Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 1 of 42
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Google, LLC
Google HSM
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 2 of 42
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Table of Contents
1 General................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................ 5
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 6
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 7
2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 7
2.5 Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 7
2.6 Security Function Implementations................................................................................... 8
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................10
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................10
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................11
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................11
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................11
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................11
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................11
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................12
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................12
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................12
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................13
4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................28
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................28
4.6 Additional Information......................................................................................................28
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................28
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................28
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................28
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................28
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................28
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................28
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required..................................................................................28
7.2 EFP/EFT Information.......................................................................................................29
7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges ..........................................................................29
7.4 Additional Information......................................................................................................29
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................29
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................30
9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................30
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................30
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................30
9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................31
10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................37
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................37
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................37
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................39
10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................41
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................41
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................41
11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................41
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................41
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................42
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ..................................................................... 6
Table 3: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 7
Table 4: Approved Algorithms.................................................................................................... 8
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ......................................................................................... 8
Table 6: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................10
Table 7: Entropy Certificates.....................................................................................................10
Table 8: Entropy Sources..........................................................................................................10
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces ....................................................................................................11
Table 10: Authentication Methods.............................................................................................12
Table 11: Roles.........................................................................................................................12
Table 12: Approved Services ....................................................................................................27
Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required ...........................................................................29
Table 14: EFP/EFT Information.................................................................................................29
Table 15: Hardness Testing Temperatures ...............................................................................29
Table 16: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................30
Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................30
Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................30
Table 19: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................33
Table 20: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................35
Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................37
Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................39
Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................39
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................40
Table 25: Error States...............................................................................................................41
List of Figures
Figure 1: H1D3P Chip (Top)....................................................................................................... 6
Figure 2: H1D3P Chip (Bottom) ................................................................................................. 6
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 5 of 42
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the Google HSM Module. It
contains a specification of the rules under which the module must operate and describes how
this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS 140-3 (Federal Information Processing
Standards Publication 140-3) for a Security Level 3 Hardware cryptographic module. This
security policy is for the validation of the Google HSM Cryptographic Module.
In this document, the terms “Google HSM Cryptographic Module”, “cryptographic module” or
“module” are used interchangeably to refer to the Google HSM Cryptographic Module with
Firmware version 0.1.0 and Hardware version H1D3P.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 3
2 Cryptographic module specification 3
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 3
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 3
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 3
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 3
10 Self-tests 3
11 Life-cycle assurance 3
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 3
Table 1: Security Levels
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
This module is a single chip hardware cryptographic module with 0.1.0 firmware. The module’s
operational environment is limited.
An embedded chip designed to securely manage and protect cryptographic keys and perform
cryptographic operations.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Single Chip
Cryptographic Boundary:
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The cryptographic boundary is defined as the entire single-chip physical boundary.
Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):
The module’s Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP) is depicted in
Figure 1 & 2 below. The physical Cryptographic boundary is the surface, edges, and pin
connections of the chip.
Figure 1: H1D3P Chip (Top) Figure 2: H1D3P Chip (Bottom)
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model
and/or
Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
H1D3P H1D3P 0.1.0 On-chip RISC-V processor
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
N/A for this module.
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
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Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
2.3 Excluded Components
N/A for this module.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
Approved Mode of
Operation
The module is always in the
approved mode of operation.
Approved FIPS-compliant
mode: true
Table 3: Modes List and Description
The module has one approved mode of operation and is in the approved mode of operation by
default. No configuration is required for the module to operate in the approved mode of
operation. The module does not claim implementation of a degraded or non-Approved mode of
operation.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-GCM A6546 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1, 8.2.2
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38D
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6546 Curve - P-256
Secret Generation Mode - testing
candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6546 Curve - P-256
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6546 Curve - P-256
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
FIPS 186-5
HMAC DRBG A6546 Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - SHA2-256
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A6546 Key Length - Key Length: 8-512
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A6546 Domain Parameter Generation
Methods - P-256
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
KDF SP800-108 A6546 KDF Mode - Feedback
Supported Lengths - Supported
Lengths: 256
SP 800-108
Rev. 1
SHA2-256 A6546 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65528 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG -
Asymmetric
Key
Type:Asymmetric
N/A NIST SP 800-133r2 Section 4 and
Section 5.1 - The unmodified output of
the DRBG is used for generation of
asymmetric keys.
CKG -
Symmetric
Key
Type:Symmetric
N/A NIST SP 800-133r2 Section 4 and
Section 6.1 - The unmodified output of
the DRBG is used for generation of
symmetric keys.
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
The module supports the following vendor affirmed algorithms in accordance with IG D.H (refer
to Table 5).
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KAS-ECC CKG
KAS-Full
Key Agreement
Scheme per
SP800-56Arev3
with key
derivation
function per
SP800-108. The
module's KAS
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 128
bits of security
strength
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 3
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6546)
KDF SP800-
108: (A6546)
HMAC DRBG:
(A6546)
CKG -
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
(ECC)
implementation
is FIPS 140-3 IG
D.F Scenario 3
compliant.
