## Ruckus Wireless LLC Ruckus FastIron ICXTM 7150/8200 Series Switch/Router ## FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Page 1 of 59 ## Table of Contents | 1 General | ................................................................................................................................... 6 | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 1.1 Overview | .......................................................................................................................... 6 | | 1.2 Security Levels | ................................................................................................................. 6 | | 2 Cryptographic Module Specification ........................................................................................ | 6 | | 2.1 Description | ....................................................................................................................... 6 | | 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification .......................................10 | | | 2.3 Excluded Components .....................................................................................................15 | | | 2.4 Modes of Operation | .........................................................................................................15 | | 2.5 Algorithms | .......................................................................................................................15 | | 2.6 Security Function Implementations ..................................................................................16 | | | 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information | ....................................................................................21 | | 2.8 RBG and Entropy | ............................................................................................................22 | | 2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................22 | | | 2.10 Key Establishment | .........................................................................................................23 | | 2.11 Industry Protocols | ..........................................................................................................23 | | 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................23 | | | 3.1 Ports and Interfaces | ........................................................................................................23 | | 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication .......................................................................................24 | | | 4.1 Authentication Methods | ...................................................................................................24 | | 4.2 Roles | ...............................................................................................................................26 | | 4.3 Approved Services | ..........................................................................................................26 | | 4.4 Non-Approved Services | ...................................................................................................37 | | 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded | ................................................................................38 | | 5 Software/Firmware Security | ...................................................................................................38 | | 5.1 Integrity Techniques | ........................................................................................................38 | | 5.2 Initiate on Demand | ..........................................................................................................38 | | 6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................38 | | | 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements | ..........................................................38 | | 7 Physical Security | ....................................................................................................................38 | | 8 Non-Invasive Security | ............................................................................................................39 | | 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ..........................................................................39 | | | 9.1 Storage Areas | .................................................................................................................39 | | 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods | ..............................................................................................39 | | 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods | ................................................................................................40 | | 9.4 SSPs | ...............................................................................................................................40 | Page 2 of 59 | 9.5 Transitions .......................................................................................................................51 | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 10 Self-Tests .............................................................................................................................51 | | 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................51 | | 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests ....................................................................................................51 | | 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ........................................................................................56 | | 10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................58 | | 11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................58 | | 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ..........................................................58 | | 11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................59 | | 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance ..........................................................................................59 | | 11.4 End of Life .....................................................................................................................59 | | 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................59 | Page 3 of 59 ### List of Tables | Table 1: Security Levels | ............................................................................................................. 6 | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Hardware | ....................................................................11 | | Table 3: Modes List and Description | .........................................................................................15 | | Table 4: Approved Algorithms | ...................................................................................................16 | | Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms | ........................................................................................16 | | Table 6: Security Function Implementations | ..............................................................................21 | | Table 7: Entropy Certificates | .....................................................................................................22 | | Table 8: Entropy Sources | ..........................................................................................................22 | | Table 9: Ports and Interfaces | ....................................................................................................24 | | Table 10: Authentication Methods | .............................................................................................26 | | Table 11: Roles | .........................................................................................................................26 | | Table 12: Approved Services | ....................................................................................................37 | | Table 13: Storage Areas | ...........................................................................................................39 | | Table 14: SSP Input-Output Methods | ........................................................................................40 | | Table 15: SSP Zeroization Methods | ..........................................................................................40 | | Table 16: SSP Table 1 | ..............................................................................................................45 | | Table 17: SSP Table 2 | ..............................................................................................................51 | | Table 18: Pre-Operational Self-Tests | ........................................................................................51 | | Table 19: Conditional Self-Tests | ...............................................................................................56 | | Table 20: Pre-Operational Periodic Information | .........................................................................56 | | Table 21: Conditional Periodic Information | ................................................................................58 | | Table 22: Error States | ...............................................................................................................58 | | List of Figures | | | Figure 1: ICX 7150-24 | ................................................................................................................ 7 | | Figure 2: ICX 7150-24P | ............................................................................................................. 7 | | Figure 3: ICX 7150-48 | ................................................................................................................ 7 | | Figure 4: ICX 7150-48P | ............................................................................................................. 8 | | Figure 5: ICX 7150-48PF | ........................................................................................................... 8 | | Figure 6: ICX 7150-48ZP | ........................................................................................................... 8 | | Figure 7: ICX 7150-C12P | ........................................................................................................... 8 | | Figure 8: ICX 8200-24/ICX 8200-24P/ICX 8200-24F | .................................................................. 9 | | Figure 9: ICX 8200-24FX | ........................................................................................................... 