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Arista Networks, Inc.
Arista Crypto Module v3.0 [Software, Software IPsec]
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version: 1.5
Date: October 13, 2025
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Table of Contents
1 General................................................................................................................................................. 5
1.1 Overview ........................................................................................................................................ 5
1.2 Security Levels............................................................................................................................... 5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification...................................................................................................... 5
2.1 Description ..................................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification...................................................... 6
2.3 Excluded Components ................................................................................................................... 8
2.4 Modes of Operation........................................................................................................................ 8
2.5 Algorithms ...................................................................................................................................... 8
2.6 Security Function Implementations............................................................................................... 14
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information ...................................................................................................... 17
2.8 RBG and Entropy ......................................................................................................................... 20
2.9 Key Generation ............................................................................................................................ 20
2.10 Key Establishment...................................................................................................................... 20
2.11 Industry Protocols....................................................................................................................... 21
2.12 Additional Information................................................................................................................. 23
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ........................................................................................................ 24
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................................... 24
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.................................................................................................... 24
4.1 Authentication Methods ................................................................................................................ 24
4.2 Roles............................................................................................................................................ 25
4.3 Approved Services ....................................................................................................................... 25
4.4 Non-Approved Services................................................................................................................ 36
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded............................................................................................. 37
5 Software/Firmware Security ................................................................................................................ 37
5.1 Integrity Techniques ..................................................................................................................... 37
5.2 Initiate on Demand ....................................................................................................................... 37
5.3 Open-Source Parameters............................................................................................................. 37
6 Operational Environment .................................................................................................................... 38
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ....................................................................... 38
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions........................................................................................ 39
7 Physical Security................................................................................................................................. 39
8 Non-Invasive Security ......................................................................................................................... 39
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management....................................................................................... 39
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9.1 Storage Areas .............................................................................................................................. 39
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................................... 39
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods............................................................................................................. 40
9.4 SSPs ............................................................................................................................................ 40
10 Self-Tests.......................................................................................................................................... 46
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ......................................................................................................... 46
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests ................................................................................................................ 47
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information..................................................................................................... 50
10.4 Error States ................................................................................................................................ 52
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ........................................................................................................................ 53
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures....................................................................... 53
11.2 Administrator Guidance .............................................................................................................. 53
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance....................................................................................................... 53
11.4 End of Life .................................................................................................................................. 53
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ................................................................................................................ 54
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels........................................................................................................................... 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets).................. 6
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid ................................................ 7
Table 4: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid ................................. 7
Table 5: Modes List and Description ........................................................................................................ 8
Table 6: Approved Algorithms................................................................................................................ 12
Table 7: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ..................................................................................................... 12
Table 8: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed.................................................. 13
Table 9: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms ................................................................................... 13
Table 10: Security Function Implementations......................................................................................... 17
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces ............................................................................................................... 24
Table 12: Authentication Methods.......................................................................................................... 24
Table 13: Roles...................................................................................................................................... 25
Table 14: Approved Services ................................................................................................................. 36
Table 15: Non-Approved Services ......................................................................................................... 37
Table 16: Storage Areas ........................................................................................................................ 39
Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods..................................................................................................... 39
Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods....................................................................................................... 40
Table 19: SSP Table 1........................................................................................................................... 44
Table 20: SSP Table 2........................................................................................................................... 46
Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests..................................................................................................... 47
Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests ............................................................................................................ 50
Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information ..................................................................................... 50
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information............................................................................................. 52
Table 25: Error States............................................................................................................................ 52
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Block Diagram......................................................................................................................... 6
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for version 3.0 of the Arista Networks
Inc. Arista Crypto Module v3.0 [Software, Software IPsec]. It contains the security rules under which the
module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB
140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for an overall Security Level 1
module.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 2
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security N/A
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The Arista Crypto Module v3.0 [Software, Software IPsec] (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a
Software Multichip standalone cryptographic module. The module provides cryptographic services to
applications running in the user space of the underlying operating system through a C language
Application Program Interface (API).
Module Type: Software
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
Module Characteristics:
Cryptographic Boundary:
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The block diagram in Figure 1 shows the cryptographic boundary of the module, its interfaces with the
operational environment and the flow of information between the module and operator (depicted through
the arrows)
Figure 1 – Block Diagram
The block diagram depicts the cryptographic boundary (in pink) and data flow between the module
interfaces and operator. The boundary also includes the instantiation of the cryptographic module in
memory
The module components consist of the fipscanister.o file in executable form. The fipscanister.o is
delivered in the product by statically linking to libcrypto.so. The Module performs no communications
other than with the calling application (the process that invokes the Module services) and the OS syslog.
The boundary also includes the instantiation of the module saved in memory.
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
Package or File Name Software/ Firmware
Version
Features Integrity Test
fipscanister.o 3.0 None Message authentication
with HMAC-SHA2-256
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)
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The module operates in a modifiable operational environment. The module runs on a commercially
available virtual machine, based on a general-purpose operating system. The module executes on the
hardware specified in Section 2.2. The module does not support concurrent operators.
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
The module has been tested on the platforms indicated in the following table, with the corresponding
module variants and configuration options with and without PAA.
Operating System Hardware
Platform
Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor
or Host OS
Version(s)
CloudEOS version 4.29
running on QEMU version
2.0.0 running on Linux 3.10.0-
1160.el7.x86_64
Supermicro
SYS-1029U-
TR-CTO
Intel Xeon
Gold 6240R
Yes None 3.0
CloudEOS version 4.29
running on QEMU version
2.0.0 running on Linux 3.10.0-
1160.el7.x86_64
Supermicro
SYS-1029U-
TR-CTO
Intel Xeon
Gold 6240R
No None 3.0
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Operating System Hardware Platform
CloudEOS Any general-purpose computer (GPC)
Any compatible OS Any general-purpose computer (GPC)
Table 4: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
The module installation procedure for the above platforms is the same as mentioned in Section 11.1,
Startup Procedures.
Per the FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Validation Program Management Manual, Section 7.9, Arista
affirms that the module remains compliant with the FIPS 140-3 validation when operating on any general-
purpose computer (GPC) provided that the GPC uses the specified operating system/mode specified on
the validation certificate, or another compatible operating system (including Linux distros such as
CentOS 6.x,7.x,8.x). The CMVP allows vendor porting and re-compilation of a validated cryptographic
module from the operational environment specified on the validation certificate to an operational
environment which was not included as part of the validation testing as long as the porting rules are
followed.
Note: CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of
the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation
certificate.
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2.3 Excluded Components
There are no excluded components for the module
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode Name Description Type Status
Indicator
Approved
Mode
Single Approved Mode - Selected by calling the
FIPS_mode_set(1) function.
Approved Per service
indication
Non-Approved
Mode
Single Non-Approved Mode - Selected by calling
the FIPS_mode_set(0) function.
Non-
Approved
Per service
indication
Table 5: Modes List and Description
When the module starts up successfully, after passing all the pre-operational self-tests, the module is set
to use Approved Mode by calling FIPS_mode_set with an argument of 1. Section 4.3 provides details on
the service indicator implemented by the module.
Mode Change Instructions and Status:
To change to Approved mode, call FIPS_mode_set(1). To validate that the Approved Mode is active, call
FIPS_mode() and verify the return value is equal to “1”.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
The table below lists the approved security functions (or cryptographic algorithms) of the module,
including specific key lengths employed for approved services, and implemented modes or methods of
operation of the algorithms.
