Thales e-Security, Inc 2200 North Commerce Parkway, Suite 200, Weston, FL 33326, USA
TEL: + 1-888-744-4976
FAX: + 1-954-888-6211
http://iss.thalesgroup.com
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DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET
SECURITY POLICY
VERSION 002 PAGE 2 OF 26 24 MARCH 2014
CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................... 4
2. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY ............................................................ 12
2.1 Crypto-Officer Role .......................................................................................................... 12
2.2 User Role......................................................................................................................... 12
2.3 Authentication .................................................................................................................. 13
3. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY................................................................................................. 14
3.1 Roles and Services.......................................................................................................... 14
3.2 Cryptographic Keys, CSPs and Access Rights................................................................ 16
3.3 Zeroisation ....................................................................................................................... 18
3.4 Other Security-Relevant Information................................................................................ 18
4. PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY............................................................................................. 20
4.1 Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms ...................................................... 20
4.1.1 1600X439, Rev. 01 Hardware ........................................................................... 20
4.1.2 1600X439, Rev. 02 Hardware ........................................................................... 21
5. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY........................................................................ 23
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS............................................................................................ 24
REFERENCES............................................................................................................................... 25
Tables
Table 1-1 Physical Ports and Status Indicators................................................................................ 7
Table 1-2 Physical Port to Logical Port Mapping ............................................................................. 7
Table 1-3 Power-Up Tests ............................................................................................................. 10
Table 1-4 Conditional Tests ........................................................................................................... 11
Table 2-1 Roles and Required Identification and Authentication .................................................. 13
Table 2-2 Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms...................................................................... 13
Table 3-1 Services Authorized for Crypto Officer........................................................................... 14
Table 3-2 Services Authorized for User ......................................................................................... 15
Table 3-3 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Common to PP and MP............................................... 16
Table 3-4 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs PP Mode Specific ........................................................ 17
Table 3-5 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs MP Mode Specific........................................................ 18
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Figures
Figure 1-1 Datacryptor® Ethernet Crypto Module Example Point to Point Network Configuration.. 6
Figure 1-2 Datacryptor® Ethernet Crypto Module Example Multipoint Network Configuration........ 6
Figure 4-1 1600X439, Rev. 01 Front.............................................................................................. 20
Figure 4-2 1600X439, Rev. 01 AC and DC Rear ........................................................................... 21
Figure 4-3 1600x439, Rev. 01 Top................................................................................................. 21
Figure 4-4 1600X439, Rev. 02 Front.............................................................................................. 21
Figure 4-5 1600X439, Rev. 02 AC and DC Rear ........................................................................... 22
Figure 4-6 1600X439, Rev. 02 Top................................................................................................ 22
DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET
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1. INTRODUCTION
Thales e-Security is a global leader in the network security market with over 60,000 network
security devices in operation, being one of the first companies to introduce a link encryption
product to the market in the early 1980s.
The Datacryptor® family represents Thales’ next generation of network security devices for a wide
variety of communications environments. It is the culmination of 20 years experience of protecting
wide-area network communications for governments, financial institutions and information-critical
industries worldwide.
This document is the Security Policy1 for the Thales e-Security Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet,
conforming to the FIPS140-2 Security Policy Requirements [1].
Further information on the Datacryptor® family and the functionality provided by the Datacryptor®
100M Ethernet is available from the Thales web site: http://iss.thalesgroup.com.
This document is updated to reflect the version 4.5 of the firmware which supports a Multipoint
(MP) licensed mode with MPLS capability as well as the Point to Point (PP) licensed mode.
Overview
The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module which facilitates
secure data transmission across Ethernet networks at 100Mb/s.
Operating at primarily at OSI Layer 2, the Data Link Layer of the protocol stack the Datacryptor®
100M Ethernet is targeted at high speed/high data throughput applications between
telecommunication facilities introducing virtually no overhead or latency to the network. Unlike
Layer 3 IP security devices (IPSEC) the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet is independent of network
configurations resulting in a solution that is simple and inexpensive to manage.
As a solution for high-speed/high-bandwidth data transport over LANs and WANs, the
Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet enables customers to take advantage of the most cost effective
transport services available while ensuring the confidentiality of the information carried through
these connections.
Version 4.5 and later allow the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet to be licensed for use in MP mode
with one central unit and up to 199 remote units, Multipoint Label Switching (MPLS) is also
optionally supported in this mode. The mode of the unit, PP or MP, can be set using a
management PC and Front Panel Viewer software. The internally stored license file dictates which
mode can be set.
