Hardware Security Module Non‐Proprietary Security Policy Version 1.14 –July 2019
Futurex EXP1000 HSM Non-Proprietary Security Policy – Page 1
FUTUREX
FIPS 140-2
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
EXP1000 Hardware Security Module
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
Hardware Security Module Non‐Proprietary Security Policy Version 1.14 –July 2019
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Table of Contents
1. Module Overview......................................................................................................................................................................3
2. Security Level ..............................................................................................................................................................................4
3. Modes of Operation.................................................................................................................................................................4
3.1. FIPS Approved Mode of Operation ..........................................................................................................................4
3.2. PCI HSM Mode of Operation (non-Approved) ....................................................................................................6
3.3. General Non-Approved Mode of Operation ........................................................................................................7
4. Ports and Interfaces..................................................................................................................................................................9
5. Identification and Authentication Policy....................................................................................................................... 10
5.1. Assumption of Roles.................................................................................................................................................... 10
5.2. Roles and Required Identification and Authentication.................................................................................. 10
5.3. Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms........................................................................................................... 11
6. Access Control Policy............................................................................................................................................................ 11
6.1. Unauthenticated Services .......................................................................................................................................... 11
6.2. Authenticated Services ............................................................................................................................................... 12
6.3. Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs).............................................................................................. 16
6.4. Definition of Public Keys ............................................................................................................................................ 18
6.5. Modes of Access for CSPs ......................................................................................................................................... 19
7. Operational Environment.................................................................................................................................................... 23
8. Security Rules........................................................................................................................................................................... 23
8.1. Self-Tests.......................................................................................................................................................................... 24
9. Physical Security Policy ........................................................................................................................................................ 25
9.1. Physical Security Mechanisms.................................................................................................................................. 25
9.2. Environmental Conditions and Environmental Failure Protection............................................................. 25
9.3. Operator Recommended Actions........................................................................................................................... 25
10. Mitigation of Other Attacks ............................................................................................................................................... 27
11. Design Assurance................................................................................................................................................................... 27
11.1. Configuration Management..................................................................................................................................... 27
11.2. Guidance Documents.................................................................................................................................................. 27
11.3. System Identification and Authentication........................................................................................................... 27
11.4. Audit Logs and Inspection Frequency .................................................................................................................. 27
12. Key Loading.............................................................................................................................................................................. 28
12.1. Key Loading (FIPS/PCI-HSM Modes)..................................................................................................................... 28
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13. Product Identification........................................................................................................................................................... 28
13.1. Hardware Identification.............................................................................................................................................. 28
13.2. Firmware Versioning Scheme and Identification.............................................................................................. 29
14. TLS Protocols............................................................................................................................................................................ 30
14.1. TLS Protocols Supported............................................................................................................................................ 30
15. References................................................................................................................................................................................. 31
16. Glossary...................................................................................................................................................................................... 32
17. CSP Abbreviations.................................................................................................................................................................. 33
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1. MODULE OVERVIEW
The EXP1000 (HW P/Ns: 9850-0365 Rev10, 9800-2082 Rev 101
, 9800-2082 Rev 10A, 9800-2082 Rev
10B, 9800-2082 Rev 10C, 9800-2082 Rev 10D, 9800-2082 Rev 10E, 9800-2082 Rev 11 and 9800-2082
Rev 11A; and FW Version 6.2.0.2) Hardware Security Module (HSM) is a multi-chip embedded
cryptographic module that provides secure data storage and processing functionality. All sensitive
components of the module are physically protected by a tamper resistant, responsive, and evident
casing where all cryptographic operations are performed. Upon tamper detection, normal operations
are halted and critical security parameters are erased. The module is assembled from production
quality components and provides high speed interfaces for control and data input, status and data
output. The image below depicts the cryptographic module and provides a visual indication of the
potting layer that outlines the cryptographic boundary.
Figure 1 – EXP1000 Hardware Security Module
1
There was a change in Futurex’s Configuration Management Policy during the evaluation period that necessitated the use of a new
part number for the EXP1000. An initial batch of the hardware product was shipped to customers with the original part number prior
to the policy change. All new shipments make use of P/N: 9800-2082. Both part numbers are included in the Security Policy to
ensure existing product, once updated with the FIPS approved firmware, will be compliant.
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2. SECURITY LEVEL
The cryptographic module meets the FIPS 140-2 overall security requirements applicable to Level 3.
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification
Module Ports and Interfaces
Roles, Services and Authentication
Finite State Model
Physical Security
Operational Environment
Cryptographic Key Management
EMI/EMC
Self-Tests
Design Assurance
Mitigation of Other Attacks
3
3
3
3
3
N/A
3
3
3
3
3
Table 1 - Module Security Level Specification
3. MODES OF OPERATION
The cryptographic module may be configured for FIPS Approved mode, PCI HSM mode (non-
Approved for FIPS 140), or General non-Approved mode by accessing the System tab on the module’s
web interface. A drop-down menu is shown for FIPS mode (“On” or “Off”) and another for PCI HSM
mode. When used in the Vectera parent device, the mode of operation is also displayed on its LCD
screen. When transitioning between modes, the module will zeroize CSPs before entering the selected
mode of operation and restart. The user can determine which mode the cryptographic module is in by
accessing the Status tab on the module’s web interface.
