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Aviat Networks, Inc.
Aviat Networks Eclipse Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version: 00E
Date: July 10, 2026
Aviat Networks, Inc.
200 Parker Drive, Suite C100A
Austin, Texas 78728
United States
(512) 265-3680
www.aviatnetworks.com
Prepared for Aviat Networks by
Rycombe Consulting Limited
http://www.rycombe.com +44 7780 682240
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Table of Contents
1 General.......................................................................................................................................................6
1.1 Overview.............................................................................................................................................6
1.2 Security Levels.....................................................................................................................................6
1.3 Additional Information........................................................................................................................6
2 Cryptographic Module Specification..........................................................................................................6
2.1 Description..........................................................................................................................................7
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ....................................................11
2.3 Excluded Components ......................................................................................................................13
2.4 Modes of Operation..........................................................................................................................13
2.5 Algorithms.........................................................................................................................................14
2.6 Security Function Implementations..................................................................................................16
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information.........................................................................................................19
2.8 RBG and Entropy...............................................................................................................................20
2.9 Key Generation .................................................................................................................................20
2.10 Key Establishment...........................................................................................................................20
2.11 Industry Protocols...........................................................................................................................21
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ............................................................................................................21
3.1 Ports and Interfaces..........................................................................................................................21
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.........................................................................................................23
4.1 Authentication Methods...................................................................................................................23
4.2 Roles..................................................................................................................................................25
4.3 Approved Services.............................................................................................................................25
4.4 Non-Approved Services.....................................................................................................................49
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................................49
4.6 Bypass Actions and Status.................................................................................................................50
4.7 Additional Information......................................................................................................................50
5 Software/Firmware Security....................................................................................................................51
5.1 Integrity Techniques .........................................................................................................................51
5.2 Initiate on Demand ...........................................................................................................................51
6 Operational Environment ........................................................................................................................51
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements..........................................................................51
7 Physical Security.......................................................................................................................................52
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required...................................................................................................52
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7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals.................................................................................................................52
8 Non-Invasive Security...............................................................................................................................59
8.1 Mitigation Techniques ......................................................................................................................59
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management...........................................................................................59
9.1 Storage Areas....................................................................................................................................59
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods...............................................................................................................59
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods ..................................................................................................................59
9.4 SSPs ...................................................................................................................................................59
10 Self-Tests................................................................................................................................................67
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests..............................................................................................................67
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests .....................................................................................................................68
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ........................................................................................................75
10.4 Error States .....................................................................................................................................76
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ..............................................................................................................................77
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ........................................................................77
11.2 Administrator Guidance..................................................................................................................78
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................................78
11.4 Design and Rules.............................................................................................................................78
Rules of Operation..............................................................................................................................78
11.5 Additional Information....................................................................................................................79
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................................79
References and Definitions.........................................................................................................................79
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels.................................................................................................................................6
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware....................................................................................13
Table 3 - Tested Module Identification – Hardware...................................................................................13
Table 4: Modes List and Description...........................................................................................................13
Table 5: Approved Algorithms ....................................................................................................................15
Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms.........................................................................................................15
Table 7: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................................19
Table 8: Ports and Interfaces ......................................................................................................................23
Table 9. LED Status Indicators.....................................................................................................................23
Table 10: Authentication Methods.............................................................................................................25
Table 11: Roles............................................................................................................................................25
Table 12: Approved Services.......................................................................................................................49
Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required.............................................................................................52
Table 14: Storage Areas ..............................................................................................................................59
Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods.........................................................................................................59
Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods ............................................................................................................59
Table 17: SSP Table 1 ..................................................................................................................................65
Table 18: SSP Table 2 ..................................................................................................................................67
Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests ..........................................................................................................68
Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests..................................................................................................................75
Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information ........................................................................................75
Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................................76
Table 23: Error States..................................................................................................................................77
Table 24 – References.................................................................................................................................80
Table 25 – Acronyms and Definitions .........................................................................................................80
List of Figures
Figure 1 - Example INUe................................................................................................................................7
Figure 2 - Module Hardware Variant Locations for INUe .............................................................................8
Figure 3 - Block Diagram .............................................................................................................................11
Figure 4 - Fan Air Filter Assembly ...............................................................................................................51
Figure 5 - INUe Enclosure............................................................................................................................53
Figure 6 - Tamper-Evident Seal Locations (Front).......................................................................................54
Figure 7 - Louver panel ...............................................................................................................................54
Figure 8 - Left Hand Louver Panel...............................................................................................................55
Figure 9 - Fitting the Left-Hand Louver Panel - 1........................................................................................55
Figure 10 - Fitting the Left-Hand Louver Panel – 1 and Position of “Top” Tamper-Evident Seals..............56
Figure 11 - Right-Hand Louver Panel ..........................................................................................................56
Figure 12 - Fitting the Right-Hand Louver Panel - 2....................................................................................56
Figure 13 - Fitting the Right-Hand Louver Panel – 2...................................................................................57
Figure 14 - Location of Security Seals on Louver Panel (Left Side) .............................................................58
Figure 15 - Location of Security Seals on Louver Panel (Right Side)...........................................................58
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for version 10.01.03 of the Aviat
Networks Eclipse Cryptographic Module. It contains the security rules under which the module must
operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for an overall Security Level 2 module.
1.2 Security Levels
The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the Module are as follows from Table 1:
Section Title Security Level
1 General 2
2 Cryptographic module specification 2
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 2
4 Roles, services, and authentication 2
5 Software/Firmware security 2
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 2
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 2
10 Self-tests 2
11 Life-cycle assurance 2
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 2
Table 1: Security Levels
1.3 Additional Information
For more information on Aviat Networks Eclipse please visit: https://aviatnetworks.com/products/all-
outdoor/.
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
This Aviat Networks, Inc. Aviat Networks Eclipse Cryptographic Module, hereafter denoted as the
Module. The Module is Aviat Networks Eclipse. Eclipse is an all-in-one next generation dual hybrid and
packet microwave radio. Eclipse provides superior networking features to address cost-optimized
mobile backhaul, public, and private networking applications, along with high performance RF and
Carrier Ethernet capabilities. Aviat Eclipse delivers a "complete" set of microwave nodal networking
capabilities. Eclipse delivers multi-directional integrated microwave switching within a single system,
supporting up to 6 RF or up to 45 Ethernet radios in a single rack unit.
Eclipse also supports both native TDM and Ethernet services and provides fully integrated Ethernet
switching and IP networking, eliminating the need for external TDM grooming or Ethernet aggregation
devices.
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Additionally, Eclipse can deliver greater than 2Gbps wireless transport with intelligent and fully
integrated bandwidth optimization features like XPIC, ACM, and data compression.
The cryptographic module includes the Eclipse Intelligent Node Unit (INUe) chassis.
The Eclipse INUe supports hardware redundancy to maintain data traffic by protecting a link with a
backup card that takes over in the event of hardware failure. It is possible to have up to 6 non-protected
links or:
• 1 protected/diversity and 4 non-protected links
• 2 protected/diversity and 2 non-protected links
• 3 protected/diversity links
The module provides data security by encrypting the payload traffic on the microwave link between up
to three radios. It also provides the Strong Encryption Suite for secure module management and uses
AES encryption to secure SNMP v3 management traffic.
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies or other markets that require FIPS 140-3
validated data encryption over a microwave radio link in a securely managed environment, the Module
is intended to be used in a microwave network.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: MultiChipStand
Module Characteristics:
The module runs on proprietary hardware. The hardware consists of a number of plug-in cards housed
in a proprietary chassis in 2RU format (88mm high x 482mm wide x 282.5mm deep).
The module consists of an Eclipse Node Control Card (NCC), one or more Radio access cards (RAC)s and a
number of other plug-in cards in combination. Only the NCC and RAC cards are involved with
cryptography. The remaining cards provide physical security via tamper evidence but do not provide any
other security-relevant functionality.
Figure 1 - Example INUe
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Figure 2 - Module Hardware Variant Locations for INUe
• Any of the Slots 1 through 10 may be covered with a blank panel. They shall not be left
unpopulated and shall have tamper seals applied per Section 7.2 below.
NCC: Node control card
FAN: Fan card (cooling)
RAC: Radio access card (supports the ODU/IRU)
DAC: Digital access card (user interfaces)
AUX: Auxiliary card (auxiliary data and alarm I/O)
NPC: Node protection card (NCC protection)
NCM: Node Convergence Module
Interface traffic options include:
• Ethernet, E1/DS1, E3/DS3, STM1/OC3
• Auxiliary data and alarm I/O
The minimum module configuration requires baseline components, INUe 2RU Chassis, an NCC card, at
least one suitable security relevant RAC card, a fan card and the FIPS installation kit to be installed in
order to support the Payload Encryption and Payload Decryption services.
Required Baseline Components Cards:
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ITEM * PART NUMBER
AND REVISION
FIRMWARE/FPGA VERSION
INFORMATION
BASELINE CONFIGURATION
QUANTITY IN
MODULE
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
FUNCTIONALITY
INUe 2RU
Chassis
EXE-002 N/A 1 No
Node
Controller Card
EXN-006-001 FPGA_NCCv4_PDH-
1.10.4.bit
FPGA_NCCv4_SDH-
2.8.3.bit
1 Yes
Fan Card EXF-103 N/A 1 No
FIPS
Installation Kit
Either:
179-530153-
001 (customer
fitted) or:
179-530153-
002 (partially
factory fitted)
N/A 1 No
Replacement
Seals
007-600331-
001
N/A 1 No
RAC 70 V2 EXR-700-002 FPGA_RAC7X_PDH_ACM-
2.37.13.bit
FPGA_RAC7X_SDH_ACM-
3.12.15.bit
0-6 Yes
RAC 7X V2 EXR-770-002 FPGA_RAC7X_PDH_ACM-
2.37.13.bit
FPGA_RAC7X_SDH_ACM-
3.12.15.bit
0-6 Yes
Aux EXA-001 FPGA_AUX_132.bit 0-1 No
DAC 155o v2 EXD-150-001 FPGA_DAC_155o_v2-
0.6.12.bit
0-6 No
DAC 155oM v3 EXD-155-001 FPGA_DAC_155_MUXV3-
0.6.1.bit
0-6 No
DAC GE3 EXD-181-002 FGPA_DACGEV3-9.0.30.bit 0-3 No
NCM EXD-400-002 FPGA_NCM-1.1.112.bit
FPGA_NCM_CES-
1.1.417.bit
FPGA_NCM_CES1-
1.1.474.bit
0-6 No
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ITEM * PART NUMBER
AND REVISION
FIRMWARE/FPGA VERSION
INFORMATION
BASELINE CONFIGURATION
QUANTITY IN
MODULE
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
FUNCTIONALITY
FPGA_NCM_HSF-
1.0.133.bit
FPGA_NCM_HSF_FIX-
1.1.152.bit
DAC
3XE3/DS3M,
MUXED TO
E1/DS1
EXD-331-001 FPGA_DAC_DS3_MUX-
10.0.20.bit
FPGA_DAC_E3_MUX_132.b
it
0-6 No
Table 1 - Required Baseline Components Cards
If a suitable card is not installed, then the Payload Encryption and Payload Decryption services are not
available. All other cards that can be installed in the 2RU chassis are interchangeable. No slot shall be
left unpopulated.
