© 2021 Senetas Corporation Ltd. All rights reserved. SP-CN6000 v1.12
Once released this document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
www.senetas.com
Senetas Corporation Ltd, distributed by Thales SA (SafeNet)
CN6000 Series Encryptors
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Level 3 Validation
April 2021
Module Name(s): CN6000 Series Encryptors
Model Names: CN6040 1G Encryptor,
CN6100 10G Encryptor
Module Version: CN6000 Series:
A6040B (AC), A6041B (DC), A6042B (AC/DC)
A6100B (AC), A6101B (DC), A6102B (AC/DC)
CN6040 1G Encryptor
CN6100 10G Encryptor
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 2 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Table of Contents
1. Introduction............................................................................................................................................................3
1.1 References .....................................................................................................................................................3
1.2 Document History...........................................................................................................................................4
1.3 Acronyms and Abbreviations .........................................................................................................................4
2. Product Description ...............................................................................................................................................7
2.1 Module Identification ......................................................................................................................................8
2.2 Operational Overview.....................................................................................................................................9
2.2.1 General ...................................................................................................................................................9
2.2.2 Encryptor deployment ...........................................................................................................................11
2.2.3 Encryptor management.........................................................................................................................11
2.2.4 Ethernet implementation .......................................................................................................................12
3. Module Ports and Interfaces................................................................................................................................15
3.1 CN6000 Series Ports....................................................................................................................................15
3.2 CN6000 Series Interfaces ............................................................................................................................18
4. Administrative Roles, Services and Authentication.............................................................................................22
4.1 Identification and Authentication ..................................................................................................................23
4.2 Roles and Services ......................................................................................................................................24
5. Physical Security .................................................................................................................................................28
6. Cryptographic Key Management.........................................................................................................................30
6.1 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs.....................................................................................................................30
6.2 Key and CSP zeroization .............................................................................................................................45
6.2.1 Zeroization sequence............................................................................................................................45
6.2.2 Erase command and key press sequence............................................................................................45
6.2.3 Approved mode of operation.................................................................................................................45
6.2.4 Tamper initiated zeroization..................................................................................................................46
6.2.5 “Emergency” Erase ...............................................................................................................................46
6.2.6 KeySecure Connector integration.........................................................................................................46
6.3 Data privacy .................................................................................................................................................46
6.4 Cryptographic Algorithms.............................................................................................................................47
6.5 Key Derivation Functions .............................................................................................................................50
6.6 Non Approved and Allowed Security Functions...........................................................................................50
7. Self Tests.............................................................................................................................................................53
8. Crypto-Officer and User Guidance ......................................................................................................................56
8.1 Delivery.........................................................................................................................................................57
8.2 Location........................................................................................................................................................57
8.3 Configuration – FIPS140-Approved mode ...................................................................................................57
8.4 Configuration - Non-Approved Mode ...........................................................................................................59
9. Mitigation of Other Attacks ..................................................................................................................................60
9.1 TRANSEC ....................................................................................................................................................60
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 3 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
1. Introduction
This is a non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for the Senetas Corporation Ltd. CN6000 Series Encryptors
comprising both the CN6040 and CN6100 (Firmware version 5.1.1) cryptographic models. This Security Policy
specifies the security rules under which the module operates to meet the FIPS 140-2 Level 3 requirements.
The CN6000 series of Ethernet Encryption devices are distributed worldwide under different brands as depicted in
this Security Policy. The vendor distributes under their Senetas brand and Gemalto NV, the master worldwide
distributor, distributes under the joint SafeNet/Senetas brand.
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2), Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules, specifies the security requirements for a cryptographic module utilized within a security
system protecting sensitive but unclassified information. Based on four security levels for cryptographic modules
this standard identifies requirements in eleven sections. For more information about the NIST/CCCS Cryptographic
Module Validation Program (CMVP) and the FIPS 140-2 standard, visit www.nist.gov/cmvp .
This Security Policy, using the terminology contained in the FIPS 140-2 specification, describes how the CN6040
1G Ethernet Encryptor and the CN6100 10G Ethernet Encryptor models comply with the eleven sections of the
standard. In this document, the CN6040 and CN6100 Encryptors are collectively referred to as the “CN6000
Series” and individually as “the module” or “the encryptor”. The model name refers to all of the relevant module
versions i.e. CN6040 refers to the module versions A6040B (AC), A6041B (DC), A6042B (AC/DC) (refer to Table 2
for a full listing).
This Security Policy and the associated CMVP certificate are for firmware version 5.1.1 only – the loading of any
other firmware version on the specified CN6000 Series Ethernet Encryption devices is out of scope of this FIPS
140-2 validation.
This Security Policy contains only non-proprietary information. Any other documentation associated with FIPS 140-
2 conformance testing and validation is proprietary and confidential to Senetas Corporation Ltd. and is releasable
only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For more information describing the CN6000 Series systems,
visit http://www.senetas.com.
1.1 References
For more information on the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program please refer to the National Institute of
Standards and Technology website at www.nist.gov/cmvp.
The following standards from NIST are all available via the URL: www.nist.gov/cmvp .
[1] FIPS PUB 140-2: Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules.
[2] FIPS 140-2 Annex A: Approved Security Functions.
[3] FIPS 140-2 Annex B: Approved Protection Profiles.
[4] FIPS 140-2 Annex C: Approved Random Number Generators.
[5] FIPS 140-2 Annex D: Approved Key Establishment.
[6] NIST Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program
[7] Derived Test Requirements (DTR) for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules.
[8] Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197.
[9] Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
186-2.
[10] Secure Hash Standard (SHS), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4.
[11] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-131A, Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of
Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths.
[12] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-90A, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
Deterministic Random Bit GeneratorsNIST.
[13] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-56A Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography.
[14] Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
186-4.
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 4 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
[15] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-56B, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes
Using Integer Factorization Cryptography.
[16] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-108 Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom
Functions
1.2 Document History
Authors Date Version Comment
Senetas Corp. Ltd. 15-Jul-2018 1.00 Initial version for v5.0.1 firmware release
Senetas Corp. Ltd. 24-Jun-2019 1.01 Changes to address CSC comments
Senetas Corp. Ltd. 17-Jan-2020 1.10 Initial version for 5.1.0 firmware release
Senetas Corp. Ltd. 06-Jan-2021 1.11 Changes to address CMVP comments
Senetas Corp. Ltd. 07-Apr-2021 1.12 Changes to address CMVP comments
1.3 Acronyms and Abbreviations
AAA Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CA Certification Authority
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
CFB Cipher Feedback
CM7 Senetas Encryptor Remote Management Application Software
CI Connection Identifier (used interchangeably with Tunnel)
CLI Command Line Interface
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CRNGT Continuous Random Number Generator Test
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter Mode
DEK Data Encrypting Key(s)
DES Data Encryption Standard
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FTP File Transfer Protocol
FTPS FTP Secure (FTP Over TLS)
Gbps Gigabits per second
GCM Galois Counter Mode
GDK Group Derivation Key
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 5 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
GEK Group Establishment Key
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
IP Internet Protocol
ISID Individual Service Identifier
IV Initialization Vector
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
KDK Key Derivation Key
KID Key ID
KEK Key Encrypting Key(s)
KMIP Key Management Interoperability Protocol
KMS Key Management Service
LED Light Emitting Diode
MAC Media Access Control (Ethernet source/destination address)
Mbps Megabits per second
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NTU Network Termination Unit
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
OAEP Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards
PUB Publication
RAM Random Access Memory
RFC Request for Comment
ROM Read Only Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest Shamir and Adleman Public Key Algorithm
RTC Real Time Clock
SAN Storage Area Network
SDRAM Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory
SFP Small Form-factor Pluggable (transceiver)
SFTP SSH File Transfer Protocol
SID Sender ID
SMC Gemalto’s Network Security Management Center
SME Secure Message Exchange
SMK System Master Key
SP Special Publication
SPB Shortest Path Bridging
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSH Secure Shell
TACACS+ Terminal Access Control Access Control Server
TLS Transport Layer Security
TRANSEC TRANsmission SECurity (also known as Traffic Flow Security or TFS)
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 6 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
X.509 Digital Certificate Standard RFC 2459
XFP 10 Gigabit Small Form Factor Pluggable (transceiver)
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 7 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
2. Product Description
CN6000 Series Encryptors are multiple-chip standalone cryptographic modules consisting of production-grade
components contained, in accordance with FIPS 140-2 Level 3, in a physically protected enclosure. The module’s
outer casing defines the cryptographic boundary aside from the pluggable transceivers (XFP and SFP), dual
redundant power supplies and replaceable fan tray module that lie outside the crypto boundary. All ventilation holes
are protected by steel anti-probing barriers. The encryptor is completely enclosed in a metal case which is
protected from tampering by internal tamper protection circuitry and external tamper evident seals. Any attempt to
remove the cover automatically erases all sensitive information stored internally in the cryptographic module.
The module meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 3 security for FIPS 140-2.
Table 1 Module Compliance Table
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 3
Roles and Services and Authentication 3
Finite State Machine Model 3
Physical Security 3
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 3
EMI/EMC 3
Self-Tests 3
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks 3
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 8 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
2.1 Module Identification
CN6000 Series Encryptors, with firmware version 5.1.1, provide data privacy and access control services for
Ethernet networks. See model details summarized in Table 2.
Data privacy is provided by a FIPS approved AES algorithm. The complete list of approved module algorithms is
included in the Approved Security Function table.
Table 2 CN6000 Models: Hardware/Firmware Versions
Hardware
Versions
Power Interface / Protocol
(Cryptographic Module)
Model Name Firmware Version
A6040B [O]1,2
A6040B [Y]1,2
A6040B [T]1,2
AC
CN6040
A6041B [O]1,2
A6041B [Y]1,2
A6041B [T]1,2
DC 1G Ethernet 5.1.1
A6042B [O]1,2
A6042B [Y]1,2
A6042B [T]1,2
AC/DC
A6100B [O]1,3
A6100B [Y]1,3
A6100B [T]1,3
AC
CN6100 5.1.1
A6101B [O]1,3
A6101B [Y]1,3
A6101B [T]1,3
DC 10G Ethernet
A6102B [O]1,3
A6102B [Y]1,3
A6102B [T]1,3
AC/DC
Table Notes:
Note 1: Model variants distinguished by [O], [Y] and [T] are identical except for logos on the front
fascia:
[O] Denotes Senetas Corp. Ltd. sole branded version
[Y] Denotes Senetas Corp. Ltd. & SafeNet co-branded version
[T] Denotes Senetas Corp. Ltd. & Thales SA co-branded version
Note 2: These models support pluggable SFP transceivers, dual power supplies and removable
fan tray which are considered to be outside the cryptographic boundary.
Note 3: These models support pluggable XFP transceivers, dual power supplies and removable
fan tray which are considered to be outside the cryptographic boundary.
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 9 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Figure 1 - Thales co-branding
Figure 2 – SafeNet co-branding
Figure 3 – Senetas sole-branding
2.2 Operational Overview
2.2.1 General
CN6000 Series Encryptors operate in point-to-point and point-to-multipoint network topologies and at data rates
ranging from 10Mb/s to 10Gb/s.
Encryptors are typically installed between an operator’s private network equipment and public network connection
and are used to secure data travelling over either fibre optic or CAT5/6 cables.
Securing a data link that connects two remote office sites is a common installation application.
Figure 4 provides an operational overview of two CN6040 encryptors positioned in the network.
Figure 4 – CN6040 Operational Overview
Devices establish one or more encrypted data paths referred to as `connections`. The term refers to a connection
that has been securely established and is processing data according to a defined encryption policy. Each
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 10 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
`connection` has a `connection identifier` (CI) and associated CI mode that defines how data is processed for each
policy. Connections are interchangeably referred to as ‘tunnels’.
CN6000 Series Encryptors support CI Modes of ‘Secure’, ‘Discard’ and ‘Bypass’. These CI Modes can be applied
to all data carried on a connection or to a selected subset or grouping which can be user configured in accordance
the specific protocol being carried on the network connection. A typical example in the case of an Ethernet network
would be to make policy decisions based upon an Ethernet packet’s VLAN ID.
The default CI Mode negotiated between a pair of connected encryptors is `Discard`. In this mode user data is not
transmitted to the public network.
In order to enter `Secure` mode and pass information securely, each encryptor must be `Certified` by the same
trusted body and exchange the key encrypting key (KEK) and initial data encryption key (DEK), using the RSA-
OAEP-256 key transport process in accordance with NIST SP800-56B Section 9. Alternatively, ECDSA/ECDH
utilises ephemeral key agreement for the purpose of establishing DEKs in accordance with NIST SP800-56A. If the
session key exchange is successful this results in a separate secure session per connection, without the need for
secret session keys (DEKs) to be displayed or manually transported and installed.
Figure 5. illustrates the conceptual data flow through a CN6000 Series Encryptor.
1. A data packet arrives at the encryptor’s interface ports. When operating in Line mode data packets are
processed according to a single CI policy, otherwise,
2. The encryptor looks up the appropriate packet header field, e.g. MAC address, VLAN ID or ISID and
determines whether the field has been associated with an existing CI,
3. If a match is found, the encryptor will process the data packet according to the policy setting for that CI and
send the data out the opposite port. If a match cannot be found, the data packet is processed according to
the default policy setting.
