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Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2
Security Policy
WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F Encryption
Module with FSP 3000 Shelf
Firmware Version: 172.19.7 or 193.1.7
Document Version: 1.31
Date: June 2, 2021
ADVA Optical Networking SE
Fraunhoferstr. 9a
82152 Martinsried/Muenchen
Germany
Phone +49(0)89-890665-0
Fax +49(0)89-890665-699
http://www.adva.com/
Security Policy
WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F
Encryption Module with FSP
3000 Shelf
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CONTENTS
1 Introduction..................................................................................................................................................................................................5
1.1 Security Level...........................................................................................................................................................................................6
1.2 Module Description and Cryptographic Boundary......................................................................................................................7
1.3 Module Ports and Interfaces..............................................................................................................................................................11
1.4 Mode of Operation..............................................................................................................................................................................13
2 Cryptographic Functionality...................................................................................................................................................................14
2.1 Algorithms and Protocols..................................................................................................................................................................14
2.2 Critical Security Parameters...............................................................................................................................................................16
3 Roles, Authentication and Services......................................................................................................................................................17
3.1 Assumption of Roles............................................................................................................................................................................17
3.2 Authentication Methods.....................................................................................................................................................................18
3.2.1 Cryptographic Officer Authentication .........................................................................................................................18
3.2.2 User Authentication ..........................................................................................................................................................19
3.3 Authentication Description...............................................................................................................................................................20
3.4 Services...................................................................................................................................................................................................20
3.5 Concurrent Operations......................................................................................................................................................................25
4 Self-Tests ....................................................................................................................................................................................................25
4.1 Power-on Self-Tests ...........................................................................................................................................................................25
4.2 Conditional Tests.................................................................................................................................................................................26
4.3 Response to Conditional Test Failures..........................................................................................................................................27
5 Physical Security Policy...........................................................................................................................................................................27
5.1 EMI/EMC................................................................................................................................................................................................28
5.2 Physical Inspection..............................................................................................................................................................................28
5.3 Cryptographic Officer-applied Tamper-Evident Seals.............................................................................................................29
5.3.1 Types of Tamper-Evident Seals....................................................................................................................................30
5.3.2 Instructions for Applying Tamper-Evident Seals ......................................................................................................31
5.3.3 Seals on 1U Shelf with Front DC Power Access .......................................................................................................32
5.3.4 Seals on 1U Shelf with Rear Power Access................................................................................................................34
5.3.5 Seals on 9U Shelf ..............................................................................................................................................................37
5.3.6 Seals on Card Secured to Transceivers and Shelf...................................................................................................39
6 Operational Environment......................................................................................................................................................................42
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy......................................................................................................................................................42
8 Security Rules and Guidance................................................................................................................................................................42
9 References and Definitions ...................................................................................................................................................................43
FIGURES
Figure 1 Cryptographic Boundary, WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F + F7/SH9HU .........................................................................................7
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Figure 2 Cryptographic Boundary, WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F + F7/SH1HU-R/PF...............................................................................8
Figure 3 Cryptographic Boundary, WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F + F7/SH1HU-HP/2DC........................................................................8
Figure 4 Cryptographic Boundary, WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F + F7/SH1HU-HP/E-TEMP/2DC.......................................................8
Figure 5 Top View, WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F Card .....................................................................................................................................9
Figure 6 Bottom View, WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F Card.............................................................................................................................10
Figure 7 Front and Back View, WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F Card..............................................................................................................10
Figure 8 Left View, WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F Card.....................................................................................................................................11
Figure 9 Right View, WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F Card..................................................................................................................................11
Figure 10 Ports and Interfaces........................................................................................................................................................................12
Figure 11 Card Connectivity to Control Console.......................................................................................................................................13
Figure 12 CSP Isolation from Outputs..........................................................................................................................................................17
Figure 13 Tamper-Evident Seal on ESD bag.............................................................................................................................................29
Figure 14 Factory-Applied Tamper Seals on WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F Card ...................................................................................29
Figure 15 General Purpose Tamper-Evident Seal....................................................................................................................................30
Figure 16 CFP Tamper-Evident Seal ............................................................................................................................................................30
Figure 17 Tamper-Evident Wire Seal............................................................................................................................................................31
Figure 18 Seal Locations on 1U Shelf with Front DC Power Access....................................................................................................32
Figure 19 Detail of Seal #1 Location on 1U Shelf with Front DC Power Access..............................................................................33
Figure 20 Detail of Seal #2 Location on 1U Shelf with Front DC Power Access.............................................................................33
Figure 21 Detail of Seal #3 Location on 1U Shelf with Front DC Power Access .............................................................................34
Figure 22 Detail of Seal #4 Location on 1U Shelf with Front DC Power Access.............................................................................34
Figure 23 Seal Locations on Top of 1U Shelf with Rear Power Access .............................................................................................35
Figure 24 Seal Locations on Bottom of 1U Shelf with Rear Power Access.......................................................................................35
Figure 25 Detail of Seal #1 and #6 Locations on 1U Shelf with Rear Power Access .....................................................................36
Figure 26 Detail of Seal #3, #4, and #5 Locations on 1U Shelf with Rear Power Access............................................................36
Figure 27 Detail of Seal #2 Location on 1U Shelf with Rear Power Access .....................................................................................37
Figure 28 Seal Locations on Top of 9U Shelf............................................................................................................................................38
Figure 29 Seal Locations on Rear of 9U Shelf ..........................................................................................................................................39
Figure 30 Seal Location on CFP Transceiver in Card .............................................................................................................................40
Figure 31 Wire Seal Placement through Top Cross-Drilled Mounting Screws on Card in 9U Shelf.........................................40
Figure 32 Cross-Drilled Card Mounting Screw Positions on 1U Shelf................................................................................................41
Figure 33 Wire Seal Placement through Four (4) Cross-Drilled Mounting Screws on Card in 1U Shelf..................................41
Figure 34 Wire Seal Placement Detail in 1U Shelf ....................................................................................................................................41
TABLES
Table 1 Cryptographic Module Configurations...........................................................................................................................................5
Table 2 Achieved Security Level by Requirement......................................................................................................................................6
Table 3 Ports and Interfaces...........................................................................................................................................................................12
Table 4 Approved Algorithms........................................................................................................................................................................15
Table 5 Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions...........................................................................................................16
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Table 6 Security-Relevant Protocols Used in FIPS Mode.......................................................................................................................16
Table 7 Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)................................................................................................................................................16
Table 8 Public Keys............................................................................................................................................................................................17
Table 9 Roles Description................................................................................................................................................................................18
Table 10 Authentication Description............................................................................................................................................................20
Table 11 Authenticated Services....................................................................................................................................................................20
Table 12 Unauthenticated Services..............................................................................................................................................................22
Table 13 Security Parameters Access Rights within Services................................................................................................................23
Table 14 Physical Security Inspection Guidelines.....................................................................................................................................28
Table 15 References..........................................................................................................................................................................................43
Table 16 Acronyms and Definitions .............................................................................................................................................................44
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1 Introduction
This document defines the security policy for the WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F Encryption Module with FSP 3000 Shelf. The
module is a transponder for core telecommunication networks, and transports plaintext 100GbE or OTU4 client side
data services to and from the encrypted network interface. The module performs key agreement and synchronization
with a peer module at the far-end of an optical network to support AES encryption of the network link. The peer
module is "the other party" in the terminology of [56Ar3].