Key
Derivation:SP
800-108
Asymmetric: ()
Key Type:
Asymmetric
KTS (Secure
Channel)
KTS-Unwrap
KTS-Wrap
KTS via Secure
Channel by
using AES-GCM
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 128
bits of security
strength
Standard:SP
800-38F
IG D.G:method:
use of any
approved
authenticated
symmetric
encryption mode
AES-GCM:
(A6546)
Key Length: 256
bits
Secure Channel
Keying Materials
Development
KBKDF Secure Channel
session keying
materials, used
to derive Secure
Channel session
keys.
KDF SP800-
108: (A6546)
Secure Channel
Privacy
BC-Auth Secure Channel
protection.
AES-GCM:
(A6546)
Key Length: 256
bits
DRBG Function DRBG Used for DRBG
generation
HMAC DRBG:
(A6546)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A6546)
ECDSA KeyGen AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
CKG
ECDSA KeyGen ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6546)
HMAC DRBG:
(A6546)
CKG -
Asymmetric: ()
Key Type:
Asymmetric
ECDSA SigGen DigSig-SigGen ECDSA SigGen ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6546)
ECDSA SigVer DigSig-SigVer ECDSA SigVer ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6546)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Firmware Load
Test
DigSig-SigVer ECDSA SigVer
and SHA2-256
for Firmware
Load Test
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6546)
SHA2-256:
(A6546)
Block Cipher
Encrypt/Decrypt
BC-Auth Block Cipher
Encrypt/Decrypt
AES-GCM:
(A6546)
Key Length: 256
bits
Table 6: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
• AES GCM is used by the secure tunnel, in accordance with Implementation Guidance
C.H. scenario #3. The 96-bit IV is comprised of a 64-bit “fixed field” derived from the
characteristics of the secure tunnel to be established, concatenated with a 32-bit non-
deterministic non-repetitive counter “invocation field”.
• AES GCM is used by the Symmetric Encrypt & Symmetric Decrypt services, in
accordance with the Implementation Guidance C.H scenario #2. The 96-bit IV is
generated randomly from an Approved DRBG within the Modules cryptographic
boundary.
• In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic module performs
Cryptographic Key Generation as per section 5 in SP800-133rev2. The resulting
generated seed used in the asymmetric key generation is the unmodified output from
SP800-90A DRBG.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert
Number
Vendor
Name
E149 Google, LLC
Table 7: Entropy Certificates
Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
Titan-D TRNG Entropy
Source
Physical H1D3P 256 Full
Entropy
A1863 (SHA2-
256)
Table 8: Entropy Sources
The module employs a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) implementation based on
SP800-90Arev1. This DRBG is used internally by the module (e.g. to generate symmetric keys,
seeds for asymmetric key pairs, and random numbers for security functions).
The DRBG implemented is an SHA2-256 HMAC DRBG, seeded by the entropy source
described in the table above. The HMAC DRBG does not employ prediction resistance.
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The DRBG is instantiated with a 256-bits long entropy input (corresponding to 256 bits of
entropy). Additionally, the DRBG is reseeded with a 256-bits long entropy input (corresponding
to 256 bits of entropy).
2.9 Key Generation
The module generates symmetric cryptographic keys in conformance with NIST SP 800-133r2
using a NIST SP 800-90A conforming DRBG (Cert. #A6546) for the encryption and protection of
data and cryptographic keys. The module generates asymmetric cryptographic key pairs in
conformance with FIPS 186-5 for the verification of digital signatures, or for the facilitation of key
agreement in conformance with NIST SP 800-56ar3.
2.10 Key Establishment
The module provides the following key/SSP establishment service in the approved mode of
operation:
KAS-ECC:
- The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS
140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-ECC shared secret computation. The shared
secret computation provides 128 bits of encryption strength.
2.11 Industry Protocols
N/A for this module.
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
VDDIOM, VDDIOA,
VDDIOB, VSS
Power Power input
USBN, USBP Data Input Data input into the module for all the services
defined in Tables 8-11
USBN, USBP Data Output Data output from the module for all the services
defined in Tables 8-11
USBN, USBP Control Input Control data input into the module for all the
services defined in Tables 8-11
USBN, USBP Status
Output
Status Information output from the module
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces
The module provides physical interfaces for power and USB which are mapped to logical
interfaces provided by the module (power, data input, data output, control input, and status
output) as above.
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each
Attempt
Strength per Minute
ECDSA-
Based
Certificate
Identity-based.
Allows the
Crypto Officer
and User to
authenticate to
the module.
ECDSA
SigVer
128-bits The modules support ECDSA
public-key based authentication
mechanism using curve P-256,
which provides 128 bits of security
strength. The probability that a
random attempt will succeed is
1/(2^128) which is less than
1/1,000,000. For multiple attacks
during a one-minute period, as the
module at its highest can support
at most ~1,000 new sessions per
second to authenticate in a one-
minute period, the probability of
successfully authenticating to the
module within a one minute period
is 1,000 * 60 = 60,000/(2^128),
which is less than 1/100,000.