Figure 5 - Data Flow through the Encryptor
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 11 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
2.2.2 Encryptor deployment
Figure 6 illustrates a point-to-point (or link) configuration in which each module connects with a single far end
module and encrypts the entire bit stream. If a location maintains secure connections with multiple remote facilities,
it will need a separate pair of encryptor’s for each physical connection (link).
Figure 6 - Link (point to point) Configuration
Figure 7 illustrates a meshed network configuration.. Each CN6000 Series Encryptor is able to maintain
simultaneous secured connections with many far end encryptors.
Figure 7 - Meshed (multipoint) Configuration
2.2.3 Encryptor management
Encryptors can be centrally controlled or managed across local and remote stations using the CM7 or SMC remote
management application. The remote management applications reside outside the cryptographic boundary and are
not in the scope of the FIPS validation. Encryptors support both in-band and out-of-band SNMPv3 management. In-
band management interleaves management messages with user data on the encryptor’s network interface port
whilst out-of-band management uses the dedicated front panel Ethernet port. A Command Line Interface (CLI) is
also available via the console RS-232 port. Alternatively the CLI can be accessed remotely via SSH (when
configured). When configuring remote CLI access the authentication algorithm is restricted to RSA and ECDSA.
RSA Keys must be a minimum of 2048 bits and ECDSA keys are restricted to NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521
curves. Remote CLI access is disabled by default.
FIPS-Approved mode of operation enforces the use of SNMPv3 privacy and authentication. Management
messages are encrypted using AES-128. Non-Approved mode allows message privacy to be disabled in order to
interwork with 3rd
party legacy management applications.
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 12 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
2.2.4 Ethernet implementation
Basic operation
The Ethernet encryptor provides layer 2 security services by encrypting the contents of data frames across
Ethernet networks. The encryptor connects between a local (protected) network and a remote (protected) network
across the public (unprotected) network. An encryptor is paired with one or more remote Ethernet encryptors to
provide secure data transfer over encrypted connections as shown in Figure 8 below.
Figure 8 – Layer 2 Ethernet connections
The encryptor’s Ethernet receiver receives frames on its ingress port; valid frames are classified according to the
Ethernet header then processed according to the configured policy.
Allowable policy actions are:
 Encrypt – payload of frame is encrypted according to the defined policy
 Discard – drop the frame, no portion is transmitted
 Bypass – transmit the frame without alteration
CN6000 Series tunnels are encrypted using CAVP validated AES algorithms. The CN6040 1G Ethernet encryptors
support AES encryption with a key size of 128 or 256 bits in cipher feedback (CFB), counter (CTR) and Galois
Counter (GCM) modes. The CN6100 10G Ethernet encryptors support AES encryption with a key size of 128 or
256 bits in counter (CTR) and Galois Counter (GCM) modes.
Connections between encryptors use a unique key pair with a separate key for each direction. Unicast traffic can
be encrypted using AES CFB, CTR or GCM modes whereas Multicast/VLAN/ISID traffic in a meshed network must
use AES CTR or GCM modes.
The Ethernet transmitter module calculates and inserts the Frame Check Sequence (FCS) at the end of the frame.
The frame is then encoded and transmitted. For details about Unicast and Multicast network topologies supported
by the modules see next section.
Unicast operation
Unicast traffic is encrypted using a key pair for each of the established connections.
When operating in line mode there is just one entry in the connection table. When operating in multipoint mode,
connection table entries are managed by MAC address or VLAN ID and can be added manually, or if ‘Auto
discovery’ is enabled, they will be automatically added based on the observed traffic. Entries do not age and will
remain in the table.
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 13 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Multipoint VLAN operation
Multicast traffic between encryptors connected in line mode shares the same single key pair that is used by unicast
traffic.
VLAN encryption mode is used to encrypt traffic sent to all encryptors on a VLAN. Unlike unicast encryption (which
encrypts traffic from a single sender to a single receiver and uses a unique pair of keys per encrypted connection),
VLAN encryption within a multipoint network requires a group key management infrastructure to ensure that each
encryptor can share a set of encryption keys per VLAN ID. The group key management scheme which is used for
VLAN mode is responsible for ensuring group keys are maintained across the visible network.
The group key management scheme is designed to be secure, dynamic and robust; with an ability to survive
network outages and topology changes automatically. It does not rely on an external key server to distribute group
keys as this introduces both a single point of failure and a single point of compromise.
For robustness and security a group key master is automatically elected amongst the visible encryptors within a
mesh based on the actual traffic.
If communications problems segment the network, the group key management scheme will automatically
maintain/establish new group key managers within each segment.
Figure 9 – Multipoint VLAN connections
TRANSEC operation
Traffic Analysis is the process of intercepting and examining messages in order to deduce information from
patterns in communication. TRANSEC is TRANsmission SECurity and is used to disguise patterns in network traffic
to prevent Traffic Analysis. TRANSEC mode can be optionally enabled between two end points of a point-point
rate-limited layer 2 service provider network.
When operating in TRANSEC mode transport frames exit the network port at a constant rate irrespective of the rate
at which user data arrives at local port. This ensures that Traffic Analysis, if performed, would generate no useful
insight into the user data. The transport frame rate and length are user configurable. AES encryption protects the
user data and when operating in GCM encryption mode provides the additional guarantee of data authentication.
TRANSEC mode coupled with AES-256 GCM provides triple layer protection of user data.
Figure 10 – TRANSEC constant rate transport frame assembly
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 14 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 15 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
3. Module Ports and Interfaces
3.1 CN6000 Series Ports
The CN6000 Series data and management ports are located on the encryptor’s front panel.
The encryptor data ports include a Local Port which connects to the physically secure private network and the
Network Port which connects to an unsecured public network.
In the case of the CN6040 operating in Ethernet encryption mode, the operator can select either the RJ45 electrical
or SFP optical physical interface to connect to the network.
The encryptor user access management ports, LCD display and Keypad are located on the front of the module as
presented in Figure 11.
The CN6040 models are depicted below in Figure 11 and Figure 12.
Serial console
USB
Ethernet ports
System LEDs (4)
Keypad
LCD
Local & Network ports
Emergency Erase button
RJ45 SFP SFP RJ45
Port LEDs (2)x4
Figure 11 - Front View of the CN6040 [Y] Encryptor
Serial console
USB
Ethernet ports
System LEDs (4)
Keypad
LCD
Local & Network ports
Emergency Erase button
RJ45 SFP SFP RJ45
Port LEDs (2)x4
Figure 12 - Front View of the CN6040 [O] Encryptor
The CN6100 models are depicted below in
Figure 13 and
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 16 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Figure 14.
Serial console
USB
Ethernet ports
System LEDs (4)
Keypad
LCD
Local & Network XFP ports
Emergency Erase button
Port LEDs (4)x2
Figure 13 - Front View of the CN6100 [Y] Encryptor
Serial console
USB
Ethernet ports
System LEDs (4)
Keypad
LCD
Local & Network XFP ports
Emergency Erase button
Port LEDs (4)x2
Figure 14 - Front View of the CN6100 [O] Encryptor
CN6000 Series Encryptors support dual redundant power supplies which are available in two variants, an AC
version for typical installs and a DC version for telecoms applications. Any power supply combination i.e. AC/AC,
AC/DC or DC/DC is supported. Details of each can be seen
in Figure 15.
AC Power
receptacle
AC ON/OFF switch
Fan Tray
DC Power
receptacle
Power LED Power LED
Figure 15 - Rear View: CN6000 Series Encryptor pictured with AC & DC supplies installed
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 17 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Figure 16 – A6100B [Y] 10G Ethernet port close-up - XFPs installed
Figure 17 – A6040B [Y] 1G Ethernet ports close-up - SFPs installed
Figure 18 – RJ45 Ethernet, Console and USB close-up
Table 3 defines the Physical Ports.
Table 3 CN6000 Series Physical Ports
Port Location Purpose
RJ-45 Ethernet Front Panel
(LAN)
Allows secure and authenticated remote management
by the selected remote management application.
RJ-45 Ethernet Front Panel
(AUX)
Auxilliary secure and authenticated remote
management by the selected remote management
application.
RJ-45 RS-232
Console
Front Panel The Serial Console port connects to a local terminal
and provides a simple command line interface (CLI)
for initialization prior to authentication and operation in
the approved mode. This port also allows
administrative access and monitoring of operations.
User name and password authentication is required to
access this port.
USB Front Panel The USB port provides a mechanism for applying
approved and properly signed firmware upgrades to
the module.
Keypad Front Panel Allows entry of initialization commands.
LCD Front Panel Displays configuration information in response to
commands entered via the keypad. Also indicates any
operational alarm states.
System LEDs Front Panel Indicate the system state, including secure status,
alarms and power.
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 18 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Port Location Purpose
Port LEDs Front Panel Indicate local and network port status and activity.
Network Port Front Panel The Network Port connects to the public network;
access is protected by X.509 certificates. The Network
Port is of the same interface type as the Local Port.
CN6040 SFP1
and RJ45 sockets
CN6100 XFP2
sockets
Local Port Front Panel The Local Port connects to the private network;
access is protected by X.509 certificates. The Local
Port is of the same interface type as the Network Port.
CN6040 SFP1
and RJ45 sockets
CN6100 XFP2
sockets
Emergency Erase
button
Front Panel The concealed front panel Emergency Erase button
can be activated using a paperclip or similar tool and
will immediately delete the System Master Key. The
Emergency Erase button functions irrespective of the
powered state of the module.
Power Connectors Rear Panel Provides AC and/or DC power to the module
depending upon which power modules have been
installed
Power LEDs Rear Panel Indicates whether power module is ON or OFF.
Note 1: The SFP sockets are the receptacles for the pluggable SFP transceivers.
Note 2: The XFP sockets are the receptacles for the pluggable XFP transceivers.
3.2 CN6000 Series Interfaces
Table 4 summarizes the FIPS 140-2 defined Logical Interfaces.
Table 4 Logical Interfaces
Interface Explanation
Data Input Interface through which data is input to the module.
Data Output Interface by which data is output from the module.
Control Input Interface through which commands are input to configure or control
the operation of the module.
Status Output Interface by which status information is output from the module.
The FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces map to the Physical Ports as outlined in Table 5.
Table 5 FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface to Physical Port Mapping
FIPS 140-2 Logical
Interface
CN6000 Series Interface Physical Port
Data Input Private Network Interface
Public Network Interface
Local Port
Network Port
Data Output Private Network Interface
Public Network Interface
Local Port
Network Port
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 19 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS 140-2 Logical
Interface
CN6000 Series Interface Physical Port
Control Input Local Console
Keypad & Display
Remote Management
Interface
Private Network Interface
Public Network Interface
Emergency Erase button
USB Firmware Upgrade
RJ-45 RS-232 Serial Console
Keypad / LCD
Management RJ-45 Ethernet
Port (LAN)
Local Port
Network Port
Emergency Erase button
USB Port
Status Output Local Console
Keypad & Display
Remote Management
Interface
Private Network Interface
Public Network Interface
LEDs
RJ-45 RS-232 Serial Console
Keypad / LCD
Management RJ-45 Ethernet
Port (LAN)
Local Port
Network Port
Front & Rear LEDs
Power Power Switch Power Connector
CN6000 Series Encryptors support the FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces as outlined in Table 6.
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 20 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Table 6 Interface Support
Logical Interface Support
Data Input &
Data Output
Local Interface:
 Connects to the local (private) network; sends and receives
plaintext user data to and from the local network.
Network Interface:
 Connects to the public network; sends and receives ciphertext
user data, via the public network, to and from a far end
cryptographic module.
 Authenticates with the far end cryptographic module(s); sends
and receives authentication data and RSA or ECDSA/ECDH key
exchange components to and from a far end module.
The module can be set to bypass allowing it to send and receive
plaintext user data for selected connections.
Control Input Control Input is provided by the Local Console, Keypad & Display,
and the Remote Management Interface as follows:
 The Keypad supports module initialization prior to authentication
and operation in the approved mode. A Crypto Officer sets the
IP address for administration by the remote management
application; sets the system clock; and loads, in conjunction with
the remote management application, the module’s certificate.
 As an alternative to using the Keypad, the Local Console may
be used for initialization prior to certification and operation in the
approved mode. The Local Console receives control input from
a locally connected terminal.
 Following initialization and authentication, the remote
management application can communicate with the module to
receive out-of-band control input.
When configured for in-band management, the Private and Public
Network Interfaces may also receive control input. In this mode, the
remote management application sends control input by way of the
Local or Network Port rather than the RJ-45 Ethernet.
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 21 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Logical Interface Support
Status Output Status output is provided by the Keypad & Display, LEDs, Local
Console and the Remote Management Interface as follows:
 The Display presents the Crypto Officer with the command data
being entered via the Keypad. It also indicates the state of the
X.509 certificates.
 The System LEDs indicate the system and tunnel state as well a
combined alarm status covering network and local ports.
 The Port LEDs indicate the state of the local and network
interfaces and the presence of network traffic.
 As an alternative to using the Keypad & Display, the Local
Console may be used for initialization prior to certification and
operation in the approved mode. The Local Console may also
be used for monitoring some operations; status output is sent to
a locally connected terminal.
 Following initialization and authentication, the module sends
out-of-band status output to the remote management
application.
When configured for in-band management, the Private and Public
Network Interfaces may also send status output. In this mode, the
module status output is sent to the remote management application
by way of the Local or Network Port rather than the RJ-45 Ethernet
Port.