The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet uses the strongest commercially available and government
approved cryptography. It is designed to easily fit into a variety of network configurations
supporting multiple modes of operation including bulk, tunnel and Virtual LAN (VLAN).
The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet comprises a 1’U’ 19 inch rack-mountable tamper-proof metal
enclosure with internal AC and DC power options. With the exception of the mains power
connection, all interfaces are located in the front panel for easy access. In addition to RJ-45 Host
1
This document is non-proprietary and may be reproduced freely in its entirety but not modified or used for
purposes other than that intended.
DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET
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and Network interfaces, dual serial and Ethernet management connections are provided along
with Light Emitting Diode (LEDs) status indicators.
Figure 1-1 shows a typical Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet configuration where 2 LANs are securely
linked across a public domain Ethernet network in PP licensed mode and Figure 1-2 a MP
licensed mode network configuration.
Modes of Operation
The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet can only operate in a FIPS 140-2 Approved mode (this includes
cryptographic services and bypass services). The modes of operation are detailed below:
 Standby Mode The module transmits/receives no data via either its Host or Network
interfaces on that channel. This mode is automatically entered if the
module detects an error state or at start-up. In Multipoint Mode the
unit is in Standby if it has no valid keys or it is configured into a block
encryption mode. This mode is indicated by the flashing green
Encrypt LED.
 Plain Text Mode2 All data received through the Host interface on that channel is
transmitted through the Network interface as plain text. Similarly, all
data received through the Network interface on that channel is
transmitted through the Host interface with no decryption applied.
This mode should only be used for diagnostic purposes, or if there is
no security risk to the data if it is transferred unencrypted. This mode
is indicated by the solid red Plain LED. The module does not support
an alternating plaintext mode.
 Encrypt Mode All data received through the Host interface on that channel is
encrypted using the transmit Data Encryption Key (DEK) and then
the encrypted data is transmitted through the Network interface.
Similarly, all data received through the Network interface on that
channel is decrypted using the receive DEK and then the decrypted
data is transmitted through the Host interface. This mode is indicated
by the solid green Encrypt LED. Note: transmit and receive DEKs are
identical when Multipoint mode is selected.
The mode of operation is selectable by the Crypto Officer using the Secure Remote Management
facility and the current mode of operation is displayed using both the Front Panel LEDs and the
Secure Remote Management (Element Manager PC) facility. Refer to the User Manual [3] for
further details.
2
This is the bypass mode.
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Figure 1-1 Datacryptor® Ethernet Crypto Module Example Point to Point Network Configuration
Figure 1-2 Datacryptor® Ethernet Crypto Module Example Multipoint Network Configuration
Public Network
Connection
Datacryptor
Ethernet
Datacryptor
Ethernet
Datacryptor
Ethernet
Datacryptor
Ethernet
Physical Ports
The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet use 10/100BASE-T ports for user traffic and 10/100BASE-T
ports for management traffic.
The physical ports are described below in Table 1-1 Physical Ports and Status Indicators:
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Table 1-1 Physical Ports and Status Indicators
Port Description
Network Connects to the public network for send and receiving encrypted
user data and inter-module key exchange data.
Host Connects to the private network for send and receiving plaintext user
data.
RS-232 Connects to a local terminal for initialization of the module and also
allows remote management from the Element Manager application
utilizing the Point-to-Point (PPP) protocol.
Ethernet Allows the remote management of a unit using the Element Manager
application and status report using an SNMP management
application.
Front Panel LEDs Indicates the operational state of the unit, including Alarm state,
Error state, Plain or Encrypt mode and Host and Network line status.
Line Interface LEDs Indicates module present and laser input detected.
Power Power interface supporting customer options of AC or DC and
international power cord standards.
The physical ports are mapped to four logical ports defined by FIPS 140-2 as described below in
Table 1-2 Physical Port to Logical Port Mapping:
Table 1-2 Physical Port to Logical Port Mapping
Logical Interface Description and Mapping to Physical Port
Data Input Host Line Interface
Network Line Interface
Data Output Host Line Interface
Network Line Interface
Control RS-232 Interface
Ethernet Interface
Status RS-232 Interface
Ethernet Interface
Front Panel LEDs
Line Interface LEDs
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User Data Security
The communications channel between two or more Datacryptor® 100M Ethernets is assumed to
be vulnerable and therefore the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet encrypts the entire user data
stream3.