Table 10: Authentication Methods
The module supports identity-based authentication.
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer (CO) Identity Crypto Officer ECDSA-Based Certificate
User Identity User ECDSA-Based Certificate
Table 11: Roles
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4.3 Approved Services
Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Show
Status
Provide
Module's
current
status
Method: HsmInfo RPC Call: HsmInfoRequest RPC Response:
HsmInfoResponse
None Crypto
Officer
(CO)
User
Show
Version
Provide
Module's
name
and
version
informati
on
Method: HsmInfo RPC Call: HsmInfoRequest RPC Response:
HsmInfoResponse
None Crypto
Officer
(CO)
User
Perform
Self-
Tests
perform
Self-
Tests
(Pre-
Operatio
nal self-
tests and
Condition
al Self-
Tests)
Method: SelfTest RPC Call: SelfTestRequest RPC Response:
SelfTestRequest
None Crypto
Officer
(CO)
User
Perform
Zeroizati
on
Perform
Zeroizati
on
Method: Zeroize RPC Call: ZeroizeRequest RPC Response:
ZeroizeResponse
None Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- Group
Wrappi
ng Key:
Z
- Group
Private
Key: Z
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Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- Group
Public
Key: Z
- VHSM
wrappin
g key: Z
- VHSM
Private
Key: Z
- VHSM
Public
Key: Z
- HSM
keypair/
self-
signed
certifica
te: Z
- Crypto
Officer
CA
certifica
te: Z
- Crypto
Officer
user
certifica
te: Z
- User
CA
certifica
te: Z
- User
certifica
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Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
te: Z
- User
crypto
key: Z
-
Secure
Channe
l ECDH
Private
Key: Z
-
Secure
Channe
l ECDH
Public
Key: Z
- Peer
Secure
Channe
l ECDH
Public
Key: Z
-
Secure
Channe
l
Shared
Secret:
Z
-
Secure
Channe
l HSM
to Client
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Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Encrypti
on Key:
Z
-
Secure
Channe
l Client
to HSM
Encrypti
on Key:
Z
- DRBG
Entropy
Input: Z
- DRBG
Seed: Z
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value: Z
- DRBG
Key: Z
Firmwar
e Load
Test
Execute
the
Firmware
Load
Test
Method:
UpdateChunk
RPC Call:
UpdateChunkRequest
RPC Response:
UpdateChunkResponse
Firmware
Load Test
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
-
Firmwar
e Load
Test
Key: E
Assign
Owner
Assign
owner of
HSM
Method:
AssignOwner
RPC Call:
AssignOwnerStartRequest,
AssignOwnerEndRequest
RPC Response:
AssignOwnerStartResponse,
AssignOwnerEndResponse
None Crypto
Officer
(CO)
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Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Create
Group
Create a
new
group
and
associate
the HSM
with this
group
Method:
CreateGroup
RPC Call:
CreateGroupRequest
RPC Response:
CreateGroupResponse
DRBG
Function
ECDSA
KeyGen
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- Group
Wrappi
ng Key:
G,E
- Group
Private
Key:
G,E
- Group
Public
Key:
G,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,E
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value:
G,E
- DRBG
Key:
G,E
Exit
Group
Remove
the group
data
associate
Method:
ExitGroup
RPC call ExitGroupRequest RPC response
ExitGroupResponse
None Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- Group
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Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
d with the
HSM
specified
group
Wrappi
ng Key:
Z
- Group
Private
Key: Z
- Group
Public
Key: Z
Clone
Group to
Destinati
on
Clone
group
data
associate
d with
HSM to
destinatio
n
Method:
DestinationClone
Group
RPC call
DestinationCloneGroupStart
Request,
DestinationCloneGroupEndR
equest
RPC response
DestinationCloneGroupStartR
esponse,
DestinationCloneGroupEndRe
sponse
DRBG
Function
Block
Cipher
Encrypt/Dec
rypt
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- Group
Wrappi
ng Key:
W,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,E
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value:
G,E
- DRBG
Key:
G,E
Clone
Group
Clone
group
data
Method:
SourceCloneGrou
p
RPC call
SourceCloneGroupStartReq
uest,
RPC response
SourceCloneGroupStartResp
onse,
Block
Cipher
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
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Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
from
Source
associate
d with
HSM
from
source
SourceCloneGroupEndRequ
est
SourceCloneGroupEndRespo
nse
Encrypt/Dec
rypt
- Group
Wrappi
ng Key:
R,E
Create
VHSM
Create a
VHSM to
be part of
a group
associate
d with the
HSM
Method:
CreateHsm
RPC call
CreateHsmRequest
RPC response
CreateHsmResponse
DRBG
Function
ECDSA
KeyGen
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- VHSM
wrappin
g key:
G
- VHSM
Private
Key: G
- VHSM
Public
Key: G
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,E
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value:
G,E
- DRBG
Key:
G,E
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Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Park
VHSM
Wraps
VHSM
context
and
exports it
outside
of HSM
Method: ParkHsm RPC call ParkHsmRequest RPC response