Optional hardware components:
ITEM* PART NUMBER
AND REVISION
FIRMWARE/FPGA VERSION
INFORMATION
QUANTITY
IN MODULE
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
FUNCTIONALITY
Fan filter kit,
2RU
131-501768-
001
N/A 0-1 No
Aux EXA-001 FPGA_AUX_132.bit 0-5 No
DAC 155o v2 EXD-150-001 FPGA_DAC_155o_v2-
0.6.12.bit
0-5 No
DAC 155oM v3 EXD-155-001 FPGA_DAC_155_MUXV3-
0.6.1.bit
0-5 No
DAC 16xV2 EXD-161-001 FPGA_DAC16V2_E1_DS1-
4.1.8.bit
0-5 No
DAC 16xV3 EXD-161-002 FPGA_DAC16V2_E1_DS1-
4.1.8.bit
0-5 No
DAC GE3 EXD-181-002 FGPA_DACGEV3-9.0.30.bit 0-5 No
NCM EXD-400-002 FPGA_NCM-1.1.112.bit
FPGA_NCM_CES-
1.1.417.bit
FPGA_NCM_CES1-
1.1.474.bit
FPGA_NCM_HSF-
1.0.133.bit
FPGA_NCM_HSF_FIX-
1.1.152.bit
0-5 No
NPC, high output EXS-002 N/A 0-1 No
Blank panel EXX-001 N/A 0-10 No
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Table 2 - Optional Hardware Components
Cryptographic Boundary:
The physical form of the Module is depicted in Figure 1. The Module is a multi-chip standalone
embodiment. The cryptographic boundary is the hardware chassis. The module is a hardware module
with firmware running on the NCC card within the chassis.
The processor of this platform executes all firmware. All firmware components of the module are
persistently stored within the device and, while executing, are stored in the device local RAM.
Optionally, an ASIC on the RAC card provides the necessary functionality to support the Payload
Encryption and Payload Decryption services.
The module has a Hardware module, so the cryptographic boundary is the same as the physical
perimeter of the INUe.
Figure 3 - Block Diagram
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
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Aviat Networks Eclipse Cryptographic Module cryptographic module, displayed as NCC-INUv4 under
view status, is tested on the following operational environment.
Model and/or Part Number Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
INUe 2RU Chassis (P/N EXE-002), Node
Controller Card (P/N EXN-006-001 with
FPGA_NCCv4_PDH-1.10.4.bit and
FPGA_NCCv4_SDH-2.8.3.bit), Fan Card (P/N
EXF-103), FIPS Installation Kit (P/N 179-
530153-001 or 179-530153-002),
Replacement Seals (P/N 007-600331-001),
RAC 70 V2 (P/N EXR-700-002 with
FPGA_RAC7X_PDH_ACM-2.37.13.bit and
FPGA_RAC7X_SDH_ACM-3.12.15.bit), RAC
7X V2 (P/N EXR-770-002 with
FPGA_RAC7X_PDH_ACM-2.37.13.bit and
FPGA_RAC7X_SDH_ACM-3.12.15.bit), Aux
(P/N EXA-001 with FPGA_AUX_132.bit), DAC
155o v2 (P/A EXD-150-001 with
FPGA_DAC_155o_v2-0.6.12.bit), DAC 155oM
v3 (P/N EXD-155-001 with
FPGA_DAC_155_MUXV3-0.6.1.bit), DAC GE3
(P/N EXD-181-002 with FGPA_DACGEV3-
9.0.30.bit), NCM (P/N EXD-400-002 with
FPGA_NCM-1.1.112.bit, FPGA_NCM_CES-
1.1.417.bit, FPGA_NCM_CES1-1.1.474.bit,
FPGA_NCM_HSF-1.0.133.bit,
FPGA_NCM_HSF_FIX-1.1.152.bit), DAC
3XE3/DS3M, MUXED TO E1/DS1 (P/N EXD-
331-001 with FPGA_DAC_DS3_MUX-
10.0.20.bit and
FPGA_DAC_E3_MUX_132.bit), Fan filter kit,
2RU (P/N 131-501768-001), Aux (P/N EXA-
001 with FPGA_AUX_132.bit), DAC 155o v2
(P/N EXD-150-001 with FPGA_DAC_155o_v2-
0.6.12.bit), DAC 155oM v3 (P/N EXD-155-001
with FPGA_DAC_155_MUXV3-0.6.1.bit), DAC
16xV2 (P/N EXD-161-001 with
FPGA_DAC16V2_E1_DS1-4.1.8.bit), DAC
16xV3 (P/N EXD-161-002 with
FPGA_DAC16V2_E1_DS1-4.1.8.bit), DAC GE3
(P/N EXD-181-002 with FGPA_DACGEV3-
9.0.30.bit), NCM (P/N EXD-400-002 with
FPGA_NCM-1.1.112.bit FPGA_NCM_CES-
1.1.417.bit, FPGA_NCM_CES1-1.1.474.bit,
FPGA_NCM_HSF-1.0.133.bit,
FPGA_NCM_HSF_FIX-1.1.152.bit), NPC, high
Please see
under
"Model/Part
Number(s)".
10.01.03
with
Bootloader
version
1.0.549
NXP
LS1026A
(Arm
Cortex A72)
N/A
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Model and/or Part Number Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
output (P/N EXS-002), Blank panel (P/N EXX-
001)
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
Table 3 - Tested Module Identification – Hardware
2.3 Excluded Components
No components are excluded from the cryptographic boundary.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
Mode
Approved mode of
operation
Approved NCC solid green status LED. Once configured, the
module only has a single mode of operation
Table 4: Modes List and Description
The module does not have a degraded mode of operation.
Mode Change Instructions and Status:
The module is originally non-compliant and must be configured to operate in an approved mode of
operation. The module only operates in an approved mode of operation once it is set into the
“Approved Mode” as follows:
1. Power up NCC.
2. The end user needs to securely download the Eclipse Portal firmware (also referred to as
“Portal” and “Craft Tool” within this SP) from the module and install it on the PC used for
the configuration of the module. The Eclipse Portal Installer, version 08.19.00, can be
obtained at https://arc.aviatnetworks.com/s/qfjsmfm9wqb256hghbhqfhk.
3. Connect to NCC with Portal.
4. Install S/W license containing Strong Security, FIPS compliance, and optional Payload
Encryption. The part numbers for this module’s licenses are EZF-04-EC.
5. Set security mode to “FIPS”.
6. The CO is prompted to enter the default credentials and click OK to confirm.
7. Hit the "Send" button to accept the configuration changes.
8. NCC reboots.
9. Connect to NCC using Portal.
10. Log in to NCC using default Crypto-Officer credentials documented in the user manual and
when prompted update the default login credentials. Upon initial login, the crypto officer's
password must be changed before access is granted.
11. Configure desired security settings and add local users and/or RADIUS servers as required.
12. By default, the FIPS non-compliant entropy mode alarm is raised against NCC.
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13. Login as a user with Crypto-Officer permissions and enter a hex string containing between
196 and 980 bytes, the entropy input string, to be used as entropy, then press “Send”.
14. The module will zeroize internal keys and reboot. Once restarted the module will be using
the supplied entropy source.
15. By default, Payload Encryption is disabled, Bypass warning alarm raised against RAC.
16. Log in as a user with Crypto-Officer permissions.
17. Perform RAC configuration to establish radio links and enable Payload Encryption.
For more details, please see the Eclipse User Manual Addendum for FIPS 140-3.
Once the module has been commissioned, the front panel of the module should be sealed, with no
visible gaps and tamper evident seals applied as shown in Figure 6. The tamper-evident seals shall be
installed for the module to operate in the approved mode of operation.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CBC A6135 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CCM A6136 Key Length - 256 SP 800-38C
AES-CCM A6537 Key Length - 256 SP 800-38C
AES-CFB128 A6135 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB C5 Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A6135 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External
IV Generation Mode -
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38D
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6135 Curve - P-256, P-384
Secret Generation Mode - extra bits
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6135 Curve - P-256, P-384 FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6135 Curve - P-256, P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384
Component - No
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6135 Curve - P-256, P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384
FIPS 186-5
Hash DRBG A6135 Prediction Resistance - Yes
Mode - SHA2-256
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
HMAC-SHA-1 A6135 Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A6135 Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
HMAC-SHA2-384 A6135 Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512 A6135 Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A6135 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-
256, P-384
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-
5)
A6135 Modulo - 2048, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
FIPS 186-5
SHA-1 A6135 Message Length - Message Length: 160, 0-
65536 Increment 2048
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A6135 Message Length - Message Length: 256, 0-
65536 Increment 2048
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A6135 Message Length - Message Length: 384, 0-
65536 Increment 2048
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A6135 Message Length - Message Length: 512, 0-
65536 Increment 2048
FIPS 180-4
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627 (CVL)
A6135 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384 SP 800-135
Rev. 1
TLS v1.3 KDF (CVL) A6135 HMAC Algorithm - SHA2-384
KDF Running Modes - DHE, PSK, PSK-DHE
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
Table 5: Approved Algorithms
The Module implements the FIPS Approved cryptographic algorithms listed in the table below.
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
The Module implements the Vendor Affirmed cryptographic algorithms listed in .
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG -
Asym
ECDSA P-256, P-384: Asymmetric: N/A SP800-133rev2 Section 4
Example 1 and IG D.H
CKG -
Sym
AES-256-CBC, AES-128-CFB128, AES-256-
GCM, AES-256-CCM: Symmetric :
N/A SP800-133rev2 Section 4
Example 1 and IG D.H
Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
The module uses a [133r2] compliant cryptographic key generation method for generating both
asymmetric and symmetric keys.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
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The module does not implement any Non-Approved, but Allowed Algorithms in the Approved Mode of
Operation.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
The module does not implement any Non-Approved, but Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed
in the approved mode of operation.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
The module does not implement any Non-Approved Algorithms, Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of
Operation.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen (SFI #3)
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
Asymmetric Key
Pair Generation
(and verification)
IG C.E: Hash DRBG:
(A6135)
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6135)
SHA2-256:
(A6135)
SHA2-384:
(A6135)
CKG - Asym: ()
AsymKeyPair-
KeyVer (SFI #17)
AsymKeyPair-
KeyVer
Asymmetric Key
Pair Verification
IG C.E: Hash DRBG:
(A6135)
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6135)
SHA2-256:
(A6135)
SHA2-384:
(A6135)
BC-AUTH (SFI #8) BC-Auth Symmetric
Encryption
Authenticated
Block Cipher:
AES-GCM:
(A6135)
AES-CBC: (A6135)
BC-AUTH-DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-Auth Symmetric
Decryption
Authenticated
Block Cipher:
AES-GCM:
(A6135)
AES-CBC: (A6135)
BC-AUTH-DEC-
CCM1 (SFI #21)
BC-Auth Symmetric
Decryption
(FPGA1)
Authenticated
Block Cipher:
AES-CCM: (A6136)
AES-ECB: (C5)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
BC-AUTH-DEC-
CCM2 (SFI #23)
BC-Auth Symmetric
Decryption
(FPGA2)
Authenticated
Block Cipher:
AES-CCM: (A6537)
AES-ECB: (C5)
BC-AUTH-ENC-
CCM1 (SFI #20)
BC-Auth Symmetric
Encryption
(FPGA1)
Authenticated
Block Cipher:
AES-CCM: (A6136)
AES-ECB: (C5)
BC-AUTH-ENC-
CCM2 (SFI #22)
BC-Auth Symmetric
Encryption
(FPGA2)
Authenticated
Block Cipher:
AES-CCM: (A6537)
AES-ECB: (C5)
BC-UNAUTH (SFI
#7)
BC-UnAuth Symmetric
Encryption
Unauthenticated
Block Cipher:
AES-CBC: (A6135)
AES-CFB128:
(A6135)
BC-UNAUTH-DEC
(SFI #15)
BC-UnAuth Symmetric
Decryption
Unauthenticated
Block Cipher :
AES-CBC: (A6135)
AES-CFB128:
(A6135)
CKG (SFI #2) CKG Symmetric Key
Generation
IG D.L:
IG D.R:
Hash DRBG:
(A6135)
CKG - Sym: ()
DigSig-SigGen (SFI
#5)
DigSig-SigGen Digital Signature
Generation
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6135)
SHA2-256:
(A6135)
SHA2-384:
(A6135)
Hash DRBG:
(A6135)
DigSig-SigVer (SFI
#6)
DigSig-SigVer Digital Signature
Verification
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6135)
SHA2-256:
(A6135)
SHA2-384:
(A6135)
Hash DRBG:
(A6135)
DRBG (SFI #14) DRBG Deterministic
Random Bit
Generator
Security Strength
= 256:
Hash DRBG:
(A6135)
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A6135)
SHA2-256:
(A6135)
Integrity (SFI #11) DigSig-SigVer Digital Signature
Verification
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6135)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SHA2-512:
(A6135)
KAS-ECC-SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-SSC Shared Secret
Calculation
Shared Secret
Calculation
[56Ar3]:
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6135)
KAS-TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS-135KDF Key Derivation TLS 1.2 Key
Derivation:
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627: (A6135)
KAS-TLS13KDF
(SFI #12)
KAS-135KDF Key Derivation TLS 1.3 Key
Derivation:
TLS v1.3 KDF:
(A6135)
HMAC-SHA2-384:
(A6135)
SHA2-384:
(A6135)
KAS1 (SFI #18) KAS-Full SSP Agreement
with TLS 1.2
SSP Agreement :
IG D.F:
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6135)
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627: (A6135)
SHA2-384:
(A6135)
KAS2 (SFI #19) KAS-Full SSP Agreement
with TLS 1.3
SSP Agreement:
IG D.F:
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6135)
TLS v1.3 KDF:
(A6135)
HMAC-SHA2-384:
(A6135)
SHA2-384:
(A6135)
MAC (SFI #9) MAC Message
Authentication
IG C.B: HMAC-SHA-1:
(A6135)
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A6135)
HMAC-SHA2-384:
(A6135)
HMAC-SHA2-512:
(A6135)
SHA-1: (A6135)
SHA2-256:
(A6135)
SHA2-384:
(A6135)
SHA2-512:
(A6135)
SAML (SFI #10) DigSig-SigVer Digital Signature
Verification
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
(A6135)
SHA2-256:
(A6135)
SHA (SFI #1) SHA Secure Hash
Standard
IG C.B: SHA-1: (A6135)
SHA2-256:
(A6135)
SHA2-384:
(A6135)
SHA2-512:
(A6135)
Table 7: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
AES GCM IV Uniqueness
FIPS140-3 IG C.H, Option 1
The AES GCM implementation generates GCM IVs deterministically as specified in [38D] Section 8.2.1
using the following protocols:
TLS 1.2
The Module is compliant with TLS v1.2 and [52r2], Section 3.3.1. The Module supports TLS 1.2 GCM
Cipher Suites for TLS, as described in RFCs 5116, 5246, 5288 and 5289 and shall only be used for the TLS
protocol version 1.2 to be compliant with FIPS140-3 IG C.H, scenario 1.
