS User are also available for the SAS User.
Reset Board Resets the module Update private key, Update Public
key, Device Secondary Master key,
DRBG Internal States values and
DRBG Seeds, AES Binary Update
Keys
Write
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7.4 SOS (Crypto-Officer) User Services in FIPS Approved
Mode
The following table shows all the services available to the SOS (Crypto-Officer) User –
Security Officer.
Table 7-3 SOS (Crypto-Officer) User Services
Services Description CSPs and Public Keys Possibly
Involved
Type of
access to
CSPs and
Public Keys
All the services listed in Table 7-2 for the SAS User are also available for the SOS (Crypto-Officer) User.
Approved Mode
Configuration
Performs specific SOS (Crypto-
Officer) User configuration
operations.
Update Private key, Update Public
Key
Read/Write
Zeroization Zeroizes sensitive data
(including all plain text CSPs)
All plaintext CSPs, Update Public
key
Write
7.5 Unauthenticated Services
The cryptographic module supports the following unauthenticated services:
Table 7-4 Unauthenticated Services
Services Description CSPs and
Public Keys
Possibly
Involved
Type of
access to
CSPs and
Public Keys
Get Session ID Exports the current Session ID of the module None None
Show Status Corresponds to the status information exported
automatically through the Serial Port
None None
Host Reset Resets the host None None
Video Settings Performs video related settings None None
Audio Engine Executes audio related commands None None
Self-Test The power recycling of the IMS3-SM allows
executing the suite of power-up tests required
by FIPS 140-2. No other defined service allows
executing these power-up tests. It has to be
considered as an unauthenticated service as it
only requires the IMS3-SM to be powered off
and powered on
None None
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IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6
7.6 Non-Approved Services
Any operator can invoke the following non-approved services in the non-approved
mode of operation:
Table 7-5 Non-Approved Services
Roles Services Description Non-Approved
Algorithm(s) Involved
PCI User Basic Configuration Sets and retrieves basic
configuration parameters.
AES-128-ECB
(non-compliant)
RNG (FIPS 186-2)
PCI User Configuration Performs configuration related
operations.
SP800-135 TLS v1.0 KDF
(non-compliant)
RSA (non-compliant)
TI-ECDH
DRBG (non-compliant)
HMAC-MD5
PCI User Advanced
Configuration
Sets and retrieves advanced
configuration parameters.
AES-128-ECB
(non-compliant)
PCI User Get Status
Information
Retrieves status information. None
PCI User GPIO Service Loads and retrieves GPIO data. None
PCI User Clear License Deletes a license file. SP800-135 TLS v1.0 KDF
(non-compliant)
RSA (non-compliant)
DRBG (non-compliant)
HMAC-MD5
PCI User,
SMS User,
SAS User,
SOS (Crypto-
Officer) User
Get Advanced
Information
Retrieves advanced
information.
SP800-135 TLS v1.0 KDF
(non-compliant)
RSA (non-compliant)
SHA-256 (non-compliant)
DRBG (non-compliant)
HMAC-MD5
PCI User,
SMS User,
SAS User,
SOS (Crypto-
Officer) User
Basic Operations Performs basic operations. SP800-135 TLS v1.0 KDF
(non-compliant)
RSA (non-compliant)
DRBG (non-compliant)
HMAC-MD5
SMS User,
SAS User,
SOS (Crypto-
Officer) User
Basic Settings Performs some of the module’s
settings.
SP800-135 TLS v1.0 KDF
(non-compliant)
RSA (non-compliant)
DRBG (non-compliant)
HMAC-MD5
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IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6 15
SMS User,
SAS User,
SOS (Crypto-
Officer) User
Suite Management Provides suite management
operations.
SP800-135 TLS v1.0 KDF
(non-compliant)
RSA (non-compliant)
AES-128-CBC (non-
compliant)
HMAC-SHA1 (non-
compliant)
DRBG (non-compliant)
HMAC-MD5
RNG (FIPS 186-2)
SAS User,
SOS (Crypto-
Officer) User
Obsolete Board Deletes non-sensitive cinema
data.
SP800-135 TLS v1.0 KDF
(non-compliant)
DRBG (non-compliant)
HMAC-MD5
RSA (non-compliant)
NDRNG
SOS (Crypto-
Officer) User
SOS Configuration Performs specific SOS (Crypto-
Officer) User configuration
operations.
SP800-135 TLS v1.0 KDF
(non-compliant)
DRBG (non-compliant)
HMAC-MD5
AES Key Wrapping (non-
compliant)
RSA (non-compliant)
SOS (Crypto-
Officer) User
Delete Deletes non-sensitive cinema
data.