The encryptor does permit logically distinct categories of information to share the Local and Network Ports. For
example, when the module is configured to allow in-band management traffic, the control/status information (key
exchange or management commands) and user data enter and exit the module via the Network Interface. The
module separates these two logically distinct categories of information by applying a unique vendor specific
Ethertype and separate subtypes to management packets and key exchange messages.
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 22 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
4. Administrative Roles, Services and Authentication
The cryptographic module supports four administrative privilege levels: Administrator, Supervisor, Operator and
Upgrader. The Administrator role is highest (most unrestricted) privilege level and is authorized to access all
module services. FIPS140-2 defines two operator classes, the Crypto Officer, who is granted access to
management functions and the User who obtains cryptographic services of the module. Crypto Officers would
assume the role of either an Administrator or Supervisor whilst Users can assume the role of an Operator or
Upgrader.
The supported roles are summarized in Table 7.
Table 7 Roles
Operator Class Role
Crypto Officer Administrator: Provides cryptographic initialization and management
functions. Crypto Officer functions are available via the CM7 or SMC
remote management application. Limited functions are also available via
the Console interface.
Supervisor: Provides limited operational management functions.
Functions are available via the remote management application. Limited
functions are also available via the Console interface.
Services for the CO are accessible directly via the Local Console CLI or
remotely via the Remote Management Interface and the remote
management application.
User Restricted to read-only access to module configuration data.
Operator: The Operator role is intended to provide sufficient restricted
module access for an IT professional to monitor and ensure the network
infrastructure to which the encryptor is connected is intact and
operational. Services for the Operator are accessible directly via the
Local Console CLI or remotely via the Remote Management Interface
and the remote management application.
Upgrader: The Upgrader Role is limited to applying field upgrades to
the module firmware. Additional access is restricted to read-only access
to module configuration data.
Services for the Upgrader are accessible directly via the Local Console
CLI or remotely via the remote management application.
Roles cannot be changed while authenticated to the module; however, the module permits multiple concurrent
operators. While only one operator may connect to the Local Console at a time, multiple concurrent remote
sessions are permitted. Remote management is not session oriented; thus, multiple operators may be issuing
commands with each command processed individually as it is received by the module. In a meshed network the
system architecture supports simultaneous interactions with many far end modules; the multiple users (remote
modules) all sending data to the data input port. The module’s access control rules, system timing, and internal
controls maintain separation of the multiple concurrent operators.
The module does not support a maintenance role. Since there are no field services requiring removal of the cover,
physical maintenance is performed at the factory.
Note: A Crypto Officer should zeroize the module before it is returned to the factory. The module
can be zeroized using several methods. When the module is powered on, the module can be
zeroized by command or by performing the Erase key press sequence defined in the user manual.
An immediate erase can be achieved, powered or un-powered, by depressing the concealed front
panel Emergency Erase button, accessed using a “paperclip” or other suitable tool. Refer to Figure
11 for location.
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 23 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
4.1 Identification and Authentication
The module employs Identity-Based Authentication. The module also supports TACACS+ for authentication in
FIPS non-Approved mode only. Four operator privilege levels have been defined for use, Administrator, Supervisor,
Operator and Upgrader with access rights as indicated in Table 8. Restricted Administrator privileges are available
until the module is “Activated”. Activation ensures that the default Administrator password is changed and allows
additional user accounts to be created. A user with Administrator privilege can further restrict the available privilege
levels to Administrator and Operator by selecting “Simplified” user model from the CLI.
Users with administrator privilege level can set a password change lockout period of between 0 (disabled) and 240
hours in which user’s passwords cannot be changed. This feature is intended to prevent a user from exhausting the
password history and recycling a previously used password. The feature is disabled by default.
Up to 30 user accounts with unique names and passwords may be defined for authorised operators
(Administrators, Supervisors Operators and Upgraders) of the module. Operators using the Local Console enter
their name and password to authenticate directly with the module. Operators using the remote management
application issue commands to the encryptor. Password based authentication is used between the management
station and the module to authenticate each user. If the user is authenticated then Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement is
employed to establish secure AES SNMPv3 privacy keys allowing the transport of secure messages to and from
the module. Commands from the remote management application are individually authenticated to ensure Data
Origin Authentication and Data Integrity. Data Origin Authentication, based on the names and passwords, ensures
the authenticity of the user claiming to have sent the command. Users employing the module’s security functions
and cryptographic algorithms, over the Data Input and Output ports, authenticate via certificates that have been
generated and signed by a common Certificate Authority (CA). The modules exchange Key Encryption Keys and
Data Encryption Keys using RSA-OAEP-256 public key transport in accordance with NIST SP800-56B Section 9.
Alternatively, ECDH ephemeral key agreement is used for the purpose of establishing DEKs in accordance with
NIST SP800-56A.
Table 8 Authentication Type
Role Type of
Authentication
Authentication Data
Administrator
Supervisor
(Crypto Officers)
Identity-based Crypto Officers using the Local Console present
unique user names and passwords to log in to
the CLI.
Crypto Officers using the remote management
application have unique identities embedded in
the command protocol. Each issued command is
individually authenticated.
Operator
Upgrader
(Users)
Identity-based Users follow the same authentication rules as
Crypto Officers.
The strength of the authentication mechanisms is detailed in Table 9.
Table 9 Strength of Authentication
Authentication Mechanism Strength
Password Crypto Officers, Operators, and Upgraders accessing the
module CLI, via the Local Console, must authenticate using a
password that is at least 8 characters and at most 29
characters in length. The characters used in the password
must be from the ASCII character set of alphanumeric and
special (printable) characters. This yields a minimum of 948
possible combinations making the possibility of correctly
guessing a password 1/948
which is far less than 1/
1,000,000.
After three failed authentication attempts via the CLI, the Local
Console port access is locked for 3 minutes. With the 3 minute
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 24 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Authentication Mechanism Strength
lockout, the possibility of randomly guessing a password in 60
seconds is 3/948
which is less than 1/100,000.
Note: The module also suppresses feedback of authentication
data, being entered into the Local Console, by returning *
characters.
Network User Certificates Far end modules (Users) authenticate using an RSA
authentication certificate based on 2048 bit keys providing 112
bit key size equivalence. Therefore possibility of deriving a
private RSA key is 1/2112
which is far less than 1 in 1,000,000.
Alternatively far end modules authenticate using an ECDSA
authentication certificate using NIST P-256, P-384 or P-521
may curves which provide 128, 192 and 256 bit key size
equivalence respectively. The worst case probability of
deriving an ECDSA private key is 1/2128
which is far less than
1 in 1,000,000. Upon an unsuccessful authentication attempt
the secure session establishment mechanism will go into a
fault state that takes one minute to clear. This gives a
possibility of randomly guessing the authentication key in 60
seconds of 1/2112
for RSA and 1/2128
for ECDSA certificates
which are both less than 1 in 100,000.
4.2 Roles and Services
CN6000 Series Encryptors support the services listed in the following tables. The tables group the authorized
services by the module’s defined roles and identify the Cryptographic Keys and CSPs associated with the services.
The modes of access are also identified per the explanation.
R - The item is read or referenced by the service.
W - The item is written or updated by the service.
E - The item is executed by the service (the item is used as part of a cryptographic function)
D - The item is deleted by the service.
N/A - Not Applicable.
The module’s services are described in more detail in the CN6000 Series documentation.
Once authenticated, the operator has access to the services required to initialize, configure and monitor the
module. With the exception of passwords associated with user accounts, the operator never enters Cryptographic
Keys or CSPs directly into the module (an Administrator CO will enter passwords when working with user
accounts).
Table 10 Operator – Roles and Services
Crypto Officer User Authorized
Service
Cryptographic Keys and
CSPs
Access
Type
Admin Supv Oper Upgr
  Set Real Time
Clock
none N/A
 Load Module
Certificate7
RSA or ECDSA Public and
Private Keys8
, SMK or
SMK_CSP
W, R
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 25 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Crypto Officer User Authorized
Service
Cryptographic Keys and
CSPs
Access
Type
Admin Supv Oper Upgr
 Create User
Account
Password, SMK or SMK_CSP W, R
 Modify User
Account
Password E, W
 Delete User
Account
Password D
    View User
Account
none N/A
  Edit Connection
Action Table
(Bypass)9
none N/A
    View Connection
Action Table
none N/A
    Show Firmware
Version
none N/A
 Clear Audit Trail Password W
    View Audit Trail none N/A
 Clear Event Log Password W
    View Event Log none N/A
    View FIPS Mode
Status
none N/A
 Change FIPS
Mode Status
Password W
  Run Self Test
(Reboot
Command)
Password E
  Install Firmware
Upgrade
Password
Firmware Upgrade RSA Public
Key
E
  Establish FTPS
(TLS) Session
FTPS (TLS) Privacy Keys3
,
FTPS (TLS) Private Key,
FTPS (TLS) Public Key,
FTPS (TLS) HMAC keys,
FTPS (TLS) Master Secret,
SMK or SMK_CSP
R, W, E
  Establish SFTP
(SSH) Session
SFTP (SSH) Privacy Keys3
,
SFTP (SSH) Key Exchange
Private Keys, SFTP (SSH)
Key Exchange Public Keys,
SFTP (SSH) HMAC keys,
SFTP (SSH) Shared Secret,
SMK or SMK_CSP
R, W, E
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 26 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Crypto Officer User Authorized
Service
Cryptographic Keys and
CSPs
Access
Type
Admin Supv Oper Upgr
  Re/Start Secure
Connection
AES KEKs1
, SME KDKs1,5
,
AES DEKs1
, AES GEKs6
,
GDKs6
, SME HMAC key,
ECDHE keys, ECDHE Shared
Secret, SMK or SMK_CSP
W
 Generate
X.509v3
Certificate
Signing Request
RSA Private Key and RSA
Public Key or ECDSA Private
Key and ECDH Public Key8
,
SMK or SMK_CSP
R, E
 Erase Module –
Zeroize (Console
Command)
System Master Key and all
CSP data stored in non-
volatile memory
D
    Establish a
Remote
Management
Session
SNMPv3 Privacy Key2
,
SNMPv3 Diffie Hellman
Private Keys, SNMPv3 Diffie
Hellman Public Keys8
R, W, E
    Establish a
Remote CLI
Session4
Remote CLI (SSH) Privacy
Keys, Remote CLI (SSH) Key
Exchange Private Keys,
Remote CLI (SSH) Key
Exchange Public Keys,
Remote CLI (SSH) HMAC
keys8
R, W, E
    Establish
RESTful HTTPS
(TLS Session)
REST (TLS) Privacy Keys3
,
REST (TLS) Private Key,
REST (TLS) Public Key,
REST (TLS) HMAC keys,
REST (TLS) Master Secret,
SMK or SMK_CSP
R, W, E
 KeyVault Sign
(X.509v3
Certificate
Signing Request)
RSA or ECDSA Private Key8
,
SMK or SMK_CSP
R, E
 KeyVault Encrypt RSA Public Key8
R, E
 KeyVault Decrypt RSA Private Key8
, SMK or
SMK_CSP
R, E
 KeyVault DRBG
Access
none N/A
 KeyVault Backup RSA Private/ Public Key
ECDSA Private/ Public Key
PKCS#12 Password, SMK or
SMK_CSP
R, W
 Enable
KeySecure
SMK_Local, SMK_Remote
 KeyVault Restore RSA Private/ Public Key
ECDSA Private/ Public Key
PKCS#12 Password, SMK or
SMK_CSP
R, W
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 27 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Crypto Officer User Authorized
Service
Cryptographic Keys and
CSPs
Access
Type
Admin Supv Oper Upgr
 Configure
KeySecure
KMS (TLS) Privacy Keys3
,
KMS (TLS) Private Key, KMS
(TLS) Public Key, KMS (TLS)
HMAC keys, KMS (TLS)
Master Secret, SMK_Local,
SMK_Mask, SMK_CSP
R, W, E
Note 1: Starting/Restarting a secure connection causes new SME KDK, GDKs, KEKs, DEKs GEKs and SME HMAC keys to be
generated.
Note 2: AES SNMPv3 Privacy keys are established using Diffie-Hellman when an SNMPv3 remote management session is initiated and
used to encrypt and decrypt all subsequent directives. The DH modulus size is set to a minimum of Oakley group 14 (2048 bits)
in SNMP.
Note 3: If the firmware upgrade image is being transferred via SFTP then AES SFTP (SSH) Privacy Keys are established using either
DH or ECDH. If the firmware upgrade image is being transferred via FTPS then AES FTPS (TLS) Privacy Keys are established
using ECDH.
Note 4: AES Remote CLI (SSH) Privacy Keys are established using DH or ECDH when a remote CLI session is established. The DH
modulus size is set to Oakley group 14 (2048 bits) in SSH. The RSA key size is checked when a user loads a remote CLI SSH
key. It is rejected if it is less than 2048 bits.
Note 5: KDKs are established using Approved (Vendor Affirmed) RSA-OAEP-256 key transport as per NIST SP-800-56B Section 9 and
described in Table 13.
Note 6: GDKs are established using ECDH key agreement.
Note 7: The Load Module Certificate service can access any RSA or ECDSA Public/Private keys that are associated with the
certificate being loaded. The RSA key size in a certificate is checked when the certificate is loaded onto the module. If the
key size is below 2048 bits the certificate will be rejected.