The module uses the extended master secret in the TLS 1.2 KDF. The module uses the RFC 7627 version
of the TLS 1.2 KDF.
The generated IV is only used in the context of the AES-GCM encryption executing the provisions of the
protocol within which the IV was generated. The IV is generated wholly within the module boundary.
The counter portion of the IV is set by the Module within its cryptographic boundary.
The nonce_explicit part of the IV is incremented each time an AES GCM computation is performed. The
Module establishes a new session key when the nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts the maximum
number of possible values (232
-1). This meets the [38D]’s collision probability requirement.
In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM
encryption/decryption shall be established.
No parts of this protocol, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
The module uses DTLS 1.2 to tunnel to a remote module. It uses the following cipher suite for this:
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
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TLS 1.3
The module is compliant with TLS v1.3 and [52r2], section 3.3.1, RFC 8446, TLS version 1.3 cipher suites
and FIPS 140-3 IG C.H scenario 5.
The generated IV is only used in the context of the AES-GCM encryption executing the provisions of the
protocol within which the IV was generated. The IV is generated wholly within the module boundary.
The counter portion of the IV is set by the Module within its cryptographic boundary.
The nonce_explicit part of the IV is incremented each time an AES GCM computation is performed. The
Module establishes a new session key when the nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts the maximum
number of possible values (232
-1). This meets the SP 800-38D collision probability requirement.
In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM
encryption/decryption shall be established.
No parts of this protocol, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
KAS-SSC [56Ar3] - Per [IG] D.F Scenario 2 path (2), compliant with the derivation of a shared secret Z in
one or more of the key agreement schemes in Section 6 of SP 800-56Arev3.
SNMPv3
The module does not contain an SNMP KDF. SNMP keys are derived externally to the module, and so no
claims are made regarding SNMP v3 management traffic.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
The module does not contain a validated entropy source.
The entropy for seeding the SP 800-90Ar1 DRBG is determined by the user of the module, which is
outside of the module’s cryptographic boundary. To be compliant, the target application shall supply at
least 256 bits of entropy in order to meet the security strength required for the random number
generation mechanism. Since entropy is loaded passively into the module, there is no assurance of the
minimum strength of generated SSPs (e.g., keys).
2.9 Key Generation
The module implements the following Key Generation Functions.
SFI #2, SFI #3
2.10 Key Establishment
Key Agreement Information
The module implements the following Key Agreement Functions.
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SFI #4, SFI #12
Key Transport Information
The module implements the following Key Transport Functions.
SFI #4, SFI #12
2.11 Industry Protocols
Protocol * Key Exchange Server/ Host Auth Cipher Integrity
TLS
(IG D.F and
[52r2])
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS v1.3
Ephemeral ECDH AES-GCM-256
TLS
(IG D.F and
[135r1])
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS v1.2
Ephemeral ECDH AES-GCM-256
TLS
(IG D.F and
[135r1])
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 TLS v1.2
Ephemeral ECDH AES-CBC-256
Table 3 - Industry Protocols
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
The Module’s ports and associated FIPS defined logical interface categories are listed below.
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
NCC RJ-45
connector
Data Input
Data
Output
Control
Input
Data Input: The NCC component has six NMS connectors, providing
Ethernet access for Portal or ProVision
(http://www.aviatnetworks.com/products/network-
managementoss/provision/). Pin assignments represent industry-
standard LAN cable assembly for a 10/100Base-T, RJ-45 connector; Data
Output: As per Data Input; Control Input: Service requests
NCC V.24
connector
Data Input
Data
Output
Control
Input
Data Input: A V.24 connector and a USB port providing serial data
access for Portal; Data Output: As per Data Input; Control Input: Service
requests
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Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
NCC USB
connector
Data Input
Data
Output
Control
Input
Data Input: A USB port providing serial data access for Portal; Data
Output: As per Data Input; Control Input: Service requests
RAC RJ-45
connector
Data Input
Data
Output
Control
Input
Data Input: Data enter and leave RAC adapters via a single RJ-45
Ethernet socket and connects to a DAC GE3 RJ-45 socket; Data Output:
As per Data Input; Control Input: Not Applicable
RAC I/F
connector
Data Input
Data
Output
Control
Input
Data Input: Data enter and leave RAC adapters via a single I/F socket
which connect the RAC to a radio transceiver so that the data can be
sent and received on a microwave link; Data Output: As per Data Input;
Control Input: Not Applicable
DAC GE3 RJ-
45 connector
Data Input
Data
Output
Control
Input
Data Input: Data enters and leaves DAC GE3 adapters via six RJ-45
Ethernet sockets; Data Output: As per Data Input; Control Input: Not
Applicable
DAC 16x
TDM
connector
Data Input
Data
Output
Control
Input
Data Input: Data enters and leaves DAC 16xV2 or DAC 16xV3 adapters
via two TDM connectors each allowing up to 8 discrete TDM channels;
Data Output: As per Data Input; Control Input: Not Applicable
NCM TDM
connector
Data Input
Data
Output
Control
Input
Data Input: Data enters and leaves NCM adapters via two TDM
connectors each allowing up to 16 discrete TDM channels; Data Output:
As per Data Input; Control Input: Not Applicable
DAC
3xE3/DS3M
BNC
connector
Data Input
Data
Output
Control
Input
Data Input: Data enters and leaves DAC 3xE3/DS3M adapters via three
pairs of TDM connectors. Each pair contains an input and output
interface; Data Output: As per Data Input; Control Input: Not Applicable
DAC 155oV2
optical
transceiver
Data Input
Data
Output
Control
Input
Data Input: Data enters and leaves DAC 155oV2 adapters via two
optical transceivers. Each transceiver contains an input and output
interface; Data Output: As per Data Input; Control Input: Not Applicable
DAC
155oMV3
optical
transceiver
Data Input
Data
Output
Control
Input
Data Input: Data enters and leaves DAC 155oMV3 adapters via two
optical transceivers. Each transceiver contains an input and output
interface; Data Output: As per Data Input; Control Input: Not Applicable
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Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
LEDs Status
Output
Service status (see "LED status indicators" table)
NCC power
interface and
optional NPC
Power Power input limits are -40.5 to -60 V DC. The power connector is a D-
Sub M/F 2W2. The positive DC return pin is connected to chassis
ground.
Table 8: Ports and Interfaces
See Figure 5 for an image of the physical ports.
Note: The module does not support Control Output.
LED status indicators:
EVENT * NCC STATUS LED NCC TEST LED RAC STATUS LED
Pre-operational self-tests in progress Solid green Flashing orange Solid red
Zeroization Solid green Flashing orange Solid red
Self-tests pass/Approved mode enabled Solid green Solid green Solid green
Pre-operational self-test failure Solid red Off Solid red
Table 9. LED Status Indicators
When the three indicated LEDs are green, the module is in the Approved mode of operation.
The use of the Approved mode locks out the use of non-Approved algorithms.
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method
Name
Description Security Mechanism Strength
Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
Locally
defined
passwords
Roles are authenticated
locally to the module with
a username and password
The passwords for the
User and Crypto Officer
roles, authenticating via
the Portal GUI, are either
strict: alphanumeric
strings of between 15 and
32 alphanumeric
characters comprised of at
least one uppercase and
one lowercase letter, one
special character and one
number or standard: 8-32
characters in length with
Strict: 1 in
3.95x10^29
Standard: 1
in 6.1x10^15
Assuming 10
attempts per
minute, strict:
1 in
3.95x10^28
and standard:
1 in 6.1x10^14
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Method
Name
Description Security Mechanism Strength
Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
at least 1 number and 1
letter. Identity based
authentication. Strict
passwords: 32 special
characters 26 upper case
26 lower case 10 numbers
Each position has 94
possible options. 15
characters give 94^15
(3.95 x 10^29) passwords.
Standard passwords: 32
special characters 26
upper case 26 lower case
10 numbers Each position
has 94 possible options. 8
characters gives 94^8 (6.1
x 10^15) passwords
RADIUS Username and password
are authenticated
remotely by a RADIUS
server and a centrally held
database of users and
credentials. If the user
identity and password
match stored values, then
authentication is
successful.
TLS tunneled RADIUS
authentication (role-based
for the purposes of FIPS
140-3). RADIUS is also
secured by a shared
secret. User
authentication relies on a
password. Overall
strength of the security
mechanism is provided by
RADIUS password.
RADIUS passwords are a
minimum of 16
characters. Each character
has 94 possible options
(see locally defined
passwords). 16 characters
give 94^16 (3.72 x 10^31)
passwords.
RADIUS
password: 1
in 3.72 x
10^31
The module
only allows
three
consecutive
failures in a
single one-
minute
period. 1 in
1.24 x 10^31
SAML ADFS server may be used
for operator
authentication, in which
case no usernames and
passwords are sent from
Eclipse. The user is simply
redirected to the server
URL in a browser to enter
their details. Upon
SAML 2.0 - RSA signature
verification. Role-based
for the purposes of FIPS
140-3. RSA provides at
least 112 bits of security
strength (SFI #10).
1 in 2^112
(5.19 x
10^33
The module
only allows
three
consecutive
failures in a
single one-
minute
period. 1 in
1.73 x 10^33
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Method
Name
Description Security Mechanism Strength
Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
successful authentication,
a SAML 2.0 token is sent
to Eclipse which contains a
username and credentials
along with time range the
token is good for. No
password is contained
within the token.
Table 10: Authentication Methods
The Module’s authentication methods are listed above.