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A3592 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CCM A3592 Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Tag Length - 112, 128, 32, 48, 64, 80, 96
IV Length - IV Length: 56
Payload Length - Payload Length: 0-256 Increment 8
AAD Length - AAD Length: 0-524288 Increment 8
SP 800-38C
AES-CFB1 A3592 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB128 A3592 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB8 A3592 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CMAC A3592 Direction - Generation, Verification
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38B
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
MAC Length - MAC Length: 16-128 Increment 8
Message Length - Message Length: 16-65536 Increment 8
AES-CTR A3592 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 8-128 Increment 8
Supports Counter larger than maximum value - Yes
Incremental Counter - Yes
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A3592 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A3592 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Tag Length - 104, 112, 120, 128, 32, 64, 96
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 256, 384, 136, 392
AAD Length - AAD Length: 0, 256, 384, 136, 392
SP 800-38D
AES-XTS
Testing
Revision 2.0
A3592 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128-65536 Increment
128
Tweak Mode - Hex
Data Unit Length - Data Unit Length: 128-65536 Increment
128
Data Unit Length Matches Payload Length - No
SP 800-38E
Counter DRBG A3592 Prediction Resistance - No, Yes
Supports Reseed - Yes
Mode - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - No, Yes
Additional Input - Additional Input: 0, 128, Additional Input:
0, 256, Additional Input: 0, 320, Additional Input: 0, 384
Entropy Input - Entropy Input: 128, Entropy Input: 192,
Entropy Input: 256, Entropy Input: 320, Entropy Input: 384
Nonce - Nonce: 0, Nonce: 128, Nonce: 256, Nonce: 64
Personalization String Length - Personalization String
Length: 0, 128, Personalization String Length: 0, 256,
Personalization String Length: 0, 320, Personalization
String Length: 0, 384
Returned Bits - 512
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
A3592 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - Testing Candidates
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA
KeyVer
(FIPS186-4)
A3592 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-4
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
A3592 Component - No
Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A3592 Component - No
Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-
384, SHA2-512
FIPS 186-4
Hash DRBG A3592 Prediction Resistance - No, Yes
Supports Reseed - Yes
Mode - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Entropy Input - Entropy Input: 128, Entropy Input: 192,
Entropy Input: 256
Nonce - Nonce: 128, Nonce: 64, Nonce: 96
Personalization String Length - Personalization String
Length: 0, 128, Personalization String Length: 0, 192,
Personalization String Length: 0, 256
Additional Input - Additional Input: 0, 128, Additional Input:
0, 192, Additional Input: 0, 256
Returned Bits - 1024, 1536, 2048, 640, 896
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
HMAC DRBG A3592 Prediction Resistance - No, Yes
Supports Reseed - Yes
Mode - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Entropy Input - Entropy Input: 128, Entropy Input: 192,
Entropy Input: 256
Nonce - Nonce: 128, Nonce: 64, Nonce: 96
Personalization String Length - Personalization String
Length: 0, 128, Personalization String Length: 0, 192,
Personalization String Length: 0, 256
Additional Input - Additional Input: 0, 128, Additional Input:
0, 192, Additional Input: 0, 256
Returned Bits - 1024, 1536, 2048, 640, 896
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
HMAC-SHA-1 A3592 MAC - MAC: 80-160 Increment 8
Key Length - Key Length: 256-2048 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
224
A3592 MAC - MAC: 112-224 Increment 16
Key Length - Key Length: 256-2048 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A3592 MAC - MAC: 128-256 Increment 64
Key Length - Key Length: 256-2048 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
384
A3592 MAC - MAC: 192-384 Increment 64
Key Length - Key Length: 256-2048 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512
A3592 MAC - MAC: 256-512 Increment 64
Key Length - Key Length: 256-2048 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A3592 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256, P-384, P-
521
Hash Function Z - SHA2-512
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A3592 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - ffdhe2048,
ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, MODP-2048, MODP-
3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192
Hash Function Z - SHA2-384
Scheme -
dhEphem -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDF IKEv1
(CVL)
A3592 Authentication Method - Pre-shared Key
Initiator Nonce Length - Initiator Nonce Length: 256-2048
Increment 128
Responder Nonce Length - Responder Nonce Length:
256-2048 Increment 128
Preshared Key Length - Preshared Key Length: 8-8192
Increment 8
Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret Length: 1024-8192 Increment 1024
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
KDF IKEv2
(CVL)
A3592 Initiator Nonce Length - Initiator Nonce Length: 256-2048
Increment 128
Responder Nonce Length - Responder Nonce Length:
256-2048 Increment 128
Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret Length: 1024-8192 Increment 1024
Derived Keying Material Length - Derived Keying Material
Length: 256-2048 Increment 128
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
KDF SP800-
108
A3592 KDF Mode - Counter
MAC Mode - CMAC-AES128, CMAC-AES256
Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 128
Fixed Data Order - Before Fixed Data
Counter Length - 8
Supports Empty IV - No
Custom Key In Length - 0
SP 800-108
Rev. 1
KDF SSH
(CVL)
A3592 Cipher - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-
384, SHA2-512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
KDF TLS
(CVL)
A3592 TLS Version - v1.0/1.1 SP 800-135
Rev. 1
KTS-IFC A3592 Function - keyPairGen, partialVal
IUT ID - CAFECAFE
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg2-basic
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
Key Transport Method -
Hash Algorithms - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Supports Null Associated Data - Yes
Associated Data Encoding - concatenation
Key Length - 512
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
A3592 Key Generation Mode - B.3.3, B.3.6
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Primality Tests - Table C.2
Info Generated By Server - No
Public Exponent Mode - Random
Private Key Format - Standard
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
A3592 Signature Type - ANSI X9.31, PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Hash Pair -
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A3592 Signature Type - ANSI X9.31, PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Modulo - 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096
Hash Pair -
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1
Public Exponent Mode - Random
FIPS 186-4
SHA-1 A3592 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224 A3592 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A3592 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A3592 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A3592 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627
(CVL)
A3592 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 SP 800-135
Rev. 1
Table 6: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG
Section 4
Key
Type:Asymmetric
N/A SP 800-133r2 Section 4, example 1: U is
directly output without XORing V
Table 7: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
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The module does not implement any Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of
Operation.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
The table below lists the non-approved algorithms that are allowed in the approved mode of operation
with no security claimed. These algorithms are used by the approved services listed in Section 4.3.
Name Caveat Use and Function
MD5 Allowed per IG 2.4.A Message digest used in TLS 1.0/1.1 KDF only
Table 8: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
The table below lists non-approved algorithms that are not allowed in the approved mode of operation.
Name Use and Function
DSA (disallowed) PQG Gen, Key Pair Gen, and Sig Gen. DSA Signature Verification and
PQG Verification are approved for Legacy use only
RSA (disallowed) Key Encryption using PKCS#1 v1.5. Key Decryption using PKCS#1 v1.5
is allowed for Legacy use only
AES/TripleDES KW
(noncompliant)
Key wrapping [algorithm disabled by module in Approved mode]
Blowfish Encryption and Decryption [algorithm disabled by module in approved
mode]
Camellia 128/192/256 Encryption and Decryption [algorithm disabled by module in approved
mode]
CAST5 Encryption and Decryption [algorithm disabled by module in approved
mode]
DES Encryption and Decryption [algorithm disabled by module in approved
mode]
DES-X Encryption and Decryption [algorithm disabled by module in approved
mode]
IDEA Encryption and Decryption [algorithm disabled by module in approved
mode]
RC2 Encryption and Decryption [algorithm disabled by module in approved
mode]
RC5 Encryption and Decryption [algorithm disabled by module in approved
mode]
SEED Encryption and Decryption [algorithm disabled by module in approved
mode]
Triple-DES Encryption and Decryption [algorithm disabled by module in approved
mode]
MD4 Message Digest [algorithm disabled by module in approved mode]
MD5 Message Digest [algorithm disabled by module in approved mode]
RIPEMD-160 Message Digest [algorithm disabled by module in approved mode]
Whirlpool Message Digest [algorithm disabled by module in approved mode]
Triple-DES MAC Message Digest [algorithm disabled by module in approved mode]
HMAC-MD5 Keyed Hash [algorithm disabled by module in approved mode]
Table 9: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms
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2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KAS-ECC-SSC KAS-SSC Used to perform
key agreement
primitives
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2, path
(1)
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
128 and 256 bits
of encryption
strength
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A3592)
KAS-FFC-SSC KAS-SSC Used to perform
key agreement
primitives
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2, path
(1)
Caveat: Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
112 and 200 bits
of encryption
strength
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A3592)
KTS-IFC AsymKeyPair-
Decap
AsymKeyPair-
Encap
Key encapsulation
and un-
encapsulation
IG:IG D.G
Caveat:Key
transport provides
between 112 and
152 bits of
encryption
strength
KTS-IFC: (A3592)
Asymmetric Key
Pair Generation
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
CKG
Asymmetric Key
Pair Generation
performed by
ECDSA or RSA
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A3592)
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A3592)
Counter DRBG:
(A3592)
Hash DRBG:
(A3592)
HMAC DRBG:
(A3592)
CKG Section 4: ()
Asymmetric Key
Verification
AsymKeyPair-
KeyVer
Asymmetric Key
Pair Verification
for ECDSA
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A3592)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Digital Signature
Generation
DigSig-SigGen Digital Signature
Generation using
ECDSA or RSA
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A3592)
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A3592)
SHA2-224:
(A3592)
SHA2-256:
(A3592)
SHA2-384:
(A3592)
SHA2-512:
(A3592)
Digital Signature
Verification
DigSig-SigVer Digital Signature
Verification using
ECDSA or RSA
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A3592)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A3592)
SHA-1: (A3592)
SHA2-224:
(A3592)
SHA2-256:
(A3592)
SHA2-384:
(A3592)
SHA2-512:
(A3592)
Encryption BC-
UnAuthEncrypt
Block Cipher
Symmetric
Encryption Non-
Authenticated
AES-CBC:
(A3592)
AES-CFB1:
(A3592)
AES-CFB128:
(A3592)
AES-CFB8:
(A3592)
AES-CTR:
(A3592)
AES-ECB:
(A3592)
AES-XTS Testing
Revision 2.0:
(A3592)
Authenticated
Encryption
BC-AuthEncrypt Block Cipher
Symmetric
Encryption
Authenticated
AES-CCM:
(A3592)
AES-GCM:
(A3592)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
MAC1 MAC Message
Authentication
Computation with
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A3592)
Key Length: 256-
2048
MAC2 MAC Message
Authentication
Computation with
AES CMAC and
HMAC
AES-CMAC:
(A3592)
Key Length: 128,
192, 256
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A3592)
Key Length: 256-
2048
HMAC-SHA2-224:
(A3592)
Key Length: 256-
2048
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A3592)
Key Length: 256-
2048
HMAC-SHA2-384:
(A3592)
Key Length: 256-
2048
HMAC-SHA2-512:
(A3592)
Key Length: 256-
2048
Message Digest SHA Message Digest SHA-1: (A3592)
SHA2-224:
(A3592)
SHA2-256:
(A3592)
SHA2-384:
(A3592)
SHA2-512:
(A3592)
DRBG DRBG Generation of
random numbers
Counter DRBG:
(A3592)
Hash DRBG:
(A3592)
HMAC DRBG:
(A3592)
KDF-TLS KAS-135KDF Key derivation for
TLS
KDF TLS: (A3592)
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627:
(A3592)
KDF-SSH KAS-135KDF Key derivation for
SSH
KDF SSH:
(A3592)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KDF-IKE KAS-135KDF Key derivation for
IKE
KDF IKEv1:
(A3592)
KDF IKEv2:
(A3592)
Authenticated
Decryption
BC-AuthDecrypt Block Cipher
Symmetric
Decryption
Authenticated
AES-CCM:
(A3592)
AES-GCM:
(A3592)
Decryption BC-
UnAuthDecrypt
Block Cipher
Symmetric
Decryption
AES-CBC:
(A3592)
AES-CFB1:
(A3592)
AES-CFB128:
(A3592)
AES-CFB8:
(A3592)
AES-CTR:
(A3592)
AES-ECB:
(A3592)
AES-XTS Testing
Revision 2.0:
(A3592)
MAC3 MAC MAC computation
with HMAC-SHA2-
256 used for the
Integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A3592)
KDF-SP800-108 KBKDF Key Derivation
with SP 800-108r1
KDF SP800-108:
(A3592)
Table 10: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
Industry Protocols
The Module does not implement the TLS, SSH, and IPSec protocols itself. However, the module
provides the cryptographic functions required for implementing the protocols. The calling application is
allowed to construct or use IV for these protocols
Notes:
• No parts of the TLS v1.0/1.1, v1.2, SSHv2, or IPsec-v3 protocols, other than the approved
cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
• The KDF SSH (CVL) shall only be used within the context of the SSHv2 protocol.
