Panorama 10.2
M-200, M-300, M-600 and
M-700
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version: 1.1
Revision Date: August 1, 2024
Palo Alto Networks, Inc.
www.paloaltonetworks.com
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks is a registered trademark of Palo Alto Networks. A list of our
trademarks can be found at https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/company/trademarks.html. All other marks
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This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Table of Contents
1. General 3
2. Cryptographic Module Specification 5
3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces 12
4. Roles, Services, and Authentication 13
5. Software/Firmware Security 23
6. Operational Environment 23
7. Physical Security 23
8. Non-Invasive Security 39
9. Sensitive Security Parameters 40
10. Self-Tests 42
11. Life-cycle Assurance 44
12. Mitigation of Other Attacks 45
13. References 45
14. Definitions and Acronyms 45
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 2
1. General
The Panorama 10.2 M-200, M-300, M-600 and M-700 from Palo Alto Networks Inc., hereafter referred to as “Panorama
M-Series”, “Panorama HW”, “modules”, or the “cryptographic modules” are multi-chip standalone cryptographic modules
designed to fulfill FIPS 140-3 level 2 requirements. Panorama M-Series management appliances provide centralized
management and visibility of Palo Alto Networks next generation firewalls. From a central location, you can gain insight into
applications, users, and content traversing the firewalls. The knowledge of what is on the network, in conjunction with safe
application enablement policies, maximizes protection and control while minimizing administrative effort. Your security team
can centrally perform analysis, reporting, and forensics with the aggregated data over time, or on data stored on the local
firewall.
The Panorama M-Series management appliances’ individual management and logging components can be separated in a
distributed manner to accommodate large volumes of log data. Panorama M-Series management appliances can be deployed
in the following ways:
● Centralized: In this scenario, all Panorama management and logging functions are combined into a single device.
● Distributed: you can separate the management and logging functions across multiple devices, splitting the functions
between managers and log collectors.
o Panorama: The Panorama manager is responsible for handling the tasks associated with policy and device
configuration across all managed devices. The manager analyzes the data stored in managed log collectors
for centralized reporting.
o Management-Only: Providing the ability to perform all functions of Panorama with the exception of logging.
o Log Collector: Organizations with high logging volume and retention requirements can deploy dedicated
Panorama log collector devices that will aggregate log information from multiple managed firewalls.
● Panorama on the M-600 and M-700 supports an additional mode, the PAN-DB private cloud. The PAN-DB private
cloud is an on-premise solution that is suitable for organizations that prohibit or restrict the use of the PAN-DB
public cloud service. With this on-premise solution, you can deploy one or more M-600/M-700 appliances as
PAN-DB servers within your network or data center.
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 3
The cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of FIPS 140-3.
Table 1 - Security Levels
ISO/IEC 24759
Section 6.
FIPS 140-3 Section Title Security
Level
1 General 2
2 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces 2
4 Roles, Services, Authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Physical Security 2
8 Non-Invasive Security N/A
9 Sensitive Security Parameter Management 2
10 Self-Tests 2
11 Life-Cycle Assurance 3
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall Level 2
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 4
2. Cryptographic Module Specification
The configurations for this validation are highlighted in Table 2.
Table 2 - Hardware Tested Configuration
Module Hardware Firmware Version Distinguishing Features
Panorama M-200
910-000176
Physical Kit: 920-000208
10.2.3-h1 RJ45 interfaces, USB ports, LEDs
Panorama M-300
910-000271
Physical Kit: 920-000319
10.2.3-h1 RJ45 interfaces, USB ports, LEDs
Panorama M-600
910-000175
Physical Kit: 920-000209
10.2.3-h1 RJ45 interfaces, USB ports, LEDs,
SFP+ ports
Panorama M-700
910-000270
Physical Kit: 920-000318
10.2.3-h1 RJ45 interfaces, USB ports, LEDs,
SFP+ ports
Approved Mode of Operation
The following procedure will initialize the modules into the Approved mode of operation:
● Install physical kit opacity shields and tamper evidence seals according to the Physical Security Policy section.
physical kits must be correctly installed to operate in the Approved mode of operation. The tamper evidence seals
and opacity shields shall be installed for the module to operate in a Approved mode of operation.
● During initial boot up, break the boot sequence via the console port connection (by pressing the maint button when
instructed to do so) to access the main menu.
● Select “Continue.”
● Select the “Set FIPS-CC Mode” option to initialize the Approved mode.
● Select “Enable FIPS-CC Mode”.
● When prompted, select “Reboot” and the module will re-initialize and continue into the Approved mode of operation
(FIPS-CC mode).
● The module will reboot.
● In FIPS-CC mode, the console port is available only as a status output port.
● Once the module has finished booting, the Crypto Officer can authenticate using the default credentials that come
with the module
o Once authenticated, the module will automatically require the operator to change their password; and the
default credential is overwritten
The module will automatically indicate the Approved mode of operation in the following manner:
● Status output interface will indicate “**** FIPS-CC MODE ENABLED ****” via the CLI session.
● Status output interface will indicate “FIPS-CC mode enabled successfully” via the console port.
● The module will display “FIPS-CC” at all times in the status bar at the bottom of the web interface.
● The module will display “fips-cc” when “show system info” is entered via the CLI
Should one or more power-up self-tests fail, the Approved mode of operation will not be achieved. Feedback will consist of:
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 5
● The module will output “FIPS-CC failure”
● The module will reboot and enter a state in which the reason for the reboot can be determined.
● To determine which self-test caused the system to reboot into the error state, connect the console cable and follow
the on-screen instructions to view the self-test output.
Note: Disabling FIPS-CC mode causes a complete factory reset, which is described in the Zeroization section below.
Selecting Panorama, Management-Only, Log Collector, and PAN-DB System Modes
Panorama M-Series appliances support multiple configurations that provide varying services. The Cryptographic Officer can
initialize the module into different system modes. The primary and default system mode is the Panorama mode. The
Management-Only system mode is the same as Panorama mode except there is no log collecting service. The Log Collector
system mode is a secondary mode that provides a focused log collecting and forwarding capability. Directions to convert the
appliance into the Log Collector mode are discussed below. The M-600 and M-700 provide a fourth system mode, PAN-DB
Private Cloud server.
Convert the M-200/M-300/M-600/M-700 appliance from Panorama mode to the Management-Only mode:
● Log into the CLI via SSH
● Enter “request system system-mode management-only”
● Enter “Y” to confirm the change to Management-Only mode.
● The system will reboot and perform the required power on self-tests.
Convert the M-200/M-300/M-600/M-700 appliance from Management-Only mode to the Panorama mode:
● Log into the CLI via SSH
● Enter “request system system-mode panorama”
● Enter “Y” to confirm the change to Panorama mode.
● The system will reboot and perform the required power on self-tests.
Convert the M-200/M-300/M-600/M-700 appliance from Panorama mode to the dedicated Panorama Log Collector mode:
● Log into the CLI via SSH
● Enter “request system system-mode logger”
● Enter “Y” to confirm the change to Panorama Log Collector mode.
● The system will reboot and perform the required power on self-tests.
Convert the M-200/M-300/M-600/M-700 appliance from Panorama Log Collector mode to the Panorama mode:
● Log into the CLI via SSH
● Enter “request system system-mode panorama”
● Enter “Y” to confirm the change to Panorama mode.
● The system will reboot and perform the required power on self-tests.
Convert the M-600/M-700 appliance from Panorama Manager mode to the dedicated PAN-DB Private Cloud mode:
● Log into the CLI via SSH
● Enter “request system system-mode panurldb”
● Enter “Y” to confirm the change to PAN-DB Private Cloud mode.
● The system will reboot and perform the required power on self-tests.
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Convert the M-600/M-700 appliance from PAN-DB mode to the Panorama Manager mode:
● Log into the CLI via SSH
● Enter “request system system-mode panorama”
● Enter “Y” to confirm the change to Panorama mode.
● The system will reboot and perform the required power on self-tests.
NOTE: Changing the System Mode does not change the FIPS-CC Mode.
Non-Compliant State
Failure to follow the directions in the Approved Mode of Operation above or rules noted in Section 11 will result in the
module operating in a non-compliant state, which is considered out of scope of this validation.