ParkHsmResponse
DRBG
Function
ECDSA
SigGen
Block
Cipher
Encrypt/Dec
rypt
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- VHSM
wrappin
g key:
R,E
- VHSM
Private
Key:
R,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,E
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value:
G,E
- DRBG
Key:
G,E
Unpark
VHSM
Unwraps
VHSM
and
imports
into
HSMs
volatile
memory
Method:
UnparkHsm
RPC call
UnparkHsmRequest
RPC response
UnparkHsmResponse
DRBG
Function
ECDSA
SigVer
Block
Cipher
Encrypt/Dec
rypt
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- VHSM
wrappin
g key:
W,E
- VHSM
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Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Public
Key:
W,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,E
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value:
G,E
- DRBG
Key:
G,E
Generat
e
Symmet
ric Key
Generate
AES256-
GCM key
for User
of VHSM
Method:
GenerateKey
RPC call
GenerateKeyRequest
RPC response
GenerateKeyResponse
DRBG
Function
User
- User
crypto
key: G
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,E
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value:
G,E
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 22 of 42
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- DRBG
Key:
G,E
Symmet
ric
Encrypt
Encrypt
data with
User
generate
d key on
VHSM
with
AES256-
GCM
Method:
SymmetricEncrypt
RPC call
SymmetricEncryptRequest
RPC response
SymmetricEncryptResponse
DRBG
Function
Block
Cipher
Encrypt/Dec
rypt
User
- User
crypto
key: E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,E
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value:
G,E
- DRBG
Key:
G,E
Symmet
ric
Decrypt
Decrypt
data with
User
generate
d key on
VHSM
with
AES256-
GCM
Method:
SymmetricDecryp
t
RPC call
SymmetricDecryptRequest
RPC response
SymmetricDecryptResponse
DRBG
Function
Block
Cipher
Encrypt/Dec
rypt
User
- User
crypto
key: E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,E
- DRBG
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 23 of 42
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Internal
State V
value:
G,E
- DRBG
Key:
G,E
Run
Secure
Channel
Execute
the
Secure
Channel
Protocol
to
mutually
authentic
ate Client
and HSM
to use
HSM
approved
services.
Any time Client
make RPC to
HSM
RPC request to HSM RPC response from HSM KAS-ECC
KTS
(Secure
Channel)
Secure
Channel
Keying
Materials
Developme
nt
Secure
Channel
Privacy
DRBG
Function
ECDSA
SigGen
ECDSA
SigVer
Crypto
Officer
(CO)
- HSM
keypair/
self-
signed
certifica
te: R
- Crypto
Officer
CA
certifica
te: E
- Crypto
Officer
user
certifica
te: W
-
Secure
Channe
l ECDH
Private
Key:
G,E
-
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 24 of 42
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Secure
Channe
l ECDH
Public
Key:
G,R
- Peer
Secure
Channe
l ECDH
Public
Key:
W,E
-
Secure
Channe
l
Shared
Secret:
G,E
-
Secure
Channe
l HSM
to Client
Encrypti
on Key:
G,E
-
Secure
Channe
l Client
to HSM
Encrypti
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 25 of 42
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
on Key:
G,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,E
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value:
G,E
- DRBG
Key:
G,E
User
- HSM
keypair/
self-
signed
certifica
te: R
- User
CA
certifica
te: E
- User
certifica
te: W
-
Secure
Channe
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 26 of 42
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
l ECDH
Private
Key:
G,E
-
Secure
Channe
l ECDH
Public
Key:
G,R
- Peer
Secure
Channe
l ECDH
Public
Key:
W,E
-
Secure
Channe
l
Shared
Secret:
G,E
-
Secure
Channe
l HSM
to Client
Encrypti
on Key:
G,E
-
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 27 of 42
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Descripti
on
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Secure
Channe
l Client
to HSM
Encrypti
on Key:
G,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,E
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value:
G,E
- DRBG
Key:
G,E
Table 12: Approved Services
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 28 of 42
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
4.4 Non-Approved Services
N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module also supports the firmware load test by using ECDSA P-256 with SHA2-256 (Cert.
#A6546) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module. A Firmware Load Test
Key was preloaded to the module in the factory and used for firmware load test. In order to load
new firmware, the Crypto Officer must authenticate to the module before loading the firmware.
This ensures that unauthorized access and use of the module is not performed. The module will
load the new update upon reboot. The update attempt will be rejected if the verification fails
Any firmware/software loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate, is out
of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation
4.6 Additional Information
The module does not support concurrent operators.