The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet uses public key cryptography for authentication and key
agreement in PP mode4 and symmetric key cryptographic for data confidentiality. The
authentication mechanism employs signed X.509 v3 certificates using the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) for signature verification. In PP and MP licensed mode the Diffie-Hellman
protocol is used to establish a Key Encryption Key (KEK) between modules. Data Encryption
Keys (DEKs), used for encrypting and decrypting data traffic, are derived from the KEK in PP
licensed mode, however in Multipoint Mode DEKs are generated internally in the central units from
its RNG and are transmitted to remote units wrapped with the KEK. Multipoint licensed Mode uses
the GCM cryptographic mode to provide authentication between communicating units on the
network data path.
Random Number Generation
The Random Number Generator consists of a hardware random number source which provides a
seed key to a FIPS 186-2 Appendix 3.1 [2] Approved pseudo random number generator.
The RNG is used in the generation of private and secret keys including Diffie-Hellman
static/ephemeral and Data Encryption Keys in PP mode and for central unit DEK generation in MP
mode.
Algorithm Support
The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet contains the following algorithms:
 AES-256 for data encryption
 AES-256KW used for key wrapping (MP mode only)
 AES-256 GCM mode (MP mode only)
 DSA for signature verification
 SHA-1 hashing algorithm
 Diffie-Hellman for key agreement
Physical Security
The multi-chip standalone embodiment of the circuitry within the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet is
contained within a strong metal production-grade enclosure that is opaque within the visible
spectrum to meet the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 3. The enclosure completely covers the
module to restrict unauthorized physical access to the module. The physical security includes
measures to provide tamper evidence, tamper detection and response. In the case of tamper
3
Providing the modules are configured to operate in Encrypt mode.
4
This key agreement method provides 80-bits of encryption strength.
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response all sensitive information stored within the module is zeroised.
The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet’s cryptographic boundary (FIPS 140-2 [1], section 2.1) is the
physical extent of its enclosure.
Secure Remote Management
The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet may be remotely and securely managed using the Element
Manager.
The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet can also be managed (for status only) using an SNMP v1 or v2c
management application. Only one management session is permitted at a time with a
Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet.
Diagnostics
A variety of diagnostics are available to maintain secure operation. These diagnostics include
cryptographic mechanisms, critical functions and environmental monitoring. In addition the module
supports a local loop-back mode to aid in diagnosing network connectivity. Log files are
maintained in the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet and can be viewed or printed.
If the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet is faulty, as indicated by the failure of a self-test diagnostic, it
will render itself inoperable until the fault is rectified.
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 Power-Up Tests On power-up Known Answer Tests (KAT) are performed on all
cryptographic algorithms and on the Pseudo Random Number Generator. In addition the
integrity of all firmware is checked.
Table 1-3 Power-Up Tests
Function Checked Description PP Mode MP Mode
DSA (CA Algorithm) KAT Test X X
AES-256-S/W (KEK
Algorithm)
KAT Test X X
AES-256 –H/W (traffic
Encrypt/Decrypt
Algorithm )
KAT Test X
AES-256 – S/W, wrap
mode (DEK wrapping)
DEK Wrap Test X
AES-256 GCM (MP
authenticated Traffic
Encrypt/Decrypt
Algorithm)
KAT Test X
SHA-1 KAT Test X X
SHA-1 RNG KAT Test X X
Firmware Integrity 16 bit Error Detection
Code (EDC) Checksum
X X
 Conditional Tests
 The output of both the hardware Random Number Generator and the Pseudo Random
Number Generator are checked whenever random data is requested by the module.
Subsequent random numbers are compared against the last generated value to verify
that these values are not the same.
 The module also performs a bypass test before entering an encrypted channel mode.
When switching from a plain to an encrypted channel mode, the module issues an
encrypted challenge to its peer using the Data Encryption Key (DEK). The challenge is
then decrypted by the peer using its DEK, and if verified, an encrypted response is
returned to the module (using the DEK). The response is decrypted by the module
(using the DEK) and verified. If successful the channel is established as being in an
encrypted state with matching DEKs in each module.
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 In the case of a firmware upgrade, this is digitally signed by a CA using DSA allowing
the module to verify the image so preventing unauthorized firmware upgrades. After
loading firmware onto this module it may no longer be a FIPS 140-2 validated module
unless the firmware has been FIPS 140-2 validated. This feature is used as an upgrade
path for future FIPS 140-2 approved modules.