3.1. FIPS APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION
In FIPS Approved mode, the module supports the following algorithms:
Approved Functions
 [FIPS 197] AES ECB, CBC, CFB (1, 8, 128), and OFB with 128, 192, and 256 bit keys for
encryption and decryption (AES Cert. #5464)
 [SP800-38B] AES CMAC with 128, 192, 256 bit keys for MAC generation and verification
(AES Cert. #5464)
 [SP800-38D] AES GCM with 256 bit keys for decryption (AES Cert. #5464)
 [SP800-38F] AES KWP (NIST SP800-38F) with 128, 192, and 256 bit keys for key wrapping
and key unwrapping (AES Cert. #5464)
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 [SP800-133] CKG (Vendor Affirmed) for asymmetric (133 §6) and symmetric (133 §7) key
generation
 [SP800-90A] CTR DRBG (using AES-256; with DF) for random number generation (DRBG
Cert. #2145)
 [FIPS 186-4] ECDSA (Cert. #1461) for key generation and signature operations:
o ECC P-192 for legacy signature verification only
o ECC P-224, P-256, P-384, and P-521 for key generation, signature generation, and
signature verification
o Hashes SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
 Note: Signature Generation with SHA-1 is only used for TLS negotiation.
 [FIPS 198-1] HMAC SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 for keyed message
authentication (HMAC Cert. #3621)
 [SP800-108] KDF CMAC Triple-DES (3-key) (KBKDF Cert. #217)
 [SP800-108] KDF CMAC AES with 128, 192, 256 bit keys (KBKDF Cert. #217)
 [SP800-135] KDF TLS 1.0/1.1, and 1.2 (CVL Cert. #1916)
 Note: No parts of TLS, other than the KDF, have been tested by CAVP or CMVP.
 [SP800-38F] KTS (Symmetric) using:
o AES KWP (AES Cert. #5464) authenticated encryption
o AES CBC (AES Cert. #5464) encryption and HMAC (HMAC Cert. #3621) authentication;
see TLS cipher suite listing for exact details
o Triple-DES CBC (Triple-DES Cert. #2749) encryption and HMAC-SHA-1 (HMAC Cert.
#3621) authentication; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of
encryption strength
 [FIPS 186-4] RSA (Cert. #2935) for key generation and signature operations:
o RSA 1024 bit keys for legacy signature verification only
o RSA 2048 and 3072 bit keys for key generation, digital signature generation and
verification
o Hashes SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
 Note: Signature Generation with SHA-1 is only used for TLS negotiation.
 [FIPS 180-4] SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 for signature operations
(generation and verification), HMAC, and other hashing (Cert. #4384)
 Note: Signature Generation with SHA-1 is only used for TLS negotiation.
 [SP800-67] Triple-DES (2-key) TECB, TCBC, TCFB (1, 8, 64), and TOFB for legacy decryption
only (Cert. #2749)
 [SP800-67] Triple-DES (3-key) TECB, TCBC, TCFB (1, 8, 64) and TOFB for encryption and
decryption (Cert. #2749)
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 Note: the operator is responsible for restricting Triple-DES encryption operations to
prevent “birthday attack” collisions; refer to FIPS IG Section A.13.
 [SP800-38B] CMAC Triple-DES (2-key) for legacy MAC verification only (Cert. #2749)
 [SP800-38B] CMAC Triple-DES (3-key) for MAC generation and verification (Cert. #2749)
 Note: the operator is responsible for restricting Triple-DES mac-generate
operations to prevent “birthday attack” collisions; refer to FIPS IG Section A.13.
Allowed Non-Approved Functions
 [IG D.8] Diffie Hellman Key Agreement (2048) (key establishment methodology provides
112 bits of encryption strength)
 [IG D.8] EC Diffie Hellman Key Agreement (P-521) (key establishment methodology
provides 256 bits of encryption strength)
 [IG G.13] NDRNG used for DRBG seed data
 Provides 1.318 bits of entropy per 8-byte sample.
 [IG D.9] RSA Key Transport (2048) (key wrapping; key establishment methodology
provides 112 bits of encryption strength)
3.2. PCI HSM MODE OF OPERATION (NON-APPROVED)
In PCI HSM mode, the module supports the following algorithms and services in addition to the
FIPS Approved Mode algorithms and services:
 RSA with additional, non-compliant key sizes (full selection is 2048 + n*8 [n = 0 to 256],
up to 4096 bits) for key generation, digital signature generation, and verification
 Triple-DES (2-key) for encryption (non-compliant)
Note: The use of two-key Triple-DES for encryption is restricted. The total number of
blocks of data encrypted with the same cryptographic key shall not be greater than 2^20.