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
To ensure firmware security, the module is protected by a proprietary 32-bit Error Detection
Code (EDC). The EDC is embedded into the firmware image, and is validated before the
module can become operational. If the integrity test fails, the module will enter into an Error
state with all crypto functionality inhibited until the integrity test passes.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
Integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed
at power-on. The operator can power-cycle or reboot the tested platform to initiate the firmware
integrity test on-demand.
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
The module operates within a limited operational environment. The module contains a locked
down OS and the module only allows authentic firmware to be loaded. See section 4.5 for
firmware loading.
7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 29 of 42
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
The device includes a production-grade tamper-evident coating which encompasses the entire
module. The hard opaque tamper-evident coating protects the module from physical tampering
and inspection from unauthorized operators within the tested operational ranges listed below.
Mechanism Inspection
Frequency
Inspection Guidance
Tamper-evident coating on
chip
12 months Inspect the module for any dents, scratches or
marks.
Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required
7.2 EFP/EFT Information
The Google HSM is equipped with temperature, overvoltage, and undervoltage sensors. The
firmware enables these sensors at boot to handle out-of-range measurements.
If the measured temperature or voltage is outside that range, the module enters the error state.
When the firmware handles a temperature or voltage out-of-range error, it writes the appropriate
error code to the FIPS Error Log and then immediately reboots.
Temp/Voltage
Type
Temperature
or Voltage
EFP
or
EFT
Result
LowTemperature 0 C EFP Shutdown
HighTemperature 80 C EFP Shutdown
LowVoltage 2.97 V EFP Shutdown
HighVoltage 3.63 V EFP Shutdown
Table 14: EFP/EFT Information
7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges
Temperature
Type
Temperature
LowTemperature 0 C
HighTemperature 80 C
Table 15: Hardness Testing Temperatures
7.4 Additional Information
The module is a single-chip embodiment that meets the commercial-grade specifications for
power, temperature, reliability and shock/vibration. The standard design of the module provides
protections from probing and direct visual observation of the circuit detail in the visible spectrum,
and well as passivation. The module is coated with a hard tamper evident coating.
8 Non-Invasive Security
N/A for this module.
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 30 of 42
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
RAM Random Access Memory Dynamic
Flash Non-Volatile Memory Static
Table 16: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Peer
Public
Key Input
External
(Outside of
the Module's
Boundary)
RAM Plaintext Automated Electronic
Module
Public
Key
Output
RAM External
(Outside of
the Module's
Boundary)
Plaintext Automated Electronic
Secure
Channel
Input
External
(Outside of
the Module's
Boundary)
Flash Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS
(Secure
Channel)
Secure
Channel
Output
Flash External
(Outside of
the Module's
Boundary)
Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS
(Secure
Channel)
Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Zeroization
RPC
Overwrites
SSPs with
zeros
The zeroization RPC will
zeroize all SSPs stored
in the RAM or Flash of
the module.
RPC call, service:
ManagementService, method:
Zeroize, req: ZeroizeRequest
Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods
Please note that the Firmware Load Test Key is only used for Firmware Load Test
Authentication and not subject to the zeroization requirement.
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 31 of 42
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established By Used By
DRBG
Entropy Input
Used to seed the DRBG 256-bits -
256-bits
Entropy Input
- CSP
DRBG Function
DRBG Seed Used in DRBG Generation 256-bits -
256-bits
DRBG Seed -
CSP
DRBG Function
DRBG
Internal State
V value
Used in DRBG Generation 256-bits -
256-bits
DRBG Internal
State V value -
CSP
DRBG Function
DRBG Key Used in DRBG Generation 256-bits -
256-bits
DRBG Key -
CSP
DRBG Function
Group
Wrapping Key
Wraps all secrets accessible
to every HSM in a particular
group - most importantly, the
exported VHSMs (and
VHSM wrapping keys)
belonging to the group.
256-bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
DRBG
Function
Block Cipher
Encrypt/Decrypt
Group Private
Key
Signs VHSMs belonging to a
group.
256-bits -
Curve: P-
256
Asymmetric:
Private Key -
CSP
ECDSA
KeyGen
ECDSA SigGen
Group Public
Key
Authenticates signed
VHSMs belonging to a
group.
256-bits -
Curve: P-
256
Asymmetric:
Public Key -
PSP
ECDSA KeyGen ECDSA SigVer
VHSM
wrapping key
Wraps all exported keys
belonging to a particular
VHSM.
256-bits -
256-bits
Symmetric key
- CSP
DRBG
Function
Block Cipher
Encrypt/Decrypt
VHSM Private
Key
Signs User Crypto Keys
belonging to the VHSM.
256-bits -
Curve: P-
256
Asymmetric:
Private Key -
CSP
ECDSA
KeyGen
ECDSA SigGen
VHSM Public
Key
Authenticates signed crypto
keys belonging to the
VHSM.