4.2 Roles
The Module supports three distinct operator roles, User, maintenance and Crypto Officer (CO). The
cryptographic module enforces the separation of roles using operator authentication for user and CO
roles. The maintenance role supports the capability for users to add or remove plug-in cards to the
module to provide extra bandwidth or different data formats. It also allows for the insertion and
removal of an optional fan air filter. Crypto-Officer support is required to perform Maintenance services.
The table below lists all operator roles supported by the Module.
The Module supports concurrent operators. Up to five operators may be logged on to the module at any
one time. It is possible for an operator in the User role and one in the Crypto-Officer role to be logged
on concurrently. Previous authentications are cleared on power cycle. Operator authentication data
entered manually is obscured using “*” characters to represent each authentication character.
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Role CO Locally defined passwords
RADIUS
SAML
User Role User Locally defined passwords
RADIUS
SAML
Maintenance Role Maintenance None
Table 11: Roles
4.3 Approved Services
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
AUTH1 Craft tool
authentication -
local user access
Event
log
Login
credentials
via craft
tool GUI
Craft tool
GUI
feedback
and event
log entry
indicating
success/fail
ure
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyVer
(SFI #17)
BC-AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
UNAUTH-
DEC (SFI
#15)
CKG (SFI
#2)
DigSig-
SigGen (SFI
#5)
DigSig-
SigVer (SFI
#6)
DRBG (SFI
#14)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS-
TLS13KDF
(SFI #12)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
KAS2 (SFI
#19)
MAC (SFI
#9)
SHA (SFI
#1)
User
- TLS
Certificate:
E
- TLS HMAC
Keys: G,W,E
- TLS Private
Key: E
- TLS Tunnel
Keys: G,W,E
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
AUTH2 Craft tool
authentication -
RADIUS
Event
log
Login
credentials
via craft
tool GUI
sent to
RADIUS
server and
then
RADIUS
response
Craft tool
GUI
feedback
and event
log entry
indicating
success/fail
ure
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyVer
(SFI #17)
BC-AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
UNAUTH-
DEC (SFI
#15)
CKG (SFI
#2)
DigSig-
SigGen (SFI
#5)
DigSig-
SigVer (SFI
#6)
DRBG (SFI
#14)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS-
TLS13KDF
(SFI #12)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
KAS2 (SFI
#19)
MAC (SFI
#9)
SHA (SFI
#1)
User
- TLS
Certificate:
E
- TLS HMAC
Keys: G,W,E
- TLS Private
Key: E
- TLS Tunnel
Keys: G,W,E
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
AUTH3 Craft tool
authentication -
ADFS
authentication
Event
log
SAML
token from
ADFS
server
containing
user
credentials
Craft tool
GUI
feedback
and event
log entry
indicating
success/fail
ure
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyVer
(SFI #17)
BC-AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
UNAUTH-
DEC (SFI
#15)
CKG (SFI
#2)
DigSig-
SigGen (SFI
#5)
DigSig-
SigVer (SFI
#6)
DRBG (SFI
#14)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS-
TLS13KDF
(SFI #12)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
KAS2 (SFI
#19)
MAC (SFI
#9)
SAML (SFI
#10)
User
- ADFS
Server
Certificate:
W,E
- TLS
Certificate:
E
- TLS HMAC
Keys: G,W,E
- TLS Private
Key: E
- TLS Tunnel
Keys: G,W,E
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
SHA (SFI
#1)
AUTH4 SNMPv3 SNMPv
3
request
status
code
Secure
SNMPv3
session
request
Secure
SNMPv3
session
response
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
UNAUTH-
DEC (SFI
#15)
MAC (SFI
#9)
User
- SNMPv3
Authenticati
on Key: R,E
- SNMPv3
Privacy Key:
R,E
Crypto
library
initializatio
n
Pre-operational
self-tests
LED Power Event log
entry
indicating
success/fail
ure
None Crypto
Officer
- Hash DRBG
C and V: Z
- Hash DRBG
Seed: Z
- Payload
Encryption
DTLS HMAC
Keys: Z
- Payload
Encryption
DTLS Tunnel
Keys: Z
- Payload
Encryption
Key: Z
- Payload
Encryption
Private Key:
Z
- SNMPv3
Authenticati
on Key: Z
- SNMPv3
Privacy Key:
Z
- TLS HMAC
Keys: Z
- TLS Private
Key: Z
- TLS Tunnel
Keys: Z
ENT1 Entropy
Configuration and
Event
log
Configurati
on change
Craft tool
GUI and/or
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyGen
Crypto
Officer
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
storage of external
entropy
via craft
tool GUI
Event log
entry
(SFI #3)
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyVer
(SFI #17)
BC-AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
UNAUTH-
DEC (SFI
#15)
CKG (SFI
#2)
DigSig-
SigGen (SFI
#5)
DigSig-
SigVer (SFI
#6)
DRBG (SFI
#14)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS-
TLS13KDF
(SFI #12)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
KAS2 (SFI
#19)
MAC (SFI
#9)
SHA (SFI
#1)
- Entropy
Input String:
R
- TLS
Certificate:
E
- TLS HMAC
Keys: G,W,E
- TLS Private
Key: E
- TLS Tunnel
Keys: G,W,E
ENT2 Entropy, Entropy
pool management
Event
log
Configurati
on change
Event log
entry
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
Crypto
Officer
- TLS
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 31 of 80
Aviat Networks, Inc. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
via craft
tool GUI
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyVer
(SFI #17)
BC-AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
UNAUTH-
DEC (SFI
#15)
CKG (SFI
#2)
DigSig-
SigGen (SFI
#5)
DigSig-
SigVer (SFI
#6)
DRBG (SFI
#14)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS-
TLS13KDF
(SFI #12)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
KAS2 (SFI
#19)
MAC (SFI
#9)
SHA (SFI
#1)
Certificate:
E
- TLS HMAC
Keys: G,W,E
- TLS Private
Key: E
- TLS Tunnel
Keys: G,W,E
Firmware Logic for pre-
operational
firmware integrity
tests
LED Power or
loading of
new
firmware
Event log
entry
indicating
Integrity
(SFI #11)
SHA (SFI
#1)
Crypto
Officer
- Integrity
key: E
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 32 of 80
Aviat Networks, Inc. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
via craft
tool GUI
success/fail
ure
Firmware
Upgrade
Updates the
firmware on within
the module and
reboots the
module to allow
the new firmware
to become
operational. Upon
failure the module
rolls back to the
previous firmware
LED Update
request on
a selected
image via
the craft
tool GUI
Event log
entry
indicating
success/fail
ure
Integrity
(SFI #11)
SHA (SFI
#1)
Crypto
Officer
- Integrity
key: R
LOG1 Secure logging
Enable/disable
secure event logs
visible to non-
crypto users
Event
log
Configurati
on request
via craft
tool GUI
Craft tool
GUI and/or
Event log
entry
indicating
status
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyVer
(SFI #17)
BC-AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
UNAUTH-
DEC (SFI
#15)
CKG (SFI
#2)
DigSig-
SigGen (SFI
#5)
DigSig-
SigVer (SFI
#6)
DRBG (SFI
#14)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
Crypto
Officer
- TLS
Certificate:
E
- TLS HMAC
Keys: G,W,E
- TLS Private
Key: E
- TLS Tunnel
Keys: G,W,E
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 33 of 80
Aviat Networks, Inc. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
(SFI #4)
KAS-
TLS13KDF
(SFI #12)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
KAS2 (SFI
#19)
MAC (SFI
#9)
SHA (SFI
#1)
LOG2 Secure logging
Event logs over TLS
to remote logging
server
Event
log
Configurati
on request
via craft
tool GUI
Craft tool
GUI and/or
Event log
entry
indicating
status
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyVer
(SFI #17)
BC-AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
UNAUTH-
DEC (SFI
#15)
CKG (SFI
#2)
DigSig-
SigGen (SFI
#5)
DigSig-
SigVer (SFI
#6)
DRBG (SFI
#14)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
Crypto
Officer
- TLS
Certificate:
E
- TLS HMAC
Keys: G,W,E
- TLS Private
Key: E
- TLS Tunnel
Keys: G,W,E
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 34 of 80
Aviat Networks, Inc. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
KAS-
TLS13KDF
(SFI #12)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
KAS2 (SFI
#19)
MAC (SFI
#9)
SHA (SFI
#1)
PAC1 Port access
control: NMS
Ethernet ports and
forwarding
enable/disable
Event
log
Configurati
on request
via craft
tool GUI
Craft tool
GUI and/or
Event log
entry
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyVer
(SFI #17)
BC-AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
UNAUTH-
DEC (SFI
#15)
CKG (SFI
#2)
DigSig-
SigGen (SFI
#5)
DigSig-
SigVer (SFI
#6)
DRBG (SFI
#14)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS-
Crypto
Officer
- TLS
Certificate:
E
- TLS HMAC
Keys: G,W,E
- TLS Private
Key: E
- TLS Tunnel
Keys: G,W,E
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 35 of 80
Aviat Networks, Inc. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
TLS13KDF
(SFI #12)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
KAS2 (SFI
#19)
MAC (SFI
#9)
SHA (SFI
#1)
PAC2 Port access
control: USB port
Event
log
Configurati
on request
via craft
tool GUI
Craft tool
GUI and/or
Event log
entry
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyVer
(SFI #17)
BC-AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
UNAUTH-
DEC (SFI
#15)
CKG (SFI
#2)
DigSig-
SigGen (SFI
#5)
DigSig-
SigVer (SFI
#6)
DRBG (SFI
#14)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS-
TLS13KDF
Crypto
Officer
- TLS
Certificate:
E
- TLS HMAC
Keys: G,W,E
- TLS Private
Key: E
- TLS Tunnel
Keys: G,W,E
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 36 of 80
Aviat Networks, Inc. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
(SFI #12)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
KAS2 (SFI
#19)
MAC (SFI
#9)
SHA (SFI
#1)
PAC3 Port access
control: V.24
Maintenance port
Event
log
Configurati
on request
via craft
tool GUI
Craft tool
GUI and/or
Event log
entry
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyVer
(SFI #17)
BC-AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
UNAUTH-
DEC (SFI
#15)
CKG (SFI
#2)
DigSig-
SigGen (SFI
#5)
DigSig-
SigVer (SFI
#6)
DRBG (SFI
#14)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS-
TLS13KDF
(SFI #12)
Crypto
Officer
- TLS
Certificate:
E
- TLS HMAC
Keys: G,W,E
- TLS Private
Key: E
- TLS Tunnel
Keys: G,W,E
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 37 of 80
Aviat Networks, Inc. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
KAS2 (SFI
#19)
MAC (SFI
#9)
SHA (SFI
#1)
PE1 Payload encryption
services: Power-on
and bypass self-
tests, conditional
bypass tests
LED Power and
request to
enable
payload
encryption
Event log
entry
SHA (SFI
#1)
Crypto
Officer
- Payload
Encryption
DTLS HMAC
Keys: Z
- Payload
Encryption
DTLS Tunnel
Keys: Z
- Payload
Encryption
Key: Z
PE2 Payload encryption
services: Key
handling:
generation/exchan
ge
Event
log
Power and
request to
enable
payload
encryption
and timed
or manual
request to
regenerate
key
Event log
entry
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyVer
(SFI #17)
BC-AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-AUTH-
DEC-CCM1
(SFI #21)
BC-AUTH-
DEC-CCM2
(SFI #23)
BC-AUTH-
ENC-CCM1
(SFI #20)
BC-AUTH-
ENC-CCM2
(SFI #22)
CKG (SFI
#2)
Crypto
Officer
- Payload
Encryption
Certificate:
G,R,W,E,Z
- Payload
Encryption
Key: G,W,Z
- Payload
Encryption
Private Key:
G,R,W,E
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 38 of 80
Aviat Networks, Inc. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
DigSig-
SigGen (SFI
#5)
DigSig-
SigVer (SFI
#6)
DRBG (SFI
#14)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
MAC (SFI
#9)
SHA (SFI