The module is a configuration of the ADVA Fiber Service Platform (FSP) 3000 scalable optical data transport system.
The encryption module is composed of a WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F card assembly installed in a customer-chosen ADVA
FSP 3000 shelf, with one of the listed network interface transceivers in the card assembly's CFP receptacle. ADVA FSP
3000 shelves are available in various form factors to host customer-chosen combinations of modular functionality and
density.
Table 1 "Cryptographic Module Configurations" shows module name, hardware part number, and hardware and
firmware version numbers. Rows 8 through 15 list the CFP form factor pluggable network transceivers.
Table 1 Cryptographic Module Configurations
Module Description HW P/N and version FW version
1 WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F +
F7/SH9HU
Card assembly in 9U shelf Card: 1063700027-01 version C-1.02
Shelf: 1078700121 version 2.01
Card: 172.19.7 or 193.1.7
Shelf: N/A
2 WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F +
F7/SH1HU-R/PF
Card assembly in 1U shelf with
rear power access and
pluggable fan unit
Card: 1063700027-01 version C-1.02
Shelf: 1078700060-01 version 1.01
Card: 172.19.7 or 193.1.7
Shelf: N/A
3 WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F +
F7/SH1HU-HP/2DC
Card assembly in 1U shelf with
DC input power
Card: 1063700027-01 version C-1.02
Shelf: 1078700144 version 2.11
Card: 172.19.7 or 193.1.7
Shelf: N/A
4 WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F +
F7/SH1HU-HP/E-TEMP/2DC
Card assembly in 1U shelf with
DC input and extended low
temperature operation
Card: 1063700027-01 version C-1.02
Shelf: 1078700145-01 version 1.01
Card: 172.19.7 or 193.1.7
Shelf: N/A
5 - General Purpose Tamper-
Evident Seal
1013700030-01 N/A
6 - CFP Tamper-Evident Seal 1013700031-01 N/A
7 - Tamper-Evident Wire Seal 1013700032-01 N/A
8 CFP pluggable transceiver CFP/112G/#DCTCG/SM/LC 1061700617-01 N/A
9 CFP pluggable transceiver CFP/112G/#DCTCF/SM/LC 1061700618-01 N/A
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Module Description HW P/N and version FW version
10 CFP pluggable transceiver CFP/112G/#DCTCF/SM/LC 1061700618-02 N/A
11 CFP pluggable transceiver CFP/112G/#DCTC/SM/LC 1061700619-01 N/A
12 CFP pluggable transceiver CFP/112G/#DCTC/SM/LC 1061700619-02 N/A
13 CFP pluggable transceiver CFP/112G/#DCTCR/SM/LC 1061700630-01 N/A
14 CFP pluggable transceiver CFP/112G/#DCTCL/SM/LC 1061700634-01 N/A
15 CFP pluggable transceiver CFP/112G/LR4/SM/LC 1061700655-02 N/A
The module is intended for use by US Federal agencies and other markets that require FIPS 140-2 validated encryption
for network communications.
1.1 Security Level
See Table 2 for the FIPS 140-2 security levels for the module.
Table 2 Achieved Security Level by Requirement
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self-tests 2
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall 2
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3000 Shelf
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1.2 Module Description and Cryptographic Boundary
The cryptographic boundary is the metal case of the WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F card in conjunction with the enclosing
ADVA shelf. The physical form of the module is shown in these figures:
• Figure 1 Cryptographic Boundary, WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F + F7/SH9HU
• Figure 2 Cryptographic Boundary, WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F + F7/SH1HU-R/PF
• Figure 3 Cryptographic Boundary, WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F + F7/SH1HU-HP/2DC
• Figure 4 Cryptographic Boundary, WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F + F7/SH1HU-HP/E-TEMP/2DC
The embodiment is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module.
The module is shielded, with openings for cooling air flow. All sensitive components are enclosed by covers that are
affixed with screws under tamper-evident seals.
In deployment, shelf slots are occupied by various card types or covered with blank panels to ensure proper cooling air
flow. These other card types and blank panels are outside the cryptographic boundary, and include:
• Backplane connectors: Mates with the connectors J2 and J3 on the WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F Encryption Module
• Shelf fan assemblies
• Power-related components, such as pluggable power supply units
Figure 1 Cryptographic Boundary, WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F + F7/SH9HU
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3000 Shelf
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Figure 2 Cryptographic Boundary, WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F + F7/SH1HU-R/PF
Figure 3 Cryptographic Boundary, WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F + F7/SH1HU-HP/2DC
Figure 4 Cryptographic Boundary, WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F + F7/SH1HU-HP/E-TEMP/2DC
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3000 Shelf
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Figure 5 Top View, WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F Card
Front
Interfaces
Backplane
Interfaces
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3000 Shelf
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Figure 6 Bottom View, WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F Card
Figure 7 Front and Back View, WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F Card
J3
J2
J1, QSFP
J5, CFP
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3000 Shelf
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Figure 8 Left View, WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F Card
Figure 9 Right View, WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F Card
1.3 Module Ports and Interfaces
The module's ports and associated FIPS defined logical interface categories are listed in Table 3, and illustrated in
Figure 10. The shelf backplane is outside the cryptographic boundary, and distributes electrical signals to and from the
WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F card backplane connectors. Connector reference designators in the table correspond to labels
on the WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F card. Signal directions are from the perspective of the WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F card.