Zeroization
The following procedure will zeroize the module and must be performed under the control of the operator:
● Access the module’s CLI via SSH, and command the module to enter maintenance mode (“debug system
maintenance-mode”); the module will reboot
o Note: Establish a serial connection to the console port
● After reboot, select “Continue.”
● Select “Factory Reset”
● The module will perform a zeroization, and provide the following message once complete:
o “Factory Reset Status: Success”
Approved and Allowed Algorithms
The following table details the cryptographic algorithms and their algorithm certificates. Only the algorithms, modes, and key
sizes specified in this table are used by the module. The CAVP certificate may contain more tested options than listed in this
table.
Table 3 - Approved Algorithms
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm and
Standard
Mode/Method Description/Key Size(s)/Key
Strength(s)
Use/Function
A2165
Conditioning
Component
AES-CBC-MAC SP
800-90B
AES-CBC-MAC 128 bits
Vetted conditioning component for ESV
Cert. #E65
A2165
Vetted conditioning component for ESV
Cert. #E66
A2518
Vetted conditioning component for ESV
Cert. #E64
A2906
AES-CBC [SP
800-38A]
CBC 128, 192 and 256 bits
Encryption
Decryption
A2906
AES-CFB128 [SP
800-38A]
CFB128 128 bits
Encryption
Decryption
A2906 AES-CTR [SP 800-38A] CTR 128, 192 and 256 bits
Encryption
Decryption
A2906 AES-GCM GCM** 128 and 256 bits Encryption
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 7
[SP 800-38D] Decryption
A2906
Counter DRBG
[SP 800-90Arev1]
Counter DRBG AES 256 bits with Derivation Function Enabled Random Bit Generator
A2906
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS 186-4)
ECDSA KeyGen P-256, P-384, P-521
Key Generation
A2906
ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS
186-4)
ECDSA KeyVer P-256, P-384, P-521
Public Key Validation
A2906
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS 186-4)
ECDSA SigGen
P-256, P-384, P-521 with SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, and SHA2-512
Signature Generation
A2906
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS
186-4)
ECDSA SigVer
P-256, P-384, P-521 with SHA-1, SHA2-224,
SHA2-256, SHA2-384, and SHA2-512
Signature Verification
A2906 HMAC-SHA-1 [FIPS
198-1]
HMAC HMAC-SHA-1 with λ=96, 160 Authentication for protocols
A2906 HMAC-SHA2-224
[FIPS 198-1]
HMAC
HMAC-SHA2-224 with λ=224
Authentication for protocols
A2906 HMAC-SHA2-256
[FIPS 198-1]
HMAC HMAC-SHA2-256 with λ=256 Authentication for protocols
A2906 HMAC-SHA2-384
[FIPS 198-1]
HMAC HMAC-SHA2-384 with λ=384 Authentication for protocols
A2906 HMAC-SHA2-512
[FIPS 198-1]
HMAC HMAC-SHA2-512 with λ=512 Authentication for protocols
A2906
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
KAS Ephemeral Unified Model: P-256/P-384/P-521
Key Exchange
A2906
KAS-FFC-SSC SP
800-56Ar3
KAS dhEphem: MODP-2048 Key Exchange
A2906
KDF SNMP [SP
800-135rev1] (CVL)
SNMPv3 KDF
Engine ID:
80001F88043030303030
343935323630
SNMPv3
A2906
KDF SSH [SP
800-135rev1] (CVL)
SSHv2 KDF
SHA-1, SHA2-256,
SHA2-512
SSH
A2906
KDF TLS [SP
800-135rev1] (CVL)
TLS1.2 KDF
TLS v1.2 Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256, SHA2-384 TLS
SA2906
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS 186-4)
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS 186-4)
2048, 3072, and 4096 bits
Key Pair Generation
A2906
RSA SigGen
(FIPS 186-4)
RSA SigGen
(FIPS 186-4)
(ANSI X9.31, RSASSA-PKCS1_v1-5,
RSASSA-PSS): 2048, 3072, and 4096-bit with
hashes 256/384/512S
Signature Generation
A2906
RSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-4)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-4)
(ANSI X9.31, RSASSA-PKCS1_v1-5,
RSASSA-PSS): 2048, 3072, 4096-bit (per IG C.F)
with hashes SHA-1/224+++/256/384/512
(Signature Verification)
+++ This Hash algorithm is not supported for
ANSI X9.31
Signature Verification
A2906 SHA-1 [FIPS 180-4] SHA
SHA-1
Digital Signature
Generation/Verification
Non-Digital Signature Applications
(e.g. component of HMAC)
A2906
SHA2-224 [FIPS
180-4]
SHA2 SHA-224
Digital Signature
Generation/Verification
Non-Digital Signature Applications
(e.g. component of HMAC)
A2906
SHA2-256 [FIPS
180-4]
SHA2 SHA-256
Digital Signature
Generation/Verification
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 8
Non-Digital Signature Applications
(e.g. component of HMAC)
A2906
SHA2-384 [FIPS
180-4]
SHA2 SHA-384
Digital Signature
Generation/Verification
Non-Digital Signature Applications
(e.g. component of HMAC)
A2906
SHA2-512 [FIPS
180-4]
SHA2 SHA-512
Digital Signature
Generation/Verification
Non-Digital Signature Applications
(e.g. component of HMAC)
A2906
Safe Primes Key
Generation [RFC
3526]
Safe Primes Key
Generation
MODP-2048 Safe Primes Key Generation
A2906
Safe Primes Key
Verification [RFC
3526]
Safe Primes Key
Verification
MODP-2048 Safe Primes Key Verification
AES Cert. #
A2906 and
HMAC
Cert. #
A2906
KTS
[SP 800-38F]
SP 800-38A, FIPS
198-1, and SP
800-38F. KTS (key
wrapping and
unwrapping) per IG
D.G.
128, 192, and 256-bit keys providing 128, 192, or
256 bits of encryption strength
Key Wrapping
AES-GCM
Cert. #
A2906
KTS
[SP 800-38F]
SP 800-38D and SP
800-38F. KTS (key
wrapping and
unwrapping) per IG
D.G.
128 and 256-bit keys providing 128 or 256 bits
of encryption strength
Key Wrapping
ESV Cert.
#E64
SP 800-90B ESV Palo Alto Networks DRNG Entropy Source Entropy
ESV Cert.
#E65
SP 800-90B ESV Palo Alto Networks DRNG Entropy Source Entropy
ESV Cert.
#E66
SP 800-90B ESV Palo Alto Networks DRNG Entropy Source Entropy
KAS-ECC-S
SC Cert.
#A2906,
KDF SSH
Cert.
#A2906
KAS [SP
800-56Arev3]
SP 800-56Arev3.
KAS-ECC per IG D.F
Scenario 2 path (2).
P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves providing 128,
192, or 256 bits of encryption strength
Key Exchange with protocol KDF
KAS-ECC-S
SC Cert.
#A2906,
KDF TLS
Cert.
#A2906
KAS [SP
800-56Arev3]
SP 800-56Arev3.
KAS-ECC per IG D.F
Scenario 2 path (2).
P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves providing 128,
192, or 256 bits of encryption strength
Key Exchange with protocol KDF
KAS-FFC-S
SC Cert.
#A2906,
KDF SSH
Cert.
#A2906
KAS [SP
800-56Arev3]
SP 800-56Arev3.
KAS-FFC per IG D.F
Scenario 2 path (2).
2048-bit key providing 112 bits of encryption
strength
Key Exchange with protocol KDF
KAS-FFC-S
SC Cert.
#A2906,
KDF TLS
KAS [SP
800-56Arev3]
SP 800-56Arev3.
KAS-FFC per IG D.F
Scenario 2 path (2).
2048-bit key providing 112 bits of encryption
strength
Key Exchange with protocol KDF
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 9
Cert.
#A2906
Vendor
Affirmed
CKG
(SP 800-133rev2)
Section 5.1, Section
5.2
Cryptographic Key
Generation; SP 800-
133 and IG D.I.
Key Generation
Note: Seeds used for asymmetric key
pair generation are produced using the
unmodified/direct output of the DRBG
The module is compliant to IG C.H: GCM is used in the context of TLS and SSH:
● For TLS, The GCM implementation meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H: it is used in a manner compliant with SP
800-52 and in accordance with Section 4 of RFC 5288 for TLS key establishment, and ensures when the
nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts all possible values for a given session key, that a new TLS
handshake is initiated per sections 7.4.1.1 and 7.4.1.2 of RFC 5246. During operational testing, the
module was tested against an independent version of TLS and found to behave correctly.
o From this RFC 5288, the GCM cipher suites in use are:
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, and
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
● For SSH, the module meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H. The module conforms to RFCs 4252, 4253, and 5647.