SP800-135 TLS v1.0 KDF
(non-compliant)
DRBG (non-compliant)
HMAC-MD5
All roles Network
Configuration
Performs non-security relevant
network related configuration
operations.
TI-ECDH
All roles Setup Performs non-security relevant
setup operations
TI-ECDH
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IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6
7.7 Authentication Strength
The cryptographic module enforces the separation of roles using identity-based operator
authentication. The PCI User role is authenticated through the use of “PCI User
Authentication Secrets” – known only by Dolby Laboratories– associated with the
current Session Id. Note that data to be compared to authentication secrets are imported
encrypted in the module.
SMS, SAS, and SOS (Crypto-Officer) User roles are authenticated through the use of 2048
bits RSA Signatures. Note that these authentications rely on the usage of TLS.
Table 7-6 Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
Role Type of Authentication Authentication Mechanism
PCI User Identity-based operator authentication Authentication Secret Verification
SMS User Identity-based operator authentication 2048 bits RSA Signature Verification
SAS User Identity-based operator authentication 2048 bits RSA Signature Verification
SOS (Crypto-
Officer) User
Identity-based operator authentication 2048 bits RSA Signature Verification
Table 7-7 Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms
Authentication Mechanism Strength of Mechanism
Authentication Secret Verification With 256 possible characters and 8-character Authentication
Secret, the probability that a random attempt will succeed or a
false acceptance will occur is 5.42 x 10ˉ(20) that is less than
1/1,000,000.
The probability of successfully authenticating to the module
within one minute with a replay delays of 1s is 3.25 x 10ˉ(18)
that is less than 1/100,000.
2048 bits RSA Signature Verification This verification relies on 2048 bits RSA keys known to
provide an equivalent of 112 bits of encryption strength.
Therefore, a random attempt has an associated probability of
fault acceptance of (1/2)^112, which is less than 1/1,000,000.
Given the processing capabilities and the clock speed, the
number of consecutive attempts that could be launched in a
one minute period is extremely limited. An extremely
conservative estimate is that the probability of successfully
authenticating in a one minute period would be (1/2)^69,
which is much less than 1/100,000.
IMS3-SM FIPS 140 Level 2 Validation
IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6 17
Chapter 8 Physical Security
The IMS3-SM is classified as a multiple-chip embedded module for FIPS purposes. It is
comprised of production grade components.
The physical security mechanism employed by the module includes a hard, opaque and
tamper-evident metal enclosure that is monitored 24/7 by tamper detection and response
mechanisms; any attempt to remove the metal enclosure results in instantaneous active
zeroization of all plaintext CSPs. The module also includes tamper evident labels
covering each of the mounting hardware for models IMS3-41, IMS3-42, IMS3-43, IMS3C-
11, IMS3C-12, and IMS3C-13. These labels are installed by the manufacturer. The PCB
itself also provides tamper evidence. The tamper evident metal enclosure, tamper
evident labels and tamper evident PCB shall be periodically inspected to ensure that
physical security is maintained.
Note: The module hardness testing was only performed at an ambient, single
temperature (i.e. 65.3° F) and no assurance is provided for Level 3 hardness conformance
at any other temperature.
The cryptographic boundary is the outer perimeter of the module’s metal enclosure edge
(see Chapter 2) and it includes the hard, opaque and tamper-evident metal enclosure
covering all security relevant components.
All the components that reside outside of the metal enclosure are excluded from FIPS
140-2 requirements. Components excluded from the FIPS 140-2 requirements are not
security relevant. The excluded components are the non-security relevant data input and
data output, filtering components (capacitors, resistors, inductance), voltage regulators,
fuses, traces and signals routed to said components, PCB outside metal enclosure, CPU
and its memory and connectors.
18 IMS3-SM FIPS 140 Level 2 Validation
IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6
Table 8-1 Physical Security Inspection
Physical Security
Mechanism
Recommended Frequency
of Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Metal enclosure with
tamper detection and
response mechanisms
Upon receiving the module
from the manufacturer, and
as often as feasible.
Visually inspect all sides of the metal enclosure
for visible evidence of tampering (for example,
scratches, scrapes, nicks, gouges, and so on).
Check the output of the Show Status service on
an ongoing basis to confirm that the module has
not been tampered with or zeroized.
Tamper evident labels Upon receiving the module
from the manufacturer, and
as often as feasible.
Visually inspect the labels for visible evidence of
tampering (for example, removal, scratches,
scrapes, rips, nicks, replacements, gouges, and so
on).
Tamper evident PCB Upon receiving the module
from the manufacturer, and
as often as feasible.