The optical network interface pins for received signals carry control inputs and encrypted data inputs. The optical
network interface pins for transmitted signals carry status outputs and encrypted data outputs. The control and status
information at the optical network interface is used for key agreement and synchronization with the far-end peer.
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Table 3 Ports and Interfaces
Port Description Logical Interface Type
J2 and J3 power pins Backplane connector, power and ground pins Power
J3 control input pins
Backplane connector, interface to shelf control unit
Control in
J3 status output pins Status out
J3 control/status bidirectional pins Backplane connector, Ethernet to shelf control unit Control in, status out
J1 pins for power
Front panel QSFP receptacle for client optical interface
Power
J1 pins for interrupt, presence Control in
J1 pins for I2C Control in, status out
J1 pins for reset, low power mode Status out
J1 pins for receive signals Data in
J1 pins for transmit signals Data out
J5 pins for power
Front panel CFP receptacle for network optical interface
Power
J5 pins for control and status Control in, status out
J5 pins for receive signals Data in, control in
J5 pins for transmit signals Data out, control out
LEDs Front panel LED indicators Status out
Figure 10 Ports and Interfaces
Figure 11 illustrates control of cards deployed in a shelf, and multiple shelves in an equipment rack. Each card's
backplane control and status signals cross the cryptographic boundary to connect to a Shelf Control Unit (SCU) that is
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outside the cryptographic module. Local rack wiring connects SCUs. One shelf includes a Network element Control
Unit (NCU) that communicates with that shelf's SCU, and through the SCU to other shelves. The NCU is outside of the
cryptographic boundary. The NCU and connected SCUs route messages through the facility's management network to
a control console. The control console provides the user interface. The connection between the control console and
the NCU is outside the cryptographic module and should be secured by the operator with SSH for text-based user
interfaces, and HTTPS for browser user interfaces.
Figure 11 Card Connectivity to Control Console
1.4 Mode of Operation
The module operates in only a "FIPS Approved" mode. Only cryptographic functions that are FIPS-approved are
applied. The module does not implement a bypass mode or a maintenance mode.
To verify that the module is in the approved mode of operation, use the "get version" feature of the "Respond to status
requests" service to display the version of firmware components. Confirm that the displayed versions match those
shown in Table 1 "Cryptographic Module Configurations". The tamper-evident seals shall be installed for the module to
operate in the approved mode of operation.
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2 Cryptographic Functionality
2.1 Algorithms and Protocols
The module implements the FIPS Approved cryptographic functions listed in Table 4 "Approved Algorithms". The
module implements the Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed in Table 5.
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Table 4 Approved Algorithms
Cert. # Algorithm Mode Description Functions/caveats
C1459
AES [197]
CTR [38A] Key size: 256 Encrypt, decrypt in FPGA
C1459 ECB [38A] Key size: 256 Encrypt in FPGA
A1098, A1099 ECB [38A] Key size: 128 Encrypt, decrypt in firmware
A1098, A1099 ECB [38A] Key size: 256 Encrypt in firmware, decrypt tested but not
used.
VA
CKG
[IG D.12]
[133r2] Section 5.2 Asymmetric key establishment key
generation using unmodified DRBG output
Key generation
[133r2] Section 6.1 Direct symmetric key generation
using unmodified DRBG output
[133r2] Section 6.2.1 Derivation of symmetric keys from
a key agreement shared secret
A1098, A1099 DRBG [90A] CTR Use_df, AES-256 Deterministic random bit generator
A1098, A1099 DSA [186] L = 2048, N = 256 KeyGen. Tested, but not used.
A1098, A1099
safe-prime
[56Ar3]
MODP-2048, MODP-3072,
MODP-4096
KeyGen, KeyVer. MODP-2048 and MODP-3072
tested but not used
A1098, A1099 HMAC [198] SHA-256 Key size: 160 Message authentication, KDF primitive
A1098, A1099 KAS [56Ar3]
FFC (party U, party V),
KPG, Full
FC (p len = 2048, q len =
256), SHA-512, HMAC-SHA-
256, Concat
Key agreement scheme provides 112 bits of
encryption strength. Tested but not used.
A1098, A1099 KAS [56Ar3]
FFC (party U, party V),
KPG, Full
p len = 4096, q len = 4096
SHA-512, HMAC-SHA-256,
Concat
Key agreement scheme with safe primes
provides 128 bits of encryption strength.
A1098, A1099 RSA [186] PSS
n = 2048 SHA-256 Signature verification. Tested but not used.
n = 3072 SHA-256
n = 4096 SHA-256
Signature verification
A1098, A1099 SHS [180]
SHA-256
SHA-512
Signature verification, message digest
generation, password obfuscation.
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Table 5 Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Mode Description Functions/caveats
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator Seeds the DRBG for 256-bit security strength.
Table 6 Security-Relevant Protocols Used in FIPS Mode
Protocol Description
None
2.2 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs used by the module are described in this section. All usage of these CSPs by the module (including all CSP
lifecycle states) is described in Section 3.4 "Services". The isolation of CSPs from data outputs is illustrated in Figure 12.
Table 7 Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
CSP Description/Usage
CO password Used to check requests for service that require the crypto officer role (only a 256-bit hash is stored)
Static DH private key Local static private key for the key agreement scheme [56Ar3] C(2e, 2s) (4096 bits)
Ephemeral DH private key Local ephemeral private key for the key agreement scheme [56Ar3] C(2e, 2s) (4096 bits)
Session key material, current
Encryption key (256 bits)
IV field of AES-256-CTR counter block (55 bits)
Session key material, next
Encryption key (256 bits)
IV field of AES-256-CTR counter block (55 bits)
MacKey Key-confirmation MAC key for HMAC-SHA-256 (160 bits) derived with session key material
Seed bits Seed bits for firmware DRBG (384 bits per reseed) generated by internal entropy source
DRBG state Internal state of CTR DRBG: V (128 bits) and Key (256 bits)
Storage extension key
128-bit key for access to nonvolatile secure storage in internal module and encryption of material stored in
that module
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Table 8 Public Keys
Public Key Description/Usage
Static DH public key Local static public key for the key agreement scheme [56Ar3] C (2e, 2s)
Ephemeral DH public key Local ephemeral public key for the key agreement scheme [56Ar3] C (2e, 2s)
Other party static DH public key Other party static public key for the key agreement scheme [56Ar3] C (2e, 2s)
The value is stored upon confirmation by the crypto officer to trust the other party's public key
Other party ephemeral DH public key Other party ephemeral public key for the key agreement scheme [56Ar3] C (2e, 2s)
Firmware authentication keys
List of 1 to 64 RSA public keys with modulus length of 3072 or 4096 bits to verify digital
signature over incoming firmware image
Figure 12 CSP Isolation from Outputs
3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Assumption of Roles
The module supports three (3) distinct operator roles: authenticated User, authenticated Cryptographic Officer (CO),
and unauthenticated role. The authenticated User connects via the optical interface's in-band overhead channels. The
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Cryptographic Officer and unauthenticated role connect via the backplane. For backplane control messages, the
cryptographic module enforces the separation of roles using password authentication of each CO command.
