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Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Forcepoint
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Forcepoint
10900-A Stonelake Blvd.
Austin, TX 78759
United States of America
Phone: 1-858-320-8000
Email: legal@forcepoint.com
www.forcepoint.com
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Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Revision History
Revision Date Reason
A May 7, 2025 Initial release.
B December 14, 2025 Updates for CMVP Comments
C May 14, 2026 Updates for CMVP Comments
Trademarks, Copyrights, and Third-Party Software
© 2025 Forcepoint. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
Preface
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Forcepoint Next Generation
Firewall for Desktop Appliances (Hardware Version: NGFW N60, NGFW N120, NGFW N120L, NGFW
N352, and NGFW N355; Firmware Version: 6.10.13.26655.fips.2) from Forcepoint. This Security Policy
describes how the Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances (referred as NGFW
appliances, modules, and firewalls) meet the security requirements of Federal Information Processing
Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-3, which details the U.S. and Canadian government requirements for
cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-3 standard and validation program is
available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Canadian Centre for
Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website at
https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program
This document also describes how to run the modules in a secure Approved mode of operation. This
policy was prepared as part of the Level 1 FIPS 140-3 validation of the module. The Forcepoint Next
Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances are referred to in this document as the NGFW appliances,
crypto modules, or modules.
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Table of Contents
1 General........................................................................................................................................7
1.1 Overview .........................................................................................................................................7
1.2 Security Levels.................................................................................................................................7
2 Cryptographic Module Specification .............................................................................................7
2.1 Description......................................................................................................................................7
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ..................................................9
2.3 Excluded Components ..................................................................................................................10
2.4 Modes of Operation......................................................................................................................10
2.5 Algorithms.....................................................................................................................................11
2.6 Security Function Implementations.............................................................................................. 14
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information.....................................................................................................23
2.8 RBG and Entropy...........................................................................................................................23
2.9 Key Generation.............................................................................................................................. 24
2.10 Key Establishment.......................................................................................................................24
2.11 Industry Protocols.......................................................................................................................24
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ...............................................................................................24
3.1 Ports and Interfaces......................................................................................................................24
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication............................................................................................27
4.1 Authentication Methods...............................................................................................................27
4.2 Roles..............................................................................................................................................28
4.3 Approved Services.........................................................................................................................28
4.4 Non-Approved Services.................................................................................................................51
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded............................................................................................51
4.6 Bypass Actions and Status.............................................................................................................51
4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status ....................................................................................52
5 Software/Firmware Security ......................................................................................................53
5.1 Integrity Techniques .....................................................................................................................53
5.2 Initiate on Demand .......................................................................................................................53
6 Operational Environment...........................................................................................................53
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements......................................................................53
7 Physical Security ........................................................................................................................53
8 Non-Invasive Security.................................................................................................................54
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management...............................................................................54
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9.1 Storage Areas................................................................................................................................ 54
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods...........................................................................................................54
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods ..............................................................................................................55
9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................................56
10 Self-Tests .................................................................................................................................85
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests..........................................................................................................85
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests .................................................................................................................86
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ....................................................................................................91
10.4 Error States..................................................................................................................................94
10.6 Additional Information................................................................................................................94
11 Life-Cycle Assurance.................................................................................................................95
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ....................................................................95
11.1.1 Hardware Setup....................................................................................................................95
11.1.2 Creating a Configuration for the Approved Mode of Operation...........................................95
11.1.3 Downloading and Upgrading to an Approved Firmware Version .........................................97
11.1.4 Setting up the Approved Configuration................................................................................98
11.1.5 Resetting the Module to Factory Settings (Sanitization) ......................................................99
11.2 Administrator Guidance..............................................................................................................99
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance......................................................................................................99
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks....................................................................................................100
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels.............................................................................................................................7
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware................................................................................10
Table 3: Modes List and Description ......................................................................................................10
Table 4: Approved Algorithms -..............................................................................................................14
Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Legacy..................................................................................................14
Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ....................................................................................................14
Table 7: Security Function Implementations..........................................................................................23
Table 8: Entropy Certificates ..................................................................................................................23
Table 9: Entropy Sources........................................................................................................................23
Table 10: Ports and Interfaces................................................................................................................27
Table 11: Authentication Methods.........................................................................................................28
Table 12: Roles........................................................................................................................................28
Table 13: Approved Services ..................................................................................................................51
Table 14: Mechanisms and Actions Required ........................................................................................53
Table 15: Storage Areas..........................................................................................................................54
Table 16: SSP Input-Output Methods.....................................................................................................55
Table 17: SSP Zeroization Methods........................................................................................................56
Table 18: SSP Table 1.............................................................................................................................. 71
Table 19: SSP Table 2.............................................................................................................................. 85
Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests......................................................................................................86
Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests .............................................................................................................91
Table 22: Pre-Operational Periodic Information....................................................................................91
Table 23: Conditional Periodic Information ...........................................................................................94
Table 24: Error States ............................................................................................................................. 94
List of Figures
Figure 1: NGFW N60 Front........................................................................................................................8
Figure 2: NGFW N60 Rear.........................................................................................................................8
Figure 3: NGFW N120 Front......................................................................................................................8
Figure 4: NGFW N120 Rear.......................................................................................................................8
Figure 5: NGFW N120L Front....................................................................................................................9
Figure 6: NGFW N120L Rear .....................................................................................................................9
Figure 7: NGFW N352/N355 Front ...........................................................................................................9
Figure 8: NGFW N355/N355 Rear.............................................................................................................9
Figure 9: Depiction of the Module Version Displayed in the SMC GUI ..................................................99
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1 General
1.1 Overview
The NGFW appliances are high-performance network security appliances that add a broad range of
built-in security features, including VPN, IPS, anti-evasion, TLS inspection, SD-WAN, and mission-
critical application proxies, to a traditional firewall and provides end-to-end protection across the
entire enterprise network. All appliances can be deployed as either a Layer 2 or Layer 3 firewall or a
next generation IPS. However, in the FIPS 140-3 approved mode, the appliances are deployed in
Firewall/VPN mode of operation, which provides access control and VPN connectivity. Each of the
appliances run NGFW firmware version 6.10.13.26655.fips.2 based on the NGFW OS 10 operating
system with Linux Kernel version 4.19.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 2
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security 1
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The Forcepoint NGFW 60, 120, and 350 series bring together a wide range of capabilities in compact
desktop appliances that are easy to install, even in smaller locations. They integrate multi-ISP SD-
WAN connectivity, site-to-site Multi-Link VPN, and high-availability clustering with next-generation
firewall (NGFW) and intrusion prevention (IPS) security. The appliances enable remote offices, branch
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offices, and stores to securely connect directly to the cloud. All Forcepoint NGFW appliances are
centrally managed using the Forcepoint Security Management Center (SMC).
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
Module Characteristics:
Cryptographic Boundary:
The cryptographic boundary of the module is defined as the outer edges of the NGFW N60, NGFW
N120, NGFW N120L, NGFW N352, and NGFW N355 chassis. This includes all ports and physical
interfaces.
Figure 1: NGFW N60 Front
Figure 2: NGFW N60 Rear
Figure 3: NGFW N120 Front
Figure 4: NGFW N120 Rear
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Figure 5: NGFW N120L Front
Figure 6: NGFW N120L Rear
Figure 7: NGFW N352/N355 Front
Figure 8: NGFW N355/N355 Rear
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model and/or
Part Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware Version Processors Features
NGFW N120,
Part Number:
120-C3
N120 6.10.13.26655.fips.2 Intel Atom
C3338R
(Goldmont)
8x1 Gbps Ethernet interfaces
Desktop form factor
NGFW N120L,
Part Number:
120-C4
N120L 6.10.13.26655.fips.2 Intel Atom
C3338R
(Goldmont)
8x1 Gbps Ethernet interfaces
Desktop form factor
NGFW N352,
Part Number:
352-C1
N352 6.10.13.26655.fips.2 Intel Atom
C5315
(Tremont)
8x1 Gbps Ethernet interfaces
1x2.5 Gbps Ethernet interface
4x10 Gbps SFP+ interfaces
Desktop form factor
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Model and/or
Part Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware Version Processors Features
NGFW N355,
Part Number:
355-C1
N355 6.10.13.26655.fips.2 Intel Atom
C5325
(Tremont)
8x1 Gbps Ethernet interfaces
1x2.5 Gbps Ethernet interface
4x10 Gbps SFP+ interfaces
Desktop form factor
NGFW N60,
Part Number:
60-C1
N60 6.10.13.26655.fips.2 Intel Atom
C3338R
(Goldmont)
4x1 Gbps Ethernet interfaces
Desktop form factor
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
N/A for this module.
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
2.3 Excluded Components
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode
Name
Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
Mode
This module only supports an
Approved Mode of Operation
where only approved security
services are provided by the
module.
Approved As per IG 2.4.C Option 1, the module
returns a separate indicator for each
approved security service. This
indicator is a log message that outputs
"Started in FIPS 140 operating mode."
Table 3: Modes List and Description
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The module supports the Approved mode of operation only. When installed, configured, and
operated according to this Security Policy, the module does not support a non-Approved mode of
operation.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
The following cryptographic library and associated CAVP certificates are used by the cryptographic
module:
➢ Forcepoint NGFW FIPS Cryptographic Module (Cert. #A4793)
➢ Forcepoint NGFW FIPS Library (Cert. #A4550)
➢ Forcepoint NGFW Cryptographic Kernel Module (Cert. #A2166)
➢ Forcepoint NGFW Entropy Library (Cert. #A4426)
Only the algorithms specified in this section are supported by the module in approved mode of
operation.
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A2166 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CBC A4793 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A4793 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A2166 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A4793 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38D
AES-KWP A4793 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38F
Counter
DRBG
A4793 Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A4793 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
ECDSA
KeyVer
(FIPS186-5)
A4793 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A4793 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A4793 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
FIPS 186-5
HMAC-SHA-1 A2166 Key Length - Key Length: 112-512 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA-1 A4793 Key Length - Key Length: 112-2048 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A2166 Key Length - Key Length: 112-512 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A4550 Key Length - Key Length: 112-2048 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A4793 Key Length - Key Length: 112-2048 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
384
A2166 Key Length - Key Length: 112-1024 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
384
A4793 Key Length - Key Length: 112-2048 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512
A2166 Key Length - Key Length: 112-1024 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512
A4793 Key Length - Key Length: 112-2048 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A4793 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-224, P-256, P-
384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A4793 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - FB, FC,
ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192,
modp-2048, modp-3072, modp-4096, modp-6144, modp-
8192
Scheme -
dhEphem -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDF IKEv1
(CVL)
A4793 Authentication Method - Digital Signature, Pre-shared Key
Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret Length: 256, 2048, Diffie-Hellman Shared
Secret Length: 256, 3072, Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret
Length: 384, 4096, 6144, Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret
Length: 528, 8192
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
Preshared Key Length - Preshared Key Length: 112, 1136
KDF IKEv2
(CVL)
A4793 Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret Length: 256, 2048, Diffie-Hellman Shared
Secret Length: 256, 3072, Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret
Length: 384, 4096, 6144, Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret
Length: 528, 8192
Derived Keying Material Length - Derived Keying Material
Length: 320, 1312, Derived Keying Material Length: 320,
1792, Derived Keying Material Length: 320, 2432, Derived
Keying Material Length: 320, 3072
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
KDF SP800-
108
A4550 KDF Mode - Counter, Feedback
Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 128, 3456, 4096,
72, 776, 8
SP 800-108
Rev. 1
PBKDF A4550 Iteration Count - Iteration Count: 1-10000 Increment 1
Password Length - Password Length: 8-128 Increment 1
SP 800-132
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A4793 Key Generation Mode - probable,
probableWithProbableAux
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Primality Tests - 2pow100
Private Key Format - standard
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A4793 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A4793 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
Safe Primes
Key
Generation
A4793 Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096,
ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, modp-2048, modp-3072, modp-
4096, modp-6144, modp-8192
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
Safe Primes
Key
Verification
A4793 Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096,
ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, modp-2048, modp-3072, modp-
4096, modp-6144, modp-8192
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
SHA-1 A2166 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA-1 A4793 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224 A4793 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A2166 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A4550 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A4793 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A2166 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A4793 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A2166 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A4793 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA3-256 A4426 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 202
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627
(CVL)
A4793 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384 SP 800-135
Rev. 1
Table 4: Approved Algorithms -
Legacy
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) A4793 Signature Type - PKCS 1.5
Modulo - 1024
FIPS 186-4
Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Legacy
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
Symmetric
CKG
Key
Type:Symmetric
Forcepoint NGFW FIPS
Cryptographic Module
Section 4 (Example 1) and Section 6.1
(via the direct generation of keys using
an approved Counter DRBG) of NIST SP
800-133 Rev. 2, and IG D.H.
Asymmetric
CKG
Key
Type:Asymmetric
Forcepoint NGFW FIPS
Cryptographic Module
Section 4 (Example 1) , Section 5.1,
and Section 5.2 of NIST SP 800-
133rev2 and IG D.H
Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
The module does not offer non-Approved algorithms not allowed in the Approved mode of
operation.
N/A for this module.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
The table below lists the security function implementations for this module.
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
AES CBC
Encryption/Decry
ption for
IPsec/VPN
BC-
UnAuth
Data
Encryption/Decry
ption used for
IPsec/VPN
AES-CBC: (A2166)
Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256
bits
AES CBC
Encryption/Decry
ption for TLS
BC-
UnAuth
Data
Encryption/Decry
ption as part of
TLS.
Special
Publication :SP
800-38A
AES-CBC: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 128 and 256 bits
AES Decryption
for Modify and
Apply
Configuration
BC-
UnAuth
Key Decryption
for Modify and
Apply
Configuration
Service
AES-CBC: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 128 and 256 bits
AES
Encryption/Decry
ption for
Configuration File
Protection
BC-
UnAuth
Data
Encryption/Decry
ption for
configuration files
stored on disk
AES-CBC: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 128 and 256 bits
AES
Encryption/Decry
ption for Key Pair
Management
BC-
UnAuth
Data
Encryption/Decry
ption for key pairs
stored on disk
AES-CBC: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 256 bits
AES-CBC
Encryption/Decry
ption for SNMP
BC-
UnAuth
Data
Encryption/Decry
ption for SNMP
AES-CBC: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 128 and 256 bits
AES-CBC
Encryption/Decry
ption for State
Synchronization
BC-
UnAuth
Data
Encryption/Decry
ption as part of
State
Synchronization
for Peer
Connection
Service
AES-CBC: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 128 bits
AES-GCM
Encryption/Decry
ption for
IPsec/VPN
BC-Auth Data
Encryption/Decry
ption used for
IPsec/VPN
AES-GCM: (A2166)
Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256
bits
AES-CBC: (A2166)
AES-GCM
Encryption/Decry
ption for TLS
BC-Auth Data
Encryption/Decry
ption as part of
TLS.
Special
Publication:SP
800-38D
AES-GCM: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 128 and 256 bits
AES-CBC: (A4793)
Authentication
for HTTPS and
Mobile VPN
SHA Authentication
for HTTPS and
Mobile VPN using
SHA2-512
SHA2-512: (A4793)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Authentication
for IPsec VPN
MAC Authentication
for IPsec VPN PSK
HMAC-SHA-1: (A2166)
Key Sizes: 112-512 bits
MAC Length: 32-160 bits
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A2166)
Key Sizes: 112-512 bits
MAC Length: 32-256 bits
HMAC-SHA2-384: (A2166)
Key Sizes: 112-1024 bits
MAC Length: 32-384 bits
HMAC-SHA2-512: (A2166)
Key Sizes: 112-1024 bits
MAC Length: 32-512 bits
SHA-1: (A2166)
SHA2-256: (A2166)
SHA2-384: (A2166)
SHA2-512: (A2166)
CKG CKG As per section 6.1
and Section 4 of
NIST SP 800-133,
the module uses
its Approved
DRBG to generate
cryptographic
keys. The
resulting
symmetric or
asymmetric key,
or generated seed
is an unmodified
output from the
DRBG.