Visually inspect the PCB for visible evidence of
tampering (for example, scratches, scrapes,
nicks, gouges, and so on).
If any tampering with the module is suspected, please remove the module from service
and contact Dolby Laboratories Technical Services department immediately at +1-415-
645-4900 or email cinemasupport@dolby.com.
IMS3-SM FIPS 140 Level 2 Validation
IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6 19
Chapter 9 Operational Environment
The IMS3-SM supports a limited operational environment that allows only the loading of
trusted, validated, and HMACed binary images through authenticated service. Dolby
Laboratories maintains sole possession of the corresponding HMAC key needed to
validate the uploaded binary into the IMS3-SM.
20 IMS3-SM FIPS 140 Level 2 Validation
IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6
Chapter 10 Self Tests
The IMS3-SM module performs the following self tests:
Power Up Self Tests Status Output
• BIOS Integrity Test “Checking BIOS checksum.. valid” or
“Checking BIOS checksum.. invalid”
• Bootloader Integrity Test “Checking bootloader checksum.. valid” or
“Checking bootloader checksum.. invalid”
• Firmware Integrity Test
(16 bits and 32 bits CRC)
“Checking boot checksum.. valid” or
“Checking boot checksum.. invalid”
“Checking root checksum.. valid” or
“Checking root checksum.. invalid”
“Checking firmware checksum.. valid” or
“Checking firmware checksum.. invalid”
“Checking rootfs” or
“rootfs checksum verification failed”
"Checking linux kernel” or
“kernel checksum verification failed”
“firmware integrity seltest succeeded” or
“firmware integrity seltest failed”
• SP800-90a Rev1 DRBG Known Answer
Test
“SP800-90A DRBG selftest succeeded” or
“SP800-90A DRBG selftest failed”
• SHA-1 Known Answer Test “SHA1 selftest succeeded” or
“SHA1 selftest failed"
• HMAC Known Answer Test “HMAC selftest succeeded” or
“HMAC selftest failed"
• AES Encryption Known Answer Test “AES selftest succeeded” or
“AES test failed"
• AES Decryption Known Answer Test “AES selftest succeeded” or
“AES test failed"
• RSA Digital Signature Generation
Known Answer Test (RSA 2048 SHA-
256)
“RSA selftest succeeded” or
“RSA selftest failed"
IMS3-SM FIPS 140 Level 2 Validation
IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6 21
• RSA Digital Signature Verification
Known Answer Test (RSA 2048 SHA-
256)
“RSA selftest succeeded” or
“RSA selftest failed"
• RSA Encryption Known Answer Test
(RSA 2048)
“RSA selftest succeeded” or
“RSA selftest failed"
• RSA Decryption Known Answer Test
(RSA 2048)
“RSA selftest succeeded” or
“RSA selftest failed"
• CRC 32-bit Known Answer Test “CRC 32-bit selftest succeeded” or
“CRC 32-bit selftest failed"
• CRC 16-bit Known Answer Test “CRC 16-bit selftest succeeded” or
“CRC 16-bit selftest failed"
• AES KeyWrap Known Answer Test “KeyWrap selftest succeeded” or
“KeyWrap selftest failed”
Conditional Tests Status Output
• Firmware Load Test (HMAC-SHA1) None in case of success;
“Error: decipher_body(): checksum
incorrect” in case of failure
• DRBG Continuous Test None in case of success;
“FIPS Lock” in case of failure
• NDRNG Continuous Test None in case of success;
“FIPS Lock” in case of failure.
• Pair-wise Consistency Test
(Digital Signature
Generation/Verification;
Encryption/Decryption)
None in case of success;
“FIPS Lock” in case of failure.
The bypass test and the Manual Key Entry Test are N/A.
Note that SHA-1 is used only for HMAC-SHA1 and RSA Digital Signature Verification.
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Chapter 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The IMS3-SM does not mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-2
requirements.
Table 11-1 Mitigation of Other Attacks
Other Attacks Mitigation Mechanism Specific Limitations
N/A N/A N/A
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Chapter 12 Security Rules
The cryptographic modules design corresponds to the modules security rules. This
chapter documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to
implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 2 module.
1. The cryptographic module shall provide four distinct operator roles. These are the
PCI User role, the SMS User role, the SAS User role, and the SOS (Crypto-Officer)
User role.
2. The cryptographic module shall provide identity-based authentication.
3. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator shall not have
access to any cryptographic services.
4. Data output shall be inhibited during self tests and error states.
5. Data output shall be logically disconnected from the internal process performing key
generation and zeroization.
6. Status information shall not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead
to a compromise of the module.