#1)
PE3 Payload encryption
services: Control
functions: bypass
enable
Event
log
Request to
enable or
disable
payload
encryption
Event log
entry
None Crypto
Officer
PE4 Payload encryption
services:
Monitoring
functions: fault and
alarm monitoring
Event
log
None Event log
entry
None Crypto
Officer
TLS1 Portal access, web
server access
Event
log
Craft tool
access over
Network
interface
Event log
indicating
successful
connection
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyVer
(SFI #17)
BC-AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
UNAUTH-
User
- TLS
Certificate:
E
- TLS HMAC
Keys: G,W,E
- TLS Private
Key: E
- TLS Tunnel
Keys: G,W,E
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 39 of 80
Aviat Networks, Inc. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
DEC (SFI
#15)
CKG (SFI
#2)
DigSig-
SigGen (SFI
#5)
DigSig-
SigVer (SFI
#6)
DRBG (SFI
#14)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS-
TLS13KDF
(SFI #12)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
KAS2 (SFI
#19)
MAC (SFI
#9)
SHA (SFI
#1)
TLS2 DTLS for PE key
exchange
Event
log
Request to
enable
payload
encryption
and timed
or manual
request to
regenerate
PE key
Event log
entry
indicating
attempt to
change PE
keys
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyVer
(SFI #17)
BC-AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-AUTH-
DEC-CCM1
(SFI #21)
BC-AUTH-
DEC-CCM2
(SFI #23)
Crypto
Officer
- Payload
Encryption
DTLS HMAC
Keys:
G,R,W,E
- Payload
Encryption
DTLS Tunnel
Keys:
G,R,W,E
- Payload
Encryption
Key:
G,R,W,E
- Payload
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 40 of 80
Aviat Networks, Inc. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
BC-AUTH-
ENC-CCM1
(SFI #20)
BC-AUTH-
ENC-CCM2
(SFI #22)
CKG (SFI
#2)
DigSig-
SigGen (SFI
#5)
DigSig-
SigVer (SFI
#6)
DRBG (SFI
#14)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
MAC (SFI
#9)
SHA (SFI
#1)
Encryption
Private Key:
E
TLS3 Self-signed TLS
certificate
generation and
storage
Event
log
Power -
certificate
generated
during
power on
sequence
None AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyVer
(SFI #17)
DigSig-
SigGen (SFI
#5)
SHA (SFI
#1)
Crypto
Officer
- TLS
Certificate:
G,W,E
- TLS Private
Key: G,W,E
TLS4 Customer TLS
certificate uploads
and storage
Event
log
Entry of
keys via
craft tool
GUI
Craft tool
GUI
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyVer
(SFI #17)
BC-AUTH
Crypto
Officer
- TLS
Certificate:
G,W,E
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 41 of 80
Aviat Networks, Inc. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
(SFI #8)
BC-AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
UNAUTH-
DEC (SFI
#15)
CKG (SFI
#2)
DigSig-
SigGen (SFI
#5)
DigSig-
SigVer (SFI
#6)
DRBG (SFI
#14)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS-
TLS13KDF
(SFI #12)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
KAS2 (SFI
#19)
MAC (SFI
#9)
SHA (SFI
#1)
TLS5 TLS 1.2 cipher suite
configuration
Event
log
Configurati
on request
via craft
tool GUI
Craft tool
GUI and/or
Event log
entry
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyVer
(SFI #17)
BC-AUTH
(SFI #8)
Crypto
Officer
- TLS
Certificate:
E
- TLS HMAC
Keys: G,W,E
- TLS Private
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 42 of 80
Aviat Networks, Inc. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
BC-AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
UNAUTH-
DEC (SFI
#15)
CKG (SFI
#2)
DigSig-
SigGen (SFI
#5)
DigSig-
SigVer (SFI
#6)
DRBG (SFI
#14)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
KAS2 (SFI
#19)
MAC (SFI
#9)
SHA (SFI
#1)
Key: E
- TLS Tunnel
Keys: G,W,E
- P-256 TLS
1.2 Pre-
Master
Secret: G,E,Z
- P-384 TLS
1.2 Pre-
Master
Secret: G,E,Z
TLS6 TLS 1.3 cipher suite
configuration
Event
log
Configurati
on request
via craft
tool GUI
Craft tool
GUI and/or
Event log
entry
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyVer
(SFI #17)
BC-AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
Crypto
Officer
- TLS
Certificate:
E
- TLS HMAC
Keys: G,W,E
- TLS Private
Key: E
- TLS Tunnel
Keys: G,W,E
- P-256 TLS
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 43 of 80
Aviat Networks, Inc. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
UNAUTH-
DEC (SFI
#15)
CKG (SFI
#2)
DigSig-
SigGen (SFI
#5)
DigSig-
SigVer (SFI
#6)
DRBG (SFI
#14)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS-
TLS13KDF
(SFI #12)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
KAS2 (SFI
#19)
MAC (SFI
#9)
SHA (SFI
#1)
1.3
Handshake
Secret: G,E,Z
- P-384 TLS
1.3
Handshake
Secret: G,E,Z
User
Manageme
nt
a.
Localauthenticatio
n: user storage,
add/remove,
password changes,
credentials b.
RADIUSauthenticat
ion: RADIUS client
and server
configuration c.
SAMLauthenticatio
n: configuration,
SAML token
Event
log
Configurati
on changes
via craft
tool GUI
Craft tool
GUI and/or
Event log
entry
indicating
configuratio
n change
success/fail
ure
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyVer
(SFI #17)
BC-AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
UNAUTH
Crypto
Officer
- Crypto-
Officer
Password:
R,W
- TLS
Certificate:
E
- TLS HMAC
Keys: G,W,E
- TLS Private
Key: E
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 44 of 80
Aviat Networks, Inc. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
parsing and
optional token
decryption d.
SNMPv3service:
user storage,
add/remove,
passkey changes,
credentials e. User
session
management
(logins, logouts,
timeouts) f. Access
control lists for
Portal and SNMP g.
Login warning
banners, login
information h.
Mechanised attack
prevention i.
Forced user
lockouts j. SNMPv3
configuration
(SFI #7)
BC-
UNAUTH-
DEC (SFI
#15)
CKG (SFI
#2)
DigSig-
SigGen (SFI
#5)
DigSig-
SigVer (SFI
#6)
DRBG (SFI
#14)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS-
TLS13KDF
(SFI #12)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
KAS2 (SFI
#19)
MAC (SFI
#9)
SHA (SFI
#1)
- TLS Tunnel
Keys: G,W,E
- User
Password:
R,W
View
configurati
on
Request via craft
tool GUI
Event
log
View
request via
craft tool
GUI
Craft tool
GUI display
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyVer
(SFI #17)
BC-AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
User
- TLS
Certificate:
E
- TLS HMAC
Keys: G,W,E
- TLS Private
Key: E
- TLS Tunnel
Keys: G,W,E
- P-256 TLS
1.2 Pre-
Master
Secret: E
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 45 of 80
Aviat Networks, Inc. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
BC-
UNAUTH-
DEC (SFI
#15)
CKG (SFI
#2)
DigSig-
SigGen (SFI
#5)
DigSig-
SigVer (SFI
#6)
DRBG (SFI
#14)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS-
TLS13KDF
(SFI #12)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
KAS2 (SFI
#19)
MAC (SFI
#9)
SHA (SFI
#1)
- P-384 TLS
1.2 Pre-
Master
Secret: E
- P-256 TLS
1.3
Handshake
Secret: E
- P-384 TLS
1.3
Handshake
Secret: E
View
Firmware
Version
(Show
Version)
Provides firmware
version
information for the
NCC, DAC GE3
plug-ins, and
attached
ODU's/IRU's
Craft
tool
GUI
Version
informatio
n request
on a
selected
image via
the craft
tool GUI
Version
information
displayed
via the craft
tool GUI
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyVer
(SFI #17)
BC-AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
User
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 46 of 80
Aviat Networks, Inc. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
UNAUTH-
DEC (SFI
#15)
CKG (SFI
#2)
DigSig-
SigGen (SFI
#5)
DigSig-
SigVer (SFI
#6)
DRBG (SFI
#14)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS-
TLS13KDF
(SFI #12)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
KAS2 (SFI
#19)
MAC (SFI
#9)
SHA (SFI
#1)
View
Hardware
Version
(Show
Version)
Provides hardware
version
information for the
chassis, and all
plug-in modules
individually
Craft
tool
GUI
Version
informatio
n request
on a
selected
plug-in
module
image via
the craft
tool GUI
Version
information
displayed
via the craft
tool GUI
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyVer
(SFI #17)
BC-AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
UNAUTH-
User
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 47 of 80
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
DEC (SFI
#15)
CKG (SFI
#2)
DigSig-
SigGen (SFI
#5)
DigSig-
SigVer (SFI
#6)
DRBG (SFI
#14)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS-
TLS13KDF
(SFI #12)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
KAS2 (SFI
#19)
MAC (SFI
#9)
SHA (SFI
#1)
View
status
(Show
Status)
View system status
via Craft tool GUI
Event
log
View status
request via
craft tool
GUI
Craft tool
GUI output
and event
log entry
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
AsymKeyPa
ir-KeyVer
(SFI #17)
BC-AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
UNAUTH-
DEC (SFI
Crypto
Officer
- TLS
Certificate:
E
- TLS HMAC
Keys: G,W,E
- TLS Private
Key: E
- TLS Tunnel
Keys: G,W,E
- P-256 TLS
1.2 Pre-
Master
Secret: E
- P-384 TLS
1.2 Pre-
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 48 of 80
Aviat Networks, Inc. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
#15)
CKG (SFI
#2)
DigSig-
SigGen (SFI
#5)
DigSig-
SigVer (SFI
#6)
DRBG (SFI
#14)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS-
TLS13KDF
(SFI #12)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
KAS2 (SFI
#19)
MAC (SFI
#9)
SHA (SFI
#1)
Master
Secret: E
- P-256 TLS
1.3
Handshake
Secret: E
- P-384 TLS
1.3
Handshake
Secret: E
Zeroization Destroys all
security
parameters
(Zeroize)
LED Configurati
on request
via craft
tool GUI
Event log
entry
None Crypto
Officer
- Hash DRBG
C and V: Z
- Hash DRBG
Seed: E
- Payload
Encryption
DTLS HMAC
Keys: Z
- Payload
Encryption
DTLS Tunnel
Keys: Z
- Payload
Encryption
Key: Z
- Payload
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 49 of 80
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Encryption
Private Key:
Z
- SNMPv3
Authenticati
on Key: Z
- SNMPv3
Privacy Key:
Z
- TLS HMAC
Keys: Z
- TLS Private
Key: Z
- TLS Tunnel
Keys: Z
- P-256 TLS
1.2 Pre-
Master
Secret: Z
- P-384 TLS
1.2 Pre-
Master
Secret: Z
- P-256 TLS
1.3
Handshake
Secret: Z
- P-384 TLS
1.3
Handshake
Secret: Z
Table 12: Approved Services
4.4 Non-Approved Services
The module does not implement Non-Approved services while running in an approved mode.
N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
NOTE: The module does not support the loading of external software/firmware other than through the
firmware upgrade service. Only the firmware versions identified on the module’s validation
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 50 of 80
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certificate are included in the scope of this validation. Any other firmware loaded onto the
module is not validated and would require a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.
4.6 Bypass Actions and Status
When entering bypass (payload encryption disable), the following two independent actions are
required:
1. Disable the bypass lock – independent configuration sent to the module.
2. Disable payload encryption - independent configuration sent to the module.
The second action cannot be initiated until the bypass lock has been disabled in step 1.
4.7 Additional Information
Maintenance
Maintenance consists of inserting, removing or replacing plug-in cards and the fan air filter. The Crypto-
Officer must perform the zeroize service and then power down the module. The module must remain
powered down during maintenance and then the Crypto-Officer must power up the module and
perform the zeroize service to complete the maintenance.
