

Apple Inc.



Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software, SL1]

FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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1 General

1.1 Overview

This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software, SL1] cryptographic module. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for a Security Level 1 module.

This document provides all tables and diagrams (when applicable) required by NIST SP 800-140Br1.

1.2 Security Levels

Section	Title	Security Level
1	General	1
2	Cryptographic module specification	1
3	Cryptographic module interfaces	1
4	Roles, services, and authentication	1
5	Software/Firmware security	1
6	Operational environment	1
7	Physical security	N/A
8	Non-invasive security	N/A
9	Sensitive security parameter management	1
10	Self-tests	1
11	Life-cycle assurance	1
12	Mitigation of other attacks	N/A
	Overall Level	1

Table 1: Security Levels

2 Cryptographic Module Specification

2.1 Description

Purpose and Use: The Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software, SL1] cryptographic module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) provides implementations of low-level cryptographic primitives to the Device OS’s (iOS, iPadOS, watchOS, tvOS, T2OS, MacOS) kernels Security Framework and Common Crypto. The module provides services intended to protect data in transit and at rest.

The module is optimized for library use within the Device OS kernel space and does not contain any terminating assertions or exceptions. It is implemented as a Device OS dynamically loadable library. The library is loaded into the Device OS kernel and its cryptographic functions are made available to Device OS kernel services only.

Any internal error detected by the module is returned to the caller with an appropriate return code. The calling Device OS kernel service must examine the return code and act accordingly. The module communicates any error status synchronously through the use of its documented return codes, thus indicating the module’s status. Caller-induced or internal errors do not reveal any sensitive material to callers.

Module Type: Software

Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone

Module Characteristics:

Cryptographic Boundary: The module cryptographic boundary is delineated by the dotted green rectangle in the Figure 1 where the Kernel Extension (KEXT) is a bundle that performs low-level tasks. KEXTs run in kernel space, which gives them elevated privileges and the ability to perform tasks that user-space apps can’t.

Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP): The physical perimeter is represented by the most exterior black line in the block diagram Figure 1. The module executes within the kernel space of the computing platforms and operating systems listed in the Tested Operational Environments Table [section 2.2](#).




Figure 1: Block Diagram

2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification

Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):

Package or File Name	Software/ Firmware Version	Features	Integrity Test
xnu-10002.60.75.0.3	14.0	N/A	HMAC-SHA256

Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)

Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:

Operating System	Hardware Platform	Processors	PAA/PAI	Hypervisor or Host OS	Version(s)
iPadOS 17	iPad (7th generation)	Apple A Series A10 Fusion	Yes	NA	v14.0
iPadOS 17	iPad (7th generation)	Apple A Series A10 Fusion	No	NA	v14.0

Operating System	Hardware Platform	Processors	PAA/PAI	Hypervisor or Host OS	Version(s)
iPadOS 17	iPad Pro 10.5-inch	Apple A Series A10X Fusion	Yes	NA	v14.0
iPadOS 17	iPad Pro 10.5-inch	Apple A Series A10X Fusion	No	NA	v14.0
iPadOS 17	iPad mini (5th generation)	Apple A Series A12 Bionic	Yes	NA	v14.0
iPadOS 17	iPad mini (5th generation)	Apple A Series A12 Bionic	No	NA	v14.0
iPadOS 17	iPad Pro 11-inch (2nd generation)	Apple A Series A12Z Bionic	Yes	NA	v14.0
iPadOS 17	iPad Pro 11-inch (2nd generation)	Apple A Series A12Z Bionic	No	NA	v14.0
iPadOS 17	iPad (9th generation)	Apple A Series A13 Bionic	Yes	NA	v14.0
iPadOS 17	iPad (9th generation)	Apple A Series A13 Bionic	No	NA	v14.0
iPadOS 17	iPad Air (4th generation)	Apple A Series A14 Bionic	Yes	NA	v14.0
iPadOS 17	iPad Air (4th generation)	Apple A Series A14 Bionic	No	NA	v14.0
iPadOS 17	iPad mini (6th generation)	Apple A Series A15 Bionic	Yes	NA	v14.0
iPadOS 17	iPad mini (6th generation)	Apple A Series A15 Bionic	No	NA	v14.0
iPadOS 17	iPad Pro 11-inch (3rd generation)	Apple M Series M1	Yes	NA	v14.0
iPadOS 17	iPad Pro 11-inch (3rd generation)	Apple M Series M1	No	NA	v14.0
iPadOS 17	iPad Pro 11-inch (4th generation)	Apple M Series M2	Yes	NA	v14.0
iPadOS 17	iPad Pro 11-inch (4th generation)	Apple M Series M2	No	NA	v14.0
iOS 17	iPhone 11 Pro	Apple A Series A13 Bionic	Yes	NA	v14.0
iOS 17	iPhone 11 Pro	Apple A Series A13 Bionic	No	NA	v14.0
iOS 17	iPhone 12	Apple A Series A14 Bionic	Yes	NA	v14.0
iOS 17	iPhone 12	Apple A Series A14 Bionic	No	NA	v14.0
iOS 17	iPhone 13 Pro Max	Apple A Series A15 Bionic	Yes	NA	v14.0
iOS 17	iPhone 13 Pro Max	Apple A Series A15 Bionic	No	NA	v14.0