• The KDF TLS (CVL) shall only be used within the context of the TLSv1.0/1.1 protocol.
• The TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (CVL) shall only be used within the context of the TLS v1.2 protocol.
• The KDF IKEv1 (CVL) shall only be used within the context of the IKEv1 protocol.
• The KDF IKEv2 (CVL) shall only be used within the context of the IKEv2 protocol.
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AES-GCM IV Generation
The module offers three AES GCM implementations. The GCM IV generation for these implementations
complies respectively with IG C.H under Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. The GCM shall only be used in the
context of the AES-GCM encryption executing under each scenario, and using the referenced APIs
explained next.
Scenario 1, TLS 1.2
The module provides the cryptographic functions to support the AES-GCM ciphersuites from
Section 3.3.1 of SP800-52rev2 and the mechanism for IV generation per RFC 5288.
The module explicitly ensures that the counter (the nonce_explicit part of the IV) does not
exhaust the maximum number of possible values of 264
-1 for a given session key. If this
exhaustion condition is observed, the module returns an error indication to the calling application,
which will then need to either abort the connection, or trigger a handshake to establish a new
encryption key.
In the event the module’s power is lost and restored, the calling application must ensure that a
new key for use with the AES-GCM key encryption or decryption under this scenario shall be
established.
Scenario 1, SSHv2
The module provides the cryptographic functions to support the calling application for compliant
with RFCs 4252, 4253, and 5647.
In the event the module’s power is lost and restored, the calling application must ensure that a
new key for use with the AES-GCM key encryption or decryption under this scenario shall be
established.
Scenario 1, IPsec-v3
The module provides the cryptographic functions to support the calling application for compliant
with RFCs 4106 and 5282.
The module’s implementation of AES-GCM is used together with an application that runs outside
the module’s cryptographic boundary. This application negotiates the protocol session’s keys and
the value in the first 32 bits of the nonce. The construction of the last 64 bits of the nonce is
deterministic and uses a counter.
The module explicitly ensures that the counter (the nonce_explicit part of the IV) does not
exhaust the maximum number of possible values of 264
-1 for a given session key. If this
exhaustion condition is observed, the module returns an error indication to the calling application,
which will then need to either abort the connection, or trigger a handshake to establish a new
encryption key.
In the event the module’s power is lost and restored, the calling application must ensure that a
new key for use with the AES-GCM key encryption or decryption under this scenario shall be
established.
Scenario 2, Random IV
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In this implementation, the module offers the interface RAND_bytes for compliance with Scenario
2 of IG C.H and SP800-38D Section 8.2.2. The AES-GCM IV is generated randomly internal to
the module using the module's approved DRBG. The DRBG seeds itself from the entropy source.
The GCM IV is 96 bits in length. The selection of the IV construction method is the responsibility
of the calling application. In approved mode, only internally generated IVs within the TOEPP is
considered compliant for use.
AES-XTS
AES-XTS shall only be used for storage applications. Per IG C.I, the module explicitly checks that Key_1
≠ Key_2.
DRBG
The module relies on passively provided entropy. The default CTR_DRBG is used without a derivation
function. IG D.L requires that a CTR_DRNG used without a derivation function shall be seeded from an
entropy source producing full-entropy outputs, and the entropy source shall be located within the
TOEPP. It is the responsibility of the developer integrating the module to ensure that the entropy used to
seed the DRBG comes from a source located within the TOEPP and which is capable of producing full
entropy output. For Hash DRBG and HMAC DRBG, the developer must ensure that the entropy used to
seed the DRBG comes from a source located within the TOEPP and that the hash function used by the
Hash DRBG and HMAC DRBG can provide a security strength that meets or exceeds the minimum
security strength required for the random bits that the DRBG generates.
HMAC
The calling application shall ensure that HMAC keys be generated as specified in SP 800-133 and an
HMAC key shall have a security strength that meets or exceeds the security strength required to protect
the data over which the HMAC is computed, that HMAC keys shall be kept secret, that when truncating
the HMAC output to generate a MacTag to a desired length, 𝜆, the 𝜆 left-most bits of the HMAC output
shall be used as the MacTag and the length of 𝜆 shall be no less than 32 bits, and that if the probability
of a forgery for a given MagTag length and the number of failed MacTag verifications is not acceptable
for the system, the HMAC key shall be changed to a new value before the number of failed MAC
verifications allowed, per IG C.L.
KAS
The module does not establish SSPs using an approved key agreement scheme (KAS). However, it
does offer some or all of the underlying KAS cryptographic functionality to be used by an external
operator/application as part of an approved KAS.
KTS
The module does not establish SSPs using an approved key transport scheme (KTS). However, it does
offer approved authenticated algorithms that can be used by an external operator/application as part of
an approved KTS. The module also provides the KTS-IFC OAEP asymmetric encapsulation and
decapsulation functions compliant to SP 800-56Br2 per IG D.G.
SHA-1
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SHA-1 for digital signature verification is legacy use. SHA-1 for digital signature generation is non-
approved. The calling application shall ensure that SHA-1 is not used in digital signature generation as
SHA-1 is disallowed per SP 800-131Ar2.
Algorithms designated as “Legacy” can only be used on data that was generated prior to the Legacy
Date specified in FIPS 140-3 IG C.M.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
N/A for this module.
The module does not implement or actively call any SP 800-90B entropy sources. (SP 800-140B table 10:
Entropy Certificates has been omitted)
The module uses an SP800-90Arev1-compliant Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) using
CTR_DRBG with AES-256 and use of derivation function for creation of asymmetric key components and
random number generation. The module receives entropy passively and uses 384 bits of entropy to seed
the DRBG. Full entropy source must be used for the default DRBG. Operators may instantiate
CTR_DRBG instances with other options. Operators may instantiate and use the other Approved
Hash_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG offered by the module.
2.9 Key Generation
For generating RSA, ECDSA and EC Diffie-Hellman keys, the module implements asymmetric key
generation services compliant with FIPS186-4 and using a DRBG compliant with SP800-90Arev1.
The random value used in asymmetric key generation is obtained from the DRBG. In accordance with
FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for
asymmetric keys as per section 5.1 of SP800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed) by obtaining a random bit string
directly from an approved DRBG and that can support the required security strength requested by the
caller (without any V, as described in Additional Comments 2 of IG D.H).
The module does not provide a dedicated service for generating symmetric keys. However, symmetric
keys can be derived using SP800-135rev1 for TLS KDF, IKE v1/2 KDF, and SSHv2 KDF algorithms, as
well as SP800-108 counter KBKDF. This generation method maps to section 6.2 of SP800-133rev2.
2.10 Key Establishment
The module provides EC Diffie-Hellman and FFC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation compliant
with SP800-56Arev3, in accordance with scenario 2, path (1) of IG D.F. It also provides RSA OAEP key
transport as KTS-IFC compliant with SP 800-56Br2 in accordance with IG D.G and applications may
transport keys as TLS, SSHv2, or IPSec protocol payload compliant to SP 800-38F in accordance with
IG D.G.
Additionally, the module also supports key derivation using TLS 1.0/1.1, TLS 1.2, IKE v1, IKE v2, SSHv2
KDF compliant to SP800-135rev1 and counter KBKDF compliant to SP800-108.