 DUKPT: key management technique
 AKB/TR-31: key bundling techniques
 When configured for operation in an issuer environment *
o Clear PIN processing
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 When configured for PIN processing, the following pin block format translation will be
allowed or disallowed.
Destination
Source
ISO 0 ISO 1 ISO 2 ISO 3 IBM3624 PIN Pad
ISO 0 Yes No No Yes No No
ISO 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
ISO 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
ISO 3 Yes No No Yes No No
IBM362
4
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PIN Pad Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 PIN generation: random and derived
*The HSM cannot be configured for both PIN processing and clear PIN operations in this mode of
operation.
 RSA with additional, non-compliant key sizes (full selection is 2048 + n*8 [n = 0 to 256]
up to 4096 bits), encrypt/decrypt for key transport
3.3. GENERAL NON-APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION
In General non-Approved mode (not FIPS or PCI HSM), the module supports the following
algorithms and services in addition to the FIPS Approved Mode and PCI HSM Mode algorithms
and services:
 RSA with additional, non-compliant key sizes (full selection is 512 + n*8 [n = 0 to 256] up to
4096 bits) for key generation, digital signature generation, and verification
 ECC with 192 bit keys for key generation, digital signature generation and verification (non-
compliant)
 DES for encryption and decryption
 Triple-DES (2-key) for encryption and decryption—without restriction (non-compliant)
 MD5, RIPEMD-160 for hashing
 HMAC MD5, HMAC RIPEMD-160 for keyed message authentication
 When configured for operation in an issuer environment*
o Clear PIN processing
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 When configured for PIN processing, the following pin block format translation will be allowed. *
Destination
Source
ISO 0 ISO 1 ISO 2 ISO 3 IBM3624 PIN Pad
ISO 0 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ISO 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ISO 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ISO 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IBM3624 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PIN Pad Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 RSA with additional, non-compliant key sizes (full selection is 512 + n*8 up to 4096 bits),
encrypt/decrypt for key transport
*The HSM cannot be configured for both PIN processing and clear PIN operations in this mode of
operation.
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4. PORTS AND INTERFACES
The cryptographic module provides one physical edge card connector (data in, data out, control in, status
out, power) that allows for the following interfaces; the standard physical connectors (e.g. RJ45) are
provided outside the boundary:
 RGMII/MDI(x2): control input, data input, data output, status output
o Ethernet ports provide encrypted communication sessions established with the TLS
protocol for control input, data input, data output, and status output.
 USB Host port (x1): Control input, data input, data output, status output
o USB ports support encrypted data input/output, control input, and status output.
 USB Client port (x1): Control input, data input, data output, status output
o USB ports support encrypted data input/output, control input, and status output. These
ports are disabled in FIPS/PCI-HSM modes.
 Power status LED (x1): Status output
 Tamper status LED (x1): Status output
 Host ID Signal (x4): Control input
 Client ID Signal (x4): Status output
 USB enable port (x1): Status Output
 Client present port: Control input
 Primary Power port (x1): Power interface
 USB Power port (x1): Power interface
 Reset port: Control input
 Reset default port: Control input
 Battery detect port: Control input
 Battery power port: Power interface
 Ground port (x12): Power interface
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5. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY
5.1. ASSUMPTION OF ROLES
The cryptographic module supports Operations, Crypto-Officer, and Transaction Processing roles.
In FIPS or PCI HSM mode, an Operations or Crypto Officer operator may communicate with the
cryptographic module via an established TLS session. The cryptographic module enforces the
separation of roles using identity-based operator authentication for all roles.
For Operations and Crypto-Officer, an operator must enter their username and password to log
in. The username is an alphanumeric string of four to sixteen characters. The password is an
alphanumeric string of six to sixty-four characters chosen from the 95 printable and human-
readable ASCII characters (0x20 to 0x7E) excluding the following: ‘[ ] < > ;’ (thus, 90 characters are
possible). Default passwords are only used for the default Crypto-Officer roles and the
cryptographic module enforces that the default passwords must be updated before keys can be
injected or generated. An operator that provides a valid username and password will be identified
as an Operations or Crypto-Officer and must re-authenticate to change identity or role. The
operator may end the session by logging out or power cycling the module, or the session will
automatically time-out after a fixed duration or transaction limit. In order to re-establish
communication, an operator must re-authenticate.
All cryptograms used while processing transactions contain authentication data for the
Transaction Processing role, which takes the form of key parity bits for Triple-DES, or KWP for
AES. In either case, the symmetric key (AES or 3-key Triple-DES) which is used to encrypt the
cryptogram corresponds to the operator’s identity. For Triple-DES-wrapped keys, the loaded key
is always Triple-DES as well. The module decrypts the key and checks its parity bits. If any bit is
incorrect, the command is rejected. (This prevents an attacker from passing off a random string as
a wrapped Triple-DES key.) For AES-wrapped keys, the key is auth-decrypted according to SP800-
38F (KWP); if this operation fails, the command is rejected.