Operating System	Hardware Platform	Processors	PAA/PAI	Hypervisor or Host OS	Version(s)
iOS 17	iPhone 14 Pro Max	Apple A Series A16 Bionic	Yes	NA	v14.0
iOS 17	iPhone 14 Pro Max	Apple A Series A16 Bionic	No	NA	v14.0
watchOS 10	Apple Watch Series S6	Apple S Series S6	Yes	NA	v14.0
watchOS 10	Apple Watch Series S6	Apple S Series S6	No	NA	v14.0
watchOS 10	Apple Watch Series S7	Apple S Series S7	Yes	NA	v14.0
watchOS 10	Apple Watch Series S7	Apple S Series S7	No	NA	v14.0
watchOS 10	Apple Watch Series S8	Apple S Series S8	Yes	NA	v14.0
watchOS 10	Apple Watch Series S8	Apple S Series S8	No	NA	v14.0
tvOS 17	Apple TV 4K (2nd generation)	Apple A Series A12 Bionic	Yes	NA	v14.0
tvOS 17	Apple TV 4K (2nd generation)	Apple A Series A12 Bionic	No	NA	v14.0
tvOS 17	Apple TV 4K (3rd generation)	Apple A Series A15 Bionic	Yes	NA	v14.0
tvOS 17	Apple TV 4K (3rd generation)	Apple A Series A15 Bionic	No	NA	v14.0
T2OS 14	Apple Security Chip T2	Apple T Series T2	Yes	NA	v14.0
T2OS 14	Apple Security Chip T2	Apple T Series T2	No	NA	v14.0
macOS 14	MacBook Air	Apple M Series M1	Yes	NA	v14.0
macOS 14	MacBook Air	Apple M Series M1	No	NA	v14.0
macOS 14	MacBook Pro (14-inch, M1 Pro, 2020)	Apple M Series M1 Pro	Yes	NA	v14.0
macOS 14	MacBook Pro (14-inch, M1 Pro, 2020)	Apple M Series M1 Pro	No	NA	v14.0
macOS 14	MacBook Pro (14-inch, M1 Max, 2021)	Apple M Series M1 Max	Yes	NA	v14.0
macOS 14	MacBook Pro (14-inch, M1 Max, 2021)	Apple M Series M1 Max	No	NA	v14.0
macOS 14	Mac Studio	Apple M Series M1 Ultra	Yes	NA	v14.0
macOS 14	Mac Studio	Apple M Series M1 Ultra	No	NA	v14.0

Operating System	Hardware Platform	Processors	PAA/PAI	Hypervisor or Host OS	Version(s)
macOS 14	MacBook Pro (13-inch, M2, 2020)	Apple M Series M2	Yes	NA	v14.0
macOS 14	MacBook Pro (13-inch, M2, 2020)	Apple M Series M2	No	NA	v14.0
macOS 14	MacBook Pro (14-inch, M2 Pro, 2023)	Apple M Series M2 Pro	Yes	NA	v14.0
macOS 14	MacBook Pro (14-inch, M2 Pro, 2023)	Apple M Series M2 Pro	No	NA	v14.0
macOS 14	MacBook Pro (14-inch, M2 Max, 2023)	Apple M Series M2 Max	Yes	NA	v14.0
macOS 14	MacBook Pro (14-inch, M2 Max, 2023)	Apple M Series M2 Max	No	NA	v14.0

Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid

2.3 Excluded Components

None for this module.

2.4 Modes of Operation

Modes List and Description:

Mode Name	Description	Type	Status Indicator
Approved mode	Approved mode of operation is entered when the module utilizes the services that use the security functions listed in the Approved Algorithms Table and the Vendor Affirmed Algorithms Table.	Approved	return a "0" from fips_allowed_mode() for block cipher functions and fips_allowed() for all other services to indicate the executed cryptographic algorithm was approved
Non-Approved mode	Non-Approved mode of operation is entered when the module utilizes non-approved security functions in the Table Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation.	Non-Approved	return any non-zero value from fips_allowed_mode() for block cipher functions and fips_allowed() for all other services to indicate the executed cryptographic algorithm was non- approved

Table 4: Modes List and Description

Mode Change Instructions and Status

The Module has an Approved and non-Approved mode of operation. The Approved mode of Operation is assumed automatically without any specific configuration. After the device starts up and the module has passed all pre-operational self-tests any calls to the Approved security functions listed in the Approved Services Table will cause the module to implicitly assume the Approved mode of operation and any calls to the non-Approved security functions listed in the Non-Approved Services Table will cause the module to implicitly assume the non-Approved mode of operation. The module transitions back to the approved mode of operation only when an approved service is requested.

