

**TITLE:** Luna® XPplus and Luna® XL/XLR and XL/XLR Premium Security Policies

**ABSTRACT:** This document describes the security policies implemented by the Luna® XPplus and XL/XLR and XL/XLR Premium modules and how the design of the modules enforce these policies.

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# 1. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1. Purpose

This document describes the security policies implemented by the Luna® XPplus and XL/XLR and XL/XLR Premium modules and how their design enforces these policies.

## 1.2. Scope

This document addresses the Luna XPplus and XL/XLR and XL/XLR Premium cryptographic module security policies.

## 1.3. Application

This document describes the security policies that apply to the following products:

1. Luna® XPplus
2. Luna® XL/XLR
3. Luna® XL/XLR Premium (Luna XL/XLR in FIPS 140-1- Level 3 Configuration)

## 1.4. Intended Audience

The intended audience for this document is the Chrysalis-ITS Engineering and Product Management Team, external agencies for validation or endorsement of the Luna XPplus and XL/XLR and XL/XLR Premium modules; selected industry partners; and potential users of these modules who want to understand the security policies of the product for FIPS-compliant operations.

The reader of this document should be familiar with the PKCS#11 standard defined by RSA Laboratories.

## 1.5. History of Revision

Revision	Date	Description
Original	November 29, 2001	Combined security policies for Luna XPplus and Luna XL/XLR modules.
1	January 9, 2002	Revised to include XLR references.
2	January 10, 2002	Revised to remove statement "there are no cloning capabilities" in description of XL/XLR Level 2 configuration.
3	April 12, 2002	Revised to address reviewer comments.
4	April 22, 2002	Minor edits

## 1.6. References

Document Number	Revision	Author	Title
CR-0529	5	Ken Baird	Luna® XPplus and Luna® XL Physical Security Design
CR-1368	1	Andres Garami	Luna® XLR Physical Security Design
PKCS#11	V2.10	RSA Laboratories	PKCS#11: Cryptographic Token Interface Standard, December 1999

## 1.7. Glossary of Acronyms / Abbreviations

<b>Shortforms</b>	<b>Longform Explanation</b>
CAV	Cryptographic Algorithm Vector
CCM	Custom Command Module
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
DAC	Discretionary Access Control
FPV	Fixed Policy Vector
KCV	Key Cloning Vector
I&A	Identification and Authentication
SO	Security Officer
SP	Secure Port
TPV	Token Policy Vector
UAV	User Authorization Vector

## 2. OVERVIEW OF THE LUNA XPplus, XL/XLR AND XL/XLR PREMIUM MODULES

Luna XPplus, Luna XL/XLR and XL/XLR Premium are cryptographic modules based on a board that is equivalent to two Luna CA<sup>3</sup> tokens with hardware cryptographic acceleration support. The XL/XLR is configured as a Level 2 stand-alone module. The XPplus and XL/XLR Premium operate as subordinate devices in conjunction with a Luna CA<sup>3</sup> token. Each module can support all cryptographic algorithms listed in Appendix A of this document.

The Luna XL/XLR module meets all FIPS 140-1 Level 2 security requirements when operated as a stand-alone module. The XPplus and XL/XLR Premium, operating in conjunction with a Luna CA<sup>3</sup> token, meet all FIPS 140-1 Level 3 requirements. The FIPS 140-1 Level 3 configurations require that the Luna CA<sup>3</sup> token act as the main device through which all access control, key generation and symmetric processing is performed. In order to log into an XPplus or XL/XLR Premium module in Level 3 mode, a user must first login to the Luna CA<sup>3</sup> as an SO or a normal user, then indirectly login to the XPplus or XL/XLR Premium module. Asymmetric processing, such as digital signature and signature verification, is offloaded to the Luna XPplus or Luna XL/XLR Premium module. For load balancing to occur, the necessary keys from the Luna CA<sup>3</sup> token are cloned to each module. However, once a Luna XPplus or Luna XL/XLR Premium module is disconnected from the Luna CA<sup>3</sup>, all sensitive information cloned to the module is zeroized.

When the Luna XL/XLR module is configured in a FIPS 140-1 Level 2 mode it will operate as a stand-alone device using standard keyboard entered passwords for login authentication. When in this state, the device will appear and behave like two Luna CA<sup>3</sup> tokens with the following exceptions: the Luna PED is not used for authentication (login); there are no M of N capabilities; and there are no permanent storage capabilities.

The Luna XPplus, XL/XLR and XL/XLR Premium modules have the ability to distinguish between two categories of authenticated users: super-users and normal users. The super-user category is referred to as the Security Officer (SO) and the normal user category is referred to as the user. The SO functions are available only to the SO; they allow the SO to manage the security policy of the module. Each user has their own authentication code initially assigned under control of the SO, which is used internally to protect the data and cryptographic keys the user owns.

