Page 1 of 90 HID Global HID Applets v4.0 on NXP JCOP 4.5 P71D600 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Page 2 of 90 Table of Contents 1 General................................................................................................................................... 5 1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5 1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5 2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................ 5 2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 5 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 8 2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 9 2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 9 2.5 Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 9 2.6 Security Function Implementations..................................................................................11 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................14 2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................17 2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................17 2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................17 2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................17 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................17 3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................17 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................18 4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................18 4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................19 4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................20 4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................53 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................53 5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................53 5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................53 5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................54 6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................54 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................54 7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................54 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required..................................................................................54 7.2 EFP/EFT Information.......................................................................................................54 7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges ..........................................................................54 8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................55 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................55 9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................55 Page 3 of 90 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................55 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................56 9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................56 9.5 Transitions.......................................................................................................................77 10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................77 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................77 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................77 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................80 10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................87 11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................88 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................88 11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................89 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................89 11.4 Design and Rules ..........................................................................................................89 11.5 Maintenance Requirements...........................................................................................89 11.6 End of Life .....................................................................................................................89 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................89 12.1 Attack List......................................................................................................................89 12.2 Mitigation Effectiveness .................................................................................................90 Page 4 of 90 List of Tables Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5 Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ..................................................................... 8 Table 3: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 9 Table 4: Approved Algorithms...................................................................................................11 Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ........................................................................................11 Table 6: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms .............................................................................11 Table 7: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................14 Table 8: Entropy Certificates.....................................................................................................17 Table 9: Entropy Sources..........................................................................................................17 Table 10: Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................18 Table 11: Authentication Methods.............................................................................................18 Table 12: Roles.........................................................................................................................20 Table 13: Approved Services ....................................................................................................53 Table 14: Mechanisms and Actions Required ...........................................................................54 Table 15: EFP/EFT Information.................................................................................................54 Table 16: Hardness Testing Temperatures ...............................................................................55 Table 17: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................55 Table 18: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................56 Table 19: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................56 Table 20: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................67 Table 21: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................76 Table 22: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................77 Table 23: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................80 Table 24: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................80 Table 25: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................87 Table 26: Error States...............................................................................................................88 Table 27: Select Applet (ACA) ..................................................................................................88 Table 28: ACA Get FIPS Module Configuration Command .......................................................88 Table 29: ACA Get FIPS Module Configuration Response........................................................88 List of Figures Figure 1: P71D600..................................................................................................................... 7 Figure 2: Block Diagram............................................................................................................. 7 Figure 3: NXP Semiconductor JCOP 4.5 P71D600 Physical Form............................................. 8 Page 5 of 90 1 General 1.1 Overview This document defines the Security Policy for the HID Applets v4.0 on NXP JCOP 4.5 P71D600 cryptographic Module, hereafter denoted the Module. The Module, validated to FIPS 140-3 overall Level 2, is a single chip Module implementing the Global Platform operational environment, with a Card Manager, Supplementary Security Domains and the HID Applets v4.0. 1.2 Security Levels Section Title Security Level 1 General 2 2 Cryptographic module specification 2 3 Cryptographic module interfaces 2 4 Roles, services, and authentication 3 5 Software/Firmware security 2 6 Operational environment N/A 7 Physical security 4 8 Non-invasive security N/A 9 Sensitive security parameter management 2 10 Self-tests 2 11 Life-cycle assurance 2 12 Mitigation of other attacks 2 Overall Level 2 Table 1: Security Levels 2 Cryptographic Module Specification 2.1 Description Purpose and Use: The HID Applets v4.0 on NXP JCOP 4.5 P71D600 is composed of a Global Platform operational environment and Java Card applets running on the P71D600 chip. Module Type: Hardware Module Embodiment: Single Chip Cryptographic Boundary: The JavaCard and Global Platform APIs are internal interfaces available to applets. Only HID applets and Card Manager, Supplementary Security Domain services are available at the card edge (the interfaces that cross the cryptographic boundary). The product is delivered with HID v4.0 applets installed and configured before the module is delivered to the customer. The module is a non-modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140-3 definitions. It always operates in an Approved mode of operation. Page 6 of 90 The HID Applets V4.0, also named Crescendo Applets later in the document, comprise: • ASCLib Library Package – This is a library package that implements functions required by other applets. The library functions are not directly accessible via the cryptographic Module command interface. • CRYPTOLib Library Package – This is a library implementing cryptographic algorithms like HMAC-SHAx. The library functions are not directly accessible via the cryptographic Module command interface. • Access Control Applet (ACA) – This applet is responsible for Access Control verification for PIN, ADMIN key. • PIVExt Applet – This applet implements SP800-73 at card-edge level for usage operations. • OATH Applet – This applet provides Open Authentication services that can be used by client application / embedded devices like Crescendo Key to authenticate against and authentication server like ActivID Authentication Server. These authentication services consist in HMAC-Based One-Time password (HOTP), Time-Based One-Time password (TOTP), OATH Challenge-Response / Digital Signature Algorithm (OCRA). • FIDO Applet – This applet provides FIDO enrollment and sign-in Services. The Module is a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-3 definitions. The following commands can be used to retrieve the module name and version: • IDENTIFY APDU • ACAAPPLET_SELECT_APDU_OK • ACAAPPLET_GET_PROPERTIES_APDU_OK The Module includes a firmware load function to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this Module is out of the scope of this validation and requires separate FIPS 140-3 validation. Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP): The Module is designed to be embedded into plastic card bodies, with a contact plate and contactless antenna connections, or as part of an embedded device like Crescendo Key. The physical form of the Module is depicted in Figure 2; the outline depicts the physical perimeter, representing the surface of the chip and the bond pads. The contactless ports of the module require connection to an antenna. The Module relies on ISO 7816 and ISO 14443 card readers as input/output devices. Page 7 of 90 Figure 1: P71D600 Figure 2: Block Diagram Page 8 of 90 Figure 3: NXP Semiconductor JCOP 4.5 P71D600 Physical Form 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification Tested Module Identification – Hardware: Model and/or Part Number Hardware Version Firmware Version Processors Features P71D600 N7122 A1 HID Applets v4.0 on NXP JCOP 4.5 P71D600 MRK3-SC 16/32-bit RISC ASCLib: 4.0.0.295 CRYPTOLib: 4.0.0.295 ACA: 4.0.0.295 PIVExt: 4.0.0.297 OATH: 4.0.0.295 FIDO: 4.0.0.296 ; ROM ID = B3375FE9B5508BC4 Patch ID = 0000000000000000 Platform ID = J3R6000373181200 Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets): N/A for this module. Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware: N/A for this module. Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module. Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: Page 9 of 90 N/A for this module. 