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The module provides the cryptographic building blocks for symmetric AES key wrapping and asymmetric
key encapsulation. A calling application may use these to implement a protocol that uses a compliant
KTS for its key establishment.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The module does not implement any industry protocols. However it provides the building blocks to
support the following protocols.
Protocol Reference
SSHv2 [IG D.F and SP 800‐135]
TLS v1.0/v1.1/v1.2 [IG D.F, IG D.G and SP 800‐135]
IPsec-v3 [RFC 4106, 5282, 7296]
Table A - Security Relevant Protocols Used in Approved Mode
Protocol Key Exchange Server/ Host
Auth
Cipher Integrity
DTLS
[IG D.G]
See TLS entry in this table.
SSHv2
[IG D.F and
SP 800‐135]
ECDH‐SHA2‐
NISTP521, ECDH‐
SHA2‐NISTP384,
ECDH‐SHA2‐
NISTP256, DIFFIE‐
HELLMANGROUP
14‐SHA1,
DIFFIE‐HELLMAN
GROUP14‐
SHA256,
DIFFIE‐HELLMAN
GROUP16‐
SHA512
ECDSA P‐
521,
ECDSA P‐
384,
ECDSA P‐
256,
RSA
AES-GCM-128
AES-GCM-256
AES-CBC-128
AES-CBC-192
AES-CBC-256
AES-CTR-128
AES-CTR-192
AES-CTR-256
HMAC SHA-1
HMAC SHA2‐256
HMAC SHA2‐512
AES-GCM-128
AES-GCM-256
TLS
[IG D.G and
SP 800‐135]
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 for TLS v1.0, v1.1,
v1.2
ECDHE RSA AES‐GCM-128 AES‐GCM-128
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 for TLS v1.0, v1.1,
v1.2
ECDHE RSA AES-GCM-256 AES-GCM-256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 for TLS v1.0, v1.1,
v1.2
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Protocol Key Exchange Server/ Host
Auth
Cipher Integrity
ECDHE ECDSA AES‐GCM‐128 AES‐GCM‐128
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 for TLS v1.0, v1.1,
v1.2
ECDHE ECDSA AES‐GCM‐256 AES‐GCM‐256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 for TLS v1.0, v1.1, v1.2
ECDHE ECDSA AES-CCM-256 AES-CCM-256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM for TLS v1.0, v1.1, v1.2
ECDHE ECDSA AES-CCM-256 AES-CCM-256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 for TLS v1.0, v1.1, v1.2
ECDHE ECDSA AES-CCM-128 AES-CCM-128
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM for TLS v1.0, v1.1, v1.2
ECDHE ECDSA AES-CCM-128 AES-CCM-128
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 for TLS v1.0, v1.1,
v1.2
ECDHE ECDSA AES-CBC-256 HMAC SHA2-384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 for TLS v1.0, v1.1,
v1.2
ECDHE ECDSA AES-CBC-128 HMAC SHA2-256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA for TLS v1.0, v1.1,
v1.2
ECDHE ECDSA AES-CBC-256 HMAC SHA-1
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA for TLS v1.0, v1.1,
v1.2
ECDHE ECDSA AES-CBC-128 HMAC SHA-1
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 for TLS v1.0, v1.1,
v1.2
ECDHE RSA AES-CBC-128 HMAC SHA2-256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 for TLS v1.0, v1.1,
v1.2
ECDHE RSA AES-CBC-256 HMAC SHA2-256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA for TLS v1.0, v1.1, v1.2
ECDHE RSA AES-CBC-256 HMAC SHA-1
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Protocol Key Exchange Server/ Host
Auth
Cipher Integrity
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA for TLS v1.0, v1.1, v1.2
ECDHE RSA AES-CBC-128 HMAC SHA-1
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 for TLS v1.0, v1.1, v1.2
DHE RSA AES-CCM-256 AES-CCM-256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM for TLS v1.0, v1.1, v1.2
DHE RSA AES-CCM-256 AES-CCM-256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 for TLS v1.0, v1.1, v1.2
DHE RSA AES-CCM-128 AES-CCM-128
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM for TLS v1.0, v1.1, v1.2
DHE RSA AES-CCM-128 AES-CCM-128
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 for TLS v1.0, v1.1, v1.2
DHE RSA AES-CBC-256 HMAC SHA2-256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 for TLS v1.0, v1.1, v1.2
DHE RSA AES-CBC-128 HMAC SHA2-256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA for TLS v1.0, v1.1, v1.2
DHE RSA AES-CBC-256 HMAC SHA-1
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA for TLS v1.0, v1.1, v1.2
DHE RSA AES-CBC-128 HMAC SHA-1
IPsec-v3 diffie-hellman
MODP-2048,
MODP-3072,
MODP-4096,
MODP-6144,
MODP-8192
ec diffie-hellman
secp256r1,
secp384r1,
secp521r1
AES-GCM-128
AES-GCM-192
AES-GCM-256
AES-CBC-128
AES-CBC-192
AES-CBC-256
AES-CTR-128
AES-CTR-192
AES-CTR-256
AES-CCM-128
AES-CCM-192
AES-CCM-256
AES-GCM-128
AES-GCM-192
AES-GCM-256
HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-384
HMAC-SHA2-512
AES-CCM-128
AES-CCM-192
AES-CCM-256
Table B - Security Relevant Protocols Used in Approved Mode
2.12 Additional Information
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The module initializes upon power-on. After the pre-operational self-tests (POST) are successfully
concluded, the module automatically transitions to the operational state. In this state, the module awaits
service requests from the operator.
Upon initializing the module by installing the module and setting the password, the operator must then
manually set the module to approved mode, via the interface described in Section “2.4 Modes of
Operation”.
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
As a Software module, the module interfaces are defined as Software or Firmware Module Interfaces
(SFMI), and there are no physical ports. The interfaces are mapped to the API provided by the module,
through which the operator can interact. The interfaces are listed in the table below.
All data output via data output interface is inhibited under the following circumstances:
● When the module is in POST mode
● During zeroisation of data such as CSPs
● When the module enters error state.
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
N/A Data Input API input parameters for data
N/A Data Output API output parameters for data
N/A Control Input API function calls
N/A Status Output API return codes, error messages, logging messages
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces
The module does not support Control Output.
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
The table below lists all operator roles supported by the module (for the role, CO indicates “Crypto
Officer”) and the security strength of the authentication. The Module does not support a maintenance role
nor bypass capability. The Module does not support concurrent operators.
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each Attempt Strength per Minute
Password Password
authentication
mechanism
HMAC-SHA-1
(A3592)
95^16 (module enforces
16 character minimum
password length)
Chance of guessing in
one minute 1 in
9.03*10^18
Table 12: Authentication Methods
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The module supports Role-based authentication using passwords as the SP 800-140E memorized
secret. The module has a strength of authentication objective of at least 1/958
, and to achieve that over a
one-minute period the module enforces a minimum password length of 16 characters. The password
can be set by the calling application through the “FIPS_set_password” API.
The module has procedural controls and enforces that an operator must set a password prior to use of
the module. The module is installed according to section 11.1 and the module authentication mechanism
is included within the module software and so automatically included during that installation process.
Since the module enforces a minimum 16 character password length and there are 95 possible ASCII
characters (upper and lower case, digits, special characters), it has an authentication strength of 95^16.
Thus the false acceptance rate is 1/9516
. Assuming a very high-performing CPU that runs at 4 GHz with
24 cores which means it can perform 4 billion * 24 instructions per second, the probability of a successful
random access within a minute is still extremely unlikely at 1/9516
* 4 billion * 24 cores * 60 seconds/min.
It would take about 150 billion years to have a 1% chance of cracking the password in this scenario:
1/9516
* 4 billion * 24 cores * 60 sec / min * 60 min / hr * 24 hr / day * 365 days / year * 150 billion
= 0.0103
4.2 Roles
The module supports the Crypto Officer role only, whose authentication is performed by the module
using password. This sole role is implicitly assumed by the operator of the module when performing a
service after authentication.
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Role CO Password
Table 13: Roles
4.3 Approved Services
The module provides services to operators who assume the available role. All services are described in
detail in the developer documentation. For the role, CO indicates “Crypto Officer”. The table below lists
the approved services that utilize approved and allowed security functions.