Note 8: All key material is sourced from the SP-800-90A DRBG and in accordance with IG Section 14.5 the entropy input string, seed
and state variables V and C are considered CSPs.
Note 9: Changing a connection’s CI Mode state to Bypass will result in all data transmitted on the connection being sent in plaintext.
Note: Plaintext Cryptographic Keys and CSPs are never output from the module regardless of the
operative role or the mode of operation.
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 28 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
5. Physical Security
CN6000 Series Encryptors employ the following physical security mechanisms:
1. The encryptor is made of commercially available, production grade components meeting commercial
specifications for power, temperature, reliability, shock and vibration. All Integrated Circuit (IC) chips have
passivation applied to them. The metal enclosure is opaque to the visible spectrum. The ventilation holes
on the encryptor’s front panel are factory fitted with baffles to obscure visual access and to prevent
undetected physical probing inside the enclosure. Attempts to enter the module without removing the cover
will cause visible damage to the module, while removing the cover will trigger the tamper circuitry.
2. Access to the internal circuitry is restricted by the use of tamper detection and response circuitry which is
operational whether or not power is applied to the module. Attempting to remove the enclosure’s cover
immediately causes the module to be set into ‘Discard’ mode and initiates the zeroization of all Keys and
CSPs. For further details refer to Section 6.2.
3. Two tamper evident seals are pre-installed (at factory). Both are placed between the top cover and
underside of the main enclosure (refer to Figure 19). Attempting to remove the top cover to obtain access
to the internal components of the module will irreparably disturb these seals, thus providing visible
evidence of the tamper attempt. Replacement tamper seals cannot be ordered from the supplier. A module
with damaged tamper evident seals should be returned to the manufacturer by the Crypto Officer.
Figure 19 – Factory installed tamper seals
While the physical security mechanisms protect the integrity of the module and its keys and CSPs, it is strongly
recommended that the cryptographic module be maintained within a physically secure, limited access room or
environment.
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 29 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Table 11 outlines the recommended inspection practices and/or testing of the physical security mechanisms.
Table 11 Physical Security Inspection & Test
Security Mechanism Inspection & Test Guidance Frequency
Tamper Evidence Tamper indication is available to all user
roles via the alarm mechanism and
physical evidence of tampering against the
tamper seals.
The Crypto Officer is responsible for the
physical security inspection.
During normal operation, the Secure LED
is illuminated green. When the unit is not
activated and/or uncertified (i.e. it has no
loaded certificate since it is either in the
default factory manufactured state or a
user erase operation has been executed)
or in the tampered state, the Secure LED
is illuminated red and all traffic is blocked.
Inspect the enclosure and tamper evident
seals for physical signs of tampering or
attempted access to the cryptographic
module.
In accordance with the
organization’s Security
Policy.
Tamper Circuit The module enters the tampered state
when the circuit is triggered. Once in this
state, the module blocks all user traffic
until the module is re-activated and re-
certified.
No direct inspection or test
is required; triggering the
circuit will block all data
flow.
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 30 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
6. Cryptographic Key Management
6.1 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
The following table identifies the Cryptographic Keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) employed within the module.
Table 12 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
Key/CSP Key Type and Use Key/CSP Key/CSP
Output
Key/CSP Destruction
Origin
Entry/Estab./Gen
Storage Sourced Format
AES System Master Key
(SMK)6
AES-CFB 256-bit key.
On initialization, the module generates the System
Master Key. This key encrypts the module’s RSA Private
Key(s) and ECDSA Private Key(s) and the user
passwords stored in the configuration flash memory.
Approved Key
Generation:
FIPS197
SP 800-133 Key
Generation using SP
800-90A DRBG
Persistently stored in
plaintext in a tamper
protected memory
device
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
Triple-DES System Master
Key
3-key Triple-DES CFB8 192 bit key.
The Triple-DES SMK is only used to decrypt CSPs when
upgrading from legacy versions of firmware. The CSPs
are subsequently re-encrypted using the AES SMK and
the Triple-DES System Master Key is destroyed. Triple-
DES is no longer used by the module for encryption
operations
Approved Key
Generation:
FIPS197
SP 800-133 Key
Generation using SP
800-90A DRBG
Stored in plaintext in a
tamper protected
memory device
No N/A  Destroyed during
upgrade process
SMK_Local 256-bit Composite Key
When KeySecure is configured the local System Master
Key (SMK_local) is generated from the internal DRBG
and stored it in tamper protected memory.
Approved Key
Generation:
FIPS197
SP 800-133 Key
Generation using SP
800-90A DRBG
Persistently stored in
plaintext in a tamper
protected memory
device
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
SMK_Mask 256-bit Composite Key
When KeySecure is configured the module will obtain a
System Master Key mask (SMK_mask) from the external
KeySecure server.
External Stored ephemerally in
volatile system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Zeroized after use
 Power cycle
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 31 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Key/CSP Key Type and Use Key/CSP Key/CSP
Output
Key/CSP Destruction
Origin
Entry/Estab./Gen
Storage Sourced Format
SMK_CSP AES-CFB 256-bit key
SMK_local and SMK_mask are combined to create
SMK_CSP which is used to encrypt and decrypt the
module’s RSA Private Key(s) and ECDSA Private Key(s)
and the user passwords stored in the configuration flash
memory.
Created by combining
SMK_local and
SMK_mask
Stored ephemerally in
volatile system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Zeroized after use
 Power cycle
RSA Private Key(s) 2048-bit key.
Generated when the module receives a Load Certificate
command from the remote management application. The
RSA Private Key(s) are used to authenticate connections
with other encryptors and to unwrap master session keys
(KEKs) and session keys (DEKs) received from far-end
encryptors.
KeyVault Sign: The RSA Private Key(s) are used to sign
X.509v3 Certificate Signing Requests
KeyVault Decrypt: The RSA Private Key(s) are used to
decrypt externally supplied session keys (KEK).
Approved Key
Generation:
FIPS 186-4 RSA
SP 800-133 Key
Generation using SP
800-90A DRBG
Persistently stored AES-
256 encrypted using the
System Master Key in
non-volatile system
memory.
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
RSA Public Key(s) 2048-bit key.
Generated when the module receives a Load Certificate
command from the remote management application. The
RSA Private Key(s) are used to authenticate connections
with other encryptors.
KeyVault Encrypt: The RSA Public Key(s) are used to
encrypt externally supplied session keys (KEK).
Note: The module and the remote management
application CM7 will only generate certificates with RSA
2048-bit key size, however It is possible to load a
certificate from an external CA with RSA 4096-bit key
size. The module certificate will have an RSA 2048-bit
key which will be used for key wrapping the KEKs.
Approved Key
Generation:
FIPS 186-4 RSA
SP 800-133 Key
Generation using SP
800-90A DRBG
Persistently stored plain-
text in the Module
Certicate(s) in non-
volatile system memory.
Electronic Plaintext within
X.509 Module
Certificate(s)
signed by
trusted CA
 Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
ECDSA Private Key(s) P-256, P-384 or P-521 curve.
Generated when the module receives a Load Certificate
command from the remote management application. The
ECDSA Private Key(s) are used to authenticate
connections with other encryptors.
KeyVault Sign: The ECDSA Private Key(s) are used to
sign X.509v3 Certificate Signing Requests
Approved Key
Generation:
186-4
SP 800-133 Key
Generation using SP
800-90A DRBG
Persistently stored AES-
256 encrypted using the
System Master Key in
non-volatile system
memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 32 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Key/CSP Key Type and Use Key/CSP Key/CSP
Output
Key/CSP Destruction
Origin
Entry/Estab./Gen
Storage Sourced Format
ECDSA Public Key(s) P-256, P-384 or P-521 curve.
Generated when the module receives a Load Certificate
command from the remote management application. The
ECDSA Private Key(s) are used to authenticate
connections with other encryptors.
Approved Key
Generation:
186-4
SP 800-133 Key
Generation using SP
800-90A DRBG
Stored persistently in
plain-text in the Module
Certicate(s) in non-
volatile system memory.
Electronic Plaintext within
X.509 Module
Certificate(s)
signed by
trusted CA
 Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
ECDH Ephemeral Private Key P-256, P-384 or P-521 curve.
Established during the key agreement process and
destroyed once the process is complete. The ECDH
Ephemeral Private Key is used to create the shared
secret.
Internally generated
using SP 800-90A
DRBG according to SP
800-133
Stored ephemerally in
volatile system memory.
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Zeroized after session
establishment
 Power cycle
ECDH Ephemeral Public Key P-256, P-384 or P-521 curve.
Established during the key agreement process and
destroyed once the process is complete. The ECDH
Ephemeral Private Key is used to create the shared
secret.
Internally generated
using SP 800-90A
DRBG according to SP
800-133
Stored ephemerally in
volatile system memory.
Electronic N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Zeroized after session
establishment
 Power cycle
ECDH Shared Secret The ECDH Shared Secret is used to derive the Data
Encryption Key in point to point sessions or the GEK in
group sessions
Established by
Approved SP 800-56A
KAS process
Stored ephemerally in
volatile system memory.
Electronic N/A  Tamper Event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
 Zeroized after session
establishment
 Power cycle
Module Certificate(s) An X.509 certificate: is associated with a session in an
operational environment. It is produced, upon request
from the module, and signed by the Certificate Authority
(CA) to establish root trust between encryptors. Once a
certificate has been authenticated, Far-end encryptors
use the signed RSA Public Key to wrap the initial session
keys (KEKs) used to encrypt a session. Alternatively, far
end encryptors use the signed ECDSA public key to
authenticate messages sent during the ECDH key
agreement process.
NA
Persistently stored in
plaintext, in non-volatile
system memory
Electronic Plaintext signed
by trusted CA
 Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 33 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Key/CSP Key Type and Use Key/CSP Key/CSP
Output
Key/CSP Destruction
Origin
Entry/Estab./Gen
Storage Sourced Format
Authentication Password Up to 30 unique Crypto Officers (Administrators,
Supervisors) or Users (Operators, Upgraders) may be
defined, with associated passwords, within the
module.
The CLI uses the Authentication Password to
authenticate Crypto Officers and Users accessing the
system via the Local Console.
The remote management application requires an
authentication password that is used to uniquely
authenticate each command to the module.
Manually Entered in
plain-text over directly
attached serial cable
AES-256-bit encrypted
using the system master
key. Stored non-volatile
system memory.
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
Key Encrypting Key (KEK) AES-CFB 256.
For each RSA based session (CI) and EC Multipoint
sessions, the AES KEK is derived from the SME KDK
using a SP 800-108 compliant KDF. The KEK persists for
the life of the session and is used to secure the Data
Encrypting Key that may be changed periodically during
the session.
EC point to point connections use ECDH key agreement
to generate the DEKs. In this case there is no need for
KEKs.
Approved Key
Generation:
Derived from the SME
KDK using a SP 800-
108 compliant KDF
Stored ephemerally in
plaintext, in volatile
SDRAM system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
 Session termination
 Power cycle
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 34 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Key/CSP Key Type and Use Key/CSP Key/CSP
Output
Key/CSP Destruction
Origin
Entry/Estab./Gen
Storage Sourced Format
Data Encrypting Key (DEK) AES CFB, CTR and GCM, 128-bit or 256-bit keys
The module generates DEKs for each data flow path in
the secure connection (one for the Initiator-Responder
path and another for the Responder-Initiator path). The
DEKs encrypt and decrypt the user data transferred
between the Encryptors. These active session keys are
normally changed periodically based on the key update
interval.
In Transport Independent Mode each encryptor uses a
single egress DEK to encrypt all secure traffic. Each
encryptor maintains 2 egress DEKs one in current use
and one stored for the next key update. The egress DEKs
are updated every hour.
Generated:
FIPS197,
SP 800-133 Key
Generation using SP
800-90A DRBG
or
Input using RSA-OAEP-
2048 Vendor affirmed
KTS
or
Established by
Approved Key
Agreement using ECDH
or
Derived from a Key
Derivation Key using SP
800-108 compliant KDF
or
Provided by an external
KMIP Key Server
Stored ephemerally in
plaintext, in volatile
SDRAM system memory
Yes For secure
connections
assigned to
RSA certificates
RSA-OAEP-256
KTS is used to
transfer the
initial DEK to a
far-end module.
Subsequent
DEKs are
transferred
using AES key
wrapping (KEK)
authenticated
with HMAC-
SHA-256.
For each
ECDSA/ECDH
based
connection (CI)
a pair of
encryptors use
ECDH KAS to
establish DEKs.
 Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
 Session termination
 Power cycle
Group Establishment Key
(GEK)
AES-CFB256.
The GEK is used to wrap the group SME KDKs and initial
DEKs using AES-256 CFB authenticated with HMAC-
SHA-256.
Derived from the GDK
using an SP 800-108
compliant KDF
Stored ephemerally in
volatile system memory.