2.5 Algorithms

Approved Algorithms:

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-CBC	A5945	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CBC	A5946	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CCM	A5948	Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38C
AES-CFB128	A5945	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CFB128	A5946	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CFB8	A5946	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CTR	A5946	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CTR	A5948	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-ECB	A5945	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-ECB	A5946	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-ECB	A5948	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-GCM	A5948	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - Internal IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38D
AES-KW	A5946	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38F

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-OFB	A5945	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-OFB	A5946	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0	A5945	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 256	SP 800-38E
Counter DRBG	A5946	Prediction Resistance - No Mode - AES-128, AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - Yes	SP 800-90A Rev. 1
Counter DRBG	A5948	Prediction Resistance - No Mode - AES-128, AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - Yes	SP 800-90A Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)	A5949	Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Secret Generation Mode - Testing Candidates	FIPS 186-4
ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4)	A5949	Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521	FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)	A5949	Component - No Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)	A5949	Component - No Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	FIPS 186-4
HMAC-SHA-1	A5949	Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-224	A5949	Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256	A5949	Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256	A5950	Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384	A5947	Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384	A5949	Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512	A5947	Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512	A5949	Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2- 512/256	A5947	Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2- 512/256	A5949	Key Length - Key Length: 8-262144 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)	A5949	Signature Type - PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096	FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)	A5949	Signature Type - PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS Modulo - 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096	FIPS 186-4
SHA-1	A5949	Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224	A5949	Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256	A5949	Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256	A5950	Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384	A5947	Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384	A5949	Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512	A5947	Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512	A5949	Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512/256	A5947	Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512/256	A5949	Message Length - Message Length: 0-32768 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4

Table 5: Approved Algorithms

The FIPS 186-4 CAVP tests in the listed ACVP certificates above are mathematically identical to the FIPS 186-5 CAVP tests. Per FIPS 140-3 C.K Additional Comments 2, the module claims compliance with FIPS 186-5 tests.

Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:

Name	Properties	Implementation	Reference
CKG	Key Type:Asymmetric	N/A	Implemented in compliance with SP800-133rev2 section 4 example 1 and IG D.H

Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms

Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:

N/A for this module.

Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:

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N/A for this module.

Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:

Name	Use and Function
ANSI X9.63 KDF	Hash based Key Derivation Function
Blowfish	Encryption / Decryption
CAST5	Encryption / Decryption
DES	Encryption / Decryption
ECDSA	PKG: Curve P-192; PKV: Curve P-192; Signature Generation: Curve P-192; Signature Verification: Curve P-192
ECDSA KeyGen	Key Pair Generation for compact point representation of points
EdDSA	Key Generation, Signature Generation, Signature Verification with Ed25519
HKDF [SP800-56Crev2]	Key Derivation Function
Integrated Encryption Scheme on elliptic curves (ECIES)	Encryption / Decryption
MD2	Message Digest
MD4	Message Digest
OMAC (One-Key CBC MAC)	MAC generation /verification
RC2	Encryption / Decryption
RC4	Encryption / Decryption
RIPEMD	Message Digest
RSA SigGen	PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS; Signature Generation using key sizes less than 2048-bits
RSA SigVer	Signature Verification using key sizes less than 1024
RSA Key Wrapping	OAEP, PKCS#1 v1.5 and -PSS schemes
Triple-DES [SP 800-67r2]	Encryption / Decryption
MD5	Message Digest
RFC 6637 Key Derivation	Key Derivation Function

Table 7: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms

2.6 Security Function Implementations

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
Symmetric Encryption and Decryption	BC-UnAuth BC-Auth	Symmetric Encryption and Decryption	AES-CBC:Key Length: 128, 192, 256 AES-CCM:Key Length: 128, 192, 256 AES-	AES-CBC: (A5945, A5946) AES-CCM: (A5948) AES-CFB128: (A5945, A5946) AES-CFB8:

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
			CFB128:Key Length: 128, 192, 256 AES-CFB8:Key Length: 128, 192, 256 AES-CTR:Key Length: 128, 192, 256 AES-ECB:Key Length: 128, 192, 256 AES-GCM:Key Length: 128, 192, 256 AES-OFB:Key Length: 128, 192, 256 AES-XTS:Key Length: 128, 256 AES-KW:Key Length: 128, 192, 256	(A5946) AES-CTR: (A5946, A5948) AES-ECB: (A5945, A5946, A5948) AES-GCM: (A5948) AES-OFB: (A5945, A5946) AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0: (A5945) AES-KW: (A5946)
Random Number Generation	DRBG	Random Number Generation	Counter DRBG: AES-128, AES-256; Derivation Function Enabled; No Prediction Resistance; Key size: 128, 256 bits	Counter DRBG: (A5946, A5948)
Asymmetric Key Generation	AsymKeyPair-KeyGen AsymKeyPair-KeyVer CKG	Key Pair Generation	ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): Key Pair Generation (PKG); CKG using method in Section 4 example 1 [SP 800-133r2]; FIPS186-4 - Appendix B.4.2 Testing Candidates; Curve: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-	ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A5949) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4): (A5949) CKG: () Key Type: Asymmetric

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
			521 ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4):Public Key Validation (PKV); Curve: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521	
Digital Signature	DigSig-SigGen DigSig-SigVer	Digital Signature	ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4):P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4):P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4):Signature Generation (PKCS#1 v1.5) and (PKCS PSS); Modulus: 2048, 3072, 4096 RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4):Signature Verification (PKCS#1 v1.5) and (PKCS PSS); Modulus: 2048, 3072, 4096	ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4): (A5949) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A5949) RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4): (A5949) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A5949)
Digital Signature Verification (legacy)	DigSig-SigVer	Digital Signature Verification using SHA-1	Publications:FIPS 140-3 IG C.M legacy algorithms Hashes:SHA-1 ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4):P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4):Signature Verification (PKCS#1 v1.5) and (PKCS PSS);	ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A5949) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A5949) SHA-1: (A5949)

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
			Modulus: 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096	
Keyed Hash	MAC	Keyed Hash	HMAC-SHA-1:Key Size: 128 - 262144 bits; Key Strength: 128 bits HMAC-SHA2-224:Key Size: 224 - 262144 bits; Key Strength: 224 bits HMAC-SHA2-256:Key Size: 256 - 262144 bits; Key Strength: 256 bits HMAC-SHA2-384:Key Size: 384 - 262144 bits; Key Strength: 384 bits HMAC-SHA2-512:Key Size: 512 - 262144 bits; Key Strength: 512 bits HMAC-SHA2-512/256:Key Size: 512 - 262144 bits; Key Strength: 256 bits	HMAC-SHA-1: (A5949) HMAC-SHA2-224: (A5949) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A5949, A5950) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A5947, A5949) HMAC-SHA2-512: (A5947, A5949) HMAC-SHA2-512/256: (A5947, A5949)
Message Digest	SHA	Message Digest	SHA-1:N/A SHA2-224:N/A SHA2-256:N/A SHA2-384:N/A SHA2-512:N/A SHA2-512/256:N/A	SHA-1: (A5949) SHA2-224: (A5949) SHA2-256: (A5949, A5950) SHA2-384: (A5947, A5949) SHA2-512: (A5947, A5949) SHA2-512/256: (A5947, A5949)

Table 8: Security Function Implementations

2.7 Algorithm Specific Information

AES-GCM

AES-GCM IV is constructed in compliance with IG C.H scenario 1 (IPsec-v3).

The GCM IV generation follows RFC 4106 and shall only be used for the IPsec protocol version 3. When the IV in RFC 4106 exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given security association, either party to the security association that encounters this condition triggers a rekeying with IKEv2 to establish a new encryption key for the security association. The module uses RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which the AES-GCM encryption keys are derived.

In compliance with IG C.H section 3, if the module's power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be re-distributed. This condition is not enforced by the module.

AES-XTS

AES-XTS mode is only approved for hardware storage applications. The length of the AES-XTS data unit does not exceed 2^{20} blocks. It is the responsibility of the Operator to ensure Key_1 and Key_2 are generated independently according to the rules for component symmetric keys from NIST SP 800-133rev2, Section 6.3. In compliance with IG C.I, before using the keys in the XTS-Algorithm, the module includes an explicit check to verify that Key_1 $\neq$ Key_2.

RSA

In compliance with IG C.F, every RSA modulus size used by the cryptographic module has been validated by the CAVP. The respective certificates are listed in the Approved Algorithms Table of this security policy. There are no untested RSA modulus sizes used by the cryptographic module.

KTS

The module does not establish SSPs using an approved key transport scheme (KTS). However, it does offer approved authenticated algorithms that can be used by an external operator/application as part of an approved KTS.