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Authenticat
ed
Decryption
Authenticated
Decryption
Mode
indicator
1, return
code 1,
syslog
message
indicating
the
service
"starting",
"perform
ed" or
Ciphertext,
Authenticat
ion Tag,
Key, IV
Plaintext Authentica
ted
Decryption
Crypto
Officer
- AES
Key:
W,E
- AES
GCM
Key:
W,E
- AES
GCM
IV: W,E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
"initialize
d"
Authenticat
ed
Encryption
Authenticated
Encryption
Mode
indicator
1, return
code 1,
syslog
message
indicating
the
service
"starting",
"perform
ed" or
"initialize
d"
Plaintext,
key, IV
Ciphertext,
authenticati
on tag
Authentica
ted
Encryption
Crypto
Officer
- AES
Key:
W,E
- AES
GCM
Key:
W,E
- AES
GCM
IV: G,E
Decryption Decryption Mode
indicator
1, return
code 1,
syslog
message
indicating
the
service
"starting",
"perform
ed" or
"initialize
d"
Ciphertext,
key
Plaintext Decryption Crypto
Officer
- AES
Key:
W,E
Encryption Encryption Mode
indicator
1, return
code 1,
syslog
message
indicating
the
service
"starting",
"perform
ed" or
"initialize
d"
Plaintext,
Key
Ciphertext Encryption Crypto
Officer
- AES
Key:
W,E
Key
Derivation
(TLS)
Deriving TLS keys Mode
indicator
1, return
code 1,
PRF
algorithm,
TLS
Derived
Keys
KDF-TLS Crypto
Officer
- TLS
Derived
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
syslog
message
indicating
the
service
"starting",
"perform
ed" or
"initialize
d"
master
secret
key/AE
S &
HMAC:
G,R
- TLS
master
secret:
G,E
- TLS
pre-
master
secret:
W,E
Key
Derivation
(SSH)
Deriving SSH keys Mode
indicator
1, return
code 1,
syslog
message
indicating
the
service
"starting",
"perform
ed" or
"initialize
d"
PRF
algorithm,
SSH
shared
secret
Derived
Keys
KDF-SSH Crypto
Officer
- SSH
Shared
Secret:
W,E
- SSH
Derived
key/AE
S &
HMAC:
G,R
Key
Derivation
(IKE)
Deriving IKE keys Mode
indicator
1, return
code 1,
syslog
message
indicating
the
service
"starting",
"perform
ed" or
"initialize
d"
PRF
algorithm,
IKE shared
secret
Derived
Keys
KDF-IKE Crypto
Officer
- IKE
shared
secret:
W,E
- IKE
Derived
key/AE
S &
HMAC:
G,R
Key
Derivation
(SP 800-
108r1)
Deriving keys Mode
indicator
1, return
code 1,
syslog
message
indicating
Shared
Secret, key
size
Derived
Keys
KDF-
SP800-
108
Crypto
Officer
- Key
Derivati
on Key:
W,E
- 800-
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
the
service
"starting",
"perform
ed" or
"initialize
d"
108
Derived
Key:
G,R
Key
Generation
Generating Key pair Mode
indicator
1, return
code 1,
syslog
message
indicating
the
service
"starting",
"perform
ed" or
"initialize
d"
Algorithm,
key size
Key Pair Asymmetri
c Key Pair
Generation
Crypto
Officer
-
ECDSA
Key
Pair:
G,R
- RSA
Key
Pair:
G,R
- DRBG
Seed:
W,E
- DRBG
C
Value:
W,E
- DRBG
V Value:
W,E
- DRBG
Key
Value:
W,E
Key
Encapsulat
ion
Key encapsulation per
SP 800-56Br2
Mode
indicator
1, return
code 1,
syslog
message
indicating
the
service
"starting",
"perform
ed" or
"initialize
d"
RSA public
key, keying
material to
encapsulat
e
Encapsulat
ed key
KTS-IFC Crypto
Officer
- RSA
KEK
Public:
W,E
- Keying
Material
: R,W
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key
Decapsulat
ion
Key decapsulation per
SP 800-56Br2
Mode
indicator
1, return
code 1,
syslog
message
indicating
the
service
"starting",
"perform
ed" or
"initialize
d"
RSA
private key,
keying
material to
decapsulat
e
Decapsulat
ed key
KTS-IFC Crypto
Officer
- RSA
KDK
Private:
W,E
- Keying
Material
: R,W
Key
Verification
Verifying the public key Mode
indicator
1, return
code 1,
syslog
message
indicating
the
service
"starting",
"perform
ed" or
"initialize
d"
Key to
verify
Return
codes and
log
messages
Asymmetri
c Key
Verification
Crypto
Officer
-
ECDSA
SVK
Public:
W,E
Initialize Initialize FIPS password
using
FIPS_set_password
Mode
indicator
1, return
code 1,
syslog
message
indicating
the
service
"starting",
"perform
ed" or
"initialize
d"
Crypto
Officer
Password
None MAC1 Crypto
Officer
- Crypto
Officer
Passwo
rd: W,E
-
Hashed
Passwo
rd: E
Message
Authenticat
ion
Generation
MAC computation Mode
indicator
1, return
code 1,
syslog
message
Message,
Algorithm,
key
Message
Authenticat
ion code
MAC2 Crypto
Officer
- AES
Key:
W,E
- HMAC
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
indicating
the
service
"starting",
"perform
ed" or
"initialize
d"
key:
W,E
Message
Digest
Generating message
digest
Mode
indicator
1, return
code 1,
syslog
message
indicating
the
service
"starting",
"perform
ed" or
"initialize
d"
Message Digest of
the
message
Message
Digest
Crypto
Officer
On-
Demand
Integrity
Test
Initiate integrity test on-
demand through
FIPS_check_incore_fing
erprint
Mode
indicator
1, return
code 1,
syslog
message
indicating
the
service
"starting",
"perform
ed" or
"initialize
d"
None Result of
test
(pass/fail)
MAC3 Crypto
Officer
On-
Demand
Self-Test
Initiate pre-operational
and conditional CAST
self-tests through
FIPS_selftest
Mode
indicator
1, return
code 1,
syslog
message
indicating
the self-
tests
were
executed
None Result of
self-test
(pass/fail)
KAS-ECC-
SSC
KAS-FFC-
SSC
KTS-IFC
Digital
Signature
Generation
Digital
Signature
Verification
Encryption
Crypto
Officer
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Authentica
ted
Encryption
MAC1
MAC2
Message
Digest
DRBG
KDF-TLS
KDF-SSH
KDF-IKE
Authentica
ted
Decryption
Decryption
MAC3
KDF-
SP800-
108
Random
Number
Generation
Generating random
numbers
Mode
indicator
1, return
code 1,
syslog
message
indicating
the
service
"starting",
"perform
ed" or
"initialize
d"
API call
parameters
Return
code,
Random
Bits
DRBG Crypto
Officer
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,E
- DRBG
C
Value:
G,E
- DRBG
V Value:
G,E
- DRBG
Key
Value:
G,E
Shared
Secret
Computatio
n
Calculating Shared
Secret
Mode
indicator
1, return
code 1,
syslog
message
indicating
the
service
EC Curve
or DH
parameters
, V's public
key
Shared
Secret
KAS-ECC-
SSC
KAS-FFC-
SSC
DRBG
Crypto
Officer
- DRBG
Seed:
W,E
- DRBG
C
Value:
W,E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
"starting",
"perform
ed" or
"initialize
d"
- DRBG
V Value:
W,E
- DRBG
Key
Value:
W,E
- DH
Private
Key:
G,E,Z
- DH
Public
Key:
G,E,Z
- ECDH
Private
Key:
G,E,Z
- ECDH
Public
Key:
G,E,Z
Show
Status
Show status of the
module state using
FIPS_mode
None None Return
code of 1
indicates
Approved
mode
enabled, 0
is disabled
None Crypto
Officer
Show
Version
Show the version of the
module using
FIPS_module_version_t
ext
None None String
indicating
the module
version
and name
None Crypto
Officer
Signature
Generation
Generating signature Mode
indicator
1, return
code 1,
syslog
message
indicating
the
service
"starting",
"perform
ed" or
Message,
hash
algorithm,
private key
Signature Digital
Signature
Generation
Crypto
Officer
-
ECDSA
SGK
Private:
W,E
- RSA
SGK
Private:
W,E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
"initialize
d"
Signature
Verification
Verifying signature Mode
indicator
1, return
code 1,
syslog
message
indicating
the
service
"starting",
"perform
ed" or
"initialize
d"
Message,
Signature,
hash
algorithm,
public key
Verification
result
Digital
Signature
Verification
Crypto
Officer
-
ECDSA
SVK
Public:
W,E
- RSA
SVK
Public:
W,E
Zeroise Zeroise SSP in volatile
memory
None Context
containing
SSPs
None None Crypto
Officer
- 800-
108
Derived
Key: Z
- AES
Key: Z
- Crypto
Officer
Passwo
rd: Z
-
Hashed
Passwo
rd: Z
- DRBG
Entropy
Input: Z
- DRBG
Seed: Z
- DRBG
C
Value: Z
- DRBG
V Value:
Z
- DRBG
Key
Value: Z
- HMAC
key: Z
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- IKE
shared
secret:
Z
- IKE
Derived
key/AE
S &
HMAC:
Z
- Keying
Material
: Z
-
Shared
Secret:
Z
- SSH
Shared
Secret:
Z
- SSH
Derived
key/AE
S &
HMAC:
Z
- TLS
Derived
key/AE
S &
HMAC:
Z
- TLS
master
secret:
Z
- TLS
pre-
master
secret:
Z
- DH
Private
Key: Z
- DH
Public
Key: Z
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- ECDH
Private
Key: Z
- ECDH
Public
Key: Z
- Key
Derivati
on Key:
Z
- AES
GCM
Key: Z
- AES
GCM
IV: Z
-
ECDSA
Key
Pair: Z
-
ECDSA
SGK
Private:
Z
-
ECDSA
SVK
Public:
Z
- RSA
Key
Pair: Z
- RSA
SGK
Private:
Z
- RSA
SVK
Public:
Z
- RSA
KDK
Private:
Z
- RSA
KEK
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Public:
Z
Table 14: Approved Services
Service Indicator
The module implements a status indicator that indicates whether the invoked service is approved. When
approved mode is active, non-approved functions cannot be used. If a non-approved function is used in
approved mode, an error code of 0 indicating failure is returned and the reason for failure is added to the
error queue.