## 3. SECURITY POLICY OVERVIEW

The security behaviour of the Luna® XPplus XL/XLR and XL/XLR Premium modules is governed by the following security policies:

- Operational Policy
- Identification and Authentication Policy
- The Token Access Control (TAC) Policy

- Physical Security Policy

These policies complement each other to provide assurance that cryptographic material is securely managed throughout its life cycle and that access to other data and functions provided by the product is properly controlled. Configurable parameters that determine many of the variable aspects of a module's behaviour are specified by the higher level Operational Policy implemented through two sets of policy parameters: the Fixed Policy and the Configurable Policy. They are described in sections 4.1 and 4.2

The Identification and Authentication policy is crucial for security enforcement and it is described in Section 5. The major security functional policy is the TAC policy. It is described in section 6, which also describes the supporting object re-use policy.

Security audit is not performed by the Luna products. It is assumed that audit is a function provided by the environment.

## 4. OPERATIONAL POLICY

The Luna XPplus, Luna XL/XLR and Luna XL/XLR Premium modules employ the concept of Operational Policy Vectors to control the module's overall behaviour. The vectors control access to certain critical operations, such as token cloning, and establish security-critical information, such as the maximum number of failed login attempts. The Operational Policy is comprised of two sub-policies, each implemented through a policy vector: the Fixed Policy (Fixed Policy Vector) and the Configurable Policy (Token Policy Vector). The Fixed Policy is set as part of the manufacturing process and cannot be modified once set. The Configurable Policy is set by the Security Officer as part of module initialization and can be changed by a subsequent module initialization operation.

### 4.1. Fixed Policy

The fixed policy is determined by the settings of the Fixed Policy Vector (FPV). The FPV contains the settings necessary to enforce policy rules that apply across a wide range of possible module usage scenarios and environments.

No user or SO can modify the FPV in a module. The FPV is put into the module when it is manufactured and remains in place until the module is destroyed or the firmware is erased. The integrity of the FPV is maintained through the same mechanism used to protect the executable code from being modified. This mechanism is a 32-bit Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) computation.

The format of the FPV is a 32-bit vector that is divided into four fields. These fields and their contents are defined in the following sections.

For each of the tables within this section, 'XL/XLR' represents the Luna XL/XLR product (Level 2 configuration) and 'XL/XLR P' represents the Luna XL/XLR Premium product (Level 3 configuration).

#### 4.1.1. Number of SO Login Fails Allowed

This field defines the number of consecutive failed login attempts that can be made by the SO before the module erases the flash memory to prevent illegal access to its contents.

This security measure prevents an impostor from cracking the SO's password. It is set to three (3) in the case of the Luna XL/XLR. It is not used in the Luna XPplus and XL/XLR Premium, as the XPplus and XL/XLR Premium uses a different authentication mechanism (see Section 5).

#### 4.1.2. Secret Key Policy Bits - FPV

The following table defines the flags that identify the security policies that are followed for secret key objects.

	Document Number	Change Level	Security Level	Page Number
	CR-1357	4	None	3

**Table 4-1 Secret Key Policy Bits - FPV**

Name	Description	Setting		
		XP+	XL/XLR	XL/XLRP
FPV_SECRET_KEY_SENSITIVE	This bit determines whether a secret key object must always be made sensitive or if it can be determined by the high-level application using the module. When this bit is set, all secret keys stored in the module are sensitive. The keys are encrypted when in the flash memory and they can be extracted outside of the module only in encrypted form using the LUNA_WRAP_KEY function. This bit must be set for FIPS-compliant modules.	1	1	1
FPV_SECRET_KEY_NO_CREATE	This bit determines whether a secret key object can be created by an external application using the LUNA_CREATE_OBJECT call, instead of being generated by the module. When this bit is set, an external application cannot create a secret key in the module; it is not possible to enter a secret key in plain text form in the module. This bit must be set for FIPS-compliant modules.	1	1	1

### 4.1.3. Private Key Policy Bits - FPV

The following table defines the flags that identify the security policies that are followed for private key objects.

**Table 4-2 Private Key Policy Bits - FPV**

Name	Description	Setting		
		XP+	XL/XLR	XL/XLRP
FPV_PRIVATE_KEY_SENSITIVE	This bit determines whether a private key object must always be made sensitive or if it can be determined by the high-level application using the module. When this bit is set, all private keys stored in the module must be flagged as sensitive whether or not the high-level application requested this flag when the keys were created. When this bit is set, all private keys are encrypted while stored in flash memory. This bit must be set for FIPS-compliant modules.	1	1	1
FPV_PRIVATE_KEY_NO_CREATE	This bit determines whether a private key object can be created by an external application using the LUNA_CREATE_OBJECT call, instead of being generated by the module. When this bit is set, an external application cannot create a private key in the module; it is not possible to enter a private key in plain text form in the module. This bit must be set for FIPS-compliant modules.	1	1	1

### 4.1.4. Token Security Policy Bits - FPV

The following table defines the flags that identify the security policies that dictate the behavior of the module in general.