5.2. ROLES AND REQUIRED IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
Role Type of Authentication
Authentication
Data
Operations Identity-based
User name and
password
Crypto-Officer Identity-based
User name and
password
Transaction Processing Identity-based
ID of wrapping key
and wrapped key
(KWP/Key Parity)
Table 2 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
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5.3. STRENGTHS OF AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS
Authentication
Mechanism
Strength of Mechanism
Username and
Password
The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will
occur is 1/531,441,000,000 (1/906
).
The module allows for 3 failed attempts and then times out for 20 seconds
before retry. The probability of successful authenticating to the module within
one minute is 1/59,049,000,000.
AES-KWP AES-KWP (SP800-38F) provides 64 bits of authentication strength to a wrapped
key. Thus, the probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false
acceptance will occur is 1/18,446,744,073,709,551,616 (1/264
).
The module allows for 50 failed attempts over 24 hours and then times out for 20
seconds before retry. The probability of successfully authenticating to the
module within one minute is 1/122,978,293,824,730,344.
Key Parity (3-key
Triple-DES)
3-key Triple-DES has 24 parity bits. Thus, the probability that a random attempt
will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 1/16,777,216 (1/224
)
The module allows for 50 failed attempts over 24 hours and then times out for 20
seconds before retry. The probability of successfully authenticating to the
module within one minute is 1/111,848
Table 3 – Strength of Authentication Mechanisms
6. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY
6.1. UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICES
The cryptographic module supports the following unauthenticated services:
 Status: This service provides the current status of the cryptographic module via the USB
or Ethernet port.
 Self-Tests: This service will enable an operator to initiate the suite of self-tests via power
cycling the module.
 Factory Reset: This service resets the module back to factory default. (Zeroize CSPs.
Passwords are zeroized and set back to default. Firmware is also restored to version
shipped with HSM.)
 Tamper: There are pins on the HSM that will allow the user to force a tamper event by
shorting them. This will zeroize all CSPs to include default TLS pairs.
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6.2. AUTHENTICATED SERVICES
Role Authorized Service
Operations:  Create Session: This service allows an operator to create a
secure session to the HSM.
 Authenticate: This service allows an operator to send credentials
to be authenticated by the cryptographic module. Sessions will
time-out after one minute of inactivity, fifteen minutes of use, or
7,500 transactions.
 Destroy Session: This service allows an operator to end the
session.
 Logout: This service allows an operator to end authentication.
 View Configuration: Gives operator the ability to view
configuration status to include IP, Com, SSL, Time, Features,
Users, IP tools, Logs. This does not allow configuration of these
items.
 Configuration: Allows operator to change IP address, syslog
level, Operations user passwords, and reboot device.
Cryptographic-Officer:  Create Session: This service allows an operator to create a
secure session to the HSM.
 Authenticate: This service allows an operator to send credentials
to be authenticated by the cryptographic module. Sessions will
time-out after one minute of inactivity, fifteen minutes of use, or
7,500 transactions.
 Destroy Session: This service allows a Crypto-Officer to end the
session.
 Initialization: This service shall enable a Crypto-Officer to
transition the cryptographic module into or out of an Approved
mode. This service shall zeroize the module and restart. If the
module is already in an Approved mode, it will remain in that
Approved mode.
 Zeroize: This service shall enable a Crypto-Officer to destroy
critical security parameters by zeroization.
 Key Loading: This service allows a Crypto-Officer to load keys
into the module.
 Update Firmware: This service shall enable the Crypto-Officer to
update the cryptographic module’s firmware. Firmware
authenticity is verified using an ECC signature. If the authenticity
of the firmware is not confirmed, the cryptographic module will
reject and delete the update.
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Role Authorized Service
Note: New firmware versions within the scope of this validation
must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other
firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this
validation and require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
 General Configuration: This service allows a Crypto-Officer to
change all configuration options for the module.
 View Configuration: Gives operator the ability to view
configuration status to include IP, Com, SSL, Time, Features,
Users, IP tools, Logs. This does not allow configuration of these
items.
 User Administration: This service will allow the Crypto-Officer to
create, manage, and delete users.
 Logout: This service will enable the Crypto-Officer to end
authentication.
 Load Encrypted Key: This service allows a user to send in
Encrypted keys and have the keys translated and stored in the
key table or returned as a cryptogram encrypted under the
master key.
 Process Transactions: This service allows a user to use any of the
commands listed in Futurex TRM. These commands must be
unblocked by the Crypto-Officer for use.
Transaction Processing  Create Session: This service allows a user to create a secure session
to the HSM.
 Destroy Session: This service allows a user to end the session.
 Authenticate: This service allows a user to send credentials to be
authenticated by the cryptographic module.
 Logout: This service will enable the Crypto-Officer to end
authentication.
 Load Encrypted Key: This service allows a user to send in Encrypted
keys and have the keys translated and stored in the key table or
returned as a cryptogram encrypted under the master key.
 Process Transactions: This service allows a user to use any of the
commands listed in Futurex TRM. These commands must be
unblocked by the Crypto-Officer for use.