2.3 Excluded Components The following components are excluded from the Evaluation: • MIFARE applet • DES Engine • Secure Box • SEOS SD and HID SEOS applet 2.4 Modes of Operation Modes List and Description: Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator Approved In this mode, only approved security functions are accessible. (The module does not support a non- approved mode). The approved mode can be verified following the initialization instructions outlined in Section 11.1 Approved 2401A5 Table 3: Modes List and Description 2.5 Algorithms Approved Algorithms: Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference AES-CBC A2713 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38A AES-CCM A2713 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38C AES-CMAC A2713 Direction - Generation, Verification Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38B AES-CTR A2713 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38A AES-ECB A2713 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38A AES-KWP A6112 Direction - Decrypt Key Length - 128, 256 SP 800-38F Counter DRBG A2713 Prediction Resistance - No, Yes Mode - AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - Yes SP 800-90A Rev. 1 ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) A6534 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates FIPS 186-5 Page 10 of 90 Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) A6534 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 Component - No FIPS 186-5 ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) A6534 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 FIPS 186-5 HMAC-SHA-1 A6112 Key Length - Key Length: 112-1024 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2-256 A6112 Key Length - Key Length: 112-1024 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2-512 A6112 Key Length - Key Length: 112-1024 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1 KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 A5910 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-384 Scheme - onePassDh - KAS Role - initiator, responder SP 800-56A Rev. 3 KDA HKDF Sp800- 56Cr1 A2713 Derived Key Length - 2048 Shared Secret Length - Shared Secret Length: 224-4096 Increment 8 HMAC Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 SP 800-56C Rev. 2 KDF SP800-108 A2713 KDF Mode - Counter, Feedback Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 112-4096 Increment 8, Supported Lengths: 128 SP 800-108 Rev. 1 KTS-IFC A6139 Modulo - 3072 Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1- basic Scheme - KTS-OAEP-basic - KAS Role - responder Key Transport Method - Key Length - 128 SP 800-56B Rev. 2 RSA Decryption Primitive Sp800-56Br2 (CVL) A6140 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 SP 800-56B Rev. 2 RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) A6535 Key Generation Mode - probable Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Primality Tests - 2pow100 Private Key Format - standard FIPS 186-5 RSA SigGen (FIPS186- 5) A6535 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss FIPS 186-5 RSA Signature Primitive (CVL) A2713 Private Key Format - crt FIPS 186-4 RSA SigVer (FIPS186- 5) A6535 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss FIPS 186-5 Page 11 of 90 Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference SHA-1 A2713 Message Length - Message Length: 0- 65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-256 A2713 Message Length - Message Length: 0- 65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 SHA2-512 A2713 Message Length - Message Length: 0- 65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 Table 4: Approved Algorithms Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: Name Properties Implementation Reference CKG- DRBG Key Type:Symmetric and Asymmetric N/A NIST SP800-133rev2 Section 4 Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: Name Properties Implementation Reference AES- 1 AES #A2713 (AES-CBC):key unwrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength Per IG D.G. This unwrapping is only approved for legacy purposes per IG D.G. Symmetric key unwrapping According to RFC3394 AES- 2 AES #2713 (AES-CBC):key unwrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength Per IG D.G. This unwrapping is only approved for legacy purposes per IG D.G. Symmetric key unwrapping According to GlobalPlatform Amendment-I Table 6: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. 2.6 Security Function Implementations Name Type Description Properties Algorithms CKG Symmetric Key Generation CKG NIST SP800-133rev2 Cryptographic Key Generation Section 4: CKG- DRBG: () Page 12 of 90 Name Type Description Properties Algorithms Symmetric keys are generated using methods described in Section 4 of SP800- 133rev2 ENT ENT-ESV Generate random data from hardware used as seed for DRBG Counter DRBG: (A2713) DRBG DRBG Deterministic random bit generator Counter DRBG: (A2713) BC-1-Auth BC-Auth AES-CCM Encryption/Decryption AES-CCM: (A2713) BC-2-UnAuth BC-UnAuth AES-128 CBC AES-CBC: (A2713) BC-3-UnAuth BC-UnAuth AES-128 ECB AES-ECB: (A2713) KTS-1 KTS-Decap Unwraps session key data, RSA Standard :SP 800-56Brev2 IG D.G:Approved method from D.G Key Confirmation:No Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides 3072 bits of security strength KTS-IFC: (A6139) KTS-2-Appletsv4 KTS-Unwrap Unwraps key data, AES Standard:SP 800-38F IG D.G:Approved method from IG D.G Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides 128 or 256 bits of security strength AES-KWP: (A6112) KTS-3 KTS-Unwrap Unwraps AES CBC / AES CMAC Standard:SP 800-38F IG D.G:Approved method from D.G Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides AES-CMAC: (A2713) AES-CBC: (A2713) Page 13 of 90 Name Type Description Properties Algorithms between 128 and 256 bits of security strength ECDSA-DigSig-1 DigSig- SigGen ECDSA Signature Generation ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186- 5): (A6534) ECDSA-DigSig-2 DigSig-SigVer ECDSA Signature Verification ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186- 5): (A6534) RSA- AsymKeyPair AsymKeyPair- KeyGen RSA Key Generation RSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 5): (A6535) CKG- DRBG: () Key Type: Symmetric and Asymmetric Counter DRBG: (A2713) RSA- AsymKeyPairVerif AsymKeyPair- KeyVer RSA key Signature verification using PKCS1 v1.5 for padding RSA SigVer (FIPS186- 5): (A6535) ECDSA- AsymKeyPair AsymKeyPair- KeyGen ECDSA Key Generation ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 5): (A6534) CKG- DRBG: () Key Type: Symmetric and Asymmetric Counter DRBG: (A2713) KAS-1 KAS-Full Key Agreement IG:IG D.F Scenario 2, Path 2 Key Conformation:No Key Derivation:KDA (separately KAS-ECC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3: (A5910) KDA HKDF Sp800- 56Cr1: (A2713) Page 14 of 90 Name Type Description Properties Algorithms tested) Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides 128 bits of security strength CKG- DRBG: () Key Type: Symmetric and Asymmetric KBKDF-2 KBKDF Counter KDF SP800- 108: (A2713) AES-CTR: (A2713) SHA SHA Message Length: 0- 65536; Increment 8 SHA-1: (A2713) SHA2-256: (A2713) SHA2-512: (A2713) MAC-Appletsv4 MAC HMAC HMAC- SHA-1: (A6112) HMAC- SHA2-256: (A6112) HMAC- SHA2-512: (A6112) MAC-AES MAC AES-CMAC AES-CMAC: (A2713) RSA-DigSig -1- Appletsv4 DigSig- SigGen RSA Signature Generation and Signature Primitive Signature Generation:2048- bits, 3072-bits, 4096-bits RSA Signature Primitive: (A2713) RSA SigGen (FIPS186- 5): (A6535) RSA-Decrypt-1- Appletsv4 KTS-Unwrap RSA Decryption Primitive RSA Decryption:3072- bits, 4096-bits RSA Decryption Primitive Sp800- 56Br2: (A6140) Table 7: Security Function Implementations 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information IG 2.4.B Page 15 of 90 RSADP (standard) Usage Restriction: The RSA Decryption Primitive (CVL) shall only be used within the context of a SP 800-56Brev2 KTS. IG D.H Symmetric keys and seeds used for generating the asymmetric keys are generated using methods described in Section 4, Section 5.1, Section 6.2.1, Section 6.2.2, Section 6.3 and Section 6.4 of SP 800-133r2. IG D.L In the case of the CTR_DRBG, the test report shall indicate if a derivation function is used during the instantiation and reseeding: The CTR_DRBG implementation of the module does use a derivation function (CAVP Cert. #A2713). In accordance with the Resolution in the IG, the V and Key values for the CTR_DRBG have been defined as CSPs as can be verified from the Section 9.4 SSP Table 1 Table 20. IG D.M Specific requirements for generating symmetric keys using SP 800-108 are found in Sec. 6.4 of SP 800-133rev1, “Symmetric Keys Derived from a Preshared Key.” SP 800-108 KDFs may not be used to generate asymmetric keys: As can be verified from the Section 9.4 SSP Table 2 Table 21, the module only uses KBKDF to derive symmetric keys. IG D.F: KAS-1: Key Agreement i.e. KAS-ECC-SSC per NIST SP 800-56Arev3 combined with an HKDF per NIST SP 800-56Cr1 (KDA) used in the context of PIV ECDH Key Agreement service (Scenario 2 path (2) per IG D.F – KAS-ECC-SSC and KDA self-tested separately): KAS (CAVP Cert. #A2713 KAS-ECC-SSC and CAVP Cert. #A2713 KDA HKDF NIST SP 800- 56Cr1; P-256 curve providing 128 bits of encryption strength) IG D.G: KTS-1: Key wrapping (Using the approved AES modes CMAC and CBC) used to provide an end-to-end confidential and authenticated protected channel between the external entity (User) and the module (i.e. used in the context of the Secure Channel service). This is per Scenario 2 in IG D.G Approved methods for key transport i.e., a “combination” method: use any approved symmetric encryption mode, such as AES ECB, AES CBC, Triple-DES ECB, etc. together with an approved authentication method (for example, HMAC or AES CMAC, or KMAC): KTS (CAVP Cert. #A2713 AES-CMAC and CAVP Cert. #A2713 AES-CBC; 128, 192, and 256- bit keys providing 128, 192, or 256 bits of encryption strength) IG 9.6.A An AES or a Triple-DES encryption using any approved mode of AES or the Triple-DES as defined in SP 800-140C CMVP Approved Security Functions: SSPs are stored encrypted using AES-CBC. Page 16 of 90 Additional Comment #1: The approved algorithm implementations used to protect stored SSPs shall be tested by the CAVP (or vendor affirmed if allowed by an IG): The AES-CBC has been tested per CAVP Cert. #A2713. IG C.E: The module generates RSA signature keys using an approved key generation procedure per RSA KeyGen validated for conformance to FIPS 186-5 Certs. #A6535 and #A6536. IG C.F: The RSA KeyGen, SigGen and SigVer implementations have been tested for all implemented RSA modulus lengths (moduli 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits). No untested moduli apply. IG C.L: Resolutions A and B: This requirement is inapplicable to the module since it does not support/implement any truncated hash functions. Resolution C 1.-5.: 1. The HMAC key provides security strength between 112-256 bits and this meets the security requirements i.e. minimum required security strength at this time per NIST SP 800-131Ar2. The actual range is 112-320 bits per the following computation but capped at 256 bits (largest security strength that can be claimed): For HMAC, NIST SP 800-107 Rev. 1 states that the effective security strength is: "Security Strength"=min⁡("strength"(K)," " 2C) where: Kis the HMAC key. Cis the internal chaining value size of the hash function. For SHA-1, C=160bits, so 2C=320bits. Thus for HMAC-SHA-1, the key security strength is: 〖"Security Strength" 〗_(HMAC-SHA1)=min⁡("strength"(K)," " 320) 2. The HMAC key is stored in the JCOP OS’ keystore to which no access is possible/provided by the module and is thus kept secret. 3. The module generates i.e. derives (using the NIST SP 800-108r1 KDF per SCP03/secure channel SFI) the keys (SD-SENC, SD-SMAC and SD-RMAC) per NIST SP 800-133r1 Section 6.2.2: Symmetric Keys Derived from a Pre-existing Key. 4. and 5. The module does not support a truncated HMAC and thus requirements per #4. and #5. do not apply to it. Resolution D 1.: The module derives the following keys with s i.e. security strengths as specified below: For NIST SP 800-108r1 derived keys: SD-SENC, SD-SMAC and SD-RMAC each with s 128 bits. a. The security strength supported by the asymmetric keys, or key-derivation key: for each of the derived keys, the KDKs are the SD-KENC (used to derive SENC) and SD-KMAC (used to derive the SMAC and RMAC) keys each with a security strength of 128 bits. b. The preimage strength of the hash function, or the hash function used in all HMAC constructions used to derive the key: 160-bits (for HMAC-SHA-1 used as a PRF for the NIST SP 800-108r1 KDF) c. The length of the derived key in bits: 128 bits. Resolution E: This requirement is inapplicable to the module since it implements a CTR-DRBG. Page 17 of 90 2.8 RBG and Entropy Cert Number Vendor Name E148 NXP Table 8: Entropy Certificates Name Type Operational Environment Sample Size Entropy per Sample Conditioning Component JCOP 4.5 on P71D600 Physical JCOP 4.5 on P71D600 8 bits 7.30359 N/A Table 9: Entropy Sources 2.9 Key Generation The module uses an approved NIST SP 800-90Ar1 DRBG for the generation of keys/SSPs. 2.10 Key Establishment The module supports approved key establishment methods as specified in the Security Functions Implementations tables 2.11 Industry Protocols N/A, this module does not implement industry protocols. 