Electronic N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
 Session termination
 Power cycle
SME HMAC keys HMAC-SHA-256 with 256-bit key length
The SME HMAC keys are used to protect the integrity of
the AES key wrapped messages between encryptors
Derived from the GDK
using an SP 800-108
compliant KDF
Stored ephemerally in
plaintext, in volatile
system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
 Session termination
 Power cycle
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 35 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Key/CSP Key Type and Use Key/CSP Key/CSP
Output
Key/CSP Destruction
Origin
Entry/Estab./Gen
Storage Sourced Format
SME KDK 256 bit Key Derivation Key
For each RSA based session (CI), the module generates
a 256 bit SME KDK. The SME KDK is used to separately
derive the KEK and the SME HMAC keys using an SP
800-108 compliant KDF. RSA Key transport is used to
transfer this key to a far-end module. EC Multipoint
connections use the GEK and AES keywrap to transport
the KDK
Approved Key
Generation:
186-4
SP 800-133 Key
Generation using SP
800-90A DRBG
or
Established by
Approved Key Transport
using vendor affirmed
RSA-OAEP-KTS or AES
key wrapping (GEK)
authenticated with
HMAC-SHA-256
Stored ephemerally in
plaintext, in volatile
SDRAM system memory
Yes Wrapped for
transport using
the far-end
module’s public
RSA key (RSA-
OAEP-256 key
transport or
AES key
wrapping
authenticated
with HMAC-
SHA-256)
 Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
 Session termination
 Power cycle
GDK 256 bit Group Derivation Key
When a slave joins an ECDSA/ECDH VLAN or multicast
group session the key master from the group and the
slave use ECDH ephemeral key agreement to establish a
GDK that is used to separately derive the GEK and the
SME HMAC keys using a SP 800-108 compliant KDF
Established by
Approved Key
Agreement using ECDH
Stored ephemerally in
volatile system memory.
Electronic N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
 Session termination
 Power cycle
SNMPv3 Privacy Keys AES-CFB 128 bit Key
For each SNMPv3 remote management session, the
module uses an AES privacy key established during the
Diffie-Hellman key agreement process to secure the
control / flow path in the secure connection.
Established by allowed
SNMP protocol
derivation
Stored ephemerally in
plaintext, in volatile
system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
 Session termination
 Power cycle
DRBG Seed Used for SP800-90 Hash_DRBG the 440-bit seed (initial
V or state) value internally generated from nonce along
with entropy input. A hardware based non-deterministic
RNG is used for seeding the approved NIST SP 800-90A
DRBG.
Internal from NDRBG Stored ephemerally in
plaintext in volatile
SDRAM system memory
Never exits
the module
N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Destroyed after use
 Power cycle
DRBG Entropy Input and
Nonce
Used for SP800-90 Hash_DRBG as input to the
instantiate function.
Internal from NDRBG Stored ephemerally in
plaintext in volatile
SDRAM system memory
Never exits
the module
N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Destroyed after u
 Power cycle
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 36 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Key/CSP Key Type and Use Key/CSP Key/CSP
Output
Key/CSP Destruction
Origin
Entry/Estab./Gen
Storage Sourced Format
DRBG V and C internal state
parameters
The V and C parameters store the internal state of the
SP800-90 DRBG.
Internal Stored ephemerally in
plaintext in volatile
SDRAM system memory
Never exits
the module
N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Power cycle
SNMPv3 Diffie Hellman
Private Keys
2048-bits
The key is created using Oakley group 14 for each
remote SNMPv3 management session to enable
agreement of the SNMPv3 privacy key between the
module and the management station.
Established by Diffie-
Hellman Key Agreement
Stored ephemerally in
plaintext, in volatile
system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
 Session termination
 Power cycle
SNMPv3 Diffie Hellman Public
Keys
2048-bits
The key is created using Oakley group 14 for each
SNMPv3 remote SNMPv3 management session to
enable agreement of the SNMPv3 privacy key between
the module and the management station.
Established by Diffie-
Hellman Key Agreement
Stored ephemerally in
plaintext, in volatile
system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
 Session termination
 Power cycle
Remote CLI (SSH) Public Key ECDSA P-256, P-384, P-521 curve Key
Used to authenticate the remote client with the module.
Loaded electronically
onto the module via
CM7 or the CLI
Stored persistently in
non-volatile system
memory.
Electronic Plaintext  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
Remote CLI (SSH) Key
Exchange Private Keys
Diffie-Hellman key (2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192-bits),
or
ECDH P-256, P-384, P-521 curve Key
The key is created for each remote SSH CLI session to
enable agreement of the remote CLI privacy key between
the module and the remote client.
Internally generated
using SP 800-90A
DRBG according to SP
800-133
Stored ephemerally in
plaintext, in volatile
system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
 Session termination
 Power cycle
Remote CLI (SSH) Key
Exchange Public Keys
Diffie-Hellman key (2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, or 8192-
bits)
or
ECDH P-256, P-384, P-521 curve Key
The key is created for each remote SSH CLI session to
enable agreement of the remote CLI privacy keys
between the module and the remote client.
Internally generated
using SP 800-90A
DRBG according to SP
800-133
Stored ephemerally in
plaintext, in volatile
system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
 Session termination
 Power cycle
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 37 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Key/CSP Key Type and Use Key/CSP Key/CSP
Output
Key/CSP Destruction
Origin
Entry/Estab./Gen
Storage Sourced Format
Remote CLI (SSH) HMAC keys HMAC-SHA-1 with 160-bit key length
HMAC-SHA-256 with 256 bit key length
HMAC-SHA-512 with 512 bit key length
The remote CLI (SSH) HMAC keys are used to protect
the integrity of the data transmitted across the secure
SSH connection.
Internal HMAC
operation
Stored ephemerally in
plaintext, in volatile
system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
 Session termination
 Power cycle
Remote CLI (SSH) Privacy
Keys
AES-CTR 128 and 256 bit Key
For each remote CLI session, the module uses an AES
privacy key established during the Diffie-Hellman or
ECDH key agreement process to secure the control / flow
path in the secure SSH connection.
Established by allowed
Diffie-Hellman Key
Agreement or
Established by
Approved Key
Agreement using ECDH
Stored ephemerally in
plaintext, in volatile
system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
 Session termination
 Power cycle
SFTP (SSH) Private Key ECDSA P-256, P-384, P-521 curve Key
Used to authenticate the module with the remote server.
Internally generated
using SP 800-90A
DRBG according to SP
800-133
Persistently stored AES-
256 encrypted using the
System Master Key in
non-volatile system
memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase button
 Erase command
SFTP (SSH) Public Key ECDSA P-256, P-384, P-521 curve Key
Used to authenticate the module with the remote server.
Internally generated
using SP 800-90A
DRBG according to SP
800-133
Stored persistently in
non-volatile system
memory.
Electronic Plaintext  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
button
 Erase command
SFTP (SSH) Key Exchange
Private Keys
Diffie-Hellman key (2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192-bits),
or
ECDH P-256, P-384, P-521 curve Key
This key is created for each SFTP session to enable
agreement of the SFTP privacy key between the module
and the remote server.
Internally generated
using SP 800-90A
DRBG according to SP
800-133
Stored ephemerally in
plaintext, in volatile
system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
 Session termination
 Power cycle
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 38 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Key/CSP Key Type and Use Key/CSP Key/CSP
Output
Key/CSP Destruction
Origin
Entry/Estab./Gen
Storage Sourced Format
SFTP (SSH) Key Exchange
Public Keys
Diffie-Hellman key (2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192-bits),
or
ECDH P-256, P-384, P-521 curve Key
This key is created for each SFTP session to enable
agreement of the SFTP privacy keys between the module
and the remote server.
Internally generated
using SP 800-90A
DRBG according to SP
800-133
Stored ephemerally in
plaintext, in volatile
system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
 Session termination
 Power cycle
SFTP (SSH) HMAC keys SHA-1 with 160 bit key length
HMAC-SHA-256 with 256 bit key length
HMAC-SHA-512 with 512 bit key length
The SFTP (SSH) HMAC keys are used to protect the
integrity of the data transmitted across the secure SSH
connection.
Internal HMAC
Operation
Stored ephemerally in
plaintext, in volatile
system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
 Session termination
 Power cycle
SFTP (SSH) Shared Secret The SFTP (SSH) Shared Secret is used to derive the
SFTP (SSH) privacy keys
Established by allowed
SSH protocol derivation.
Stored in plaintext, in
volatile system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
 Session termination
 Power cycle
SFTP (SSH) Privacy Keys AES-CTR 128 and 256 bit Key.
For each SFTP session, the module uses an AES privacy
key established during the Diffie-Hellman or ECDH key
agreement process to secure the control / flow path in the
secure SSH connection.
Established by allowed
SSH protocol derivation.
All privacy keys are
stored in plaintext, in
volatile system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
 Session termination
 Power cycle
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 39 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Key/CSP Key Type and Use Key/CSP Key/CSP
Output
Key/CSP Destruction
Origin
Entry/Estab./Gen
Storage Sourced Format
FTPS (TLS) Private Key ECDSA P-256, P-384, P-521 curve Key
FTPS private key used to authenticate the module with
the remote server when using TLS.
Internally generated
using SP 800-90A
DRBG according to SP
800-133
AES-256 encrypted
format, non-volatile
system memory.
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
FTPS (TLS) Public Key ECDSA P-256, P-384, P-521 curve Key
FTPS public key used to authenticate the module with the
remote server when using TLS.
Electronically input into
the module via CM7
Stored in non-volatile
system memory.
Electronic Plaintext within
X.509 certificate
self signed by
the ftp server or
a trusted CA
 Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
FTPS (TLS) Key Exchange
Private Keys
ECDH P-256, P-384, P-521 curve Key
The secret component of the FTPS (TLS) Key Exchange
key pair. The key is created for each FTPS session to
enable agreement of the FTPS privacy key between the
module and the remote server.
Internally generated
using SP 800-90A
DRBG according to SP
800-133
Stored in plaintext, in
volatile system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
 Session termination
 Power cycle
FTPS (TLS) Key Exchange
Public Keys
ECDH P-256, P-384, P-521 curve Key
The public component of the FTPS (SSH) Key Exchange
key pair. The key is created for each FTPS session to
enable agreement of the FTPS privacy keys between the
module and the remote server.
Internally generated
using SP 800-90A
DRBG according to SP
800-133
Stored in plaintext, in
volatile system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
 Session termination
 Power cycle
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 40 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Key/CSP Key Type and Use Key/CSP Key/CSP
Output
Key/CSP Destruction
Origin
Entry/Estab./Gen
Storage Sourced Format
FTPS (TLS) HMAC keys HMAC-SHA-256 Key length 256 bits
HMAC-SHA-384 Key Length 384 bits
The FTPS (TLS) HMAC keys are used to protect the
integrity of the data transmitted across the secure TLS
connection.
Internal HMAC
Operation
Stored in plaintext, in
volatile system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
 Session termination
 Power cycle
FTPS (TLS) Master Secret The FTPS (TLS) Master Secret is used to derive the
FTPS (TLS) privacy keys
Established by allowed
TLS protocol derivation.
Stored in plaintext, in
volatile system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
 Session termination
 Power cycle
FTPS (TLS) Privacy Keys AES-CBC or AES-GCM 128 and 256 bit key
For each FTPS session, the module uses an AES privacy
key established using ECDH to secure the control / flow
path in the secure TLS connection.
Established by allowed
TLS protocol derivation.
All privacy keys are
stored in plaintext, in
volatile system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
 Session termination
 Power cycle
KMS (TLS) Private Key RSA 2048-bits or ECDSA P-256, P384, P-521 curve
Key
KMS private key used to authenticate the module with the
remote key server when using TLS. RSA keys are also
used for key transport.
Internally generated
using SP 800-90A
DRBG according to SP
800-133
AES-256 encrypted
format, non-volatile
system memory.
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 41 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Key/CSP Key Type and Use Key/CSP Key/CSP
Output
Key/CSP Destruction
Origin
Entry/Estab./Gen
Storage Sourced Format
KMS (TLS) Public Key RSA 2048-bits or ECDSA P-256, P384, P-521 curve
Key
KMS public key used to authenticate the module with the
remote key server when using TLS. RSA keys are also
used for key transport.
Electronically input into
the module via CM7
Stored in non-volatile
system memory.
Electronic Plaintext within
X.509 certificate
self signed by
the ftp server or
a trusted CA
 Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)

KMS (TLS) Key Exchange
Private Keys
ECDH P-256, P-384, P-521 curve Key
The secret component of the KMS (TLS) Key Exchange
key pair. The key is created for each KMS session to
enable agreement of the KMS privacy key between the
module and the remote key server.
Internally generated
using SP 800-90A
DRBG according to SP
800-133
Stored in plaintext, in
volatile system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
 Session termination
 Power cycle
KMS (TLS) Key Exchange
Public Keys
ECDH P-256, P-384, P-521 curve Key
The public component of the KMS (TLS) Key Exchange
key pair. The key is created for each KMS session to
enable agreement of the KMS privacy keys between the
module and the remote key server.
Internally generated
using SP 800-90A
DRBG according to SP
800-133
Stored in plaintext, in
volatile system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
 Session termination
 Power cycle
KMS (TLS) HMAC keys HMAC-SHA-256 Key length 256 bits
HMAC-SHA-384 Key Length 384 bits
The KMS (TLS) HMAC keys are used to protect the
integrity of the data transmitted across the secure TLS
connection.
Internal HMAC
Operation
Stored in plaintext, in
volatile system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
 Session termination
 Power cycle
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 42 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Key/CSP Key Type and Use Key/CSP Key/CSP
Output
Key/CSP Destruction
Origin
Entry/Estab./Gen
Storage Sourced Format
KMS(TLS) Master Secret The KMS (TLS) Master Secret is used to derive the KMS
(TLS) privacy keys
Established by allowed
TLS protocol derivation.