Table 1-4 Conditional Tests
Function Checked Description
Hardware RNG CRNG
FIPS186-2 RNG CRNG
Bypass Bypass Test
Firmware Upgrade Authentication Verify (DSA)
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2. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY
The two roles associated with the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet are:
Crypto-Officer Commissioning and configuration of the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet.
User This role occurs when two Datacryptor® 100M Ethernets are communicating
with each other.
The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet does not support multiple concurrent roles.
2.1 Crypto-Officer Role
The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet can be managed by the Crypto-Officer using either of the
following two methods:
 Element Manager - This PC-based software application enables a Crypto-Officer to
commission and administer the module.
 SNMP Management Station - This is limited to requesting and obtaining status
information from the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet.
The Crypto-Officer role utilizes the Element Manager to commission and configure the module via
the dedicated Ethernet or serial management port.
Commissioning a module installs a X.509 certificate (containing the CA public key, certificate
name, unit serial number and certificate life time) and the required Diffie Hellman parameters
(base and modulus) to allow the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet to generate a corresponding Diffie
Hellman key set. This information is digital signed allowing the unit to authenticate the certificate’s
signature using the issuing CA Public key held within the module. The module must be
commissioned before it may be administered.
When administering the module the Element Manager establishes a secure connection
(connection authentication and data confidentiality) to the module. This connection is established
and protected in the same manner as a module to module connection. To establish the secure
connection the Crypto-Officer uses a removable media key-material set containing the Crypto-
Officer’s name and access rights, Diffie-Hellman key set and own certificate. To access the key-
material set the Crypto-Officer must login to the Element Manager by presenting the key-material
set and the Crypto-Officer’s own password of at least 8 ASCII printable characters. This allows the
Element Manager to verify the identity of a Crypto-Officer before establishing a secure connection
using the key material set.
2.2 User Role
The Crypto-Officer can download one or more signed X.509 User Certificates to the Datacryptor®
100M Ethernet. Each User Certificate gives a Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet an identity.
Identity-based authentication is implemented between two communicating Datacryptor® 100M
Ethernets. The modules are then operating in the User role. This identity can be authenticated to
another module which verifies the User Certificate’s signature using the issuing CA Public key held
within the module.
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If the issuing CA Public key is not held within the authenticating module then verification cannot be
undertaken. Therefore no communications channel can be established between the two
Datacryptor® 100M Ethernets.
2.3 Authentication
The types and strengths of authentication for each Role identified for the Datacryptor® 100M
Ethernet are given in Table 2-1 and Table 2-2 below.
Table 2-1 Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
Role Type of Authentication Authentication Data
Crypto-Officer Identity based Signed X.509 Digital Certificate
User Identity based Signed X.509 Digital Certificate
The identity of each entity performing a role that requires authentication is held within the X.509
Digital Certificate allowing the identity and authorization of the operator to be validated by
checking the signature (DSA) of the certificate.
Table 2-2 Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms
Authentication
Mechanism
Strength of Mechanism
Signed X.509
Digital Certificate
The strength depends upon the size of the private key space. The
Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet uses DSA, which is a FIPS Approved algorithm.
Therefore the probability of successfully guessing the private key (160 bits),
and hence correctly signing an X.509 certificate, is significantly less than one in
1,000,000 (2160).
Multiple attempts to use the authentication mechanism during a one-minute
period do not constitute a threat for secure operation of the Datacryptor® 100M
Ethernet. This is because each attempt requires the Datacryptor® 100M
Ethernet to check the signature on the certificate that is to be loaded. Therefore
the total number of attempts that can be made in a one-minute period will be
limited by the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet signature verification and response
operation, which takes on average approximately 30 seconds. The majority of
this time is accounted for by the communications overheads since the signature
checking operation within the module is relatively fast.
Given the very large size (160 bits) of the private key space used by the FIPS
Approved signature algorithm (DSA) loaded in the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet
it follows that the probability that an intruder will be able to guess the private
key, and thereby gain authentication, by making multiple attempts is
significantly less than one in 100,000 (2160 / 2).
There is no feedback of authentication data to the Crypto-Officer or User that
might serve to weaken the authentication mechanism.
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3. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY
3.1 Roles and Services
Table 3-1 Services Authorized for Crypto Officer lists the authorized services available for each
role within the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet. All services require authentication to the module.