Table 4 - Authorized Services by Role
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Service Control Input Data Input Data
Output
Status Output
Create Session Header Info Signed Plaintext
Data
Encrypted
Data
N/A
Authenticate Header Info Username &
Password
N/A Success / Fail
Destroy Session Header Info N/A N/A N/A
Process
Transactions
Header Info Encrypted Data Encrypted
Data
Plaintext Status
Data
Logout Header Info N/A N/A N/A
Status N/A N/A N/A Plaintext Status
Data
Initialization Header Info Encrypted Data Encrypted
Data
Success / Fail
Zeroize Header Info N/A N/A Success / Fail
Self-Tests N/A N/A N/A Success / Fail
User
Administration
Header Info Encrypted Data Encrypted
Data
Plaintext Status
Data
Update Firmware Header Info Encrypted Data Encrypted
Data
Plaintext Status
Data
Factory Reset Header Info N/A N/A Success
View
Configuration
Header Info N/A N/A Plaintext Status
Data
Configuration Header Info N/A N/A Success/Fail
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Service Control Input Data Input Data
Output
Status Output
General
Configuration
Header Info and
Configuration Options
N/A N/A Success/Fail
Tamper Tamper Signal N/A N/A Tamper
Key Loading Header Info Encrypted Data Encrypted
Data
Plaintext Status
Data
Load Encrypted
Key
Header Info Encrypted Data Encrypted
Data
Plaintext Status
Data
Table 5 - Specification of Service Inputs & Outputs
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6.3. DEFINITION OF CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS (CSPS)
CSPs are secured within the cryptographic boundary as unencrypted plaintext or binary data.
Operators do not have direct access to CSPs within the device. The following are CSPs contained in
the module:
CSP Type Description
Unique Device
Keys
AES-256 CBC Used to Encrypt or Decrypt TLS private keys
Server Private
Keys
ECC 521
RSA 2048
Sign or Decrypt data sent to the device from an
operator during the creation of a TLS session.
Used during creation of a TLS session.
Session
Encryption Key
AES-128 CBC
AES-256 CBC
Triple-DES 192 CBC
Encrypts / Decrypts data passed between an
operator and the device during an established TLS
session
Session Hash Key HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-384
Used for hashing data passed between an operator
and the device during an established TLS session
Pre-Master Secret Keying Material
(384 bits)
Used to create the TLS session keys with TLS KDF
DH Private Key ECC P-521
DH 2048
Used for DH TLS exchange
Ephemeral
Asymmetric Key
ECC P-521 Used to transfer Ephemeral Key between HSM’s for
component transfer
Ephemeral
Symmetric Key
AES 256 KWP Used to encrypt key components
Crypto-Officer
Password
Pass-phrase Used to authenticate the identity of a Crypto-
Officer.
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CSP Type Description
Operations
Password
Pass-phrase Used to authenticate the identity of an Operations
user.
Platform Master
Key
AES 256 KWP Used to encrypt AES keys
FTK Key AES 256 KWP Used to encrypt AES keys for PKCS #11
Key Exchange Key AES 256 KWP Used to load User Keys as part of Transaction
Processing
Backup Key AES 256 CBC Encrypts the User Keys for backup
Smart Card
Encryption Key
AES 256 CBC Wraps smart card fragments (keys and other
sensitive data) for storage on smart card.
User Keys Triple-DES 128** ECB, CBC,
CFB64, OFB
Triple-DES 192 ECB, CBC,
CFB1, CFB8, CFB64, OFB
AES 128, 192, 256 ECB, CBC,
OFB, CFB1, CFB8, CFB128
RSA 1024*, 2048, 307
ECC 192***, 224, 256, 384,
521 HMAC
Data encryption, key exchange, CMAC, and HMAC
keys used by user
These keys are available to the Crypto Officer and
Transaction Processing roles.
Seed Value NDRNG value Seed for CTR DRBG.
(The seed provides at least 384 bits of entropy.)
DRBG State Internal RNG state “V” and “Key” internal values for CTR DRBG.
HSM Signing
Private Key
RSA 2048 Used to sign the logs when output
Table 6 - Critical Security Parameters
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*NOTE: RSA 1024 can only be used for verification.
**NOTE: Triple-DES 128 can only be used for decryption.
***NOTE: ECC 192 can only be used for verification.
6.4. DEFINITION OF PUBLIC KEYS
The following are the public keys contained in the module:
 Firmware Public Keys (ECC 521): These public keys are used for signature verification of
the firmware and firmware updates in order to protect against unauthorized modification.
 Customer Admin Public Keys (RSA 2048/ECC 521): The public keys components of the
Administration certificates used for verifying signatures. This corresponds to one of the
server private keys.
 Customer Production Excrypt Public Keys (RSA 2048/ECC 521): The public keys
components of the Production Excrypt certificates used for verifying signatures. This
corresponds to one of the server private keys.
 Customer Production International Public Keys (RSA 2048/ECC 521): The public keys
components of the Production International certificates used for verifying signatures. This
corresponds to one of the server private keys.