Stored in plaintext, in
volatile system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
 Session termination
 Power cycle
KMS (TLS) Privacy Keys AES-CBC or AES-GCM 128 and 256 bit key
For each KMS session, the module uses an AES privacy
key established using ECDH to secure the control / flow
path in the secure TLS connection.
Established by allowed
TLS protocol derivation.
All privacy keys are
stored in plaintext, in
volatile system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
 Session termination
 Power cycle
REST (TLS) Private Key ECDSA P-256, P-384, P-521 curve Key
RESTful interface private key used to authenticate the
module with the remote RESTful client using TLS.
Internally generated
using SP 800-90A
DRBG according to SP
800-133
AES-256 encrypted
format, non-volatile
system memory.
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
REST (TLS) Public Key ECDSA P-256, P-384, P-521 curve Key
RESTful interface public key used to authenticate the
module with the remote RESTful client using TLS.
Electronically input into
the module via CM7
Stored in non-volatile
system memory.
Electronic Plaintext within
X.509 certificate
self signed by
the ftp server or
a trusted CA
 Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)

Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 43 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Key/CSP Key Type and Use Key/CSP Key/CSP
Output
Key/CSP Destruction
Origin
Entry/Estab./Gen
Storage Sourced Format
REST (TLS) Key Exchange
Private Keys
ECDH P-256, P-384, P-521 curve Key
The secret component of the Restful interface (TLS) Key
Exchange key pair. The key is created for each Restful
interface session to enable agreement of the Restful
interface privacy key between the module and the remote
client.
Internally generated
using SP 800-90A
DRBG according to SP
800-133
Stored in plaintext, in
volatile system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
 Session termination
 Power cycle
REST (TLS) Key Exchange
Public Keys
ECDH P-256, P-384, P-521 curve Key
The public component of the Restful interface (TLS) Key
Exchange key pair. The key is created for each Restful
interface session to enable agreement of the Restful
interface privacy keys between the module and the
remote client.
Internally generated
using SP 800-90A
DRBG according to SP
800-133
Stored in plaintext, in
volatile system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
 Session termination
 Power cycle
REST (TLS) HMAC keys HMAC-SHA-256 Key length 256 bits
HMAC-SHA-384 Key Length 384 bits
The Restful interface (TLS) HMAC keys are used to
protect the integrity of the data transmitted across the
secure TLS connection.
Internal HMAC
Operation
Stored in plaintext, in
volatile system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
 Session termination
 Power cycle
REST (TLS) Master Secret The Restful interface (TLS) Master Secret is used to
derive the Restful interface (TLS) privacy keys
Established by allowed
TLS protocol derivation.
Stored in plaintext, in
volatile system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
 Session termination
 Power cycle
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 44 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Key/CSP Key Type and Use Key/CSP Key/CSP
Output
Key/CSP Destruction
Origin
Entry/Estab./Gen
Storage Sourced Format
REST (TLS) Privacy Keys AES-CBC or AES-GCM 128 and 256 bit key
For each Restful interface session, the module uses an
AES privacy key established using ECDH to secure the
control / flow path in the secure TLS connection.
Established by allowed
TLS protocol derivation.
All privacy keys are
stored in plaintext, in
volatile system memory
No N/A  Tamper event
 Emergency erase
 Erase command (which
zeroizes the system
master key and deletes
the module certificates)
 Session termination
 Power cycle
Firmware Upgrade RSA
Public Key
2048-bit key
Is the public component of the module’s firmware
upgrade RSA key pair. It is used for authenticating the
firmware upgrade image (signature verification only). The
Firmware Upgrade RSA Public Key is embedded in the
module’s firmware.
Pre-Loaded at Factory Stored in non-volatile
system memory.
Electronic Plaintext N/A. This public key is
embedded in the firmware.
Note 1: While the certificates, maintained within the module, are listed as CSPs, they contain only public information.
Note 2: As per SP 800-133, all random data including cryptographic Key material is sourced unmodified from the NIST SP800-90A DRBG as required.
Note 3: Switching modes or selecting the front panel key press erase sequence or pressing the concealed Emergency Erase button initiates a module Erase resulting in the destruction of this Key/CSP.
Note 4: The ECDH key agreement methodology as implemented in the module provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.
Note 5: The services above which utilize key establishment methods, shall be configured to use only the cipher suites labelled as "approved" when operating in the approved mode. Failure to utilize the
approved cipher suites as per 0 and Table 19 of this security policy, will place the modules into a non-approved mode of operation.
Note 6: The system Master Key is never used for key wrapping for transporting keys.
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 45 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
6.2 Key and CSP zeroization
Zeroization of cryptographic Keys and CSPs is a critical module function that can be initiated by a Crypto Officer or
under defined conditions, carried out automatically. Zeroization is achieved using the “Zeroization sequence” defined
in section 6.2.1 below.
Crypto Officer initiated zeroization will occur immediately when the:
1. Module Erase command issued from the CLI or remote management application
2. Front Panel key press Erase sequence is selected
3. Concealed front panel “Emergency” Erase button is depressed
Automatic zeroization will occur immediately when the module is:
1. Switched from an Approved to non-Approved mode of operation
2. Switched from an non-Approved to Approved mode of operation
3. Physically tampered
The following sections describe the specific events that occur when zeroization initiated. Note zeroization behaviour is
the same whether the module is configured to run in FIPS-Approved or non-Approved mode.
6.2.1 Zeroization sequence
Once initiated the module Zeroization sequence immediately carries out the following:
 Sets each session (CI) to DISCARD, before zeroizing the DEKs
 Zeroizes the System Master Key rendering the RSA and ECDSA Private Keys, User passwords and other
CSPs (Certificates, RSA public keys) indecipherable
 Deletes all Certificate information
 Deletes RSA and ECDSA Private and Public keys, module Configuration and User table
 Automatically REBOOTs the module destroying KEKs. DEKs, Privacy and Diffie Hellman keys residing in
volatile system memory
6.2.2 Erase command and key press sequence
A Crypto officer can initiate a module Erase remotely using the remote management application or when physically in
the presence of the module using the management console CLI interface or Front Panel key press Erase sequence.
Zeroization of the module Keys and CSPs is achieved using the zeroization sequence as defined in section 6.2.1.
6.2.3 Approved mode of operation
Switching the module to and from the FIPS Approved mode of operation will automatically initiate a Zeroization
sequence to as defined in section 6.2.1 above.
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 46 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
6.2.4 Tamper initiated zeroization
Zeroization will be initiated immediately upon detection of a tamper event. The Tamper Circuit is active at all times; the
specific tamper response differs slightly based on the module’s power state. From a practical standpoint the effect on
the Keys and CSPs is the same.
The tamper initiated zeroization process achieves the following:
1. Zeroization of the System Master Key (SMK) rendering the RSA and ECDSA Private Keys, User passwords
and other CSPs indecipherable. Zeroization of the SMK occurs irrespective of the powered state of the
module.
2. When powered on and the Tamper Circuit is triggered, the module will automatically:
a. Set the encryption mode for each session (CI) to DISCARD ensuring no user data is output from the
module,
b. Log the tamper event to the Audit Log,
c. Set the System, Secure and Alarm LEDs to flash RED on the front panel and herald the tamper event
via the internal speaker,
d. Initiate the Zeroization sequence zeroizing all Session Keys (DEKs) and CSPs in volatile system
memory and non-volatile Configuration and User account data,
e. REBOOT the module.
3. When powered off and the Tamper Circuit is triggered, there are no Session Keys (DEKs) or CSPs in system
volatile memory to be zeroized however upon re-powering the module, the zeroized System Master Key will
indicate that the system has been tampered. The module will:
a. Log the tamper event to the Audit log,
b. Initiate the Zeroization sequence,
c. Continue to the BOOT, returning the module to the un-Activated factory default state.
4. When the BOOT sequence has completed the module will have:
a. Generated a new System Master Key,
b. Re-created the default administration account,
c. Set the encryption mode to DISCARD,
d. Entered the factory default state ready for Configuration (as described in Section 8.3 below).
6.2.5 “Emergency” Erase
The “Emergency” Erase feature is initiated when the concealed front panel Emergency Erase button is depressed and
follows the behaviour defined in section 6.2.4 Tamper initiated zeroization above.
6.2.6 KeySecure Connector integration
The CN6000 series of encryptors have the ability to communicate with SafeNet’s KeySecure key management
system. When KeySecure is enabled and correctly configured the encryptor will still derive a local System Master Key
(SMK_local) from the internal DRBG and store it in tamper protected memory. In addition it will also obtain a remote
System Master Key mask (SMK_mask) from the external KeySecure server. When the encryptor needs to encrypt or
decrypt a CSP it will retrieve SMK_local and SMK_mask and combine them to create SMK_csp which is used to
perform the crypto operation.
This feature allows centralised management of CSPs within a network of encryptors. Deleting SMK_mask in the
KeySecure server will effectively destroy the CSPs in the encryptor. The KeySecure feature is disabled by default.
6.3 Data privacy
To ensure user data privacy the module prevents data output during system initialization. No data is output until the
module is successfully authenticated (activated) and the module certificate has been properly loaded. Following
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 47 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
system initialization, the module prevents data output during the self tests associated with a power cycle or reboot
event. No data is output until all self tests have completed successfully. The module also prevents data output during
and after zeroization of data plane cryptographic keys and CSPs; zeroization occurs when the tamper circuit is
triggered. In addition, the system’s underlying operational environment logically separates key management functions
and CSP data from the data plane.
6.4 Cryptographic Algorithms
CN6000 Series Encryptors employ the following approved cryptographic algorithms. Table 13 lists approved
embedded software algorithms that are common to the CN6000 Series. Table 14 lists approved firmware algorithms
that are specific to the CN6040 and CN6100 hardware versions.
Table 13 FIPS Approved Algorithms – CN6000 Series Common Crypto Library
Algorithm
Type
Algorithm FIPS Validation
Certificate
Target Model Notes
CN6000 Series Common Crypto Library CN4010 / CN4020 /
CN6010 / CN6140
Module Public &
Private RSA keys,
User table
encryption
SNMP message
privacy
Symmetric
Key
Triple-DES
TCFB81
(d; KO 1)
Triple-DES
C1339
AES
CFB128 (e/d; 128,256)
AES C1339
AES
CTR (int only; 128, 256)
AES C1339
AES
ECB2
(e/d; 128, 256)
AES C1339
AES
CBC (e/d; 128,256)
AES C1339
AES
GCM (e/d; 128,256 Internal IV,
AAD=0 to 256)
AES C1339
AES
GMAC (e/d; 128,256 Internal IV,
AAD=0 to 256)
AES C1339
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 48 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Asymmetric
Key
RSA
FIPS186-4:
KeyGen3
; MOD: 2048
ALG[RSASSA-PKCS1_V1_5];
SigGen; MOD: 2048 SHS: SHA-256
SigVer4
; MOD: 2048 SHS: SHA-256
FIPS186-2:
ALG[RSASSA-PKCS1_V1_5];
SigVer; MOD: 40965
, SHS: SHA-1,
SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512
ECDSA
FIPS186-4:
PKG: P-256, P-384 and P-521
curves
PKV: P-256, P-384 and P-521 curves
SigGen P-256 (SHA-256), P-384
(SHA-384) and P-521 (SHA-512)
curves
SigVer P-256 (SHA-256), P-384
(SHA-384) and P-521 (SHA-512)
curves
ECDH
NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521 curves
are supported and SHA-256, SHA-
384 and SHA-512 (respectively) are
used for key derivation in accordance
with SP800-56A
RSA C2207
ECDSA C1339
KAS C1339
Data Session
Establishment
Hashing SHA-16
(BYTE only)
SHA-256 (BYTE only)
SHA-384 (BYTE only)
SHA-512 (BYTE only)
SHS C1339 File system integrity
Data Session
update
HMAC HMAC-SHA-17.
(Key Sizes Ranges
Tested: KS<BS)
HMAC-SHA-256 (Key Sizes Ranges
Tested: KS<BS)
HMAC-SHA-384 (Key Sizes Ranges
Tested: KS<BS)
HMAC-SHA-512 (Key Sizes Ranges
Tested: KS<BS)
HMAC C1339 SNMP message
authentication
Upgrade image
authentication
DRBG NIST SP800-90A
Hash_Based DRBG: [ Prediction
Resistance Tested: Not Enabled
(SHA-256) ]
DRBG C1339
KBKDF NIST SP 800-108 Counter based
KDF using HMAC-SHA-256
KBKDF C1339
CKG SP800-133 –
section 6.1
Asymmetric key
generation using
unmodified DRBG
output
Vendor Affirmed
SP800-133 –
section 7.1
Direct generation of
symmetric key
using unmodified
DRBG output
Vendor Affirmed
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 49 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
SP800-133 –
section 7.2
Distribution of
generated
symmetric key (see
KTS)
Vendor Affirmed
SP800-133 –
section 7.3
Symmetric keys
generated using
ECDH key
agreement in
accordance with
SP 800-56A
Vendor Affirmed
KTS NIST SP800-56B RSA-OAEP-256
Key Transport8
Vendor Affirmed
KTS AES-256 key wrapping authenticated
with HMAC-SHA-2569
AES C1339
HMAC C1339
Note 1: Triple-DES is only used to decrypt CSPs when upgrading from legacy versions of software. The CSPs are
subsequently re-encrypted using AES-256 CFB. Triple-DES is no longer used by the module for encryption
operations.