Symmetric
Keys:Configura
tion File
Protection
Passphrase,
Configuration
File Protection
Key, and State
Synchronizatio
n Key
Symmetric CKG : ()
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5):
(A4793)
Curves: P-224, P-256, P-
384, and P-521
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5):
(A4793)
Modulus: 2048 and 3072
bits
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3:
(A4793)
KAS-FFC Keys for TLS:
ffdhe2048/3072/4096/614
4/8192
KAS-FFC Keys for IKE:
MODP-
2048/3072/4096/6144/819
2
Counter DRBG: (A4793)
Asymmetric CKG: ()
Key Type: Asymmetric
DRBG DRBG Get random bits
from the Counter
DRBG
Counter DRBG: (A4793)
AES-ECB: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 256 bits
ECDSA Key
Generation
AsymKeyP
air-KeyGen
Key Pair
Generation for
TLS/VPN
Asymmetric CKG: ()
Key Type: Asymmetric
Counter DRBG: (A4793)
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5):
(A4793)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Curves: P-224, P-256, P-
384 and P-521 curves
ECDSA Key
Verification
AsymKeyP
air-KeyVer
Key Pair
Verification for
TLS/VPN
ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5):
(A4793)
Curves: P-224, P-256, P-
384, and P-521
ECDSA Signature
Generation
DigSig-
SigGen
Signature
Generation for
TLS/VPN
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5):
(A4793)
SHA2-256: (A4793)
SHA2-384: (A4793)
SHA2-512: (A4793)
ECDSA Signature
Verification
DigSig-
SigVer
Signature
Verification for
TLS/VPN
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5):
(A4793)
Curves: P-224, P-256, P-
384, and P-521
SHA2-224: (A4793)
SHA2-256: (A4793)
SHA2-384: (A4793)
SHA2-512: (A4793)
Entropy source ENT-ESV Non-physical
entropy source
with a
conditioning
function
SHA3-256: (A4426)
Firmware
integrity
DigSig-
SigVer
Firmware
signature
verification
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5):
(A4793)
Curve: P-256
SHA2-512: (A4793)
HMAC for
Configuration File
Authentication
MAC HMAC for the
authentication of
configuration files
stored on disk
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A2166)
Key Sizes: 112-512 bits
MAC Length: 32-160 bits
SHA2-256: (A2166)
HMAC for IKE MAC HMAC for the
authentication of
IKEv1/IKEv2
packets
SHA-1: (A4793)
SHA2-256: (A4793)
SHA2-384: (A4793)
SHA2-512: (A4793)
HMAC-SHA-1: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 112-2048 bits
MAC Length: 80-160 bits
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 112-2048 bits
MAC Length: 80-256 bits
HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 112-2048 bits
MAC Length: 80-384 bits
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
HMAC-SHA2-512: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 112-2048 bits
MAC Length: 80-512 bits
HMAC for
IPsec/VPN
MAC Authentication
Key used in
IPsec/VPN
connections.
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 112-2048 bits
MAC Length: 80-256 bits
SHA2-256: (A4793)
HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 112-2048 bits
MAC Length: 80-384 bits
SHA2-384: (A4793)
HMAC-SHA2-512: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 112-2048 bits
MAC Length: 80-512 bits
SHA2-512: (A4793)
HMAC-SHA-1: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 112-2048 bits
MAC Length: 80-160 bits
SHA-1: (A4793)
HMAC for Key
Pair Management
MAC HMAC for the
authentication of
key pairs stored
on disk
SHA2-256: (A2166)
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A2166)
Key Sizes: 256 bits
MAC Length: 32-256 bits
HMAC for Peer
Heartbeat
MAC HMAC for the
authentication of
Peer Heartbeat
messages
HMAC-SHA-1: (A2166)
Key Sizes: 256 bits
MAC Length: 32-160 bits
SHA-1: (A2166)
HMAC for Peer
State
Synchronization
MAC HMAC for the
authentication of
Peer State
Synchronization
messages
HMAC-SHA-1: (A2166)
Key Sizes: 160 bits
MAC Length: 32-160 bits
SHA-1: (A2166)
Counter DRBG: (A4793)
HMAC for SNMP MAC HMAC for the
Authentication of
SNMP packets
HMAC-SHA-1: (A2166)
Key Sizes: 160 bits
MAC Length: 32-160 bits
SHA-1: (A2166)
HMAC for TLS MAC Authentication
Key used in TLS
session.
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 256 bits
MAC Length: 80-256 bits
SHA2-256: (A4793)
HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 256 bits
MAC Length: 80-384 bits
SHA2-384: (A4793)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
IPSec Key
Agreement using
KAS-ECC-SSC
KAS-Full Key Agreement
for IPSec using
KAS-ECC-SSC
Caveat:No
parts of the
IKEv1 or IKEv2
protocol, other
than the KDF,
have been
tested by
CAVP.
Strength:SSP
establishment
methodology
provides
between 112
and 256 bits of
encryption
strength
KDF IKEv1: (A4793)
KDF IKEv2: (A4793)
SHA2-256: (A4793)
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3:
(A4793)
Scheme: ephemeralUnified
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5):
(A4793)
ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5):
(A4793)
Counter DRBG: (A4793)
Asymmetric CKG: ()
Key Type: Asymmetric
IPSec Key
Agreement using
KAS-FFC-SSC
KAS-Full Key Agreement
for IPSec using
KAS-FFC-SSC
Caveat:No
parts of the
IKEv1 or IKEv2
protocol, other
than the KDF,
have been
tested by
CAVP.
Strength:Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 112
and 202 bits of
encryption
strength.
KDF IKEv1: (A4793)
KDF IKEv2: (A4793)
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3:
(A4793)
Scheme: dhEphem
Safe Primes Key
Generation: (A4793)
Safe Primes: modp-2048,
modp-3072, modp-4096,
modp-6144, and modp-
8192
Safe Primes Key
Verification: (A4793)
Safe Primes: modp-2048,
modp-3072, modp-4096,
modp-6144, and modp-
8192
SHA2-256: (A4793)
KAS-ECC Full
Public Key
Validation
AsymKeyP
air-
PubKeyVal
Full Public Key
Validation for
Ephemeral Key
Pairs
Special
Publication:SP
800-56Arev3
(Section:
5.6.2.3.3)
ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5):
(A4793)
KAS-FFC Full
Public Key
Validation
AsymKeyP
air-
PubKeyVal
Full Public Key
Validation for
Ephemeral Key
Pairs
Special
Publication :SP
800-56Arev3
(Section:
5.6.2.3.1)
Safe Primes Key
Verification: (A4793)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KBKDF KBKDF Key-Based Key
Derivation
KDF SP800-108: (A4550)
Mode: Counter and
Feedback
SHA2-256: (A4793)
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 112-2048 bits
MAC Length: 80-256 bits
KTS for TLS/IPsec
Connections (AES-
CBC + HMAC)
KTS-Wrap Key transport
(Encryption with
Message
Authentication)
Strength:SSP
establishment
methodology
provides
between 128
and 256 bits of
encryption
strength.
AES-CBC: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 128 and 256 bits
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 112-2048 bits
MAC Length: 80-256 bits
SHA2-256: (A4793)
HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 112-2048 bits
MAC Length: 80-384 bits
SHA2-384: (A4793)
KTS for TLS/IPsec
Connections (AES-
GCM)
KTS-Wrap Key transport
(Encryption with
Message
Authentication)
Strength:SSP
establishment
methodology
provides
between 128
and 256 bits of
encryption
strength.
AES-GCM: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 128 and 256 bits
AES-CBC: (A4793)
KTS for VPN KTS-Wrap Key Wrapping
used in VPN
Connections
Special
Publication:SP
800-38F
AES-KWP: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 256 bits
AES-ECB: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 256 bits
PBKDF PBKDF Password-based
key derivation
PBKDF: (A4550)
Key Sizes: 128 and 256 bits
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4550)
Key Sizes: 256 bits
MAC Length: 256 bits
SHA2-256: (A4550)
RSA Key
Generation
AsymKeyP
air-KeyGen
Key Pair
Generation for
TLS/VPN.
Special
Publication
:FIPS 186-5
Counter DRBG: (A4793)
Asymmetric CKG: ()
Key Type: Asymmetric
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5):
(A4793)
Modulus Size: 2048, 3072,
and 4096 bits
RSA Signature
Generation
DigSig-
SigGen
Signature
Generation for
TLS/VPN
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5):
(A4793)
Modulo Size: 2048, 3072,
Page 21 of 100
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
and 4096
SHA2-384: (A4793)
SHA2-512: (A4793)
SHA2-256: (A4793)
RSA Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-4)
DigSig-
SigVer
FIPS 186-4
Signature
Verification for
TLS/VPN
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4):
(A4793)
Modulo Size: 1024
SHA-1: (A4793)
SHA2-224: (A4793)
SHA2-256: (A4793)
SHA2-384: (A4793)
SHA2-512: (A4793)
RSA Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-5)
DigSig-
SigVer
FIPS 186-5
Signature
Verification for
TLS/VPN
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5):
(A4793)
Modulo Size: 2048, 3072,
and 4096
SHA-1: (A4793)
SHA2-384: (A4793)
SHA2-512: (A4793)
SHA2-224: (A4793)
Safe Prime Key
Generation
KAS-
KeyGen
Key generation
for all module
services that
utilize KAS-FFC-
SSC.
Safe Primes Key
Generation: (A4793)
Safe Prime Groups:
ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072,
ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144,
ffdhe8192, modp-2048,
modp-3072, modp-4096,
modp-6144, and modp-
8192
Counter DRBG: (A4793)
Safe Prime Key
Verification
KAS-SSC Key Verification
for all module
services that
utilize KAS-FFC-
SSC.
Safe Primes Key
Verification: (A4793)
Safe Prime Groups: Safe
Prime Groups : ffdhe2048,
ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096,
ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192,
modp-2048, modp-3072,
modp-4096, modp-6144,
and modp-8192
TLS Key
Agreement using
KAS-ECC-SSC
KAS-Full Key Agreement
for TLS using KAS-
ECC-SSC.
Caveat:No
parts of the
TLS protocol,
other than the
KDF, have
been tested by
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627:
(A4793)
MAC Algorithms: HMAC-
SHA2-256 and HMAC-
SHA2-384
SHA2-256: (A4793)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
CAVP.
Key
Strength:SSP
establishment
methodology
provides
between 112
and 256 bits of
encryption
strength
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 256 bits
MAC Lengths: 80-256 bits
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3:
(A4793)
Scheme: ephemeralUnified
SHA2-384: (A4793)
HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 384 bits
MAC Length : 80-384 bits
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5):
(A4793)
ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5):
(A4793)
Counter DRBG: (A4793)
Asymmetric CKG: ()
Key Type: Asymmetric
TLS Key
Agreement using
KAS-FFC-SSC
KAS-Full Key Agreement
for TLS using KAS-
FFC-SSC
Caveat:No
parts of the
TLS protocol,
other than the
KDF, have
been tested by
CAVP.
Strength:Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 112
and 202 bits of
encryption
strength.
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627:
(A4793)
MAC Algorithm: HMAC-
SHA2-256 and HMAC-
SHA2-384
SHA2-256: (A4793)
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 256 bits
MAC Length: 80-256 bits
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3:
(A4793)
Scheme: dhEphem
Safe Primes Key
Generation: (A4793)
Generated Safe Primes:
ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072,
ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, and
ffdhe8192
Safe Primes Key
Verification: (A4793)
Verified Safe Primes:
ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072,
ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, and
ffdhe8192
SHA2-384: (A4793)
HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4793)
Key Sizes: 384 bits
MAC Length: 80-384 bits
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Table 7: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
- IG C.D - Truncated HMAC
➢ HMAC-SHA-1
o Security Strength: 112-bits
o MAC Sizes: 80-160 bits
➢ HMAC-SHA2-256
o Security Strength: 112-bits
o MAC Sizes: 80-256 bits
➢ HMAC-SHA2-384
o Security Strength: 112-bits
o MAC Sizes: 80-384 bits
➢ HMAC-SHA2-512
o Security Strength: 112-bits
o MAC Sizes: 80-512 bits
- IG C.M – Legacy Algorithms
➢ Algorithm: RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)
➢ Modulus Sizes: 1024 bits
➢ Caveat: Legacy usage only. This legacy algorithms can only be used on data that was
generated prior to the Legacy Date specified in FIPS 140-3 IG C.M.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
The table below specifies the module’s entropy certificates.
Cert
Number
Vendor
Name
E126 Forcepoint
Table 8: Entropy Certificates
The table below specifies the module’s entropy sources.
Name Type Operational Environment Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
Forcepoint
NGFW
Entropy
Library
Non-
Physical
Intel Atom® C3338R
(Goldmont)/Intel Atom® C5315
(Tremont)/Intel Atom® C5325
(Tremont) on a NGFW OS 10 on
Linux 4.19
256
bits
256 bits SHA3-256
(A4426)
Table 9: Entropy Sources
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The module's entropy source is expected to provide full entropy. A total of 512 bits of this full-
entropy data is used to seed the module's CTR_DRBG via its entropy input. This amount of entropy is
sufficient to support 256 bits of security strength, in accordance with NIST SP 800-57.
For more details about the entropy source please see the public use document for ESV certificate
number E126.
2.9 Key Generation
As per IG D.H and SP 800-133rev2, the module uses an Approved Counter DRBG to generate random
values and seeds that are used for asymmetric and symmetric key generation. The generated seed is
an unmodified output from the Counter DRBG.
2.10 Key Establishment
The module supports the following Key Establishment methods:
1. Key Agreement Schemes:
- SP 800-56Arev3 KAS-FFC-SSC
- SP 800-56Arev3 KAS-ECC-SSC
2. Key Transport Schemes
- SP 800-38F Compliant SSP Transport via AES-CBC and HMAC
- SP 800-38F Compliant SSP Transport via AES-GCM
- SP 800-38F Compliant SSP Transport via AES-KWP
All Key Establishment methods are entered and outputted using the AD/EE method as per IG 9.5.A.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The following industry protocols1 are used by the module:
➢ TLS
➢ IPsec
➢ IKEv1
➢ IKEv2
➢ SNMPv3
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
1
No parts of the TLS v1.2, IKEv1, IKEv2, and SNMPv3 protocols, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP or
CMVP
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Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
USB ports (x2)
[N60/N60L/N120/120L]
None Can be used to input initial configuration from
SMC. Disabled after initial configuration has been
loaded.
SIM Card Slot (x1) [N60L] None Used to hold a Nano-SIM card for the LTE
capabilities
Fixed Gb ethernet port (x4) Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
Control
Output
Status
Output
Network traffic
Rear fixed ethernet port LEDs
(x8) [N60/N60L]
Status
Output
Used to indicate link status and network activity
Front Ethernet Indicator LEDs
(x8) [N60/N60L/N120/120L]
Status
Output
Used to indicate port activity and link status
Console port Status
Output
Used for external connections to console
monitors, which can be used for status
monitoring. Can be used to input initial
configuration from SMC, but disabled after initial
configuration has completed.
Power LED (x1)
[N60/N60L/N120/120L]
Status
Output
Used to indicate whether the module is running,
in a standby state, or powered down
Disk status LEDs (x1) Status
Output
Used to determine the presence of disk activity
MGMT LED (x1) Status
Output
Used to determine the presence management
connections
HA LED (x1) Status
Output
Used to determine if the module is running in
High Availability
LTE LED (x1) [N60L/120L] Status
Output
Used to determine the strength of the LTE
connection
Power button (x1) Control
Input
Used to turn on and turn off the module
12V Power Connector (x1)
[N60/N60L/N120/120L]
Power Used to input power to the module
Fixed Gb ethernet port (x2)
[N120/120L]
Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
Control
Output
Status
Output
Network traffic/PoE
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Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
Fixed Gb WAN ethernet port
(x2) [N120/120L/N352/N355]
Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
Control
Output
Status
Output
Network traffic
Rear fixed ethernet port LEDs
(x16) [N120/120L/N352/N355]
Status
Output
Used to indicate link status and network activity
PoE LED (x1)
[N120/120L/N352/N355]
Status
Output
Used to determine if there is any power that is
actively fed through a supported Ethernet port
54V Power Connector (x1)
[N120/120L]
Power Used to input power to the module
USB ports (x3) [N352/N355] Control
Input
Can be used to input initial configuration from
SMC
Fixed Ethernet RJ45 ports (x8)
[N352/N355]
Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
Control
Output
Status
Output
Network traffic
Fixed Ethernet 2.5 Gbps RJ45
ports (x1) [N352/N355]
Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
Control
Output
Status
Output
Network traffic
Fixed SFTP+ ports (x4)
[N352/N355]
Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
Control
Output
Status
Output
Network traffic
Rear fixed ethernet port LEDs
(x10)[N352/N355]
Status
Output
Used to indicate link status and network activity
Front Ethernet Indicator LEDs
(x26) [N352/N355]
Status
Output
Used to indicate port activity and link status
Page 27 of 100
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Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
Power LED (x2) [N352/N355] Status
Output
Used to indicate whether the module is running,
in a standby state, or powered down
19V Power Connector (x1)
[N352/N355]
Power Used to input power to the module
Reset Button None Disabled
Table 10: Ports and Interfaces
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
The module supports role-based authentication within the module, where all roles must authenticate
to the module by providing their authentication data.