SHA-1

SHA-1 is only approved when used in approved mode for message digest and signature verification. Digital signature generation using SHA-1 is non-approved and not allowed in approved services. The SHA-1 algorithm, as implemented by the module, will be non-approved for all purposes except signature verification, starting January 1, 2031.

Legacy Algorithms

Algorithms designated as “Legacy” can only be used on data that was generated prior to the Legacy Date specified in FIPS 140-3 IG C.M. SHA-1 used in the context of ECDSA SigVer and RSA SigVer, is allowed for Legacy use only.

2.8 RBG and Entropy

Cert Number	Vendor Name
E113	apple

Table 9: Entropy Certificates

Name	Type	Operational Environment	Sample Size	Entropy per Sample	Conditioning Component
Apple corecrypto physical entropy source	Physical	See Tested Operational Environment Table in section 2.2	256 bit	Full Entropy	SHA-256 [ACVP cert. #C1223]

Table 10: Entropy Sources

Entropy source: The module makes use of a physical entropy source listed in the above table, which is located within the physical perimeter of the module (TOEPP) but outside the cryptographic boundary of the module. The output of the entropy source provides full entropy to seed and reseed SP800-90Arev1 DRBG during initialization and reseeding respectively.

DRBG: The NIST [SP 800-90Arev1] approved deterministic random bit generators (DRBG) used for random number generation is a CTR_DRBG using AES-256 with derivation function and without prediction resistance.

The module performs DRBG health tests according to SP800-90Arev1 section 11.3.

2.9 Key Generation

See vendor affirmed algorithms (CKG) in section 2.5. The module implements ECDSA Key Generation in compliance with SP800-133rev2 section 4 example 1 and IG D.H.

The module does not implement symmetric key generation.

2.10 Key Establishment

The module implements Key Transport via AES Key Wrapping, in compliance with IG D.F and SP800-38F.

The module does not implement key agreement.

2.11 Industry Protocols

No parts of the IPSec, other than those mentioned above, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.

3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces

3.1 Ports and Interfaces

Physical Port	Logical Interface(s)	Data That Passes
N/A	Data Input Data Output	Data inputs/outputs are provided in the variables passed in the C language Kernel Interfaces (KPIs) and callable service invocations, generally through caller-supplied buffers
N/A	Control Input	Control inputs which control the mode of the module are provided through dedicated parameters.
N/A	Status Output	Status output is provided in return codes and through messages. Documentation for each KPI lists possible return codes. A complete list of all return codes returned by the C language KPIs within the module is provided in the header files and the KPI documentation. Messages are also documented in the KPI documentation.

Table 11: Ports and Interfaces

The module does not implement a Control Output Logical Interface.

4 Roles, Services, and Authentication

4.1 Authentication Methods

N/A for this module.

FIPS 140-3 does not require an authentication mechanism for level 1 modules. Therefore, the module does not support an authentication mechanism for Crypto Officer. The Crypto Officer role is authorized to access all services provided by the module (see Table - Approved Services and Table - Non-Approved Services).

4.2 Roles

Name	Type	Operator Type	Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer	Role	Crypto Officer	None

Table 12: Roles

4.3 Approved Services

The abbreviations of the access rights to SSPs have the following interpretation:

G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.

R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).

W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.

E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.

Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP.

N/A = The service does not access any SSP during its operation

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
AES Encryption/Decryption	Execute AES-mode encrypt or decrypt operation	0	plaintext data and key / ciphertext data and key	ciphertext data / plaintext data	Symmetric Encryption and Decryption	Crypto Officer - AES key: W,E Unauthenticated
Secure Hash Generation	Generate a digest for the	0	message	digest	Message Digest	Crypto Officer Unauthenticated

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
	requested algorithm					
Message Authentication Generation	Generate a MAC digest using the requested SHA algorithm	0	message, MAC key, MAC algorithm	MAC	Keyed Hash	Crypto Officer - HMAC key: W,E Unauthenticated
Message Authentication Code Verification	Verify a MAC digest	0	MAC, message, MAC key, MAC algorithm	pass/fail	Keyed Hash	Crypto Officer - HMAC key: W,E Unauthenticated
RSA signature generation and verification	Sign a message with a specified RSA private key. Verify the signature of a message with a specified RSA public key.	0	SigGen: private key, message, hash function; SigVer: public key, digital signature, message, hash function	SigGen: computed signature; SigVer: pass/fail result of digital signature verification	Digital Signature Digital Signature Verification (legacy)	Crypto Officer - RSA key pair: W,E Unauthenticated
ECDSA signature generation and verification	Sign a message with a specified ECDSA private key. Verify the signature of a message with a specified	0	SigGen: private key, message, hash function; SigVer: public key, digital signature, message	SigGen: computed signature; SigVer: pass/fail result of digital signature verification	Digital Signature Digital Signature Verification (legacy)	Crypto Officer - ECDSA key pair: W,E Unauthenticated