Plug-in Cards
To remove a plug-in card or blank, remove its tamper-evident seals, loosen its front-panel fastening
screws and pull it towards you. Inserting a card may require the removal of a blank to access the card
slot. To insert a plug-in card, push it into the appropriate slot. Ensure its backplane connector is correctly
engaged before applying sufficient pressure to bring the plug-in panel flush with the front panel. Secure
the card using its fastening screws.
Fan Air Filter
For the INUe, a fan air filter kit is supplied, comprising a filter frame, filter element, and fastening screw.
It is installed in the INUe to the right side of the FAN module, as illustrated below.
Remove the FAN module and slide the air filter into the chassis so that it locates to the right side of the
FAN module backplane connector, and up against the chassis side. FAN module removal and
replacement do not affect traffic.
Installation instructions are included with the fan filter kit.
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 51 of 80
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Figure 4 - Fan Air Filter Assembly
Renewing Physical Security Following a Maintenance Task
The physical security measures must be checked and renewed as appropriate following any module
maintenance. When replacing a tamper-evident seal, any residue from a previous seal must be removed
before a new seal is applied.
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The Module is composed of the following firmware component(s):
• Component 1: Node Controller Card firmware - binary
The firmware component is protected with the authentication technique of verifying the RSA-4096
signature of a SHA2-512 hash of the firmware image (CAVP Cert. #A6135). The same technique is used
for the module integrity test and the software/firmware load test.
The Module does contain some open-source code and uses the GCC compiler to compile this.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The operator can initiate the integrity test on demand by power cycling the Eclipse terminal.
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
Limited
The module has a limited operational environment under FIPS 140-3 definitions with Physical Security at
Level 2. Therefore, per the FIPS 140-3 Management Manual Section 7.5 “Partial validations and non-
applicable areas”, this section is not applicable.
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 52 of 80
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7 Physical Security
The module is entirely encased by a thick steel chassis. The back of the chassis is completely closed off
and internally has a backplane into which plug-in cards may be inserted. The front of the chassis, where
plug-in cards are inserted, must be sealed in a commissioned module. The sides of the chassis have vent
holes to allow air to flow across components within the module to provide cooling and prevent
overheating.
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
The module requires tamper evident seals and louvers to meet the FIPS 140-3 level 2 tamper evidence
and opacity requirements. These are either factory fitted or operator fitted and the actions required for
fitting are described below.
Mechanism Inspection
Frequency
Inspection Guidance
Tamper-
Evident Seals
6 months Tamper-evident seals should be inspected for integrity (installed as per
Figure 6, Figure 14 and Figure 15) at least once every six (6) months If
tamper is suspected, remove the INUe from the network immediately
and return the module to Aviat for examination
Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required
7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals
The louvers shown in Figure 6 and its tamper-evident seals are installed in the factory. The INUe is then
installed in its equipment rack prior to shipment. If physical security kit 179-530153-002 is used, the
tamper evident labels on the louvers must be checked for evidence of tampering when the equipment is
received. The operator applies all of the front panel tamper-evident seals.
Number:
The module is supplied with a set of twenty-three (23) tamper-evident seals consisting of two (2)
different types of seals. There are fifteen (15) white narrow seals that are used on the top front and on
the front panel and must be fitted correctly to satisfy the physical security requirements for the module
(see Figure 6 and Figure 10). In addition, there are eight (8) wider holographic seals used for the side
louver panels (see Figure 14 and Figure 15). Once a module is commissioned, the seals must be applied
by the operator to the NCC, plug-in cards and blanking plates, such that for each item that borders that
chassis, there is a seal joining the item to the chassis. For each item that does not border the chassis,
there is a seal linking it to its neighbor.
Placement:
See Figure 6, Figure 14 and Figure 15.
Surface Preparation:
Remove excessive grease, dirt, or oil from the cover if appropriate by using alcohol-based cleaning pads
before applying the tamper evident seals. The chassis temperature should be above 10° C (50° F). All
surfaces should be allowed to dry following cleaning.
Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals:
See below.
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 53 of 80
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Part Numbers:
Physical security kits 179-530153-001 and 179-530153-002 are identical in content. However, for each
installation only one kit is required. Kit 179-530153-001 is used where the operator installs the louvers
and kit 179-530153-002 is used when the louvers are factory fitted.
All parts of Kit 179-530153-001 are installed by the operator.
Kit 179-530153-002 is partially factory fitted.
The INUe enclosure (below) has an NCC card and ten expansion slots, each of which must either contain
a plug-in card or be covered by a blanking plate.
Figure 5 - INUe Enclosure
To install the tamper-evident seals on front panel (physical security kits 179-530153-001 and 179-
530153-002):
• Verify that the front panel is contiguous
• For slots that do not contain plug-in cards, fit a blank panel (HW P/N EXX-001 per Figure 1)
• Remove excessive grease, dirt, or oil from the cover if appropriate by using alcohol-based
cleaning pads before applying the tamper evident seals. The chassis temperature should be above 10° C
(50° F).
• Affix (12) narrower tamper-evident seals as indicated in the figure below such that it is not
possible to remove either a single card or a group of cards without also removing a seal and leaving
tamper evidence.
• Install the INUe shelf into the rack and apply security seals over front of the cards in the chassis
as shown. Use caution to avoid touching the adhesive with fingerprints to avoid damaging the seals.
Allow the seal adhesive at least sixty (60) minutes to cure.
• At the conclusion of both installation and commissioning, the tamper evident labels must be
inspected for integrity. If there is evidence of tampering, the equipment must be removed from service
and returned to Aviat for examination.
• The tamper-evident seals should be replaced whenever components are added or removed
from the module. Replacement seals can be ordered from Aviat Networks, part number 007-600331-001
• Tamper-evident seals should be inspected for integrity at least once every six (6) months
• If tamper is suspected, remove the INUe from the network immediately and return the module
to Aviat for examination.
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 54 of 80
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Figure 6 - Tamper-Evident Seal Locations (Front)
Opacity: The module enclosure has vent holes at the sides. The vent holes are covered by louver panels
that provide no line-of-sight view of any internal components that are affixed with double sided PSA
foam tape. Once secured, four (4) tamper-evident seals are fitted to each louver panel.
Figure 7 - Louver panel
The tamper-evident seals and louver panels/filters shall be installed for the module to operate in an
Approved mode of operation.
The Crypto-Officer is responsible for the application and maintenance per the physical security policy:
To fit and affix the louver panels (physical security kit 179-530153-001):
All surfaces must be clean and dry prior to installation. Wipe the side of the INUe surfaces with isopropyl
alcohol and let dry. Place the INUe shelf on flat surface and install the louver panels as shown below.
Left Hand Side (as viewed from the front)
• Locate the louver panel and remove the paper backing from the double-sided pressure sensitive
adhesive (PSA) foam tape.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
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Figure 8 - Left Hand Louver Panel
• Align the front edge of the louver panel with the edge of the radius near the front mounting ear.
• Align the bottom edge of the louver panel with the bottom edge of the INUe shelf.
Figure 9 - Fitting the Left-Hand Louver Panel - 1
• Apply strong pressure to the side of the louver panel to bond the PSA to the INUe shelf.
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 56 of 80
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Figure 10 - Fitting the Left-Hand Louver Panel – 1 and Position of “Top” Tamper-Evident Seals
• Let the louver panel PSA cure for at least five (5) minutes before proceeding to install the right-
hand side.
Right Hand Side (as viewed from the front)
• Locate the louver panel and remove the paper backing from the double-sided PSA foam
tape.
Figure 11 - Right-Hand Louver Panel
• Align the front edge of the louver panel with the edge of the radius near the front
mounting ear.
• Align the bottom edge of the louver panel with the bottom edge of the INUe shelf.
Figure 12 - Fitting the Right-Hand Louver Panel - 2
• Apply strong pressure to the side of the louver panel to bond PSA to the INUe shelf.
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 57 of 80
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Figure 13 - Fitting the Right-Hand Louver Panel – 2
• Let the louver panel PSA cure for at least five (5) minutes then proceed to install the
security seals to both sides.
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 58 of 80
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• Apply security SEALS over louver panels:
Left hand side (as viewed from the front)
• Apply the wider security seal over louver panel and across INUe chassis. Use caution to
avoid touching the adhesive with fingerprints to avoid damaging the seals. Allow the
seal adhesive at least sixty (60) minutes to cure.
Figure 14 - Location of Security Seals on Louver Panel (Left Side)
Right hand side (as viewed from the front)
• Apply the wider security seal over louver panel and across INUe chassis. Use caution to
avoid touching the adhesive with fingerprints to avoid damaging the seals. Allow the
seal adhesive at least sixty (60) minutes to cure.
Figure 15 - Location of Security Seals on Louver Panel (Right Side)
Immediately before the INUe is installed into its rack/cabinet, apply the narrower tamper evident seals
as shown in Figure 10 with a seal over each of the three (3) top-front screw heads, and apply the four (4)
wider seals per side as indicated in Figure 14 and Figure 15.
• Clean the areas where the seals are to be applied as appropriate using alcohol-based cleaning
pads or a rag moistened with isopropyl alcohol and let dry.
• When peeling and placing the seals avoid finger contact with the seal backing/adhesive to
prevent damage to the seal. The use of tweezers applied on the edge of the seal is
recommended.
• Ensure the seals are not damaged when installing the INUe into its rack/cabinet.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
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Louver panels (physical security kit 179-530153-002):
• Louvers and all associated tamper evident seals (detailed in the section above for kit 179-
530153-001) will already be installed to the INUe.
• The operator must fully check the condition of the louvers and tamper evident seals applied to
the louvers and replace any physical security items that are not fully intact.
8 Non-Invasive Security
8.1 Mitigation Techniques
The Module does not implement any mitigation method against non-invasive attack.
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage Area Name Description Persistence
Type
Disk Drive (S2) Stored in flash, associated by memory location (pointer). Static
System Memory (S1) Only stored in volatile memory (RAM). Dynamic
Table 14: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Input in plaintext (IO3) Craft tool Module (S1) Plaintext Manual Direct
Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
Z1 Key
zeroization
service
Zeroization actively overwrites existing values with zeros.
The new values are stored in the same place as the
previous values and so the previous values are no longer
retrievable.
Explicit
Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods
9.4 SSPs
All usage of these SSPs by the Module are described in the services detailed in Section 4.3
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Establishe
d By
Used By
ADFS Server
Certificate
This is a user
provided
certificate for
decrypting
SAML 2.0
responses
from an ADFS
server
(Microsoft
Active
Directory
Federated
Services) for
user
authentication
.
2048-bit
RSA
certificate -
112 bits
Asymmetric
public key -
PSP
SAML
(SFI #10)
Crypto-
Officer
Password
Used to
authenticate
Crypto-Officer
to Craft Tool.
8 - 32
characters -
N/A
Authenticatio
n Data - CSP
Entropy Input
String
Used to seed
the Hash
DRBG
1568 bits -
N/A
Bit string -
CSP
DRBG
(SFI #14)
Hash DRBG C
and V
These are
variables used
internally by
the Hash
DRBG that are
required by
Implementatio
n Guidance
14.5 to be
listed in the
Cryptographic
Module
Security Policy
document.
They
represent the
internal state
of the DRBG.
440 bits -
N/A
DRBG
security
parameters -
CSP
DRBG (SFI
#14)
CKG (SFI
#2)
Hash DRBG
Seed
Seed for the
Hash DRBG.
256 bits -
256 bits
DRBG
security
parameters -
CSP
DRBG (SFI
#14)
CKG (SFI
#2)
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Establishe
d By
Used By
Integrity key A fixed and
hard coded
key used in the
firmware load
conditional
self-test.
4096-bit
RSA public
key - 150
bits
Asymmetric
public key -
PSP
pre-loaded Integrity
(SFI #11)
Payload
Encryption
Certificate
Self-generated
and self-signed
certificate
used to
generate the
Payload
Encryption
Tunnel Key
and Payload
Encryption
HMAC Key.
Certificate's
public key is
ECDSA/ECDH.