**Table 4-3 Token Security Policy Bits - FPV**

Name	Description	Setting
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		XP+	XL/XLR	XL/XLR P
FPV_DOMESTIC_FLAG	This bit determines whether the module can be exported. When this bit is set, the module is configured for the domestic market and cannot be exported. This bit is verified internally every time a cryptographic function implying an encryption or a decryption is performed. If the bit is set, no restrictions exist on key sizes. If the bit is not set, a limitation of 56 bits is applied to any symmetric keys used for encryption or decryption, and a 512-bit limitation on asymmetric keys used for wrapping and unwrapping operations. Signature and verification operations are not restricted in terms of key lengths.	1	1	1
FPV_ENABLE_CLONING	This bit determines whether sensitive objects in the module can be "cloned" to another similarly enabled module. When this bit is set, cloning is enabled. For a Luna RA module, this bit is tested in conjunction with the FPV_RA_TOKEN bit to restrict the cloning of objects with the private key attribute set (i.e., CKO_PRIVATE_KEY).	1	1	1
FPV_USE_CAV	This bit is used by the firmware to determine if the CAV should be checked to validate the desired algorithm. Normally, this bit is clear, which assumes all algorithms are valid.	0	0	0
FPV_WRAPPING_TOKEN	This bit determines whether RSA private keys can be wrapped. When this bit is set, an RSA private key can be wrapped. <b>Note:</b> This setting ensures that a private key cannot be extracted from the token even in encrypted format	0	0	0
FPV_USE_M_OF_N	This bit defines whether the module can perform M of N activation. When this bit is set, the module can be configured to perform M of N activation.	1	0	1
FPV_USE_RAW_RSA	This bit determines whether RAW RSA operations can be performed in the module. When this bit is set, RAW RSA operations are allowed. RAW RSA provides access to RSA to perform encrypt and decrypt operations on data without any padding.	1	1	1
FPV_SPECIAL_CLONING	This bit determines whether the module allows the factory-default Chrysalis-ITS key cloning certificate to be replaced. When this bit is set, customers can create their own key cloning certificate.	1	1	1
FPV_ENABLE_CCM	This bit determines whether a Custom Command Module (CCM) can be loaded onto the module. When this bit is set, a CCM can be loaded onto the module. This bit must be cleared (i.e., zero) for FIPS-compliant modules.	0	0	0
FPV_CCM_PRESENT_FWUPDATE	This bit determines whether a CCM must be present before a firmware update operation is allowed to proceed. When this bit is set, a CCM must be loaded in the module to perform a firmware update. Additionally, the CCM must implement the PreModuleUpdate function. This bit is for an OEM version of Luna2 and does not apply to the Chrysalis-ITS labeled product.	0	0	0
FPV_FORCE_RSA_BLINDING	This bit determines whether the module must perform blinding, which introduces a random element to the time needed to complete an RSA operation. Blinding defeats timing attacks on an RSA operation. If this bit is set, the module will always use RSA blinding (the TPV_FORCE_RSA_BLINDING bit will have no effect).	0	0	0
FPV_PIN_MUST_USE_SP	This bit determines if the serial communication port must be used to enter an authentication code. When this bit is set, an authentication code can only be entered through the serial communication port. When this bit is cleared, authentication codes are entered via the host computer.	0	0	0
FPV_MOFN_MUST_USE_SP	This bit determines if the serial communication port must be used to enter the M of N secret. When this bit is set, the M of N secret can only be entered through the serial communication port. When this bit is cleared, the M of N secret is entered via the host computer.	0	0	0
FPV_KCV_MUST_USE_SP	This bit determines if the serial communication port must be used to enter the key cloning domain identifier. When this bit is set, the key cloning domain identifier can only be entered through the serial communication port. When this bit is cleared, the key cloning domain identifier is entered via the host computer.	0	0	0



Name	Description	Setting		
		XP+	XL/XLR	XL/XLR P
FPV_ALLOW_HA_RECOVERY	With this bit set, the High-availability recovery mode is enabled.	0	1	1

#### 4.1.5. Product Identification Bits - FPV

The following table defines the flags that identify the configuration of the product.