Table 9 lists all operator roles supported by the module. The module does not support a maintenance role or bypass
capability.
The module supports concurrent operators. Some commands that are honored only from the Cryptographic Officer
role or from the unauthenticated role can execute without interrupting certain processes that are executed in the User
role. See Section 3.5 "Concurrent Operations".
Each CO command is individually authenticated, and previous authentications are cleared at the conclusion of the
command's operations.
Authentication data in the form of the CO password is protected from unauthorized disclosure, modification and
substitution by physical access limitations to backplane signals within the system shelf. See Section 5.2 "Physical
Inspection" for guidance on inspecting the shelf system that hosts the module. See Section 8 "Security Rules and
Guidance" for recommendations on privacy measures for network links and user interface terminals that connect
remotely to the system shelf.
The User authentication data is the static DH public key of the other party. The User authentication data is stored
securely in the module to protect from unauthorized modification or substitution.
Table 9 Roles Description
Role ID Role Description Authentication Type Authentication Data
CO
Cryptographic Officer: Approve trust of other party public key, set
policy values, enable User key agreement operations, commit
firmware update, validate digital signature on new firmware image.
Role based Password
User
User: Perform recurring key agreement operations to generate
session keys for data encryption
Role based Static DH public key
Unauthenticated
Unauthenticated: Request status indications, copy a firmware update
image to standby memory, manage all non-cryptographic
telecommunications functions, establish telecommunications
operational states (e.g. "in service" or "disabled").
None None
3.2 Authentication Methods
3.2.1 Cryptographic Officer Authentication
Authentication data accompanies each CO command.
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The module enforces minimum password length of 10 characters and allows the characters to be chosen from the set
of 95 ASCII printable characters. At least one character must be lower case, at least one must be upper case, and at
least one must be a numeral. This allows at least 10 ^ 17 possible passwords. The probability that a random attempt will
produce a successful guess of a randomly chosen password is less than one in 10^17, which is far less than one in
1,000,000.
After the module receives three consecutive CO commands with bad authentication data, the module enforces a 10-
minute lock out during which incoming CO commands are discarded without examination. In a one-minute period, no
more than three (3) attempts to guess an unknown password can occur. The probability that random attempts during
a one-minute period will successfully authenticate is less than three in 10^17, which is far less than 1 in 100,000.
See Section 8 "Security Rules and Guidance" for recommendations on password selection.
3.2.2 User Authentication
The key agreement protocol conducted with the other party operates as a User process. Key agreement is
authenticated with a static Diffie-Hellman key of the other party. The Cryptographic Officer provisions the module to
trust the other party static DH public key.
The other party static DH public key is in a domain that has prime modulus length 4096 bits and order length 4095
bits. The other party static DH public key is used for key agreement in a C (2e, 2s) scheme that complies with [56Ar3].
This provides security strength of greater than 128 bits per Table 2 in [57p1r4].
The key agreement protocol runs automatically after the CO provisions trust of the other party and clears any policies
or conditions that suspend automatic key agreement. The module limits the rate at which it will run a complete key
agreement protocol exchange to one per minute. Since the key agreement scheme provides security strength greater
than 128 bits, the probability that any single random attempt will succeed, or that attempts in a one-minute period will
succeed, is much less than one in 1,000,000.
Successful key agreement is automatically followed by user data path encryption. The user data path is disconnected if
the other party is not trusted and if there is no unexpired session key material. When the user data path is
disconnected, user plaintext data streams are replaced with standard dummy patterns.
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3.3 Authentication Description
Table 10 Authentication Description
Authentication Method Probability Justification
CO password less than one in 1,000,000
Minimum length 10 characters from 95-symbol alphabet, requiring at least one
lower case character, at least one upper case character, and one numeral, gives at
least 10 ^ 17 possible passwords, which is greater than 1,000,000.
User static DH key less than 1 / (2^128)
4096-bit Diffie-Hellman keys are in a domain with prime modulus of length 4096
bits and order of length 4095 bits. In the nomenclature of [57p1r4], this is L =
4096 and N = 4095. Section 5.6.1 and Table 2 of [57p1r4] indicate that L >= 3072
with N >= 256 provides security strength 128.
Digital signature on update
code image
less than 1 / (2^112)
Updates to the firmware code image are authenticated by the module using the
signature scheme RSASSA-PSS with SHA-256 and modulus lengths of at least
2048 bits. The initial values of trusted firmware authentication public keys are
preloaded in manufacturing. Additions and deletions to the values of trusted
firmware authentication public keys are delivered in update firmware code
images. The signature scheme provides security strength 112 per Section 5.6.1,
Table 2, and Table 3 of [57p1r4].
3.4 Services
All services implemented by the module are listed in Table 11 "Authenticated Services" and Table 12 "Unauthenticated
Services". No CSP is output from the module by any service.
Table 11 Authenticated Services
Authenticated Service
Role
Description
Affected CSPs and Public
Keys
Initialize CO
Establish CO password and apply built-in default session key lifetime and
event thresholds.
CO password
Seed bits
DRBG state
Storage extension key
Reset CO Reset to factory state and zeroize all CSPs including CO password.
All CSPs and public keys except
Fw auth key
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Authenticated Service
Role
Description
Affected CSPs and Public
Keys
Cold boot CO Reboot.
CO password
Static DH public key
Ephemeral DH private key
Ephemeral DH public key
Session key material
MacKey
Seed bits
DRBG state
Other party Eph DH pub key
Update firmware CO Control firmware update and mark which image is active.