The module does not implement a limit on consecutive authentication attempts, as described in
section 5.2.2 of SP 800-63B. However, this is mitigated by the two-second delay for failed user
password attempts and by a conservative argument about network session rate for the other
authenticators. The success probability for random attempts during a one-minute period, as shown
in the third column of the below table, shows that the module is well protected against password
guessing attacks for all authenticators.
Method Name Description Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each
Attempt
Strength per Minute
Single factor
cryptographic software
for SMC, Peer NGFW,
and Log Server
Authentication for
SMC, Peer NGFW,
and Log Server
HMAC-SHA-1
(A4793)
Min:
1/(2^112)
Min:
60,000,000/(2^112)
Single factor
cryptographic software
for SNMP
Authentication for
SNMP
HMAC-SHA-1
(A4793)
Min:
1/(2^128)
Min:
60,000,000/(2^128)
Memorized secret for
HTTPS and Mobile VPN
Authentication for
HTTPS and Mobile
VPN
SHA2-512
(A4793)
Min: 1 /
(94^10)
Min: 30 / (94^10)
Single factor
cryptographic software
for IPsec VPN (RSA)
Authentication for
IPsec VPN using
Digital Signatures
RSA Signature
Generation
Min: 1 /
(2^112)
Min: 60,000,000 /
(2^112)
Single factor
cryptographic software
for IPsec VPN (ECDSA)
Authentication for
IPsec VPN using
Digital Signatures
ECDSA
Signature
Generation
Min: 1 /
(2^112)
Min: 60,000,000 /
(2^112)
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Method Name Description Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each
Attempt
Strength per Minute
Single factor
cryptographic software
for IPsec VPN (HMAC)
Authentication for
IPsec VPN using
MAC's
HMAC-SHA-1
(A4793)
Min: 1 /
(94^14)
Min: 60,000,000 /
(94^14)
Table 11: Authentication Methods
4.2 Roles
The mapping of the cryptographic module’s roles services is in the table below:
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto-Officer Role CO Single factor cryptographic
software for SMC, Peer
NGFW, and Log Server
User Role User Single factor cryptographic
software for SNMP
Memorized secret for
HTTPS and Mobile VPN
Single factor cryptographic
software for IPsec VPN
(RSA)
Single factor cryptographic
software for IPsec VPN
(ECDSA)
Single factor cryptographic
software for IPsec VPN
(HMAC)
Table 12: Roles
4.3 Approved Services
All services listed in the table below can be accessed in approved mode and when in this mode
exclusively use the security functions listed in Cryptographic Algorithms.
➢ In the ‘Access Rights to Keys and/or SSPs’ column:
• G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The module exports the SSP.
• W = Write: The SSP is imported or updated
• E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP.
➢ In the ‘Roles SSP Access’ column:
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• For a complete description of SSP referenced from the table, see Section “9 Sensitive
Security Parameters Management”.
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Export
Logs and
Monitorin
g Data
Service
Traffic logs
and
monitorin
g data are
exported
to Log
Server
securely.
Log field -
[sendlogd:
FIPS: starting
in FIPS
compliant
mode],
[entries are
received by
the log
server.]; SMC
Monitoring -
[data shown
in the SMC
monitoring
window]
TLS
protocol
messages
TLS
protocol
messages,
Log data
Monitoring
data, TLS
ECDSA
Public Key,
TLS ECDH
Public Key
AES-GCM
Encryption/Dec
ryption for TLS
CKG
DRBG
ECDSA Key
Generation
ECDSA Key
Verification
ECDSA
Signature
Generation
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
Entropy source
HMAC for TLS
KAS-ECC Full
Public Key
Validation
TLS Key
Agreement
using KAS-ECC-
SSC
Crypto-
Officer
- DRBG
'Key'
Value:
G,W,E
- DRBG 'V'
Value:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- HTTPS
ECDSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- TLS
Authentica
tion Key:
G,W,E
- TLS ECDH
Private
Key: G,W,E
- TLS ECDH
Public Key:
G,W,E
- TLS
ECDSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- TLS
ECDSA
Public Key:
G,W,E
- TLS
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
Page 30 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
- TLS Pre-
Master
Secret:
G,W,E
- TLS
Trusted
Certificates
: G,W,E
HTTPS
Proxy
Service
Sidewinde
r proxy
used for
outbound
traffic.
Log field -
[SSM Proxy;
TLS
Decrypted=tr
ue]
TLS
protocol
messages
TLS
protocol
messages,
SSM HTTPS
DH Public
Key, SSM
HTTPS
ECDH
Public Key,
SSM Client
Protection
RSA Public
Key, SSM
Client,
Protection
ECDSA
Public Key,
Status
indicator
AES CBC
Encryption/Dec
ryption for TLS
AES-GCM
Encryption/Dec
ryption for TLS
CKG
DRBG
ECDSA Key
Generation
ECDSA Key
Verification
ECDSA
Signature
Generation
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
Entropy source
HMAC for TLS
KAS-ECC Full
Public Key
Validation
KAS-FFC Full
Public Key
Validation
PBKDF
RSA Key
Generation
RSA Signature
Generation
RSA Signature
Verification
(FIPS 186-4)
RSA Signature
Verification
User
- DRBG
'Key'
Value:
G,W,E
- DRBG 'V'
Value:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- Key
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
- SSM
Client
Protection
ECDSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- SSM
Client
Protection
ECDSA
Public Key:
G,W,E
- SSM
Client
Protection
RSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
Page 31 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
(FIPS 186-5)
Safe Prime Key
Generation
Safe Prime Key
Verification
TLS Key
Agreement
using KAS-ECC-
SSC
TLS Key
Agreement
using KAS-FFC-
SSC
- SSM
Client
Protection
RSA Public
Key: G,W,E
- SSM
HTTPS
Authentica
tion Key:
G,W,E
- SSM
HTTPS DH
Private
Key: G,W,E
- SSM
HTTPS DH
Public Key:
G,R,W,E
- SSM
HTTPS
ECDH
Private
Key: G,W,E
- SSM
HTTPS
ECDH
Public Key:
G,R,W,E
- SSM
HTTPS
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
- SSM
HTTPS
Master
Secret:
G,W,E
- SSM
HTTPS Pre-
Master
Secret:
G,W,E
- Trusted
Internet
Page 32 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Certificates
: G,W,E
HTTPS
User
Authentic
ation
Service
End user’s
authentica
tion to the
module via
web
browser.
Log field -
[New user has
been
authorized,
User has been
reauthorized]
TLS
protocol
messages,
User
authentica
tion data
TLS
protocol
messages,
HTTPS DH
Public Key,
HTTPS
ECDH
Public Key,
HTTPS RSA
Public Key,
Status
indicator
AES CBC
Encryption/Dec
ryption for TLS
AES-GCM
Encryption/Dec
ryption for TLS
Authentication
for HTTPS and
Mobile VPN
CKG
DRBG
ECDSA Key
Generation
ECDSA Key
Verification
Entropy source
HMAC for TLS
RSA Key
Generation
RSA Signature
Generation
Safe Prime Key
Generation
Safe Prime Key
Verification
TLS Key
Agreement
using KAS-ECC-
SSC
TLS Key
Agreement
using KAS-FFC-
SSC
User
- DRBG
'Key'
Value:
G,W,E
- DRBG 'V'
Value:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- HTTPS
Authentica
tion Key:
G,W,E
- HTTPS DH
Private
Key: G,W,E
- HTTPS DH
Public Key:
G,R,W,E
- HTTPS
ECDH
Private
Key: G,W,E
- HTTPS
ECDH
Public Key:
G,R,W,E
- HTTPS
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
- HTTPS
Master
Secret:
G,W,E
- HTTPS
Pre-Master
Page 33 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Secret:
G,W,E
- HTTPS
RSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- HTTPS
RSA Public
Key: G,W,E
- TLS
Master
Secret:
G,W,E
- User
Password:
E
Initialize
module
Set up the
module
using
NGFW
Initial
Configurat
ion
Wizard.
The setup
process
includes
mandatory
firmware
upgrade,
applying
initial
configurati
on and
enabling
the
Approved
Mode of
operation.
Log field:
"Started in
FIPS 140
operating
mode."
Firmware
image and
signature
Initial
configurati
on data -
TLS
Trusted
Certificates
Status
Indicator
DRBG
Firmware
integrity
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
Crypto-
Officer
-
Configurati
on File
Protection
Key: G,W,E
-
Configurati
on File
Protection
Passphrase
: G,W,E
IPsec VPN
Service
VPN
tunneling
clients
establish
secure
Log field -
[IPsec VPN:
IPsec SA
initiator
done], [IPsec
IKE
protocol
messages,
IPSec
IKE
protocol
messages,
IPSec
protocol
AES CBC
Encryption/Dec
ryption for
IPsec/VPN
AES-GCM
User
- DRBG
'Key'
Value:
G,W,E
Page 34 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
IPsec VPN
connectio
ns to the
module.
VPN: IPsec SA
responder
done]
protocol
messages
messages,
VPN DH
Public Key,
VPN ECDH
Public Key,
VPN RSA
Public Key,
VPN
ECDSA
Public Key,
Status
indicator
Encryption/Dec
ryption for
IPsec/VPN
Authentication
for IPsec VPN
DRBG
ECDSA Key
Generation
ECDSA Key
Verification
ECDSA
Signature
Generation
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
Entropy source
HMAC for IKE
HMAC for
IPsec/VPN
HMAC for
SNMP
IPSec Key
Agreement
using KAS-ECC-
SSC
IPSec Key
Agreement
using KAS-FFC-
SSC
KAS-ECC Full
Public Key
Validation
KAS-FFC Full
Public Key
Validation
KTS for VPN
RSA Signature
Generation
RSA Signature
Verification
(FIPS 186-4)
RSA Signature
Verification
- DRBG 'V'
Value:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- IKE
Authentica
tion Key:
G,W,E
- IKE
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
- IPsec
Authentica
tion Key:
G,W,E
- IPsec
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
- SKEYID,
SKEYID_d:
G,W,E
-
SKEYSEED,
SK_d,
SK_pi,
SK_pr:
G,W,E
- User
Password:
E
- VPN DH
Private
Key: G,W,E
- VPN DH
Public Key:
G,W,E
- VPN DH
Shared
Page 35 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
(FIPS 186-5)
Safe Prime Key
Generation
Safe Prime Key
Verification
Secret:
G,W,E
- VPN
ECDH
Private
Key: G,W,E
- VPN
ECDH
Public Key:
G,W,E
- VPN
ECDH
Shared
Secret:
G,W,E
- VPN
ECDSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- VPN
ECDSA
Public Key:
G,W,E
- VPN Key
Wrapping
Key: G,W,E
- VPN Pre-
Shared
Key: G,W,E
- VPN RSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- VPN RSA
Public Key:
G,W,E
- VPN
Trusted
Certificates
: G,W,E
Key Pair
Managem
ent
Service
SMC using
the
managem
ent
communic
Log field -
[Private key
<filename>
has been
created]
Certificate
data,
Issued
certificate
Certificate
signing
request,
Status
indicator
CKG
TLS Key
Agreement
using KAS-ECC-
SSC
Crypto-
Officer
-
Configurati
on File
Page 36 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
ation
protocol
requests
engine to
generate
key pair
and
certificate
signing
request.
RSA Key
Generation
AES-GCM
Encryption/Dec
ryption for TLS
HMAC for TLS
DRBG
Entropy source
ECDSA Key
Generation
ECDSA Key
Verification
ECDSA
Signature
Generation
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
RSA Signature
Generation
AES
Encryption/Dec
ryption for Key
Pair
Management
HMAC for Key
Pair
Management
Authentica
tion Key:
G,W,E
-
Configurati
on File
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
- DRBG
'Key'
Value:
G,W,E
- DRBG 'V'
Value:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- HTTPS
ECDSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- HTTPS
ECDSA
Public Key:
G,W,E
- HTTPS
RSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- HTTPS
RSA Public
Key: G,W,E
- TLS
Authentica
tion Key:
G,W,E
- TLS ECDH
Private
Key: G,W,E
Page 37 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
- TLS ECDH
Public Key:
G,W,E
- TLS
ECDSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- TLS
ECDSA
Public Key:
G,W,E
- TLS
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
- TLS
Master
Secret:
G,W,E
- TLS Pre-
Master
Secret:
G,W,E
- VPN
ECDSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- VPN
ECDSA
Public Key:
G,W,E
- VPN RSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- VPN RSA
Public Key:
G,W,E
Managem
ent
Connectio
n Service
SMC
establishes
secure
managem
ent
connectio
ns to the
module
Log field:
Management:
TLS
Connection
established
TLS
protocol
messages,
Manageme
nt protocol
requests
TLS
protocol
messages,
Manageme
nt protocol
responses,
TLS ECDSA
Public Key,
AES-GCM
Encryption/Dec
ryption for TLS
DRBG
ECDSA Key
Generation
ECDSA Key
Verification
Crypto-
Officer
- DRBG
'Key'
Value:
G,W,E
- DRBG 'V'
Value:
Page 38 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
over TLS.
After
initializing
the
module
and initial
contact
with SMC,
all post-
installatio
n
configurati
on and
modificati
on of
initial
configurati
on is
secured
using TLS
connectio
ns from
SMC.
TLS ECDH
Public Key,
VPN RSA
Public Key,
VPN
ECDSA,
Public Key,
HTTPS RSA
Public Key
ECDSA
Signature
Generation
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
HMAC for TLS
KAS-ECC Full
Public Key
Validation
TLS Key
Agreement
using KAS-ECC-
SSC
G,W,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- HTTPS
RSA Public
Key:
G,R,W,E
- TLS
Authentica
tion Key:
G,W,E
- TLS ECDH
Private
Key: G,W,E
- TLS ECDH
Public Key:
G,R,W,E
- TLS
ECDSA
Public Key:
G,R,W,E
- TLS
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
- TLS
Master
Secret:
G,W,E
- TLS Pre-
Master
Secret:
G,W,E
- TLS
Trusted
Certificates
: G,W,E
- VPN
ECDSA
Public Key:
Page 39 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
G,R,W,E
- VPN RSA
Public Key:
G,R,W,E
Mobile
VPN
Service
VPN
tunneling
clients
establish
secure
IPsec VPN
connectio
ns to the
module.
Log field -
[IPsec VPN:
Mobile
session
created],[IPse
c VPN: Mobile
session
closed]
IKE
protocol
messages,
IPSec
protocol
messages,
User
authentica
tion data
IKE
protocol
messages,
IPSec
protocol
messages,
VPN DH
Public Key,
Status
indicator,
VPN ECDH
Public Key,
VPN ECDH
Public Key,
VPN RSA
Public Key,
VPN
ECDSA
Public Key,
Status
indicator
CKG
IPSec Key
Agreement
using KAS-ECC-
SSC
IPSec Key
Agreement
using KAS-FFC-
SSC
DRBG
Entropy source
ECDSA Key
Generation
ECDSA Key
Verification
ECDSA
Signature
Generation
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
Safe Prime Key
Generation
Safe Prime Key
Verification
RSA Signature
Generation
KAS-ECC Full
Public Key
Validation
KAS-FFC Full
Public Key
Validation
Authentication
for HTTPS and
Mobile VPN
User
- DRBG
'Key'
Value:
G,W,E
- DRBG 'V'
Value:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- IKE
Authentica
tion Key:
G,W,E
- IKE
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
- IPsec
Authentica
tion Key:
G,W,E
- IPsec
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
- SKEYID,
SKEYID_d:
G,W,E
-
SKEYSEED,
SK_d,
SK_pi,
SK_pr:
G,W,E
- User
Password:
Page 40 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
E
- VPN DH
Private
Key: G,W,E
- VPN DH
Public Key:
G,W,E
- VPN DH
Shared
Secret:
G,W,E
- VPN
ECDH
Private
Key: G,W,E
- VPN
ECDH
Public Key:
G,W,E
- VPN
ECDH
Shared
Secret:
G,W,E
- VPN
ECDSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- VPN
ECDSA
Public Key:
G,W,E
- VPN Key
Wrapping
Key: G,W,E
- VPN Pre-
Shared
Key: G,W,E
- VPN RSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- VPN RSA
Public Key:
G,W,E
Page 41 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
- VPN
Trusted
Certificates
: G,W,E
Modify
and Apply
Configurat
ion
Verify and
apply the
configurati
on
changes to
the
modules
securely
including
configurati
on of
client
protection
and server
protection
certificate
authority
and TLS
credentials
.