**Table 4-4 Product Identification Bits - FPV**

Name	Description	Setting		
		XP+	XL/XLR	XL/XLR P
FPV_XP_TOKEN	This bit determines if the module is used in an XP style functionality, thus allowing the KCV to be set indirectly (allows XP modules to get a CA <sup>3</sup> 's domain vector). This allows the module to be initialized as either a FIPS Level 2 or 3 device at InitModule time; all keys must be volatile.	1	0	0
FPV_LUNA_SSL_TOKEN		0	1	1
FPV_RA_TOKEN	This bit determines if the token has the RA functionality, which includes private RSA key extraction. In addition to the cloning restriction of private key objects (see FPV_ENABLE_CLONING), special component key wrapping is associated with the LUNA_MECH_3DES_ECB mechanism.	0	0	0
FPV_XPPLUS_TOKEN	This bit indicates that the module is built upon XPplus-style hardware. XPplus hardware has: asymmetric math accelerators; extra RAM; non-volatile RAM; tamper detection mechanisms which trigger interrupts and wipe non-volatile RAM.	1	1	1

## 4.2. Configurable Policy

The configurable policy is determined by the settings of the Token Policy Vector (TPV). The TPV contains the settings necessary to enforce policy rules locally in an organization. For example, one bit in the TPV defines whether the module can perform a signature operation using a signing key generated by an outside process or if it must use an internally generated key for this function. The TPV can be modified by the module's SO. The TPV contents are used by the internal code to validate the operations performed by the module's user.

The format of the TPV is a 32-bit vector that is divided into four fields of eight bits. These fields and their contents are defined in the following sections. Since the SO can modify any of these settings, the values provided below are the default values set during manufacturing.

For the tables within this section 'XL/XLR' represents both the Luna XL/XLR and the Luna XL/XLR Premium products.

### 4.2.1. Number of User Login Fails Allowed

This field defines the number of consecutive failed login attempts that can be made by a user before the user gets locked out or the user's data is erased. This security feature prevents illegal access to the user's data and keys: it prevents an impostor from cracking the user's authentication code on the token. Whether the user is locked out or the data is erased depends upon the "User Zeroize" bit. If the User Zeroize bit is disabled, too many failed login attempts results in the User getting locked out. In this case, a user must make a request to the SO to regain access to the token. The SO also provides a new password for the user. If the User Zeroize bit is enabled, too many failed login attempts results in the User being deleted. In this case, the User's identity and private data (including key material) are erased from the token. The SO must create a new user in order to continue. The new

user will have no association with the previous (deleted) user. The default setting of the User Zeroize bit is enabled.

#### 4.2.2. Minimum/Maximum Authentication Code Length

These two fields define the minimum and maximum length restrictions for a user's authentication code. These fields only apply to the Luna XL/XLR FIPS 140-1 level 2 module.

#### 4.2.3. Local Policy Bits - TPV

The following table defines the flags that identify the security policies that dictate the behavior of the users in the module.

**Table 4-5 Local Policy Bits - TPV**

Name	Description	Default Setting	
		XP+	XL/ XLR
TPV_USER_ZEROIZE	This bit determines whether the module can be zeroized by a normal user or if only the module's SO can zeroize the module. When this bit is set, it indicates that a valid module user can zeroize the module. When this bit is set, a user is zeroized after too many unsuccessful login attempts.	1	1
TPV_USER_FW_UPDATE	This bit determines whether the firmware can be updated by a normal user or if only the module's SO can update the firmware. When this bit is set, a normal user can perform the firmware update.	0	0
TPV_M_OF_N_ACTIVATION	This bit determines whether M of N activation is required for a user to gain access to the module. When this bit and the FPV_USE_M_OF_N bit in the FPV is set, the module is not activated until the required number of parts to a split secret has been entered.	0	0
TPV_KEY_ATTRIB_LOCK	This bit determines whether the flag attributes of a key can be modified once the key is a valid object in the module. When this bit is set, it indicates that the flag attributes of a key cannot be modified after they have been established. For example, if this bit is set and a DES key is created for encryption and decryption, these attributes cannot be changed to wrap and unwrap once the key exists in the module.	1	1
TPV_KEY_SINGLE_FUNCTION	This bit determines whether a key can be used to perform multiple types of operations (i.e., use a key for encrypting, signing, and wrapping). When this bit is set, it indicates that keys can be used only to perform single functions. For symmetric keys, a single function is considered to be a pair of related functions such as encryption/decryption, wrapping/unwrapping, or sign/verify	0	0
TPV_SIGNING_KEY_LOCAL	When performing a signing operation, the private key used may have been generated locally or provided by an external source. In most environments, it is preferable to have the signing/verifying key pair generated by the module and never extracted from it. However, in certain cases the signing keys are generated externally and loaded in the module for subsequent signature operations. When this bit is set, it indicates that externally generated keys cannot be used for signing operations performed by the module.	0	0

## 4.2.4. Local Policy Bits – Extended TPV

The following table defines the flags that identify the security policies that dictate the behavior of the users in the module.