ECDSA/ECD
H P-256
curve - 128
bits
Asymmetric
public key -
PSP
AsymKeyPai
r-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
DigSig-
SigVer
(SFI #6)
Payload
Encryption
DTLS HMAC
Keys
Used to
authenticate
the tunnel
established
using DTLS.
HMAC-SHA-1.
160 bits
Symmetric
key - 160-
bits
Symmetric
key - CSP
CKG (SFI #2) KAS1
(SFI #18)
KAS2
(SFI #19)
MAC
(SFI #9)
Payload
Encryption
DTLS Tunnel
Keys
Used to
encrypt the
tunnel
established
using DTLS.
AES-256.
256 bits
Symmetric
key - 256
bits
Symmetric
key - CSP
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-
UNAUTH
-DEC (SFI
#15)
BC-
AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
KAS1
(SFI #18)
Payload
Encryption
Key
Used to
encrypt/decry
pt payload.
256 bits -
256 bits
Symmetric
key - CSP
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
BC-
AUTH-
ENC-
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Establishe
d By
Used By
Only AES- 256
bits is used for
payload
encryption.
KAS-
TLS13KDF
(SFI #12)
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
KAS2 (SFI
#19)
CCM1
(SFI #20)
BC-
AUTH-
DEC-
CCM1
(SFI #21)
BC-
AUTH-
ENC-
CCM2
(SFI #22)
BC-
AUTH-
DEC-
CCM2
(SFI #23)
Payload
Encryption
Private Key
ECDSA/ECDH
P-256 key used
to establish
the Payload
Encryption
DTLS tunnel
key.
ECDSA/ECD
H P 256
curve - 128
bits
Asymmetric
private key -
CSP
AsymKeyPai
r-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
DigSig-
SigGen
(SFI #5)
SNMPv3
Authenticatio
n Key
Used for
authenticating
SNMPv3
packets.
HMAC-SHA-1.
128 bits -
128 bits
- CSP SHA (SFI
#1)
SNMPv3
Privacy Key
Used for
encrypting
SNMPv3
packets. AES-
256.
128 bits -
128 bits
Asymmetric
private key -
CSP
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
UNAUTH
-DEC (SFI
#15)
CKG (SFI
#2)
TLS
Certificate
This is used to
establish TLS
tunnel for
HTTPS and
WMTS ports
for managing
remote radio.
ECDSA/ECD
H P-256 or
P-384 curve
- 128 bits or
192 bits
Asymmetric
public key -
PSP
AsymKeyPai
r-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
DigSig-
SigVer
(SFI #6)
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Establishe
d By
Used By
Certificate's
public key is
ECDSA/ECDH.
There are two
options for the
TLS Certificate.
The default
option is for a
self-generated
and self-signed
certificate. The
second option
is for a user-
uploaded, CA
signed
certificate that
takes the place
of the self-
signed one
when
configured.
TLS HMAC
Keys
Message
authentication
within TLS.
HMAC-SHA-1
or HMAC-
SHA2-256,
depending on
cipher suite.
160 bits -
160 bits
Authenticatio
n Key - CSP
CKG (SFI #2) KAS1
(SFI #18)
KAS2
(SFI #19)
MAC
(SFI #9)
TLS Private
Key
ECDSA/ECDH
P-256 or P-384
key used to
establish TLS
tunnel for
HTTPS and
WMTS ports
for managing
remote radio.
Size: P-256,
P-384
curves -
Strength:
128-192
bits
Asymmetric
private key -
CSP
AsymKeyPai
r-KeyGen
(SFI #3)
DigSig-
SigGen
(SFI #5)
KAS1
(SFI #18)
KAS2
(SFI #19)
TLS Tunnel
Keys
Encrypt TLS
session for the
Craft tool and
web server.
AES-128 or
AES-256,
depending on
cipher suite.
128 or 256
bits - 128
or 256 bits
Symmetric
key - CSP
TLS v1.2
KDF
RFC7627
(A6135)
TLS v1.3
KDF
(A6135)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-
UNAUTH
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Establishe
d By
Used By
-DEC (SFI
#15)
BC-
AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
KAS1
(SFI #18)
KAS2
(SFI #19)
User
Password
Used to
authenticate
User to Craft
Tool.
8 - 32
characters -
N/A
Authenticatio
n Data - CSP
P-256 TLS 1.2
Pre-Master
Secret
Intermediate
shared secret
used to derive
the Extended
Master Secret
256 bits -
128 bits
Shared Secret
- CSP
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
BC-
AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-
AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
UNAUTH
-DEC (SFI
#15)
KAS1
(SFI #18)
P-384 TLS 1.2
Pre-Master
Secret
P-256 TLS 1.2
Pre-Master
Secret
Intermediate
shared secret
used t
384 bits -
192 bits
Shared Secret
- CSP
KAS-ECC-
SSC (SFI
#13)
KAS-
TLS1.2KDF
(SFI #4)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
BC-
AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-
AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
KAS1
(SFI #18)
P-256 TLS 1.3
Handshake
Secret
Intermediate
secret derived
256 bits -
128 bits
Shared Secret
- CSP
KAS-
TLS13KDF
(SFI #12)
BC-
AUTH
(SFI #8)
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Establishe
d By
Used By
from the initial
key agreement
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
KAS2 (SFI
#19)
BC-
AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
UNAUTH
-DEC (SFI
#15)
KAS2
(SFI #19)
P-384 TLS 1.3
Handshake
Secret
Intermediate
secret derived
from the initial
key agreement
384 bits -
192 bits
Shared Secret
- CSP
KAS-
TLS13KDF
(SFI #12)
KAS1 (SFI
#18)
KAS2 (SFI
#19)
BC-
AUTH
(SFI #8)
BC-
AUTH-
DEC (SFI
#16)
BC-
UNAUTH
(SFI #7)
BC-
UNAUTH
-DEC (SFI
#15)
KAS2
(SFI #19)
Table 17: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
ADFS Server
Certificate
Input in
plaintext
(IO3)
Disk Drive
(S2):Plaintext
N/A Z1
Crypto-Officer
Password
Input in
plaintext
(IO3)
Disk Drive
(S2):Plaintext
N/A Z1
Entropy Input
String
Input in
plaintext
(IO3)
Disk Drive
(S2):Plaintext
N/A Z1
Hash DRBG C and
V
System
Memory
(S1):Plaintext
Zeroised
when
Z1 Hash DRBG
Seed:Derived From
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 66 of 80
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
module
reset
Hash DRBG Seed System
Memory
(S1):Plaintext
Zeroised
when
module
reset
Z1 Hash DRBG C and
V:Derived From
Integrity key Disk Drive
(S2):Plaintext
N/A Z1
Payload
Encryption
Certificate
Disk Drive
(S2):Plaintext
N/A Z1 Payload Encryption
Private Key:Paired
With
Payload
Encryption DTLS
HMAC Keys
System
Memory
(S1):Plaintext
Zeroised
when
module
reset
Z1 Payload Encryption
DTLS Tunnel
Keys:Used With
Payload
Encryption DTLS
Tunnel Keys
System
Memory
(S1):Plaintext
Zeroised
when
module
reset
Z1 Payload Encryption
DTLS HMAC
Keys:Used With
Payload
Encryption Key
System
Memory
(S1):Plaintext
Zeroised
when
module
reset
Z1
Payload
Encryption
Private Key
Disk Drive
(S2):Plaintext
Z1 Payload Encryption
Certificate:Used With
SNMPv3
Authentication
Key
Input in
plaintext
(IO3)
System
Memory
(S1):Plaintext
Disk Drive
(S2):Plaintext
Zeroised
when
module
reset
Z1 SNMPv3 Privacy
Key:Used With
SNMPv3 Privacy
Key
Input in
plaintext
(IO3)
System
Memory
(S1):Plaintext
Disk Drive
(S2):Plaintext
Zeroised
when
module
reset
Z1
TLS Certificate Input in
plaintext
(IO3)
Disk Drive
(S2):Plaintext
N/A Z1
TLS HMAC Keys System
Memory
(S1):Plaintext
Zeroised
when
module
reset
Z1
TLS Private Key Disk Drive
(S2):Plaintext
N/A Z1 TLS Certificate:Paired
With
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 67 of 80
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
TLS Tunnel Keys System
Memory
(S1):Plaintext
Zeroized
when
module
reset
Z1
User Password Input in
plaintext
(IO3)
Disk Drive
(S2):Plaintext
N/A Z1
P-256 TLS 1.2 Pre-
Master Secret
Input in
plaintext
(IO3)
Disk Drive
(S2):Plaintext
N/A Z1
P-384 TLS 1.2 Pre-
Master Secret
Input in
plaintext
(IO3)
Disk Drive
(S2):Plaintext
N/A Z1
P-256 TLS 1.3
Handshake Secret
Input in
plaintext
(IO3)
Disk Drive
(S2):Plaintext
N/A Z1
P-384 TLS 1.3
Handshake Secret
Input in
plaintext
(IO3)
Disk Drive
(S2):Plaintext
N/A Z1
Table 18: SSP Table 2
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The Module performs self-tests to ensure the proper operation of the Module. Per FIPS 140-3, these are
categorized as either pre-operational self-tests or conditional self-tests.
Pre-operational self–tests are available on demand by power cycling the Module. Pre-operational
Software/Firmware Integrity Test must pass their own CASTs prior to the Integrity Test.
The Module performs the following pre-operational self-tests in the table below.
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details
Bypass Encryption of
known data
KAT Bypass If the self-test fails, the
module enters an error
state and becomes
unresponsive. If all pre-
operational self-tests
succeed, the module
becomes operational.
RAC FPGA pre-
operational bypass
test is performed
known Payload
Encryption Key and
known data (CAVP
Cert. #A6136).
Compares encrypted
string to expected
result.
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 68 of 80
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details
Firmware
integrity
RSA-4096
signature of a
SHA2-512
hash of the
firmware
image.
KAT SW/FW
Integrity
If the self-test fails, the
module enters an error
state and becomes
unresponsive. If all pre-
operational self-tests
succeed, the module
becomes operational.
Firmware Integrity test
performed by verifying
the RSA-4096
signature of a SHA2-
512 hash of the
firmware image (CAVP
Cert. #A6135)
Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-
CBC(A6135)
Decrypt
AES-128-
CBC, AES-
256-CBC
KAT CAST If the self-test
fails, the
module
enters an
error state
and becomes
unresponsive.
If all
algorithm
bootup tests
succeed, the
module
becomes
operational.
Decryption Before first
use of AES-
CBC, or AES-
GCM during
boot-up
AES-
CBC(A6135)
Encrypt
AES-128-
CBC, AES-
256-CBC
KAT CAST If the self-test
fails, the
module
enters an
error state
and becomes
unresponsive.
If all
algorithm
bootup tests
succeed, the
module
becomes
operational.
Encryption Before first
use of AES-
CBC, or AES-
GCM during
boot-up
AES-
CCM(A6136)
Decrypt
AES-256-
CCM
KAT CAST If the self-test
fails, the
module
enters an
Decryption Before first
use of AES-
CCM by the
PDH version
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
error state
and becomes
unresponsive.
If all
algorithm
bootup tests
succeed, the
module
becomes
operational.
of the RAC
FPGA during
boot-up
AES-
CCM(A6136)
Encrypt
AES-256-
CCM
KAT CAST If the self-test
fails, the
module
enters an
error state
and becomes
unresponsive.
If all
algorithm
bootup tests
succeed, the
module
becomes
operational.
Encryption Before first
use of AES-
CCM by the
PDH version
of the RAC
FPGA during
boot-up
AES-
CCM(A6537)
Decrypt
AES-256-
CCM
KAT CAST If the self-test
fails, the
module
enters an
error state
and becomes
unresponsive.
If all
algorithm
bootup tests
succeed, the
module
becomes
operational.
Decryption Before first
use of AES-
CCM by the
SDH version
of the RAC
FPGA during
boot-up
AES-
CCM(A6537)
Encrypt
AES-256-
CCM
KAT CAST If the self-test
fails, the
module
enters an
error state
and becomes
unresponsive.