The fixed field is 4-byte in length and is derived using the SSH KDF; this ensures the fixed field is unique
for any given GCM session. The invocation field is 8-byte in length and is incremented for each invocation
of GCM; this prevents the IV from repeating until the entire invocation field space of 264
is exhausted,
which can take hundreds of years. (In FIPS-CC Mode, SSH rekey is automatically configured at 1 GB of
data or 1 hour, whichever comes first.)
In all the above cases, the nonce_explicit is always generated deterministically. AES GCM keys are zeroized when the
module is power cycled. For each new TLS or SSH session, a new AES GCM key is established.
The module is compliant to IG C.F:
The module utilizes Approved modulus sizes 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits for RSA signatures. This functionality has been CAVP
tested as noted above. The minimum number of Miller Rabin tests for each modulus size is implemented according to Table
C.2 of FIPS 186-4. For modulus size 4096, the module implements the largest number of Miller-Rabin tests shown in Table
C.2. RSA SigVer is CAVP tested for all three supported modulus sizes as noted above. The module does not perform FIPS
186-2 SigVer. All supported modulus sizes are CAVP testable and tested as noted above. The module does not implement
RSA key transport in the approved mode.
The module does not have any algorithms that fall under:
- Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation
- Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed
- Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 10
Table 4 - Supported Protocols in the Approved Mode
TLSv1.2
SSHv2
SNMPv3
*Note: these protocols were not reviewed or tested by the CMVP or CAVP.
Module Diagrams
Figures 1 - 8 depict the modules and their interfaces. Please refer to the appendices for depictions of the modules with the
physical kits installed.
Figure 1 - M-200 Front
Figure 2 - M-200 Rear
Figure 3 - M-300 Front
Figure 4 - M-300 Rear
Figure 5 - M-600 Front
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 11
Figure 6 - M-600 Rear
Figure 7 - M-700 Front
Figure 8 - M-700 Rear
3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces
The modules are multi-chip standalone modules with ports and interfaces as shown below. The modules do not implement a
control output interface.
Table 5 - Ports and Interfaces
Physical Interface Logical Interface Data that passes over port/interface
LED Status output Module status via LED indicators
Power Power N/A
RJ45 Console Status output Self-test output
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 12
RJ45 Ethernet Data input, control input, control output,
data output, status output
TLS, SSH
SFP+
(M-600, M-700)
Data input, control input, data output,
status output
TLS
4. Roles, Services, and Authentication
Assumption of Roles
The module supports distinct operator roles. The cryptographic module in Panorama mode, Management-Only mode, or
PAN-DB mode enforces the separation of roles using unique authentication credentials associated with operator accounts.
The Log Collector mode only supports one role, the Crypto-Officer (CO) role.
The module supports concurrent operators.
The module does not provide a maintenance role or bypass capability.
Table 6 – Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output
Role Service Input Output
CO Show Version
Query module for version Module provides version
CO
System Provisioning
Configuring and managing
system configurations (e.g., IP
address, system time, etc.) via
CLI or WebUI
Confirmation of service via
Configuration Logs
CO, User
Access web portal Connect to web portal from TLS
client.
Confirmation of service via
Configuration Logs
CO, User
Access CLI Connect to SSH server from SSH
client
Confirmation of service via
Configuration Logs
CO
Panorama Firmware Update Loading new image Message output noting version
updated successfully via System
Logs
CO
Panorama Manager Setup Configuring and managing
Manager configurations (e.g.,
HTTPS, NTP, etc.) via CLI or
WebUI
Confirmation of service via
Configuration Logs
CO
Manage Panorama
Administrative Access
Configuring and managing
Administrative configurations
(e.g., creating user accounts,
setting authentication method,
etc.) via CLI or WebUI
Confirmation of service via
Configuration Logs
CO
Configure High Availability Configuring and managing High
Availability (HA) configuration
via CLI or WebUI
Confirmation of service via
Configuration Logs
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CO
Panorama Certificate
Management
Configuring and managing
certificates via CLI or WebUI
Confirmation of service via
Configuration Logs
CO
Panorama Log Setting Configuring and managing log
settings via CLI or WebUI
Confirmation of service via
Configuration Logs
CO
Panorama Server Profiles Configuring and managing
Server configurations (e.g.
SNMP, etc.) via CLI or WebUI
Confirmation of service via
Configuration Logs
CO
Setup Managed Devices and
Deployment
Configuring and managing
Managed Devices configurations
(e.g., Versions, Licenses, etc.) via
CLI or WebUI
Confirmation of service via
Configuration Logs
CO
Configure Managed Log
Collectors
Configuring and managing
Managed Log Collectors
configurations via CLI or WebUI
Confirmation of service via
Configuration Logs
CO,
Unauthentica
ted
Zeroize Zeroize from CLI Zeroization Indicator
CO, User,
Unauthentica
ted
Self-Test Run self-test via CLI or WebUI Output results via System Logs
CO, User
Show Status Show status via CLI or WebUI FIPS-CC Mode Indicator
CO, User
System Audit View system audit records via
CLI or WebUI
Audit records via System Logs
CO, User
Monitor System Status and Logs View system status records via
CLI or WebUI
System status via System Logs
CO
Panorama Log Collector Setup Configuring and managing Log
Collectors configurations via CLI
Confirmation of service via
Configuration Logs
CO
Panorama Pan-DB Setup Configuring and managing
Pan-DB URL configurations via
CLI
Confirmation of service via
Configuration Logs
CO
Manage Pan-DB Administrative
Access
Configuring and managing
Administrator password via CLI
Confirmation of service via
Configuration Logs
Table 7 - Roles and Authentication
Role Authentication Method Authentication Strength
CO Memorized Secret (Unique
Username/password) and/or
Single-Factor Cryptographic
Software (certificate common
name / public key-based
authentication)
Password-based
Minimum length is eight1
(8) characters (95 possible characters).
The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false
acceptance will occur is 1/(958
) which is less than 1/1,000,000.
The probability of successfully authenticating to the module
within one minute is 10/(958
), which is less than 1/100,000. The
module’s configuration supports at most ten failed attempts to
authenticate in a one-minute period.
1
In FIPS-CC Mode, the module checks and enforces the minimum password length of eight (8) as specified in SP 800-63B.
Passwords are securely stored hashed with salt value, with very restricted access control, and rate limiting mechanism for
authentication attempts.
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 14
Certificate/Public key-based
The security modules support public-key based authentication
using RSA 2048 and certificate-based authentication using RSA
2048, RSA 3072, RSA 4096, ECDSA P-256, P-384, or P-521.
The minimum equivalent strength supported is 112 bits. The
probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/(2112
) which is
less than 1/1,000,000. The probability of successfully
authenticating to the module within a one minute period is
10/(2112
), which is less than 1/100,000. The module in FIPS-CC
mode allows at most 10 failed attempts before a lockout occurs.
User
Memorized Secret (Unique
Username/password) and/or
Single-Factor Cryptographic
Software (certificate common
name / public key-based
authentication)
Access Control Policy
While in the Approved mode of operation all authenticated services and CSPs are accessed via authenticated SSH or TLS
sessions. Access is restricted to authenticated operators only and no interface is provided to modify the public or private key.
SNMPv3 authentication is supported but is not a method of module administration and does not allow read/write access of
CSPs. Approved and allowed algorithms, relevant CSP and public keys related to these protocols are used to access the
following services. CSP access by services is further described in the following tables. Additional service information and
administrator guidance for Panorama can be found at https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/.
The Crypto-Officer may access all services, and through the “management of administrative access” service may define
multiple Crypto-Officer roles with limited services. The User role provides read-only access to the System Audit service.
When configured in the default mode, Panorama Manager provides services via web-browser based interface and a
command line interface (CLI). For the Panorama Log Collector mode and PAN-DB mode, only the CLI is available for
management.
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 15
SSP Access Rights
The table below defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The modes of
access shown in the table are defined as:
G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).
W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP.