**Table 4-6 Local Policy Bits – Extended TPV**

Name	Description	Default Setting	
		XP+	XL/XLR
TPV_FORCE_RSA_BLINDING	This bit determines whether the module must perform blinding on RSA operations. If the FPV_FORCE_RSA_BLINDING bit is on, RSA blinding is performed in the module regardless of this TPV bit. However, if the FPV_FORCE_RSA_BLINDING bit is clear, the TPV_FORCE_RSA_BLINDING bit determines if the module will use RSA blinding. When the bit is set, blinding is performed.	1	1 <sup>1</sup>
TPV_DISABLE_CLONING_BY_USER	This bit determines whether a user or both a user and the module's SO are permitted to clone sensitive objects when the FPV_ENABLE_CLONING bit is set. If the FPV_ENABLE_CLONING bit is clear, no cloning is permitted and the TPV_DISABLE_CLONING_BY_USER bit has no effect regardless of its value. If the FPV_ENABLE_CLONING bit is set and the TPV_DISABLE_CLONING_BY_USER is clear, both a user and the module's SO are permitted to clone sensitive objects. If the FPV_ENABLE_CLONING bit is set and the TPV_DISABLE_CLONING_BY_USER is set, only the module's SO is permitted to clone sensitive objects.	0	0
TPV_XP_MUST_USE_SP	This bit determines whether the module implements XP-type functionality. When this bit is set: all objects are stored in volatile memory; module KCV may be cloned from a different module; the module is dual mode (i.e., whether the SP is required is defined at module initialization time); and, object headers are always modifiable, even in non-modifiable objects.	0	0
TPV_ALLOW_HA_RECOVERY	If enabled by the Fixed Policy Vector, with this bit set, High-availability recovery is allowed.	0	0 <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> By default, the Extended TPV bit for RSA Blinding on a Luna XL/XLR is set as part of the manufacturing process. When initialized by Enabler, RSA Blinding is disabled for Luna XL/XLR.

<sup>2</sup> By default, the Extended TPV bit for HA Recovery on a Luna XL/XLR is disabled as part of the manufacturing process. When initialized by Enabler, the HA Recovery bit is set for Luna XL/XLR Premium and is left disabled for Luna XL/XLR.

## 5. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (I&A)

The Luna XPplus, Luna XL/XLR and XL/XLR Premium modules enforce an identity-based user authentication policy. Users are identified by a user number, with the Security Officer having a special user number assigned. The module also supports three user roles: Public, Token User and Security Officer. Public users are unauthenticated and unauthenticated and may perform a limited set of functions, such as opening a session with a module and performing pre-defined diagnostics. A Public user cannot perform any cryptographic functions. The Security Officer (SO) is a privileged role whose primary purpose is to initially configure the module for operation and to perform security administration tasks such as user creation. The Token User is the normal operational role given to authenticated users on the module.

**Note:** Token users also have a text-based name associated with them. The name corresponding to a particular user number can be queried from the module (in the case of the XL/XLR) or the host Luna CA<sup>3</sup> token (in the case of the XPplus and XL/XLR Premium).

### 5.1. Login

For a user to assume either the Token User or Security Officer role and perform cryptographic functions and other operations beyond those allowed for a Public user, the user must be identified and authenticated. For a Token User, the user number and valid authentication data (e.g., a password or the data stored on a Datakey device) must be provided to the module before access to private data and token services can be granted. For the SO, only valid authentication data is required. When M of N Activation has been enabled, as required by local security policy, no user can assume either the Token User or the Security Officer role before the M of N activation has been completed.

## 5.2. Authentication Data and Trusted Path

Authentication data can be provided in multiple forms. For the FIPS 140-1 Level 2 XL/XLR modules, it is in the form of a user-generated password or Personal Identification Number (PIN) that is normally entered via the keyboard of the host computer.

For the Level 3 configured modules, the indirect login process is used to authenticate to the module through a Luna CA<sup>3</sup> token. In this case, the primary form of authentication data is randomly generated by the host CA<sup>3</sup> token, stored on a PED key and entered by the user for authentication. The Luna CA<sup>3</sup> token requires that authentication data and M of N shares be entered using a trusted path separate from the host IT environment. In addition, as required by the settings of the Configurable Policy, they may also require the entry by the user of a separate user-generated authentication secret via the trusted path in addition to the randomly generated data.

The following steps describe the procedure that must be followed to configure the module into FIPS 140-1 Level 3 mode:

- select a Luna CA<sup>3</sup> token to be used as the authentication token for the module;
- ensure the authentication token has been initialized and has a 'User' on it;
- open a session on the authentication token;
- login to the authentication token as 'User';
- indirectly initialize the module with a call to CA\_InitIndirectToken;
- open a session on the module;
- login to the module as the SO using the call CA\_IndirectLogin;
- create a user on the module using the call CA\_InitIndirectPIN;
- subsequent user logins can now be performed using the call CA\_IndirectLogin following authentication to the Luna CA<sup>3</sup> token.