Log field -
[Inspection:
System Policy-
Loaded],[Insp
ection:
System Policy-
Applied]
Configurati
on data,
VPN Pre-
Shared
Key, Client
Protection
CA RSA
Public/Priv
ate Key,
Server
Protection
RSA
Public/Priv
ate Key,
Server
Protection
ECDSA
Public/Priv
ate Key,
SNMP
Encryption
Key, SNMP
Authentica
tion Key,
Trusted
Internet
Certificates
, VPN
Trusted
Certificates
, Cluster
Protocol
Key, Key
Encryption
Passphrase
Status
indicator
AES Decryption
for Modify and
Apply
Configuration
AES
Encryption/Dec
ryption for
Configuration
File Protection
AES-GCM
Encryption/Dec
ryption for TLS
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
HMAC for
Configuration
File
Authentication
HMAC for TLS
KBKDF
KTS for
TLS/IPsec
Connections
(AES-GCM)
PBKDF
RSA Signature
Verification
(FIPS 186-4)
RSA Signature
Verification
(FIPS 186-5)
KTS for
TLS/IPsec
Connections
(AES-CBC +
HMAC)
Crypto-
Officer
- Client
Protection
CA RSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- Client
Protection
ECDSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- Client
Protection
IM CA
ECDSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- Client
Protection
IM CA RSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- Client
Protection
RSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- Cluster
Protocol
Key: G,W,E
-
Configurati
on File
Authentica
tion Key:
G,W,E
-
Configurati
on File
Page 42 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
- Key
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
- Key
Encryption
Passphrase
: G,W,E
- SNMP
Authentica
tion Key:
G,W,E
- SNMP
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
- VPN Pre-
Shared
Key: G,W,E
Peer
Connectio
n Service
Peer
NGFW
modules
establish
secure
network
connectio
n within a
cluster.
Log field -
[dsd: FIPS:
starting in
FIPS
compliant
mode], [ssd:
FIPS: starting
in FIPS
compliant
mode]
TLS
protocol
messages,
Heartbeat
State
synchroniz
ation data,
Data
synchroniz
ation data,
State
Synchroniz
ation Key,
IKE
Encryption
Key, IKE
Authentica
tion Key,
SKEYID,
SKEYID_D,
SKEYSEED,
SK_D,
SK_PI,
SK_PR,
IPSec
TLS
protocol
messages,
Heartbeat
State
synchroniz
ation data,
Data
synchroniz
ation data,
State
Synchroniz
ation Key,
IKE
Encryption
Key, IKE
Authentica
tion Key,
SKEYID,
SKEYID_D,
SKEYSEED,
SK_D,
SK_PI,
SK_PR,
IPSec
AES CBC
Encryption/Dec
ryption for
IPsec/VPN
AES-CBC
Encryption/Dec
ryption for
State
Synchronization
AES-GCM
Encryption/Dec
ryption for
IPsec/VPN
AES-GCM
Encryption/Dec
ryption for TLS
CKG
DRBG
ECDSA Key
Generation
ECDSA Key
Verification
ECDSA
Signature
Generation
Crypto-
Officer
- Cluster
Protocol
Key: G,W,E
- DRBG
'Key'
Value:
G,W,E
- DRBG 'V'
Value:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- HTTPS
ECDSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- HTTPS
RSA
Page 43 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Encryption
Key, IPsec
Authentica
tion Key,
VPN RSA
Public/Priv
ate Key,
VPN
ECDSA
Public/Priv
ate Key,
HTTPS RSA
Public/Priv
ate Key
Encryption
Key, IPsec
Authentica
tion Key,
VPN RSA
Public/Priv
ate Key,
VPN
ECDSA
Public/Priv
ate Key,
HTTPS RSA
Public/Priv
ate Key,
TLS ECDH
Public Key,
TLS ECDSA
Public Key
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
Entropy source
HMAC for Peer
Heartbeat
HMAC for Peer
State
Synchronization
HMAC for TLS
IPSec Key
Agreement
using KAS-ECC-
SSC
IPSec Key
Agreement
using KAS-FFC-
SSC
KAS-ECC Full
Public Key
Validation
KAS-FFC Full
Public Key
Validation
KTS for
TLS/IPsec
Connections
(AES-GCM)
Safe Prime Key
Generation
Safe Prime Key
Verification
TLS Key
Agreement
using KAS-ECC-
SSC
KTS for
TLS/IPsec
Connections
(AES-CBC +
HMAC)
Private
Key:
G,R,W,E
- HTTPS
RSA Public
Key:
G,R,W,E
- IKE
Authentica
tion Key:
G,R,W,E
- IKE
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
- IPsec
Authentica
tion Key:
G,R,W,E
- IPsec
Encryption
Key:
G,R,W,E
- SKEYID,
SKEYID_d:
G,R,W,E
-
SKEYSEED,
SK_d,
SK_pi,
SK_pr:
G,R,W,E
- State
Synchroniz
ation Key:
G,R,W,E
- TLS
Authentica
tion Key:
G,W,E
- TLS ECDH
Private
Key: G,W,E
- TLS ECDH
Public Key:
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
G,R,W,E
- TLS
ECDSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- TLS
ECDSA
Public Key:
G,W,E
- TLS
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
- TLS
Master
Secret:
G,W,E
- TLS Pre-
Master
Secret:
G,W,E
- TLS
Trusted
Certificates
: G,W,E
- VPN DH
Private
Key:
G,R,W,E
- VPN
ECDH
Public Key:
G,W,E
- VPN
ECDSA
Private
Key:
G,R,W,E
- VPN
ECDSA
Public Key:
G,R,W,E
- VPN RSA
Private
Key:
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
G,R,W,E
- VPN RSA
Public Key:
G,R,W,E
Perform
Self-Tests
Perform
all power-
on self-
tests.
Console
output: FIPS
power-up
tests
succeeded;
Log field:
Cryptographic
self-tests
succeeded
None Self-test
result
Firmware
integrity
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
Crypto-
Officer
- Firmware
Integrity
Check
Public Key
: E
Show
Status
Report the
status of
the
module.
SMC
monitoring:
interface
SMC:
Approved
mode
displayed in
SMC
monitoring
window
None Module
status
informatio
n
None Crypto-
Officer
Show
Versionin
g
Informati
on
Display
the
module
name and
version
informatio
n.
Console
output:
Forcepoint
NGFW version
<version>;
SMC
monitoring
interface:
version
displayed in
SMC
monitoring
window.
None Module
name and
version
None Crypto-
Officer
Shut
down the
module
Terminate
module
operations
in
preparatio
n for
powering
off.
Power LED: A
shut down
module is
indicated by
an unlit
power LED.
Power
control
command
Status
indicator
None Crypto-
Officer
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
SNMP
Monitorin
g Service
SNMP
manager
receives
network
managem
ent
informatio
n and
traps.
Log field -
[smonitd: FIPS
starting in
FIPS
compliant
mode]
Encrypted
and
authentica
ted SNMP
requests
Encrypted
and
authentica
ted SNMP
responses,
Status
indicator
AES-CBC
Encryption/Dec
ryption for
SNMP
HMAC for
SNMP
User
- SNMP
Authentica
tion Key: E
- SNMP
Encryption
Key: E
TLS
Inspection
Service
Perform
TLS
inspection
on HTTPS
network
traffic.
Log field -
[Inspection;
TLS
Decrypted=tr
ue]
TLS
protocol
messages
TLS
protocol
messages,
TLS ECDSA
Public Key,
Inspection
DH Public
Key,
Inspection
ECDH
Public Key,
Client
Protection
RSA Public
Key, Client
Protection
ECDSA
Public Key,
Client
Protection
IM CA RSA
Public Key,
Client
Protection
IM CA
ECDSA
Public Key,
Server
Protection
RSA Public
Key, Server
Protection
ECDSA
Public Key,
AES CBC
Encryption/Dec
ryption for TLS
AES-GCM
Encryption/Dec
ryption for TLS
CKG
DRBG
ECDSA Key
Generation
ECDSA Key
Verification
ECDSA
Signature
Generation
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
Entropy source
HMAC for TLS
KAS-ECC Full
Public Key
Validation
KAS-FFC Full
Public Key
Validation
RSA Key
Generation
RSA Signature
Generation
RSA Signature
Verification
(FIPS 186-4)
RSA Signature
Verification
User
- Client
Protection
CA RSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- Client
Protection
CA RSA
Public Key:
G,W,E
- Client
Protection
ECDSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- Client
Protection
ECDSA
Public Key:
G,R,W,E
- Client
Protection
IM CA
ECDSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- Client
Protection
IM CA
ECDSA
Public Key:
G,W,E
- Client
Protection
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Status
indicator
(FIPS 186-5)
Safe Prime Key
Generation
Safe Prime Key
Verification
TLS Key
Agreement
using KAS-ECC-
SSC
TLS Key
Agreement
using KAS-FFC-
SSC
IM CA RSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- Client
Protection
IM CA RSA
Public Key:
G,W,E
- Client
Protection
RSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- Client
Protection
RSA Public
Key:
G,R,W,E
- DRBG
'Key'
Value:
G,W,E
- DRBG 'V'
Value:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
-
Inspection
Authentica
tion Key:
G,W,E
-
Inspection
DH Private
Key: G,W,E
-
Inspection
DH Public
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Key:
G,R,W,E
-
Inspection
ECDH
Private
Key: G,W,E
-
Inspection
ECDH
Public Key:
G,R,W,E
-
Inspection
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
-
Inspection
Master
Secret:
G,W,E
-
Inspection
Pre-Master
Secret:
G,W,E
- Server
Protection
ECDSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- Server
Protection
ECDSA
Public Key:
G,W,E
- Server
Protection
RSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- Server
Protection
RSA Public
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Key:
G,R,W,E
- SSM
Client
Protection
ECDSA
Public Key:
G,R,W,E
- SSM
Client
Protection
RSA Public
Key:
G,R,W,E
- Trusted
Internet
Certificates
: G,W,E
User
Managem
ent
Service
SMC
enters the
user
password
hashes
using
LDAPS.
Log field -
[slapd: FIPS:
running in
FIPS
compliant
mode]
TLS
protocol
messages,
LDAP
protocol
messages,
User
Password
TLS
protocol
messages,
LDAP
protocol
messages,
TLS ECDSA
Public Key,
TLS ECDH
Public Key,
Status
indicator
AES-GCM
Encryption/Dec
ryption for TLS
CKG
DRBG
ECDSA Key
Generation
ECDSA Key
Verification
ECDSA
Signature
Generation
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
Entropy source
HMAC for TLS
KAS-ECC Full
Public Key
Validation
TLS Key
Agreement
using KAS-ECC-
SSC
Crypto-
Officer
- DRBG
'Key'
Value:
G,W,E
- DRBG 'V'
Value:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- HTTPS
ECDSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- HTTPS
ECDSA
Public Key:
G,W,E
- TLS
Authentica
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
tion Key:
G,W,E
- TLS ECDH
Private
Key: G,W,E
- TLS ECDH
Public Key:
G,W,E
- TLS
ECDSA
Private
Key: G,W,E
- TLS
ECDSA
Public Key:
G,W,E
- TLS
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
- TLS
Master
Secret:
G,W,E
- TLS Pre-
Master
Secret:
G,W,E
- User
Password:
E
Zeroize
keys
The
module
will
overwrite
all CSPs.
Zeroizatio
n of keys
can be
invoked by
performin
g a factory
reset
exercising
commands
Console
output:
System
zeroization
complete
following
reboot.
Factory
default
settings
restored.
Power
control
command
Keyboard
input
Status
indicator
None Crypto-
Officer
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
. The
zeroization
occurs
while the
module is
still in the
Approved
mode, and
the
module is
restored
to a
factory
state.
Table 13: Approved Services
4.4 Non-Approved Services
N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
Not Applicable, the module does not load any new firmware while in the compliant state.
4.6 Bypass Actions and Status
The module operates in an alternating bypass mode according to the policies set. The enabling and
disabling of the bypass capability is performed via ‘Modify and apply configuration’ service allocated
to the CO role. The module implements the following forms of alternating bypass:
VPN network traffic:
For policy-based VPN traffic, the module operates with bypass deactivated if the module action is set
to IPsec VPN, where the module is operating to provide VPN service for the specified
source/destination addresses. The module will encrypt/decrypt network traffic according to the
policy. The module operates with bypass activated if the module action is set to allow in Access rules
for network traffic, where the module is accepting/sending plaintext data for the specified
source/destination addresses. For route-based VPN traffic, the module operates with bypass
deactivated when network traffic is routed to module interfaces that are designated as endpoints for
a VPN tunnel and is sent into the VPN tunnel. If Access rules allow the traffic, traffic is automatically
sent through the tunnel to the endpoint. The module operates with bypass activated when network
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traffic is routed to module interfaces that accept plaintext data. Based on the Access rule
(allow/discard), the traffic is either forwarded to the endpoint or dropped. In both cases, to activate
the bypass feature, two independent actions must be taken by a CO. The CO must create the firewall
policy allowing the bypass feature and apply the policy to the module to enable it.
Firewall network traffic:
The default action for network traffic in firewall Access rules is discard. For firewall traffic, the module
operates with bypass deactivated if the traffic from the endpoint is sent/received using HTTPS, and
the module action is set to allow. If traffic from the endpoint is passed directly to the module using
HTTP, and the module action is set to allow, then the module is operating with bypass activated. For
incoming traffic, if the HTTPS option is selected, the module connections with the endpoint are
encrypted using TLS (bypass deactivated). If the HTTP option is selected, the module accepts
connections in plaintext (bypass activated). For Outgoing traffic, If HTTPS is selected, web traffic will
be re-encrypted using TLS (bypass deactivated). If HTTP is configured, web traffic is sent in plaintext
(bypass activated). Two independent actions must be taken by a CO. The CO must create the firewall
policy allowing bypass and apply to the module to enable it.
The rules in the policy that is currently applied to the module specify whether the module allows the
encrypted or plaintext traffic. The status information for the bypass activation and deactivation can
be viewed via established management connection from SMC as indicated below:
➢ Bypass – When bypass is activated, the Situation field in the Logs view shows “Connection
Allowed” and the TLS decrypted field in the Connections view is blank.
➢ IPSEC VPN/HTTPS – The Situation field in the Logs view indicates the respective operations
performed by these services. For example, “IPsec-SA-Responder-Done”.
➢ TLS Inspection – For this service the Situation field in the Logs view shows
“Connection_Allowed” and the TLS decrypted field in Connections view is "true".
4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status
The Export Logs and Monitoring Data Service and the Peer Connection Service are self-initiated
cryptographic output capabilities supported by the module. In both cases, these services are
triggered by the module itself without a specific request to perform the service.
➢ The Export Logs and Monitoring Data Service is enabled on the first policy push from the
SMC where the Log Server address is specified. This is configured through two
independent steps: adding the Log Server and activating the policy.
➢ The Peer Connection Service is enabled when the module is joined to a cluster. While the
module is in a cluster, this communication happens, and it stops when module is removed
from the cluster. This is also configured through two independent steps:
o Installing the new engine (module) and performing the initial configuration after
adding the engine to the Firewall Cluster element’s properties and defining the
node-specific IP addresses of the new node.
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o Refreshing the security policy of the Firewall Cluster.
The Crypto officer can make usage of the module’s Show status service to determine if the self-
initiated cryptographic output capability is active by observing the ‘Status’ tab on the SMC Web GUI:
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances firmware integrity is checked on
startup as described in Section “10 Self-Tests”. The module runs the self-test functions to check the
firmware integrity as well as the cryptographic algorithms used. Any failures during these tests will
result in a module halt in which an error message is output, the module reboots and data output is
inhibited.
The images are stored as signed binary (6.10.13.26655.fips.2.bin) using the “Firmware Integrity Check
Public Key” which uses ECDSA SigVer (A4793) with P-521 and SHA2-512.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The operator can trigger an on-demand check of the module firmware by rebooting the module.
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: The module supports a Limited as defined in ISO/IEC 19790:2012,
as the module is not designed to accept firmware changes in the Approved mode of operation.
7 Physical Security
Mechanism Inspection
Frequency
Inspection
Guidance
N/A N/A N/A
Table 14: Mechanisms and Actions Required
The module’s embodiment type is Multi-chip Standalone.
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8 Non-Invasive Security
N/A: Section “8 Non-Invasive Security” is Not-Applicable as there are currently no requirements in SP
800-140F.
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
The table below lists sensitive security parameters (SSPs) storage areas for this module. Section “9.4
SSPs” below selects from the storage areas listed and specifies the appropriate parameter in the
“Storage” column if applicable to a specific SSP.