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces 3.1 Ports and Interfaces Physical Port Logical Interface(s) Data That Passes VSS, VDD Power These interfaces are used to supply power to the module in contact mode; The module starts when interface is powered RST Control Input If a signal is sent on this interface in contact mode, the module will reboot (active low) CLK Control Input The interface is used by an external device (ex: smartcard reader) to provide a clock signal to the IC in contact mode; The IC will derive its own clock from this signal I/O Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output This interface is used to communicate with an external entity (ex: SmartCard reader) in contact mode LA, LB Data Input Data Output This interface is used to communicate with an external entity (ex: SmartCard reader) in contactless mode Page 18 of 90 Physical Port Logical Interface(s) Data That Passes Control Input Status Output Table 10: Ports and Interfaces Control Output is not applicable for this module. 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication 4.1 Authentication Methods Method Name Description Security Mechanism Strength Each Attempt Strength per Minute SCP Secure Channel Protocol AES CMAC Mutual Authentication 2.9E39 5.2E-37 XAUTH External Authentication AES Encryption Challenge/Response 2.9E39 1.17E-35 PIN PIN-based Authentication PIN Comparison 8.3 E-9 1.24E-7 Table 11: Authentication Methods • SCP - Secure Channel Protocol Authentication Method The Secure Channel Protocol authentication method is provided by the Secure Channel service. The SD-KENC and SD-KMAC keys are used to derive the SD-SENC and SD-SMAC keys, respectively. The off-card entity participating in the mutual authentication sends a 64-bit challenge to the Smart Card. The Smart Card generates its own challenge and computes a 64- bit cryptogram with SD-SMAC key and both challenges. The Smart Card cryptogram and challenge are sent to the off-card entity which checks the Smart Card cryptogram and creates its own 64-bit cryptogram with both challenges. A 64-bit message authentication code (MAC) is also computed on the command containing the off-card entity cryptogram with AES-CMAC and SD-SMAC key; the MAC is concatenated to the command, and this whole command is sent to the Smart Card. The Smart Card checks the message authentication code and compares the received cryptogram to the calculated cryptogram. If all of this succeeds, the two participants are mutually authenticated. The probability that a random attempt will succeed using this authentication method is: - 1/(2^128) = 2.9E‐39 (MAC||cryptogram) using a 128‐bit block for authentication). This authentication method includes a counter of failed authentication called “velocity checking” by Global Platform. The counter is decremented prior to any attempt to authenticate and is only reset to its threshold (maximum value) upon successful authentication. The Module enforces a maximum of 60 failed Global Platform SCP03 authentication attempts before blocking permanently the card. Page 19 of 90 The probability that a random attempt will succeed over a one-minute interval is (with the assumption here that 3 attempts are possible per second) - 60*3/2^128 = 5.2E-37 (MAC||cryptogram), using a 128‐bit block for authentication. Note: in the above paragraph, SD- stands for ISD, SD, i.e. Issuer Security Domain or Supplementary Security Domain. • XAUTH - External Authentication Method The External Authentication method is provided by Authenticate service. This authentication method decrypts with ACA-SPAK an encrypted 128-bit challenge sent to the module by an off- card entity and compares the resulting challenge to the expected value. The authentication strength for this method depends on the algorithm, key size and challenge size used: the minimum strength key used for this method is AES-128 Key; however, the limiting factor in this authentication method is the 128-bit block size. The associated probability of false authentication of this authentication methods is: - 1/(2^128) = 2.9E‐39 The execution of this authentication mechanism is rate limited, the module can perform no more than (60/0.015) attempts per minute. Therefore, the probability that a random attempt will succeed over a one minute period is: - 60/(0.015*(2^128)) = 1.17E -35 • PIN - PIN-Based Authentication Method This PIN-Based authentication method compares a value sent to the Module to the stored ACA- PIN or ACA-PUK values; if the two values are equal, the operator is authenticated. The strength of this authentication method depends on both internal and external factors. The Module supports numeric PIN values coded in ASCII with a length comprises between 6 and 8 bytes. The character space for the first 6 bytes is 10 (the values ‘30’ through ‘39’ are permitted) and in the last 2 characters is 11 (the values ‘30’ through ‘39’ and ‘FF’ are permitted). The probability of false authentication of this authentication method is as follows: - 1/(10^6*11^2) = 8.3E-9 Based on the SP800-73 defined maximum count of 15 for failed authentication attempts, the probability that a random attempt will succeed over a one minute period is: - 15/(10^6*11^2) = 1.24E-7 4.2 Roles Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods ICO- Issuer Cryptographic Officer Identity CO SCP CCO- Crescendo Applets Cryptographic Officer Identity CO SCP AA: Application Administrator Identity CO XAUTH HD: Help Desk Officer Identity CO PIN CH: Card Holder Identity CO PIN UU: Unauthenticated User Role Unauthenticated User None Page 20 of 90 Table 12: Roles • ICO - Issuer Cryptographic Officer: o Identity-based authentication using Global Platform Secure Channel Protocol Authentication Method with ISD and SSD0 keys. o Manages Module (Card Manager) and SSD0 Content. • CCO - Crescendo Applets Cryptographic Officer: o Identity-based authentication using Global Platform Secure Channel Protocol Authentication Method with SSD1 keys. o Manages SSD1 content, as well as Crescendo (ACA, PIVEXT, OATH, FIDO) Applets content and configuration in managed mode. • AA - Application Administrator: o Identity-based authentication using “External Authentication” Authentication Method with ACA-ADMK keys. o Manages Crescendo (ACA, PIVEXT, OATH, FIDO) Applets content and configuration in unmanaged mode and PIN Authenticator (unlock) in managed mode. • HD - Help Desk Officer o Identity-based authentication using “PIN-based” Authentication Method with ACA-PUK. o Manages PIN Authenticator (unlock…) in unmanaged/managed. • CH - Card Holder o Identity-based authentication using “PIN-based” Authentication Method with ACA-PIN. o Manages Crescendo (ACA, PIVEXT, OATH, FIDO) Applets content and configuration in unmanaged mode. o Uses Crescendo (ACA, PIVEXT, OATH, FIDO) Applets services and crypto operations in unmanaged/managed modes. • UU - Unauthenticated User o No authentication needed o Accesses Module services where SSPs are not modified and CSPs are not disclosed. Note: Crescendo Applets are configurable in Managed or Unmanaged mode, each mode corresponding to a different Access Control Rules Definition. In Managed mode, the Crescendo Applets content and configurations are done by CCO operator, while in Unmanaged mode they can be done by AA operator or CH user. The recommended mode is the Managed mode involving a Credential Management System. 4.3 Approved Services Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access Card Reset Power cycle or reset the Module. Includes Power- Statu s Word N/A ATR None UU: Unauthent icated Page 21 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access On Self-Test and Zeroization of SSPs. User - OS- DRBG-EI: E - OS- DRBG- SEED: E - ISD- SENC: Z - ISD- SMAC: Z - ISD- RMAC: Z - ACA- SKISK: Z - FIDO- PINS: Z Card Manager Context Select the Card Manager; Card Manager Select and Manage Channel service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters Card Manag er Inform ation, Chann el Numb er None UU: Unauthent icated User - ISD- SENC: Z - ISD- SMAC: Z - ISD- RMAC: Z Card Manager Secure Channel Secure Channel Establishment; Initialize Update and External Authenticate Service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters Secur e Chann el Param eters CKG Symmetri c Key Generatio n ENT DRBG KBKDF-2 MAC-AES ICO- Issuer Cryptogra phic Officer - OS- DRBG-EI: E - OS- DRBG- SEED: E - OS- DRBG- KEY: E - OS- DRBG-V: E - OS- DRBG- OUTPUT: E Page 22 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access - OS- DRBG- STATE: E - OS- MKEK: E - ISD- KENC: E - ISD- KMAC: E - ISD- SENC: G,E - ISD- SMAC: G,E - ISD- RMAC: G,E Card Manager Info (Self-Test) Read unprivileged data objects, e.g. module configuration or status information; Card Manager GET DATA unprivileged service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters Reque sted Inform ation None UU: Unauthent icated User Card Manager Lifecycle Modify the card or applet life cycle status; Card Manager SET STATUS service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters N/A None ICO- Issuer Cryptogra phic Officer - ISD- SENC: E - ISD- SMAC: E - ISD- RMAC: E - OS- MKEK: Z Card Manager Privileged Info (Show module's Status and Version) Read privileged data objects and Read card or applet life cycle status; Card Manager GET DATA privileged Statu s Word Comm and Param eters Reque sted Inform ation None ICO- Issuer Cryptogra phic Officer - ISD- SENC: E Page 23 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access and GET STATUS service - ISD- SMAC: E - ISD- RMAC: E Card Manager Manage Content Delete a package or object, load, install and update application packages; Card Manager DELETE, LOAD, INSTALL and PUT KEY Service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters N/A BC-3- UnAuth KTS-3 ICO- Issuer Cryptogra phic Officer - ISD- SENC: E - ISD- SMAC: E - ISD- RMAC: E - ACA- ADMK: W - ACA- PIN: W - PIV- PWC-Pr: W - PIV- PWC-Pu: W - FIDO- IDENCK: G - FIDO- FAUTHK- Pr: G - FIDO- CREDRA NDUVK: G - ISD- KENC: W - ISD- KMAC: W - ISD- KDEK: W,E - OS- MKEK: E,G - SD- DAPK: E Page 24 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access - OS- SKEK: W SSD Context Select the Security Domain and Manage Logical Channel; SSD SELECT and MANAGE CHANNEL service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters N/A None UU: Unauthent icated User - SD- SENC: Z - SD- SMAC: Z - SD- RMAC: Z SSD Secure Channel Secure Channel Establishment; SSD INITIALIZE UPDATE and SSD EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters Secur e Chann el Param eters CKG Symmetri c Key Generatio n ENT DRBG KBKDF-2 MAC-AES ICO- Issuer Cryptogra phic Officer - OS- DRBG-EI: E - OS- DRBG- SEED: E - OS- DRBG- KEY: E - OS- DRBG-V: E - OS- DRBG- OUTPUT: E - OS- DRBG- STATE: E - OS- MKEK: E - SD- KENC: E - SD- KMAC: E - SD- SENC: G,E - SD- SMAC: G,E Page 25 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access - SD- RMAC: G,E CCO- Crescend o Applets Cryptogra phic Officer - OS- DRBG-EI: E - OS- DRBG- SEED: E - OS- DRBG- KEY: E - OS- DRBG-V: E - OS- DRBG- OUTPUT: E - OS- DRBG- STATE: E - OS- MKEK: E - SD- KENC: E - SD- KMAC: E - SD- SENC: G,E - SD- SMAC: G,E - SD- RMAC: G,E SSD Info Read unprivileged data objects, e.g. module configuration or status information; Statu s Word Comm and Param eters Reque sted Inform ation None UU: Unauthent icated User Page 26 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access SSD GET DATA unprivileged service SSD Privileged Info Read privileged data objects and Read Card or Applet life cycle status; SSD GET DATA privileged and GET STATUS service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters Reque sted Inform ation None ICO- Issuer Cryptogra phic Officer - SD- SENC: E - SD- SMAC: E - SD- RMAC: E CCO- Crescend o Applets Cryptogra phic Officer - SD- SENC: E - SD- SMAC: E - SD- RMAC: E SSD Manage Content Update Security Domain Keys; SSD PUT KEY service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters (includ ing SSPs) N/A KTS-3 ICO- Issuer Cryptogra phic Officer - SD- SENC: E - SD- SMAC: E - SD- RMAC: E - SD- KENC: W - SD- KMAC: W - SD- KDEK: W,E - SD- DAPK: W,Z - OS- Page 27 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access MKEK: E CCO- Crescend o Applets Cryptogra phic Officer - SD- SENC: E - SD- SMAC: E - SD- RMAC: E - SD- KENC: W - SD- KMAC: W - SD- KDEK: W,E - SD- DAPK: W,Z - OS- MKEK: E ACA Select Applet Select Applet; ACA SELECT Service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters Applet s Inform ation None UU: Unauthent icated User - SD- SENC: Z - SD- SMAC: Z - SD- RMAC: Z ACA Secure Channel Secure Channel Establishment; ACA INITIALIZE UPDATE and EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters Secur e Chann el Param eters CKG Symmetri c Key Generatio n ENT DRBG KBKDF-2 MAC-AES CCO- Crescend o Applets Cryptogra phic Officer - OS- DRBG-EI: E - OS- DRBG- SEED: E - OS- Page 28 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access DRBG- KEY: E - OS- DRBG-V: E - OS- DRBG- OUTPUT: E - OS- DRBG- STATE: E - OS- MKEK: E - SD- KENC: E - SD- KMAC: E - SD- SENC: G,E - SD- SMAC: G,E - SD- RMAC: G,E ACA Logout Logout ICO, CCO, CH, AA roles; ACA LOGOUT Service Statu s Word N/A N/A None UU: Unauthent icated User - ACA- SKISK: Z - OS- MKEK: E ACA Authenticate Application Administrator Authentication and Card Holder Authentication by presenting the PIN; ACA GET CHALLENGE, EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE and VERIFY Service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters (includ ing Crypto gram and SSPs) ) Challe nge None AA: Applicatio n Administr ator - ACA- ADMK: E - OS- MKEK: E CH: Card Holder - ACA- PIN: E Page 29 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access - OS- MKEK: E ACA PUT KEY Put XAUTH Key (ACA Manage Content) Statu s Word Comm and Param eters (includ ing SSPs) N/A KTS-2- Appletsv4 KTS-3 CCO- Crescend o Applets Cryptogra phic Officer - SD- SENC: E - SD- SMAC: E - SD- RMAC: E - SD- KDEK: E - ACA- CAST- KWPK: E - ACA- ADMK: W,Z - OS- MKEK: E AA: Applicatio n Administr ator - ACA- SKISK: E - ACA- CAST- KWPK: E - ACA- ADMK: W,Z - OS- MKEK: E CH: Card Holder - ACA- SKISK: E - ACA- CAST- KWPK: E - ACA- ADMK: Page 30 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access W,Z - OS- MKEK: E ACA CHANGE REFERENCE DATA (CREATE PIN) Create PIN Value (ACA Manage Content) Statu s Word Comm and Param eters (includ ing SSPs) N/A KTS-2- Appletsv4 CCO- Crescend o Applets Cryptogra phic Officer - SD- SENC: E - SD- SMAC: E - SD- RMAC: E - SD- KDEK: E - ACA- PIN: W - ACA- CAST- KWPK: E - OS- MKEK: E ACA CHANGE REFERENCE DATA (CREATE PUK) Create/Update/Del ete PUK value (ACA Manage Content) Statu s Word Comm and Param eters (includ ing SSPs) N/A KTS-2- Appletsv4 CCO- Crescend o Applets Cryptogra phic Officer - SD- SENC: E - SD- SMAC: E - SD- RMAC: E - SD- KDEK: E - ACA- PUK: W - ACA- CAST- KWPK: E - OS- MKEK: E AA: Applicatio n Page 31 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access Administr ator - ACA- PUK: W - OS- MKEK: E CH: Card Holder - ACA- PUK: W - OS- MKEK: E ACA RESET CARD Reset the card content (ACA Manage Content) Statu s Word N/A N/A None CCO- Crescend o Applets Cryptogra phic Officer - SD- SENC: E - SD- SMAC: E - SD- RMAC: E - ACA- ADMK: Z - ACA- SKISK: Z - ACA- PIN: W - ACA- PUK: Z - PIVX- GPK-Pr: Z - PIV- AuK-Pr: Z - PIV- DSK-Pr: Z - PIV- KMK-Pr: Z - PIV- RKMK-Pr: Z - PIV- CaK-Pr: Z - PIV- SKIKTK- Page 32 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access Pr: Z - PIVX- GPK-Pu: Z - PIV- AuK-Pu: Z - PIV- DSK-Pu: Z - PIV- KMK-Pu: Z - PIV- RKMK- Pu: Z - PIV- CaK-Pu: Z - PIV- SKIKTK- Pu: Z - OATH- OTP: Z - FIDO- PIN: Z - FIDO- ENTK-Pr: Z - FIDO- ENTK-Pu: Z - FIDO- IDENCK: G - FIDO- AUTHRK- Pr: Z - FIDO- AUTHRK- Pu: Z - OS- MKEK: E AA: Applicatio n Administr ator - ACA- Page 33 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access ADMK: Z - ACA- SKISK: Z - ACA- PIN: W - ACA- PUK: Z - PIVX- GPK-Pr: Z - PIV- AuK-Pr: Z - PIV- DSK-Pr: Z - PIV- KMK-Pr: Z - PIV- RKMK-Pr: Z - PIV- CaK-Pr: Z - PIV- SKIKTK- Pr: Z - PIVX- GPK-Pu: Z - PIV- AuK-Pu: Z - PIV- DSK-Pu: Z - PIV- KMK-Pu: Z - PIV- RKMK- Pu: Z - PIV- CaK-Pu: Z - PIV- SKIKTK- Pu: Z - OATH- OTP: Z - FIDO- PIN: Z Page 34 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access - FIDO- ENTK-Pr: Z - FIDO- ENTK-Pu: Z - FIDO- IDENCK: G - FIDO- AUTHRK- Pr: Z - FIDO- AUTHRK- Pu: Z - OS- MKEK: E CH: Card Holder - ACA- ADMK: Z - ACA- SKISK: Z - ACA- PIN: W - ACA- PUK: Z - PIVX- GPK-Pr: Z - PIV- AuK-Pr: Z - PIV- DSK-Pr: Z - PIV- KMK-Pr: Z - PIV- RKMK-Pr: Z - PIV- CaK-Pr: Z - PIV- SKIKTK- Pr: Z - PIVX- GPK-Pu: Z - PIV- Page 35 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access AuK-Pu: Z - PIV- DSK-Pu: Z - PIV- KMK-Pu: Z - PIV- RKMK- Pu: Z - PIV- CaK-Pu: Z - PIV- SKIKTK- Pu: Z - OATH- OTP: Z - FIDO- PIN: Z - FIDO- ENTK-Pr: Z - FIDO- ENTK-Pu: Z - FIDO- IDENCK: G - FIDO- AUTHRK- Pr: Z - FIDO- AUTHRK- Pu: Z - OS- MKEK: E ACA UPDATE PROPERTIES (Shared PIN) Update the shared/unshared PIN properties of the card (ACA Manage Content) Statu s Word Comm and Param eters N/A None CCO- Crescend o Applets Cryptogra phic Officer - SD- SENC: E - SD- SMAC: E - SD- Page 36 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access RMAC: E UU: Unauthent icated User ACA UPDATE PROPERTIES (Others) Update the applet properties (PIN Policy configurations, Managed Mode, Communication Media, Contactless Firewall, ForcePINChange) (ACA Manage Content) Statu s Word Comm and Param eters N/A None CCO- Crescend o Applets Cryptogra phic Officer - SD- SENC: E - SD- SMAC: E - SD- RMAC: E AA: Applicatio n Administr ator CH: Card Holder ACA CHANGE REFERENCE DATA (CHANGE PIN) Change the PIN value (ACA CH Authentication Management) Statu s Word Comm and Param eters N/A None CH: Card Holder - ACA- PIN: W,E - OS- MKEK: E ACA RESET RETRY COUNTER Unblock and change the PIN value (ACA CH Authentication Management) Statu s Word Comm and Param eters (includ ing SSPs) N/A KTS-2- Appletsv4 CCO- Crescend o Applets Cryptogra phic Officer - SD- SENC: E - SD- SMAC: E - SD- RMAC: E - SD- KDEK: E - ACA- PIN: W - ACA- Page 37 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access CAST- KWPK: E - OS- MKEK: E AA: Applicatio n Administr ator - ACA- ADMK: E - ACA- PIN: W - OS- MKEK: E HD: Help Desk Officer - ACA- PIN: W - ACA- PUK: E - OS- MKEK: E ACA Info Retrieve FIPS Module Configuration, Trigger the Self- Tests, Retrieve the FIPS CAST execution status; ACA GET PROPERTIES service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters FIPS Status KTS-2- Appletsv4 MAC- Appletsv4 UU: Unauthent icated User - ACA- CAST- HMACK: E - ACA- CAST- KWPK: E - OS- MKEK: E PIVEXT Select Applet Select Applet; PIVEXT SELECT Service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters Applet s Inform ation None UU: Unauthent icated User - SD- SENC: Z - SD- SMAC: Z - SD- RMAC: Z Page 38 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access PIVEXT Secure Channel Secure Channel Establishment; PIVEXT INITIALIZE UPDATE and EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters Secur e Chann el Param eters CKG Symmetri c Key Generatio n ENT DRBG KBKDF-2 MAC-AES CCO- Crescend o Applets Cryptogra phic Officer - OS- DRBG-EI: E - OS- DRBG- SEED: E - OS- DRBG- KEY: E - OS- DRBG-V: E - OS- DRBG- OUTPUT: E - OS- DRBG- STATE: E - OS- MKEK: E - SD- KENC: E - SD- KMAC: E - SD- SENC: G,E - SD- SMAC: G,E - SD- RMAC: G,E PIVEXT Manage Content Update PIV Instance Type, Generate an asymmetric RSA or ECC Key Pair, Create, update, or delete PIV Data Object and/or Statu s Word Comm and Param eters PSP KTS-2- Appletsv4 KTS-3 RSA- AsymKey Pair RSA- AsymKey CCO- Crescend o Applets Cryptogra phic Officer - SD- SENC: E Page 39 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access Inject or delete RSA/ECC private Key, update Security Configuration; PIVEXT UPDATE PROPERTIES, GENERATE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR(GENERATE KEY), PUT DATA and PUT KEY Service PairVerif ECDSA- AsymKey Pair KAS-1 SHA - SD- SMAC: E - SD- RMAC: E - SD- KDEK: E - PIVX- GPK-Pr: G,Z,W - PIV- AuK-Pr: G,Z,W - PIV- DSK-Pr: G,Z,W - PIV- KMK-Pr: G,Z,W - PIV- RKMK-Pr: G,Z,W - PIV- CaK-Pr: G,Z,W - PIV- SKIKTK- Pr: G,Z - PIVX- GPK-Pu: G,R,Z - PIV- AuK-Pu: G,R,Z - PIV- DSK-Pu: G,R,Z - PIV- KMK-Pu: G,R,Z - PIV- RKMK- Pu: G,R,Z - PIV- CaK-Pu: G,R,Z - PIV- SKIKTK- Pu: G,R,Z Page 40 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access - PIV- PWC-Pr: E - PIV- PWC-Pu: E - ACA- CAST- KWPK: E - OS- MKEK: E AA: Applicatio n Administr ator - PIVX- GPK-Pr: G,Z,W - PIV- AuK-Pr: G,Z,W - PIV- DSK-Pr: G,Z,W - PIV- KMK-Pr: G,Z,W - PIV- RKMK-Pr: G,Z,W - PIV- CaK-Pr: G,Z,W - PIV- SKIKTK- Pr: G,Z - PIVX- GPK-Pu: G,R,Z - PIV- AuK-Pu: G,R,Z - PIV- DSK-Pu: G,R,Z - PIV- KMK-Pu: Page 41 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access G,R,Z - PIV- RKMK- Pu: G,R,Z - PIV- CaK-Pu: G,R,Z - PIV- SKIKTK- Pu: G,R,Z - PIV- PWC-Pr: E - PIV- PWC-Pu: E - ACA- CAST- KWPK: E - ACA- SKISK: E - OS- MKEK: E CH: Card Holder - PIVX- GPK-Pr: G,Z,W - PIV- AuK-Pr: G,Z,W - PIV- DSK-Pr: G,Z,W - PIV- KMK-Pr: G,Z,W - PIV- RKMK-Pr: G,Z,W - PIV- CaK-Pr: G,Z,W - PIV- SKIKTK- Pr: G,Z - PIVX- GPK-Pu: Page 42 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access G,R,Z - PIV- AuK-Pu: G,R,Z - PIV- DSK-Pu: G,R,Z - PIV- KMK-Pu: G,R,Z - PIV- RKMK- Pu: G,R,Z - PIV- CaK-Pu: G,R,Z - PIV- SKIKTK- Pu: G,R,Z - PIV- PWC-Pr: E - PIV- PWC-Pu: E - ACA- CAST- KWPK: E - ACA- SKISK: E - OS- MKEK: E PIVEXT Info Retrieve the applet, Return the public key of the asymmetric key; PIVEXT GET PROPERTIES and GENERATE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR (GET MODULUS) Service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters Reque sted Inform ation, PSP None UU: Unauthent icated User - PIVX- GPK-Pu: R - PIV- AuK-Pu: R - PIV- DSK-Pu: R - PIV- KMK-Pu: R Page 43 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access - PIV- RKMK- Pu: R - PIV- CaK-Pu: R - PIV- SKIKTK- Pu: R - OS- MKEK: E PIVEXT Privileged Info Read the PIV Data Object content; PIVEXT GET DATA Service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters Reque sted Inform ation None CH: Card Holder UU: Unauthent icated User PIVEXT Authenticate Card Holder Authentication by presenting the PIN; PIVEXT VERIFY Service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters (includ ing SSPs) N/A None CH: Card Holder - ACA- PIN: E - OS- MKEK: E PIVEXT CH Authentication Management Change the PIN value, Unblock and change the value of the PIN; PIVEXT CHANGE REFERENCE DATA and RESET RETRY COUNTER Service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters (includ ing SSPs) N/A None CH: Card Holder - ACA- PIN: W,E - OS- MKEK: E AA: Applicatio n Administr ator - ACA- PIN: W - ACA- PUK: E - OS- MKEK: E PIVEXT RSA, ECC Crypto Operation Perform a requested cryptographic operation with an RSA/ECC Asymmetric Key; Statu s Word Comm and Param eters (Data To be Proce ssed Value KTS-1 ECDSA- DigSig-1 ECDSA- DigSig-2 KAS-1 CH: Card Holder - ACA- SKISK: W - PIVX- GPK-Pr: Page 44 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access PIVEXT GENERAL AUTHENTICATE Service Proce ssed) SHA RSA- DigSig -1- Appletsv4 RSA- Decrypt-1- Appletsv4 E - PIV- AuK-Pr: E - PIV- DSK-Pr: E - PIV- KMK-Pr: E - PIV- RKMK-Pr: E - PIV- SKIKTK- Pr: E - OS- MKEK: E UU: Unauthent icated User - PIV- CaK-Pr: E - OS- MKEK: E PIVEXT Logout Logout CH authentication; PIVEXT VERIFY (LOGOUT) Service Statu s Word N/A N/A None UU: Unauthent icated User OATH Select Applet Select Applet; OATH SELECT Service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters Applet Inform ation None UU: Unauthent icated User - SD- SENC: Z - SD- SMAC: Z - SD- RMAC: Z OATH Secure Channel Secure Channel Establishment; OATH INITIALIZE UPDATE and EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters Secur e Chann el Param eters CKG Symmetri c Key Generatio n ENT DRBG CCO- Crescend o Applets Cryptogra phic Officer - OS- DRBG-EI: Page 45 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access KBKDF-2 MAC-AES E - OS- DRBG- SEED: E - OS- DRBG- KEY: E - OS- DRBG-V: E - OS- DRBG- OUTPUT: E - OS- DRBG- STATE: E - OS- MKEK: E - SD- KENC: E - SD- KMAC: E - SD- SENC: G,E - SD- SMAC: G,E - SD- RMAC: G,E OATH Info Retrieve the applet properties; OATH GET PROPERTIES Service Statu s Word N/A Reque sted Inform ation None UU: Unauthent icated User OATH GET CODE Obtain a One Time Password (HOTP, TOTP), (Never to be used as a first factor for UU); (OATH Authentication) Statu s Word Comm and Param eter HOTP, TOTP MAC- Appletsv4 CH: Card Holder - ACA- CAST- HMACK: E - OATH- OTP: E UU: Unauthent icated Page 46 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access User - ACA- CAST- HMACK: E - OATH- OTP: E OATH OCRA AUTHENTICATE Perform an OCRA challenge Response or Digital Signature (OATH Authentication) Statu s Word Data to be proces ed Proce ssed Data MAC- Appletsv4 