Note that a single Luna CA<sup>3</sup> token can be the authentication token for several modules. To accomplish this, indirectly initialize a number of modules without re-initializing the authentication token.

If the authentication token for a module is inadvertently re-initialized, it will no longer function for authentication through indirect login with the module. To continue using the module, the indirect initialization procedure must be repeated.

## 5.3. Limits on Login Failures

The Luna® XPplus, XL/XLR and XL/XLR Premium modules also enforce a maximum login attempts policy. The policy differs for an SO authentication data search and a Token User authentication data search.

In the case of a Token User PIN search:

- If "y" consecutive user logon attempts fail ("y" is defined by the SO in the Configurable Policy) the token flags the event in the user's account data and handles the event as described in section 4.2.1.

In the case of an SO PIN search:

- If three (3) consecutive SO logon attempts fail, the token is zeroized. It must be re-initialized to return it to operation.

#### 5.4. M of N Activation (XPplus and XL/XLR Premium)

If M of N activation is required by the Configurable Policy, “M” out of a total of “N” shares of a split authentication secret must be entered via the trusted path in order to activate the host Luna CA<sup>3</sup> for operation. The M of N secret and the shares are generated by the Luna CA<sup>3</sup> token.

### 6. TOKEN ACCESS CONTROL (TAC)

The Token Access Control (TAC) policy applies to all objects on the Token, in particular to private key and secret key objects, and covers the following operations:

- Create
- Read
- Copy
- Modify
- Destroy
- Generate
- Derive
- Wrap
- Unwrap
- Use (encrypt, decrypt, sign, verify)
- Clone

The policy is summarized by the following statements:


A user may perform an allowed operation on an object if one of the following two conditions holds:

1. The object is a “Public” object, i.e., the PRIVATE attribute is FALSE, or
2. The user owns the object.

Allowed operations are those permitted by the Fixed and Configurable Policy settings and the values of the attributes shown in Table 6-1.

The token does not allow for any granularity of ownership other than that of private or public (i.e., a data object cannot be owned by two users and restricted from other users). Also, ownership of an object implies full access rights to the object and those access rights cannot be individually assigned by the owner to other users (e.g., User1, as the owner of an object, cannot give read access to it to User2). Table 6-1 lists object attributes used in making TAC policy enforcement decisions, the values each can have and the impact of each attribute value on policy enforcement. These attributes may only be set and/or modified, within the restrictions established by the Fixed and Configurable Policies, by the SO and Token User.

**Table 6-1: Object Attributes Used in TAC Policy**

 Document Number	Change Level	Security Level	Page Number
CR-1357	4	None	10

Attribute	Values	Impact
PRIVATE	TRUE – Object is private to (owned by) the user identified as the Access Owner when the object is created	Object is only accessible to subjects (sessions) bound to the user identity that owns the object.
	FALSE – Object is not private to one user identity	Object is accessible to all subjects.
SENSITIVE	TRUE – Attribute values representing plaintext key material are not permitted to exist (value encrypted)	Key material is stored in encrypted form. For all FIPS-compliant products, this attribute is always TRUE.
	FALSE – Attribute values representing plaintext key material are permitted to exist	Plaintext key material is stored with the object and is accessible to all subjects otherwise permitted access to the object.
MODIFIABLE	TRUE – The object’s attribute values may be modified	The object is “writeable” and its attribute values can be changed during a copy operation.
	FALSE – The object’s values may not be modified	The object can only be read and only duplicate copies can be made.
EXTRACTABLE	TRUE – Key material stored with the object may be extracted from the token using the Wrap operation	The ability to extract a key permits sharing with other cryptomodules and archiving of key material.
	FALSE – Key material stored with the object may not be extracted from the token	Keys must never leave the token. Private Keys are always treated as if this attribute is FALSE.

## 6.1. Object Re-use

The access control policy is supported by an object re-use policy. The object re-use policy requires that the resources allocated to an object be cleared of their information content before they are re-allocated to a different object.

## 7. PHYSICAL SECURITY

### 7.1. Meeting FIPS 140-1 Requirements

To meet the requirements for physical security for multiple-chip standalone cryptographic modules as set out by FIPS 140-1, security level 3, Chrysalis-ITS provides the following physical security mechanisms. See CR-0529 and CR-1368 for details.

- The module circuitry meets production quality standards using standard passivation techniques, and is implemented as a production-grade, multiple-chip embodiment.
- The module is contained within an enclosure with a removable cover that provides protection for the circuitry within the cryptographic boundary from environmental and physical damage (meets level 1).
- When maintenance is to be performed, all plaintext secret and private keys and other unprotected Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) contained in the cryptographic module are zeroized automatically when the cover is removed (meets level 1).
- The module enclosure is opaque (meets level 2).