Storage Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
Disk - Encrypted Files on the file system, stored on a solid state disk Static
Disk - Plaintext Files on the file system, stored on a solid state disk Static
SDRAM Memory area reserved for the process Dynamic
Table 15: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
The table below lists SSP input and output methods for this module. Section “9.4 SSPs” below selects
from the input and output methods listed and specifies the appropriate parameter in the
“Inputs/Outputs” column if applicable to a specific SSP.
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES CBC
+ HMAC)
Outside
Cryptographic
Boundary
SDRAM Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS for
TLS/IPsec
Connections
(AES-GCM)
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES
GCM)
Outside
Cryptographic
Boundary
SDRAM Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS for
TLS/IPsec
Connections
(AES-GCM)
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES-
KWP)
Outside
Cryptographic
Boundary
SDRAM Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS for VPN
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Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Encrypted
Output
via
Ethernet
(AES CBC
+ HMAC)
SDRAM Outside
Cryptographic
Boundary
Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS for
TLS/IPsec
Connections
(AES-GCM)
Encrypted
Output
via
Ethernet
(AES
GCM)
SDRAM Outside
Cryptographic
Boundary
Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS for
TLS/IPsec
Connections
(AES-GCM)
Encrypted
Output
via
Ethernet
(AES-
KWP)
SDRAM Outside
Cryptographic
Boundary
Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS for VPN
Input
Hashed
and
Salted
Outside
Cryptographic
Boundary
Disk Encrypted Automated Electronic Authentication
for HTTPS and
Mobile VPN
Plaintext
Input via
Ethernet
Outside
Cryptographic
Boundary
Disk Plaintext Automated Electronic
Plaintext
Output
via
Ethernet
Disk Outside
Cryptographic
Boundary
Plaintext Automated Electronic
Table 16: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
The table below lists SSP zeroization methods for this module. Section “9.4 SSPs” below selects from
the zeroization methods listed and specifies the appropriate parameter in the “Zeroization” column if
applicable to a specific SSP.
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Factory
Reset
All SSPs stored in memory are
zeroized by overwriting them
with ‘0’ during shutdown. All
SSPs stored on disk are
zeroized by overwriting them
After
overwriting the
original SSP
data is no
longer available
1. Reboot the appliance and select
System restore options from the
boot menu. NGFW System
Restore starts. 2. Enter 2 for
Advanced data removal options.
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Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
an operator-specified number
of times during factory reset
3. Enter one of the following
options: - 1 for 1 pass overwrite -
8 for a Custom number of
overwrite passes
Power-
Cycling
All SSPs stored in memory are
zeroized by overwriting them
with ‘0’ during shutdown
After
overwriting the
original SSP
data is no
longer available
Operator presses the power
button to shut down and restart
the appliance
Table 17: SSP Zeroization Methods
9.4 SSPs
The following table lists Sensitive Security Parameters (SSP) used to perform approved security
functions supported by the cryptographic module.
The following notes should be observed when reading the table:
➢ When reading the ‘strength’ column, the listed security strength is calculated using methods
in FIPS 140-3 IG D.B, ‘Strength of SSP Establishment Methods’.
➢ When reading the ‘Security Function and Cert Number’ column, this is the security function
that will consume the SSP.
➢ When reading the ‘Use and Related Keys’ column, this will contain the other SSPs that are
either established via the SSP, other SSPs that are used to establish the SSP, or if it is a key pair
the associated public or private component will be listed as well.
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
Client
Protection
CA RSA
Private Key
Private
signature key
used in TLS
inspection
CA.
2048-
4096
bits -
112-150
bits
Private Key
- CSP
CKG
RSA Key
Generati
on
RSA Signature
Generation
Client
Protection
CA RSA
Public Key
Public
signature key
used in TLS
inspection
CA.
2048-
4096
bits -
112-150
bits
Public Key -
PSP
CKG
RSA Key
Generati
on
RSA Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-4)
RSA Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-5)
Client
Protection
ECDSA
Private Key
Private
authenticatio
n key used in
TLS
inspection.
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Private Key
- CSP
CKG
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
ECDSA Signature
Generation
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
Client
Protection
ECDSA Public
Key
Public
authenticatio
n key used in
TLS
inspection.
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Public Key -
PSP
CKG
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
ECDSA Signature
Verification
Client
Protection
IM CA ECDSA
Private Key
Private
authenticatio
n key used in
TLS
inspection.
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Private Key
- CSP
CKG
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
ECDSA Signature
Generation
Client
Protection
IM CA ECDSA
Public Key
Public
authenticatio
n key used in
TLS
inspection.
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Public Key -
PSP
CKG
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
ECDSA Signature
Verification
Client
Protection
IM CA RSA
Private Key
Private
authenticatio
n key used in
TLS
inspection.
2048-
4096
bits -
112-150
bits
Private Key
- CSP
CKG
RSA Key
Generati
on
ECDSA Signature
Generation
Client
Protection
IM CA RSA
Public Key
Public
authenticatio
n key used in
TLS
inspection.
2048-
4096
bits -
112-150
bits
Public Key -
PSP
CKG
RSA Key
Generati
on
RSA Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-4)
RSA Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-5)
Client
Protection
RSA Private
Key
Private
authenticatio
n key used in
TLS
inspection.
2048-
4096
bits -
112-150
bits
Private Key
- CSP
CKG
RSA Key
Generati
on
RSA Signature
Generation
Client
Protection
RSA Public
Key
Public
authenticatio
n key used in
TLS
inspection.
2048-
4096
bits -
112-150
bits
Public Key -
PSP
CKG
RSA Key
Generati
on
RSA Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-4)
RSA Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-5)
Cluster
Protocol Key
Used for
authenticatio
n within the
cluster
protocol.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Authenticati
on key - CSP
HMAC for Peer
State
Synchronization
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
Configuratio
n File
Authenticati
on Key
Used to
authenticate
configuration
files on disk.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Authenticati
on Key - CSP
KBKDF HMAC for
Configuration File
Authentication
Configuratio
n File
Encryption
Key
Used to
encrypt
configuration
files on disk.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KBKDF AES
Encryption/Decryp
tion for
Configuration File
Protection
Configuratio
n File
Protection
Key
Used to
derive the
configuration
file
encryption
and
authenticatio
n keys.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
CKG KBKDF
Configuratio
n File
Protection
Passphrase
Used to
derive the
key pair
obfuscation
and integrity
protection
keys.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
CKG PBKDF
DRBG 'Key'
Value
DRBG State
Value
256 bits
- 256
bits
DRBG State
- CSP
DRBG Entropy source
DRBG 'V'
Value
DRBG State
Value
128 bits
- 128
bits
DRBG State
- CSP
DRBG Entropy source
DRBG
Entropy
Input
Entropy
input for
DRBG
512 bits
- 512
bits
Entropy
Input - CSP
Entropy
source
DRBG
DRBG Seed Seeding
material for
the DRBG
512 bits
- 512
bits
DRBG Seed
- CSP
Entropy
source
DRBG
Firmware
Integrity
Check Public
Key
Used for
firmware
integrity
check.
P-521
curve -
256
Integrity
Public Key -
Neither
Firmware
integrity
Firmware integrity
HTTPS
Authenticati
on Key
Authenticati
on key used
in TLS.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Authenticati
on Key - CSP
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
HMAC for TLS
Page 59 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
KAS-ECC-
SSC
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-FFC-
SSC
HTTPS DH
Private Key
Private
ephemeral
key
agreement
key used in
TLS.
2048-
8192
bits -
112-202
bits
Private Key
- CSP
Safe
Prime
Key
Generati
on
TLS Key
Agreement using
KAS-FFC-SSC
HTTPS DH
Public Key
Public
ephemeral
key
agreement
key used in
TLS.
2048-
8192
bits -
112-202
bits
Public Key -
PSP
Safe
Prime
Key
Generati
on
TLS Key
Agreement using
KAS-FFC-SSC
HTTPS ECDH
Private Key
Private
ephemeral
key
agreement
key used in
TLS.
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Private Key
- CSP
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
TLS Key
Agreement using
KAS-ECC-SSC
HTTPS ECDH
Public Key
Public
ephemeral
key
agreement
key used in
TLS.
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Public Key -
PSP
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
TLS Key
Agreement using
KAS-ECC-SSC
HTTPS
ECDSA
Private Key
Private key
used to
authenticate
the server
during HTTPS
connections
via digital
signatures.
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Private Key
- CSP
CKG
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
ECDSA Signature
Generation
HTTPS
ECDSA Public
Key
Public key
used to
authenticate
the server
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Public Key -
CSP
CKG
ECDSA
Key
ECDSA Signature
Generation
Page 60 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
during HTTPS
connections
via digital
signatures.
Generati
on
HTTPS
Encryption
Key
Data
encryption
key used in
TLS.
128, 256
bits -
128, 256
bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-ECC-
SSC
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-FFC-
SSC
AES CBC
Encryption/Decryp
tion for TLS
AES-GCM
Encryption/Decryp
tion for TLS
HTTPS
Master
Secret
Value
calculated
during TLS
handshake.
384 bits
- 384
bits
Master
Secret - CSP
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-ECC-
SSC
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-FFC-
SSC
HMAC for TLS
HTTPS Pre-
Master
Secret
Shared
secret
generated or
established
for a TLS
session.
KAS-ECC
(224-
521 bits)
/ KAS-
FFC (
2048-
8192
bits) -
112-256
bits /
112-202
bits
Shared
Secret - CSP
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-ECC-
SSC
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-FFC-
SSC
TLS Key
Agreement using
KAS-ECC-SSC
TLS Key
Agreement using
KAS-FFC-SSC
HTTPS RSA
Private Key
Private
authenticatio
n key used in
HTTPS user
authenticatio
n.
2048-
4096
bits -
112-150
bits
Private Key
- CSP
CKG
RSA Key
Generati
on
RSA Signature
Generation
Page 61 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
HTTPS RSA
Public Key
Public
authenticatio
n key used in
HTTPS user
authenticatio
n.
2048-
4096
bits -
112-150
bits
Public Key -
PSP
CKG
RSA Key
Generati
on
RSA Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-4)
RSA Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-5)
IKE
Authenticati
on Key
Authenticati
on key used
in IKE
negotiations.
128-256
bits -
112-256
bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
IPSec Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-ECC-
SSC
IPSec Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-FFC-
SSC
HMAC for
IPsec/VPN
KTS for VPN
IKE
Encryption
Key
Data
encryption
key used in
IKE
negotiations.
128, 256
bits -
128, 256
bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
IPSec Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-ECC-
SSC
IPSec Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-FFC-
SSC
AES CBC
Encryption/Decryp
tion for IPsec/VPN
AES-GCM
Encryption/Decryp
tion for IPsec/VPN
KTS for VPN
Inspection
Authenticati
on Key
Authenticati
on key used
in TLS
inspection.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Authenticati
on Key - CSP
HMAC
for TLS
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-ECC-
SSC
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-FFC-
SSC
HMAC for TLS
Inspection
DH Private
Key
Private
ephemeral
key
agreement
key used in
2048-
8192
bits -
112-202
bits
Private Key
- CSP
Safe
Prime
Key
Generati
on
TLS Key
Agreement using
KAS-FFC-SSC
Page 62 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
TLS
inspection.
Inspection
DH Public
Key
Public
ephemeral
key
agreement
key used in
TLS
inspection.
2048-
8192
bits -
112-202
bits
Public Key -
PSP
Safe
Prime
Key
Generati
on
TLS Key
Agreement using
KAS-FFC-SSC
Inspection
ECDH Private
Key
Private
ephemeral
key
agreement
key used in
TLS
inspection.
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Private Key
- CSP
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
TLS Key
Agreement using
KAS-ECC-SSC
Inspection
ECDH Public
Key
Public
ephemeral
key
agreement
key used in
TLS
inspection.
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Public Key -
PSP
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
TLS Key
Agreement using
KAS-ECC-SSC
Inspection
Encryption
Key
Data
encryption
key used in
TLS
inspection.
128, 256
bits -
128, 256
bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-ECC-
SSC
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-FFC-
SSC
AES CBC
Encryption/Decryp
tion for TLS
AES-GCM
Encryption/Decryp
tion for TLS
Inspection
Master
Secret
Value
calculated
during TLS
inspection.
384 bits
- 384
bits
Master
Secret - CSP
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-ECC-
SSC
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-FFC-
SSC
HMAC for TLS
Page 63 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
Inspection
Pre-Master
Secret
Shared
secret
generated or
established
for TLS
inspection.
KAS-ECC
(224-
521 bits)
/ KAS-
FFC (
2048-
8192
bits) -
112-256
bits /
112-202
bits
Pre-Master
Secret - CSP
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-ECC-
SSC
TLS Key
Agreement using
KAS-ECC-SSC
TLS Key
Agreement using
KAS-FFC-SSC
IPsec
Authenticati
on Key
Authenticati
on key used
in IPsec
negotiations.
128-256
bits -
128-256
bits
Authenticati
on Key - CSP
IPSec Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-ECC-
SSC
IPSec Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-FFC-
SSC
HMAC for
IPsec/VPN
KTS for VPN
IPsec
Encryption
Key
Data
encryption
key used in
IPsec
negotiations.
128, 256
bits -
128, 256
bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
IPSec Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-ECC-
SSC
IPSec Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-FFC-
SSC
AES CBC
Encryption/Decryp
tion for IPsec/VPN
AES-GCM
Encryption/Decryp
tion for IPsec/VPN
KTS for VPN
Key
Encryption
Key
Used to
encrypt/decr
ypt private
keys stored
on disk.
128 bits
- 128
bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
PBKDF AES
Encryption/Decryp
tion for Key Pair
Management
Key
Encryption
Passphrase
Derive the
key
encryption
key used to
protect
private keys
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
PBKDF
Page 64 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
stored on
disk.
Server
Protection
ECDSA
Private Key
Private
authenticatio
n key used in
TLS
inspection.
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Private Key
- CSP
CKG
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
ECDSA Signature
Generation
Server
Protection
ECDSA Public
Key
Public
authenticatio
n key used in
TLS
inspection.
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Public Key -
PSP
CKG
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
ECDSA Signature
Verification
Server
Protection
RSA Private
Key
Private
authenticatio
n key used in
TLS
inspection.
2048-
4096
bits -
112-150
bits
Private Key
- CSP
CKG
RSA Key
Generati
on
RSA Signature
Generation
Server
Protection
RSA Public
Key
Public
authenticatio
n key used in
TLS
inspection.
2048-
4096
bits -
112-150
bits
Public Key -
PSP
CKG
RSA Key
Generati
on
RSA Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-4)
RSA Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-5)
SKEYID,
SKEYID_d
Values
calculated
during IKE v1
negotiation.
112-256
bits -
112-256
bits
Symmetric
Key
Material -
CSP
IPSec Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-ECC-
SSC
IPSec Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-FFC-
SSC
HMAC for Peer
Heartbeat
HMAC for Peer
State
Synchronization
SKEYSEED,
SK_d, SK_pi,
SK_pr
Values
calculated
during IKEv2
negotiation.
112-256
bits -
112-256
bits
Symmetric
Key
Material -
CSP
IPSec Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-ECC-
SSC
IPSec Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-FFC-
SSC
HMAC for Peer
Heartbeat
HMAC for Peer
State
Synchronization
Page 65 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
SNMP
Authenticati
on Key
Authenticati
on key used
in SNMPv3.
160 bits
- 160
bits
Authenticati
on Key - CSP
HMAC for SNMP
SNMP
Encryption
Key
Data
encryption
key used in
SNMPv3.
128, 256
bits -
128, 256
bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
AES-CBC
Encryption/Decryp
tion for SNMP
SSM Client
Protection
ECDSA
Private Key
Used to
identify the
module in
the SSM
Proxy
Service.
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Private key -
CSP
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
ECDSA Signature
Generation
SSM Client
Protection
ECDSA Public
Key
Used to
identify the
module in
the SSM
Proxy
Service.
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Public Key -
PSP
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
ECDSA Signature
Verification
SSM Client
Protection
RSA Private
Key
Used to
identify the
module in
the SSM
Proxy
Service.
2048-
4096
bits -
112-150
bits
Private key -
CSP
RSA Key
Generati
on
RSA Signature
Generation
SSM Client
Protection
RSA Public
Key
Used to
identify the
module in
the SSM
Proxy
Service.
2048-
4096
bits -
112-150
bits
Public Key -
PSP
RSA Key
Generati
on
RSA Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-4)
RSA Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-5)
SSM HTTPS
Authenticati
on Key
Authenticati
on key used
in HTTPS
inspection.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Authenticati
on Key - CSP
HMAC
for TLS
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-ECC-
SSC
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-FFC-
SSC
HMAC for TLS
Page 66 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
SSM HTTPS
DH Private
Key
Private
ephemeral
key
agreement
key used in
HTTPS
inspection.