256-bits -
Curve: P-
256
Asymmetric:
Public Key -
PSP
ECDSA KeyGen ECDSA SigVer
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 32 of 42
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established By Used By
HSM keypair/
self-signed
certificate
Authenticates the HSM side
of the secure channel
connections.
256-bits -
Curve: P-
256
Asymmetric:
Public Key -
PSP
ECDSA
KeyGen
ECDSA SigGen
Crypto Officer
CA certificate
Crypto Officer CA certificate
uploaded to the HSM and
authenticates Crypto Officer
certificates signed by the
external private key.
256-bits -
Curve: P-
256
Asymmetric:
Public Key -
PSP
ECDSA SigGen
Crypto Officer
user
certificate
Used by Crypto Officer to
authenticate to the HSM.
256-bits -
Curve: P-
256
Asymmetric:
Public Key -
PSP
ECDSA SigVer
User CA
certificate
User CA certificate uploaded
to the HSM and
authenticates User
certificates signed by the
external private key.
256-bits -
Curve: P-
256
Asymmetric:
Public Key -
PSP
ECDSA SigGen
User
certificate
Used by User to
authenticate to the HSM.
256-bits -
Curve: P-
256
Asymmetric:
Public Key -
PSP
ECDSA SigVer
User crypto
key
AES256-GCM key created
and managed by the HSM.
256-bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
DRBG
Function
Block Cipher
Encrypt/Decrypt
Firmware
Load Test
Key
Used for Firmware Load
Test
256-bits -
Curve: P-
256
Asymmetric:
Public Key -
CSP
Firmware Load
Test
Secure
Channel
ECDH Private
Key
Used to derive Secure
Channel Shared Secret
256-bits -
Curve: P-
256
Asymmetric:
Private Key -
CSP
KAS-ECC KAS-ECC
Secure
Channel
ECDH Public
Key
Used to derive Secure
Channel Shared Secret
256-bits -
Curve: P-
256
Asymmetric:
Public Key -
PSP
KAS-ECC
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 33 of 42
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established By Used By
Peer Secure
Channel
ECDH Public
Key
Used to derive Secure
Channel Shared Secret
256-bits -
Curve: P-
256
Asymmetric:
Public Key -
PSP
KAS-ECC
Secure
Channel
Shared Secret
Used to derive Secure
channel Encryption Keys
256-bits -
Curve: P-
256
Shared Secret
- CSP
KAS-ECC Secure Channel
Keying Materials
Development
Secure
Channel HSM
to Client
Encryption
Key
Used to protect Secure
Channel HSM to Client
Session
256-bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
Secure Channel
Keying Materials
Development
Secure Channel
Privacy
Secure
Channel
Client to HSM
Encryption
Key
Used to protect Secure
Channel Client to HSM
Session
256-bits -
256-bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
Secure Channel
Privacy
Secure Channel
Privacy
Table 19: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
DRBG Entropy
Input
RAM:Plaintext Immediately after use Zeroization
RPC
DRBG Seed:Used With
DRBG Internal State V
value:Used With
DRBG Key:Used With
DRBG Seed RAM:Plaintext Immediately after use Zeroization
RPC
DRBG Entropy
Input:Used With
DRBG Internal State V
value:Used With
DRBG Key:Used With
DRBG Internal
State V value
RAM:Plaintext Zeroization, or on reboot Zeroization
RPC
DRBG Entropy
Input:Used With
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 34 of 42
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
DRBG Seed:Used With
DRBG Key:Used With
DRBG Key RAM:Plaintext Zeroization, or on reboot Zeroization
RPC
DRBG Entropy
Input:Used With
DRBG Seed:Used With
DRBG Internal State V
value:Used With
Group Wrapping
Key
Flash:Plaintext Erased from flash when an HSM
leaves a group or is zeroized.
Zeroization
RPC
VHSM wrapping
key:Encrypts
Group Private Key Secure
Channel
Output
Flash:Plaintext Erased from flash when an HSM
leaves a group or is zeroized.
Zeroization
RPC
Group Public Key:Paired
With
VHSM Private Key:Signs
VHSM Public Key:Signs
Group Public Key Secure
Channel
Output
Flash:Plaintext Erased from flash when an HSM
leaves a group or is zeroized.
Zeroization
RPC
Group Private
Key:Paired With
VHSM wrapping
key
Secure
Channel
Output
Flash:Plaintext Erased from flash when all HSMs
which own the VHSM leaves the
group or have been zeroized.
Zeroization
RPC
User crypto
key:Encrypts
VHSM Private Key Secure
Channel
Output
RAM:Plaintext Erased from flash when all HSMs
which own the VHSM leaves the
group or have been zeroized.
Zeroization
RPC
VHSM Public Key:Paired
With
User crypto key:Signs
VHSM Public Key Secure
Channel
Output
Flash:Plaintext Erased from flash when all HSMs
which own the VHSM leaves the
group or have been zeroized.