CO password
Static DH public key
Ephemeral DH private key
Ephemeral DH public key
Session key material
MacKey
Seed bits
DRBG state
Other party Eph DH pub key
Fw auth key
Run self-tests CO Perform power-on self-tests upon command. CO password
Start pairing CO
Remove trust of other party public key, delete old local static DH key pair,
generate new local static DH key pair, and exchange static public info with
other party.
CO password
Seed bits
DRBG state
Static DH private key
Static DH public key
Complete pairing CO
Accept trust of other party static DH public key, and on success automatically
begin the services "Key agreement" and "Encrypt network link".
CO password
Static DH private key
Static DH public key
Other party static DH pub key
Storage extension key
Set parameters CO
Set session key lifetime, persistence of selected status indications, and
thresholds for event counters that drive status indicators.
CO password
Clear event counters CO
Clear counters of key agreement protocol errors, data path integrity check
errors.
CO password
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Authenticated Service
Role
Description
Affected CSPs and Public
Keys
Change password CO Change CO password. CO password
Key agreement User
Perform key agreement with other party to periodically generate fresh
session keys for data encryption.
Static DH private key
Static DH public key
MacKey
Seed bits
DRBG state
Ephemeral DH private key
Ephemeral DH public key
Session key material
Storage extension key
Other party static DH pub key
Other party eph DH pub key
Encrypt network link User
Encrypt / decrypt bidirectional traffic at the network interface. In the absence
of valid session key material, forward dummy replacement signals instead of
encrypted and decrypted data.
Session key material
Validate new firmware CO
Use a trusted public key embedded in the currently active image to validate
the digital signature over a candidate new firmware image.
FW auth key
Table 12 Unauthenticated Services
Unauthenticated Service Description Affected CSPs
Reset upon uninstall
Reset to factory state and zeroize all CSPs including CO password upon removal
of card from backplane.
All
Run power-on self-tests Perform self-tests at power-up. None
Respond to status requests Provide status and alarm indications in response to request commands. None
Indicate events and alarms Send notifications and alarm indications at status outputs. None
Copy firmware Copy candidate firmware image to inactive memory area. None
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Table 13 "Security Parameters Access Rights within Services" defines the relationship between access to security
parameters and the different module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as:
• G = Generate: The module generates the CSP.
• R = Read: The module reads the CSP for output.
• E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP.
• W = Write: The module writes the CSP to persistent storage.
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
Table 13 Security Parameters Access Rights within Services
Service CSPs and Public Keys
CO
pw
Static
DH
private
key
Static
DH
public
key
Eph
DH
private
key
Eph
DH
public
key
Session
key,
current
Session
key,
next
MacKey
Seed
bits
DRBG
state
Storage
extension
key
Other
party
static
DH
public
key
Other
party
Eph
DH
public
key
Fw
auth
key
Initialize W G G GW
Reset EZ Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Cold boot E Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Update firmware E Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z W
Run self-tests E
Start pairing E GWE GWE GEZ GE E
Complete pairing E E R E WE
Set parameters E
Clear event counters E
Change password EW
Reset upon uninstall Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Run power-on self-tests
Respond to status
requests R R R
Indicate events and
alarms
Key agreement E GR GEZ GR G G GEZ GEZ GE E EZ EZ
Encrypt network link E E
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Service CSPs and Public Keys
CO
pw
Static
DH
private
key
Static
DH
public
key
Eph
DH
private
key
Eph
DH
public
key
Session
key,
current
Session
key,
next
MacKey
Seed
bits
DRBG
state
Storage
extension
key
Other
party
static
DH
public
key
Other
party
Eph
DH
public
key
Fw
auth
key
Copy firmware
Validate new firmware E
The services to indicate events and alarms do not interact with CSPs. The service to respond to status requests does
not interact with CSPs.
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3.5 Concurrent Operations
These services do not allow any other service to run concurrently:
• Reset upon uninstall
• Run power-on self-tests
• Initialize
• Reset
• Cold boot
• Update firmware
• Run self-tests
The service "Encrypt network link" can operate concurrently with these in-operation services:
• Start pairing (if prior pairing and operations produced valid session key)
• Complete pairing (if prior pairing and operations produced valid session key)
• Key agreement
• Set parameters
• Clear event counters
• Change password
• Respond to status requests
• Indicate events and alarms
• Copy firmware
• Validate new firmware
4 Self-Tests
The module performs self-tests to ensure the proper operation of the module. Per FIPS 140-2 these are categorized as
either power-on self-tests or conditional tests.
4.1 Power-on Self-Tests
Power-on self-tests are available on demand by power cycling the module, or by an authenticated command from the
Cryptographic Officer. The module inhibits all data outputs while in the power-on self-test state.
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The module performs the following algorithm known-answer tests (KATs) during power-on self-tests:
• RSASSA-PSS with SHA-256 signature verification with 3072-bit modulus
• Modular exponentiation for DH key agreement with 2048-bit operands
• CTR_DRBG SP 800-90A health tests for Instantiate, Reseed, and Generate functions
• SHA-256
• SHA-512
• AES-128 ECB encrypt and decrypt (firmware implementation)
• AES-256 ECB encrypt and decrypt (firmware implementation, decryption not used in subsequent operations)
• HMAC-SHA-256
• AES-256 ECB encrypt (FPGA implementation)
The module performs a firmware integrity test with SHA-256 over code in non-volatile memory.
All of the above tests must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography or CSPs by the module. If
any test fails, the module enters the power-on self-test error state and disables data output and cryptographic
functions with CSPs. The front panel LEDs illuminate red to indicate error status. The power-on self-test error state can
be cleared by a successful re-execution of the power-on self-tests.
Successful completion of power-on self-tests is indicated by yellow and green front panel LED illumination, as detailed
in user documentation.
Status messages for power-on self-test success and failure are sent from the module over the backplane interface to
the shelf control unit, which makes information available for display on local and remote user interfaces.
4.2 Conditional Tests
Conditional tests are performed when the related service operates.
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The module performs the following conditional self-tests as indicated:
• Firmware load test via digital signature verification on candidate firmware update image (RSASSA-PSS with
SHA-256 and modulus lengths of 2048, 3072, or 4096 bits)
• Seed source repetition count test on each output block (IG 9.8)
• Static and ephemeral DH private and public key pairwise consistency test on each key generation
4.3 Response to Conditional Test Failures
A failure of the firmware load test results in continued operation with the current firmware image and refusal to
execute the failed candidate image.