2048-
8192
bits -
112-202
bits
Private key -
CSP
Safe
Prime
Key
Generati
on
TLS Key
Agreement using
KAS-FFC-SSC
SSM HTTPS
DH Public
Key
Public
ephemeral
key
agreement
key used in
HTTPS
inspection.
2048-
8192
bits -
112-202
bits
Public Key -
PSP
Safe
Prime
Key
Generati
on
TLS Key
Agreement using
KAS-FFC-SSC
SSM HTTPS
ECDH Private
Key
Private
ephemeral
key
agreement
key used in
HTTPS
inspection.
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Private Key
- CSP
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
TLS Key
Agreement using
KAS-ECC-SSC
SSM HTTPS
ECDH Public
Key
Public
ephemeral
key
agreement
key used in
HTTPS
inspection.
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Public Key -
PSP
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
TLS Key
Agreement using
KAS-ECC-SSC
SSM HTTPS
Encryption
Key
Data
encryption
key used in
HTTPS
inspection.
128, 256
bits -
128, 256
bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-ECC-
SSC
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-FFC-
SSC
AES CBC
Encryption/Decryp
tion for TLS
AES-GCM
Encryption/Decryp
tion for TLS
SSM HTTPS
Master
Secret
Value
calculated
during HTTPS
inspection.
384 bits
- 384
bits
Master
Secret - CSP
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-ECC-
SSC
HMAC for TLS
Page 67 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-FFC-
SSC
SSM HTTPS
Pre-Master
Secret
Shared
secret
generated or
established
for HTTPS
inspection.
KAS-ECC
(224-
521 bits)
/ KAS-
FFC (
2048-
8192
bits) -
112-256
bits /
112-202
bits
Pre-Master
Secret - CSP
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-ECC-
SSC
TLS Key
Agreement using
KAS-ECC-SSC
TLS Key
Agreement using
KAS-FFC-SSC
State
Synchronizat
ion Key
Used for
encryption
and
authenticatio
n in the state
synchronizati
on protocol.
128 bits
- 128
bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
CKG AES-CBC
Encryption/Decryp
tion for State
Synchronization
HMAC for Peer
State
Synchronization
TLS
Authenticati
on Key
Authenticati
on key used
in TLS.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Authenticati
on Key - CSP
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-ECC-
SSC
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-FFC-
SSC
HMAC for TLS
TLS ECDH
Private Key
Private
ephemeral
key
agreement
key used in
TLS.
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Private Key
- CSP
CKG
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
TLS Key
Agreement using
KAS-ECC-SSC
TLS ECDH
Public Key
Public
ephemeral
key
224-521
bits -
Public Key -
PSP
CKG
ECDSA
Key
TLS Key
Agreement using
KAS-ECC-SSC
Page 68 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
agreement
key used in
TLS.
112-256
bits
Generati
on
TLS ECDSA
Private Key
Private key
used in TLS
signature.
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Private Key
- CSP
CKG
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
ECDSA Signature
Generation
TLS ECDSA
Public Key
Public key
used in TLS
signature.
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Public Key -
PSP
CKG
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
ECDSA Signature
Verification
TLS
Encryption
Key
Data
encryption
key used in
TLS
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-ECC-
SSC
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-FFC-
SSC
AES CBC
Encryption/Decryp
tion for TLS
AES-GCM
Encryption/Decryp
tion for TLS
TLS Master
Secret
Value
calculated
during TLS
handshake.
112-256
bits -
112-256
bits
Master
Secret - CSP
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-ECC-
SSC
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-FFC-
SSC
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627 (A4793)
TLS Pre-
Master
Secret
Shared
secret
generated or
established
for a TLS
session.
112-256
bits -
112-256
bits
Pre-Master
Secret - CSP
TLS Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-ECC-
SSC
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627 (A4793)
TLS Trusted
Certificates
Trusted
certificates
for use in TLS
112-256
bits -
112-256
bits
Certificates
- PSP
ECDSA Signature
Verification
RSA Signature
Verification (FIPS
Page 69 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
186-4)
RSA Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-5)
Trusted
Internet
Certificates
Trusted
certificates
for
authenticatin
g internet
servers
112-256
bits -
112-256
bits
Certificates
- PSP
ECDSA Signature
Verification
RSA Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-4)
RSA Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-5)
User
Password
Identify users
in HTTPS
authenticatio
n and Mobile
VPN.
10
characte
rs - N/A
Password -
CSP
Authentication for
HTTPS and Mobile
VPN
VPN DH
Private Key
Private
ephemeral
key
agreement
key used in
IKE.
2048-
8192
bits -
112-202
bits
Private Key
- CSP
Safe
Prime
Key
Generati
on
IPSec Key
Agreement using
KAS-FFC-SSC
VPN DH
Public Key
Public
ephemeral
key
agreement
key used in
IKE.
2048-
8192
bits -
112-202
bits
Public Key -
PSP
Safe
Prime
Key
Generati
on
IPSec Key
Agreement using
KAS-FFC-SSC
VPN DH
Shared
Secret
Diffie-
Hellman
shared secret
in IKE
112-202
bits -
112-202
bits
Shared
Secret - CSP
IPSec Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-FFC-
SSC
Safe
Prime
Key
Generati
on
Safe
Prime
Key
Page 70 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
Verificati
on
VPN ECDH
Private Key
Private
ephemeral
key
agreement
key used in
IKE.
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Private Key
- CSP
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
IPSec Key
Agreement using
KAS-ECC-SSC
VPN ECDH
Public Key
Public
ephemeral
key
agreement
key used in
IKE.
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Public Key -
PSP
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
IPSec Key
Agreement using
KAS-ECC-SSC
VPN ECDH
Shared
Secret
Elliptical
curve Diffie-
Hellman
shared secret
in IKE
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Shared
Secret - CSP
IPSec Key
Agreeme
nt using
KAS-ECC-
SSC
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
VPN ECDSA
Private Key
Private
authenticatio
n key used in
IKE.
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Private Key
- CSP
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
ECDSA Signature
Generation
VPN ECDSA
Public Key
Public
authenticatio
n key used in
IKE.
224-521
bits -
112-256
bits
Authenticati
on Key - PSP
ECDSA
Key
Generati
on
ECDSA Signature
Verification
VPN Key
Wrapping
Key
IKE and IPsec
key and key
wrapping
material
256 bits
- 256
bits
Wrapping
Key - CSP
KBKDF KTS for VPN
VPN Pre-
Shared Key
Shared
secret used
in IKE.
112-256
bits -
112-256
bits
Shared
Secret - CSP
KDF IKEv1 (A4793)
KDF IKEv2 (A4793)
VPN RSA
Private Key
Private
authenticatio
n key used in
IKE.
2048-
4096
bits -
Private Key
- CSP
RSA Key
Generati
on
KTS for TLS/IPsec
Connections (AES-
GCM)
RSA Signature
Page 71 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
112-150
bits
Generation
KTS for TLS/IPsec
Connections (AES-
CBC + HMAC)
VPN RSA
Public Key
Public
authenticatio
n key used in
IKE.
2048-
4096
bits -
112-150
bits
Public Key -
PSP
RSA Key
Generati
on
RSA Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-4)
RSA Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-5)
VPN Trusted
Certificates
Trusted
certificates
for use in
VPNs
112-256
bits -
112-256
bits
Certificates
- PSP
ECDSA Signature
Verification
RSA Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-4)
RSA Signature
Verification (FIPS
186-5)
Table 18: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Client
Protection CA
RSA Private Key
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES GCM)
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES CBC +
HMAC)
Disk -
Encrypted:Encrypted
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Client Protection
CA RSA Public
Key:Paired With
Client
Protection CA
RSA Public Key
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES GCM)
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES CBC +
HMAC)
Disk -
Encrypted:Encrypted
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Client Protection
CA RSA Private
Key:Paired With
Client
Protection
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Client Protection
ECDSA Public
Key:Paired With
Page 72 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
ECDSA Private
Key
Power-
Cycling
Client
Protection
ECDSA Public
Key
Plaintext
Output via
Ethernet
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Client Protection
ECDSA Private
Key:Paired With
Client
Protection IM
CA ECDSA
Private Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Client Protection
IM CA ECDSA
Public Key:Paired
With
Client
Protection IM
CA ECDSA Public
Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Client Protection
IM CA ECDSA
Private Key:Paired
With
Client
Protection IM
CA RSA Private
Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Client Protection
IM CA RSA Public
Key:Paired With
Client
Protection IM
CA RSA Public
Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Client Protection
IM CA RSA Private
Key:Paired With
Client
Protection RSA
Private Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Client Protection
RSA Public
Key:Paired With
Client
Protection RSA
Public Key
Plaintext
Output via
Ethernet
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Client Protection
RSA Private
Key:Paired With
Cluster Protocol
Key
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES GCM)
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES CBC +
HMAC)
Disk -
Encrypted:Encrypted
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Configuration
File
Authentication
Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Configuration File
Protection
Key:Derived From
Page 73 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Configuration
File Encryption
Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Configuration File
Protection
Key:Derived From
Configuration
File Protection
Key
Disk -
Plaintext:Plaintext
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Configuration File
Encryption
Key:Derived From
Configuration File
Authentication
Key:Derived From
Configuration
File Protection
Passphrase
Disk -
Plaintext:Plaintext
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
DRBG 'Key'
Value
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
DRBG 'V'
Value:Paired With
DRBG Seed:Paired
With
DRBG Entropy
Input:Paired With
DRBG 'V' Value SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
DRBG Entropy
Input:Paired With
DRBG Seed:Paired
With
DRBG Entropy
Input
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
DRBG 'Key'
Value:Paired With
DRBG 'V'
Value:Paired With
DRBG Seed SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
DRBG Entropy
Input:Paired With
DRBG 'Key'
Value:Paired With
DRBG 'V'
Value:Paired With
Firmware
Integrity Check
Public Key
Disk -
Plaintext:Plaintext
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
HTTPS
Authentication
Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
HTTPS Master
Secret:Derived
From
HTTPS DH
Private Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
HTTPS Pre-Master
Secret:Derived
Page 74 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Power-
Cycling
From
HTTPS DH Public
Key:Paired With
HTTPS DH Public
Key
Plaintext
Input via
Ethernet
Plaintext
Output via
Ethernet
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
HTTPS DH Private
Key:Paired With
HTTPS Pre-master
Secret:Derived
From
HTTPS ECDH
Private Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
HTTPS Pre-Master
Secret:Derived
From
HTTPS ECDH Public
Key:Paired With
HTTPS ECDH
Public Key
Plaintext
Input via
Ethernet
Plaintext
Output via
Ethernet
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
HTTPS ECDH
Private Key:Paired
With
HTTPS Pre-master
Secret:Derived
From
HTTPS ECDSA
Private Key
Disk -
Encrypted:Encrypted
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
HTTPS ECDSA
Public Key:Paired
With
HTTPS ECDSA
Public Key
Plaintext
Output via
Ethernet
Disk -
Encrypted:Encrypted
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
HTTPS ECDSA
Private Key:Paired
With
HTTPS
Encryption Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
HTTPS Master
Secret:Derived
From
HTTPS Master
Secret
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
HTTPS Pre-Master
Secret:Derived
From
HTTPS Encryption
Key:Derived From
HTTPS
Authentication
Key:Derived From
HTTPS Pre-
Master Secret
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
HTTPS DH Private
Key:Derived From
HTTPS ECDH
Private
Page 75 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Key:Derived From
HTTPS ECDH Public
Key:Used With
HTTPS Master
Secret:Used With
HTTPS RSA
Private Key
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES GCM)
Encrypted
Output via
Ethernet
(AES GCM)
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES CBC +
HMAC)
Encrypted
Output via
Ethernet
(AES CBC +
HMAC)
Disk -
Encrypted:Encrypted
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
HTTPS RSA Public
Key:Paired With
HTTPS RSA
Public Key
Plaintext
Input via
Ethernet
Plaintext
Output via
Ethernet
Disk -
Plaintext:Plaintext
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
HTTPS RSA Private
Key:Paired With
IKE
Authentication
Key
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES-KWP)
Encrypted
Output via
Ethernet
(AES-KWP)
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
SKEYID,
SKEYID_d:Derived
From
SKEYSEED, SK_d,
SK_pi,
SK_pr:Derived
From
IKE Encryption
Key
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES-KWP)
Encrypted
Output via
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
SKEYID,
SKEYID_d:Derived
From
SKEYSEED, SK_d,
SK_pi,
SK_pr:Derived
From
Page 76 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Ethernet
(AES-KWP)
Inspection
Authentication
Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Inspection Master
Secret:Derived
From
Inspection DH
Private Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Inspection DH
Public Key:Paired
With
Inspection Pre-
Master
Secret:Derived
From
Inspection DH
Public Key
Plaintext
Input via
Ethernet
Plaintext
Output via
Ethernet
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Inspection DH
Private Key:Paired
With
Inspection Pre-
Master
Secret:Derived
From
Inspection ECDH
Private Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Inspection ECDH
Public Key:Paired
With
Inspection Pre-
Master
Secret:Derived
From
Inspection ECDH
Public Key
Plaintext
Input via
Ethernet
Plaintext
Output via
Ethernet
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Inspection ECDH
Private Key:Paired
With
Inspection Pre-
Master
Secret:Derived
From
Inspection
Encryption Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Inspection Master
Secret:Derived
From
Inspection
Master Secret
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Inspection Pre-
Master
Secret:Derived
From
Inspection
Encryption
Page 77 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Key:Derived From
Inspection
Authentication
Key:Derived From
Inspection Pre-
Master Secret
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Inspection ECDH
Private
Key:Derived From
Inspection ECDH
Public Key:Derived
From
Inspection DH
Private
Key:Derived From
Inspection DH
Public Key:Derived
From
Inspection Master
Secret:Derived
From
IPsec
Authentication
Key
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES-KWP)
Encrypted
Output via
Ethernet
(AES-KWP)
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
SKEYID,
SKEYID_d:Derived
From
SKEYSEED, SK_d,
SK_pi,
SK_pr:Derived
From
IPsec Encryption
Key
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES-KWP)
Encrypted
Output via
Ethernet
(AES-KWP)
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
SKEYID,
SKEYID_d:Derived
From
SKEYSEED, SK_d,
SK_pi,
SK_pr:Derived
From
Key Encryption
Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Key Encryption
Passphrase:Paired
With
Key Encryption
Passphrase
Plaintext
Input via
Ethernet
Plaintext
Disk -
Plaintext:Plaintext
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Key Encryption
Key:Paired With
Page 78 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Output via
Ethernet
Server
Protection
ECDSA Private
Key
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES GCM)
Encrypted
Output via
Ethernet
(AES GCM)
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES CBC +
HMAC)
Encrypted
Output via
Ethernet
(AES CBC +
HMAC)
Disk -
Encrypted:Encrypted
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Server Protection
ECDSA Public
Key:Paired With
Server
Protection
ECDSA Public
Key
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES GCM)
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES CBC +
HMAC)
Disk -
Encrypted:Encrypted
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Server Protection
ECDSA Private
Key:Paired With
Server
Protection RSA
Private Key
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES GCM)
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES CBC +
HMAC)
Disk -
Encrypted:Encrypted
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Server Protection