 Customer Production Web Public Keys (RSA 2048/ECC 521): The public keys components
of the Production Web certificates used for verifying signatures. This corresponds to one
of the server private keys.
 Customer App Administration Public keys (RSA 2048/ECC 521): The public keys
components of the Application Administration certificates used for verifying signatures.
This corresponds to one of the server private keys.
 Customer App Production Public Keys (RSA 2048/ECC 521): The public keys component of
the Application Production certificates used for verifying signatures. This corresponds to
one of the server private keys.
 User public keys (RSA 1024/2048/3072, ECC 192/224/256/384/521): These public keys are
always used by the operator.
 HSM signing public key (RSA 2048/ECC 521): Output to allow host to verify log signature.
 DH Public Key (DH 2048/ECC 521): Used for TLS key exchange
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6.5. MODES OF ACCESS FOR CSPS
Table 7 provides a list of supported access operations by the cryptographic module. Access rights
for the supported modes of access are shown in table 8 below. Supported Access operations are
defined as follows:
 Generate functions: These operations generate a particular CSP within the cryptographic
module.
 Load functions: These operations allow for a particular CSP to be loaded into the
cryptographic module.
 Wrap functions: These operations encrypt a particular CSP.
 Un-wrap functions: These operations decrypt a particular CSP.
 Destroy functions: These operations erase the CSP from the cryptographic module.
CSP
Operation
Generate Load Wrap Un-wrap Destroy
Unique Device Keys x x x x
Server Private Keys × ×
Session Encryption Key × × × ×
Session Hash Key × × × ×
Pre-Master Secret x x
DH Private Key x x
Ephemeral Asymmetric Key x x x x
Ephemeral Symmetric Key x x x x
Crypto-Officer Password × ×
Operations Password × x
Platform Master Key x x x x
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CSP
Operation
Generate Load Wrap Un-wrap Destroy
FTK Key x x x x
Key Exchange Key x x x x
Backup Key x x x x
Smart Card Encryption Key x x x x
User Keys x × × x
Seed Value x x
HSM Signing Private Key x x
Table 7 - Supported Access Operations
Note: Unique Device Key is generated at time of manufacture or re-generated during tamper recovery
and is not associated with any user roles.
Cryptographic Keys and
CSPs Access Operation
Service Operations
Role
CO
Role
Transaction
Processing
U/A*
Generate Session Encryption
and Hash keys
Create Session × × x
Wrap and un-wrap with
Session Encryption and Hash
keys
Process
Transactions
× x
Destroy Session Encryption
and Hash keys
Destroy Session × × x
(No CSP access) Status x
Generate Ephemeral Keys;
Wrap and un-wrap with
Ephemeral Keys
Key Loading x
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Cryptographic Keys and
CSPs Access Operation
Service Operations
Role
CO
Role
Transaction
Processing
U/A*
Destroy Ephemeral Keys Key Loading
(upon
completion)
x
Destroy Server Private and
Public Key, CO/User Names
and Passwords, Key Exchange
Key, Backup Key, Smart Card
Encryption Key
Zeroize ×
Zeroize and generate Server
Private and Public Key
Initialization ×
Zeroize all CSPs to include
default TLS keys
Tamper x
(No CSP access) Self-Tests x
Load CO/User Names and
Passwords
Destroy CO/User Names and
Passwords
User
Administration
×
Verify with Firmware Public
Key
Update Firmware ×
Zeroize CSPs and restore
factory defaults**
Factory Reset x
Send in authentication
credentials
Authenticate x x x
No CSP access Logout x x x
No CSP access General
Configuration
x
No CSP access Configuration x x
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Cryptographic Keys and
CSPs Access Operation
Service Operations
Role
CO
Role
Transaction
Processing
U/A*
No CSP access View
Configuration
x x
Loading of PMK, FTK, KEK,
Backup Key, SCEK, User Keys
Key Loading x
Loading of Encrypted User
Keys
Load Encrypted
Key
x x
Table 8 - CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services
*NOTE 1: U/A = Unauthenticated (no role required).
**NOTE 2: The Factory Reset service does not zeroize the UDK (only a Tamper does that). If the UDK has
been previously zeroized by a tamper event, the Factory Reset service generates a new UDK.
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7. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the
cryptographic module supports a limited operational environment.
8. SECURITY RULES
The cryptographic module’s design corresponds to the cryptographic module’s security rules. This
section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security
requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 3 module.
1. The cryptographic module provides three distinct operator roles. These are the Operations role, the
Cryptographic-Officer role, and the Transaction Processing role.
2. The cryptographic module provides identity-based authentication.
3. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any
cryptographic services.
4. The cryptographic module encrypts message data using a FIPS-allowable TLS cipher suite when TLS is
used (see Section 14 of this document).
5. The cryptographic module performs the Power-Up and Conditional self-tests as specified in Section
8.1, below.
6. The cryptographic module clears previous authentications on power off/cycle.
7. Any time the cryptographic module is in an idle state, the operator is able to command the module to
perform the Power-Up self-test.