CH: Card Holder - ACA- CAST- HMACK: E - OATH- OTP: E OATH Manage Content Inject or delete a new OATH key, or Security Configuration; OATH PUT KEY Service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters (includ ing SSPs) N/A KTS-2- Appletsv4 KTS-3 CCO- Crescend o Applets Cryptogra phic Officer - SD- SENC: E - SD- SMAC: E - SD- RMAC: E - SD- KDEK: E - ACA- CAST- KWPK: E - OATH- OTP: Z,W - OS- MKEK: E AA: Applicatio n Administr ator - ACA- SKISK: E - ACA- CAST- KWPK: E - OATH- OTP: Z,W Page 47 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access - OS- MKEK: E CH: Card Holder - ACA- SKISK: E - ACA- CAST- KWPK: E - OATH- OTP: Z,W - OS- MKEK: E FIDO Select Applet Select Applet; FIDO Select Service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters Applet s Inform ation KAS-1 SHA UU: Unauthent icated User - SD- SENC: Z - SD- SMAC: Z - SD- RMAC: Z - FIDO- PWC-Pr: W - FIDO- AUTHKA K-Pr: G - FIDO- PINENCS K: Z - FIDO- PINAUTH SK: Z - FIDO- SALTENC SK: Z - FIDO- SALTAUT HSK: Z - FIDO- PWC-Pu: W - FIDO- AUTHKA K-Pu: G Page 48 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access FIDO Secure Channel Secure Channel Establishment; FIDO INITIALIZE UPDATE and EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE Service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters Secur e Chann el Param eters CKG Symmetri c Key Generatio n ENT DRBG KBKDF-2 MAC-AES CCO- Crescend o Applets Cryptogra phic Officer - OS- DRBG-EI: E - OS- DRBG- SEED: E - OS- DRBG- KEY: E - OS- DRBG-V: E - OS- DRBG- OUTPUT: E - OS- DRBG- STATE: E - OS- MKEK: E - SD- KENC: E - SD- KMAC: E - SD- SENC: G,E - SD- SMAC: G,E - SD- RMAC: G,E FIDO Info Retrieve the applet properties, Return the public key of the asymmetric key and Read the Data Object content; FIDO Statu s Word Comm and Param eters Reque st Inform ation Status None UU: Unauthent icated User - FIDO- ENTK-Pu: R Page 49 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access GET PROPERTIES, GENERATE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR (GET MODULUS) and GET DATA Service - OS- MKEK: E FIDO Manage Content Inject attestation certificate, enterprise attestation certificate and RPID List, Inject Attestation Key, Generate Enterprise Attestation Ecc Key Pair, Update FIDO Applet Properties (AlwaysUv, MinPinLength,For cePINChange, Communication Media, Enterprise Attestation configuration); FIDO PUT DATA, PUT KEY, GENERATE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR (GENERATE KEY) and UPDATE PROPERTIES Service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters (includ ing SSPs) PSP KTS-2- Appletsv4 KTS-3 ECDSA- DigSig-1 ECDSA- DigSig-2 ECDSA- AsymKey Pair SHA CCO- Crescend o Applets Cryptogra phic Officer - SD- SENC: E - SD- SMAC: E - SD- RMAC: E - SD- KDEK: E - ACA- CAST- KWPK: E - FIDO- ATTK-Pr: W - FIDO- ENTK-Pr: W,G - FIDO- ENTK-Pu: G,R FIDO ECC Crypto Operation Perform an ECDSA signature with an ECC Asymmetric Private Key; FIDO GENERAL AUTHENTICATE Service Statu s Word Comm and Param eters (Data to be Proce ssed) Proce ssed Data ECDSA- DigSig-1 SHA CCO- Crescend o Applets Cryptogra phic Officer - SD- SENC: E - SD- SMAC: E Page 50 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access - SD- RMAC: E - FIDO- ENTK-Pr: E FIDO AuthenticatorMakeCr edential Create a new FIDO credential (discoverable or non-discoverable) (FIDO Services) Statu s Word Comm and Param eters Respo nse Data (includ ing PSPs) , BC-1- Auth ECDSA- DigSig-1 ECDSA- DigSig-2 ECDSA- AsymKey Pair SHA MAC- Appletsv4 CH: Card Holder - ACA- CAST- HMACK: E - FIDO- PINS: Z,E - FIDO- ATTK-Pr: E - FIDO- ENTK-Pr: E - FIDO- IDENCK: E - FIDO- AUTHRK- Pr: G - FIDO- AUTHKS K-Pr: G - FIDO- AUTHKS K-Pu: G,R - FIDO- AUTHRK- Pu: G,R - OS- MKEK: E FIDO AuthenticatorGetAss ertion Use FIDO Credential (FIDO Services) Statu s Word Comm and Param eters Respo nse Data BC-1- Auth BC-2- UnAuth ECDSA- DigSig-1 SHA MAC- Appletsv4 CH: Card Holder - ACA- CAST- HMACK: E - FIDO- PINS: Z,E - FIDO- IDENCK: E - FIDO- Page 51 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access AUTHRK- Pr: E - FIDO- AUTHKS K-Pr: E,R - FIDO- AUTHKS K-Pu: R - FIDO- FAUTHK- Pr: E - FIDO- SALTAUT HSK: W,E - FIDO- SALTENC SK: W,E - FIDO- CREDRA NDUVK: E - OS- MKEK: E FIDO AuthenticationGetNe xtAssertion Use FIDO Credential (Next) (FIDO Services) Statu s Word Comm and Param eters Respo nse Data BC-2- UnAuth ECDSA- DigSig-1 SHA MAC- Appletsv4 CH: Card Holder - FIDO- IDENCK: E - FIDO- FAUTHK- Pr: E - FIDO- AUTHRK- Pr: E - FIDO- SALTAUT HSK: E - FIDO- SALTENC SK: E - FIDO- CREDRA NDUVK: E - OS- MKEK: E Page 52 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access FIDO AuthenticatorGetInfo Get FIDO device information (FIDO Services) Statu s Word N/A Reque sted Inform ation None UU: Unauthent icated User FIDO AuthenticatorClientPI N Set, Change, authenticate PIN value (FIDO Services) Statu s Word Comm and Param eters (includ ing SSPs) N/A BC-2- UnAuth KAS-1 SHA MAC- Appletsv4 CH: Card Holder - ACA- PIN: W,E - ACA- CAST- HMACK: E - FIDO- PIN: W,E - FIDO- PINS: G - PIV- PWC-Pr: E - PIV- PWC-Pu: E - FIDO- AUTHKA K-Pr: G - FIDO- PINENCS K: W,E - FIDO- PINAUTH SK: Z,W,E - FIDO- AUTHKA K-Pu: G,R - OS- MKEK: E FIDO AuthenticatorReset Reset FIDO credentials (FIDO Services) Statu s Word N/A N/A None UU: Unauthent icated User - FIDO- PIN: Z - FIDO- PINS: Z - FIDO- IDENCK: G Page 53 of 90 Name Description Indic ator Inputs Outpu ts Security Function s SSP Access - FIDO- AUTHRK- Pr: Z - OS- MKEK: E FIDO AuthenticatorCreden tialManagement List and Delete FIDO Credentials (command authenticated with pinUvAuthToken) (FIDO Services) Statu s Word Comm and Param eters Respo nse Data MAC- Appletsv4 CH: Card Holder - ACA- CAST- HMACK: E - FIDO- PINS: Z,E FIDO AuthenticatorConfig Configure FIDO authenticator (enable Enterprise Attestation, set Min PIN Length) (FIDO Services) Statu s Word Comm and Param eters N/A MAC- Appletsv4 CH: Card Holder - FIDO- PINS: Z,E - ACA- CAST- HMACK: E Table 13: Approved Services The modes of access shown in the table above are defined as: • G = Generate: The service generates or derives the CSP/Public Key. • W = Write: The service inputs the CSP/Public Key. • E = Execute: The Module executes using the CSP/Public Key. • R = Read: The service outputs the CSP/Public Key. • Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the CSP/Public Key after usage. 4.4 Non-Approved Services The module does not support Non-Approved Services 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded A new FIPS140-3 CMVP validated HID signed applet (partial firmware loading) can be loaded through NXP platform Card Manager Manage Content service and Mandated DAP mechanism. The authenticity of the loaded firmware is verified by the module using DAP public key based on ECDSA P-256 with SHA2-256. 5 Software/Firmware Security 5.1 Integrity Techniques Firmware Integrity: 32-bit CRC performed over all code located in Flash. Page 54 of 90 5.2 Initiate on Demand Firmware Integrity can be done on Demand by performing a power up of the module. 6 Operational Environment 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements Type of Operational Environment: Limited 7 Physical Security 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required Mechanism Inspection Frequency Inspection Guidance Hard, tamper evident coating N/A N/A Table 14: Mechanisms and Actions Required The module is a single-chip implementation that meets commercial-grade specifications for power, temperature, reliability, and shock/vibrations. The module uses standard passivation techniques. The module includes Environmental Failure Protection features such as temperature and voltage sensors. Fault Induction mitigation techniques are light sensors and spike sensors on the supply voltage lines. Identification of internal features such as sensitive components or interconnections is impeded by a fine mesh of metal shield lines that resides at the outermost layers of the chip. Delivery forms of the module are QFN package, contactless chip card module, or sawn wafer. Therefore, the module does not rely on any physical security based on a package 7.2 EFP/EFT Information Temp/Voltage Type Temperature or Voltage EFP or EFT Result LowTemperature -45°C EFP Shutdown HighTemperature +125°C EFP Shutdown LowVoltage 1.62V EFP Shutdown HighVoltage 6.0V EFP Shutdown Table 15: EFP/EFT Information 7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges Temperature Type Temperature LowTemperature -45°C HighTemperature +125°C Page 55 of 90 Table 16: Hardness Testing Temperatures 8 Non-Invasive Security Please see Section 12 below for information regarding non-invasive security countermeasures. 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management 9.1 Storage Areas Storage Area Name Description Persistence Type Temporarily stored in RAM (COD) plaintext cleared on Deselect (does not persist beyond a power cycle); object identifier to entity association Dynamic Temporarily stored in RAM (COR) plaintext cleared on Reset (does not persist beyond a power cycle); object identifier to entity association Dynamic Stored in NVM plaintext or encrypted with Approved AES CBC with OSMKEK; object identifier or key version to entity association Static Table 17: Storage Areas 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods Name From To Format Type Distributio n Type Entry Type SFI or Algorith m Entered during manufacturin g/ personalizati on Vendor generated at manufacture/duri ng personalization Stored in NVM Plaintext N/A N/A I0 External Stored in NVM Plaintext Manual Electroni c I1 External Stored in NVM Encrypte d Automated Electroni c KTS-3 I2 External Stored in NVM Encrypte d Automated Electroni c KTS-2- Appletsv 4 I3 External Temporari ly stored in RAM (COR) Encrypte d Automated Electroni c KTS-1 I4 External Stored in NVM Encrypte d Manual Electroni c KTS-2- Appletsv 4 Page 56 of 90 Name From To Format Type Distributio n Type Entry Type SFI or Algorith m I5 External Stored in NVM Plaintext Automated Electroni c I6 External Stored in NVM Encrypte d Automated Electroni c BC-1- Auth I7 External Stored in NVM Encrypte d Manual Electroni c BC-2- UnAuth I8 External Temporari ly stored in RAM (COD) Encrypte d Automated Electroni c BC-2- UnAuth O0 Stored in NVM External Plaintext Automated Electroni c O1 Stored in NVM External Encrypte d Automated Electroni c BC-1- Auth O2 Temporarily stored in RAM (COR) External Encrypte d Automated Electroni c BC-2- UnAuth Table 18: SSP Input-Output Methods 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods Zeroization Method Description Rationale Operator Initiation Power-off Remove the power from the module. All the data in Transient Storage Area are reset Overwrite with zeroes the RAM when power is removed Operator initiation Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perform Zeroisation service) Modify the card or applet life cycle status. This service can be used to zeroize the module Zeroize OS-MKEK, so all CSPs encrypted by OS-MKEK are destroyed Operator initiation Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) The SSPs are cleared using the different objects clearKey() methods, PIN objects are randomized Overwrite the keys with zeros, and randomization of PIN objects Operator initiation Table 19: SSP Zeroization Methods 9.4 SSPs Page 57 of 90 Name Description Size - Stren gth Type - Categor y Genera ted By Establi shed By Used By OS- DRBG-EI Random value from ENT (P) used to seed the AES- 256 CTR_DRBG 384 bits - 384 bits Entropy Input - Neither ENT CKG Symmetric Key Generation ENT DRBG OS- DRBG- SEED Seed provided to the CTR_DRBG. 3). Generated internally via SP800-90Ar1 DRBG process 384 bits - 384 bits DRBG seed Value - Neither DRBG CKG Symmetric Key Generation ENT DRBG OS- DRBG- KEY Current DRBG state value (per IG D.L Resolution 3). Generated internally via SP800-90Ar1 DRBG process 256 bits - 256 bits DRBG State Value - Neither DRBG CKG Symmetric Key Generation ENT DRBG OS- DRBG-V Current DRBG state value (per IG D.L Resolution 3). Generated internally via SP800-90Ar1 DRBG process 256 bits - 256 bits DRBG State Value - Neither DRBG CKG Symmetric Key Generation ENT DRBG OS-SKEK Used to build OS-MKEK 128 bits - 128 bits Symmet ric key - CSP BC-1-Auth BC-2- UnAuth BC-3- UnAuth MAC-AES OS-MKEK Used to encrypt all secret and private key data stored in NVM. Generated by OS-SKEK permutation (xor between OS-SKEK and a constant value) 128 bits - 128 bits Symmet ric key - CSP BC-1-Auth BC-2- UnAuth BC-3- UnAuth MAC-AES OS- DRBG- STATE Current DRBG State Value 880 - 880 DRBG Internal State - Neither KAS-1 OS- DRBG- OUTPUT Unmodified output from the DRBG used for SSP generation. Generated internally via SP800-90Ar1 DRBG process 256 - 256 Entropy Output - Neither DRBG Page 58 of 90 Name Description Size - Stren gth Type - Categor y Genera ted By Establi shed By Used By ISD-KENC AES (128-bit, 192-bit, 256- bit) Master key used to derive ISDSENC. 