The module enters a time-limited-encryption state in which further key agreement attempts are suspended upon
failure of these conditional tests:
• seed sources, DRBG functions, or properties of internally generated DH keys
• repeated failures in shared secret verification
While in a time-limited-encryption state that suspends further key agreement, the module continues to supply network
link encryption and decryption services with the current valid session key material until expiration of that material. In
the absence of valid key material, the module replaces user data with dummy replacement data at the data output
interfaces.
A front panel LED illuminates yellow to indicate suspended key agreement status, as detailed in user documentation.
The suspended key agreement state can be cleared by an authenticated command from the Cryptographic Officer, or
by successful execution of power-on self-tests.
Successful completion of conditional tests is indicated by green front panel LED illumination, as detailed in user
documentation.
Status messages for conditional test failures, for key agreement success, and for firmware update status are sent from
the module over the backplane interface to the shelf control unit, which makes information available for display on
local and remote user interfaces.
5 Physical Security Policy
The module is designed for use in an ADVA FSP3000 shelf deployed in a typical data center or telecommunication
equipment office. The facility should incorporate appropriate controls, including administrative policies and procedures,
physical and environmental controls, information and data controls, software acquisition controls, and contingency
planning. It is assumed that the facility's security controls restrict the equipment and time that an attacker can have at
the module's location.
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Encryption Module with FSP
3000 Shelf
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In addition to the above, the module itself has tamper-evident seals. Refer to Section 5.2 "Physical Inspection".
5.1 EMI/EMC
The module, when installed per this security policy, complies with the EMI/EMC requirements of 47 CFR FCC Part 15,
Subpart B, Class A (Business use) equipment.
5.2 Physical Inspection
Table 14 Physical Security Inspection Guidelines
Physical Security Mechanism
Recommended Frequency of
Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Factory-applied seals on shipping
packaging, quantity one (1)
Upon initial receipt of card
Inspect the factory-applied seal on the card's shipping
bag that protects the module from electrostatic
discharge (ESD). Confirm that labeled hardware
versions match the values in release notes and this
security policy.
Factory-applied tamper-evident
seals, quantity six (6)
Upon module installation and at any physical
reconfiguration of hardware in the hosting
shelf
Inspect factory-applied seals on card to confirm the
card has not been tampered with since leaving the
factory. Inspect connector pins to confirm no
unauthorized connections have been added. Install
card to its authorized position in the shelf.
CO-applied tamper-evident seals,
quantity four (4) or six (6) seals on
shelf depending on shelf type,
quantity one (1) seal on CFP
transceiver, and quantity one (1) wire
seal
Monthly, or after any log event that indicates
a card removal condition or absence of the
CFP form factor pluggable subassembly
Apply and inspect seals to confirm that the card has not
been moved from its authorized position in the shelf.
Apply and inspect seals on front panel pluggable
transceivers to confirm that the pluggable transceivers
have not been removed to expose control inputs.
Inspect seals on the shelf chassis to confirm that covers
have not been removed to expose control inputs, such
as CO password material on the backplane during
Initialization. Monitor event logs for unexplained errors
in key agreement or decryption services.
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Encryption Module with FSP
3000 Shelf
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Figure 13 shows a factory-applied seal on the ESD-protective bag.
Figure 13 Tamper-Evident Seal on ESD bag
Figure 14 shows the six (6) factory-applied tamper-evident seals on the card assembly.
Figure 14 Factory-Applied Tamper Seals on WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F Card
5.3 Cryptographic Officer-applied Tamper-Evident Seals
To provide assurance that module control inputs are connected only to authorized signals on the backplane and front
panel pluggable transceivers, the Cryptographic Officer must apply four (4) or six (6) adhesive tamper-evident seals
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(depending on shelf type) to the host shelf, one (1) adhesive tamper-evident seal on the installed pluggable CFP
transceiver, and one (1) wire seal through cross-drilled mounting screws.
The Cryptographic Officer is responsible for securing and having control at all times of any unused seals, and for direct
control and observation of module installation.
If tamper evidence is found on a seal and is not known to be due to authorized card installation and removal activities,
the Cryptographic Officer should remove optical client data connections from the module and from the far-end peer
module. The far-end peer module should be commanded to reset to its factory state to zeroize trust values and
shared secrets. The module with tamper evidence should be replaced with a trusted unit, after which the optical client
data connections at the local and far-end can be reconnected, and services resumed.
5.3.1 Types of Tamper-Evident Seals
5.3.1.1 General Purpose Tamper-Evident Seal
Figure 15 shows a general purpose tamper-evident seal for application at different positions on the shelf chassis and
card. The general purpose tamper-evident seal is ADVA part number 1013700030-01. When applied to seams or over
access points, the tamper-evident seal will show visible damage if parts forming a seam are displaced or if the seal is
punctured or removed to provide access.
Figure 15 General Purpose Tamper-Evident Seal
5.3.1.2 CFP Tamper-Evident Seal
Figure 16 shows a tamper-evident seal for application to the CFP pluggable transceiver that is inserted at the card front
panel to implement the network side optical to electrical interface. The CFP tamper-evident seal is ADVA part number
1013700031-01. If the pluggable CFP transceiver is removed from the module front panel, the tamper-evident seal will
show visible damage.
Figure 16 CFP Tamper-Evident Seal
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5.3.1.3 Tamper-Evident Wire Seal
Figure 17 shows a tamper-evident wire seal with a plastic body for application on mechanical assemblies that have
security parts with aligned holes. The tamper-evident wire seal is ADVA part number 1013700032-01. When properly
sealed, the wire is threaded through the aligned holes, and the seal or wire must be broken to disassemble the secured
parts.
Figure 17 Tamper-Evident Wire Seal
5.3.2 Instructions for Applying Tamper-Evident Seals
For seals that adhere to surfaces:
• Handle seals with care.
• Do not touch the adhesive side.
• Before applying the seal, ensure the location for the application is clean, dry, and clear of any residue.
• Carefully align the seal in position before first contacting the application surface.
• Place the seal on the application surface and apply firm pressure to ensure adhesion.