For further details of each operation refer to the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet User Guide [3].
Table 3-1 Services Authorized for Crypto Officer
Service Description Input Output Access
Access module Login/logout of the
module
password, crypto
officer public
key, crypto
officer certificate
Command
response
Peer Module Certificate - read
Manage Key Material Loads module’s key
material, deletes
module’s key material
module public
key, module
certificate
Command
response
CA Public Key – read/write,
Module Certificate – read/write
General Configuration Display/edit module’s
name, description, time
and interface settings.
Commands and
parameters
Command
response
None
Diagnostics Reboot or erase key
material. Configure
loopback mode
Commands and
parameters
Command
response
None
IP Management Display/edit module’s
ports, Ethernet and
serial, configuration.
Commands and
parameters
Command
response
None
SNMP Display/edit general
information, SNMP
version, SNMP
communities and
SNMP traps.
Commands and
parameters
Command
response
None
IP Routes Display/edit IP routing
information
Commands and
parameters
Command
response
None
Security Display/edit key
lifetimes, and general
key exchange
parameters
Commands and
parameters
Command
response;
key
exchange if
forced.
Key Encryption Key – write
(delete), Data Encryption Key –
write (delete)
RIP Display/edit RIP version
and RIP password
Commands and
parameters
Command
response
None
Communications Display/edit Ethernet
mode (bulk, tunneling),
interface mode
Multipoint/Point-to-Point
mode
Commands and
parameters
Command
response
None
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Service Description Input Output Access
Encryption Display current
connection mode - one
of standby, plain or
encrypt and ping the
connected unit.
Commands and
parameters
Command
response,
ping packet
to
connected
peer.
None
Tunneling
(not applicable to MP
mode)
Display own MAC
address, display/edit
peer MAC address,
filter rules, VLAN
identification and
fragmentation size.
Commands and
parameters
Command
response
Environment Display fan speed, and
module temperature.
Commands and
parameters
Command
response.
None
License Display/edit currently
loaded license file for
the Datacryptor
module.
License file Command
response
None
Show Status View status of the
module.
None
Commands and
parameters
Front Panel
LEDs Status
Indicators
Status
information
over
Element
Manager or
SNMP
Traps
None
Operator Callable Self-
Test
Module performs self-
test
Reboot Module Front Panel
LEDs Status
Indicators
None
Plaintext Enable module to
perform bypass.
Commands and
parameters.
Bypass test
pass or fail
indicated by
Front Panel
Status LEDs
None
Table 3-2 Services Authorized for User
Service Description Input Output Accessed
Encrypt Encrypt data received
from the Host interface
and transmit on the
Network interface.
User traffic
(plain)
User traffic
(encrypted)
DEK – read
Decrypt Decrypt data received
from the Network
interface and transmit
on the Host interface.
User traffic
(encrypted)
User traffic
(plain)
DEK - read
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3.2 Cryptographic Keys, CSPs and Access Rights
The cryptographic keys and CSPs stored in the Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet module are listed in
Table 3-3.
All private and secret keys (Diffie-Hellman, KEKs and DEKs) are generated internally in the
module and may not be either loaded or read by the Crypto Officer or User.
Table 3-3 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Common to PP and MP
Keys/CSPs Description Key/CSP
Type
and Size
Generated/
Established
Stored Zeroised
Master Key Encrypts all non-volatile
Keys and CSPs stored on
the module
AES
(256 bits)
At start-up if not
present using the
module’s hardware
random number
generator and an
approved RNG (cert#
588).
SRAM
battery
Backed
(plaintext)
On tamper
detect or by
user.
CA Public Key The public key of the CA
key pair use to verify
subsequent key material
loaded into the module.
DSA
(1024 bits)
Generated external
and loaded as part of
the commissioning
process.
Non-volatile
memory –
Compact
Flash
(encrypted)
When the key is
deleted or
replace by a
subsequent key.
Own Module
Certificate/Diffie-
Hellman Static Key
Pair
An X.509 certificate
containing the module
name, Diffie-Hellman static
public key (the static private
key is stored separately)
and associated parameters.
Diffie-
Hellman
(1024 bits)
The Diffie-Hellman
static key pair is
generated locally by
the module, using the
module’s hardware
random number
generator and an
approved RNG
(cert#588) from the
parameters supplied
during the
commissioning
process. The module
name and Diffie-
Hellman static public
key is then exported
to be signed by
issuing CA so forming
the module certificate.