128- bits, 192- bits, 256- bits - 128- bits, 192- bits, 256- bits Symmet ric Key - CSP KBKDF-2 ISD- KMAC AES (128-bit, 192-bit, 256- bit) Master key used to derive ISDSMAC. 128- bits, 192- bits, 256- bits - 128- bits, 192- bits, 256- bits Symmet ric Key - CSP KBKDF-2 ISD-KDEK AES (128-bit, 192-bit, 256- bit) Sensitive data decryption key used to decrypt CSPs. 128- bits, 192- bits, 256- bits - 128- bits, 192- bits, 256- bits Symmet ric Key - CSP KTS-3 ISD-SENC AES (128-bit, 192-bit, 256- bit) Session encryption key used to encrypt / decrypt secure channel data. 128- bits, 192- bits, 256- bits - 128- bits, 192- bits, Symmet ric Key - CSP KBKDF -2 BC-1-Auth BC-2- UnAuth BC-3- UnAuth MAC-AES Page 59 of 90 Name Description Size - Stren gth Type - Categor y Genera ted By Establi shed By Used By 256- bits ISD- SMAC AES (128-bit, 192-bit, 256- bit) Session MAC key used to verify inbound secure channel data integrity. 128- bits, 192- bits, 256- bits - 128- bits, 192- bits, 256- bits Symmet ric Key - CSP KBKDF -2 BC-1-Auth BC-2- UnAuth BC-3- UnAuth MAC-AES ISD- RMAC AES (128-bit, 192-bit, 256- bit) Session MAC key used to generate response secure channel data MAC. 128- bits, 192- bits, 256- bits - 128- bits, 192- bits, 256- bits Symmet ric Key - CSP KBKDF -2 BC-1-Auth BC-2- UnAuth BC-3- UnAuth MAC-AES SD-KENC AES (128-bit, 192-bit, 256- bit) Master key used to derive SD-SENC 128, 192, 256 bits - 128, 192, 256 bits Symmeti c key - CSP KBKDF-2 SD-KMAC AES (128-bit, 192-bit, 256- bit) Master key used to derive SD-SMAC 128, 192, 256 bits - 128, 192, 256 bits Symmet ric key - CSP KBKDF-2 SD-KDEK AES (128-bit, 192-bit, 256- bit) Sensitive data decryption key used to decrypt CSPs. 128, 192, 256 bits - Symmet ric key - CSP KTS-2- Appletsv4 KTS-3 Page 60 of 90 Name Description Size - Stren gth Type - Categor y Genera ted By Establi shed By Used By 128, 192, 256 bits SD-SENC AES (128-bit, 192-bit, 256- bit) Session encryption key used to encrypt / decrypt secure channel data. 128, 192, 256 bits - 128, 192, 256 bits Symmet ric key - CSP KBKDF -2 BC-2- UnAuth SD-SMAC AES (128-bit, 192-bit, 256- bit) Session MAC key used to verify inbound secure channel data integrity 128, 192, 256 bits - 128, 192, 256 bits Symmet ric key - CSP KBKDF -2 MAC-AES SD-RMAC AES (128-bit, 192-bit, 256- bit) Session MAC key used to generate response secure channel data MAC. 128, 192, 256 bits - 128, 192, 256 bits Symmet ric key - CSP KBKDF -2 MAC-AES SD-DAPK ECC public key used for Mandated DAP 256 bits - 256 bits Public key - PSP ECDSA- DigSig-2 ACA- ADMK AES 128-bits Administrator Key used to authenticate the AA role 128- bits - 128- bits Symmet ric Key - CSP BC-3- UnAuth ACA- SKISK AES 128-bits Secure Key Injection Session Key used to download keys within Secure Key Injection protocol 128- bits - 128- bits Symmet ric Key - CSP KTS-2- Appletsv4 ACA-PIN 6-63 characters string PIN used for local PIN verification 48- 504 bits - N/A Authenti cation PIN - CSP Page 61 of 90 Name Description Size - Stren gth Type - Categor y Genera ted By Establi shed By Used By ACA-PUK 8-byte binary PIN Unlocking Key used to confirm authorization to unblock a blocked PIN. 8- bytes - N/A N/A - CSP ACA- CAST- HMACK HMAC 160-bits static key used for HMAC Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests 160- bits - 160- bits Symmet ric Key - CSP MAC- Appletsv4 ACA- CAST- KWPK AES 128-bits static key used for KWP Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests 128- bits - 128- bits Symmet ric Key - CSP KTS-2- Appletsv4 PIVX- GPK-Pr General purpose key with usage determined outside the Module scope. The following key types are supported: RSA (2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit), ECC P-256 and ECC P-384 curves. 2048- bits, 3072- bits, 4096- bits - 128, 192, 112, 128, 140 Private Key - CSP RSA- AsymKe yPair ECDSA - AsymKe yPair ECDSA- DigSig-1 KAS-1 RSA- DigSig -1- Appletsv4 RSA- Decrypt-1- Appletsv4 PIV-AuK- Pr PIV Card Application Authentication Key (9A): RSA (2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit) and ECDSA (P- 256, P-384) private key for signature generation 256, 384, 2048, 3072, 4096 bits - 128, 192, 112, 128, 140 Private Key - CSP RSA- AsymKe yPair ECDSA - AsymKe yPair ECDSA- DigSig-1 KAS-1 RSA- DigSig -1- Appletsv4 RSA- Decrypt-1- Appletsv4 PIV-DSK- Pr PIV Card Application Digital Signature Key (9C): RSA (2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit) and ECDSA (P- 256, P-384) private key for signature generation 256, 384, 2048, 3072, 4096 bits - 128, 192, 112, 128, 140 Private Key - CSP RSA- AsymKe yPair ECDSA - AsymKe yPair ECDSA- DigSig-1 KAS-1 RSA- DigSig -1- Appletsv4 RSA- Decrypt-1- Appletsv4 Page 62 of 90 Name Description Size - Stren gth Type - Categor y Genera ted By Establi shed By Used By PIV-KMK- Pr PIV Card Application Key Management Key (9D): RSA (2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit) and ECDSA (P- 256, P-384) private key for key establishment schemes realization 256, 384, 2048, 3072, 4096 bits - 128, 192, 112, 128, 140 Private Key - CSP RSA- AsymKe yPair ECDSA - AsymKe yPair ECDSA- DigSig-1 KAS-1 RSA- DigSig -1- Appletsv4 RSA- Decrypt-1- Appletsv4 PIV- RKMK-Pr PIV Card Application Key Management Key (82-95): RSA (2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit) and ECDSA (P- 256, P-384) private key for key establishment schemes realization 256, 384, 2048, 3072, 4096 bits - 128, 192, 112, 128, 140 Private Key - CSP RSA- AsymKe yPair ECDSA - AsymKe yPair ECDSA- DigSig-1 KAS-1 RSA- DigSig -1- Appletsv4 RSA- Decrypt-1- Appletsv4 PIV-CaK- Pr PIV Card ApplicationPIV Card Application Authentication Key (9E): RSA (2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit) and ECDSA (P- 256, P-384) private key for signature generation Authentication Key (9E): RSA (2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit) and ECDSA (P- 256, P-384) private key for signature generation 256, 384, 2048, 3072, 4096 bits - 128, 192, 112, 128, 140 Private Key - CSP RSA- AsymKe yPair ECDSA - AsymKe yPair ECDSA- DigSig-1 KAS-1 RSA- DigSig -1- Appletsv4 RSA- Decrypt-1- Appletsv4 PIV- SKIKTK- Pr Secure Key Injection Key Transport Key (F0): RSA (3072-bit): private key for transportation of the SKI Session Key. 3072- bits - 128- bits Private Key - CSP RSA- AsymKe yPair KTS-1 PIV-PWC- Pr Key used for the PairWise Consistency: ECDSA (P- 256, P-384) 256, 384 bits - 128, 192 Private Key - CSP KAS-1 Page 63 of 90 Name Description Size - Stren gth Type - Categor y Genera ted By Establi shed By Used By OATH- OTP HMAC Key (112-bits to 1024-bits) used by the OATH applet for one time password generation. 112- bits to 1024- bits - 112- bits to 1024- bits Symmet ric Key - CSP MAC- Appletsv4 FIDO-PIN 6-63 characters PIN used for FIDO PIN verification 48bit s to 504- bits - N/A Authenti cation - Neither FIDO- PINS 32 bytes generated during the clientPIN getPINToken/getPINToken withPermissions operations and used to authenticate during other operations 128 bits - N/A Authenti cation - Neither CKG Symmet ric Key Generat ion DRBG MAC- Appletsv4 FIDO- ATTK-Pr FIDO Attestation (ECDSA P-256) private key for attestation signature generation 256 bits - 128 Private Key - CSP ECDSA- DigSig-1 FIDO- ENTK-Pr FIDO Enterprise Attestation (ECDSA P- 256) private key for enterprise attestation signature generation 256 bits - 128 Private Key - CSP ECDSA - AsymKe yPair ECDSA- DigSig-1 FIDO- PWC-Pr Key used for the PairWise Consistency: ECDSA (P- 256) 128 bits - 128 Private Key - CSP KAS-1 FIDO- IDENCK AES 128-bits Encryption Key used to wrap the FIDO-AUTHKSK-Pr to generate credential identifier 128- bits - 128- bits Symmet ric Key - CSP CKG Symmet ric Key Generat ion DRBG BC-1-Auth FIDO- FAUTHK- Pr FIDO Private Fake Authentication Key (ECDSA P-256) used for fake signature generation in getAssertion operation 256 bits - 128 Private Key - CSP ECDSA - AsymKe yPair ECDSA- DigSig-1 Page 64 of 90 Name Description Size - Stren gth Type - Categor y Genera ted By Establi shed By Used By FIDO- AUTHRK- Pr FIDO Private Resident Key (ECDSA P-256) used for signature generation 256 bits - 128 Private Key - CSP ECDSA - AsymKe yPair ECDSA- DigSig-1 FIDO- AUTHKSK -Pr FIDO Private Non- Resident Session Key (ECDSA P-256) used for signature generation 256 bits - 128 Private - CSP ECDSA - AsymKe yPair ECDSA- DigSig-1 FIDO- AUTHKAK -Pr FIDO Private Key Agreement Key (ECDH P- 256) used to establish a shared secret 256 bits - 128 Private Key - CSP ECDSA - AsymKe yPair KAS-1 FIDO- PINENCS K AES 256-bits PIN Encryption Session key used to decrypt the PIN during clientPIN setPIN/changePIN operations 256- bits - 256- bits Symmet ric Key - CSP MAC- Applets v4 BC-2- UnAuth FIDO- PINAUTH SK FIDO HMAC (256-bits) PIN Authentication Session Key used to compute / verify authentication codes during clientPIN setPIN/changePIN operations 256- bits - 256- bits Symmet ric Key - CSP MAC- Applets v4 MAC- Appletsv4 FIDO- SALTENC SK AES-256 Salt Encryption Session Key used to decrypt the salt during getAssertion operation 256- bits - 256- bits Symmet ric Key - CSP MAC- Applets v4 BC-2- UnAuth FIDO- SALTAUT HSK FIDO HMAC (256-bits) Salt Authentication Session Key used to compute / verify authentication codes during getAssertion operations 256- bits - 256- bits Symmet ric Key - CSP MAC- Applets v4 MAC- Appletsv4 FIDO- CREDRA NDUVK FIDO HMAC (256-bits) Credential Random with UV Key used to compute an hmac secret during getAssertion operations when UV is present 256- bits - 256- bits Symmet ric Key - CSP CKG Symmet ric Key Generat ion DRBG MAC- Applets v4 MAC- Appletsv4 Page 65 of 90 Name Description Size - Stren gth Type - Categor y Genera ted By Establi shed By Used By PIVX- GPK-Pu General purpose key with usage determined outside the Module scope. The following key types are supported: RSA (2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit), ECC P-256 and ECC P-384 curves. 2048- bits, 3072- bits, 4096- bits; P- 256, P- 384 - 128, 192, 112, 128, 140 Public Key - PSP RSA- AsymKe yPair ECDSA - AsymKe yPair RSA- AsymKeyP airVerif ECDSA- DigSig-2 KAS-1 PIV-AuK- Pu PIV Card Application Authentication Key (9A): RSA (2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit)and ECDSA (P- 256, P-384) public key for signature verification 2048- bits, 3072- bits, 4096- bits; P- 256, P- 384 - 128, 192, 112, 128, 140 Public Key - PSP RSA- AsymKe yPair ECDSA - AsymKe yPair RSA- AsymKeyP airVerif ECDSA- DigSig-2 KAS-1 PIV-DSK- Pu PIV Card Application Digital Signature Key (9C): RSA (2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit) and ECDSA (P- 256 , P-384) public key for signature verification 2048- bits, 3072- bits, 4096- bits; P- 256, P- 384 - 128, 192, 112, 128, 140 Public Key - PSP RSA- AsymKe yPair ECDSA - AsymKe yPair RSA- AsymKeyP airVerif ECDSA- DigSig-2 KAS-1 Page 66 of 90 Name Description Size - Stren gth Type - Categor y Genera ted By Establi shed By Used By PIV-KMK- Pu PIV Card Application Key Management Key (9D): RSA (2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit) and ECDSA (P- 256 , P-384) public key for key establishment schemes realization 2048- bits, 3072- bits, 4096- bits; P- 256, P- 384 - 128, 192, 112, 128, 140 Public Key - PSP RSA- AsymKe yPair ECDSA - AsymKe yPair RSA- AsymKeyP airVerif ECDSA- DigSig-2 KAS-1 PIV- RKMK-Pu PIV Card Application Key Management Key (82-90): RSA (2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit) and ECDSA (P- 256 , P-384) public key for key establishment schemes realization 2048- bits, 3072- bits, 4096- bits; P- 256, P- 384 - 128, 192, 112, 128, 140 Public Key - PSP RSA- AsymKe yPair ECDSA - AsymKe yPair RSA- AsymKeyP airVerif ECDSA- DigSig-2 KAS-1 PIV-CaK- Pu PIV Card Application Authentication Key (9E): RSA (2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit) and ECDSA (P- 256, P-384) public key for signature verification 2048- bits, 3072- bits, 4096- bits; P- 256, P- 384 - 128, 192, 112, 128, 140 Public Key - PSP RSA- AsymKe yPair ECDSA - AsymKe yPair RSA- AsymKeyP airVerif ECDSA- DigSig-2 KAS-1 Page 67 of 90 Name Description Size - Stren gth Type - Categor y Genera ted By Establi shed By Used By PIV- SKIKTK- Pu Secure Key Injection Key Transport Key (F0): RSA (3072-bit): public key for encryption of the SKI Session Key. 3072- bits - 128 Public Key - PSP RSA- AsymKe yPair PIV-PWC- Pu Key used for the PairWise Consistency: ECDSA (P- 256, P-384) 256, 384 bits - 128, 192 Public Key - PSP KAS-1 FIDO- ENTK-Pu FIDO Enterprise Attestation (ECDSA P- 256) public key for enterprise attestation signature verification 256- bits - 128 Public Key - PSP ECDSA - AsymKe yPair FIDO- PWC-Pu Key used for the PairWise Consistency: ECDSA (P- 256, P-384) 