Table 8 - Approved Services
Service Description Approved Security Functions Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access rights to
Keys and/or SSPs
Indicator
Show Version Query the module to display
the version
N/A N/A CO N/A Version displayed via
System Logs / CLI / UI
System Provisioning
Perform panorama
licensing, diagnostics,
debug functions, manage
Panorama support
information and switch
between Panorama
Management-only, and
Logger modes.
(Panorama or
Management-Only
Mode)
N/A N/A CO N/A
System and
Configuration logs
Access web portal Connect to module’s web
portal to invoke services.
(Panorama or
Management-Only Mode)
RSA SigVer (186-4) CA Certificates CO G/R/E/W System Logs
RSA SigVer (186-4) RSA Public Keys G/R/E/W
ECDSA SigVer (186-4) ECDSA Public Keys G/R/E/W
KAS KDF TLS (CVL) TLS Pre-Master
Secret
G/E/Z
KDF TLS (CVL) TLS Master Secret G/E/Z
CKG,
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS 186-4),
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS 186-4),
KAS-ECC-SSC,
KAS-FFC-SSC,
Safe Primes Key
Generation, Safe
Primes Key
Verification
TLS DHE/ECDHE
Private Components
G/E/Z
TLS DHE/ECDHE
Public Components
G/E/Z
KTS
HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-384
TLS HMAC Keys G/E/Z
AES-CBC TLS Encryption Keys G/E/Z
KTS AES-GCM TLS Encryption Keys G/E/Z
Counter DRBG, ESV DRBG Seed G/E
DRBG V
DRBG Key
Entropy Input String
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 16
Access CLI Connect to module’s CLI via
SSH
KTS HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-512
SSH Session
Authentication Keys
CO, User G/E/Z System Logs
AES-CBC
AES-CTR
SSH Session
Encryption Keys
G/E/Z
KTS AES-GCM G/E/Z
KAS KDF SSH (CVL) SSH DHE/ECDHE
Private Components
G/E/Z
KAS-ECC-SSC
KAS-FFC-SSC
Safe Primes Key
Generation
Safe Primes Key
Verification
SSH DHE/ECDHE
Public Components
G/E/R/W/Z
Counter DRBG, ESV DRBG Seed G/E
DRBG V
DRBG Key
Entropy Input String
Panorama Firmware
Update
Download and install
firmware updates
RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) Public Key for
Firmware Load Test
CO W/E System and
Configuration logs
Panorama Manager Setup Presents configuration
options for management
interfaces and
communication for peer
services (e.g., SNMP,
RADIUS).
Import, Export, Save, Load,
revert and validate
Panorama configurations
and state role
(Panorama or
Management-Only Mode)
CKG
RSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4)
RSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4)
RSA Private Keys CO G/W/E System and
Configuration logs
CKG
ECDSA KeyGen
( FIPS 186-4)
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS 186-4)
ECDSA Private Keys G/W/E
RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) RSA Public Keys G/R/E/W
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) ECDSA Public Keys G/R/E/W
KDF SNMP (CVL) SNMPv3
Authentication Secret
W/E
KDF SNMP (CVL) SNMPv3 Privacy
Secret
W/E
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA2-224
HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-384
HMAC-SHA2-512
SNMPv3
Authentication Key
G/E/Z
AES-CFB128 SNMPv3 Session Key G/E/Z
RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-4)
CA Certificates G/R/E/W
KAS KDF TLS (CVL) TLS Pre-Master
Secret
G/E/Z
KDF TLS (CVL) TLS Master Secret G/E/Z
CKG,
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS 186-4),
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS 186-4),
KAS-ECC-SSC,
KAS-FFC-SSC,
Safe Primes Key
Generation, Safe
Primes Key
Verification
TLS DHE/ECDHE
Private Components
G/E/Z
TLS DHE/ECDHE
Public Components
G/E/R/W/Z
KTS HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-384
TLS HMAC Keys G/E/Z
AES-CBC TLS Encryption Keys G/E/Z
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 17
KTS AES-GCM TLS Encryption Keys G/E/Z
KTS HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-512
SSH Session
Authentication Keys
G/E/Z
AES-CBC,
AES-CTR
SSH Session
Encryption Keys
G/E/Z
KTS AES-GCM
KAS KDF SSH (CVL)
KAS-ECC-SSC
KAS-FFC-SSC
Safe Primes Key
Generation, Safe
Primes Key
Verification
SSH DHE/ECDHE
Private Components
G/E/Z
SSH DHE/ECDHE
Public Components
G/E/R/W/Z
Counter DRBG, ESV DRBG Seed CO G/E System and
Configuration Logs
DRBG V
DRBG Key
Entropy Input String
Manage Panorama
Administrative Access
Define access control
methods via admin profiles,
configure administrators
and password profiles
Configure local user
database, authentication
profiles, sequence of
methods and access
domains.
(Panorama,
Management-Only, or Log
Collector Mode)
N/A CO, User Password CO G/E/W System and
Configuration logs
RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) SSH Client Public Key W/E
RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)
SSH Host Public Key G/R/E/W
Configure High
Availability
Configure High Availability
communication settings
(Panorama or
Management-Only Mode)
RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) RSA Public Key CO G/R/E/W Configuration Logs
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) ECDSA Public Key G/R/E/W
Panorama Certificate
Management
Manage RSA/ECDSA
certificates and private
keys, certificate profiles,
revocation status, and
usage; show status.
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS 186-4)
RSA SigGen
(FIPS 186-4)
RSA Private Keys
ECDSA Private Keys
CO G/R/W/E System and
Configuration logs
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 18
(Panorama,
Management-Only, or Log
Collector Mode)
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-4)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-4)
RSA Public Keys
ECDSA Public Keys
G/R/W/E
Counter DRBG, ESV DRBG Seed G/E
DRBG V
DRBG Key
Entropy Input String
Panorama Log Setting Configure log forwarding
(Panorama or
Management-Only Mode)
N/A N/A CO N/A Configuration Logs
Panorama Server Profiles Configure communication
parameters and information
for peer servers
(Panorama or
Management-Only Mode)
KDF SNMP (CVL) SNMPv3
Authentication Secret
CO W/E System Logs
KDF SNMP (CVL) SNMPv3 Privacy
Secret
W/E
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA2-224
HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-384
HMAC-SHA2-512
SNMPv3
Authentication Key
G/E/Z
AES-CFB128 SNMPv3 Session Key G/E/Z
Setup Managed Devices
and Deployment
Set-up and define managed
devices, device groups for
firewalls
Configure device
deployment applications
and licenses
View current deployment
information on the managed
firewalls. It also allows you
to manage firmware
versions and schedule
updates on the managed
firewalls and managed log
collectors.
(Panorama or
Management-Only Mode)
N/A N/A CO N/A Configuration Logs
Configure Managed Log
Collectors
Setup and manage other
Log Collector management,
communication and storage
settings
View current deployment
information on the managed
Log Collectors. It also allows
you to manage firmware
versions and schedule
updates on managed log
collectors.
(Panorama or
Management-Only Mode)
N/A CO, User Password CO G/E/W System and
Configuration logs
Zeroize Zeroize all SSPs N/A All SSPs CO Z Zeroization Indicator
Self-Test Run power up self-tests on
demand by power cycling
the module.
N/A Firmware Integrity
Verification Key
CO, User E System Logs
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 19
Show Status View status of the module N/A N/A CO, User N/A FIPS-CC Mode Indicator
System Audit Allows review of limited
configuration and system
status via SNMPv3, logs,
dashboard, show status, and
configuration screens.
CO Only: Provides
configuration commit
capability.
(Panorama,
Management-Only, or
PAN-DB Mode)
N/A N/A CO, User N/A System Logs
Monitor System Status and
Logs
Review system status via
the panorama system CLI,
dashboard and logs; show
status.
(Panorama or
Management-Only Mode)
N/A N/A CO, User N/A System Logs
Panorama Log Collector
Setup
Presents configuration
options for management
interfaces and
communication for peer
services
Import, Export, Save, Load,
revert and validate
Panorama configurations
and state.