Own Module
Certificate
Non-volatile
memory –
Compact
Flash
(encrypted)
Diffie-
Hellman
static private
key – Non-
volatile
memory –
FRAM
(encrypted)
When the
certificate is
deleted or
replaced by a
subsequent
certificate.
The Diffie-
Hellman static
private key may
deleted by a
user.
Diffie-Hellman
Ephemeral Key
Pair
The Diffie-Hellman
ephemeral key pair.
Diffie-
Hellman
(1024 bits)
The Diffie-Hellman
ephemeral key pair is
generated locally by
the module, using the
module’s hardware
random number
generator and an
approved RNG
(cert#588) from the
parameters supplied
during the
commissioning
process. This key pair
Volatile
memory -
SRAM
(encrypted)
Zeroised when a
new link is
established.
DATACRYPTOR® 100M ETHERNET
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Keys/CSPs Description Key/CSP
Type
and Size
Generated/
Established
Stored Zeroised
is used in conjunction
with the static key pair
to establish the KEK.
Peer Module
Certificate/ Diffie-
Hellman Static
Public Key
Received during link
establishment between two
modules to allow
authentication of the peer
module using signature
verification (DSA).
Diffie-
Hellman
(1024 bits)
Generated by peer in
the same manner as
Own Module
Certificate.
Non-Volatile
memory –
Compact
Flash
(encrypted)
Zeroised when a
new link is
established.
Seed Key Used by the Approved RNG RNG Seed
Key
(256 bits)
Generated via internal
hardware RNG
Not stored. Zeroised when a
subsequent seed
key is generated
and the CRNG
comparison is
successful.
Note: A Thales e-Security public key is embedded within the firmware which is used to verify the
integrity of the firmware during module startup.
Table 3-4 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs PP Mode Specific
Keys/CSPs Description KEY/CSP
Type and
Size
Generated/
Established
Stored Zeroised
Data Encryption
Keys (DEKs)
A pair of keys (one for
transmit and one for
receive) used for
encryption and decryption
of line data.
AES
(256 bits)
Generated during link
establishment using
AES (KEK), DEKDD
and XOR operations.
Volatile
memory –
BRAM &
FRAM
(up to three
stored with
CRC
integrity
protection)
Zeroised when a
new link is
established or
when a new
DEK is
generated at a
user defined
time interval.
Data Encryption
Key Derivation
Data (DEKDD)
Random data used to
derive data encryption keys
in conjunction with KEK
256 bits Generated during
DEK derivation using
the module’s
hardware random
number generator
and an approved
RNG (cert# 588).
Not stored. N/A
Key Encryption
Key (KEK)
Key used to derive data
encryption keys in
conjunction with DEKID
AES
(256 bits)
Established during
link establishment
with Diffie-Hellman
using the static and
ephemeral key pairs.
Volatile
memory –
BRAM
(encrypted)
Zeroised when a
new link is
established or
when a new KEK
is generated at a
user defined
time interval.
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Table 3-5 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs MP Mode Specific
Keys/CSPs Description KEY/CSP
Type and
Size
Generated/
Established
Stored Zeroised
Data Encryption
Keys (DEKs)
A key used for encryption
and decryption of line data.
In MP mode the same DEK
is used for encrypt and
decrypt.
In MP mode every central
to remote unit link utilizes
the same DEK.
AES
(256 bits)
Generated using the
RNG.
Volatile
memory –
BRAM &
FRAM
(up to three
stored with
CRC
integrity
protection)
Zeroised when a
new link is
established or
when a new
DEK is
requested at a
user defined
time interval.
Key Encryption
Key (KEK)
Key used by the Central
unit to wrap data encryption
keys to send to remote
units, unique to each
central unit to remote link.
AES
(256 bits)
Established during
link establishment
with Diffie-Hellman
using the static and
ephemeral key pairs.
Volatile
memory –
BRAM
(encrypted)
Zeroised when a
new link is
established or
when a new KEK
is generated at a
user defined
time interval.
3.3 Zeroisation
The Crypto Officer can zeroise keys through the Element Manager application. As indicated in the
table above, the Crypto Officer has the choice to directly delete keys, establish a new link with
another peer module or force the module to generate new keys. Keys that are not zeroised are
encrypted by the master key. The module zeroises the master key when the tamper response and
zeroisation circuitry responds to an intrusion of the enclosure which renders all other keys
indecipherable.