256- bits - 128 Public Key - PSP KAS-1 FIDO- AUTHRK- Pu FIDO Public Resident Key (ECDSA P-256) used for signature verification 256 - 128 Public Key - PSP ECDSA - AsymKe yPair ECDSA- DigSig-2 FIDO- AUTHKSK -Pu FIDO Public Non-Resident Session Key (ECDSA P- 256) used for signature verification 256 - 128 Public Key - PSP ECDSA - AsymKe yPair FIDO- AUTHKAK -Pu FIDO Public Key Agreement Key (ECDH P- 256) used to establish a shared secret 256 - 128 Public Key - PSP Table 20: SSP Table 1 Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs OS-DRBG-EI Temporarily stored in RAM (COR):Plaint ext Until power- cycle Power-off Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) OS-DRBG- SEED Temporarily stored in RAM (COR):Plaint ext Until power- cycle Power-off Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo Page 68 of 90 Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs rm Zeroisation service) OS- DRBG- KEY Stored in NVM:Plaintex t Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) OS-DRBG-V Stored in NVM:Plaintex t Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) OS-SKEK Entered during manufacturin g/ personalizati on Stored in NVM:Plaintex t Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) OS- MKEK:Used to build OS-MKEK Stored in NVM:Plaintex t Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) OS-DRBG- STATE Stored in NVM:Plaintex t Until power- cycle Power-off Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) OS-DRBG- OUTPUT Stored in NVM:Plaintex t Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) ISD-KENC I1 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) ISD-KMAC I1 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati Destroyed by termination of the module Page 69 of 90 Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs on of module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) ISD-KDEK I1 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) ISD- KMAC:Decry pts ISD- KDEK:Decryp ts ISD-SENC Temporarily stored in RAM (COD):Plaint ext Until power- cycle Power-off Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) ISD-SMAC Temporarily stored in RAM (COD):Plaint ext Until power- cycle Power-off Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) ISD-RMAC Temporarily stored in RAM (COD):Plaint ext Until power- cycle Power-off Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) SD-KENC I1 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) SD-KMAC I1 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati Destroyed by termination of the module Page 70 of 90 Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs on of module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) SD-KDEK I1 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) SD-SENC Temporarily stored in RAM (COD):Plaint ext Until power- cycle Power-off Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) SD-SMAC Temporarily stored in RAM (COD):Plaint ext Until power- cycle Power-off Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) SD-RMAC Temporarily stored in RAM (COD):Plaint ext Until power- cycle Power-off Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) SD-DAPK I5 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) ACA-ADMK I1 I2 Stored in NVM:Plaintex t Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) ACA-SKISK I3 Stored in NVM:Plaintex t Until terminati Destroyed by termination of the module Page 71 of 90 Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs on of module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) ACA-PIN I0 I4 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) ACA-PUK I2 I5 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) ACA-CAST- HMACK Stored in NVM:Plaintex t N/A ACA-CAST- KWPK Stored in NVM:Plaintex t N/A PIVX-GPK-Pr I1 I2 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) PIVX-GPK- Pu:Paired With PIV-AuK-Pr I1 I2 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) PIV-AuK- Pr:Paired With PIV-DSK-Pr I1 I2 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati Destroyed by termination of the module PIV-DSK- Pu:Paired With Page 72 of 90 Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs on of module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) PIV-KMK-Pr I1 I2 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) PIV-KMK- Pu:Paired With PIV-RKMK-Pr I1 I2 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) PIV-RKMK- Pu:Paired With PIV-CaK-Pr I1 I2 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) PIV-CaK- Pu:Paired With PIV-SKIKTK- Pr Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) PIV-SKIKTK- Pu:Paired With PIV-PWC-Pr Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed N/A FIDO-PWC- Pu:Paired With OATH-OTP I1 I2 Stored in NVM:Plaintex t Until terminati Destroyed by termination of the module Page 73 of 90 Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs on of module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) FIDO-PIN I7 Stored in NVM:Plaintex t Until "Reset Device" zeroizatio n method is invoked Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) FIDO-PINS I8 O2 Temporarily stored in RAM (COR):Plaint ext Until power- cycle Power-off Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) FIDO-ATTK-Pr I1 I2 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) FIDO-ENTK-Pr I1 I2 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) FIDO-ENTK- Pu:Paired With FIDO-PWC-Pr Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed N/A FIDO-PWC- Pu:Paired With FIDO-IDENCK Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) FIDO- FAUTHK-Pr Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) FIDO- AUTHRK-Pr Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati Destroyed by termination of the module FIDO- AUTHRK- Page 74 of 90 Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs on of module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) Pr:Paired With FIDO- AUTHKSK-Pr O1 I6 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) FIDO- AUTHKSK- Pu:Paired With FIDO- AUTHKAK-Pr Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) FIDO- AUTHKAK- Pu:Paired With FIDO- PINENCSK Temporarily stored in RAM (COD):Plaint ext Until power- cycle Power-off Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) FIDO- PINAUTHSK Temporarily stored in RAM (COD):Plaint ext Until power- cycle Power-off Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) FIDO- SALTENCSK Temporarily stored in RAM (COD):Plaint ext Until power- cycle Power-off Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) FIDO- SALTAUTHSK Temporarily stored in RAM (COD):Plaint ext Until power- cycle Power-off Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) FIDO- CREDRANDU VK Stored in NVM:Plaintex t Until "Reset Device" zeroizatio n method is invoked Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) PIVX-GPK-Pu O0 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati Destroyed by termination of the module PIVX-GPK- Pr:Paired With Page 75 of 90 Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs on of module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) PIV-AuK-Pu O0 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) PIV-AuK- Pr:Paired With PIV-DSK-Pu O0 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) PIV-DSK- Pr:Paired With PIV-KMK-Pu O0 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) PIV-KMK- Pr:Paired With PIV-RKMK-Pu O0 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) PIV-RKMK- Pr:Paired With PIV-CaK-Pu O0 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) PIV-CaK- Pr:Paired With Page 76 of 90 Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) PIV-SKIKTK- Pu O0 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) PIV-SKIKTK- Pr:Paired With PIV-PWC-Pu Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed N/A PIV-PWC- Pr:Paired With FIDO-ENTK- Pu O0 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) FIDO-ENTK- Pr:Paired With FIDO-PWC-Pu Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed N/A FIDO-PWC- Pr:Paired With FIDO- AUTHRK-Pu O0 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) Reset Device (ACA RESET CARD service) FIDO- AUTHRK- Pr:Paired With FIDO- AUTHKSK-Pu O0 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) FIDO- AUTHKSK- Pr:Paired With FIDO- AUTHKAK-Pu O0 Stored in NVM:Encrypt ed Until terminati on of module Destroyed by termination of the module (LifeCycle/Perfo rm Zeroisation service) FIDO-PWC- Pr:Used With FIDO- AUTHKAK- Pr:Paired With Table 21: SSP Table 2 Page 77 of 90 9.5 Transitions • NIST will transition away from the use of SHA-1 for applying cryptographic protection to all applications by December 31, 2030. • The minimum key size will transition from 112-bits to 128-bits in 2030. 10 Self-Tests 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details Firmware Integrity 32-bit CRC performed over all code located in NVM 32-bit CRC SW/FW Integrity No switch to Mute state If the integrity test fails at power on, the module enters the hard error (MUTE) state Table 22: Pre-Operational Self-Tests 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details Conditions AES-CBC Encrypt (A2713) 128-bit KAT CAST No switch to Mute state Encrypt Performed automatically on every boot AES-CBC (A2713) 128-bit KAT CAST No switch to Mute state Decrypt Performed automatically on every boot AES-CMAC Encrypt (A2713) 128-bit KAT CAST No switch to Mute state Encrypt Performed automatically on every boot AES-CMAC (A2713) 128-bit KAT CAST No switch to Mute state Decrypt Performed automatically on every boot Counter DRBG (A2713) 256-bit KAT CAST No switch to Mute state Health Tests: Generate, Reseed, Instantiate functions per Section 11 in NIST SP800- 90Ar1 Performed automatically on every boot ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186- 5) (A6534) P-521 SHA- 256 KAT CAST No switch to Mute state Signature Generation Performed automatically on every boot Page 78 of 90 Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details Conditions ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186- 5) (A6534) P-521 SHA- 256 KAT CAST No switch to Mute state Signature Verification Performed automatically on every boot KDA HKDF Sp800- 56Cr1 (A2713) SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 KAT CAST No switch to Mute state Key Derivation Function per NIST SP 800- 56Cr1 Performed automatically on every boot KDF SP800-108 (AES-128) (A2713) Counter mode with AES-128 KAT CAST No switch to Mute state Key Derivation Function per NIST SP 800- 108r1 (Counter mode) Performed automatically on every boot KDF SP800-108 (A2713) Feedback Mode with HMAC- SHA1 KAT CAST No switch to Mute state Key Derivation Function per NIST SP 800- 108r1 (Counter mode) Performed automatically on every boot RSA SigVer (FIPS186- 5) (A6535) 2048-bit SHA2-256 KAT CAST No switch to Mute state Signature Verification Performed automatically on every boot SHA-1 (A2713) SHA-1 KAT CAST No switch to Mute state Hash generation Performed automatically on every boot SHA2-256 (A2713) SHA2-256 KAT CAST No switch to Mute state Hash generation Performed automatically on every boot SHA2-512 (A2713) SHA2-512 KAT CAST No switch to Mute state Hash generation Performed automatically on every boot Firmware Load Test ECDSA P- 256 with SHA2-256 Load Test SW/FW Load No switch to Mute state Signature Verification based on ECDSA P- 256 with SHA2-256 Upon loading of firmware from an external source (e.g. the applet). NIST SP800-90B ENT (P) Repetition Count Test (RCT) - NIST SP 800- 90B Health Test CAST Implicit, based on output of entropy - Performed continuously by the entropy source Page 79 of 90 Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details Conditions NIST SP800-90B ENT (P) Developer Defined Heath Test Transition Count Test - NIST SP 800- 90B Health Test CAST Implicit, based on output of entropy - Performed continuously by the entropy source NIST SP800-90B ENT (P) Developer Defined Heath Test ChiSquare Test - NIST SP 800- 90B Health Test CAST Implicit, based on output of entropy - Performed continuously by the entropy source NIST SP800-90B ENT (P) Developer Defined Heath Test Amplitude Limiter Analog Test - NIST SP 800- 90B Health Test CAST Implicit, based on output of entropy - Performed continuously by the entropy source AES-KWP (A6112) 128-bits KAT CAST No switch to Mute state Decrypt Before first use HMAC- SHA-1 (A6112) HMAC-SHA- 1 with a 160- bits key KAT CAST No switch to Mute state - Before first use Generate PCT RSA Pairwise consistency test - 2048- bits / 3072- bits / 4096- bits PCT PCT No switch to Mute state Cipher decrypt / encrypt On keypair generation Generate PCT ECC Pairwise consistency test - 256- bits / 384- bits PCT PCT No switch to Mute state ECDSA Sign/Verify ECDH Key Agreement On keypair generation Generate