(Log Collector Mode only)
CKG
RSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4)
RSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4)
RSA Private Keys CO G/W/E System and
Configuration logs
CKG
ECDSA KeyGen
( FIPS 186-4)
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS 186-4)
ECDSA Private Keys G/W/E
RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) RSA Public Keys G/R/E/W
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) ECDSA Public Keys G/R/E/W
KAS KDF TLS (CVL) TLS Pre-Master
Secret
G/E/Z
KDF TLS (CVL) TLS Master Secret G/E/Z
CKG,
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS 186-4),
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS 186-4),
KAS-ECC-SSC,
KAS-FFC-SSC,
Safe Primes Key
Generation, Safe
Primes Key
Verification
TLS DHE/ECDHE
Private Components
G/E/Z
TLS DHE/ECDHE
Public Components
G/E/R/W/Z
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 20
KTS HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-384
TLS HMAC Keys G/E/Z
AES-CBC TLS Encryption Keys G/E/Z
KTS AES-GCM TLS Encryption Keys G/E/Z
KTS HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-512
SSH Session
Authentication Keys
G/E/Z
AES-CBC,
AES-CTR
SSH Session
Encryption Keys
G/E/Z
KTS AES-GCM
KAS KDF SSH SSH DHE/ECDHE
Private Components
G/E/Z
KAS-ECC-SSC
KAS-FFC-SSC
Safe Primes Key
Generation, Safe
Primes Key
Verification
Counter DRBG, ESV DRBG Seed G/E
DRBG V
DRBG Key
Entropy Input String
Panorama Pan-DB Setup Presents configuration
options for management
interfaces and
communication for peer
services
Import, Export, Save, Load,
revert and validate
Panorama configurations
and state.
(PAN-DB Mode only)
KAS KDF TLS (CVL) TLS Pre-Master
Secret
CO G/E/Z System Logs
KDF TLS (CVL) TLS Master Secret G/E/Z
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 21
CKG,
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS 186-4),
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS 186-4),
KAS-ECC-SSC,
KAS-FFC-SSC,
Safe Primes Key
Generation, Safe
Primes Key
Verification
TLS DHE/ECDHE
Private Components
G/E/Z
TLS DHE/ECDHE
Public Components
G/E/R/W/Z
KTS HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-384
TLS HMAC Keys G/E/Z
AES-CBC TLS Encryption Keys G/E/Z
KTS AES-GCM TLS Encryption Keys G/E/Z
KTS HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-512
SSH Session
Authentication Keys
G/E/Z
AES-CBC,
AES-CTR
SSH Session
Encryption Keys
G/E/Z
KTS AES-GCM
KAS KDF SSH SSH DHE/ECDHE
Private Components
G/E/Z
KAS-ECC-SSC
KAS-FFC-SSC
Safe Primes Key
Generation, Safe
Primes Key
Verification
Counter DRBG, ESV DRBG Seed G/E
DRBG V
DRBG Key
Entropy Input String
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 22
Manage Pan-DB
Administrative Access
Update Administrator
password.
(PAN-DB Mode only)
N/A CO, User Password CO G/E/W System and
Configuration logs
Note: Configuration/System Logs for Approved services above will indicate FIPS-CC mode is enabled and that the service succeeded.
5. Software/Firmware Security
The module performs the Firmware Integrity test by using HMAC-SHA-256 and ECDSA signature verification (HMAC and
ECDSA Cert. #A2906) during the Pre-Operational Self-Test. In addition, the module also conducts the firmware load test by
using RSA 2048 with SHA-256 (Cert. #A2906) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module.
The pre-operational self-tests can be initiated by power cycling the module. When this is performed, the module
automatically runs the cryptographic algorithm self-tests in addition to the pre-operational firmware integrity test.
6. Operational Environment
The FIPS 140-3 Area 5 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the module contains a
non-modifiable operational environment. The operational environment is limited since the module includes a firmware load
service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through
the FIPS 140-3 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and requires a
separate FIPS 140-3 validation.
7. Physical Security
Physical Security Mechanisms
The multi-chip standalone modules are production quality containing standard passivation. Chip components are protected
by an opaque enclosure. There are tamper-evident seals that are applied on the modules by the Crypto-Officer. There are
fifteen (15) for the M-200, fifteen (15) for the M-300, twenty-one (21) for the M-600, and twenty-one (21) for the M-700. All
unused seals are to be controlled by the Crypto-Officer. The seals prevent removal of the opaque enclosure without
evidence. The Crypto-Officer must ensure that the module surface is clean and dry. Tamper evident seals must be pressed
firmly onto the adhering surfaces during installation and once applied, the Crypto-Officer shall permit 24 hours of cure time
for all tamper evident seals. The seals prevent removal of the opaque enclosure without evidence. The Crypto-Officer should
inspect the seals and shields for evidence of tamper every 30 days. If the seals show evidence of tamper, the Crypto-Officer
should assume that the modules have been compromised and contact support.
Note: For ordering information, see Table 2 for physical kit part numbers and versions. Opacity shields are included in the
physical kits.
Operator Required Actions
The following table provides information regarding the various physical security mechanisms, and their recommended
frequency of inspection/test.
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 23
Table 9 - Physical Security Inspection Guidelines
Physical Security
Mechanism
Recommended Frequency
of Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Tamper Evident
Seals
30 days (M-200, M-300) Verify integrity of tamper-evident seals in the
locations identified in Section 7 of this Security Policy.
Front and Rear
Opacity Shields
Side Rails
30 days (M-200, M-300) Verify that opacity shields and side rails have not
been loosened or deformed from their original shape, thereby
reducing their effectiveness.
Top Overlays 30 days (M-200, M-300) Verify top overlays have not been removed or
deformed. All edges should maintain strong adhesion
characteristics.
Tamper Evident
Seals
30 days (M-600, M-700) Verify integrity of tamper-evident seals in the
locations specified in Section 7 of this Security Policy.
Front and Rear
Opacity Shields
30 days (M-600, M-700) Verify that the front and rear opacity shields
have not been deformed from their original shape, thereby
reducing their effectiveness.
Vent Overlays 30 days (M-600, M-700) Verify that the vent overlays have not been
removed or deformed. All edges should maintain strong adhesion
characteristics.
Refer to the following sections for instructions on installation and placement of the tamper seals and opacity shields.
M-200 Tamper Seal Installation (15 Seals)
1. Replace the top cover with the physical top cover.
a. Remove the VOID WARRANTY label and cover screws (replacement label included in the kit).
M-200 appliance—Remove the Void Warranty label that covers the left top cover screw then use a
Phillips-head screwdriver to remove both screws as indicated in the illustration.
b. Simultaneously depress the two (2) release buttons on top of the cover and slide the cover toward the back
of the appliance to remove it.
c. Slide the top cover (does not have vents) on the appliance until the release buttons click. Reinsert and slide
cover into position and secure with the two (2) screws.
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 24
Figure 9 – M-200: Top Cover Replacement
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 25
2. On the left side of the M-200, firmly apply seven (7) tamper-evident seals as indicated in the illustration.
Figure 10 – M-200: Side View Before Rail Installation
Install the inner rack mount rail brackets as described in the “M-200 and M-600 Appliance Hardware Reference”.
The front rack bracket that you replace in the next step is located on the front inner rails.
Figure 11 – M-200: Inner Rack Mount Rail Brackets
3. Attach the front cover brackets.
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 26
Replace the front rack-mount brackets (one bracket on each side) that are part of the inner-rack rails with the
rack-mount brackets by removing and then reinstalling two screws on each bracket. The handles have standoffs
that are used to secure the front cover.
Figure 12 – M-200: Replacing Front Rack-Mount Brackets
4. Attach the physical kit front cover to the front of the appliance.
Slide the M-200 physical kit front cover over the brackets and secure the cover by turning the thumb screws
clockwise (one thumb screw on each side).
Figure 13 – M-200: Attach Physical Kit Front Cover
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 27
5. Attach the physical kit back cover to the back of the appliance.
Slide the back cover onto the back of the appliance, insert two M4 x 0.7 x 8mm (one (1) screw on each side), and
turn the screws clockwise to secure the cover.
6. Apply a tamper-evident seal to each location shown in the following M-200 illustrations. Ensure you apply two
(2) tamper-evident seals on the power supplies (see seals #14 and #15 on the rear illustration).
Before you apply the tamper-evident seals, ensure that the appliance and physical kit surfaces are clean and
dry. Firmly press one (1) seal on to each of the locations shown in the illustrations. Avoid touching the seals for
at least 24 hours to allow time for the seals to properly adhere to the appliance and physical kit surfaces.