To verify if approved mode is active, the function FIPS_mode() should be called. This function is
described in Section “2.4 Modes of Operation”.
In addition to the return code, the module outputs syslog messages to indicate whether an invoked
service is approved. The usage is as follows:
STEP 1: Check the system log output buffer for existing log messages
STEP 2: Make a service call i.e., API function for performing a service
STEP 3: Check the system log output buffer for a new log message indicating which service was
invoked. For example, running the TLS key derivation service will generate a new log message saying
“OpenSSL: Key derivation service for TLS performed”. If there is no log message, that is an indication
that the invoked function was not an approved service.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
The table below lists the non-approved services that utilize non-approved security functions.
Name Description Algorithms Role
Decryption Decryption Blowfish
Camellia 128/192/256
CAST5
DES
DES-X
IDEA
RC2
RC5
SEED
Triple-DES
CO
Encryption Encryption Blowfish
Camellia 128/192/256
CAST5
DES
DES-X
IDEA
RC2
RC5
CO
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Name Description Algorithms Role
SEED
Triple-DES
Key Wrapping Encrypting/ Decrypting key RSA (disallowed)
AES/TripleDES KW (noncompliant)
CO
Message Digest Hash computation MD4
MD5
RIPEMD-160
Whirlpool
Triple-DES MAC
HMAC-MD5
CO
Signature Generation Signature Generation DSA (disallowed) CO
Table 15: Non-Approved Services
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module does not have external software/firmware load capability.
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The integrity of the module is validated by comparing the module with a HMAC-SHA2-256 value
generated after the build of fipscanister.o, which is the FIPS Object Module. This generated value is
embedded into fipscanister.o before fipscanister.o is statically linked to libcrypto.so. During runtime the
FIPS_mode_set() function calculates the digest over fipscanister.o, excluding the embedded hash value,
and checks to see if the embedded value matches the calculated digest.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The module provides on-demand integrity test. The integrity test is performed by the On-Demand
Integrity Test service, which calls the FIPS_check_incore_fingerprint function. The integrity test is also
performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. One can also initiate the On Demand Integrity Test
service by calling “openssl --fips” on the command line, which is a calling application that runs the
module’s self-test API function. A successful test will show “FIPS mode is enabled”.
5.3 Open-Source Parameters
The source distribution package (including Arista own patches and updates) is located at Arista internal
repository. The module is built with the following configuration for linux-x86_64 using Linux 5.10 and gcc
11.3:
OPENSSL_NO_BF (skip dir)
OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA (skip dir)
OPENSSL_NO_CAST (skip dir)
OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 (skip dir)
OPENSSL_NO_GMP (skip dir)
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OPENSSL_NO_IDEA (skip dir)
OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE (skip dir)
OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
OPENSSL_NO_MD2 (skip dir)
OPENSSL_NO_MD5 (skip dir)
OPENSSL_NO_MDC2 (skip dir)
OPENSSL_NO_RC2 (skip dir)
OPENSSL_NO_RC4 (skip dir)
OPENSSL_NO_RC5 (skip dir)
OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 (skip dir)
OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD (skip dir)
OPENSSL_NO_SEED (skip dir)
OPENSSL_NO_SRP (skip dir)
OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 (skip dir)
OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 (skip dir)
OPENSSL_NO_STORE (skip dir)
OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 (skip dir)
OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT (skip dir)
IsMK1MF=0
CC =gcc
CFLAG =-DOPENSSL_FIPSCANISTER -fPIC -DOPENSSL_PIC -DOPENSSL_THREADS -
D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -g -Wa,--noexecstack -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -
DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2 -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT -
DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5 -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m -DSHA1_ASM -DSHA256_ASM -
DSHA512_ASM -DMD5_ASM -DAES_ASM -DWHIRLPOOL_ASM -DGHASH_ASM
EX_LIBS =-lm -ldl
To build the openssl-fips object module
# ./ a4 rpmbuild openssl-fips
This command executes the following steps:
1. Patch the OpenSSL object module code with Arista patches
2. Run “./config”
3. Run “make”
4. This creates the object module at fipscanister.o and hash at fipscanister.o.sha1, and other files
such as fips_premain.o and fips_premain.o.sha1.
5. These files are placed in /usr/local/ssl/fips-2.0/lib folder, which OpenSSL is configured to use.
Run “a4 rpmbuild openssl”, which will build openssl using the FIPS object module and generate
OpenSSL RPMs, which are installed on the software image during the build process.
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable
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6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions
The module should be installed as stated in section 11.
7 Physical Security
N/A for this module.
8 Non-Invasive Security
N/A for this module.
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
RAM System Memory Dynamic
Table 16: Storage Areas
SSPs are provided to the module by the calling process and are destroyed when released by the
appropriate zeroisation function calls. The module does not perform persistent storage of SSPs.
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
SSP Input Calling process RAM Plaintext Automated Electronic
SSP Output RAM Calling process Plaintext Automated Electronic
Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods
The module does not support manual SSP entry or intermediate key generation output. The module does
not support entry and output of SSPs beyond the physical perimeter of the operational environment.
Except for services designed to wrap or unwrap an SSP the SSPs are provided to the module via API
input parameters in the plaintext form and output via API output parameters in the plaintext form to and
from the calling application running on the same operational environment. SSPs provided for
unwrapping are input encrypted using KTS-IFC’s RSA-OAEP_basic, and SSPs the module wrapped are
output encrypted using KTS-IFC’s RSA-OAEP_basic.
The output of plaintext CSPs requires two independent internal actions. Specifically, the first action is
creation of the cipher context to request the service and to hold the CSPs to be output from the module.
The second action is to process the ‘Key Generation’ service request using the context created. Only
after successful completion of this request, the generated CSP is output via the API output parameter.
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9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
API call The zeroisation is
performed by the module
overwriting zeroes to the
memory location occupied
by the SSP and further
deallocating that area.
The calling application, interacting with the
module, is responsible for calling the
appropriate destruction functions using the
zeroisation APIs listed in the above table to
zeroise the calling application's copies of the
SSP. The completion of a zeroisation routine
will indicate that a zeroisation procedure
succeeded
By
invocation
through API
call
Module
Restart
The zeroisation is
performed by erasing the
memory location occupied
by the SSP and further
deallocating that area.
Restart to zeroize the Hashed Password Restart the
module
Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods
The zeroisation is performed by the module overwriting zeroes or predefined values to the memory
location occupied by the SSP and further deallocating that area. The calling application, interacting with
the module, is responsible for calling the appropriate destruction functions using the zeroisation APIs
listed in the above table to zeroise the calling application’s copies of the SSP. The completion of a
zeroisation routine will indicate that a zeroisation procedure succeeded.
9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
800-108
Derived
Key
Keying material
derived from
key derivation
function SP
800-108rev1
128, 192,
256 -
128, 192,
256
Keying
Material -
CSP
KDF-
SP800-108
Key
Derivation
Key
Key-Derivation
key for SP 800-
108rev1
128, 192,
256 -
128, 192,
256
Key-derivation
Key - CSP
KDF-SP800-
108
AES Key AES Key 128, 192,
256 -
128, 192,
256
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KDF-TLS
KDF-SSH
KDF-IKE
KAS-ECC-
SSC
KAS-FFC-
SSC
Encryption
Authenticated
Encryption
MAC2
Authenticated
Decryption
Decryption
AES
GCM Key
AES GCM key
for
encrypt/decrypt
128, 192,
256 -
128, 192,
256
Symmetric
Key - CSP
Authenticated
Encryption
Authenticated
Decryption
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
AES
GCM IV
AES GCM IV
for
encrypt/decrypt
96 - 96 IV - CSP DRBG Authenticated
Encryption
Authenticated
Decryption
Crypto
Officer
Password
Crypto Officer
Password used
during the
authentiication
N/A - N/A Authentication
Password -
CSP
MAC1
Hashed
Password
Hash of the
Crypto Officer
Password
N/A - N/A Authentication
Password -
CSP
MAC1 MAC1
DRBG
Entropy
Input
Entropy
material for
DRBG
384 - 384 Entropy Input
- CSP
DRBG
DRBG
Seed
Seeding
material for
DRBG
256 - 256 DRBG
Material -
CSP
DRBG DRBG
DRBG C
Value
Used for
DRBG.