Tamper evidence function is available immediately after seal application. The adhesive cures for up to 72 hours before
it reaches complete stability.
For wire seals:
• Handle seals with care.
• Do not bend the seal handle.
• Feed the seal wire through the cross-holes in screws and chassis blocks according to user documentation for
the combination of card and shelf chassis.
• Feed each seal wire end through one of the two cross-holes of the seal body until approximately 2 cm (1 inch)
of wire passes through the seal body.
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• Twist the seal handle clockwise until all seal wire is coiled completely into the seal body and the seal handle
cannot be twisted further without breaking parts.
• Remove the seal handle by bending the handle toward the seal body.
5.3.3 Seals on 1U Shelf with Front DC Power Access
The figures in this section show the locations of seals on the model F7/SH1HU-HP/2DC shelf and model
F7/SH1HU-HP/E-TEMP/2DC shelf. The figures show locations of the general purpose tamper-evident seal, ADVA part
number 1013700030-01.
Use four (4) seals on the 1U shelves with front DC power access. The seal locations are marked in Figure 18:
• Seal #1: at the top cover and side wall by the power supply.
• Seal #2: at the top cover near the center of the front panel area.
• Seal #3: at the top cover and side wall on the side opposite the power supply.
• Seal #4: at the bottom and rear surfaces near the center of the rear panel area.
Figure 18 Seal Locations on 1U Shelf with Front DC Power Access
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See Figure 19 for a close-up view of seal #1's location on the 1U shelf with front DC power access. The seal must be
placed on the top cover at the front left edge and must wrap onto the left side.
Figure 19 Detail of Seal #1 Location on 1U Shelf with Front DC Power Access
See Figure 20 for a close-up view of seal #2’s location on the 1U shelf with front DC power access. The seal must be
placed on the top cover near the center of the front panel area to cover the "Guarantee Void" label, which in turn
covers the screw that holds the chassis card slot separator.
Figure 20 Detail of Seal #2 Location on 1U Shelf with Front DC Power Access
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See Figure 21 for a close-up view of seal #3’s location on the 1U shelf with front DC power access. The seal must be
placed on the top cover near the middle of the right edge, about 2/5 of the way from the rear, and must wrap onto
the right side between the air outlets.
Figure 21 Detail of Seal #3 Location on 1U Shelf with Front DC Power Access
See Figure 22 for a close-up view of seal #4's location on the 1U shelf with front DC power access. The seal must be
placed on the bottom and rear surfaces near the center screw about 2 to 4 cm toward the ground lugs.
Figure 22 Detail of Seal #4 Location on 1U Shelf with Front DC Power Access
5.3.4 Seals on 1U Shelf with Rear Power Access
The figures in this section show the locations of seals on the model F7/SH1HU-R/PF shelf. The figures show locations of
the general purpose tamper-evident seal, ADVA part number 1013700030-01.
Use six (6) seals on the 1U shelf with rear power access. Four (4) seal locations are marked in Figure 23 and two (2) seal
locations are marked in Figure 24:
• Seal #1: at the top cover on the side with the power supply.
• Seal #2: at the top cover near the center of the front panel area.
• Seal #3: at the top cover on the side opposite the power supply near the front.
• Seal #4: at the top cover on the side opposite the power supply near the rear.
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3000 Shelf
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• Seal #5: at the bottom cover on the side opposite the power supply.
• Seal #6: at the bottom cover on the side with the power supply.
Figure 23 Seal Locations on Top of 1U Shelf with Rear Power Access
Figure 24 Seal Locations on Bottom of 1U Shelf with Rear Power Access
See Figure 25 for a close-up view of locations for seal #1 and seal #6 on the 1U shelf with rear power access. Seal #1
must be placed on the top cover near the middle of the left edge and must wrap onto the left side between the air
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3000 Shelf
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outlets. Seal #6 must be placed on the bottom cover near the middle of the left edge and must wrap onto the left side
between the air outlets.
Figure 25 Detail of Seal #1 and #6 Locations on 1U Shelf with Rear Power Access
See Figure 26 for a close-up view of locations for seals #3, #4, and #5 on the 1U shelf with rear power access. Seal #3
must be placed on the top cover near the front of the right edge and must wrap onto the right side in front of the air
outlets. Seal #4 must be placed on the top cover near the rear of the right edge and must wrap onto the right side
behind the air outlets. Seal #5 must be placed on the bottom cover near the middle of the right edge and must wrap
onto the right side between the air outlets.
Figure 26 Detail of Seal #3, #4, and #5 Locations on 1U Shelf with Rear Power Access
See Figure 27 for a close-up view of seal #2's location on the 1U shelf with rear power access. The seal must be placed
on the top cover near the center of the front panel area to cover the "Warranty Void" label, which in turn covers the
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3000 Shelf
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screw that holds the chassis card slot separator. (Note: The white “Warranty Void” label shown in Figure 27 is not a
tamper-evident seal.)
Figure 27 Detail of Seal #2 Location on 1U Shelf with Rear Power Access
5.3.5 Seals on 9U Shelf
The figures in this section show the locations of seals on the model F7/SH9HU shelf. The figures show locations of the
general purpose tamper-evident seal, ADVA part number 1013700030-01.
Use four (4) seals on the 9U shelf.
Two (2) seal locations on the top of the shelf are marked in Figure 28:
• Seal #1: at the rear edge of the chassis top surface, covering the second screw from the left edge.
• Seal #2: at the rear edge of the chassis top surface, covering the second screw from the right edge.
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3000 Shelf
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Figure 28 Seal Locations on Top of 9U Shelf
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Two (2) seal locations on the rear of the shelf are marked in Figure 29:
• Seal #3: at the left side (as viewed from the rear) at about 2/3 the height of the removable rear cover,
wrapped around the edge to adhere to the rear and left covers.
• Seal #4: at the top about 1/3 of the chassis width from the left side (as viewed from the rear), wrapped around
the edge to adhere to the rear and top covers.
Figure 29 Seal Locations on Rear of 9U Shelf
5.3.6 Seals on Card Secured to Transceivers and Shelf
The figures in this section show the locations of seals on the WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F card.
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3000 Shelf
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Figure 30 shows the location of the CFP tamper-evident seal, ADVA part number 1013700031-01, on the CFP form
factor network interface transceiver.