7. The module shall not support a bypass capability or a maintenance interface.
8. The cryptographic module performs the self tests as presented in Chapter 10 above.
9. At any time the operator is capable of commanding the module to perform the
power-up self-test by a power cycle.
10. Prior to each use, the SP800-90a Rev1 DRBG and the NDRNG are tested using the
conditional test specified in FIPS 140-2 §4.9.2.
11. The module supports concurrent operators.
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Chapter 13 Appendix A – CSPs and Public Keys
The module's CSPs are listed below:
1) Device Secondary Master Key
- Description: AES KW 128 bits Key used to encrypt/decrypt other CSPs.
- Generation: Generated using the SP800-90A Rev1 DRBG. As per SP800-133 Section 7.1,
key generation is performed as per the “Direct Generation” of Symmetric Keys
which is an Approved key generation method.
- Establishment: N/A
- Storage: Stored in plaintext in the Tamper switch. Temporarily stored in plaintext in
SDRAM.
- Entry: N/A
- Output: N/A
- Zeroization: Zeroized by "Zeroization" or "Reset Board" authenticated services.
Zeroized when the Tamper switch it is stored in is opened. Also destructed when a
tamper event is detected.
2) Update Private Key
- Description: Private 2048 bits RSA key used for key wrapping.
- Generation: N/A. Pre-loaded during manufacturing.
- Establishment: N/A
- Storage: Stored encrypted using AES KW in flash memory. Temporarily stored in
plaintext in SDRAM.
- Entry: N/A
- Output: N/A
- Zeroization: Temporary plaintext copies are zeroized by the "Zeroization" authenticated
service and when a tamper event or a power shortage happens.
3) Secondary CSP Secret Key
- Description: 128 bits AES KW key used to decrypt other CSPs.
- Generation: N/A. Pre-loaded during manufacturing.
- Establishment: N/A
- Storage: Stored encrypted using AES KW in flash memory and temporarily in plaintext
in the SDRAM.
- Entry: N/A
- Output: N/A
- Zeroization: All copies are zeroized by the "Zeroization" authenticated service.
Temporary copies stored in RAM are also zeroized at power-off, when a tamper
event or a power shortage happens.
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4) DRBG Internal State Values
- Description: The internal state values required by the DRBG based on SP800-90A Rev 1
present on the module are the following:
. K (AES key) – 256 bits
. V (seed) – 128 bits
- Generation: Initialized and updated through the DRBG processing itself.
- Establishment: N/A
- Storage: Stored in plaintext in SDRAM.
- Entry: N/A
- Output: N/A
- Zeroization: All copies of these internal state values are destructed when the DRBG is
uninstantiated.
5) DRBG Seed Values
- Description: Seed values required by the DRBG based on SP800-90A Rev1
- Generation: Initialized by the module’s Hardware TRNG.
- Establishment: N/A
- Storage: Stored in plaintext in SDRAM.
- Entry: N/A
- Output: N/A
- Zeroization: All copies of these seeds are zeroized by the "Zeroization" authenticated
service and when the DRBG is uninstantiated. Plaintext copies are also zeroized
when a tamper event or a power shortage happens.
6) Dolby HMAC Key
- Description: 160 bit HMAC key used to authenticate binaries loaded into the module.
- Generation: N/A. Pre-loaded during manufacturing.
- Establishment: N/A
- Storage: Stored encrypted using AES KW in flash memory and in plaintext in SDRAM.
- Entry: N/A
- Output: N/A
- Zeroization: All plaintext copies of this key are zeroized by the "Zeroization"
authenticated service. Plaintext copies of this key stored in RAM are also zeroized at
power-off, when a tamper event or a power shortage happens.
7) AES Binary Update Key
- Description: 128 bits AES-CBC Key used for decryption.
- Generation: N/A. Imported wrapped in RSA.
- Establishment: Wrapped with RSA
- Storage: Stored temporarily in plaintext in SDRAM. Otherwise, the RSA wrapped
copies are stored encrypted using AES KW in flash memory.
- Entry: Imported wrapped in RSA, through the “Update” authenticated service.
- Output: Exported wrapped in RSA, through the authenticated TLS services “Update”.
- Zeroization: All plaintext copies (and non-AES-encrypted, wrapped in RSA or not) of
this key are zeroized by the “Zeroization” authenticated service. Copies (wrapped in
RSA or not) stored in RAM are also destructed at power-off. Plaintext copies (and
non-AES-encrypted RSA wrapped copies) are also destructed when a tamper event
or a power shortage happens.