Note 2: AES-ECB Is only validated as part of the AES-CTR validation. The mode is not actively used by the module.
Note 3: The module does not generate RSA keys < 2048 for use in X.509v3 certificates in accordance with NIST SP800-
131A.
Note 4: Only RSA 2048 signature verification using SHA-256 is approved.
Note 5: The module and the remote management application CM7 will only generate certificates with RSA 2048-bit key size.
It is possible to load a certificate from an external CA with RSA 4096-bit key size, although the encryptor certificate
will have an RSA 2048-bit key which will be used for key wrapping the KEKs.
Note 6: The module does not support the use of SHA-1 for X.509v3 certificate digital signatures in line with SP800-131A.
Note 7: HMAC keys < 112 bits are non-compliant in line with SP800-131A. HMAC keys for SSL and TLS are a minimum of
256 bits.
Note 8: Approved (Vendor Affirmed) RSA-OAEP-256 key transport as per NIST SP-800-56B Section 9 using 2048 bit keys
(112 bit equivalent strength) with OAEP padding using SHA-256 can be employed to establish the AES 128 or 256 bit
symmetric keys used to secure connections between cryptographic modules.
Note 9: AES-256 key wrapping provides 256 bit of encryption strength and can be employed to establish the AES 128 or 256
bit symmetric keys used to secure connections between cryptographic modules.
TLS AES-GCM Key and IV generation:
• The module conforms to TLSv1.2 GCM cipher suites as specified in SP 800-52 Rev 1, Section 3.3.1.
• When the nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given
session key, the module will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key according to RFC
5246.
• The IV is 96 bits in length and is internally generated randomly using an Approved DRBG in compliance
with Section 8.2.2 of NIST SP 800-38D.
Table 14 FIPS Approved Algorithms – CN6000 Series Firmware Algorithms
Algorithm
Type
Algorithm FIPS
Validation
Certificate
Target Model Notes
CN6040 Module – Ethernet Mode
Ethernet Mode
Selectable line rate of:
10/100/1000 Mbps
Symmetric
Key
AES
CFB128 (e/d; 128, 256) AES C1340
AES
CTR (int only; 128, 256)
AES C1340
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 50 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
AES
ECB (e; 128, 256) AES C1340
Model number /description:
A6040B
1G Ethernet Encryptor
AES
GCM (e/d; 128, 256;
Internal IV2
, AAD=112 to 688)
AES C1340
CN6100 Module – Ethernet Mode Ethernet Mode
Line rate: 10 Gbps
Model number /description:
A6100B
10G Ethernet Encryptor
Symmetric
Key
AES
CTR (int only; 128, 256) AES C1341
AES
ECB (e; 128, 256)
AES C1341
AES
GCM ( e/d; 128, 256;
Internal IV2
, AAD=112 to 688)
AES C1341
Note 1: The IV is 96 bits in length and is Internally generated deterministically in compliance with Section 8.2.1 of NIST SP
800-38D
6.5 Key Derivation Functions
CN6000 Series Encryptors employ the following application-specific Key Derivation Functions (KDFs). Table 15 lists
the KDFs.
Table 15 FIPS Approved KDF
KDF Hash Algorithm FIPS Validation
Certificate
Target Model Notes
CN6000 Series Common Crypto Library CN6040 / CN6100
SNMP Privacy and
Authentication Key
SHA-1 CVL (Cert. C1339) No parts of the SNMP
protocol, other than the KDF,
have been reviewed or
tested by the CAVP and
CMVP
TLS (version 1.2) SHA-256
SHA-384
CVL (Cert. C1339) No parts of the TLS protocol,
other than the KDF, have
been reviewed or tested by
the CAVP and CMVP
SSH SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
CVL (Cert. C1339) No parts of the SSH protocol,
other than the KDF, have
been reviewed or tested by
the CAVP and CMVP
6.6 Non Approved and Allowed Security Functions
Table 16 Non-Approved and Allowed Security Functions
Function
A non-approved, non-deterministic RNG (NDRNG) is used to seed the approved NIST SP 800-
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 51 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
90A Hash_DRBG. The module generates a minimum of 256 bits of entropy for key generation.
In addition to the FIPS approved algorithms, the CN6000 Series also includes the following
allowed algorithms.
Table 17 Allowed Algorithms
Function Use
RSA Key Wrapping RSA key wrapping using 2048 bit keys (112 bit equivalent
strength) can be employed to establish the AES 128 or 256 bit
symmetric keys used to secure connections between
cryptographic modules.
ECDH Ephemeral Key
Agreement
It is possible to configure an encryptor to use ECDH ephemeral
key agreement with NIST P-256 (128 bit equivalent strength), P-
384 (192 bit equivalent strength) or NIST P-521 (256 bit
equivalent strength) curves to establish AES 256 bit symmetric
keys used to secure encrypted connections between
cryptographic modules. Only the use of P-521 will ensure that
the established key maintains the full 256 bits of encryption
strength.
SNMPv3 Diffie-Hellman
Key Agreement
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement using 2048 bit Oakley Group 14
(112 bit equivalent strength) is employed to establish the AES
128 bit SNMPv3 privacy keys used to secure the management
interface between the management application and the
cryptographic module.
Remote CLI (SSH) Diffie-
Hellman Key Agreement
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement using 2048 bit Oakley Group 14
(112 bit equivalent strength) is employed to establish the AES
128 or 256 bit Remote CLI (SSH) privacy keys used to secure
the CLI session between the module and the remote client.
Remote CLI (SSH) ECDH
Key Agreement
It is possible to configure an encryptor to use ECDH ephemeral
key agreement with NIST P-256 (128 bit equivalent strength), P-
384 (192 bit equivalent strength) or NIST P-521 (256 bit
equivalent strength) curves to establish AES 256 bit symmetric
keys used to secure the CLI session between the module and
the remote client. Only the use of P-521 will ensure that the
established key maintains the full 256 bits of encryption strength.
SFTP (SSH) Diffie-Hellman
Key Agreement
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement using 2048 bit Oakley Group 14
(112 bit equivalent strength) is employed to establish the AES
128 or 256 bit SFTP (SSH) privacy keys used to secure SFTP
sessions between the module and the remote server.
SFTP (SSH) ECDH Key
Agreement
It is possible to configure an encryptor to use ECDH ephemeral
key agreement with NIST P-256 (128 bit equivalent strength), P-
384 (192 bit equivalent strength) or NIST P-521 (256 bit
equivalent strength) curves to establish AES 256 bit symmetric
keys used to secure SFTP connections between the module and
the remote server. Only the use of P-521 will ensure that the
established key maintains the full 256 bits of encryption strength.
FTPS (TLS) ECDH Key
Agreement
It is possible to configure an encryptor to use ECDH ephemeral
key agreement with NIST P-256 (128 bit equivalent strength), P-
384 (192 bit equivalent strength) or NIST P-521 (256 bit
equivalent strength) curves to establish AES 256 bit symmetric
keys used to secure FTPS connections between the module and
the remote server. Only the use of P-521 will ensure that the
established key maintains the full 256 bits of encryption strength.
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 52 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Table 18 TLS (version 1.2) Cryptographic Algorithms. TLS is used for FTPS (firmware upgrades), RESTful
interface and KMS (KeySecure)
OpenSSL1
Cipher Suite Authentication Key
Exchange
Symmetric
Encryption
Hash for HMAC2
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 ECDSA3
ECDH3
AES-256-GCM4
SHA-384
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 ECDSA3
ECDH3
AES-128-GCM4
SHA-256
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA-384 ECDSA3
ECDH3
AES-256-CBC SHA-384
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA-256 ECDSA3
ECDH3
AES-128-CBC SHA-256
AES256-SHA256 RSA5
RSA5
AES-256-CBC SHA256
AES128-SHA256 RSA5
RSA5
AES-128-CBC SHA256
Note 1: OpenSSL version 1.1.0f
Note 2: Minimum HMAC key size is 256 bits
Note 3: ECDSA/ ECDH curves are restricted to NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521.
Note 4: The AES GCM IV is internally generated randomly in compliance with TLS 1.2 GCM Cipher Suites for TLS and
Section 8.2.2 of NIST SP 800-38D
Note 5: RSA is only used for KMS (Keysecure). Minimum RSA key size allowed is 2048 bits.
Table 19 SSH (for Remote CLI and SFTP) Cryptographic Algorithms
Algorithm Type Algorithm
Authentication ECDSA1
Key Exchange ECDH1
DH2
Symmetric Encryption AES-256-CTR
AES-128-CTR
Hash for HMAC SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-512
Note 1: ECDSA/ ECDH curves are restricted to NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521.
Note 2: Minimum DH key size allowed is 2048 bits.
Note: Please refer to Table 21 in section 8.4 for details on non-Approved algorithms in non-Approved mode of
operation.
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 53 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
7. Self Tests
CN6000 Series cryptographic modules perform both power-up and conditional self tests to verify the integrity and
correct operational functioning of the encryptor. Any failure of a self test will cause the module to transition to an error
state and block all traffic on the data ports. Upon entering an error state an operator can attempt to clear the state by
restarting the module. If the state cannot be cleared the module must be returned to the manufacturer. Table 20
summarizes the module’s self tests.
The design of the CN6000 Series cryptographic modules ensures that all data output, via the data output interface, is
inhibited whenever the module is in a self-test condition. Status information displaying the results of the self tests is
allowed from the status output interface. No CSPs, plaintext data, or other information, that if misused could lead to a
compromise, is passed to the status output interface.
Upon successful completion of the self tests the module will allow access via the CLI and remote management tools.
The LCD will display the set time and date as well as the time since successful reboot (self tests passed).
Table 20 Self Tests
Table Legend
Halt (Secure) Behaviour: The module will enter a Secure shutdown state and Halt
(“Secure Halt”). Thereby preventing the module being configured and
passing any data over the Network data output interface.
Recovery: Attempt to recover by power-cycle. If the Secure Halt
condition persists the module cannot be recovered and must be
returned to the factory.
Erase Behaviour: The module will be Erased and reset to Factory Defaults.
Recovery: Re-activate, certify and attempt to pass Network data.
Error/Alarm Behaviour: Error/Alarm logged. System state unchanged
Recovery: Observe carefully and re-attempt, if error persists check
“User Guide”
Self Test Description Fault
Mandatory Tests Performed at power-up and on demand
Known Answer Tests Each cryptographic algorithm, employed by the
encryptor, is tested using a “Known Answer Test” to
verify the operation of the function.CN6000 Series
KATs are divided into four distinct modules which
correspond to the common modules listed in table
13 and firmware modules listed in table 14.
CN6000 Series Common
Crypto Library
The following CN6000 Series Common Crypto
Library algorithms are tested: AES128 encrypt,
AES128 decrypt, AES256 encrypt, AES256
decrypt, AES-GCM-128 encrypt, AES-GCM-128
decrypt, AES-GCM-256 encrypt, AES-GCM-256
decrypt,Triple-DES168 encrypt, Triple-DES168
decrypt, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512,
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384,
HMAC-SHA-512, KDF CTR HMAC-SHA256,
RSA2048 encrypt, RSA2048 decrypt, RSA4096
encrypt, RSA4096 decrypt, RSA-OAEP-SHA-256
2048 encrypt, RSA-OAEP-SHA-256 2048 decrypt,
ECDSA P-256, P-384, and P-521 (Sign and Verify
and KAT), ECDH P-256, P-384, and P-521
(primitive KAT), SP 800-90A DRBG KAT,
Statistical, Instantiate, Reseed, Generate and Un-
Halt
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 54 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Self Test Description Fault
instantiate tests.
Each of the AES firmware modules are tested at
power-up.
CN6040 1G Ethernet AES CFB (e/d; 128, 256), CTR (e; 128, 256), GCM
(e/d; 128, 256)
Halt
CN6100 10G Ethernet AES CTR (e/d; 128, 256), GCM (e/d; 128, 256) Halt
Firmware Integrity Test An Error Detection Code (32-byte SHA-256 hash)
is used to verify the integrity of all components
within the cryptographic firmware when the module
is powered up.
Upon any file error the system will enter a Secure
shutdown state and Halt (“Secure Halt”)
Halt
Bypass Test CN6000 Series modules support alternating
between Bypass, Discard and Encrypt modes
(which can be seen from the management
interface).
The configuration files that control the
bypass/discard and encrypt settings are integrity
checked using a stored checksum (32 bit CRC). On
power-up the module calculates a fresh checksum
for all configuration files and compares each to the
stored values. Upon a mismatch an error is flagged.
The error condition will result in a recreation of the
configuration file with the factory default settings.
Factory default settings are to fail safe, setting
policy to Discard. An audit message is entered to
reflect the re-initialisation.
Any user change (crypto officer) to or from encrypt,
bypass or discard shall cause an audit log entry.
Erase
Critical Functions Performed at power-up
Battery The battery voltage is tested to determine if it is
critically low. This test is guaranteed to fail prior to
the battery voltage falling below the minimum
specified data retention voltage for the associated
battery-backed components. If this test fails, the
battery low alarm condition is raised. The module
continues to operate however it is advisable that
the battery be replaced immediately. The battery is
located in the removable fan tray and can be
ordered from the module’s supplier.