9 | | Figure 10: ICX 8200-24ZP | ......................................................................................................... 9 | | Figure 11: ICX 8200-48/ICX 8200-48P | ....................................................................................... 9 | | Figure 12: ICX 8200-48F ............................................................................................................ | 9 | | Figure 13: ICX 8200-48PF/ICX 8200-48PF2 | .............................................................................10 | | Figure 14: ICX 8200-48ZP2 | ......................................................................................................10 | | Figure 15: ICX 8200-C08PF | ......................................................................................................10 | | Figure 16: ICX 8200-C08ZP | ......................................................................................................10 | | Figure 17: ICX 7150 Series | .......................................................................................................12 | | Figure 18: ICX 7150 Z-Series | ....................................................................................................12 | | Figure 19: ICX 7150 Compact Series | ........................................................................................12 | | Figure 20: ICX 8200 Series with fixed power supply and | fans ...................................................13 | | Figure 21: ICX 8200 Series with hot-swap power | supply and fans ............................................13 | | Figure 22: ICX 8200 Compact Series | ........................................................................................14 | Page 4 of 59 ##### Figure 23: ICX 8200 Fiber Series ..............................................................................................14 Page 5 of 59 ## 1 General ## 1.1 Overview This is a non-proprietary cryptographic module security policy for Ruckus FastIron ICX ™ 7150/8200 Series Switch/Router (hereinafter referred to as the module). The firmware version running on each module is IronWare OS 10.0.10. This security policy describes how the module meets the FIPS 140-3 Level 1 security requirements, and how to operate the module in an approved mode. This security policy may be freely distributed. FIPS 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3 -Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-3 standard and validation program is available on the NIST website at https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-modulevalidation-program. ## 1.2 Security Levels | Section | Title | Security Level | |-----------|-----------------------------------------|------------------| | 1 | General | 1 | | 2 | Cryptographic module specification | 1 | | 3 | Cryptographic module interfaces | 1 | | 4 | Roles, services, and authentication | 2 | | 5 | Software/Firmware security | 1 | | 6 | Operational environment | 1 | | 7 | Physical security | 1 | | 8 | Non-invasive security | N/A | | 9 | Sensitive security parameter management | 1 | | 10 | Self-tests | 1 | | 11 | Life-cycle assurance | 1 | | 12 | Mitigation of other attacks | N/A | | | Overall Level | 1 | Table 1: Security Levels ## 2 Cryptographic Module Specification ## 2.1 Description ##### Purpose and Use: The module delivers the performance, flexibility, and scalability required for enterprise access deployment. Module Type : Hardware Module Embodiment : MultiChipStand Page 6 of 59 ##### Module Characteristics : ##### Cryptographic Boundary: The Tested Operational Environment Physical Perimeter (TOEPP) is defined as the entire chassis unit's physical perimeter encompassing the "top," "front," "left," "right," 'rear' and "bottom" surfaces of the case as shown in the figures below and in the Physical Security section. The cryptographic boundary encompasses the entire TOEPP. This section illustrates the module hardware with the help of photographs. Figure 1: ICX 7150-24 Figure 2: ICX 7150-24P Figure 3: ICX 7150-48 Page 7 of 59 Figure 4: ICX 7150-48P Figure 5: ICX 7150-48PF Figure 6: ICX 7150-48ZP Figure 7: ICX 7150-C12P Page 8 of 59 Figure 8: ICX 8200-24/ICX 8200-24P/ICX 8200-24F Figure 9: ICX 8200-24FX Figure 10: ICX 8200-24ZP Figure 11: ICX 8200-48/ICX 8200-48P Figure 12: ICX 8200-48F Page 9 of 59 Figure 13: ICX 8200-48PF/ICX 8200-48PF2 Figure 14: ICX 8200-48ZP2 Figure 15: ICX 8200-C08PF Figure 16: ICX 8200-C08ZP ## 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ##### Tested Module Identification -Hardware: | Model and/or Part Number | Hardware Version | Firmware Version | Processors | Features | |----------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|------------| | ICX7150-24 | ICX7150-24 | IronWare OS 10.0.10 | ARM Cortex A9 (ARMv7) | | | ICX7150-24P | ICX7150-24P | IronWare OS 10.0.10 | ARM Cortex A9 (ARMv7) | | Page 10 of 59 Table 2: Tested Module Identification -Hardware | Model and/or Part Number | Hardware Version | Firmware Version | Processors | Features | |----------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|------------------------|------------| | ICX7150-48 | ICX7150-48 | IronWare OS 10.0.10 | ARM Cortex A9 (ARMv7) | | | ICX7150-48P | ICX7150-48P | IronWare OS 10.0.10 | ARM Cortex A9 (ARMv7) | | | ICX7150-48PF | ICX7150-48PF | IronWare OS 10.0.10 | ARM Cortex A9 (ARMv7) | | | ICX7150-48ZP | ICX7150-48ZP | IronWare OS 10.0.10 | ARM Cortex A9 (ARMv7) | | | ICX7150-C12P | ICX7150-C12P | IronWare OS 10.0.10 | ARM Cortex A9 (ARMv7) | | | ICX8200-24 | ICX8200-24 | IronWare OS 10.0.10 | ARM Cortex A55 (ARMv8) | | | ICX8200-24P | ICX8200-24P | IronWare OS 10.0.10 | ARM Cortex A55 (ARMv8) | | | ICX8200-24F | ICX8200-24F | IronWare OS 10.0.10 | ARM Cortex A55 (ARMv8) | | | ICX8200-24FX | ICX8200-24FX | IronWare OS 10.0.10 | ARM Cortex A55 (ARMv8) | | | ICX8200-24ZP | ICX8200-24ZP | IronWare OS 10.0.10 | ARM Cortex A55 (ARMv8) | | | ICX8200-48 | ICX8200-48 | IronWare OS 10.0.10 | ARM Cortex A55 (ARMv8) | | | ICX8200-48P | ICX8200-48P | IronWare OS 10.0.10 | ARM Cortex A55 (ARMv8) | | | ICX8200-48F | ICX8200-48F | IronWare OS 10.0.10 | ARM Cortex A55 (ARMv8) | | | ICX8200-48PF | ICX8200-48PF | IronWare OS 10.0.10 | ARM Cortex A55 (ARMv8) | | | ICX8200- 48PF2 | ICX8200- 48PF2 | IronWare OS 10.0.10 | ARM Cortex A55 (ARMv8) | | | ICX8200- 48ZP2 | ICX8200- 48ZP2 | IronWare OS 10.0.10 | ARM Cortex A55 (ARMv8) | | | ICX8200- C08PF | ICX8200- C08PF | IronWare OS 10.0.10 | ARM Cortex A55 (ARMv8) | | | ICX8200- C08ZP | ICX8200- C08ZP | IronWare OS 10.0.10 | ARM Cortex A55 (ARMv8) | | The module is a hardware module. The module's operational environment is limited. The module's firmware version running on each model is IronWare OS 10.0.10. The distinguishing features of each Hardware Model are detailed below: Page 11 of 59 Figure 17: ICX 7150 Series Note: The USB Port for external file storage is functionally disabled Figure 18: ICX 7150 Z-Series Note: The USB Port for external file storage is functionally disabled Figure 19: ICX 7150 Compact Series Note: The USB Port for external file storage is functionally disabled Page 12 of 59 Figure 20: ICX 8200 Series with fixed power supply and fans Note: The USB Port for external file storage is functionally disabled Figure 21: ICX 8200 Series with hot-swap power supply and fans Note: The USB Port for external file storage is functionally disabled Page 13 of 59 Figure 22: ICX 8200 Compact Series Note: The USB Port for external file storage is functionally disabled Figure 23: ICX 8200 Fiber Series Note: The USB Port for external file storage is functionally disabled Tested Module Identification -Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets): N/A for this module. Tested Module Identification -Hybrid Disjoint Hardware: N/A for this module. Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module. Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module. Page 14 of 59 ## 2.3 Excluded Components N/A for this module ## 2.4 Modes of Operation ##### Modes List and Description: Table 3: Modes List and Description | Mode Name | Description | Type | Status Indicator | |----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Approved Mode of Operation | The module is always in the approved mode of operation after initial operations are performed. | Approved | Global indicator after module initialization. Please refer to Security Policy, section Life-Cycle Assurance for more information | By default, the module is delivered in an un-initialized state but supports an approved mode of operation. Once the module is configured to operate in the approved mode of operation by following the steps in section " Life-Cycle Assurance" of this document by the Crypto Officer, the module can only operate in the approved mode. The module does not claim implementation of a degraded mode of operation. ## 2.5 Algorithms ##### Approved Algorithms: | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |--------------------------|-------------|--------------|-------------------| | AES-CBC | A5076 | - | SP 800-38A | | AES-CFB128 | A5076 | - | SP 800-38A | | AES-CTR | A5076 | - | SP 800-38A | | AES-ECB | A5076 | - | SP 800-38A | | AES-GCM | A5076 | - | SP 800-38D | | Counter DRBG | A5076 | - | SP 800-90A Rev. 1 | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) | A5076 | - | FIPS 186-5 | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) | A5076 | - | FIPS 186-5 | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) | A5076 | - | FIPS 186-5 | | HMAC-SHA-1 | A5076 | - | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2-256 | A5076 | - | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2-384 | A5076 | - | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2-512 | A5076 | - | FIPS 198-1 | | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 | A5076 | - | SP 800-56A Rev. 3 | | KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 | A5076 | - | SP 800-56A Rev. 3 | | KDF SNMP (CVL) | A5076 | - | SP 800-135 Rev. 1 | | KDF SSH (CVL) | A5076 | - | SP 800-135 Rev. 1 | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) | A5076 | - | FIPS 186-5 | | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) | A5076 | - | FIPS 186-5 | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) | A5076 | - | FIPS 186-5 | Page 15 of 59 Table 4: Approved Algorithms | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |----------------------------|-------------|--------------|-------------------| | Safe Primes Key Generation | A5076 | - | SP 800-56A Rev. 3 | | SHA-1 | A5076 | - | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-256 | A5076 | - | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-384 | A5076 | - | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-512 | A5076 | - | FIPS 180-4 | | TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (CVL) | A5076 | - | SP 800-135 Rev. 1 | ##### Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms | Name | Properties | Implementation | Reference | |--------|---------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | CKG | Key Type:Asymmetric | N/A | The module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys as detailed by example 1 in section 4 and section 5 of SP800-133r2 | ##### Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. ##### Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: N/A for this module. ##### Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. ## 2.6 Security Function Implementations | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |-----------------|--------------|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | KAS-ECC (SSHv2) | CKG KAS-Full | Full KAS-ECC Key Agreement used for SSHv2 service | Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of security strength IG:IG D.F Scenario 2, Path 2, Split | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A5076) KDF SSH: (A5076) Counter DRBG: (A5076) CKG: () | Page 16 of 59 | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |-------------------|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | KAS-FFC (SSHv2) | CKG KAS-Full | Full KAS-FFC Key Agreement used for SSHv2 service | 135rev1 CVL Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 200 bits of security strength IG:IG D.F Scenario 2, Path 2, Split Key Confirmation:No Key Derivation:IG 2.4.B SP 800- 135rev1 CVL | KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A5076) Domain Parameter Generation Methods: MODP-2048, MODP-4096, MODP-8192 Safe Primes Key Generation: (A5076) Safe Prime Groups: MODP- 2048, MODP- 4096, MODP- 8192 KDF SSH: (A5076) Counter DRBG: (A5076) | | KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2) | CKG KAS-Full | Full KAS-ECC Key Agreement used for TLSv1.2 service | Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 192 bits of security strength IG:IG D.F Scenario 2, Path 2, Split Key Confirmation:No Key Derivation:IG 2.4.B SP 800- 135rev1 CVL | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A5076) Domain Parameter Generation Methods: P-256, P-384 TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627: (A5076) Counter DRBG: (A5076) CKG: () | | KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2) | CKG KAS-Full | Full KAS-FFC Key Agreement used for TLSv1.2 service | Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of security strength | KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A5076) Domain Parameter Generation | Page 17 of 59 | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |------------------------|----------|------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | SSH-KTS (AES and HMAC) | KTS-Wrap | KTS via SSHv2 service by using AES and HMAC | Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of security strength Standard:SP 800- 38F IG D.G:"combination" method: use any approved symmetric encryption mode together with an approved authentication method | (A5076) CKG: () AES-CBC: (A5076) AES-CTR: (A5076) HMAC-SHA-1: (A5076) HMAC-SHA2- 256: (A5076) | | TLS-KTS (AES and HMAC) | KTS-Wrap | KTS via TLS v1.2 service by using AES and HMAC | Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of security strength Standard:SP 800- 38F IG D.G:"combination" method: use any approved symmetric encryption mode together with an approved | AES-CBC: (A5076) AES-ECB: (A5076) HMAC-SHA-1: (A5076) HMAC-SHA2- 256: (A5076) HMAC-SHA2- 512: (A5076) | Page 18 of 59 | Name | Type | Description | Properties authentication | Algorithms | |--------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------| | TLS-KTS (AES- GCM) | KTS-Wrap | KTS via TLSv1.2 service by using AES- GCM | method Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of security strength Standard:SP 800- 38F IG D.G:Uses a previously approved authenticated symmetric encryption mode | AES-GCM: (A5076) | | SSH RSA KeyGen | AsymKeyPair- KeyGen CKG | RSA KeyGen for SSHv2 | Keysize:112 bits encryption strength | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5076) Counter DRBG: (A5076) CKG: () | | SSH RSA SigGen | DigSig-SigGen | RSA SigGen for SSHv2 | | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A5076) | | SSH RSA SigVer | DigSig-SigVer | RSA SigVer for SSHv2 | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5076) | | SSH ECDSA KeyGen | AsymKeyPair- KeyGen CKG | ECDSA KeyGen for SSHv2 | Keysize:128 to 192 bits encryption strength | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5076) Counter DRBG: (A5076) CKG: () | | SSH ECDSA SigGen | DigSig-SigGen | ECDSA SigGen for SSHv2 | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A5076) | | SSH ECDSA SigVer | DigSig-SigVer | ECDSA SigVer for SSHv2 | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5076) | | TLS RSA KeyGen | AsymKeyPair- KeyGen CKG | RSA KeyGen for TLSv1.2 | Keysize:112 bits encryption strength | Counter DRBG: (A5076) RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5076) CKG: () | Page 19 of 59 | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |-------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | TLS RSA SigGen | DigSig-SigGen | RSA SigGen for TLSv1.2 | | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A5076) | | TLS RSA SigVer | DigSig-SigVer | RSA SigVer for TLSv1.2 | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5076) | | TLS ECDSA KeyGen | AsymKeyPair- KeyGen CKG | ECDSA KeyGen for TLSv1.2 | Keysize:128 to 192 bits encryption strength | Counter DRBG: (A5076) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5076) CKG: () | | TLS ECDSA SigGen | DigSig-SigGen | ECDSA SigGen for TLSv1.2 | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A5076) | | TLS ECDSA SigVer | DigSig-SigVer | ECDSA SigVer for TLSv1.2 | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5076) | | Block ciphers (SSHv2) | BC-UnAuth | Block ciphers for SSHv2 service | | AES-CBC: (A5076) AES-CTR: (A5076) | | Block ciphers (TLSv1.2) | BC-Auth BC-UnAuth | Block ciphers for TLSv1.2 service | | AES-CBC: (A5076) AES-GCM: (A5076) AES-ECB: (A5076) | | Block ciphers (SNMPv3) | BC-UnAuth | Block ciphers for SNMPv3 service | | AES-CFB128: (A5076) KDF SNMP: (A5076) | | MAC (SSHv2) | MAC | MAC for SSHv2 service | | HMAC-SHA-1: (A5076) HMAC-SHA2- 256: (A5076) HMAC-SHA2- 512: (A5076) SHA-1: (A5076) SHA2-256: (A5076) SHA2-512: (A5076) | | MAC (TLSv1.2) | MAC | Message Authentication for TLSv1.2 services | | HMAC-SHA-1: (A5076) HMAC-SHA2- 256: (A5076) HMAC-SHA2- 384: (A5076) | Page 20 of 59 Table 6: Security Function Implementations | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |-------------------------------------|---------------|----------------------------------------------------|--------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | MAC (SNMPv3) | MAC | Message Authentication for SNMPv3 services | | SHA2-384: (A5076) HMAC-SHA-1: (A5076) HMAC-SHA2- 256: (A5076) HMAC-SHA2- 384: (A5076) HMAC-SHA2- 512: (A5076) SHA-1: (A5076) SHA2-256: (A5076) SHA2-384: (A5076) SHA2-512: (A5076) KDF SNMP: (A5076) | | Firmware Load Test | DigSig-SigVer | Signature Verification for firmware load test | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5076) | | DRBG Function | DRBG | Used for DRBG generation | | Counter DRBG: (A5076) | | SNMPv3 Keying Materials Development | KAS-135KDF | Keying materials, used to derive SNMP session keys | | KDF SNMP: (A5076) | | TLS Keying Materials Development | KAS-135KDF | Keying materials, used to derive TLS session keys | | TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627: (A5076) | ## 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information ##### Notes: - The Module's AES -GCM implementation conforms to Implementation Guidance C.H scenario #1 following RFC 5288 for TLS. The Module is compatible with TLSv1.2 and provides support for the acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1, Section 3.3.1. The keys for the client and server negotiated in the TLSv1.2 handshake process (client_write_key and server_write_key) are compared and the Module aborts the session if the key values are identical. The operations of one of the two parties involved Page 21 of 59 in the TLS key establishment scheme were performed entirely within the cryptographic boundary of the Module being validated. The counter portion of the IV is set by the Module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. In case the Module's power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established. - In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic Module performs Cryptographic Key Generation as per section 5 in SP800-133 Rev2. The resulting generated seed used in the asymmetric key generation is the unmodified output from SP800-90A Rev1 DRBG. ## 2.8 RBG and Entropy | Cert Number | Vendor Name | |---------------|---------------------| | E192 | Ruckus Wireless LLC | Table 7: Entropy Certificates | Name | Type | Operational Environment | Sample Size | Entropy per Sample | Conditioning Component | |----------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------------------------------------|---------------|----------------------|--------------------------| | Ruckus IronWare 10.0.10 Entropy Source | Non- Physical | ARM Cortex A55 (ARMv8); ARM Cortex A9 (ARMv7) | 8 bits | 4 bits | N/A | Table 8: Entropy Sources Ruckus FastIron ™ IronWare 10.0.10 Entropy Source v1.0 is the entropy source used on each Ruckus FastIron ICX ™ 7150 and 8200 Series Router with firmware IronWare OS 10.0.10 to seed the approved DRBG. The noise source of entropy is periodic sampling of the highprecision CPU clock within the ARM CPU. There is no conditioning component applied on the output of the clock source. Health testing is implemented on the output of the noise source. The entropy source provides a minimum entropy of 4 bits per sample with the sample size of 8 bits. The module makes repeated calls to the entropy source after which the random data is loaded into a buffer. This buffer is used by the DRBG to get entropy input. Buffer size is big enough that the overall effective entropy is more than that is required for the DRBG instantiation. Similar implementation is done for DRBG reseeding. ## 2.9 Key Generation The module generates RSA, ECDSA, EC Diffie-Hellman, and Diffie-Hellman asymmetric key pairs compliant with FIPS 186-5, using a NIST SP 800-90Ar1 CTR DRBG for random number generation. In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic module performs CKG for asymmetric keys as per section 5.1 of NIST SP 800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed) by obtaining a random bit string directly from an approved DRBG. The random bit string