If all
Encryption Before first
use of AES-
CCM by the
SDH version
of the RAC
FPGA during
boot-up
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 70 of 80
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
algorithm
bootup tests
succeed, the
module
becomes
operational.
AES-CFB128
(A6135)
AES-
CFB128
KAT CAST If the self-test
fails, the
module
enters an
error state
and becomes
unresponsive.
If all
algorithm
bootup tests
succeed, the
module
becomes
operational.
Decryption Before first
use of AES-
CFB128
during boot-
up
AES-
CFB128(A6135)
Encrypt
AES-
CFB128
KAT CAST If the self-test
fails, the
module
enters an
error state
and becomes
unresponsive.
If all
algorithm
bootup tests
succeed, the
module
becomes
operational.
Encryption Before first
use of AES-
CFB128
during boot-
up
AES-
GCM(A6135)
Decrypt
AES-256-
GCM
KAT CAST If the self-test
fails, the
module
enters an
error state
and becomes
unresponsive.
If all
algorithm
bootup tests
succeed, the
module
Decryption Before first
use of AES-
GCM during
boot-up
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 71 of 80
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
becomes
operational.
AES-
GCM(A6135)
Encrypt
AES-256-
GCM
KAT CAST If the self-test
fails, the
module
enters an
error state
and becomes
unresponsive.
If all
algorithm
bootup tests
succeed, the
module
becomes
operational.
Encryption Before first
use of AES-
GCM during
boot-up
Bypass Exclusive
bypass
KAT Bypass RAC is
disabled and
no data is
passed
RAC enters
switches
between a
bypass mode
and
cryptographic
mode of
operation
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6135)
Key pair
correctness
ECDSA
Pairwise
Consistency
test
PCT Key rejected
with error
code
ECDSA
Pairwise
Consistency
test
Asymmetric
key pair
generated
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6135)
P-256 KAT CAST If the self-test
fails, the
module
enters an
error state
and becomes
unresponsive.
If all
algorithm
bootup tests
succeed, the
module
becomes
operational.
Signature
generation
Before first
use of
ECDSA
during boot-
up
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6135)
P-256 KAT CAST If the self-test
fails, the
module
Signature
verification
Before first
use of
ECDSA
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
enters an
error state
and becomes
unresponsive.
If all
algorithm
bootup tests
succeed, the
module
becomes
operational.
during boot-
up
Firmware
upgrade
Integrity
test
KAT SW/FW
Load
Firmware
upgrade fails.
NCC Status
LED
illuminates
solid red.
Firmware
load test -
Approved
integrity
technique
using SHA2-
512 and RSA.
(RSA Cert.
#A6135; SHS
Cert. #A6135
Firmware
upgrade
Hash DRBG
(A6135)
[90A] Hash
DRBG
KAT CAST If the self-test
fails, the
module
enters an
error state
and becomes
unresponsive.
If all
algorithm
bootup tests
succeed, the
module
becomes
operational.
[90A] Hash-
based DRBG
Known
answer test
[90A] Section
11.3 Health
Tests
Before first
use of DRBG
during boot-
up or
immediately
upon
registering
an external
entropy
source with
the module
HMAC-SHA-1
(A6135)
HMAC-
SHA-1
KAT CAST If the self-test
fails, the
module
enters an
error state
and becomes
unresponsive.
If all
algorithm
bootup tests
succeed, the
Known
answer test
(CAVP Cert.
#A6135)
Before first
use of SHA-
1 or HMAC-
SHA-1
during boot-
up
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 73 of 80
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
module
becomes
operational.
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A6135)
HMAC-
SHA2-256
KAT CAST If the self-test
fails, the
module
enters an
error state
and becomes
unresponsive.
If all
algorithm
bootup tests
succeed, the
module
becomes
operational.
Known
answer test
(CAVP Cert.
#A6135)
Before first
use of
SHA2-256 or
HMAC-
SHA2-256
during boot-
up
HMAC-SHA2-
512 (A6135)
HMAC-
SHA2-512
KAT CAST If the self-test
fails, the
module
enters an
error state
and becomes
unresponsive.
If all
algorithm
bootup tests
succeed, the
module
becomes
operational.
Known
answer test
(CAVP Cert.
#A6135)
Before first
use of
SHA2-384,
SHA2-512,
HMAC-
SHA2-384,
or HMAC-
SHA2-512
during boot-
up
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A6135)
Shared
secret Z
KAT CAST If the self-test
fails, the
module
enters an
error state
and becomes
unresponsive.
If all
algorithm
bootup tests
succeed, the
module
becomes
operational.
Performs an
ECC shared
secret Z KAT
using a NIST
defined P-256
curve.
Before first
use of ECC
for shared
secret
generation
during boot-
up
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
Manual key
entry
Duplicate
key entry
Duplicate
key entry
Manual
Entry
Key rejected
with error
feedback
Operator
enters the
same key
twice. The
two entries
are
compared. If
they match
the test
passes, if
they do not
match the
test fails.
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6135)
2048-bit
RSA
KAT CAST If the self-test
fails, the
module
enters an
error state
and becomes
unresponsive.
If all
algorithm
bootup tests
succeed, the
module
becomes
operational.
Signature
Verification.
Performed
before Pre-
Operational
FW integrity
test.
Before first
use of RSA
during boot-
up
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627
(A6135)
TLS v1.2
KDF
KAT CAST If the self-test
fails, the
module
enters an
error state
and becomes
unresponsive.
If all
algorithm
bootup tests
succeed, the
module
becomes
operational.
Known
answer test
Before first
use of
TLSv1.2 KDF
during boot-
up
TLS v1.3 KDF
(A6135)
TLS v1.3
KDF
KAT CAST If the self-test
fails, the
module
enters an
error state
Known
answer test
Before first
use of
TLSv1.3 KDF
during boot-
up
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 75 of 80
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
and becomes
unresponsive.
If all
algorithm
bootup tests
succeed, the
module
becomes
operational.
Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
Bypass KAT Bypass On Demand Pre-operational
self-tests are
available on
demand by power
cycling the
Module.
Firmware
integrity
KAT SW/FW Integrity On Demand Pre-operational
self-tests are
available on
demand by power
cycling the
Module.
Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-CBC(A6135)
Decrypt
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CBC(A6135)
Encrypt
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CCM(A6136)
Decrypt
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CCM(A6136)
Encrypt
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CCM(A6537)
Decrypt
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CCM(A6537)
Encrypt
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CFB128
(A6135)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 76 of 80
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-
CFB128(A6135)
Encrypt
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM(A6135)
Decrypt
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM(A6135)
Encrypt
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
Bypass KAT Bypass On Demand Manually
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6135)
ECDSA Pairwise
Consistency test
PCT On Demand Manually
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6135)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6135)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
Firmware upgrade KAT SW/FW Load On Demand Manually
Hash DRBG
(A6135)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
HMAC-SHA-1
(A6135)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A6135)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-512
(A6135)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A6135)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
Manual key entry Duplicate key
entry
Manual Entry On Demand Manually
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6135)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627 (A6135)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
TLS v1.3 KDF
(A6135)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 77 of 80
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Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
ES1 The Module
fails a KAT, PCT,
or duplication,
or conditional
self-test.
The Module enters a
failure state, and all
input/output is
suppressed and is
automatically restarted.
Reboot Outputs status of "FIPS
self test failure" in the
event log, otherwise it
indicates successful
completion by an output
of "FIPS self tests passed"
in the event log.
ES2 The Module
fails a firmware
loading
The module
automatically attempts
to roll back to the
previous firmware
version.
Reboot Outputs status of "FIPS
self test failure" in the
event log, otherwise it
indicates successful
completion by an output
of "FIPS self tests passed"
in the event log.
ES3 The Module
fails the
firmware
integrity pre-
operational
self-test.
The Module enters a
failure state, and all
input/output is
suppressed and
automatically attempts
to roll back to the
previous firmware.
Reboot Outputs status of "FIPS
self test failure" in the
event log. No indication if
no error detected.
ES4 The Module
fails the manual
duplicate key
entry test.
The new input is
rejected.
Manually re-
enter keys.
Craft tool feedback to the
CO is the pop-up message
"Failed to commit
changes to the terminal -
Could not switch
configuration."
ES5 A RAC plugin
fails the pre-
operational or
conditional
bypass test
The plugin enters a
failure state, and all
traffic output is
suppressed. The plugin
module is automatically
reset. After three failed
recovery attempts the
plugin is disabled.
Reboot. If that
fails, re-seat the
RAC plugin
module. Replace
the RAC plugin
module if
previous recovery
methods fail.
Outputs status of "FIPS
self test failure" in the
event log, otherwise it
indicates successful
completion by an output
of "FIPS self tests passed"
in the event log.
Table 23: Error States
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
Delivery of the Cryptographic Module to customers from the vendor is via third party couriers. The
parcels are sealed in tamper evident packaging, and each parcel is tracked from vendor to customer.
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 78 of 80
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Once on site, the customer must follow vendor guidance (See Section 2.4) to securely install and
configure the module.
Physical security measures must be installed as described in Section 7 above.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
Guidance appropriate to an operator’s Role is provided with the module and provides all the necessary
assistance to enable the secure operation of the module by an operator, including the Approved security
functions of the module. The operator manual can be obtained at www.aviatcloud.com once an
operator has been granted access to ARC (Aviat Resource Center).
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
Guidance appropriate to an operator’s Role is provided with the module and provides all the necessary
assistance to enable the secure operation of the module by an operator, including the Approved security
functions of the module.
11.4 Design and Rules
Design documentation for the module is maintained to provide clear and consistent information within
the document hierarchy to enable transparent traceability between corresponding areas throughout the
document hierarchy, for instance, between elements of this Cryptographic Module Security Policy
(CMSP) and the design documentation.
Rules of Operation
1. The Module provides three distinct operator roles: User, Maintenance and Crypto Officer.
2. The Module provides role-based authentication.
3. The Module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
4. An operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role.
5. The Module allows the operator to initiate power-up self-tests by power cycling power or resetting
the Module.
6. All self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. Data output is inhibited during key generations, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
8. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise
of the Module.
9. There are no restrictions on which keys or SSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
10. The Module supports up to five concurrent operators.
11. The Module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of
data.
12. The Module does not store any plaintext CSPs
Copyright Aviat Networks, Inc., 2025 Version 00E Page 79 of 80
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13. The Module does not output intermediate key values.
11.5 Additional Information
Aviat Networks employ industry standard best practices in the design, development, production and
maintenance of the Aviat Networks Eclipse product, including the FIPS 140-3 module.
Aviat Networks has an ISO 9001 Quality Management System.
This includes the use of an industry standard configuration management system that is operated in
accordance with the requirements of FIPS 140-3, such that each configuration item that forms part of
the module is stored with a label corresponding to the version of the module and that the module and
all of its associated documentation can be regenerated from the configuration management system with
reference to the relevant version number.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The Module does not implement any mitigation method against other attacks.
References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Abbreviation* Full Specification Name
[ISO24759] International Standard, ISO/IEC 24759, Information technology — Security techniques —
Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Second and Corrected version, 15
December 2015
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program, December 20, 2024
[133r2] NIST Special Publication 800-133, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation,
Revision 2, June 2020
[135r1] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Existing
Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions, Special Publication 800-135rev1, December
2011.
[180] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015
[186] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 186-5, February 2023.
[197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, May 9, 2023
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Aviat Networks, Inc. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Abbreviation* Full Specification Name
[198] National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198-1, July, 2008
[38A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December
2001
[38C] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, Special
Publication 800-38C, May 2004
[38D] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800-
38D, November 2007
[52r2] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Guidelines for the Selection,
Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations, Special
Publication 800-52 revision 2, August 2019
[56Ar3] NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, April 2018
[90A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A,
Revision 1, June 2015.
Table 24 – References
Acronym * Definition
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
KAT Know Answer Test
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter
Table 25 – Acronyms and Definitions