Battery alarm indication is available to all user roles
via the alarm mechanism.
Alarm
Real Time Clock / Tamper
Memory
The Real Time Clock (RTC) oscillator is checked at
start-up and the Tamper memory is examined for
evidence of a Tamper Condition.
Halt
Conditional Tests Performed, as needed, during operation
Bypass Test The module supports alternating between Bypass,
Discard and Encrypt modes (which can be seen
Erase
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 55 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Self Test Description Fault
from the management interface). The configuration
files that control the bypass/discard and encrypt
settings are integrity checked using a stored
checksum (32 bit CRC). Conditional bypass tests
are enforced by checking the CRC during each
process initialisation that memory maps specific
configuration data. If the CRC is valid, the process
continues execution with that data, otherwise a re-
initialisation is executed to failsafe values. Once
running, a process will update the relevant
configuration data when required, recalculating and
storing the new CRC value.
Pair-wise Consistency RSA Public and Private keys are used for the
calculation and verification of digital signatures and
for key transport. These keys are tested for
consistency, based on their purpose, at the time
they are used. RSA wrapping keys are tested by an
encrypt/decrypt pair-wise consistency test;
signature keys are tested by a sign/verify pair-wise
consistency test.
ECDSA Public and Private keys are used for the
calculation and verification of digital signatures.
These keys are tested at the time they are used
with a sign/verify pair-wise consistency test.
Halt
Firmware Load When a new firmware image file is generated by
the vendor, the file is encrypted and then signed
with the firmware upgrade RSA private key. When
any firmware load is applied to the encryptor in the
field, the module verifies the authenticity of the
firmware image file using its copy of the firmware
upgrade RSA public key. Only firmware loads with
a valid and verified firmware upgrade RSA
signature are accepted.
Error
CRNGT for the NDRNG and
DRBG
The non-deterministic RNGs are continuously
tested according to SP800-90B (section 4.4). The
DRBG is continuously tested according to
FIPS140-2 (section 4.9.2).
Halt
Crypto Officers can run the power-up self-test on demand by issuing a module reboot command. This may be
accomplished via the Local Console, or by cycling the power to the module. Use of the Local Console or power cycling
the module requires a direct connection or physical access to the module respectively. Rebooting or power cycling the
module causes the keys securing the configured connections to be re-established following the restoration of
communications.
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 56 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
8. Crypto-Officer and User Guidance
This section provides information for Crypto Officers to install, configure and operate the CN6000 Series Encryptors in
FIPS mode.
As outlined in this Security Policy, Crypto Officers (more specifically, Administrators and Supervisors) are the only
administrators/operators that can make configuration changes or modify the system settings. The Crypto Officer is
responsible for the physical security inspection.
The CN6000 Series is designed to operate in either a FIPS approved mode or a non-FIPS approved mode. The
operator can query the FIPS status (operating mode) of a module, and authorized operators may change the FIPS
mode of operation. The FIPS status can be queried from the Local Console via the CLI or remotely via the remote
management application.
To ensure that no CSPs are accessible from a previous operating mode a module Erase and Reboot are automatically
performed upon mode change.
Note: Non-FIPS mode of operation is provided for interoperability with legacy systems. The module’s factory
default state (prior to commissioning as outlined in section 8.3) for the FIPS configuration setting is Enabled.
The CN6000 Series must be explicitly configured to operate in a non-FIPS approved mode.
The console command is:
> fips on<ENTER>
CN6100> fips on
FIPS mode enabled
The Senetas CM7 remote management application screen for reporting the FIPS status is found on the User
Management screen, in the Access tab under FIPS PUB 140-2 Mode.
Figure 20 – FIPS Approved and non-Approved mode selection
Note: Read all of the instructions in this section before installing, configuring, and operating
the CN6000 Series Encryptors.
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 57 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
8.1 Delivery
Before the shipment proceeds a serial number is allocated for the ordered module. Prior to the module shipping, a
Shipping Advice form listing the purchase order number, the model number, the serial number and date of shipment is
sent to the purchaser. When the module is delivered, the CO can verify that the model and serial numbers on the
outside of the packaging, the model and serial numbers attached to the encryptor itself, and the numbers listed on the
Shipping Advice form, all match. The CO can also verify that the encryptor has not been modified by examining the
tamper evident seal on the outside of the unit. If the seal is broken, then the integrity of the encryptor cannot be
assured and the supplier should be informed immediately.
Upon receipt of a CN6000 Series Encryptor, the following steps should be undertaken:
1. Inspect the shipping label as well as the label on the bottom of the system to ensure it is the correct FIPS-
approved version of the hardware.
2. Inspect the encryptor for signs of tampering. Check that the tamper evident tape and the covers of the device
do not show any signs of tampering. If tampering is detected, return the device to the manufacturer.
Do not install the encryptor if it shows signs of tampering or has an incorrect label. Contact your organization’s
Security Officer for instructions on how to proceed.
If the device has the correct label and shows no signs of tampering, proceed to the next section.
8.2 Location
The encryptor must be installed in a secure location to ensure that it cannot be physically bypassed or tampered with.
Ultimately the security of the network is only as good as the physical security around the encryptor.
Always maintain and operate the CN6000 Series Encryptor in a protected/secure environment. If it is configured in a
staging area, and then relocated to its operational location, never leave the unit unsecured and unattended.
Ideally the encryptor will be installed in a climate-controlled environment with other sensitive electronic equipment
(e.g. a telecommunications room, computer room or wiring closet). The encryptor can be installed in a standard 19-
inch rack or alternatively mounted on any flat surface. Choose a location that is as dry and clean as possible. Ensure
that the front and rear of the encryptor are unobstructed to allow a good flow of air through the fan vents.
The encryptor is intended to be located between a trusted and an untrusted network. The Local Interface of the
encryptor is connected to appropriate equipment on the trusted network and the Network Interface of the encryptor is
connected to the untrusted (often public) network.
Depending on the topology of your network, the Local Interface will often connect directly to a router or switch, while
the Network Interface will connect to the NTU provided by the network carrier.
8.3 Configuration – FIPS140-Approved mode
Full configuration instructions are provided in the User Manual. Use the guidance here to constrain the configuration
so that the device is not compromised during the configuration phase. This will ensure the device boots properly and
enters FIPS 140-2 approved mode.
When powering up the module for the first time, use the front panel to configure the system for network connectivity.
Then use the remote management application to initialize the module and perform the configuration operations.
1. Power on the unit.
The system boot-up sequence is entered each time the module is powered on and after a firmware restart.
The CN6000 Series Encryptor automatically completes its self tests and verifies the authenticity of its firmware
as part of the initialization process. The results of these tests are reported on the front panel LCD and are also
logged in the system audit log.
If errors are detected during the diagnostic phase, the firmware will not complete the power up sequence but
will instead enter a Secure shutdown state and Halt (“Secure Halt”). If this occurs the first time power is
applied or any time in the future, the module will notify the CO that a persistent (hard) error has occurred and
that the module must be returned for inspection and repair.
2. Follow the User Manual’s Commissioning section to set the system’s IP Address, Date and Time.
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 58 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
3. If the CM7 application is being run for the first time, it will ask if the CM7 installation will act as the Certification
Authority (CA) for the secure network. If the user selects yes a private and public RSA or ECDSA key pair that
will be used to sign X.509v3 Certificate Signing Requests from the module is generated by the CM7
application.
4. Activate the cryptographic module.
A newly manufactured or erased cryptographic module must be Activated before X.509 certificate requests
can be processed. See the User Manual’s Commissioning section for details.
Activation ensures that the default credentials of the ‘admin’ account are replaced with those specified by the
customer prior to loading signed X.509 certificates in to the module.
The updated user credentials (username and password) are transmitted to the encryptor using RSA 2048
public key encryption, and a hashing mechanism is used by the local administrator CO to authenticate the
message.
5. Install a signed X.509 certificate into the cryptographic module.
CN6000 Series cryptographic modules support X.509v3 Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs) and will accept
certificates signed by the remote management application CM7 (when acting as a CA) as well as certificates
signed by External CAs. In both cases each CN6000 Series cryptographic module supplies upon request an
X.509v3 CSR containing the module’s details and either a 2048 bit Public RSA key or an ECDSA Public key
using NIST P-256, P-384 or P-521 curves.
The administrator then takes the CSR and has it signed by either the trusted local CA (the remote
management application CM7 for X.509v3 certificates using either a 2048 bit Public RSA key or an ECDSA
Public key using NIST P-256, P-384 or P-521 curves) or an external CA for X.509v3 certificates using either a
2048 or 4096 bit Public RSA key or an ECDSA Public key using NIST P-256, P-384 or P-521 curves. For a
typical deployment this procedure is repeated for all cryptographic modules in the network and the signed
certificates are installed in to each module.
After an X.509 certificate has been installed into CN6000 Series module the administrator can create
supervisor and operator accounts.
At this point the CN6000 Series Encryptor is able to encrypt in accordance with the configured security policy;
the ENT key on the front panel is disabled; and the default factory account has been removed.
6. Ensure the encryptor is in FIPS 140-2 mode (default setting) via the Senetas CM7 remote management
applications’ Management-Access tab. See Figure 20 for details. Alternatively log into the CLI and run the
CLI command “fips on” and follow the prompts. After the unit reboots log into the CLI and run the “fips”
command without an argument. The command should return the message “FIPS mode enabled”.
7. The maximum number of encryptors allowed in a multipoint group is 512. When operating in multipoint mode
(MAC Multicast, VLAN or ISID mode) with Sender ID (SID) enabled the user must set a unique SID between 1
and 512 for each encryptor within the Multipoint group. Failure to do so will place the module in non-approved
mode.
8. Configure the security policy to enable encrypted tunnels with other CN6000 Series modules.
Configuration of the security policy is network specific; refer to the User Manual for specific details.
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 59 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
8.4 Configuration - Non-Approved Mode
The CN6000 Series is capable of providing a number of non-approved services in order to support legacy functions
such as SNMPv3 without privacy enabled and to provide remote AAA support, TACACS+ and other services.
These services are either gated via the FIPS enabled/disabled function, or may be audited from the fips CLI
command.
Configuring the CN6000 Series into non-Approved mode of operation can be achieved using the CM7 remote
management application or the local console via CLI. Once the change is affected the module will automatically
erase and restart:
1. Navigate to the FIPS PUB 140-2 setting in Management-Access tab within the CM7 Application and
SET the Disable FIPS PUB 140-2 Mode checkbox
– OR -
2. Login via the front panel management console and execute the console command e.g. “CN6100
Encryptor> fips off”. See Figure 20 for details.
Table 21 Non-Approved Mode Services
Service Description
Custom elliptic
curve parameters
With FIPS mode disabled, users are able to load non-approved custom
elliptic curve parameter sets for both CA and encryptor certificates for
use by ECDSA and ECDH during secure session establishment. In this
mode an extended list of OpenSSL1
built in Elliptic Curves will also be
available to the user.
RSA legacy
certificate support
With FIPS mode disabled, users are able to load RSA certificates with
key sizes < 2048 bits.
Entropy load With FIPS mode disabled, users are able to load their own entropy pool
onto the encryptor via the upgrade process. This entropy pool is used in
place of the internal DRBG until it is exhausted or the service is
disabled. The pool is deleted during an erase operation.
Customisable AES
S-Boxes
With FIPS mode is disabled, users are able to modify the AES S-Boxes
by loading configuration information into the encryptor via the CLI. This
feature is disabled by default and only available to the user when FIPS
mode is disabled.
TACACS+2
TACACS+ can be configured in the module to allow AAA services to be
provided from a remote TACACS+ server. When the user enables
TACACS+ they are given a warning that TACACS+ uses non-approved
algorithms and an audit log message stating that TACACS+ has been
enabled is created. The fips CLI command will also give the user a
warning if algorithms unsupported by FIPS140-2 are in service.
Note 1: OpenSSL version 1.1.0f
Note 2: TACACS+ uses MD5
Upon restart, the FIPS mode state can be checked using the remote management application or local console.
Senetas Corp. Ltd. Version 1.12 Page 60 of 60
CN6000 Series Non-Proprietary Security Policy
9. Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module can be configured to mitigate against traffic analysis attacks on point-to-point connections using the
TRANSEC feature.
The module does not mitigate against any other specific attacks.
9.1 TRANSEC
Traffic Analysis is the process of intercepting and examining messages in order to deduce information from patterns in
communication. It can be performed even when the messages are encrypted and cannot be decrypted. TRANSEC is
transmission security and is used to disguise patterns in network traffic to prevent Traffic Analysis.
A TRANSEC enabled module exhibits the following encryption characteristics:
 Generates and transmits fixed size encrypted Ethernet frames at a constant frame rate from the WAN facing
network port.
 Encrypts the entire Ethernet frame received on the local port so that no MAC addresses, other header
information or payload data is exposed.
 The rate of the transmitted Ethernet frame is constant and independent of the received plaintext traffic rate
from the local port.
 In the absence of user data from the local port the TRANSEC encryptor module fills the transmitted frames
with pseudo random or encrypted data such that it cannot be distinguished from encrypted user data.
 TRANSEC encryptor modules default to decrypting traffic received on their network interface and discard all
introduced traffic that is not ‘real’ user data.