- Tamper-evident seals affixed to the enclosure will provide evidence of tampering if an attempt is made to remove the cover. Seals will cover one screw on each side of the bottom of the enclosure to ensure the unit may not be opened without tampering with the seals. In addition, the metal enclosure would be visibly damaged if access were to be attempted without removing all the cover mounting hardware (meets level 2).
- Removable screws that are outside the cryptographic boundary (such as those holding the enclosure to the bottom of the unit) are not protected in any special manner. Removable screws that are located within the cryptographic boundary are protected by closed/blind-threaded fasteners. (meets level 3).
- The module is contained within a strong metal enclosure (meets level 3).
- The module contains tamper response and zeroization circuitry that zeroizes all plaintext secret and private keys and other unprotected CSPs upon the removal of the cover. Furthermore, the circuitry is operational when the plaintext cryptographic keys or other unprotected CSPs are contained within the cryptographic module. The net result of zeroizing these parameters is that the appliance will cease to function (meets level 3).
- The module prevents undetected probing inside the enclosure by means of an interior baffle arrangement. This baffle arrangement either prevents or deflects any probe from accessing the hardware within the cryptographic boundary. This protection is not provided in front of the fan; instead, zeroization circuitry provides protection in this area. When a probe is inserted through the fan, the fan will stop. This stoppage is detected by the zeroization circuitry, which results in the plaintext cryptographic keys being zeroized (meets level 3).

For additional information about the physical security of the Luna XPplus and Luna XL/XLR, contact Chrysalis-ITS.

## APPENDIX A. Cryptographic Algorithms Support

### Encrypt/Decrypt:

- **DES-ECB**
- **DES-CBC**
- **3-DES-ECB**
- **3-DES-CBC**
- RC2-ECB
- RC2-CBC
- RC4
- RC5-ECB
- RC5-CBC
- CAST-ECB
- CAST-CBC
- CAST3-ECB
- CAST3-CBC
- CAST5-ECB
- CAST5-CBC
- RSA X-509

### Digest:

- MD2
- MD5
- **SHA-1**

### Sign/Verify:

- **RSA -1024**
- **RSA -2048**
- **DSA**
- **DES-MAC**
- **3-DES-MAC**
- RC2-MAC
- RC5-MAC
- CAST-MAC
- CAST3-MAC
- CAST5-MAC
- SSL3-MD5-MAC
- SSL3-SHA1-MAC
- HMAC-SHA1
- HMAC-MD5

### Generate Key:

- **DES**
- **double length DES**
- **triple length DES**
- RC2
- RC4
- RC5
- CAST
- CAST3
- CAST5
- PBE-MD2-DES
- PBE-MD5-DES
- PBE-MD5-CAST
- PBE-MD5-CAST3
- PBE-SHA-1-CAST5
- GENERIC-SECRET
- SSL PRE-MASTER



*Generate Key Pair:*

- **RSA-1024**
- **RSA-2048**
- **DSA-1024**
- **DH-1024**

*Wrap Symmetric Key Using Symmetric Algorithm:*

- DES-ECB
- 3-DES-ECB
- RC2-ECB
- CAST-ECB
- CAST3-ECB
- CAST5-ECB

*Wrap Symmetric Key Using Asymmetric Algorithm:*

- RSA-1024
- RSA-2048

*Wrap Asymmetric Key Using Symmetric Algorithm:*

- 3-DES-CBC<sup>1</sup>

*Unwrap Symmetric Key With Symmetric Algorithm:*

- DES-ECB
- 3-DES-ECB
- RC2-ECB
- CAST-ECB
- CAST3-ECB
- CAST5-ECB

*Unwrap Symmetric Key With Asymmetric Algorithm:*

- RSA-1024
- RSA-2048

*Unwrap Asymmetric Key With Symmetric Algorithm:*

- DES-CBC
- 3-DES-CBC
- CAST-CBC
- CAST3-CBC
- CAST5-CBC

*Derive Key Value:*

- DH-1024
- concatenate Base & Key
- concatenate Base & Data
- concatenate Data & Base
- XOR Base and Data
- Extract Key from Key
- MD2 Derivation
- MD5 Derivation
- SHA -1 Derivation
- SSL3-Master
- SSL3-Key & MAC

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<sup>1</sup> Although this is a mechanism that is supported by the base firmware, the FPV settings for the Luna CA<sup>3</sup>, Luna XPplus and Luna XL/XLR Premium prevent wrapping of asymmetric private keys.