Zeroization
RPC
VHSM Private
Key:Paired With
HSM keypair/ self-
signed certificate
Module
Public Key
Output
RAM:Plaintext Unique per physical HSM. New
random keypair generated on
reboot.
Zeroization
RPC
Crypto Officer CA
certificate
Secure
Channel
Input
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
RPC
Crypto Officer user
certificate
Peer Public
Key Input
RAM:Plaintext While Secure Channel is Active Zeroization
RPC
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 35 of 42
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
User CA certificate Secure
Channel
Input
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
RPC
User certificate Peer Public
Key Input
RAM:Plaintext While Secure Channel is Active Zeroization
RPC
User crypto key Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
RPC
Firmware Load
Test Key
Flash:Plaintext N/A
Secure Channel
ECDH Private Key
RAM:Plaintext While Secure Channel is active Zeroization
RPC
Secure Channel ECDH
Public Key:Paired With
Peer Secure Channel
ECDH Public Key:Used
With
Secure Channel
ECDH Public Key
Module
Public Key
Output
RAM:Plaintext While Secure Channel is active Zeroization
RPC
Secure Channel ECDH
Private Key:Paired With
Peer Secure
Channel ECDH
Public Key
Peer Public
Key Input
RAM:Plaintext While Secure Channel is active Zeroization
RPC
Secure Channel ECDH
Private Key:Used With
Secure Channel
Shared Secret
RAM:Plaintext While Secure Channel is active Zeroization
RPC
Secure Channel ECDH
Private Key:Derived
From
Peer Secure Channel
ECDH Public
Key:Derived From
Secure Channel
HSM to Client
Encryption Key
RAM:Plaintext While Secure Channel is active Zeroization
RPC
Secure Channel Shared
Secret:Derived From
Secure Channel
Client to HSM
Encryption Key
RAM:Plaintext While Secure Channel is active Zeroization
RPC
Secure Channel Shared
Secret:Derived From
Table 20: SSP Table 2
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 36 of 42
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 37 of 42
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details
Firmware
Integrity Test
32-bit Error
Detection Code
(EDC)
KAT SW/FW
Integrity
Module is in
normal
operation
32-bit
Checksum
EDC
Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The module performs the firmware integrity test prior to the module becoming operational.
Following the successfully pre-operational self-test, the module executes the Conditional
Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests (CASTs) detailed below.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorith
m or
Test
Test
Propert
ies
Test
Meth
od
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditi
ons
AES-
GCM
Authentic
ated
Encrypt
KAT
(A6546)
256-bits KAT CAS
T
Success: No Error Code;
Failure: "Aes256GcmKatFail"
Authentic
ated
Encrypt
Power
Up
AES-
GCM
Authentic
ated
Decrypt
KAT
(A6546)
256-bits KAT CAS
T
Success: No Error Code;
Failure: "Aes256GcmKatFail"
Authentic
ated
Decrypt
Power
Up
HMAC
DRBG
Instantiat
e KAT
(A6546)
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
KAT CAS
T
Success: No Error Code;
Failure:
"DrbgHmacSha256KatFail"
Instantiat
e KAT
Power
Up
HMAC
DRBG
Generate
KAT
(A6546)
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
KAT CAS
T
Success: No Error Code;
Failure:
"DrbgHmacSha256KatFail"
Generate
KAT
Power
Up
HMAC
DRBG
Reseed
KAT
(A6546)
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
KAT CAS
T
Success: No Error Code;
Failure:
"DrbgHmacSha256KatFail"
Reseed
KAT
Power
Up
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 38 of 42
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Algorith
m or
Test
Test
Propert
ies
Test
Meth
od
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditi
ons
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186
-5) KAT
(A6546)
Curve:
P-256
with
SHA2-
256
KAT CAS
T
Success: No Error Code;
Failure: "EcdsaP256KatFail"
ECDSA
SigGen
KAT
Power
Up
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186
-5) KAT
(A6546)
Curve:
P-256
with
SHA2-
256
KAT CAS
T
Success: No Error Code;
Failure: "EcdsaP256KatFail"
ECDSA
SigVer
KAT
Power
Up
Entropy
Source
RCT
Start-up
Health
Tests
Repetiti
on
Count
Test
(RCT)
RCT CAS
T
Module is in normal state N/A Power
up
Entropy
Source
APT
Start-up
Health
Tests
Adaptiv
e
Proporti
on Test
(APT)
APT CAS
T
Module is in normal state N/A Power
up
Entropy
Source
RCT
Continuo
us Health
Tests
Repetiti
on
Count
Test
(RCT)
RCT CAS
T
Module is in normal state N/A Perform
ed
continuo
usly as
entropy
source is
active
Entropy
Source
APT
Continuo
us Health
Tests
Adaptiv
e
Proporti
on Test
(APT)
APT CAS
T
Module is in normal state N/A Perform
ed
continuo
usly as
entropy
source is
active
HMAC-
SHA2-
256 KAT
(A6546)
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
KAT CAS
T
Success: No Error Code;
Failure: "HmacSha256KatFail"
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
Power
Up
KAS-
ECC-
SSC
Sp800-
56Ar3
KAT
(A6546)
Curve:
P-256
KAT CAS
T
Success: No Error Code;
Failure: "EcdhP256KatFail"
Primitive
Z KAT
Power
Up
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 39 of 42