supports the required security strength requested by the calling application (without any V, as described in Additional Comments 2 of IG D.H.). Page 22 of 59 ## 2.10 Key Establishment The module provides the following key/SSP establishment services in the approved mode of operation: - KAS-FFC Shared Secret Computation: - o The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-FFC shared secret computation. The shared secret computation provides between 112 and 200 bits of encryption strength. - KAS-ECC Shared Secret Computation: - o The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-ECC shared secret computation. The shared secret computation provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength. ## 2.11 Industry Protocols The module supports SSHv2, TLS v1.2, and SNMPv3 industrial protocols. No parts of the SSH, TLS and SNMP protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. Please refer to SSPs Table for more information. ## 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ## 3.1 Ports and Interfaces | Physical Port | Logical Interface(s) | Data That Passes | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Console port, Mgmt Port, PoE+ ports, Ethernet Ports, SPF/SFP+ uplink/stacking ports | Data Input | Data input into the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, and SNMPv3 service data. | | Console port, Mgmt Port, PoE+ ports, Ethernet Ports, SPF/SFP+ uplink/stacking ports | Data Output | Data output from the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, and SNMPv3 service data. | | Console port, Mgmt Port, PoE+ ports, Ethernet Ports, SPF/SFP+ uplink/stacking ports | Control Input | Control Data input into the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, and SNMPv3 service data. | | Console port, Mgmt Port, PoE+ ports, Ethernet Ports, SPF/SFP+ uplink/stacking ports and LEDs | Status Output | Status Information output from the module. | | N/A | Control Output | N/A | Page 23 of 59 Table 9: Ports and Interfaces | Physical Port | Logical Interface(s) | Data That Passes | |-----------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------------| | Power | Power | Provide the Power Supply to the module. | The module's physical perimeter encompasses the case of the tested platform mentioned in Table 2. The module provides physical ports which are mapped to logical interfaces provided by the module (data input, data output, control input, control output and status output) as above. ## 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ## 4.1 Authentication Methods | Method Name | Description | Security Mechanism | Strength Each Attempt | Strength per Minute | |------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Password- Based | The minimum length is eight (8) characters (94 possible characters). The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 1/(94^8) which is less than 1/1,000,000. As the module supports at most ten failed attempts to authenticate in a one- minute period, the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is 10/(94^8), which is less than 1/100,000. This calculation is based on the assumption that the typical standard American QWERTY computer keyboard has 10 Integer digits, 52 alphabetic characters, and 32 special characters providing 94 characters to choose from in total. | Password Based | The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 1/(94^8) which is less than 1/1,000,000. Please refer to Description section in this table for more details. | The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is 10/(94^8), which is less than 1/100,000. Please refer to Description section in this table for more details. | | RSA- Based Certificate | The modules supports RSA public-key based authentication | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5076) | With a minimum modulus size of 2048, the | For multiple attacks during a one- minute period, to | Page 24 of 59 | Method Name | Description | Security Mechanism | Strength Each Attempt | Strength per Minute | |--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | mechanism using a minimum of RSA 2048 bits, which provides 112 bits of security strength. The probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/(2^112) which is less than 1/1,000,000. For multiple attacks during a one-minute period, as the module at its highest can support at most 17,000 new sessions per second to authenticate in a one- minute period, the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 17,000 * 60 = 1,020,000/(2^112), which is less than | | probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/(2^112) which is less than 1/1,000,000. Please refer to Description section in this table for more details. | exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 8.65x10^31 (2^112 /60 = 8.65 x 10^31) attempts per second. Please refer to Description section in this table for more details. | | ECDSA- Based Certificate | 1/100,000. The modules support ECDSA public-key based authentication mechanism using a minimum of curve P- 256, which provides 128 bits of security strength. The probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/(2^128) which is less than 1/1,000,000. For multiple attacks during a one-minute period, as the module at its highest can support at most 17,000 new sessions per second to authenticate in a one- minute period, the probability of successfully authenticating to the | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5076) | With a minimum curve of P-256, the probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/(2^128) which is less than 1/1,000,000. Please refer to Description section in this table for more details. | For multiple attacks during a one- minute period, to exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 5.67x10^36 (2^128 /60 = 5.67 x 10^36) attempts per second. Please refer to Description section in this table for more details. | Page 25 of 59 Table 10: Authentication Methods | Method Name | Description | Security Mechanism | Strength Each Attempt | Strength per Minute | |---------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------| | | module within a one minute period is 17,000 * 60 = 1,020,000/(2^128), which is less than 1/100,000. | | | | The module implements role-based authentication. The module supports the Crypto Officer role and the User role. The module also allows the concurrent operators. ## 4.2 Roles Table 11: Roles | Name | Type | Operator Type | Authentication Methods | |-------------------|--------|-------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------| | Crypto Officer | Role | CO | Password-Based RSA-Based Certificate ECDSA-Based Certificate | | User | Role | User | Password-Based RSA-Based Certificate ECDSA-Based Certificate | | Port Config Admin | Role | Port Config Admin | Password-Based RSA-Based Certificate ECDSA-Based Certificate | Unauthenticated Users can run the self-test service by power-cycling the module by removing the power and re-applying. ## 4.3 Approved Services | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Function s | SSP Access | |--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------------| | Show Status | Provide Module's current status (return codes and/or syslog messages) | Global Indicator or syslog message | Command used to show Module's Status | Module's Operationa l Status | None | Crypto Officer Port Config Admin User | | Show Version | Provide Module's name and | Console message | Command to show version | Module's ID and versioning information | None | Crypto Officer Port Config | Page 26 of 59 | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Function s | SSP Access | |---------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | version information | | | | | Admin User | | Perform Self-Tests | Perform Self-Tests (Pre- operational self-test and Conditional Self-Tests) | Perform self-test completio n message | Command to trigger Self-Test | Status of the self- tests results | None | Crypto Officer User Port Config Admin Unauthentic ated | | Perform Zeroization | Perform Zeroization | Syslog message | Command to zeroize the module | Status of the SSPs zeroization | None | Crypto Officer - DRBG Entropy Input: Z - DRBG Seed: Z - DRBG Internal State V value: Z - DRBG Key: Z - User Password: Z - Crypto Officer Password: Z - Port Config Admin Password: Z - Firmware Load Test Key: Z - SSH DH Private Key: Z - SSH DH Public Key: Z - SSH Peer DH Public Key: Z - SSH DH Shared Secret: Z - SSH ECDH Private Key: | Page 27 of 59 | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Function | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | s | Z - SSH ECDH Public Key: Z - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: Z - SSH ECDSA Private Key: Z - SSH ECDSA Public Key: Z - SSH RSA Private Key: Z - SSH RSA Public Key: Z - SSH Session Encryption Key: Z - SSH Session Authenticatio n Key: Z - TLS DH Private Key: Z - TLS DH Public Key: Z - TLS Peer DH Public Key: Z - TLS DH Shared Secret: Z - TLS ECDH Private Key: Z - TLS ECDH | Page 28 of 59 | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Function s | SSP Access | |--------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Public Key: Z - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: Z - TLS ECDSA Private Key: Z - TLS ECDSA Public Key: Z - TLS RSA Private Key: Z - TLS RSA Public Key: Z - TLS Master Secret: Z - TLS Session Encryption Key: Z - TLS Session Authenticatio n Key: Z - SNMPv3 Authenticatio n Secret: Z - SNMPv3 Encryption Key: Z - SNMPv3 Integrity Key: Z | | Crypto Officer Authenticat ion | CO Role Authenticat ion | N/A | CO Authenticat ion Request | Status of the CO authenticat ion | None | Crypto Officer - Crypto Officer Password: W,Z | Page 29 of 59 | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Function s | SSP Access | |-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | User Authenticat ion | User Role Authenticat ion | N/A | User role authenticat ion request | Status of the User role authenticat ion | None | User - User Password: W,Z | | Port Config Admin Authenticat ion | Port Config Admin Role Authenticat ion | N/A | Port Config Admin role authenticat ion request | Status of the Port Config Admin role authenticat ion | None | Port Config Admin - Port Config Admin Password: W,Z | | Port Configurati on Mangemen t | Perform Port Configurati on | N/A | Commands to configure the port parameters of switch/rout er | Port configurati on completion status information | None | Crypto Officer Port Config Admin | | Account Mangemen t | Account Creation | N/A | Commands to create a new user account | Status of the new user accounts | None | Crypto Officer | | Configure SSHv2 Function | Configure SSHv2 Function | Global Indicator and SSHv2 configurati on success status message | Commands to configure SSHv2 | Status of the completion of the SSHv2 configurati on | SSH RSA KeyGen SSH ECDSA KeyGen DRBG Function | Crypto Officer - SSH RSA Private Key: G,W - SSH RSA Public Key: G,W - SSH ECDSA Private Key: G,W - SSH ECDSA Public Key: G,W - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E - DRBG Seed: G,W,E - DRBG Internal State V | Page 30 of 59 | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Function s | SSP Access | |--------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | value: G,W,E - DRBG Key: G,W,E | | Run SSHv2 Function | Execute SSHv2 Function | Global Indicator and successfu l SSHv2 log message | Initiate SSHv2 tunnel establishm ent | Status of SSHv2 tunnel establishm ent | KAS-ECC (SSHv2) KAS-FFC (SSHv2) SSH-KTS (AES and HMAC) SSH RSA SigGen SSH RSA SigVer SSH ECDSA SigGen SSH ECDSA SigVer Block ciphers (SSHv2) MAC (SSHv2) DRBG Function | Crypto Officer - SSH DH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH DH Public Key: G,R,W,E,Z - SSH Peer DH Public Key: W,E,Z - SSH DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Public Key: G,R,W,E,Z - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E,Z - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - SSH RSA Private Key: E - SSH RSA Public Key: R,E - SSH ECDSA Private Key: E - SSH ECDSA Public Key: R,E - SSH Session | Page 31 of 59 | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Function | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | s | Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - SSH Session Authenticatio n Key: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E - DRBG Seed: G,W,E - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E - DRBG Key: G,W,E - RADIUS Secret: W,E Port Config Admin - SSH DH Private Key: R,E - SSH DH Public Key: R,E - SSH Peer DH Public Key: R,E - SSH DH Shared Secret: R,E - SSH ECDH Private Key: R,E - SSH ECDH Public Key: R,E - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: R,E - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: R,E | Page 32 of 59 | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Function | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | s | - SSH RSA Private Key: R,E - SSH RSA Public Key: R,E - SSH ECDSA Private Key: R,E - SSH ECDSA Public Key: R,E - SSH Session Encryption Key: R,E - SSH Session Authenticatio n Key: R,E - DRBG Entropy Input: R,E - DRBG Seed: R,E - DRBG Internal State V value: R,E - DRBG Key: R,E - RADIUS Secret: W,E User - SSH DH Private Key: R,E - SSH DH Public Key: R,E - SSH Peer DH Public Key: R,E - SSH DH Shared Secret: R,E | Page 33 of 59 | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Function | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | s | - SSH ECDH Private Key: R,E - SSH ECDH Public Key: R,E - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: R,E - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: R,E - SSH RSA Private Key: R,E - SSH RSA Public Key: R,E - SSH ECDSA Private Key: R,E - SSH ECDSA Public Key: R,E - SSH Session Encryption Key: R,E - SSH Session Authenticatio n Key: R,E - DRBG Entropy Input: R,E - DRBG Seed: R,E - DRBG Internal State V value: R,E - DRBG Key: R,E - RADIUS Secret: W,E | Page 34 of 59 | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Function s | SSP Access | |-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Configure SSL over TLSv1.2 Function | Configure SSL over TLSv1.2 Function | Global Indicator and TLS v1.2 configurati on success status message | Commands to configure TLSv1.2 | Status of the completion of TLSv1.2 configurati on | TLS RSA KeyGen TLS ECDSA KeyGen DRBG Function | Crypto Officer - TLS RSA Private Key: G,W - TLS RSA Public Key: G,W - TLS ECDSA Private Key: G,W - TLS ECDSA Public Key: G,W - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E - DRBG Seed: G,W,E - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E - DRBG Key: | | Run SSL over TLSv1.2 Function | Execute SSL over TLSv1.2 Function | Global Indicator and successfu l TLS v1.2 log message | Commands to initiate TLSv1.2 | Status of the completion of TLSv1.2 establishm ent | KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2) KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2) TLS-KTS (AES and HMAC) TLS-KTS (AES- GCM) TLS RSA KeyGen TLS RSA SigGen TLS RSA SigVer TLS ECDSA KeyGen TLS | G,W,E Crypto Officer - TLS DH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS DH Public Key: G,R,W,E,Z - TLS Peer DH Public Key: W,E,Z - TLS DH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDH Private Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS ECDH Public Key: | Page 35 of 59 | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Function s | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | ECDSA SigGen TLS ECDSA SigVer Block ciphers (TLSv1.2) MAC (TLSv1.2) DRBG Function TLS Keying Materials Developm ent | G,R,W,E,Z - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E,Z - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS RSA Private Key: E - TLS RSA Public Key: R,E - TLS Master Secret: G,W,E,Z - TLS Session Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - TLS Session Authenticatio n Key: G,W,E,Z - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E - DRBG Seed: G,W,E - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E - DRBG Key: G,W,E - TLS ECDSA Private Key: E - TLS ECDSA Public Key: R,E | Page 36 of 59 Table 12: Approved Services | Name | Descriptio n | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Function s | SSP Access | |---------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Configure SNMPv3 Function | Configure SNMPv3 Function | Global Indicator and SNMPv3 configurati on success status message | Commands to configure SNMPv3 service | Status of the completion of SNMPv3 configurati on | Block ciphers (SNMPv3) MAC (SNMPv3) | Crypto Officer - SNMPv3 Authenticatio n Secret: W,E - SNMPv3 Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - SNMPv3 Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z | | Run SNMPv3 Function | Execute SNMPv3 Function | Global Indicator and successfu l SNMPv3 log message | Commands to initiate SNMPv3 service | Status of the completion of SNMPv3 establishm ent | Block ciphers (SNMPv3) MAC (SNMPv3) SNMPv3 Keying Materials Developm ent | Crypto Officer - SNMPv3 Authenticatio n Secret: W,E - SNMPv3 Encryption Key: G,W,E,Z - SNMPv3 Integrity Key: G,W,E,Z | | Firmware Load Test | Execute the Firmware Load Test | Global indicator and successfu l Firmware Loading status message | Commands to load new firmware image | Outcome of the Firmware Load Test | Firmware Load Test | Crypto Officer - Firmware Load Test Key: E | ##### Unauthenticated Services Unauthenticated Users can run the self-test service by power-cycling the module by removing the power and re-applying. ## 4.4 Non-Approved Services N/A for this module. Page 37 of 59 ## 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded The module also supports the firmware load test by using RSA 2048 bits with SHA2-256 (RSA Cert. #A5076) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module. A Firmware Load Test Key was preloaded to the module's binary at the factory and used for firmware load test. In order to load new firmware, the Crypto Officer must authenticate to the module before loading the firmware. This ensures that unauthorized access and use of the module is not performed. The module will load the new update upon reboot. The update attempt will be rejected if the verification fails ## 5 Software/Firmware Security ## 5.1 Integrity Techniques The module performs the Firmware Integrity tests by using CRC-32 during the Pre-Operational SelfTest. At Module's initialization, the integrity of the runtime executable binary file is verified using the following two integrity check mechanisms to ensure that the module has not been tampered: - Bootloader Integrity Test (CRC-32) - Firmware Integrity Test (CRC-32) If at the load time the CRC-32 value does not match the stored, known CRC-32 value, the module would enter to an Error state with all crypto functionality inhibited. In addition, the module also supports the firmware load test detailed in the 'External Software/Firmware Loaded' section above. ## 5.2 Initiate on Demand Integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed at power-on. The operator can power-cycle or reboot the module to initiate the firmware integrity test on-demand. This automatically performs the integrity test of all firmware components included within the boundary of the module. ## 6 Operational Environment ## 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements Type of Operational Environment : Limited ## 7 Physical Security The module is a multi-chip standalone hardware cryptographic module. The module meets the FIPS 140-3 Level 1 security requirements as production grade equipment. Page 38 of 59 ## 8 Non-Invasive Security No approved non-invasive attack mitigation test metrics are defined at this time. ## 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ## 9.1 Storage Areas Table 13: Storage Areas | Storage Area Name | Description | Persistence Type | |---------------------|---------------------|--------------------| | DRAM | Volatile Memory | Dynamic | | Flash | Non-Volatile Memory | Static | ## 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods | Name | From | To | Format Type | Distributio n Type | Entry Type | SFI or Algorith m | |---------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|---------------|----------------------|--------------|------------------------| | Peer Public Key Input | External (Outside of the Module's Boundary ) | Module | Plaintext | Automated | Electroni c | | | Module Public Key Output | Module | External (Outside of the Module's Boundary ) | Plaintext | Automated | Electroni c | | | Password/Secre t Input via SSHv2 encrypted by AES and HMAC | External (Outside of the Module's Boundary ) | Module | Encrypte d | Automated | Electroni c | SSH-KTS (AES and HMAC) | | Password/Secre t Input via TLS v1.2 encrypted by AES and HMAC | External (Outside of the Module's Boundary ) | Module | Encrypte d | Automated | Electroni c | TLS-KTS (AES and HMAC) | | Password/Secre t Input via TLS | External (Outside of the | Module | Encrypte d | Automated | Electroni c | TLS-KTS (AES- GCM) | Page 39 of 59 Table 14: SSP Input-Output Methods | Name | From | To | Format Type | Distributio n Type | Entry Type | SFI or Algorith m | |---------------------------|---------------------|------|---------------|----------------------|--------------|---------------------| | v1.2 encrypted by AES-GCM | Module's Boundary ) | | | | | | ## 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods Table 15: SSP Zeroization Methods | Zeroization Method | Description | Rationale | Operator Initiation | |----------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------| | Zeroization Command | CO issues zeroization service | the zeroization command will erase all SSPs stored in the DRAM or in the Flash of the module. | 'fips zeroize all' Command | Please note that the Firmware Load Test Key is only used for Firmware Load Test Authentication and not subject to the zeroization requirement. ## 9.4 SSPs | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generate d By | Establishe d By | Used By | |-----------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------| | DRBG Entropy Input | Used to seed the DRBG | 960 - at least 256 bits | Entropy Input - CSP | | | DRBG Function | | DRBG Seed | Used in DRBG Generation | 384 bits - 384 bits | DRBG Seed - CSP | | | DRBG Function | | DRBG Internal State V value | Used in DRBG Generation | 128 bits - 128 bits | DRBG Internal State V value - CSP | | | DRBG Function | | DRBG Key | Used in DRBG Generation | 256 bits - 256 bits | DRBG Key - CSP | | | DRBG Function | | User Password | User authenticatio n | 8-60 Character s - 8-60 Character s | Authenticati on Data - CSP | | | | | Crypto Officer Password | Crypto Officer authenticatio n | 8-60 Character s - 8-60 Character s | Authenticati on Data - CSP | | | | Page 40 of 59 | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generate d By | Establishe d By | Used By | |----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|--------------------| | Port Config Admin Password | Port Config Admin authenticatio n | 8-60 Character s - 8-60 Character s | Authenticati on Data - CSP | | | | | RADIUS Secret | RADIUS Server Authenticati on | 8-64 Character s - 8-64 Character s | Authenticati on Data - CSP | | | | | Firmware Load Test Key | Used for Firmware Load Test | 2048 bits - 112 bits | Public Key - CSP | | | Firmware Load Test | | SSH ECDH Private Key | Used to derive the SSH ECDH Shared Secret | Curves: 256, 384, 521 bits - 128 to 256 bits | Private Key - CSP | KAS-ECC (SSHv2) | | KAS- ECC (SSHv2) | | SSH ECDH Public Key | Used to derive SSH ECDH Shared Secret | Curves: 256, 384, 521 bits - 128-256 bits | Public Key - PSP | | KAS-ECC (SSHv2) | | | SSH Peer ECDH Public Key | Used to derive SSH ECDH Shared Secret | Curves: 256, 384, 521 bits - 128 to 256 bits | Public Key - PSP | | | KAS- ECC (SSHv2) | | SSH ECDH Shared Secret | Used to derive SSH Session Encryption Keys, SSH Session Authenticati on Keys | Curves: 256, 384, 521 bits - 128 to 256 bits | Shared Secret - CSP | | KAS-ECC (SSHv2) | KAS- ECC (SSHv2) | | SSH DH Private Key | Used to derive the SSH DH Shared Secret | MODP- 2048, MODP- 4096, MODP- 8192 - 112-200 bits | Private Key - CSP | KAS-FFC (SSHv2) | | KAS- FFC (SSHv2) | | SSH DH Public Key | Used to derive SSH DH Shared Secret | MODP- 2048, MODP- 4096, | Public Key - PSP | | KAS-FFC (SSHv2) | | Page 41 of 59 | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generate d By | Establishe d By | Used By | |---------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------|------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------| | | | MODP- 8192 - 112-200 bits | | | | | | SSH Peer DH Public Key | Used to derive SSH DH Shared Secret | MODP- 2048, MODP- 4096, MODP- 8192 - 112-200 bits | Public Key - PSP | | | KAS- FFC (SSHv2) | | SSH DH Shared Secret | Used to derive SSH Session Encryption Keys, SSH Session Authenticati on Keys | MODP- 2048, MODP- 4096, MODP- 8192 - 112-200 bits | Shared Secret - CSP | | KAS-FFC (SSHv2) | KAS- FFC (SSHv2) | | SSH RSA Private Key | Used for SSH session authenticatio n | Modulus 2048 bits - 112 bits | Private Key - CSP | SSH RSA KeyGen | | SSH RSA SigGen | | SSH RSA Public Key | Used for SSH sessions authenticatio n | Modulus 2048 bits - 112 bits | Public Key - PSP | | SSH RSA KeyGen | | | SSH ECDSA Private Key | Used for SSH session authenticatio n | Curve P- 256/P- 384 - 128-192 bits | Private Key - CSP | SSH ECDSA KeyGen | | SSH ECDSA SigGen | | SSH ECDSA Public Key | Used for SSH sessions authenticatio n | Curve P- 256/P- 384 - 128-192 bits | Public Key - PSP | | SSH ECDSA KeyGen | | | SSH Session Encryption Key | Used for SSH Session confidentialit y protection | 128-256 bits - 128-256 bits | Session Key - CSP | | KAS-ECC (SSHv2) KAS-FFC (SSHv2) | Block ciphers (SSHv2) | | SSH Session Authenticati on Key | Used for SSH Session | At least 160 bits - At least 160 bits | Session Key - CSP | | KAS-ECC (SSHv2) KAS-FFC (SSHv2) | MAC (SSHv2) | Page 42 of 59 | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generate d By | Establishe d By | Used By | |--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------| | | integrity protection | | | | | | | TLS ECDH Private Key | Used to derive the TLS ECDH Shared Secret | Curves: 256, 384 bits - 128 to 192 bits | Private Key - CSP | KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2) | | KAS- ECC (TLSv1.2 ) | | TLS ECDH Public Key | Used to derive TLS ECDH Shared Secret | Curves: 256, 384 bits - 128 to 192 bits | Public Key - PSP | | KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2) | | | TLS Peer ECDH Public Key | Used to derive TLS ECDH Shared Secret | Curves: 256, 384 bits - 128 to 192 bits | Public Key - PSP | | | KAS- ECC (TLSv1.2 ) | | TLS ECDH Shared Secret | Used to derive TLS Session Encryption Keys, TLS Session Authenticati on Keys | Curves: 256, 384 bits - 128 to 192 bits | Shared Secret - CSP | | KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2) | KAS- ECC (TLSv1.2 ) | | TLS DH Private Key | Used to derive the TLS DH Shared Secret | ffdhe204 8 - 112 bits | Private Key - CSP | KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2) | | KAS- FFC (TLSv1.2 ) | | TLS DH Public Key | Used to derive TLS DH Shared Secret | ffdhe204 8 - 112 bits | Public Key - PSP | | KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2) | | | TLS Peer DH Public Key | Used to derive TLS DH Shared Secret | ffdhe204 8 - 112 bits | Public Key - PSP | | | KAS- FFC (TLSv1.2 ) | | TLS DH Shared Secret | Used to derive TLS Session Encryption Keys, TLS Session Authenticati on Keys | ffdhe204 8 - 112 bits | Shared Secret - CSP | | KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2) | KAS- FFC (TLSv1.2 ) | Page 43 of 59 | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generate d By | Establishe d By | Used By | |---------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------| | TLS RSA Private Key | Used for TLS session authenticatio n | Modulus 2048 bits - 112 bits | Private Key - CSP | TLS RSA KeyGen | | TLS RSA SigGen | | TLS RSA Public Key | Used for TLS sessions authenticatio n | Modulus 2048 bits - 112 bits | Public Key - PSP | | TLS RSA KeyGen | | | TLS ECDSA Private Key | Used for TLS session authenticatio n | Curve P- 256/P- 384 - 128-192 bits | Private Key - CSP | TLS ECDSA KeyGen | | TLS ECDSA SigGen | | TLS ECDSA Public Key | Used for TLS sessions authenticatio n | Curve P- 256/P- 384 - 128-192 bits | Public Key - PSP | | TLS ECDSA KeyGen | | | TLS Master Secret | Used to protect TLS Session. Pre-master secret | At least 112 bits - At least 112 bits | Master Secret - CSP | | TLS Keying Materials Developme nt | KAS- ECC (TLSv1.2 ) KAS- FFC (TLSv1.2 ) | | TLS Session Encryption Key | Used to protect TLS Session. TLS Master secret | 128-256 bits - 128-256 bits | Session Key - CSP | | KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2) KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2) TLS Keying Materials Developme nt | Block ciphers (TLSv1.2 ) | | TLS Session Authenticati on Key | Used to protect TLS Session. TLS master secret | at least 112 bits - at least 112 bits | Session Key - CSP | | KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2) KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2) TLS Keying Materials Developme nt | MAC (TLSv1.2 ) | | SNMPv3 Authenticati on Secret | Used for SNMPv3 user authenticatio n | 8-20 character s - N/A | Authenticati on Secret - CSP | | | | Page 44 of 59 | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generate d By | Establishe d By | Used By | |-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------| | SNMPv3 Encryption Key | Used to protect SNMPv3 traffic confidentialit y | 128 bits - 128 bits | Encryption Key - CSP | | SNMPv3 Keying Materials Developme nt | Block ciphers (SNMPv 3) | | SNMPv3 Integrity Key | Used to secure SNMPv3 traffic integrity | At least 160 bits - At least 112 bits | Authenticati on Key - CSP | | SNMPv3 Keying Materials Developme nt | MAC (SNMPv 3) | Table 16: SSP Table 1 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duratio n | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |-----------------------------|------------------|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | DRBG Entropy Input | | DRAM:Plaintex t | Until Reboot | Zeroization Command | DRBG Seed:Used With DRBG Internal State V value:Used With DRBG Key:Used With | | DRBG Seed | | DRAM:Plaintex t | Until Reboot | Zeroization Command | DRBG Entropy Input:Used With DRBG Internal State V value:Used With DRBG Key:Used With | | DRBG Internal State V value | | DRAM:Plaintex t | Until Reboot | Zeroization Command | DRBG Entropy Input:Used With DRBG Seed:Used With DRBG Key:Used With | Page 45 of 59 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duratio n | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | DRBG Key | | DRAM:Plaintex t | Until Reboot | Zeroization Command | DRBG Entropy Input:Used With DRBG Seed:Used With DRBG Internal State V value:Used With | | User Password | Password/Secre t Input via SSHv2 encrypted by AES and HMAC Password/Secre t Input via TLS v1.2 encrypted by AES and HMAC Password/Secre t Input via TLS v1.2 encrypted by AES-GCM | Flash:Plaintext | | Zeroization Command | | | Crypto Officer Password | Password/Secre t Input via SSHv2 encrypted by AES and HMAC Password/Secre t Input via TLS v1.2 encrypted by AES and HMAC Password/Secre t Input via TLS v1.2 encrypted by AES-GCM | Flash:Plaintext | | Zeroization Command | | | Port Config Admin Password | Password/Secre t Input via SSHv2 encrypted by AES and HMAC Password/Secre t Input via TLS v1.2 encrypted | Flash:Plaintext | | Zeroization Command | | Page 46 of 59 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duratio n | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------| | RADIUS Secret | by AES and HMAC Password/Secre t Input via TLS v1.2 encrypted by AES-GCM Password/Secre t Input via | Flash:Plaintext | | Zeroization Command | | | Firmware Load Test Key | by AES-GCM | Flash:Plaintext | | N/A | | | SSH ECDH Private Key | | DRAM:Plaintex t | While SSH tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | SSH ECDH Public Key:Paired With SSH Peer ECDH Public Key:Used With | | SSH ECDH Public Key | Module Public Key Output | DRAM:Plaintex t | While SSH tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | SSH ECDH Private Key:Paired With | | SSH Peer ECDH Public Key | Peer Public Key Input | DRAM:Plaintex t | While SSH tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | SSH ECDH Private Key:Used With | | SSH ECDH Shared Secret | | DRAM:Plaintex t | While SSH tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | SSH ECDH Private Key:Derived From SSH ECDH Public Key:Derived From | Page 47 of 59 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duratio n | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |---------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------| | SSH DH Private Key | | DRAM:Plaintex t | While SSH tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | SSH DH Public Key:Paired With SSH Peer DH Public Key:Used With | | SSH DH Public Key | Module Public Key Output | DRAM:Plaintex t | While SSH tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | SSH DH Private Key:Paired With | | SSH Peer DH Public Key | Peer Public Key Input | DRAM:Plaintex t | While SSH tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | SSH DH Private Key:Used With | | SSH DH Shared Secret | | DRAM:Plaintex t | While SSH tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | SSH DH Private Key:Derived From SSH DH Public Key:Derived From | | SSH RSA Private Key | | Flash:Plaintext | | Zeroization Command | SSH RSA Public Key:Paired With | | SSH RSA Public Key | Module Public Key Output | Flash:Plaintext | | Zeroization Command | SSH RSA Private Key:Paired With | | SSH ECDSA Private Key | | Flash:Plaintext | | Zeroization Command | SSH ECDSA Public Key:Paired With | | SSH ECDSA Public Key | Module Public Key Output | Flash:Plaintext | | Zeroization Command | SSH ECDSA Private Key:Paired With | | SSH Session Encryption Key | | DRAM:Plaintex t | While SSH tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | SSH Session Authentication Key:Used With | | SSH Session Authenticatio n Key | | DRAM:Plaintex t | While SSH | Zeroization Command | SSH Session Encryption | Page 48 of 59 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duratio n | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | tunnel is on | | Key:Used With | | TLS ECDH Private Key | | DRAM:Plaintex t | While TLS tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | TLS ECDH Public Key:Paired With TLS Peer ECDH Public Key:Used With | | TLS ECDH Public Key | Module Public Key Output | DRAM:Plaintex t | While TLS tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | TLS ECDH Private Key:Paired With | | TLS Peer ECDH Public Key | Peer Public Key Input | DRAM:Plaintex t | While TLS tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | TLS ECDH Private Key:Used With | | TLS ECDH Shared Secret | | DRAM:Plaintex t | While TLS tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | TLS ECDH Private Key:Derived From TLS ECDH Public Key:Derived From | | TLS DH Private Key | | DRAM:Plaintex t | While TLS tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | TLS DH Public Key:Paired With TLS Peer DH Public Key:Used With | | TLS DH Public Key | Module Public Key Output | DRAM:Plaintex t | While TLS tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | TLS DH Private Key:Paired With | | TLS Peer DH Public Key | Peer Public Key Input | DRAM:Plaintex t | While TLS tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | TLS DH Private Key:Used With | | TLS DH Shared Secret | | DRAM:Plaintex t | While TLS tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | TLS DH Private Key:Derived From TLS DH | Page 49 of 59 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duratio n | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |---------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | Public Key:Derived From | | TLS RSA Private Key | | Flash:Plaintext | | Zeroization Command | TLS RSA Public Key:Paired With | | TLS RSA Public Key | Module Public Key Output | Flash:Plaintext | | Zeroization Command | TLS RSA Private Key:Paired With | | TLS ECDSA Private Key | | Flash:Plaintext | | Zeroization Command | TLS ECDSA Public Key:Paired With | | TLS ECDSA Public Key | Module Public Key Output | Flash:Plaintext | | Zeroization Command | TLS ECDSA Private Key:Paired With | | TLS Master Secret | | DRAM:Plaintex t | While TLS tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | TLS ECDH Shared Secret:Derive d From | | TLS Session Encryption Key | | DRAM:Plaintex t | While TLS tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | TLS Session Authentication Key:Used With | | TLS Session Authenticatio n Key | | DRAM:Plaintex t | While TLS tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | TLS Session Encryption Key:Used With | | SNMPv3 Authenticatio n Secret | Password/Secre t Input via SSHv2 encrypted by AES and HMAC | DRAM:Plaintex t | While SNMPv3 tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | SNMPv3 Encryption Key:Derive To SNMPv3 Integrity Key:Derive To | | SNMPv3 Encryption Key | | DRAM:Plaintex t | While SNMPv3 tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | SNMPv3 Authentication Secret:Derive d From | | SNMPv3 Integrity Key | | DRAM:Plaintex t | While SNMPv3 tunnel is on | Zeroization Command | SNMPv3 Authentication Secret:Derive d From SNMPv3 Encryption | Page 50 of 59 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duratio n | Zeroizatio n | Related SSPs | |--------|------------------|-----------|---------------------|----------------|----------------| | | | | | | Key:Used With | Table 17: SSP Table 2 ## 9.5 Transitions ##### SHA-1 The module includes an implementation of SHA-1 for hashing and message authentication. This implementation will be non-Approved for all uses starting January 1, 2031. User should move to SHA2, which is available in this module. ## 10 Self-Tests ## 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests Table 18: Pre-Operational Self-Tests | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | |---------------------|-------------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | CRC-32 (Bootloader) | N/A | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Module is in normal state | The module performs the Bootloader integrity test by using CRC-32 at the power up | | CRC-32 (Firmware) | N/A | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Module is in normal state | The module performs the Firmware integrity test by using CRC-32 at the power up | The modules perform the self-tests, including the pre-operational self-tests and conditional selftests. The module runs all self-tests without operator intervention. In the event that a self-test fails, the module will enter an error state, output an error message and follow up with a module reboot. The module permits operators to initiate the pre-operational or conditional self-tests on demand for periodic testing of the module by rebooting the system (i.e., power-cycling). ## 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests | Algorithm or Test | Test Properti es | Test Metho d | Test Type | Indicat or | Details | Conditio ns | |-----------------------------|--------------------|----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-----------|---------------| | AES-CBC Encrypt KAT (A5076) | 128 bits | KAT | CAST | Module is in normal state | Encrypt | Power Up | | AES-CBC Decrypt KAT (A5076) | 128 bits | KAT | CAST | Module is in | Decrypt | Power Up | Page 51 of 59 | Algorithm or Test | Test Properti es | Test Metho d | Test Type | Indicat or | Details | Conditio ns | |-------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|----------------|-------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------------|---------------| | | | | | normal state | | | | AES-GCM Authenticated Encrypt KAT (A5076) | 128 bits | KAT | CAST | Module is in normal state | Encrypt | Power Up | | AES-GCM Authenticated Decrypt KAT (A5076) | 128 bits | KAT | CAST | Module is in normal state | Decrypt | Power Up | | Counter DRBG Instantiate/Generate/Res eed KAT (A5076) | AES-128 | KAT | CAST | Module is in normal state | Instantiate, Generate, and Reseed KATs | Power Up | | HMAC-SHA-1 KAT (A5076) | SHA-1 | KAT | CAST | Module is in normal state | HMAC- SHA-1 | Power Up | | HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT (A5076) | SHA2- 256 | KAT | CAST | Module is in normal state | HMAC- SHA2-256 | Power Up | | HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT (A5076) | SHA2- 384 | KAT | CAST | Module is in normal state | HMAC- SHA2-384 | Power Up | | HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT (A5076) | SHA2- 512 | KAT | CAST | Module is in normal state | HMAC- SHA2-512 | Power Up | | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 KAT (A5076) | P-256 Curve | KAT | CAST | Module is in normal state | Primitive Z KAT | Power Up | | KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 KAT (A5076) | MODP- 2048 | KAT | CAST | Module is in normal state | Primitive Z KAT | Power Up | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) KAT (A5076) | Curve P- 256 | KAT | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power Up | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) KAT (A5076) | Curve P- 256 | KAT | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power Up | Page 52 of 59 | Algorithm or Test | Test Properti es | Test Metho d | Test Type | Indicat or | Details | Conditio ns | |--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------|-------------|---------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------| | RSA SigGen (FIPS186- 5) KAT (A5076) | 2048 bit modulus with SHA2- 256 | KAT | CAST | Module is in normal state | RSA SigGen KAT | Power Up | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) KAT (A5076) | 2048 bit modulus with SHA2- 256 | KAT | CAST | Module is in normal state | RSA SigVer KAT | Power Up | | KDF SNMP KAT (A5076) | N/A | KAT | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power Up | | KDF SSH KAT (A5076) | N/A | KAT | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power Up | | TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 KAT (A5076) | N/A | KAT | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power Up | | SHA-1 KAT (A5076) | N/A | KAT | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power Up | | SHA2-256 KAT (A5076) | N/A | KAT | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power Up | | SHA2-384 KAT (A5076) | N/A | KAT | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power Up | | SHA2-512 KAT (A5076) | N/A | KAT | CAST | Module is in normal state | N/A | Power Up | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) PCT (A5076) | Curve P- 256 | PCT | PCT | Module is in normal state | N/A | Performs all required pair-wise consisten cy tests on the newly generated | Page 53 of 59 | Algorithm or Test | Test Properti es | Test Metho d | Test Type | Indicat or | Details | Conditio ns | |--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------|-------------|---------------------------|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | keypairs before the first operation al use. | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 5) PCT (A5076) | 2048 bit Modulus | PCT | PCT | Module is in normal state | RSA | Performs all required pair-wise consisten cy tests on the newly generated key pairs before the first operation al use. | | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 PCT (A5076) | Curve P- 256 with SHA2- 256 | PCT | PCT | Module is in normal state | N/A | Performs all required pair-wise consisten cy tests on the newly generated key pairs before the first operation al use. | | KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 PCT (A5076) | MODP- 2048 | PCT | PCT | Module is in normal state | N/A | Performs all required pair-wise consisten cy tests on the newly generated key pairs before the first operation al use. | Page 54 of 59 | Algorithm or Test | Test Properti es | Test Metho d | Test Type | Indicat or | Details | Conditio ns | |-----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------|-------------|---------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------| | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) Firmware Load Test | 2048 bits with SHA2- 256 | KAT | SW/F W Load | Module is in normal state | N/A | When firmware has been uploaded to the module | | Entropy 90B Start-up Repetition Count Test (RCT) | Repetitio n Count Test | RCT | CAST | Module is in normal state | Designed to quickly detect catastrophic failures that cause the noise source to become "stuck" on a single output value for a long period of time | Power Up | | Entropy 90B Start-up Adaptive Proportion Test (APT) | Adaptive Proportio n Test | APT | CAST | Module is in normal state | Designed to detect a large loss of entropy that might occur as a result of some physical failure or environment al change affecting the noise source | Power Up | | Entropy 90B Continuous Repetition Count Test (RCT) | Repetitio n Count Test | RCT | CAST | Module is in normal state | Designed to quickly detect catastrophic failures that cause the noise source to become "stuck" on a single output value | Entropy data is generated from the Entropy Source - Continuou s | Page 55 of 59 Table 19: Conditional Self-Tests | Algorithm or Test | Test Properti es | Test Metho d | Test Type | Indicat or | Details | Conditio ns | |-------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------|-------------|---------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | for a long period of time | | | Entropy 90B Continuous Adaptive Proportion Test (APT) | Adaptive Proportio n Test | APT | CAST | Module is in normal state | Designed to detect a large loss of entropy that might occur as a result of some physical failure or environment al change affecting the noise source | Entropy data is generated from the Entropy Source - Continuou s | ## 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |---------------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------| | CRC-32 (Bootloader) | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | CRC-32 (Firmware) | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | Table 20: Pre-Operational Periodic Information | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------------| | AES-CBC Encrypt KAT (A5076) | KAT | CAST | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | AES-CBC Decrypt KAT (A5076) | KAT | CAST | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | AES-GCM Authenticated Encrypt KAT (A5076) | KAT | CAST | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | AES-GCM Authenticated Decrypt KAT (A5076) | KAT | CAST | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | Counter DRBG Instantiate/Generate/Reseed KAT (A5076) | KAT | CAST | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | HMAC-SHA-1 KAT (A5076) | KAT | CAST | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | Page 56 of 59 | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |-----------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------------| | HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT (A5076) | KAT | CAST | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT (A5076) | KAT | CAST | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT (A5076) | KAT | CAST | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 KAT (A5076) | KAT | CAST | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 KAT (A5076) | KAT | CAST | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) KAT (A5076) | KAT | CAST | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) KAT (A5076) | KAT | CAST | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) KAT (A5076) | KAT | CAST | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) KAT (A5076) | KAT | CAST | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | KDF SNMP KAT (A5076) | KAT | CAST | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | KDF SSH KAT (A5076) | KAT | CAST | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 KAT (A5076) | KAT | CAST | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | SHA-1 KAT (A5076) | KAT | CAST | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | SHA2-256 KAT (A5076) | KAT | CAST | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | SHA2-384 KAT (A5076) | KAT | CAST | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | SHA2-512 KAT (A5076) | KAT | CAST | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 5) PCT (A5076) | PCT | PCT | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) PCT (A5076) | PCT | PCT | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 PCT (A5076) | PCT | PCT | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 PCT (A5076) | PCT | PCT | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) Firmware Load Test | KAT | SW/FW Load | Recommend 60 Days | Reboot | | Entropy 90B Start-up Repetition Count Test (RCT) | RCT | CAST | N/A | N/A | | Entropy 90B Start-up Adaptive Proportion Test (APT) | APT | CAST | N/A | N/A | Page 57 of 59 | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |-------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------|----------|-------------------| | Entropy 90B Continuous Repetition Count Test (RCT) | RCT | CAST | N/A | N/A | | Entropy 90B Continuous Adaptive Proportion Test (APT) | APT | CAST | N/A | N/A | Table 21: Conditional Periodic Information ## 10.4 Error States | Name | Description | Conditions | Recovery Method | Indicator | |-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------| | Error State | If self-test tests fail, the module is put into an error state | Self-test failure | Reboot the module | System Halt | Table 22: Error States If any of the above-mentioned self-tests fail, the module reports the cause of the error and enters an error state. In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited. The only method to recover from the error state is to reboot the module and reperforming the self-tests, including the pre-operational software integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The module will only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre-operational firmware integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The table below shows the different causes that lead to the Error State and the status indicators reported. ## 11 Life-Cycle Assurance ## 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures The module meets all the Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-3. Follow the secure operations provided below to place the module in approved mode. Operating this module without maintaining the following settings will put the module operate in a non-compliant state. The module runs firmware version IronWare OS 10.0.10. This is the only allowable firmware image for this current approved mode of operation. The Crypto Officer shall load the FIPS 140-3 validated firmware only to maintain validation. Any firmware/software loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate, is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. The module is initiated into the approved mode of operation via the following procedures through the Command Line interface (CLI): 1. The Crypto Officer must login by using the default login password. 2. The Crypto Officer shall replace the default login password with a new one. 3. Enter into the configuration mode by using 'conf t' command. 4. Enable approved mode by using 'fips enable' command. 5. Create accounts for Port Config Admin role and User role respectively. Page 58 of 59 6. Configure SSH, TLS, and SNMPv3 services by using only approved algorithms listed above. 7. If using RADIUS server for roles authentication, please configure a secure TLS tunnel to secure traffic between the module and the RADIUS server. The RADIUS shared secret must be at least 8 characters long. 8. Disable the TFTP server. 9. Ensure that installed digital certificates are signed using approved algorithms. 10. Save the configuration. 11. Reload the module. 12. Verify the approved mode by using command 'fips show' (This command outputs the module's status. After the approved mode was enabled, the output would be 'approved mode: Administrative status ON ') . 13. The Crypto Officer shall load the FIPS 140-3 validated firmware only to maintain validation. Once the module has completed initialization into the approved mode of operation, the module automatically enforces a password change for the Crypto Officer. Any non-approved algorithms or security functions are rejected automatically by the module and an error message is output. ## 11.2 Administrator Guidance No specific Administrator guidance. ## 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance No specific Non-Administrator guidance. ## 11.4 End of Life Crypto Officers should follow the procedure below for the secure destruction of their module. Please note that this process will cause the module to no longer function after it has wiped all configurations and keys . 1. Access the module via SSH with Crypto Officer 2. Authenticate using proper credentials 3. Execute command: 'fips zeroize all' - a. Confirm command Module will begin zeroization process and wipe all security parameters and configurations. ## 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A for this module. Page 59 of 59