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
	ECDSA public key		e, hash function			
Random Number Generation	Generate random number	0	length of generated number	random bit-string	Random Number Generation	Crypto Officer - Entropy input string: E - DRBG seed, internal state V value, and key: G,W,E Unauthenticated
ECDSA key pair generation and validation	Generate a keypair for a requested elliptic curve and validity	0	curve size	key pair	Random Number Generation Asymmetric Key Generation	Crypto Officer - DRBG seed, internal state V value, and key: W,E - ECDSA key pair: G,R Unauthenticated
Self-test	execute CASTs	0	power	pass/fail results	Symmetric Encryption and Decryption Random Number Generation Asymmetric Key Generation Digital Signature Digital Signature Verification (legacy) Keyed Hash Message Digest	Crypto Officer Unauthenticated

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
Show Status	Return the module status	N/A	N/A	Status output	None	Crypto Officer Unauthenticated
Show version/module info	Return Module Base Name and Module Version Number	N/A	N/A	Module information	None	Crypto Officer Unauthenticated
Zeroization	SSPs are zeroised when the system is powered down, when all resources of symmetric crypto function context, all resources of hash context, all resources of asymmetric crypto function context are released.	0	N/A	N/A	None	Crypto Officer - AES key: Z - AES key-wrapping key: Z - HMAC key: Z - ECDSA key pair: Z - RSA key pair: Z - Entropy input string: Z - DRBG seed, internal state V value, and key: Z Unauthenticated

Table 13: Approved Services

4.4 Non-Approved Services

Name	Description	Algorithms	Role
Triple-DES encryption / decryption	Execute Triple-DES mode encrypt or decrypt operation.	Triple-DES [SP 800-67r2]	CO
RSA Key Encapsulation	The CAST does not perform the full KTS, only the raw RSA encrypt/decrypt.	RSA Key Wrapping	CO
RSA Signature Generation	Sign a message with a non-approved RSA private key size	RSA SigGen	CO
RSA Signature Verification	Verify the signature of a message with a non-approved RSA public key size	RSA SigVer	CO
ECDSA key-pair generation, ECDSA PKV, ECDSA signature generation, ECDSA signature verification	For curve P-192	ECDSA	CO
ECDSA Key Pair Generation for compact point representation of points	For compact point representation of points	ECDSA KeyGen	CO
EdDSA Key Generation, Signature Generation, Signature Verification	Ed25519	EdDSA	CO
ECIES	Elliptic Curve encrypt/decrypt	Integrated Encryption Scheme on elliptic curves (ECIES)	CO
ANSI X9.63 Key Derivation	SHA-1 hash-based	ANSI X9.63 KDF	CO
SP800-56Crev2 Key Derivation (HKDF)	SHA-256 hash-based	HKDF [SP800-56Crev2]	CO
OMAC Message Authentication Code Generation	One-Key CBC-MAC using 128-bit key	OMAC (One-Key CBC MAC)	CO
OMAC Message Authentication Code Verification	One-Key CBC-MAC using 128-bit key	OMAC (One-Key CBC MAC)	CO
Message digest generation	Message digest generation using non-approved algorithms	MD2 MD4 RIPEMD MD5	CO
Symmetric encryption / decryption	Symmetric encryption / decryption using non-approved algorithms	Blowfish CAST5 DES RC2 RC4	CO
RFC 6637 KDF	SHA-256, SHA-512, AES-128, AES-256	RFC 6637 Key Derivation	CO

Table 14: Non-Approved Services

4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded

The module does not support the loading of external software/firmware.

5 Software/Firmware Security

5.1 Integrity Techniques

A software integrity test is performed on the runtime image of the module. The HMAC-SHA256 implemented in the module is used as the approved algorithm for the integrity test. If the test fails, the module enters an error state where no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited i.e. the module is not operational.

5.2 Initiate on Demand

The module's integrity test can be performed on demand by power-cycling the computing platform. Integrity test on demand is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests, automatically executed at power-on.

6 Operational Environment

6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements

Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable

6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions

The module is supplied as part of Device OS, a commercially available general-purpose operating system executing on the computing platforms specified in [section 2.2](#).

7 Physical Security

The FIPS 140-3 physical security requirements do not apply to the Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software, SL1] since it is a software module.

8 Non-Invasive Security

8.1 Mitigation Techniques

Per IG 12.A, until the requirements of NIST SP 800-140F are defined, non-invasive mechanisms fall under ISO/IEC 19790:2012 Section 7.12 Mitigation of other attacks.