256 - 256 DRBG
Material -
CSP
DRBG DRBG
DRBG V
Value
Used for DRBG 256 - 256 DRBG
Material -
CSP
DRBG DRBG
DRBG
Key Value
Used for DRBG 256 - 256 DRBG
Material -
CSP
DRBG DRBG
HMAC
key
Message
authentication
256-2048
- 128-
256
HMAC Key -
CSP
KDF-TLS
KDF-SSH
KDF-IKE
KDF-
SP800-108
KAS-ECC-
SSC
KAS-FFC-
SSC
MAC1
MAC2
MAC3
IKE
shared
secret
IKE key
agreement
112-256
- 112-
256
Shared Secret
- CSP
KDF-IKE
IKE
Derived
key/AES
& HMAC
IKE Derived
Keys for IKE
key agreement
112 or
greater -
112 or
greater
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KDF-IKE Encryption
Authenticated
Encryption
MAC2
Authenticated
Decryption
Decryption
Keying
Material
KTS-IFC keying
material to be
encapsulated or
un-
encapsulated
112 or
greater -
112 or
greater
Keying
Material -
CSP
KTS-IFC KTS-IFC
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
by RSA-
OAEP_basic
Shared
Secret
Shared Secret
for Key
Agreement
112 or
greater -
112 or
greater
Bitstring -
CSP
KAS-ECC-
SSC
KAS-FFC-
SSC
SSH
Shared
Secret
SSH Shared
Secret for SSH
Key Agreement
112 or
greater -
112 or
greater
Bitstring -
CSP
KDF-SSH
SSH
Derived
key/AES
& HMAC
SSH derived
keys for
securing SSH
connection
112 or
greater -
112 or
greater
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KDF-SSH Encryption
Authenticated
Encryption
MAC2
Authenticated
Decryption
Decryption
TLS
Derived
key/AES
& HMAC
TLS derived
keys for
securing TLS
connection
112 or
greater -
112 or
greater
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KDF-TLS Encryption
Authenticated
Encryption
MAC2
Authenticated
Decryption
Decryption
TLS
master
secret
TLS master
secret for TLS
key derivation
384 -
112-256
TLS Key -
CSP
KDF-TLS
TLS pre-
master
secret
TLS pre-master
secret for TLS
key derivation
112-256
- 112-
256
TLS Key -
CSP
KAS-ECC-
SSC
KAS-FFC-
SSC
KDF-TLS
DH
Private
Key
Key agreement 2048,
3072,
4096,
8192 -
112, 128,
152, 200
Asymmetric
Key - CSP
Asymmetric
Key Pair
Generation
KAS-FFC-
SSC
DH Public
Key
DH public key 2048,
3072,
4096,
8192 -
112, 128,
152, 200
Asymmetric
Key - PSP
Asymmetric
Key Pair
Generation
KAS-FFC-
SSC
ECDH
Private
Key
ECDH private
key
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 -
Asymmetric
Key - CSP
Asymmetric
Key Pair
Generation
KAS-ECC-
SSC
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
128, 192,
256
ECDH
Public
Key
ECDH public
key
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 -
128, 192,
256
Asymmetric
Key - PSP
Asymmetric
Key Pair
Generation
KAS-ECC-
SSC
ECDSA
Key Pair
ECDSA key
pair generation
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 -
128, 192,
256
Asymmetric
Key - CSP
Asymmetric
Key Pair
Generation
ECDSA
SGK
Private
ECDSA
signature
generation
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 -
128, 192,
256
Asymmetric
Key - CSP
Digital
Signature
Generation
ECDSA
SVK
Public
ECDSA
signature
verification
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 -
128, 192,
256
Asymmetric
Key - PSP
Asymmetric
Key
Verification
Digital
Signature
Verification
RSA Key
Pair
RSA key pair
generation
2048,
3072,
4096 -
112, 128,
152
Asymmetric
Key - CSP
Asymmetric
Key Pair
Generation
RSA SGK
Private
RSA signature
generation
2048,
3072,
4096 -
112, 128,
152
Asymmetric
Key - CSP
Digital
Signature
Generation
RSA SVK
Public
RSA signature
verification
2048,
3072,
4096 -
112, 128,
152
Asymmetric
Key - PSP
Digital
Signature
Verification
RSA KDK
Private
Asymmetric
decapsulation
2048,
3072,
4096 -
112, 128,
152
Asymmetric
Key - CSP
KTS-IFC
RSA KEK
Public
Asymmetric
encapsulation
2048,
3072,
4096 -
Asymmetric
Key - PSP
KTS-IFC
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
112, 128,
152
Table 19: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
800-108
Derived Key
SSP
Output
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call Key Derivation Key:Derived
From
Key Derivation
Key
SSP
Input
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call 800-108 Derived
Key:Derives
AES Key SSP
Input
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call IKE shared secret:Derived
From
Shared Secret:Derived
From
SSH Shared
Secret:Derived From
TLS master secret:Derived
From
AES GCM Key SSP
Input
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call AES GCM IV:Used With
AES GCM IV RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call AES GCM Key:Used With
Crypto Officer
Password
SSP
Input
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call Hashed Password:Used
With
Hashed
Password
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral Module
Restart
Crypto Officer
Password:Used With
DRBG Entropy
Input
SSP
Input
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call DRBG Seed:Used With
DRBG C Value:Used With
DRBG V Value:Used With
DRBG Key Value:Used
With
DRBG Seed RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call DRBG Entropy Input:Used
With
DRBG C Value RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call DRBG Seed:Computed
From
DRBG V Value RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call DRBG Seed:Computed
From
DRBG Key
Value
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call DRBG Seed:Computed
From
HMAC key SSP
Input
SSP
Output
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call Shared Secret:Derived
From
IKE shared
secret
SSP
Input
SSP
Output
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call IKE Derived key/AES &
HMAC:Used With
DH Private Key:Used With
DH Public Key:Used With
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
ECDH Private Key:Used
With
ECDH Public Key:Used
With
IKE Derived
key/AES &
HMAC
SSP
Output
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call IKE shared secret:Derived
From
Keying Material SSP
Input
SSP
Output
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call RSA KDK Private:Used
With
RSA KEK Public:Used With
Shared Secret SSP
Input
SSP
Output
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call DH Private Key:Used With
DH Public Key:Used With
ECDH Private Key:Used
With
ECDH Public Key:Used
With
SSH Shared
Secret
SSP
Input
SSP
Output
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call SSH Derived key/AES &
HMAC:Derives
DH Private Key:Used With
DH Public Key:Used With
ECDH Private Key:Used
With
ECDH Public Key:Used
With
SSH Derived
key/AES &
HMAC
SSP
Output
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call SSH Shared
Secret:Derived From
TLS Derived
key/AES &
HMAC
SSP
Output
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call TLS master secret:Derived
From
TLS pre-master
secret:Used With
TLS master
secret
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call TLS Derived key/AES &
HMAC:Derives
TLS pre-master
secret:Derived From
TLS pre-master
secret
SSP
Input
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call TLS master secret:Derives
DH Private Key RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call DRBG Seed:Used With
DRBG C Value:Used With
DRBG Key Value:Used
With
Shared Secret:Used With
DH Public Key SSP
Output
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call DH Private Key:Paired With
ECDH Private
Key
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call DRBG Seed:Used With
DRBG C Value:Used With
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
DRBG V Value:Used With
DRBG Key Value:Used
With
Shared Secret:Used With
ECDH Public
Key
SSP
Output
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call ECDH Private Key:Paired
With
ECDSA Key
Pair
SSP
Output
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call DRBG Seed:Used With
DRBG C Value:Used With
DRBG V Value:Used With
DRBG Key Value:Used
With
ECDSA SGK
Private
SSP
Input
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call ECDSA SVK Public:Paired
With
ECDSA SVK
Public
SSP
Input
SSP
Output
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call ECDSA SGK Private:Paired
With
RSA Key Pair SSP
Output
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call DRBG Seed:Used With
DRBG C Value:Used With
DRBG V Value:Used With
DRBG Key Value:Used
With
RSA SGK
Private
SSP
Input
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call RSA SVK Public:Paired
With
RSA SVK
Public
SSP
Input
SSP
Output
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call RSA SGK Private:Paired
With
RSA KDK
Private
SSP
Input
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call Keying
Material:Decapsulates
RSA KEK Public:Paired
With
RSA KEK
Public
SSP
Input
SSP
Output
RAM:Plaintext Ephemeral API call Keying
Material:Encapsulates
RSA KDK Private:Paired
With
Table 20: SSP Table 2
Intermediate key generation values are never output from the module, but are treated like CSPs and are
automatically zeroised once no longer needed.
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A3592)
128-bit
hardcoded
key
Compare
Hash
Results
SW/FW
Integrity
Error
message to
stdout
Single encompassing
message authentication
code
Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The module does not implement pre-operational bypass or critical functions tests. We note that the
entropy source is not within the cryptographic boundary of the module, instead passively receiving
entropy from the external entropy source. Thus, its critical functions tests are not included in the module.
The module performs pre-operational tests automatically when the module is powered on. The pre-
operational self-tests ensure that the module is not corrupted and that the cryptographic algorithms work
as expected. The module transitions to the operational state only after the pre-operational self-tests (and
the cryptographic algorithm self-tests, which in this module are executed automatically after the pre-
operational self-tests) are passed successfully.
The types of pre-operational self-tests are described in the next sub-section.