8. Prior to each use, the DRBG is tested using the conditional test specified in FIPS 140-2 §4.9.2
(continuous RNG test).
9. Data output is logically inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states using
separate system processes.
10. Zeroization clears all CSPs in at most one-tenth of a second.
11. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
12. The module does not support the update of the logical serial number or vendor ID.
13. If the cryptographic module remains inactive in any valid role for a maximum period of five minutes,
the module automatically logs out the operator.
14. This validation does not provide assurance of algorithmic compliance in the non-FIPS-Approved
modes.
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8.1. SELF-TESTS
The cryptographic module will perform power-up self-tests without operator intervention. Self-tests
may also be executed at the request of an operator by power cycling the module. When power
cycling the module, no operator intervention is required before self-tests are performed. If a self-test
fails, the device will transition to the Fatal Error state and report an error to its parent device. If all
tests pass, the module powers up normally and reports success to its parent device.
Power-Up and Periodic Self Tests
The following tests shall be performed at power-up:
 Known answer tests (only performed for FIPS mode) for:
o AES 128/192/256 Encrypt and Decrypt
o Triple-DES Keying Option 1/2 Encrypt and Decrypt
o SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
o RSA 1024 Verify
o RSA 2048/3072 Sign and Verify
o ECDSA P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, and P-521 Sign and Verify
o HMAC with SHA1/SHA256/SHA384/SHA512
o DRBG
o Triple-DES CMAC Generate and Verify
o AES CMAC Generate and Verify
o KDF Counter Mode using CMAC (KBKDF)
o AES KWP
 Firmware integrity and authenticity test (ECDSA signature) are performed in all modes of
operation
Conditional Self-Tests
The device will perform the following conditional self-tests:
 Firmware load test (ECC signature verification) is performed in all modes of operation
 The following conditional self-tests are executed in FIPS and PCI modes of operation:
o Continuous random number generator tests for NDRNG and DRBG.
o DRBG Health Checks (SP800-90A §11.3)
o Pair-wise consistency test for RSA key generation (encrypt/decrypt and sign/verify), ECC key
generation (sign/verify)
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9. PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY
9.1. PHYSICAL SECURITY MECHANISMS
The multi-chip embedded cryptographic module includes the following physical security
mechanisms:
 Hard, opaque potting material encapsulates the body of the module, and intrusion
attempts will result in serious damage which will cause the module to stop functioning.
(More gentle attempts will scratch the potting, leaving evidence of a tamper attempt.)
 The module is protected by a tamper sensing envelope, which responds to physical
tampering with CSP zeroization.
 Environmental monitoring sensors will trigger a tamper response and CSP zeroization to
prevent the module from being compromised from altering certain environmental or
operational conditions.
9.2. ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL FAILURE PROTECTION
The following environmental conditions should be maintained for the module:
 Operating environment temperature: -40 to 60°C
 Storage temperature: -40 to 85°C
Environmental Failure Protection will trigger a shutdown or tamper response should the module
detect environmental conditions outside of these specifications:
 Temperature: -40 to 85°C
 Voltage: 5.77 VDC at Primary and USB Power port
 Voltage: 2.41 to 3.58 VDC at Battery Power port.
9.3. OPERATOR RECOMMENDED ACTIONS
 The operator may be required to periodically inspect the unit for forced entry.
Physical Security
Mechanisms
Recommended Frequency of
Inspection / Test
Inspection / Test Guidance Details
Tamper Evident Potting Monthly, and prior to module
Initialization
Inspect hard potting for
removal/penetration attempts.
Table 9 - Inspection / Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms
The figures below show the module with its tamper evident potting intact, and a sample of the
potting after a tamper attempt has been made.
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Figure 2 – EXP1000 with its Tamper Potting Intact
Figure 3 – Examples of Tamper Attempts on the EXP1000 Potting
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10. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS
The module mitigates emitting compromising emanations through suppression and containment
of side channel signals. The physical housing of the module attenuates these signals, reducing the
effectiveness of the attacks.RSA blinding is also used to help mitigate side-channel attacks.
11. DESIGN ASSURANCE
11.1. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
Documentation for the cryptographic module, which includes hardware specifications, firmware
source code, guidance documents, and FIPS documents, is maintained using a version control
repository. All configuration management items are uniquely identified by a path and filename
within the repository. All configuration management items within the version control repository
are uniquely identifiable.
11.2. GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
Provided with the cryptographic module are all Crypto-Officer and user guidance documents that
specify the following:
 Administrative functions, physical ports, and interfaces
 Procedures describing how to securely administer the cryptographic module
 Approved security functions
 User responsibilities for securely operating the cryptographic module
11.3. SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
Procedures for system identification and authentication of the module are detailed in the Futurex
PCI HSM User Guide Addendum.
11.4. AUDIT LOGS AND INSPECTION FREQUENCY
Understanding of the operation and initialization of the module is requisite to configure logging.
Procedures to configure audit logging are detailed in the Futurex PCI HSM User Guide
Addendum.