The requirements of this area are not applicable to the module.

9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management

9.1 Storage Areas

Storage Area Name	Description	Persistence Type
RAM	Temporary storage for SSPs used by the module as part of service execution. The module does not perform persistent storage of SSPs	Dynamic

Table 15: Storage Areas

9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods

Name	From	To	Format Type	Distribution Type	Entry Type	SFI or Algorithm
KPI input parameters	Operator calling application (TOEPP)	Cryptographic module	Plaintext	Manual	Electronic	
KPI output parameters	Cryptographic module	Operator calling application (TOEPP)	Plaintext	Manual	Electronic	

Table 16: SSP Input-Output Methods

9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods

Zeroization Method	Description	Rationale	Operator Initiation
Wipe and Free memory block allocated	Zeroizes the SSPs contained within the cipher handle.	Memory occupied by SSPs is overwritten with zeroes and then it is released, which renders the SSP values irretrievable. The completion of the zeroization routine indicates that the zeroization procedure succeeded.	By calling the cipher related zeroization API
Module Reset	De-allocates the volatile memory used to store SSPs	Volatile memory used by the module is overwritten within nanoseconds when power is removed.	By unloading and reloading the module
Intermediate value zeroization	Intermediate keygen values are zeroized before the module	Intermediate keygen values are zeroized before the module returns from the key generation function.	N/A

Zeroization Method	Description	Rationale	Operator Initiation
	returns from the key generation function.		

Table 17: SSP Zeroization Methods

9.4 SSPs

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
AES key	AES key	128 to 256 bits - 128 to 256 bits	Symmetric - CSP			Symmetric Encryption and Decryption
AES key-wrapping key	AES KW	128 to 256 bits - 128 to 256 bits	symmetric - CSP			Symmetric Encryption and Decryption
HMAC key	HMAC key	128 to 256 - 128 to 256	MAC - CSP			Keyed Hash
ECDSA key pair	ECDSA key pair (including intermediate keygen values)	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 - 112 to 256 bits	Asymmetric - CSP	Asymmetric Key Generation		Digital Signature Digital Signature Verification (legacy)
RSA key pair	RSA key pair (including intermediate keygen values)	2048 - 4096 - 112 to 150 bits	Asymmetric - CSP			Digital Signature Digital Signature Verification (legacy)
Entropy input string	Entropy input string	512 bits - 256 bits	Entropy input string - CSP			Random Number Generation
DRBG seed, internal state V value, and key	DRBG input parameters	384 bits - 256 bits	DRBG - CSP	Random Number Generation		Random Number Generation

Table 18: SSP Table 1

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
AES key	KPI input parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation to service completion	Wipe and Free memory block allocated Module Reset	
AES key-wrapping key	KPI input parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation to service completion	Wipe and Free memory block allocated Module Reset	
HMAC key	KPI input parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation to service completion	Wipe and Free memory block allocated Module Reset	
ECDSA key pair	KPI input parameters KPI output parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation to service completion	Wipe and Free memory block allocated Module Reset Intermediate value zeroization	DRBG seed, internal state V value, and key:Used With
RSA key pair	KPI input parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation to service completion	Wipe and Free memory block allocated Module Reset Intermediate value zeroization	DRBG seed, internal state V value, and key (IG D.L compliant):Derived From
Entropy input string		RAM:Plaintext	Storage duration during the usage of the CSP	Module Reset	DRBG seed, internal state V value, and key:Used With
DRBG seed, internal state V			Storage duration during the	Module Reset	Entropy input string:Used With

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Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
value, and key			usage of the CSP		

Table 19: SSP Table 2

9.5 Transitions

SHA-1 is disallowed for digital signature generation. When used for digital signature verification, SHA-1 is allowed for legacy use. The use of SHA-1 is deprecated through December 31, 2030, for applying protection in non-digital signature applications and disallowed thereafter. The use of SHA-1 is acceptable for processing already-protected information through December 31, 2030, and allowed for legacy use thereafter.

10 Self-Tests

While the module is executing the self-tests, services are not available, and input and output are inhibited.

10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests

The module performs a pre-operational software integrity automatically when the module is loaded into memory (i.e., at power on) before the module transitions to the operational state. A software integrity test is performed on the runtime image of the module with HMAC-SHA256 used to perform the approved integrity technique. Prior to using HMAC-SHA-256, a Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests (CAST) is performed.

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A3687)	112-bit key	Message Authentication	SW/FW Integrity	Module successful execution	The HMAC-SHA2-256 value calculated at runtime is compared with the HMAC-SHA2-256 value stored in the module, computed at compilation time.

Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests

10.2 Conditional Self-Tests

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
AES-GCM Encrypt	128-bit key, encrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Symmetric Encryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-GCM Decrypt	128-bit key, decrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Symmetric Decryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 Encrypt	128-bit key encrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Symmetric Encryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 Decrypt	128-bit key decrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Symmetric Decryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
AES-CBC Encrypt	128-bit key encrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Symmetric Encryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-ECB Decrypt	128-bit key decrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Symmetric Decryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
Counter DRBG	128-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Compliant with SP 800-90Ar1	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-256	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA-1	SHA-1	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-512	SHA2-512	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)	PKCS#1 v1.5 with 2048 bit key and SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Digital signature generation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)	PKCS#1 v1.5 with 2048 bit key and SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Digital signature verification	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)	PCT with SHA2-256	PCT	PCT	Successful key pair generation	Signature generation & verification	Key pair generation
ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4)	PCT with SHA2-256	PCT	PCT	Successful key pair generation	Signature generation & verification	Key pair generation
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)	P-224 with SHA-224	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Digital signature generation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)	P-224 with SHA-224	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Digital signature verification	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test

Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests

10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A3687)	Message Authentication	SW/FW Integrity	Whenever module is powered on	Upon every power on

Table 22: Pre-Operational Periodic Information

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
AES-GCM Encrypt	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually
AES-GCM Decrypt	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 Encrypt	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 Decrypt	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually
AES-CBC Encrypt	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually
AES-ECB Decrypt	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually
Counter DRBG	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA-1	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-512	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)	PCT	PCT	On Demand	Manually

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4)	PCT	PCT	On Demand	Manually
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manually

Table 23: Conditional Periodic Information

10.4 Error States

Name	Description	Conditions	Recovery Method	Indicator
Error State	1) The HMAC-SHA-256 value computed over the module did not match the pre-computed value or 2) The computed value in the invoked Conditional CAST did not match the known value or 3) The signature failed to generate/verify successfully in the Conditional PCT. No cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited	1) Pre-operational Software Integrity Test failure or 2) Conditional CAST failure 3) Conditional PCT failure	Power cycle the device which results in the module being reloaded into memory and reperforming the pre-operational software integrity test and the Conditional CASTs.	1) Error message "FAILED: fipspost_post_integrity" send to caller or 2) Error message "FAILED:<event>" sent to caller (<event> refers to any of the cryptographic functions listed Table - Conditional Self-Tests 3) Error code "CCEC_GENERATE_KEY_CONSISTENCY" returned for ECDSA and EC Diffie-Hellman

Table 24: Error States

10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests

The module permits operators to initiate the pre-operational or conditional self-tests on demand for periodic testing of the module by rebooting the system (i.e., power-cycling).

11 Life-Cycle Assurance

11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures

Startup Procedures: The module is built into Device OS defined in [section 2](#) and delivered/installed with the respective Device OS. There is no standalone delivery of the module as a software library.

Installation Process and Authentication Mechanisms: The vendor's internal development process guarantees that the correct version of module goes with its intended Device OS version. For additional assurance, the module is digitally signed by vendor, and it is verified during the integration into Host Device OS.

This digital signature-based integrity protection during the delivery/integration process is not to be confused with the HMAC-256 based integrity check performed by the module itself as part of its pre-operational self- tests.

11.2 Administrator Guidance

The Approved mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only be transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved services listed in Table - Non-Approved Services. If the device starts up successfully, then the module has passed all self-tests and is operating in the Approved mode.

Apple Platform Certifications guide and Apple Platform Security guide are provided by Apple which offers IT System Administrators with the necessary technical information to ensure FIPS 140-3 Compliance of the deployed systems. This guide walks the reader through the system's assertion of cryptographic module integrity and the steps necessary if module integrity requires remediation.

The administrator should request the "Show module and version info" service from the module and confirm that it outputs "Apple corecrypto Module v14.0 [Apple ARM, Kernel, Software, SL1]" to identify the module and its version. The term Apple ARM identifies Apple Silicon chips.

11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance

No non-administrator guidance.

11.4 Design and Rules

The Crypto Officer shall consider the following requirements and restrictions when using the module.

- AES-GCM see [section 2.11](#).
- AES-XTS see [section 2.11](#).

11.5 End of Life

The module secure sanitization is accomplished by first powering the module down, which will zeroize all SSPs within volatile memory. Following the power-down, an uninstall by way of system wipe or system update will zeroize the xnu-10002.60.75.0.3 binary file listed in Table 2.

12 Mitigation of Other Attacks

The module does not claim mitigation of other attacks.