RSA Public
Key:Paired With
Server
Protection RSA
Public Key
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES GCM)
Encrypted
Input via
Disk -
Encrypted:Encrypted
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Server Protection
RSA Private
Key:Paired With
Page 79 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Ethernet
(AES CBC +
HMAC)
SKEYID,
SKEYID_d
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES-KWP)
Encrypted
Output via
Ethernet
(AES-KWP)
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
VPN DH Shared
Secret:Derived
From
VPN ECDH Shared
Secret:Derived
From
VPN Pre-Shared
Key:Derived From
IKE Encryption
Key:Used With
IKE Authentication
Key:Used With
IPsec Encryption
Key:Used With
TLS Authentication
Key:Used With
SKEYSEED, SK_d,
SK_pi, SK_pr
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES-KWP)
Encrypted
Output via
Ethernet
(AES-KWP)
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
VPN DH Shared
Secret:Derived
From
VPN ECDH Shared
Secret:Derived
From
VPN Pre-Shared
Key:Derived From
IKE Encryption
Key:Used With
IKE Authentication
Key:Used With
IPsec Encryption
Key:Used With
IPsec
Authentication
Key:Used With
SNMP
Authentication
Key
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES GCM)
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
Disk -
Plaintext:Plaintext
Disk -
Encrypted:Encrypted
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Page 80 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
(AES CBC +
HMAC)
SNMP
Encryption Key
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES GCM)
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES CBC +
HMAC)
Disk -
Plaintext:Plaintext
Disk -
Encrypted:Encrypted
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
SSM Client
Protection
ECDSA Private
Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
SSM Client
Protection ECDSA
Public Key:Paired
With
SSM Client
Protection
ECDSA Public
Key
Plaintext
Output via
Ethernet
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
SSM Client
Protection ECDSA
Private Key:Paired
With
SSM Client
Protection RSA
Private Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
SSM Client
Protection RSA
Public Key:Paired
With
SSM Client
Protection RSA
Public Key
Plaintext
Output via
Ethernet
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
SSM Client
Protection RSA
Private Key:Paired
With
SSM HTTPS
Authentication
Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
SSM HTTPS Master
Secret:Derived
From
SSM HTTPS DH
Private Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
SSM HTTPS DH
Public Key:Paired
With
SSM HTTPS Pre-
Master
Secret:Derived
From
SSM HTTPS DH
Public Key
Plaintext
Input via
Ethernet
Plaintext
Output via
Ethernet
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
SSM HTTPS DH
Private Key:Paired
With
SSM HTTPS Pre-
Master
Page 81 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Secret:Derived
From
SSM HTTPS
ECDH Private
Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
SSM HTTPS ECDH
Public Key:Paired
With
SSM HTTPS Pre-
Master
Secret:Derived
From
SSM HTTPS
ECDH Public Key
Plaintext
Input via
Ethernet
Plaintext
Output via
Ethernet
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
SSM HTTPS ECDH
Private Key:Paired
With
SSM HTTPS Pre-
Master
Secret:Derived
From
SSM HTTPS
Encryption Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
SSM HTTPS Master
Secret:Derived
From
SSM HTTPS
Master Secret
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
SSM HTTPS Pre-
Master
Secret:Derived
From
SSM HTTPS
Encryption
Key:Derived From
SSM HTTPS
Authentication
Key:Derived From
SSM HTTPS Pre-
Master Secret
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
SSM HTTPS DH
Private
Key:Derived From
SSM HTTPS DH
Public Key:Derived
From
SSM HTTPS ECDH
Private
Key:Derived From
SSM HTTPS ECDH
Public Key:Derived
From
SSM HTTPS Master
Page 82 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Secret:Derived
From
State
Synchronization
Key
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES-KWP)
Encrypted
Output via
Ethernet
(AES-KWP)
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
TLS
Authentication
Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
TLS Master
Secret:Derived
From
TLS ECDH
Private Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
TLS Pre-Master
Secret:Derived
From
TLS ECDH Public
Key:Paired With
TLS ECDH Public
Key
Plaintext
Input via
Ethernet
Plaintext
Output via
Ethernet
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
TLS ECDH Private
Key:Paired With
TLS Pre-Master
Secret:Paired With
TLS ECDSA
Private Key
Disk -
Encrypted:Encrypted
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
TLS ECDSA Public
Key:Paired With
TLS ECDSA
Public Key
Plaintext
Output via
Ethernet
Disk -
Plaintext:Plaintext
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
TLS ECDSA Private
Key:Paired With
TLS Encryption
Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
TLS Master
Secret:Derived
From
TLS Master
Secret
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
TLS Pre-Master
Secret:Derived
From
TLS Encryption
Key:Derived From
TLS Authentication
Key:Derived From
Page 83 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
TLS Pre-Master
Secret
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
TLS ECDH Private
Key:Derived From
TLS Master
Secret:Derived
From
TLS ECDH Public
Key:Used With
TLS Trusted
Certificates
Plaintext
Input via
Ethernet
Disk -
Plaintext:Plaintext
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Trusted Internet
Certificates
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES GCM)
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES CBC +
HMAC)
Disk -
Encrypted:Encrypted
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
User Password Input
Hashed
and Salted
Disk -
Plaintext:Plaintext
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
VPN DH Private
Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
VPN DH Public
Key:Paired With
VPN DH Shared
Secret:Paired With
VPN DH Public
Key
Plaintext
Input via
Ethernet
Plaintext
Output via
Ethernet
Disk -
Plaintext:Plaintext
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
VPN DH Private
Key:Paired With
VPN DH Shared
Secret:Derived
From
VPN DH Shared
Secret
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
VPN DH Private
Key:Paired With
VPN DH Public
Key:Paired With
VPN ECDH
Private Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
VPN ECDH Public
Key:Paired With
VPN ECDH Shared
Secret:Paired With
VPN ECDH
Public Key
Plaintext
Input via
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
VPN ECDH Private
Key:Paired With
Page 84 of 100
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall for Desktop Appliances - LEVEL 1 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Rev. C, Copyright © 2026 Forcepoint
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Ethernet
Plaintext
Output via
Ethernet
Power-
Cycling
VPN ECDH Shared
Secret:Derived
From
VPN ECDH
Shared Secret
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
VPN ECDH Private
Key:Paired With
TLS ECDH Public
Key:Paired With
VPN ECDSA
Private Key
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES GCM)
Encrypted
Output via
Ethernet
(AES GCM)
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES CBC +
HMAC)
Encrypted
Output via
Ethernet
(AES CBC +
HMAC)
Disk -
Encrypted:Encrypted
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
VPN ECDSA Public
Key:Paired With
VPN ECDSA
Public Key
Plaintext
Input via
Ethernet
Plaintext
Output via
Ethernet
Disk -
Encrypted:Encrypted
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
VPN ECDSA Private
Key:Paired With
VPN Key
Wrapping Key
SDRAM :Plaintext Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Cluster Protocol
Key:Used With
VPN Pre-Shared
Key
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES GCM)
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
Disk -
Plaintext:Plaintext
Disk -
Encrypted:Encrypted
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
SKEYID,
SKEYID_d:Derived
From
SKEYSEED, SK_d,
SK_pi,
SK_pr:Derived
From
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
(AES CBC +
HMAC)
VPN RSA Private
Key
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES GCM)
Encrypted
Output via
Ethernet
(AES GCM)
Encrypted
Input via
Ethernet
(AES CBC +
HMAC)
Encrypted
Output via
Ethernet
(AES CBC +
HMAC)
Disk -
Encrypted:Encrypted
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
VPN RSA Public
Key:Paired With
VPN RSA Public
Key
Plaintext
Input via
Ethernet
Plaintext
Output via
Ethernet
Disk -
Encrypted:Encrypted
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
VPN RSA Private
Key:Paired With
VPN Trusted
Certificates
Plaintext
Input via
Ethernet
Disk -
Plaintext:Plaintext
Until
Zeroized
Factory
Reset
Power-
Cycling
Table 19: SSP Table 2
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The module performs pre-operational self-tests upon power-up to confirm firmware integrity and
verify the correct operation of each implemented cryptographic algorithm used in support of the
integrity checks. Specifically, the module performs the ECDSA Verify KAT and SHA2-512 KAT during
initialization.
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details
Pre-
operational
Bypass Test
Bypass Test Bypass
Test
Bypass Success: "FIPS bypass
test passed” output to
console Failure: "FIPS
bypass test FAILED,
rebooting..." output to
console, module
reboots
Alternating Bypass
mode with preset
policy and routing
configuration
Root
Filesystem
Integrity
Test
ECDSA with
P-521 and
SHA2-512
Firmware
Integrity
SW/FW
Integrity
Success: “FIPS: rootfs
integrity check OK”
output to console
Failure: “FIPS: rootfs
integrity check FAILED,
rebooting...” output to
console, module
reboots
ECDSA KAT (Sign,
Verify) SHA2-512
KAT (Digest)
Firmware Integrity
(Verify, Digest)
Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The module automatically performs conditional self-tests based on the module operation. These self-
tests do not require operator input to initiate. Implemented conditional tests are in one of the
following forms:
➢ Known Answer Test (KAT)
➢ Pair-Wise Consistency Test (PCT)
➢ Health tests
➢ Bypass tests
All KATs alongside health testing of the noise source are performed immediately following the pre-
operational self-tests at module power-on.
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
Adaptive
Proportion
Test
APT Fault
Detection
Test
CAST FIPS: OpenSSL
self-tests
FAILED,
rebooting...
Comparison of
Samples within
Window
At Startup
and Upon
Entropy
Generation
AES-CBC
Decrypt
(A2166)
128, 192,
256 bit
KAT CAST NGFW
Cryptographic
Kernel
Module failed
to load,
rebooting...
Decrypt Upon
Library
Load
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-CBC
Decrypt
(A4793)
128-bit KAT CAST FIPS:
Cryptographic
module self-
tests FAILED,
rebooting..
Decrypt Upon
Library
Load
AES-CBC
Encrypt
(A2166)
128, 192,
256 bit
KAT CAST NGFW
Cryptographic
Kernel
Module failed
to load,
rebooting...
Encrypt Upon
Library
Load
AES-CBC
Encrypt
(A4793)
128-bit KAT CAST FIPS:
Cryptographic
module self-
tests FAILED,
rebooting..
Encrypt Upon
Library
Load
AES-GCM
Decrypt
(A2166)
128 bit KAT CAST NGFW
Cryptographic
Kernel
Module failed
to load,
rebooting...
Decrypt Upon
Library
Load
AES-GCM
Decrypt
(A4793)
128-bit KAT CAST FIPS:
Cryptographic
module self-
tests FAILED,
rebooting..
Decrypt Upon
Library
Load
AES-GCM
Encrypt
(A2166)
128 bit KAT CAST NGFW
Cryptographic
Kernel
Module failed
to load,
rebooting...
Encrypt Upon
Library
Load
AES-GCM
Encrypt
(A4793)
128-bit KAT CAST FIPS:
Cryptographic
module self-
tests FAILED,
rebooting..
Encrypt Upon
Library
Load
Configuration
Bypass Test
HMAC
Bypass Test
Bypass
Test
Bypass FIPS:
Cryptographic
module self-
tests FAILED,
rebooting..
MAC
Verification
New Policy
Files
Received
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
Counter
DRBG Reseed
Health Test
AES-256 KAT CAST FIPS:
Cryptographic
module self-
tests FAILED,
rebooting..
Reseed Upon
Library
Load
Counter
DRBG (A4793)
AES-256 KAT CAST FIPS:
Cryptographic
module self-
tests FAILED,
rebooting..
[Prediction
Resistance:
No],[Derivation
Function
Enabled: Yes]
Upon
Library
Load
Counter
DRBG
Instantiate
and Generate
Health Tests
(A4793)
AES-256 KAT CAST FIPS:
Cryptographic
module self-
tests FAILED,
rebooting..
Instantiate and
Generate
Upon
Library
Load
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4793)
P-224 w/
SHA2-224
KAT CAST FIPS:
Cryptographic
module self-
tests FAILED,
rebooting..
Sign Upon
Library
Load
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4793)
P-224 w/
SHA2-224
KAT CAST FIPS:
Cryptographic
module self-
tests FAILED,
rebooting..
Verify Upon
Library
Load
HMAC-SHA-1
(A2166)
SHA-1; Key
length 640
bits
KAT CAST NGFW
Cryptographic
Kernel
Module failed
to load,
rebooting...
Message
Authentication
Upon
Library
Load
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A2166)
SHA2-256;
Key length
1048 bits
HMAC-
SHA2-256-
96
KAT CAST NGFW
Cryptographic
Kernel
Module failed
to load,
rebooting...
Message
Authentication
Upon
Library
Load
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A4793)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST FIPS:
Cryptographic
module self-
tests FAILED,
rebooting..
Message
Authentication
Upon
Library
Load
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
HMAC-SHA2-
512 (A2166)
SHA2-512;
Key length
160 bits
KAT CAST NGFW
Cryptographic
Kernel
Module failed
to load,
rebooting...
Message
Authentication
Upon
Library
Load
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A4793)
P-224 KAT CAST FIPS:
Cryptographic
module self-
tests FAILED,
rebooting..
Shared Secret
“Z”
Computation
Upon
Library
Load
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A4793)
2048 KAT CAST FIPS:
Cryptographic
module self-
tests FAILED,
rebooting..
Shared Secret
“Z”
Computation
Upon
Library
Load
KDF IKEv1
(A4793)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST FIPS:
Cryptographic
module self-
tests FAILED,
rebooting..
Secure Hash Upon
Library
Load
KDF IKEv2
(A4793)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST FIPS:
Cryptographic
module self-
tests FAILED,
rebooting..
Secure Hash Upon
Library
Load
KDF SP800-
108 (A4550)
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(Mode:
Counter)
KAT CAST FIPS: OpenSSL
self-tests
FAILED,
rebooting...
Key Derivation Upon
Library
Load
Lag Predictor
Test
Lag
Predictor
Test
Fault
Detection
Test
CAST FIPS: OpenSSL
self-tests
FAILED,
rebooting...
Designed to
detect a known
failure mode
where the
result becomes
mostly
deterministic.
At Startup
and Upon
Entropy
Generation
PBKDF
(A4550)
HMAC-
SHA2-256
KAT CAST FIPS: OpenSSL
self-tests
FAILED,
rebooting...
Key Derivation Upon
Library
Load
PCT for
ECDSA key
pairs created
ECDSA
Sign/Verify
PCT PCT FIPS: OpenSSL
self-tests
Key Generation Upon
ECDSA Key
Generation
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
for digital
signature
purposes
and SHA2-
256
FAILED,
rebooting...
PCT for KAS-
ECC key pairs
created for
key
agreement
purposes
KAS-ECC-
SSC
PCT PCT FIPS: OpenSSL
self-tests
FAILED,
rebooting...
Key Generation Upon ECDH
Key
Generation
PCT for KAS-
FFC key pairs
created for
key
agreement
purposes
KAS-FFC-
SSC
PCT PCT FIPS: OpenSSL
self-tests
FAILED,
rebooting...
Key Generation Upon DH
Key
Generation
PCT for RSA
key pairs
created for
digital
signature
purposes
RSA
Sign/Verify
w/
PKCS#1v1.5
and SHA2-
256
PCT PCT FIPS: OpenSSL
self-tests
FAILED,
rebooting...
Key Generation Upon RSA
Key
Generation
Repetition
Count Test
RCT Fault
Detection
Test
CAST FIPS: OpenSSL
self-tests
FAILED,
rebooting...
Comparison of
Subsequent
Entropy
Samples
At Startup
and Upon
Entropy
Generation
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4793)
RSA 2048
w/ SHA2-
256
PKCS#1v1.5
KAT CAST FIPS:
Cryptographic
module self-
tests FAILED,
rebooting..
Sign Upon
Library
Load
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4793)
RSA 2048
w/ SHA2-
256
PKCS#1v1.5
KAT CAST FIPS:
Cryptographic
module self-
tests FAILED,
rebooting..
Verify Upon
Library
Load
SHA-1
(A2166)
SHA-1 KAT CAST NGFW
Cryptographic
Kernel
Module failed
to load,
rebooting...
Secure Hash Upon
Library
Load
SHA-1
(A4793)
SHA-1 KAT CAST FIPS:
Cryptographic
module self-
Secure Hash Upon
Library
Load
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
tests FAILED,
rebooting..
SHA2-256
(A2166)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST NGFW
Cryptographic
Kernel
Module failed
to load,
rebooting...
Secure Hash Upon
Library
Load
SHA2-512
(A2166)
SHA2-512 KAT CAST NGFW
Cryptographic
Kernel
Module failed
to load,
rebooting...
Secure Hash Upon
Library
Load
SHA2-512
(A4793)
SHA2-512 KAT CAST FIPS:
Cryptographic
module self-
tests FAILED,
rebooting..
Secure Hash Upon
Library
Load
SHA3-256
(A4426)
SHA3-256 KAT CAST FIPS:
Cryptographic
module self-
tests FAILED,
rebooting...
Entropy
Conditioning
Component
Upon
Library
Load
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627
(A4793)
HMAC-
SHA2-256
KAT CAST FIPS:
Cryptographic
module self-
tests FAILED,
rebooting..