Pre-Operational Software Integrity Test
The HMAC-SHA2-256 Conditional CAST is performed before checking the module integrity. Then the
integrity of the software component of the module is verified according to Section 5, using HMAC-SHA2-
256. If the comparison verification fails, the module transitions to the error state (Section 10.4).
Pre-Operational Bypass and Critical Functions Tests
The module does not implement pre-operational bypass or critical functions tests. We note that the
entropy source is not within the cryptographic boundary of the module, instead passively receiving
entropy from the external entropy source. Thus, its critical functions tests are not included in the module.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-ECB
(A3592)
128 KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Encrypt/Decrypt Power-up
AES-GCM
(A3592)
256 KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Encrypt/Decrypt Power-up
AES-CCM
(A3592)
192 KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Encrypt/ Decrypt Power-up
AES-XTS
Testing
Revision 2.0
(A3592)
128, 256 KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Encrypt/ Decrypt Power-up
AES-CMAC
(A3592)
128, 192, 256 KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Generate/Verify Power-up
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
Counter
DRBG
(A3592)
Chained
instantiate,
reseed,
generate
KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
SP 800-90A
section 11.3
health tests
Power-up
Hash DRBG
(A3592)
Chained
instantiate,
reseed,
generate
KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
SP 800-90A
section 11.3
health tests
Power-up
HMAC
DRBG
(A3592)
Chained
instantiate,
reseed,
generate
KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
SP 800-90A
section 11.3
health tests
Power-up
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A3592)
Curve P-384
and SHA-512
KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Sign Power-up
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A3592)
Curve P-384
and SHA-512
KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Verify Power-up
HMAC-SHA-
1 (A3592)
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Generate Power-up
HMAC-
SHA2-224
(A3592)
HMAC-SHA2-
224
KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Generate Power-up
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A3592)
HMAC-SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Generate Power-up
HMAC-
SHA2-384
(A3592)
HMAC-SHA2-
384
KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Generate Power-up
HMAC-
SHA2-512
(A3592)
HMAC-SHA2-
512
KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Generate Power-up
KAS-ECC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
(A3592)
P-224 and P-
256 curves
KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Shared Secret 'z'
computation
Power-up
KAS-FFC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
(A3592)
ffdhe2048 safe
prime group
KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Shared Secret 'z'
computation
Power-up
KDF SP800-
108 (A3592)
Counter mode KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Derive Power-up
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
KDF IKEv1
(A3592)
N/A KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Derive Power-up
KDF IKEv2
(A3592)
N/A KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Derive Power-up
KTS-IFC
(A3592)
2048 KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Encrypt/Decrypt Power-up
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A3592)
2048; PKCS
1.5 & PSS;
SHA2-224,
SHA2-256,
SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Sign Power-up
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A3592)
2048; PKCS
1.5 & PSS;
SHA2-224,
SHA2-256,
SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Verify Power-up
SHA-1
(A3592)
N/A KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Generate Power-up
SHA2-256
(A3592)
N/A KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Generate Power-up
SHA2-512
(A3592)
N/A KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Generate Power-up
KDF SSH
(A3592)
N/A KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Derive Power-up
KDF TLS
(A3592)
TLS 1.0/1.1 KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Derive Power-up
TLS v1.2
KDF
RFC7627
(A3592)
TLS 1.2 SHA2-
256, SHA2-512
KAT CAST Error
message
to stdout
Derive Power-up
KAS-ECC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 PCT
Generated
keypair
SP 800-
56Arev3
assurance
checks
PCT Error
message
to stdout
SP 800-56Arev3
assurance
checks
Keypair
generation
KAS-FFC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 PCT
Generated
keypair
SP 800-
56Arev3
PCT Error
message
to stdout
SP 800-56Arev3
assurance
checks
Keypair
generation
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
assurance
checks
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
PCT
Generated
keypair
Sign/Verify PCT Error
message
to stdout
Sign/Verify Keypair
generated
ECDSA
KeyVer
(FIPS186-4)
PCT
Generated EC
keypair
Public key
verify
PCT Error
message
to stdout
Public key validity Keypair
generated
RSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
PCT
Generated
keypair
Sign/Verify PCT Error
message
to stdout
Sign/Verify Keypair
generated
Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests
Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests
The module performs self-tests on FIPS-Approved cryptographic algorithms supported in the approved
mode of operation, using the tests shown in Section 10.2 (and indicated as CASTs) and using the
provision of IG 10.3.A and IG 10.3.B for optimization of the number of self-tests. Data output through the
data output interface is inhibited during the self-tests. The cryptographic algorithm self-tests are
performed in the form of Known Answer Tests (KATs), in which the calculated output is compared with
the expected known answer (that are hard-coded in the module). A failed match causes a failure of the
self-test.
If any of these self-tests fails, the module transitions to error state and is aborted.
Conditional Pairwise Consistency Tests
The module implements RSA and ECDSA key generation service and performs the respective pairwise
consistency test using sign and verify functions when the keys are generated. In addition, SP 800-56A
Rev3 conditional tests are run when ephemeral keypairs are created for key agreement.
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A3592)
Compare Hash
Results
SW/FW Integrity Every time the
module is loaded
Start the module
Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-ECB (A3592) KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
AES-GCM
(A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-CCM
(A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
AES-XTS Testing
Revision 2.0
(A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
AES-CMAC
(A3592)
KAT CAST During module
loading
Load the module
Counter DRBG
(A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
Hash DRBG
(A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
HMAC DRBG
(A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
HMAC-SHA-1
(A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
HMAC-SHA2-224
(A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
HMAC-SHA2-384
(A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
HMAC-SHA2-512
(A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
KDF SP800-108
(A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
KDF IKEv1
(A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
KDF IKEv2
(A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
KTS-IFC (A3592) KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
SHA-1 (A3592) KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
SHA2-256
(A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
SHA2-512
(A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
KDF SSH (A3592) KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
KDF TLS (A3592) KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627 (A3592)
KAT CAST During the module
loading
Load the module
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3 PCT
SP 800-56Arev3
assurance checks
PCT N/A N/A
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3 PCT
SP 800-56Arev3
assurance checks
PCT N/A N/A
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4) PCT
Sign/Verify PCT N/A N/A
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-4) PCT
Public key verify PCT N/A N/A
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4) PCT
Sign/Verify PCT N/A N/A
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information
On demand self-tests can be invoked by powering-off and reloading the module. This service performs
the same pre-operational test that includes integrity test and cryptographic algorithm tests executed
during power-up. The integrity test can also be performed on demand by calling the
FIPS_check_incore_fingerprint function. During the execution of the on-demand self-tests, cryptographic
services are not available, and no data output or input is possible.
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery Method Indicator
Conditional
Error
Conditional Error
state reached
when a conditional
test fails.
Conditional
test failure
The module generates
a new key and tests
the key via a PCT. If
the test fails, an error
is returned.
Error message is placed
into the error queue. An
error code is returned
from the key generation
function
PreOp
Error
PreOp Error state
reached when a
pre-operational
test fails.
Pre-
operational
test failure
The module is aborted
- restart module
Self-test function returns
a return code 0. Error
message "FATAL FIPS
SELFTEST FAILURE" is
output on stdout
Table 25: Error States
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If the module fails any of the self-tests, the module enters the error state. In the error state, the module
outputs the error through the status output interface and the abort function is called that raises the
SIGABRT signal, causing the program termination such that the module is no longer operational. In the
error state, as the module is no longer operational the data output interface is inhibited. In order to
recover from the Error state, the module needs to be rebooted.
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
The cryptographic module is the fipscanister.o file, though Arista does not distribute this file on its own.
Instead it is embedded into the shared library libcrypto.so which is part of OpenSSL, which in turn is
distributed as part of the CloudEOS product, in the CloudEOS image accessible through the Arista
software downloads website. The CloudEOS product includes the CloudEOS operating system, virtual
machine, applications, OpenSSL, libcrypto.so, and fipscanister.o. While there is no need for the
fipscanister.o library to be built by the user at any point in time, the file can be verified as the correct one
by comparing the SHA256 hash sum. The SHA256 hash should be
8b92b97d92571963b66649d0bb3ca62fba77100a316757e9487ad2091eddcc18. In the Arista build
process for building OpenSSL, this fipscanister.o file is linked into OpenSSL’s libcrypto.so shared library
file and OpenSSL is configured to use it.
When downloading the CloudEOS image, the SHA-256 hash of the image is also made available. When
an authorized operator downloads the CloudEOS image, they can also download the hash file and
compare the SHA-256 hash of the CloudEOS image to the one listed in the file to make sure that the
downloaded image is correct. Then they can install the CloudEOS image onto the virtual machine.
Upon completion of installation, the user can confirm that the correct module has been installed by
running the “show version” service should display the module base name and version number, “Crypto
Module: Arista Crypto Module v3.0“. Correct operation of the module can be verified by running the on-
demand self-test service as specified in Section 5 by calling “openssl --fips” from bash.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
None
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
None
11.4 End of Life
To cease using the module, power off the module. The module does not possess persistent storage of
SSPs. The SSP value only exists in volatile memory and that value vanishes when the module is
powered off. So as a first step for the secure sanitization, the module needs to be powered off. Then for
actual deprecation, the module will be upgraded to a newer version that is approved. This upgrade
process will uninstall/remove the old/terminated and provide a new replacement.
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
N/A for this module.