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The module supports the following Public Keys:
1) Update Public Key
- Description: 2048 bits Update Public RSA Key used in Digital Certificate
- Generation: N/A. Pre-loaded during manufacturing.
- Establishment: N/A
- Storage: Stored in plaintext in the flash memory. Temporarily stored in plaintext in
SDRAM.
- Entry: Imported back in an RSA digitally signed certificate through the “Approved
Mode Configuration” authenticated service.
- Output: Exported through the “Approved Mode Configuration” authenticated service.
- Zeroization: Zeroized by the “Zeroization” or “Reset Board” authenticated services.
2) SMS User Public Key
- Description: 2048 bits Public RSA Key used within Digital Certificate for TLS
authentication.
- Generation: N/A. Imported during manufacturing.
- Establishment: N/A
- Storage: Stored in plaintext in the flash memory. Temporarily stored in plaintext in
SDRAM.
- Entry: Imported in an RSA digitally signed certificate through the “Approved Mode
Configuration” authenticated service and during TLS handshake mechanism.
- Output: Exported through the “Approved Mode Configuration” authenticated service.
- Zeroization: Zeroized by the “Zeroization” or “Reset Board” authenticated service.
3) SAS User Public Key
- Description: 2048 bits Public RSA Key used within Digital Certificate for TLS
authentication.
- Generation: N/A. Pre-loaded during manufacturing.
- Establishment: N/A
- Storage: Stored in plaintext in the flash memory. Temporarily stored in plaintext in
SDRAM.
- Entry: The certificate to be compared against this SAS certificate is imported during TLS
handshake mechanism.
- Output: N/A
- Zeroization: N/A
4) SOS User Public Key
- Description: 2048 bits Public RSA Key used within Digital Certificate for TLS
authentication.
- Generation: N/A. Pre-loaded during manufacturing.
- Establishment: N/A
- Storage: Stored in plaintext in the flash memory. Temporarily stored in plaintext in
SDRAM.
- Entry: The certificate to be compared against this SOS certificate is imported during TLS
handshake mechanism.
- Output: N/A
- Zeroization: N/A
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5) Cinema Equipment Public Keys
- Description: 2048 bits Public RSA Keys imported within a Digital Certificate when a
TLS connection is established.
- Generation: N/A
- Establishment: N/A
- Storage: Stored in plaintext SDRAM.
- Entry: TLS handshake mechanism.
- Output: N/A
- Zeroization: Zeroized at power-off or when the TLS session ends.
6) Signers Public Keys
- Description: 2048 bits Public RSA Keys imported within a Digital Certificate as part of a
digitally signed license files import. They are used only to verify digital signatures.
- Generation: N/A
- Establishment: N/A
- Storage: Stored in plaintext SDRAM and in plaintext in the flash memory.
- Entry: Imported through “Update” authenticated service.
- Output: Exported through the “Update” authenticated service.
- Zeroization: Zeroized by the “Reset Board”, the “Zeroization” and the “Update”
authenticated services. Copies stored in RAM are zeroized at power-off. Also, the
expired license files (therefore their signer public keys) are automatically deleted
every hour.
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Chapter 14 Appendix B – CKG as per SP800-133
In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs
Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) as per SP800-133 (vendor affirmed). The
resulting generated symmetric key is the unmodified output from SP800-90A
DRBG. Please see Appendix A – CSPs and Public Keys for more information.
IMS3-SM FIPS 140 Level 2 Validation
IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6 29
Chapter 15 Acronyms
Term Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AES/EBU Audio Engineering Society/European Broadcasting Union
ANSI American National Standards Institute
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DCI Digital Cinema Initiatives
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DRNG Deterministic Random Number Generator
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
FPGA Field-Programmable Gate Array
GPI General Purpose Input
GPIO General Purpose Input/Output
GPO General Purpose Output
HD High Definition
HMAC Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code
KAT Known Answer Test
LTC Linear Time-Code
N/A Not Applicable
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OSD On Screen Display
PCI Peripheral Component Interconnect
30 IMS3-SM FIPS 140 Level 2 Validation
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Term Definition
PRF Pseudo Random Function
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adelman
RTC Real Time Clock
SAS Security Agent System
SDI Serial Digital Interface
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMS Screen Management System
SOS Security Officer System
TLS Transport Layer Security
TRNG True Random Number Generator
IMS3-SM FIPS 140 Level 2 Validation
IMS.TD.005346.DRM; Issue 6 31
Chapter 16 Document Revision History
Date Issue Description
03/16/2017 1 First version
05/16/2017 2 Second version
06/20/2017 3 Third version
11/01/2019 4 Fourth version
11/24/2020 5 Fifth version
12/09/2020 6 Sixth version