 The module supports secure logging of transactions, data, and events to enable auditing
 Operator restrictions for accessing, archiving, or deleting logs are configured by settings
and policies established by system administrators
 Logs should be audited on a daily basis, and an appropriate notification tree should be
established for escalating and investigating any suspicious log activity
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12. KEY LOADING
12.1. KEY LOADING (FIPS/PCI-HSM MODES)
When operating in FIPS or PCI-HSM Modes, all key loading traffic to HSM must be encrypted. This is
accomplished by using a Futurex Securus. The Securus is a fully functional TRSM that will encrypt all
data between it and the HSM using TLS.
13. PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION
13.1. HARDWARE IDENTIFICATION
To identify an EXP1000 refer to the product identification label. Refer to Figure 1 for the location of
the product identification lable. Figure 4 shows the product identification label. Note that the
EXP1000 may be identified by the part number 9800-2082 or 9850-0365.
Figure 4 – EXP1000 Product Identification Label
The EXP1000 is typically sold as an embedded component inside of other Futurex devices and its
product identification label is not visible without opening the chassis. Internal inspection is not
possible without specialized tools only available to authorized service technicians. As such, Futurex
places product identification labels on the exterior of all chassis that support the EXP1000. Figure 5
shows an example of a chassis label that reference the existence of an embedded EXP1000.
Figure 5 – Chassis Label
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Figure 6 through Figure 8 show typical placements of chassis labels.
Figure 6 – 1U Chassis Label Location
Figure 7 – 2U Chassis Label Location
Figure 8 – Securus 2 Label Location
13.2. FIRMWARE VERSIONING SCHEME AND IDENTIFICATION
The firmware version is made of four components concatenated with periods in the form of
Major.Audit.Branch.Release where:
 Major - The major number shall only be incremented when large scale changes have
been made to the release in question. Its value will be updated when Futurex believes the
scope of the changes warrants an update.
 Audit - The audit number shall only be incremented when changes have been made that
require an additional PCI security audit or when the firmware is submitted for audit to an
independent lab.
 Branch - This is incremented when a new branch is created. These changes are non-
security related.
 Release - This is incremented when a new release happens off a branch. These changes
are non-security related.
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The firmware version can be found on the LCD screen, web portal, or in Excrypt Manager. Please refer
to images below for reference. Also, provided in this view is the enabled feature identifier that may be
concatenated to the end of the firmware version and indicated by one or more of the following
characters: ‘i’ International Restriction Crypto, ‘c’ Clear PIN Support, or ‘k’ RSA Support.
Figure 9 - Firmware Version through Web Portal
Figure 10 - Firmware Version through Excrypt Manager
14. TLS PROTOCOLS
14.1. TLS PROTOCOLS SUPPORTED
The list below contains all the TLS Protocols supported.
 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
Note: While the component algorithms have been tested by the CAVP, the TLS protocol
itself has not been tested by the CAVP or CMVP.
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15. REFERENCES
1. FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 2001 May 25.
2. Annex A: Approved Security Functions for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules, Draft, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2010
January 27.
3. Annex B: Approved Protection Profiles for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules, Draft, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2007 June
14.
4. Annex C: Approved Random Number Generators for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, Draft, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 2009 July 21.
5. Annex D: Approved Key Establishment Techniques for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, Draft, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 2009 October 08.
6. Derived Test Requirements for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules, Draft, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2004 March 24.
7. Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program, National Institute of Standards and Technology
8. NIST Special Publication 800-17, Modes of Operation Validation System (MOVS):
Requirements and Procedures, National Institute of Standards and Technology, February
1998.
9. NIST Special Publication 800-20, Modes of Operation Validation System for the Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm (TMOVS): Requirements and Procedures, National Institute of
Standards and Technology, April 2000.
10. ANSI X9.31-1998, Digital Signature using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry (rDSA), Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc., 1998.
11. The RSA Validation System (RSAVS), National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2004
November 09.
12. FIPS PUB 180-2 with Change Notice 1, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 2004 February 25.
13. The Secure Hash Algorithm Validation System (SHAVS), National Institute of Standards
and Technology, 2004 July 22.
14. The Random Number Generator Validation System (RNGVS), National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 2005 January 31.
15. FIPS PUB 198, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 2002 March 06.
16. The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code Validation System (HMACVS), National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2004 December 03.
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16. GLOSSARY
Term Definition
ANSI American National Standards Institute
CA Certificate Authority
CO Cryptographic Officer
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DES Data Encryption Standard
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography (i.e. ECDH, ECDSA)
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FIPS PUB Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
HMAC-SHA-1 Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code using SHA-1
I2
C Inter-Integrated Circuit
IP Internet Protocol
LCD Liquid Crystal Display
MD5 Message Digest 5
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adelman public key algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
TRM Technical Reference Manual
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17. CSP ABBREVIATIONS
Term Definition
KEK Key Exchange Key
PMK Platform Master Key
SCEK Smart Card Encryption Key
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