Figure 14 – M-200: Seal locations on Top and Right Side
Figure 15 – M-200: Seal Locations on Left Side and Rear
M-300 Tamper Seal Installation (15 Seals)
1. Replace the top cover with the FIPS top cover.
a. Remove the VOID WARRANTY label and cover screws (replacement label included in the kit).
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 28
M-300 appliance—Remove the Void Warranty label that covers the left top cover screw then use a
Phillips-head screwdriver to remove both screws as indicated in the illustration.
b. Simultaneously depress the two (2) release buttons on top of the cover and slide the cover toward the back
of the appliance to remove it.
c. Slide the physical kit top cover (does not have vents) on the appliance until the release buttons click.
Reinsert and slide cover into position and secure with the two (2) screws.
Figure 16 – M-300: Top Cover Replacement
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 29
2. On the left side of the M-300, firmly apply seven (7) tamper-evident seals as indicated in the illustration.
Figure 17 – M-300: Side View Before Rail Installation
Install the inner rack mount rail brackets as described in the “M-300 and M-700 Appliance Hardware Reference”.
The front rack bracket that you replace in the next step is located on the front inner rails.
Figure 18 – M-200: Inner Rack Mount Rail Brackets
3. Attach the physical kit front cover brackets.
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 30
Replace the front rack-mount brackets (one bracket on each side) that are part of the inner-rack rails with the
physical kit rack-mount brackets by removing and then reinstalling two screws on each bracket. The physical kit
handles have standoffs that are used to secure the front cover.
Figure 19 – M-300: Replacing Front Rack-Mount Brackets
4. Attach the physical kit front cover to the front of the appliance.
Slide the M-300 physical kit front cover over the physical kit brackets and secure the cover by turning the thumb
screws clockwise (one thumb screw on each side).
Figure 20 – M-300: Attach Physical Kit Front Cover
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 31
5. Attach the physical kit back cover to the back of the appliance.
Slide the back cover onto the back of the appliance, insert two M4 x 0.7 x 8mm (one (1) screw on each side), and
turn the screws clockwise to secure the cover.
6. Apply a tamper-evident seal to each location shown in the following M-300 illustrations. Ensure you apply two
(2) tamper-evident seals on the power supplies (see seals #14 and #15 on the rear illustration).
Note: Before you apply the tamper-evident seals, ensure that the appliance and physical kit surfaces are clean and dry.
Firmly press one (1) seal on to each of the locations shown in the illustrations. Avoid touching the seals for at least 24
hours to allow time for the seals to properly adhere to the appliance and physical kit surfaces.
Figure 21 – M-300: Seal locations on Top and Right Side
Figure 22 – M-300: Seal Locations on Left Side and Rear
M-600 Tamper Seal Installation (21 Seals)
1. Replace the top cover with the FIPS top cover.
a. Remove the VOID WARRANTY label and cover screws (replacement label included in the kit).
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 32
Remove the Void Warranty label that covers the left side cover screw then use a Phillips-head
screwdriver to remove both screws as indicated in the illustration.
b. Simultaneously depress the two (2) release buttons on top of the cover and slide the cover toward the back
of the appliance to remove it.
c. Slide the physical kit top cover (does not have vents) on the appliance until the release buttons click.
Replace the two screws that you removed from the old cover
Figure 23 – M-600: Top Cover Replacement
2. Attach the physical front cover brackets.
Remove the front pull handles by removing two (2) screws from each handle (one (1) handle on each side), insert
the M-600 physical kit front-cover brackets under each handle, and then replace the handles and secure them
using the screws that you removed. The physical kit handles have standoffs that are used to secure the front
cover.
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 33
Figure 24 – M-600: Front Cover Bracket
3. Attach the physical kit front cover to the front of the appliance.
Slide the M-600 physical kit front cover over the physical kit pull handle brackets and secure the cover by
turning the thumb screws clockwise (one thumb screw on each side).
Figure 25 – M-600: Physical Kit Front Cover
4. Install a tamper-evident seal on the back of the appliance. This is seal #13 in the M-600 Figure 53. You need to
install this seal before you install the M-600 physical kit back cover.
5. Attach the physical kit back cover to the back of the appliance.
a. Slide the back cover onto the back of the appliance and turn the two (2) thumb screws clockwise
until tight (one (1) screw on each side) to secure the cover.
6. Apply a tamper-evident seal to each location shown in the following M-600 illustrations below.
Also install the overlay stickers to cover vent openings (two (2) stickers on each side). You then install
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 34
tamper-evident seals over the overlay stickers. Apply two (2) tamper-evident seals on the back side of the right
rack handle (see seals #18 and #19 on the left side in Figure 54). Apply two (2) tamper-evident seals on the
power supplies (see seals #11 and #12 with rear inset of Figure 53).
Note: Before you apply the tamper-evident seals, ensure that the appliance and physical kit surfaces are clean
and dry. Firmly press one (1) seal on to each of the locations shown in the illustrations. Avoid touching the seals
for at least 24 hours to allow time for the seals to properly adhere to the appliance and physical kit surfaces.
M-600 Seal Placement (21 Seals)
Figure 26 – M-600: Tamper Seal Locations (Top and Rear)
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 35
Figure 27 – M-600: Tamper Seal Locations (Top and Front)
Figure 28 – M-600: Tamper Seals Location for Side Rails
M-700 Tamper Seal Installation (21 Seals)
7. Replace the top cover with the physical kit top cover.
a. Remove the VOID WARRANTY label and cover screws (replacement label included in the kit).
Remove the Void Warranty label that covers the left side cover screw then use a Phillips-head
screwdriver to remove both screws as indicated in the illustration.
b. Simultaneously depress the two (2) release buttons on top of the cover and slide the cover toward the back
of the appliance to remove it.
c. Slide the physical kit top cover (does not have vents) on the appliance until the release buttons click.
Replace the two screws that you removed from the old cover
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 36
Figure 29 – M-700: Top Cover Replacement
8. Attach the physical kit front cover brackets.
Remove the front pull handles by removing two (2) screws from each handle (one (1) handle on each side), insert
the M-700 physical kit front-cover brackets under each handle, and then replace the handles and secure them
using the screws that you removed. The physical kit handles have standoffs that are used to secure the front
cover.
Figure 30 – M-700: Front Cover Bracket
9. Attach the physical kit front cover to the front of the appliance.
Slide the M-700 physical front cover over the physical kit pull handle brackets and secure the cover by turning
the thumb screws clockwise (one thumb screw on each side).
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 37
Figure 31 – M-700: Physical Kit Front Cover
10. Install a tamper-evident seal on the back of the appliance. This is seal #13 in the M-700 Figure 53. You need to
install this seal before you install the M-700 physical kit back cover.
11. Attach the physical kit back cover to the back of the appliance.
a. Slide the back cover onto the back of the appliance and turn the two (2) thumb screws clockwise
until tight (one (1) screw on each side) to secure the cover.
12. Apply a tamper-evident seal to each location shown in the following M-700 illustrations below.
Also install the overlay stickers to cover vent openings (two (2) stickers on each side). You then install
tamper-evident seals over the overlay stickers. Apply two (2) tamper-evident seals on the back side of the right
rack handle (see seals #18 and #19 on the left side in Figure 54). Apply two (2) tamper-evident seals on the
power supplies (see seals #11 and #12 with rear inset of Figure 53).
Note: Before you apply the tamper-evident seals, ensure that the appliance and physical kit surfaces are clean
and dry. Firmly press one (1) seal on to each of the locations shown in the illustrations. Avoid touching the seals
for at least 24 hours to allow time for the seals to properly adhere to the appliance and physical kit surfaces.
M-700 Seal Placement (21 Seals)
Figure 32 – M-700: Tamper Seal Locations (Top and Rear)
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 38
Figure 33 – M-700: Tamper Seal Locations (Top and Front)
Figure 34 – M-700: Tamper Seals Location for Side Rails
8. Non-Invasive Security
There are currently no defined Approved non-invasive attack mitigation test metrics in SP 800-140F.
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 39
9. Sensitive Security Parameters
The following table details all the sensitive security parameters utilized by the module.
Table 10 - SSPs
Key/SSP/Name
/Type
Strength Security
Function and
Cert.