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Algorith
m or
Test
Test
Propert
ies
Test
Meth
od
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditi
ons
KDF
SP800-
108 KAT
(A6546)
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
Feedba
ck
KAT CAS
T
Success: No Error Code;
Failure:
"KdfHmacSha256KatFail"
KDF KAT Power
Up
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186
-5) PCT
(A6546)
Curve:
P-256
with
SHA2-
256
PCT PCT Success: No Error Code;
Failure:
"EcdsaP256PairwiseConsisten
cyCheckFail"
Pairwise
consisten
cy test
After key
pair
generati
on
KAS-
ECC-
SSC
Sp800-
56Ar3
PCT
(A6546)
Curve:
P-256
PCT PCT Success: No Error Code;
Failure:
"EcdhP256PairwiseConsistenc
yCheckFail"
Pairwise
consisten
cy test
After key
pair
generati
on
Firmware
Load
Test
ECDSA
P-256
with
SHA2-
256
KAT SW/
FW
Load
Success: No Error Code;
Failure:
"InvalidImageChecksum"
ECDSA
SigVer
and
SHA2-
256
When
firmware
has
been
uploade
d to the
module
Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests
All cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs) must be performed and passed prior to any other
use of cryptography by the module.
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
Firmware
Integrity Test
KAT SW/FW Integrity 24 Hours Automatic
Reboot
Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-GCM
Authenticated
Encrypt KAT
(A6546)
KAT CAST 24 Hours Automatic
Reboot
AES-GCM
Authenticated
KAT CAST 24 Hours Automatic
Reboot
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 40 of 42
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
Decrypt KAT
(A6546)
HMAC DRBG
Instantiate KAT
(A6546)
KAT CAST 24 Hours Automatic
Reboot
HMAC DRBG
Generate KAT
(A6546)
KAT CAST 24 Hours Automatic
Reboot
HMAC DRBG
Reseed KAT
(A6546)
KAT CAST 24 Hours Automatic
Reboot
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
KAT (A6546)
KAT CAST 24 Hours Automatic
Reboot
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
KAT (A6546)
KAT CAST 24 Hours Automatic
Reboot
Entropy Source
RCT Start-up
Health Tests
RCT CAST 24 Hours Automatic
Reboot
Entropy Source
APT Start-up
Health Tests
APT CAST 24 Hours Automatic
Reboot
Entropy Source
RCT Continuous
Health Tests
RCT CAST 24 Hours Automatic
Reboot
Entropy Source
APT Continuous
Health Tests
APT CAST 24 Hours Automatic
Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-
256 KAT
(A6546)
KAT CAST 24 Hours Automatic
Reboot
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
KAT (A6546)
KAT CAST 24 Hours Automatic
Reboot
KDF SP800-108
KAT (A6546)
KAT CAST 24 Hours Automatic
Reboot
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
PCT (A6546)
PCT PCT 24 Hours Automatic
Reboot
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
PCT (A6546)
PCT PCT 24 Hours Automatic
Reboot
Firmware Load
Test
KAT SW/FW Load N/A N/A
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 41 of 42
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
The module maintains a self-test internal timer; each time the timer expires the module
automatically performs all the cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs) and resets the timer.
The operator can also initiate the pre-operational and conditional self-tests on demand by
rebooting the module.
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Error
State
A FIPS error can be
detected in any state and
always results in a reboot.
Self-test failure
Firmware EDC
check failure
Temperature
outside operational
range
Voltage outside
operational range
Reboot the
module
From HSM:
HSM is in error
state
Table 25: Error States
If anyone of the above-mentioned self-tests fails, the pre-operational firmware integrity test fails,
or the temperature/ voltage is outside the operational range, the module logs the cause of the
error to the FIPS error log and enters the error state. In the error state, all cryptographic
services are halted, and the data output from the data output interface is inhibited. The only way
to recover the module from the error state is to reboot the module, which will perform the pre-
operational, cryptographic algorithm self-tests and check the temperature/ voltage. The module
will only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre-operational and
cryptographic algorithm self-tests and the temperature/ voltage is within the operational range.
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
The module is configured in the factory to be in the Approved mode of operation, and can only
be operated in the Approved mode of operation. No procedures for the secure installation,
initialization, and startup of the module are required.
The operator can verify the module is in the Approved mode of operation by authenticating to
the module and performing the `Show Status` service and confirm the module outputs: “FIPS-
compliant mode: true.”
11.2 Administrator Guidance
No specific Administrator guidance.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
No specific Non-Administrator guidance.
Google, LLC 2026 Version 1.0 Page 42 of 42
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
N/A for this module.