Figure 30 Seal Location on CFP Transceiver in Card
Figure 31 shows the location of the tamper-evident wire seal, ADVA part number 1013700032-01. The wire is threaded
through the cross-drilled top mounting screws that secure the card in the 9U shelf.
Figure 31 Wire Seal Placement through Top Cross-Drilled Mounting Screws on Card in 9U Shelf
When the WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F card is installed in a 1U chassis, the two cross-drilled mounting screws that are
supplied at the bottom front position of the card must be moved to secure the neighboring cards or blank panels. This
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3000 Shelf
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allows a single wire seal to secure all the slots on the 1U shelf. The red arrow in Figure 32 shows the repositioning of
two cross-drilled screws, and the green arrow shows the repositioning of conventional screws.
Figure 32 Cross-Drilled Card Mounting Screw Positions on 1U Shelf
Figure 33 shows the position of the tamper-evident wire seal, ADVA part number 1013700032-01. Close-up detail is
shown in Figure 34. The wire is threaded through the four (4) cross-drilled screws at the front center of the shelf. One
cross-drilled screw secures each of the two (2) blank panels or cards on the left side of the shelf, and two (2) cross-
drilled screws secure the WCC-PCN-AES100GB-F card.
Figure 33 Wire Seal Placement through Four (4) Cross-Drilled Mounting Screws on Card in 1U Shelf
Figure 34 Wire Seal Placement Detail in 1U Shelf
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6 Operational Environment
The module has a non-modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions. The module includes a
firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware is only activated if the Cryptographic Officer
authorizes installation of the matching firmware version and the module successfully verifies a digital signature over the
firmware image. The module is FIPS-validated only when running firmware that has been validated on the module
through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP.
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
This section is not applicable. The module does not claim to mitigate any other attacks.
8 Security Rules and Guidance
This section documents the security rules for operation of the module to implement the security requirements of FIPS
140-2.
1. The module provides two (2) distinct authenticated operator roles: User and Cryptographic Officer, and an
unauthenticated role.
2. The module provides role-based authentication: password for Cryptographic Officer commands which affect
security and static Diffie-Hellman authentication for User operations.
3. The module clears previous authentications at the completion of each authenticated command and on power
cycle.
4. An operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role.
5. The module allows the operator to initiate power-on self-tests by power cycling the module or by issuing an
authenticated Cryptographic Officer command.
6. Power-on self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. Data outputs are inhibited during self-tests, zeroization, and error states. Data outputs are not connected to
key generation processes. Data outputs do not contain CSPs.
8. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the
module.
9. Zeroization performed by the reset and firmware update services operates on all CSPs.
10. The module supports the "Encrypt network link" User service concurrently with some in-operation services (see
Section 3.5 "Concurrent Operations").
11. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role, or a bypass mode.
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12. The module does not support manual key entry.
13. The module interfaces with the ADVA NCU and ADVA SCU via the shelf backplane for control and status
input/output. The module interfaces with industry standard optical transponders for input/output of client and
network data.
14. The module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs; the CO password is entered as a hash value.
15. The module does not output intermediate key values.
16. The operator must apply the tamper seals as indicated in Section 5.3 "Cryptographic Officer-applied Tamper-
Evident Seals".
17. The Cryptographic Officer must select a password with a value that is robust against human and machine
guessing, for instance by using an entropy-seeded password generator program.
18. When changing the password from its factory-default value, the Cryptographic Officer should confirm that the
shelf backplane and local rack wiring has not been tampered with by an attacker, and that the communication
links for the user interface do not reveal plaintext contents of password change commands.
19. The module automatically starts the "Encrypt network link" service and automatically reruns the "Key
agreement" service in the User role after the Cryptographic Officer has accepted trust of the other party
cryptographic credentials.
9 References and Definitions
Table 15 References
Reference Full Specification Name
[38A]
Morris Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation - Methods and
Techniques, NIST Special Publication 800-38A, December 2001. U.S. Department of Commerce,
National Institute of Standards and Technology.
[56Ar3]
Elaine Barker, Lily Chen, Allen Roginsky, Apostol Vassilev and Richard Davis, Recommendation
for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, NIST Special
Publication 800-56A Revision 3, April 2018. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of
Standards and Technology.
[57p1r4]
Elaine Barker, Recommendation for Key Management, Part 1: General, NIST Special Publication
800-57 Part 1 Revision 4, January 2016. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of
Standards and Technology.
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Reference Full Specification Name
[90A]
Elaine Barker and John Kelsey, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
Deterministic Random Bit Generators, NIST Special Publication 800-90A Revision 1, June 2015.
U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology.
[133r2]
Elaine Barker, Allen Roginsky, and Richard Davis, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key
Generation, NIST Special Publication 800-133 Revision 2, June 2020. U.S. Department of
Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology.
[140]
FIPS PUB 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001. U.S.
Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology.
[180]
FIPS PUB 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS), August 2015. U.S. Department of Commerce,
National Institute of Standards and Technology.
[186]
FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), July 2013. U.S. Department of Commerce,
National Institute of Standards and Technology.
[197]
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197 Specification for the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), November 26, 2001. U.S. Department of Commerce, National
Institute of Standards and Technology.
[198]
FIPS PUB 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), July 2008. U.S.
Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology.
[IG]
Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program, August 28, 2020. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Canadian Centre
for Cyber Security.
[RFC 3447]
Jakob Jonsson and Burt Kaliski, Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA
Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1, Internet Society Request for Comments 3447, February
2003.
Table 16 Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard (see [197])
CFP C Form-factor Pluggable transceiver interface
CKG Cryptographic Key Generation
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Cryptographic Officer
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Acronym Definition
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter mode of block cipher operation (see [38A])
DLC Discrete Logarithm Cryptography
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator (see [90A])
FC Name for an FFC parameter-size set (see Table 1 in [56Ar3])
FFC Finite Field Cryptography
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code (see [198])
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol for Secure Communication
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
KPG Key Pair Generation
NCU ADVA Network element Control Unit
OTU4 Signaling format specified in ITU-T Recommendation G.709
PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme (see [186] and [RFC 3447])
QSFP Quad Small Form-factor Pluggable transceiver interface
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman cryptosystem (see [186])
SCU ADVA Shelf Control Unit
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm (see [180])
SHS Secure Hash Standard (see [180])
SSH Secure Shell
VA Vendor Affirmed (see Section A.3 of [IG])