Number
Generati
on
Import/Exp
ort
Establishm
ent
Storage Zeroization1
Use & Related Keys
CA Certificates 112 bits minimum
RSA SigVer (FIPS
186-4)
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-4)
Cert. #A2906
DRBG, FIPS
186-4
TLS or SSH
Session Key
Encrypted
N/A
HDD/RAM –
plaintext
HDD –
Zeroize
Service
RAM - Zeroize
at session
termination
ECDSA/RSA Public key -
Used to trust a root CA
intermediate CA and
leaf /end entity
certificates
(RSA 2048, 3072, and
4096 bits)
(ECDSA P-256, P-384,
and P-521)
RSA Public Keys 112 bits minimum
RSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-4)
Cert. #A2906
DRBG, FIPS
186-4
TLS or SSH
Session Key
Encrypted or
Plaintext
TLS handshake
N/A
HDD/RAM –
plaintext
Zeroize
Service
RSA public keys
managed as certificates
for the verification of
signatures,
establishment of TLS,
operator authentication
and peer
authentication.
(RSA 2048, 3072, or
4096-bit)
RSA Private Keys 112 bits minimum
RSA SigGen
(FIPS 186-4)
Cert. #A2906
DRBG, FIPS
186-4
TLS or SSH
Session Key
Encrypted
N/A
HDD/RAM –
plaintext
HDD – Zeroize
Service
RAM - Zeroize at
session
termination
RSA Private keys for
generation of
signatures,
authentication or key
establishment.
(RSA 2048, 3072, or
4096-bit)
ECDSA Public
Keys
128 bits minimum
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-4)
Cert. #A2906
DRBG, FIPS
186-4
TLS or SSH
Session Key
Encrypted or
Plaintext
TLS handshake
N/A
HDD/RAM –
plaintext
Zeroize Service
ECDSA public keys
managed as certificates
for the verification of
signatures,
establishment of TLS,
operator authentication
and peer
authentication.
(ECDSA P-256, P-384,
or P-521)
ECDSA Private
Keys
128 bits minimum
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS 186-4)
Cert. #A2906
DRBG, FIPS
186-4
TLS or SSH
Session Key
Encrypted
N/A
HDD/RAM –
plaintext
HDD – Zeroize
Service
RAM - Zeroize at
session
termination
ECDSA Private key for
generation of signatures
and authentication
(P-256, P-384, or
P-521)
TLS DHE/ECDHE
Private
Components
112 bits minimum
KAS-ECC-SSC
KAS-FFC-SSC
Cert. #A2906
DRBG, SP
800-56A Rev.
3
N/A N/A RAM - plaintext
Zeroize at session
termination
KAS-FFC or KAS-ECC
Ephemeral values used
in key agreement
(KAS-FFC MODP-2048,
KAS-ECC P-256, P-384,
P-521)
TLS DHE/ECDHE
Public
Components
112 bits minimum
KAS-ECC-SSC
KAS-FFC-SSC
Cert. #A2906
DRBG, SP
800-56A Rev.
3
Plaintext - TLS
handshake
N/A N/A
Zeroize at session
termination
KAS-FFC or KAS-ECC
Ephemeral values used
in key agreement
(KAS-FFC MODP-2048,
KAS-ECC P-256, P-384,
P-521)
TLS Pre-Master
Secret
N/A
KDF TLS
Cert. #A2906
KAS SP
800-56A Rev.
3
N/A N/A RAM – plaintext
Zeroize at session
termination
Secret value used to
derive the TLS Master
Secret along with client
and server random
nonces
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 40
TLS Master
Secret
N/A
KDF TLS
Cert. #A2906
KDF TLS N/A N/A RAM – plaintext
Zeroize at session
termination
Secret value used to
derive the TLS session
keys
TLS Encryption
Keys
128 bits minimum
AES-CBC or
AES-GCM
Cert. #A2906
KDF TLS N/A
TLS, KAS SP
800-56A Rev. 3
RAM - plaintext
Zeroize at session
termination
AES (128 or 256 bit)
keys used in TLS
connections (GCM;
CBC)
TLS HMAC Keys 256 bits minimum
HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-384
Cert. #A2906
KDF TLS N/A
TLS, KAS SP
800-56A Rev. 3
RAM - plaintext
Zeroize at session
termination
HMAC keys used in TLS
connections (SHA-256,
SHA-384)
( 256, 384 bits)
SSH
DHE/ECDHE
Private
Components
112 bits minimum
KAS-ECC-SSC
KAS-FFC-SSC
Cert. #A2906
DRBG, SP
800-56A Rev.
3
N/A N/A RAM - plaintext
Zeroize at session
termination
KAS-FFC or KAS-ECC
public component
(KAS-FFC MODP-2048,
KAS-ECC P-256,
KAS-ECC P-384,
KAS-ECC P-521)
SSH
DHE/ECDHE
Public
Components
112 bits minimum
KAS-ECC-SSC
KAS-FFC-SSC
Cert. #A2906
DRBG, SP
800-56A Rev.
3
Plaintext SSH
handshake
N/A RAM - plaintext
Zeroize at session
termination
KAS-FFC or KAS-ECC
public component
(KAS-FFC MODP-2048,
KAS-ECC P-256,
KAS-ECC P-384,
KAS-ECC P-521)
SSH Host Public
Key
112 bits minimum
RSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-4)
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-4)
Cert. #A2906
DRBG, FIPS
186-4
N/A N/A
HDD/RAM –
plaintext
Zeroize Service
SSH Host Public Key
(RSA 2048, RSA 3072,
RSA 4096, ECDSA
P-256, P-384, or P-521)
SSH Client Public
Key
112 bits minimum
RSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-4)
Cert. #A2906
N/A
Encrypted via
SSH or TLS
N/A
HDD/RAM –
plaintext
Zeroize Service
Public RSA key used to
authenticate client.
(RSA 2048, 3072, and
4096 bits)
SSH Session
Encryption Keys
128 bits minimum
AES-CBC,
AES-CTR, or
AES-GCM
Cert. #A2906
KDF SSH N/A
SSH, KAS SP
800-56A Rev. 3
RAM - plaintext
Zeroize at session
termination
Used in all SSH
connections to the
security module’s
command line interface.
(128, 192, or 256 bits:
CBC or CTR)
(128 or 256 bits: GCM)
SSH Session
Authentication
Keys
160 bits minimum
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-512
Cert. #A2906
KDF SSH N/A
SSH, KAS SP
800-56A Rev. 3
RAM - plaintext
Zeroize at session
termination
Authentication keys
used in all SSH
connections to the
security module’s
command line interface
(HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA2-256,
HMAC-SHA2-512)
(160, 256, 512 bits)
Firmware
integrity
verification key
128 bits
HMAC-SHA2-256,
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-4)
Cert. #A2906
N/A N/A N/A
HDD -
plaintext
N/A
Used to check the
integrity of
crypto-related code.
(HMAC-SHA-256 and
ECDSA P-256) (Note:
This is not considered an
SSP)
Public Key for
Firmware Load
Test
112 bits
RSA SigVer
(FIPS 186-4)
Cert. #A2906
N/A N/A N/A
HDD -
plaintext
N/A
Used to authenticate
firmware and content to
be installed on the
firewall (RSA 2048 with
SHA-256)
CO, User
Password
N/A
SHA2-256
Cert. #A2906
External
Encrypted via
SSH or TLS
N/A
HDD - a password
hash (SHA2-256)
Zeroize
Service
Authentication string
with a minimum length
of eight (8) characters.