Secure Hash Upon
Library
Load
Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
Pre-operational
Bypass Test
Bypass Test Bypass On-Demand Programmatically
Root Filesystem
Integrity Test
Firmware
Integrity
SW/FW Integrity On-Demand Programmatically
Table 22: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
Adaptive
Proportion Test
Fault Detection
Test
CAST On Demand Programmatically
AES-CBC Decrypt
(A2166)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
AES-CBC Decrypt
(A4793)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
AES-CBC Encrypt
(A2166)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
AES-CBC Encrypt
(A4793)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
AES-GCM Decrypt
(A2166)
KAT CAST Upon Library
Load
Programmatically
AES-GCM Decrypt
(A4793)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
AES-GCM Encrypt
(A2166)
KAT CAST Upon Library
Load
Programmatically
AES-GCM Encrypt
(A4793)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
Configuration
Bypass Test
Bypass Test Bypass On Demand Programmatically
Counter DRBG
Reseed Health
Test
KAT CAST On Demand On
Programmatically
Counter DRBG
(A4793)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
Counter DRBG
Instantiate and
Generate Health
Tests (A4793)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4793)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4793)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
HMAC-SHA-1
(A2166)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A2166)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A4793)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
HMAC-SHA2-512
(A2166)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A4793)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A4793)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
KDF IKEv1
(A4793)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
KDF IKEv2
(A4793)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
KDF SP800-108
(A4550)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
Lag Predictor Test Fault Detection
Test
CAST On Demand On
Programmatically
PBKDF (A4550) KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
PCT for ECDSA
key pairs created
for digital
signature
purposes
PCT PCT On Demand Programmatically
PCT for KAS-ECC
key pairs created
for key
agreement
purposes
PCT PCT On Demand On
Programmatically
PCT for KAS-FFC
key pairs created
for key
agreement
purposes
PCT PCT On Demand Programmatically
PCT for RSA key
pairs created for
digital signature
purposes
PCT PCT On Demand Programmatically
Repetition Count
Test
Fault Detection
Test
CAST On Demand Programmatically
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A4793)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A4793)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
SHA-1 (A2166) KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
SHA-1 (A4793) KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
SHA2-256
(A2166)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
SHA2-512
(A2166)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
SHA2-512
(A4793)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
SHA3-256
(A4426)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627 (A4793)
KAT CAST On Demand Programmatically
Table 23: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
If one of the pre-operational self-tests fails or a conditional self-test fails, the module enters an error
state. An error message is output on the status output interface specifying the library within the
module that failed the self-test. In this state, all data output via the module’s data output interfaces is
inhibited. The module proceeds to reboot and re-runs all self-tests. Successful completion of the self-
tests will clear the error state, and the module will return to the Approved mode of operation. For
any consecutive failure of the self-tests during restart, the appliance continues to restart. If the
problem persists, CO intervention is required to either perform a restore to factory defaults settings
and reinstall, or power-off and contact Forcepoint Customer Support.
Name Description Conditions Recovery Method Indicator
Error
State
Performs
automatic
power-cycle
upon self-test
failure.
Module fails
any of the
other self-
tests
No operator action is
required, the appliance
will restart itself. If the
restart also fails then the
appliance needs to be
reset and reconfigured,
or if due to hardware
malfunction the
appliance must be
replaced
Pre-operational bypass test:
"FIPS bypass test FAILED,
rebooting..." is printed to the
kernel log Rootfs integrity test:
“FIPS: OpenSSL self-tests” is
logged CASTs (depending on
which algorithm and service
was used for the failing test:
“FIPS: OpenSSL self-tests
FAILED, rebooting...” is logged
or “FIPS: Cryptographic module
self-tests FAILED, rebooting...”
is logged
Table 24: Error States
10.6 Additional Information
While the module is running these self-tests, all data output interfaces are disabled until the
successful completion of the self-tests.
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
11.1.1 Hardware Setup
Upon receiving the NGFW hardware, the CO shall check that the appliance is not damaged and that
all required parts and instructions are included. If the Network Components are not installed in the
appliance, the CO must insert them by performing the following:
Note: Read all safety instructions before installing the Network Components. Do not install any
Network Components while the appliance is on. Fasten a grounding strip from the wrist to the
appliance.
1. Locate the Network Component slots on the front of the appliance.
2. If the appliance was shipped with the Network Component slot(s) covered by a plate, remove
the thumbscrew and plate from the appliance. Store the thumbscrew and plate in case the
Network Component is eventually removed.
3. Push the Network Component into the slot. The Network Component is properly installed
when the front of the Network Component is flush with the front of the appliance.
11.1.2 Creating a Configuration for the Approved Mode of Operation
The administration of the NGFW modules is done through the SMC, which provides centralized
administrative functionalities for all the managed NGFW modules. The SMC can be shipped
preinstalled on its own Forcepoint hardware appliance, installed as a virtual machine on a
virtualization platform, or installed on a third-party Windows or Linux platform. The SMC can be
accessed by an administrator via a Java-based Management Client running on the administrator’s
workstation.
Using the Management Client, create a configuration for the NGFW Engine in the Approved Mode of
Operation.
1. To use HTTPS User Authentication and TLS Inspection for Client Protection or Server
Protection, create a TLS Cryptography Suite Set element. Select only the Approved and
Allowed algorithms and TLS cipher suites. The Management Connection Service, Peer
Connection Service, Key Pair Management Service, and User Management Service utilize the
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 cipher suite. Refer to Section “2.5
Algorithms“ above for a list of algorithms implemented. For more information, see the
“Create TLS Cryptographic Suite Set elements” topic of the Forcepoint NGFW Product Guide.
• In accordance with the NGFW Product user guide, the following TLS Cipher Suites are
utilized within the module:
o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
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o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
2. To use certificates signed by a Certificate Authority (CA) that is not one of the default Trusted
Certificate Authority elements, create a Trusted Certificate Authority element. Import only a
certificate signed using an Approved signature algorithm. For more information, see the
“Create Trusted Certificate Authority elements” topic of the Forcepoint NGFW Product Guide.
3. To use HTTPS User Authentication, create a TLS Profile element. Select the TLS Cryptography
Suite Set element, the Trusted Certificate Authority, and the minimum TLS version. For more
information, see the “Create TLS Profile elements” topic of the Forcepoint NGFW Product
Guide.
4. Create the NGFW Engine Element by defining the properties in the Engine Editor.
• Browse to Advanced Settings, then select FIPS-Compatible Operating Mode.
• Select “FIPS-Disable Remote Engine Upgrades” for the NGFW to prevent firmware load
attempts from the SMC.
• To use HTTPS User Authentication, browse to Add-Ons | User Authentication, then
enable HTTPS and select the TLS Profile element. Use 2048 or greater as the Key
Length when creating a certificate signing request in HTTPS Settings. For more
information, see the “Enable browser-based user authentication” topic of the
Forcepoint NGFW Product Guide.
• To use TLS Inspection for Client Protection, create a Client Protection Certificate
Authority element and import the private key and the certificate used to issue
certificates in TLS Inspection. Use only the Approved algorithms and key size for the
key pair and certificate. In the Engine Editor, browse to Add-Ons | TLS Inspection, then
select the Cryptography Suite Set. For more information, see the “Configure TLS
inspection for client protection” and “Activating TLS inspection” topics in the “Setting
up TLS Inspection” chapter of the Forcepoint NGFW Product Guide.
• To use TLS Inspection for Server Protection, browse to Add-Ons | TLS Inspection, then
select the Cryptography Suite Set. For more information, see the “Activating TLS
inspection” topic in the “Setting up TLS Inspection” chapter of the Forcepoint NGFW
Product Guide.
• When using TLS Inspection or Sidewinder HTTPS proxy, create a Firewall Policy that has
an Access rule that allows the TLS connection and create an Inspection Policy that has
an Inspection rule that terminates connections that match the TLS_Certificate-Verify-
Failed Situation. On the Inspection tab of the Firewall Policy, you must select the
Inspection Policy that you created.
• To use Sidewinder HTTP and HTTPS proxies, browse to Add-Ons | Sidewinder Proxy,
click Advanced, then set the value of the tls_cipher_override property to
TLSv1.2+ECDHE+AES!AESCCM:TLSv1.2+DHE+AES!AESCCM!DSS on the HTTP tab. For
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more information, see the “Advanced settings for Sidewinder Proxies” topic in the
“Sidewinder Proxies” chapter of the Forcepoint NGFW Product Guide.
• When using IPsec, disable Automated RSA Certificate Management. Browse to VPN |
Certificates, then deselect Automated RSA Certificate Management.
• To use IPsec, right-click the Gateway element, then select Tools | Generate Certificate
to create a certificate signing request. Select RSA with 2048 or greater key size, or
ECDSA as the Public Key Algorithm. For more information, see the “Create a VPN
certificate or certificate request for a VPN Gateway element” topic in the “Managing
VPN certificates” chapter of the Forcepoint NGFW Product Guide.
• To use an IPsec VPN, create a VPN Profile element. Use only the Approved and Allowed
algorithms and key sizes in the profile. Refer to Table 3: Approved Algorithms above
for a list of algorithms implemented. Additionally, in the profile element, the IPsec
Tunnel Lifetime should be set to less than 232 bytes. Select the VPN Profile element.
For more information, see the “Create VPN Profile elements” topic in the “VPNs in
Forcepoint NGFW” chapter of the Forcepoint NGFW Product Guide.
• Create Access Rules to configure the Alternating Bypass Feature.
• Save the initial configuration for the NGFW Engine. Make a note of the one-time
password, which is required for initial contact with the SMC.
See Section “11.1.4 Setting up the Approved Configuration” for setting up the device configurations.
11.1.3 Downloading and Upgrading to an Approved Firmware Version
The NGFW appliances are delivered in an operational state with the most recent firmware
preinstalled. The NGFW firmware must be upgraded to the FIPS 140-3 validated NGFW firmware
version to be placed in the Approved mode of operation.
Note: The upgrade to the FIPS 140-3 validated NGFW firmware version is necessary even if the same
version was installed previously. This is required because the file system checksum is stored during
the upgrade process. A method to update the firmware image with a SHA2-512 checksum signed with
ECDSA P-521 is provided. Prior to installing the new image, its associated checksum is checked. If the
signature check fails, the new firmware is ignored, and the current firmware remains loaded. If the
signature check passes, the new image will be installed and executed after the appliance is restarted.
Any firmware loaded into the module other than version 6.10.13.26655.fips.2 is out of the scope of
this validation and will mean that the module is not operating in the approved mode of operation.
A FIPS 140-3 Validated NGFW firmware version is downloaded as follows:
1. Login to the Forcepoint Support https://support.forcepoint.com/Login
2. Proceed to the Forcepoint NGFW downloads section.
3. Download the firmware version 6.10.13.26655.fips.2 installation file
(sg_engine_6.10.13.26655.fips.2_x86-64-small.zip).
4. Verify the SHA checksum.
Note: The correct checksums are shown on the download page and can also be found in the release
notes
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After downloading the firmware, the operator can upgrade to a FIPS 140-3 validated firmware
version:
1. Save the FIPS 140-3 validated NGFW firmware version upgrade .zip file to the root directory of
a USB drive. Note – The firmware upgrade zip file must be in the root directory of the media.
2. Connect to the appliance using a monitor and keyboard.
3. Power on the appliance and start the NGFW Configuration Wizard.
4. Select the Firewall/VPN option.
5. Select Upgrade. The Select Source Media dialog opens.
6. Select the appropriate media type and select OK. The firmware update signature is verified.
7. Select OK. The upgrade starts.
8. Select “Set kernel in FIPS mode” after restart. Select OK.
9. The NGFW appliance restarts and displays the upgraded version.
10. Verify the NGFW firmware version to ensure that the FIPS validated NGFW firmware version is
loaded.
11.1.4 Setting up the Approved Configuration
To configure the NGFW Engine:
1. Start the NGFW Configuration Wizard as instructed in the Configuring the Engine in the Engine
Configuration Wizard section of the NGFW Installation Guide.
2. Configure the network interfaces according to your environment as instructed in the
Configuring the Network Interfaces section of the NGFW Installation Guide.
a. Configure the operating system settings according to the "Configuring the Operating
System Settings" section of the NGFW Installation Guide.
b. Select both:
- "Restricted FIPS-compatible operating mode" (This automatically disables the
SSH daemon and root password options in the Engine Configuration Wizard).
- "FIPS 140-3 compatible mode" (This setting ensures the module uses only
FIPS 140-3 approved algorithms and security functions).
3. Contact the Management Server as instructed in the Contacting the Management Server
section of the NGFW Installation Guide. Enter node IP address manually is selected by default
and other IP address options are disabled when the “Restricted FIPS-compatible operating
mode” setting is enabled. The engine restarts.
4. To verify the “FIPS 140-3 compatible operating mode” setting is activated:
a. Verify that the following messages are displayed on the console when the engine
restarts:
- FIPS: rootfs integrity check OK (Displayed after the root file system integrity
test has been executed successfully)
- FIPS power-up tests succeeded (Displayed after the FIPS 140 power-up tests
have been executed successfully)
b. Continue as instructed in the “After Successful Management Server Contact” section of
the NGFW Installation Guide.
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Note: If the engine does not enter the “Restricted FIPS-compatible operating mode” even though it is
configured to do so, or if the power-up tests fail (a power-up test error message is displayed or the
success message is not displayed), the appliance must be reset to factory settings and reinstalled.
Note: The “FIPS 140-3 compatible operating mode” and “Restricted FIPS-compatible operating mode”
settings must be enabled during the initial configuration of the appliance.
11.1.5 Resetting the Module to Factory Settings (Sanitization)
Resetting the appliance to factory settings is not part of the normal installation procedure. There is
no need to reset the appliance to factory settings before starting to use it for the first time. These
instructions can be used to reset the appliance to factory settings when necessary, such as when
initial configuration has been completed without enabling the “Restricted FIPS-compatible operating
mode”, during use, or when the appliance is being removed from use.
To reset the appliance to factory settings:
1. Reboot the appliance and select System restore options from the boot menu. NGFW System
Restore starts.
2. Enter 2 for Advanced data removal options.
3. Enter one of the following options:
• 1 for 1 pass overwrite.
• 8 for a Custom number of overwrite passes.
If you selected Custom, enter the number of overwrite passes. A larger number of overwrites is more
secure, but it may take a considerable amount of time depending on the appliance storage capacity.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
The Crypto-Officer is responsible for ensuring the module is running in Approved mode of operation
using the steps in Section “11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures”.
In order to identify the modules’ version, the operator must do the following:
1. At the Home screen of the SMC that is being used to manage the module, click on the firewall.
2. On the right-hand column, under “Info”, the firewall version (and update package) will be in
the “General” tab
Figure 9: Depiction of the Module Version Displayed in the SMC GUI
If problems occur, Crypto-Officer intervention is required to either perform a restore to factory
defaults settings and reinstall, or power-off and contact Forcepoint Customer Support.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
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The notes below provide additional guidance and policies that must be followed by module
operators:
• Use of AES GCM: The module generates AES GCM IV in accordance with SP 800-38D in
compliance with IG C.H scenario 1. The GCM IV generation in the TLS context follows RFC 5288
and SP 800-52rev2 section 3.3.1 and shall only be used for the TLS protocol version 1.2. The
GCM IV generation in the IPsec context follows RFC 4106 and RFC 7296 and shall only be used
with IPsec and IKEv2 to be compliant with IG C.H. The implementation of the 64-bit
nonce_explicit part of the IV is deterministic and management logic is inside the module. By
the design of the module and by virtue of the data size limit (see above Section "11.1.2
Creating a Configuration for the Approved Mode of Operation”) set, the maximum number
possible value of 2^64 for nonce_explicit part of the IV is never reached. In case the module’s
power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption or decryption shall
be re-distributed.
• Use of PBKDF: The module implements key derivation through the SP 800-132 PBKDF2. The
module supports option 1a from Section 5.4 of SP 800-132, whereby the MK is used directly as
the DPK. Keys derived from passwords or passphrases are only used for data at rest. The
length of the salt should be at least 128 bits and the length of the password or passphrase
should be at least 10 characters, which provides the probability of guessing this password or
passphrase to be (1/94)10. The caller shall observe all requirements and should consider all
recommendations specified in SP 800-132 with respect to the strength of the generated key,
including the quality of the password and the quality of the salt. Keys derived from passwords,
as shown in SP 800-132, may only be used in storage applications. For encrypted private key
entry as part of the configuration, the PBKDF2 iteration count must be between 1000 and
10000 to allow the recommended minimum in SP 800-132 while keeping performance the
impact small, and the passphrase must be at least 14 characters.
• Use of insecure protocols – The following insecure protocols are disabled by default: SSH,
Console Access, and WIFI Interfaces. The root password option is automatically disabled. To
maintain compliance with FIPS requirements, these protocols and services shall not be
enabled.
• Network Component replacement – As noted earlier, the NGFW appliances are modular by
design. The Network Components are field-replaceable. Operators in the field can order the
desired Network Components directly from Forcepoint Customer Support using the
appropriate part numbers. The CO must install the Network Components as described in
Section “11.1.1 Hardware Setup“ above.
• Use of Legacy 1024-bit RSA – Operators of the module shall only import 1024-bit RSA keys
created prior to the 2011 transition date and the operator shall not verify any signatures
signed after 2011. By default, the module does not include any trusted certificates with 1024-
bit RSA keys that were signed after the 2011 transition date.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
This Section is Not Applicable. The modules do not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-
3 Level 1 requirements for this validation.