3.4 Other Security-Relevant Information
FIPS Approved Mode of Operation
The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet only operates in an Approved mode and does not support any
unapproved modes of operation.
1. FIPS 140-2 Approved and Certified
 SHA-1 (FIPS Certificate #985)
 DSA (FIPS Certificate #349)
 FIPS 186-2 (FIPS Certificate #588).
 AES-256 (FIPS Certificate #1033 and 1549)
 AES-256 GCM Mode (FIPS Certificate #1490)
2. Non-Approved Allowed
 Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 80 bits of
encryption strength) Note, in MP mode used for initial KEK derivation for DEK
distribution only. In PP used for DEK derivation.
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 Hardware RNG for generating seed key for Approved RNG
Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet FPGA Details
The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet cryptographic module utilizes a Xilinx Virtex 4 XC4FX40 FPGA.
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4. PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY
The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet is a multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module consisting of
production-grade components to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 3.
The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet is protected by a strong metal production-grade enclosure that is
opaque within the visible spectrum with tamper evident labels (highlighted in red) and tamper
response mechanisms. Attempts to access the module without removing the cover will cause
visible physical damage to the module and/or tamper evident labels.
The module’s ventilation holes on the sides and back on the enclosure are fitted with baffles to
prevent physical probing of the enclosure.
The module has a removable top cover which is protected by tamper response circuitry, which
zeroises all plaintext CSPs. Access to the internal components of the module requires that these
covers are removed.
The module's cryptographic boundary (FIPS 140-2 [1], section 2.1) is the physical extent of its
external casing.
4.1 Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms
The following guidelines should be considered when producing a Security Policy for the network in
which the module is deployed.
The Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet should be periodically checked for evidence of tampering, in
particular damage to the tamper evident labels as these are part of the security of the unit. In
addition the audit logs should be checked for activation of the tamper response mechanism.
The frequency of a physical inspection depends on the information being protected and the
environment in which the unit is located. At a minimum it would be expected that a physical
inspection would be made at least monthly and audit logs daily.
4.1.1 1600X439, Rev. 01 Hardware
Figure 4-1 1600X439, Rev. 01 Front
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Figure 4-2 1600X439, Rev. 01 AC and DC Rear
Figure 4-3 1600x439, Rev. 01 Top
The tamper evident labels shall only be applied at the Thales facility. Tamper evident labels are
not available for order or replacement from Thales.
Two undamaged tamper evident labels must be visible for the module to be operated in a FIPS
approved mode of operation. They shall be in the positions shown (see Figure 4-1), one on the left
side of the front panel (position 1) and one on the right side of the front panel (position 2)
4.1.2 1600X439, Rev. 02 Hardware
Figure 4-4 1600X439, Rev. 02 Front
3
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Figure 4-5 1600X439, Rev. 02 AC and DC Rear
Figure 4-6 1600X439, Rev. 02 Top
The tamper evident labels shall only be applied at the Thales facility. Tamper evident labels are
not available for order or replacement from Thales.
Three undamaged tamper evident labels must be visible for the module to be operated in a FIPS
approved mode of operation. They shall be in the positions shown (see Figure 4-4), one on the left
side of the front panel (position 1), one on the right side of the front panel (position 2) and one in
the middle of the front panel (position 3).
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5. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY
None.
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI American National Standards Institute
CA Certification Authority
CTS Cipher Text Stealing
DEK Data Encryption Key
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
EDC Error Detection Code
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
GCM Galois Counter Mode
ITU International Telecommunications Union
KAT Know Answer Test
KEK Key Encryption Key
LAN Local Area Network
MAC Media Access Control
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
PPP Point-to-Point
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
PSU Power Supply Unit
RIP Routing Information Protocol
RNG Random Number Generator
SDH Synchronous Digital Hierarchy
SHA-1 Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
VLAN Virtual LAN
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REFERENCES
1. FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication, 25th May 2001.
Including Change Notices 2,3,4: 12/03/2002
Available from the NIST web site: http://www.nist.gov/cmvp
2. FIPS 186-2 Digital Signature Standard, Federal Information Processing
Standards Publication, 27th January 2000. Including Change Notice 1: 5th
October 2001.
Available from the NIST web site: http://www.nist.gov/cmvp
3. Datacryptor® 100M Ethernet User Manual, 1270A450, Issue 8 May 2010.
Available from Thales e-Security.
4. AES Keywrap Specification November 2001, NIST
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