Protocol Secrets N/A N/A N/A
Encrypted via
SSH or TLS
N/A
HDD/RAM –
plaintext
Zeroize
Service
Secrets used by RADIUS
(8 characters minimum)
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 41
Entropy Input
String
256 bits
CKG (vendor
affirmed), Counter
DRBG
Cert. #A2906
Entropy as
per
SP 800-90B
N/A N/A RAM - plaintext Power cycle
Entropy input string
coming from the
entropy source
Input length = 384 bits
DRBG Seed 256 bits
CKG (vendor
affirmed), Counter
DRBG
Cert. #A2906
Entropy as
per
SP 800-90B
N/A N/A RAM - Plaintext Power cycle
DRBG seed coming from
the entropy source
Seed length = 384 bits
DRBG Key 256 bits
CKG (vendor
affirmed), Counter
DRBG
Cert. #A2906
Entropy as
per
SP 800-90B
N/A N/A RAM - plaintext Power cycle
AES 256 CTR DRBG
state Key used in the
generation of a random
values
DRBG V 128 bits
CKG (vendor
affirmed), Counter
DRBG
Cert. #A2906
Entropy as
per
SP 800-90B
N/A N/A RAM - plaintext Power cycle
AES 256 CTR DRBG
state V used in the
generation of a random
values
SNMPv3
Authentication
Secret
N/A
KDF SNMP
Cert. #A2906
N/A
Encrypted via
TLS/SSH
N/A
HDD/RAM –
plaintext
Zeroize
Service
Used to support SNMPv3
services
(Minimum 8 characters)
SNMPv3 Privacy
Secret
N/A
KDF SNMP
Cert. #A2906
N/A
Encrypted via
TLS/SSH
N/A
HDD/RAM –
plaintext
Zeroize
Service
Used to support SNMPv3
services
(Minimum 8 characters)
SNMPv3
Authentication
Key
160 bits minimum
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA2-224
HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-384
HMAC-SHA2-512
Cert. #A2906
KDF SNMP N/A N/A
HDD/RAM -
Plaintext
Zeroize
Service
HMAC–SHA-1/224/256
/384/512
Authentication protocol
key (160 bits)
SNMPv3 Session
Key
128 bits minimum
AES-CFB128
Cert. #A2906
KDF SNMP N/A N/A
HDD/RAM -
Plaintext
Zeroize
Service
Privacy protocol
encryption key
(AES-CFB 128)
Note: SSPs are implicitly zeroized when power is lost, or explicitly zeroized by the zeroize service. In the case of implicit zeroization, the SSPs are
implicitly overwritten with random values due to their ephemeral memory being reset upon power loss. For the zeroization service and zeroization at
session termination, the SSP's memory location is overwritten with random values.
Table 11 – Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification
Entropy Source Minimum number of
bits of entropy
Details
Palo Alto Networks DRNG
Entropy Source
256 bits
ESV Cert. #E64, #E65, #E66
Entropy source provides full entropy, which is provided in the 384
bit seed.
10. Self-Tests
The cryptographic module performs the following tests below. The operator can command the module to perform the
power-up self-test by cycling power of the module; these tests do not require any operator action.
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 42
Pre-operational Self-Tests
Pre-operational Firmware Integrity Test
● Verified with HMAC-SHA-256 and ECDSA P-256
Note: the ECDSA and HMAC-SHA-256 KATs are performed prior to the Firmware Integrity Test
Conditional self-tests
Cryptographic algorithm self-tests
● AES 128-bit ECB Encrypt Known Answer Test
● AES 128-bit ECB Decrypt Known Answer Test
● AES 128-bit CMAC Known Answer Test*
● AES 256-bit GCM Encrypt Known Answer Test
● AES 256-bit GCM Decrypt Known Answer Test
● AES 192-bit CCM Encrypt Known Answer Test*
● AES 192-bit CCM Decrypt Known Answer Test*
● RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 Sign Known Answer Test
● RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 Verify Known Answer Test
● RSA 2048-bit Encrypt Known Answer Test*
● RSA 2048-bit Decrypt Known Answer Test*
● ECDSA P-256 with SHA-512 Sign Known Answer Test
● ECDSA P-256 with SHA-512 Verify Known Answer Test
● HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test
● HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test
● HMAC-SHA-384 Known Answer Test
● HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Test
● SHA-1 Known Answer Test
● SHA-256 Known Answer Test
● SHA-384 Known Answer Test
● SHA-512 Known Answer Test
● DRBG SP 800-90Arev1 Instantiate/Generate/Reseed Known Answer Tests
● SP 800-90Arev1 Instantiate/Generate/Reseed Section 11.3 Health Tests
● SP 800-56Ar3 KAS-FFC-SSC 2048-bit Known Answer Test
● SP 800-56Ar3 KAS-ECC-SSC P-256 Known Answer Test
● SP 800-135rev1 TLS 1.2 with SHA-256 KDF Known Answer Tests
● SP 800-135rev1 SSH KDF with SHA-256 Known Answer Tests
● SP 800-135rev1 IKEv2 KDF Known Answer Tests*
Note: Supported by the module cryptographic implementation, but only utilized for CAST
● SP 800-90B RCT/APT Health Tests on Entropy Source
Note: The SP 800-90B Health Tests are implemented by the entropy source.
*Note: Supported by the module cryptographic implementation, but only utilized for CAST
Conditional Pairwise Consistency Self-Tests
● RSA Pairwise Consistency Test
● ECDSA/KAS-ECC Pairwise Consistency Test
● KAS-FFC Pairwise Consistency Test
Conditional Firmware Load test
● Firmware Load Test – Verify RSA 2048 with SHA-256 signature on firmware at time of load
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 43
Conditional Critical Functions Tests
● SP 800-56A Rev. 3 Assurance Tests (Based on Sections 5.5.2, 5.6.2, and 5.6.3)
Error Handling
In the event of a conditional test failure, the module will output a description of the error. These are summarized below.
Table 12 - Errors and Indicators
Cause of Error Error State Indicator
Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test or Firmware
Integrity Test Failure
FIPS-CC mode failure. <Algorithm test> failed.
Conditional Pairwise Consistency or Critical Functions Test
Failure
System log prints an error message.
Conditional Firmware Load Test Failure System prints Invalid image message.
11. Life-cycle Assurance
The vendor provided life-cycle assurance documentation that describes configuration management, design, finite state
model, development, testing, delivery + operation, end of life procedures, and guidance. For details regarding the secure
installation, initialization, startup, and operation of the module, see section “Modes of Operation”.
Palo Alto Network provides an Administrator Guide for additional information noted in the “References” section of this
Security Policy.
Module Enforced Security Rules
The module design corresponds to the module security rules. This section documents the security rules enforced by the
cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-3 Level 2 module.
1. The cryptographic module shall provide distinct operator roles. When the module has not been placed in a valid
role, the operator shall not have access to any cryptographic services.
2. The cryptographic module shall provide identity-based authentication.
3. The cryptographic module shall clear previous authentications on power cycle.
4. The module shall support the generation of key material with the approved DRBG. The entropy provided must
be greater than or equal to the strength of the key being generated.
1. Data output shall be inhibited during power-up self-tests and error states.
2. Processes performing key generation and zeroization processes shall be logically isolated from the logical data
output paths.
3. The module does not output intermediate key generation values.
4. Status information output from the module shall not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to
a compromise of the module.
5. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
6. The module maintains separation between concurrent operators.
7. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
8. The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
9. The module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs.
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 44
Vendor imposed security rules
In FIPS-CC mode, the following rules shall apply:
1. When FIPS-CC mode is enabled, the operator shall not install plugins.
a. Checked via CLI using “show plugins installed”
2. When FIPS-CC mode is enabled, the operator shall not use TACACS+. RADIUS may be used but must be
protected by TLS protocol.
a. Checked via CLI using “show deviceconfig” command
Key to Entity
The cryptographic module associates all keys (secret, private, or public) stored within, entered into or output from the
module with authenticated operators of the module. Keys stored within the module are only made available to
authenticated operators via TLS or SSH. Keys are only input or output from the module by the authenticated operator via a
SSH or TLS protected communication. Any attempt to intervene in the key to entity relationship would require defeating the
module TLS or SSH encryption and authentication/integrity mechanism.
12. Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module is not designed to mitigate any specific attacks outside the scope of FIPS 140-3. These requirements are not
applicable.
13. References
[FIPS 140-3] FIPS Publication 140-3 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
[AGD] Panorama Administrator’s Guide Version 10.2
14. Definitions and Acronyms
AES – Advanced Encryption Standard
CA – Certificate Authority
CLI – Command Line Interface
CO – Crypto-Officer
CSP – Critical Security Parameter
CVL – Component Validation List
DB9 – D-sub series, E size, 9 pins
DES – Data Encryption Standard
DH – Diffie-Hellman
DRBG – Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EDC – Error Detection Code
ECDH – Elliptical Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA – Elliptical Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
FIPS – Federal Information Processing Standard
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 45
HMAC – (Keyed) Hashed Message Authentication Code
KDF – Key Derivation Function
LED – Light Emitting Diode
RJ45 – Networking Connector
RNG –Random number generator
RSA – Algorithm developed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
SHA – Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP – Simple Network Management Protocol
SSH – Secure Shell
TLS – Transport Layer Security
USB – Universal Serial Bus
VGA – Video Graphics Array
© 2024 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Panorama HW 10.2 Security Policy 46