PCT ECC FIDO 1 Pairwise consistency test - 256- bits PCT PCT No switch to Mute state ECDSA Sign/Verify On Signature key pair generation Page 80 of 90 Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details Conditions Generate PCT ECC FIDO 2 Pairwise consistency test - 256- bits PCT PCT No switch to Mute state ECDH Key Agreement On key Agreement pair generation KAS-ECC- SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A5910) P-384 Scheme: onePassDh: KAS Role: initiator, responder KAT CAST No switch to Mute state Shared Secret Computation (Z) Performed automatically on every boot RSA SigGen (FIPS186- 5) (A6535) 2048-bit SHA2-256 KAT CAST No switch to Mute state Signature Generation Performed automatically on every boot Table 23: Conditional Self-Tests 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method Firmware Integrity 32-bit CRC SW/FW Integrity Repeated after every 500,000 CAPDUs/commands Automatic execution per module design (the test is repeated after every 500,000 CAPDUs/commands) Table 24: Pre-Operational Periodic Information Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method AES-CBC Encrypt (A2713) KAT CAST On Demand Manually, all the Self-Tests can be performed on-demand with the GET DATA APDU command (Info service) with the following parameters: CLA = 80, INS = CA, P1 = 00, P2 = FE, Lc = 04, Incoming Data = DF4B0120, and Le = 00. Page 81 of 90 Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method AES-CBC (A2713) KAT CAST On Demand Manually, all the Self-Tests can be performed on-demand with the GET DATA APDU command (Info service) with the following parameters: CLA = 80, INS = CA, P1 = 00, P2 = FE, Lc = 04, Incoming Data = DF4B0120, and Le = 00. AES-CMAC Encrypt (A2713) KAT CAST On Demand Manually, all the Self-Tests can be performed on-demand with the GET DATA APDU command (Info service) with the following parameters: CLA = 80, INS = CA, P1 = 00, P2 = FE, Lc = 04, Incoming Data = DF4B0120, and Le = 00. AES-CMAC (A2713) KAT CAST On Demand Manually, all the Self-Tests can be performed on-demand with the GET DATA APDU command (Info service) with the following parameters: CLA = 80, INS = CA, P1 = 00, P2 = FE, Lc = 04, Incoming Data = DF4B0120, and Le = 00. Page 82 of 90 Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method Counter DRBG (A2713) KAT CAST On Demand Manually, all the Self-Tests can be performed on-demand with the GET DATA APDU command (Info service) with the following parameters: CLA = 80, INS = CA, P1 = 00, P2 = FE, Lc = 04, Incoming Data = DF4B0120, and Le = 00. ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6534) KAT CAST On Demand Manually, all the Self-Tests can be performed on-demand with the GET DATA APDU command (Info service) with the following parameters: CLA = 80, INS = CA, P1 = 00, P2 = FE, Lc = 04, Incoming Data = DF4B0120, and Le = 00. ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6534) KAT CAST On Demand Manually, all the Self-Tests can be performed on-demand with the GET DATA APDU command (Info service) with the following parameters: CLA = 80, INS = CA, P1 = 00, P2 = FE, Lc = 04, Incoming Data = DF4B0120, and Le = 00. Page 83 of 90 Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method KDA HKDF Sp800-56Cr1 (A2713) KAT CAST On Demand Manually, all the Self-Tests can be performed on-demand with the GET DATA APDU command (Info service) with the following parameters: CLA = 80, INS = CA, P1 = 00, P2 = FE, Lc = 04, Incoming Data = DF4B0120, and Le = 00. KDF SP800-108 (AES-128) (A2713) KAT CAST On Demand Manually, all the Self-Tests can be performed on-demand with the GET DATA APDU command (Info service) with the following parameters: CLA = 80, INS = CA, P1 = 00, P2 = FE, Lc = 04, Incoming Data = DF4B0120, and Le = 00. KDF SP800-108 (A2713) KAT CAST On Demand Manually, all the Self-Tests can be performed on-demand with the GET DATA APDU command (Info service) with the following parameters: CLA = 80, INS = CA, P1 = 00, P2 = FE, Lc = 04, Incoming Data = DF4B0120, and Le = 00. Page 84 of 90 Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6535) KAT CAST On Demand Manually, all the Self-Tests can be performed on-demand with the GET DATA APDU command (Info service) with the following parameters: CLA = 80, INS = CA, P1 = 00, P2 = FE, Lc = 04, Incoming Data = DF4B0120, and Le = 00. SHA-1 (A2713) KAT CAST On Demand Manually, all the Self-Tests can be performed on-demand with the GET DATA APDU command (Info service) with the following parameters: CLA = 80, INS = CA, P1 = 00, P2 = FE, Lc = 04, Incoming Data = DF4B0120, and Le = 00. SHA2-256 (A2713) KAT CAST On Demand Manually, all the Self-Tests can be performed on-demand with the GET DATA APDU command (Info service) with the following parameters: CLA = 80, INS = CA, P1 = 00, P2 = FE, Lc = 04, Incoming Data = DF4B0120, and Le = 00. Page 85 of 90 Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method SHA2-512 (A2713) KAT CAST On Demand Manually, all the Self-Tests can be performed on-demand with the GET DATA APDU command (Info service) with the following parameters: CLA = 80, INS = CA, P1 = 00, P2 = FE, Lc = 04, Incoming Data = DF4B0120, and Le = 00. Firmware Load Test Load Test SW/FW Load On Demand Manually, all the Self-Tests can be performed on-demand with the GET DATA APDU command (Info service) with the following parameters: CLA = 80, INS = CA, P1 = 00, P2 = FE, Lc = 04, Incoming Data = DF4B0120, and Le = 00. NIST SP800- 90B ENT (P) Repetition Count Test (RCT) NIST SP 800- 90B Health Test CAST On Demand Manually, by rebooting the module/resetting the entropy source NIST SP800- 90B ENT (P) Developer Defined Heath Test Transition Count Test NIST SP 800- 90B Health Test CAST On Demand Manually, by rebooting the module/resetting the entropy source NIST SP800- 90B ENT (P) Developer Defined Heath NIST SP 800- 90B Health Test CAST On Demand Manually, by rebooting the module/resetting the entropy source Page 86 of 90 Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method Test ChiSquare Test NIST SP800- 90B ENT (P) Developer Defined Heath Test Amplitude Limiter Analog Test NIST SP 800- 90B Health Test CAST On Demand Manually, by rebooting the module/resetting the entropy source AES-KWP (A6112) KAT CAST On Demand Manually, by executing the following command after having selected the ACA (as per Table 28) CLA = 80, INS = 56, P1 = 02, P2 = 22, Le = 00 HMAC-SHA-1 (A6112) KAT CAST On Demand Manually, by executing the following command after having selected the ACA (as per Table 28) CLA = 80, INS = 56, P1 = 02, P2 = 44, Le = 00 Generate PCT RSA PCT PCT Before first use Manually, by rebooting the module Generate PCT ECC PCT PCT Before first use Manually, by rebooting the module Generate PCT ECC FIDO 1 PCT PCT Before first use Manually, by rebooting the module Generate PCT ECC FIDO 2 PCT PCT Before first use Manually, by rebooting the module KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A5910) KAT CAST On Demand Manually, all the Self-Tests can be performed on-demand with the GET DATA APDU command (Info service) Page 87 of 90 Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method with the following parameters: CLA = 80, INS = CA, P1 = 00, P2 = FE, Lc = 04, Incoming Data = DF4B0120, and Le = 00. RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6535) KAT CAST On Demand Manually, all the Self-Tests can be performed on-demand with the GET DATA APDU command (Info service) with the following parameters: CLA = 80, INS = CA, P1 = 00, P2 = FE, Lc = 04, Incoming Data = DF4B0120, and Le = 00. Table 25: Conditional Periodic Information 10.4 Error States Name Description Conditions Recovery Method Indicator CRYPTO (Hard) error state The module enters in CRYPTO error state when one of the AES KWP or HMAC-SHAx self test has failed. In that case, all module subsequent APDU's return 6600 status words until a power off is done AES KWP Failure HMAC-SHAx Failure Power Cycle; But in the event that the error persists, the module must be returned to the vendor Return 6600 Status MUTE (Hard) error state All the Self-Tests can be performed on-demand with the GET DATA APDU command (Info service) with the following parameters: CLA = 80, INS = CA, P1 = 00, P2 = FE, Lc = 04, Incoming Data = DF4B0120, In case of failure of a pre- operational, conditional self- test or NIST SP 800-90B compliant A reset of the module can be attempted but in the event that the error persists, the module must Return 66A7 (failure) status Page 88 of 90 Name Description Conditions Recovery Method Indicator and Le = 00. The expected result is FE04DF4B0120. The return code 9000 signifies success. In case of a failure, the module enters a hard error (MUTE) state and returns a code/status indicator entropy source health test be returned to the vendor Table 26: Error States 11 Life-Cycle Assurance 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures To verify the Cryptographic Module runs in Approved mode of operation, use the following commands: • Select Applet (ACA) (Table 27) • ACA Get FIPS Module Configuration (Table 28) Code Value Description CLA ‘00’ ISO Cla Value INS ‘A4’ SELECT P1 ‘04’ Select by name P2 ‘00’ Reference Control Parameter P2 Lc ‘07’ Length of data field Data ‘A0000000791000’ ACA AID Le ‘00’ Length of response data Table 27: Select Applet (ACA) Code Value Description CLA ‘80’ Proprietary Cla Value INS ‘56’ GET PROPERTIES P1 ‘01’ Get Approved Configuration P2 ‘00’ Reference Control Parameter P2 Lc Empty Data Empty Le ‘00’ Length of response data Table 28: ACA Get FIPS Module Configuration Command Code Value Description Data ‘2401XX’ Approved mode configuration, where XX can have the following value: • ‘A5’: Approved mode SW1/SW2 ‘9000’ Status Words Table 29: ACA Get FIPS Module Configuration Response Page 89 of 90 11.2 Administrator Guidance The cryptographic module is delivered with default ACA-ADM, ACA-PIN, SD-KENC, SD-KMAC and SD-KDEK authentication data for SSD1. No authenticated operation is allowed with these authentication data until those default values are replaced. • For Crescendo Applets Cryptographic Officer (CCO), SD keys need to be replaced via SSD PUT KEY service • For Application Administrator, ACA-ADM key needs to be replaced via ACA PUT KEY service • For Card Holder (CH), ACA-PIN needs to be replaced via ACA CHANGE REFERENCE DATA or PIVEXT CHANGE REFERENCE DATA service 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance To ensure that all modules reach their destination safely and in perfect condition, professional transportation services that specialize in secure and reliable deliveries are used. Secure Handling: The modules are carefully packaged and handled to prevent damage during transit. Trusted Carriers: Deliveries are managed by experienced logistics providers known for their secure and trackable shipping processes. Tracking Information: Once the modules are shipped, a tracking number is issued to monitor its journey in real time. Delivery Confirmation: A signature or confirmation is required upon delivery to ensure the modules reach the correct recipient. 11.4 Design and Rules A Configuration Management system is used for the development of the cryptographic module, the module components, as well as the associated documentation. They are all tracked with their module name, as well as its version number. The firmware is implemented using a high-level, non-proprietary language. 11.5 Maintenance Requirements No specific maintenance requirements apply to the module. 11.6 End of Life The module must be zeroised (using the Perform zeroisation service per Section 4.3 of this document) in order to perform secure sanitization of the module. 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks 12.1 Attack List Page 90 of 90 The module is protected against the following non-invasive attacks: SPA, DPA, Timing Analysis and Fault Induction using a combination of firmware and hardware countermeasures. Protection features include detection of out-of-range supply voltages, frequencies or temperatures, fault induction mitigations like light sensors, voltage glitch sensors and an active shield, and detection of illegal address or instruction. 12.2 Mitigation Effectiveness All cryptographic computations and sensitive operations such as critical data comparison provided by the module are designed to be resistant to timing and power analysis. Sensitive operations are performed in constant time, regardless of the execution context (parameters, keys, etc.), owing to a combination of hardware and firmware features. In addition to the non- invasive attacks, the module also uses standard passivation techniques and is protected by active shielding (a grid of top metal layer wires with tamper response) which qualifies for classification under mitigation of other attacks.