## APPENDIX B. Session And Login States Required For Luna Commands

Command To Module	No Session Open	Session Open, No Login	SO Logged On	User Logged On
<b>Token Main Module Commands</b>				
LUNA_ZEROIZE	√			
LUNA_INIT_TOKEN			√	
LUNA_GET	√			
LUNA_GET_USV			√	
LUNA_SET_TPV			√	
LUNA_FW_UPDATE			√	
LUNA_CONFIGURE_SP	√			
<b>Session Manager Commands</b>				
LUNA_OPEN_ACCESS	√			
LUNA_CLEAN_ACCESS	√			
LUNA_CLOSE_ACCESS	√			
LUNA_GET_ALL_ACCESSES	√			
LUNA_OPEN_SESSION	√			
LUNA_CLOSE_SESSION		√		
LUNA_CLOSE_ALL_SESSIONS	√			
LUNA_GET_SESSION_INFO		√		
LUNA_EXTRACT_CONTEXTS		√		
LUNA_INSERT_CONTEXTS		√		
<b>User Module Commands</b>				
LUNA_GET_USER_LIST		√		
LUNA_GET_USER_NAME		√		
LUNA_LOGIN		√		
LUNA_LOGOUT				√
LUNA_SET_PIN				√
LUNA_INIT_PIN			√	
LUNA_CREATE_USER			√	
LUNA_DELETE_USER			√	
<b>Object Management Module</b>				
LUNA_CREATE_OBJECT		√		
LUNA_COPY_OBJECT		√		
LUNA_DESTROY_OBJECT		√		
LUNA_GET_OBJECT_SIZE		√		
LUNA_GET_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE		√		
LUNA_GET_ATTRIBUTE_SIZE		√		
LUNA_MODIFY_OBJECT		√		
LUNA_FIND_OBJECTS		√		
<b>Random Number Generator Module</b>				
LUNA_GET_RANDOM		√		
LUNA_SEED_RANDOM		√		
<b>Key Management Module</b>				
LUNA_GENERATE_KEY				√
LUNA_GENERATE_KEY_W_VALUE				√
LUNA_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR				√
LUNA_WRAP_KEY				√
LUNA_UNWRAP_KEY				√
LUNA_UNWRAP_KEY_W_VALUE				√
LUNA_DERIVE_KEY				√
LUNA_DERIVE_KEY_W_VALUE				√
LUNA_MFG_LOAD				√

Command To Module	No Session Open	Session Open, No Login	SO Logged On	User Logged On
<b>Cryptographic Algorithm Module</b>				
LUNA_ENCRYPT_INIT				√
LUNA_ENCRYPT_INIT_W_VALUE				√
LUNA_ENCRYPT_INIT				√
LUNA_ENCRYPT_INIT_W_VALUE				√
LUNA_ENCRYPT				√
LUNA_ENCRYPT_FIFO				√
LUNA_ENCRYPT_END				√
LUNA_DECRYPT_INIT				√
LUNA_DECRYPT_INIT_W_VALUE				√
LUNA_DECRYPT				√
LUNA_DECRYPT_FIFO				√
LUNA_DECRYPT_END				√
LUNA_DECRYPT_RAW_RSA				√
LUNA_DIGEST_INIT		√		
LUNA_DIGEST		√		
LUNA_DIGEST_FIFO		√		
LUNA_DIGEST_KEY				√
LUNA_DIGEST_KEY_VALUE				√
LUNA_DIGEST_END		√		
LUNA_SIGN_INIT				√
LUNA_SIGN_INIT_W_VALUE				√
LUNA_SIGN				√
LUNA_SIGN_FIFO				√
LUNA_SIGN_END				√
LUNA_SIGN_SINGLEPART				√
LUNA_SIGN_UPDATE_KEY				√
LUNA_SIGN_FINAL_DERIVE_KEY				√
LUNA_VERIFY_INIT				√
LUNA_VERIFY_INIT_W_VALUE				√
LUNA_VERIFY				√
LUNA_VERIFY_FIFO				√
LUNA_VERIFY_END				√
LUNA_VERIFY_SINGLEPART				√
LUNA_GET_MECH_LIST	√			
LUNA_GET_MECH_INFO	√			
LUNA_SELF_TEST	√			
LUNA_SET_UP_MASKING_KEY	√			
LUNA_CLONE_AS_SOURCE				√
LUNA_CLONE_AS_TARGET_INIT				√
LUNA_CLONE_AS_TARGET				√
LUNA_GEN_TKN_KEYS			√	
LUNA_LOAD_CERT			√	
LUNA_GEN_KCV				√
LUNA_LOAD_CUSTOMER_VERIFICATION_KEY			√	
LUNA_M_OF_N_GENERATE			√	
LUNA_M_OF_N_ACTIVATE				√
LUNA_M_OF_N_MODIFY			√	
<b>Special Packet Processing Commands</b>				
LUNA_IPSEC_INIT_NO_USER	√			
LUNA_IPSEC_PROCESS_PACKET	√			
LUNA_IPSEC_END	√			
LUNA_GEN_CRC32	√			

Command To Module	No Session Open	Session Open, No Login	SO Logged On	User Logged On
LUNA_SCP_TEST	√			