Apple Inc.
Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon,
Kernel, Software]
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
document version: 1.3
November, 2022
Prepared by:
atsec information security corporation
9130 Jollyville Road, Suite 260
Austin, TX 78759
www.atsec.com
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Trademarks
Apple’s trademarks applicable to this document are listed in https://www.apple.com/legal/intellectual-property/
trademark/appletmlist.html. Other company, product, and service names may be trademarks or service marks of
others.
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Table of Contents
1. General..............................................................................................................5
2. Cryptographic Module Specification ..................................................................6
3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces .....................................................................12
4. Roles, services, and authentication ..................................................................13
5. Software/Firmware security .............................................................................19
5.1. Integrity Techniques ................................................................................................19
5.2. On-Demand Integrity Test ........................................................................................19
6. Operational Environment .................................................................................20
6.1. Applicability............................................................................................................20
7. Physical Security..............................................................................................21
8. Non-invasive Security ......................................................................................22
9. Sensitive Security Parameter Management.......................................................23
9.1. Random Number Generation ....................................................................................24
9.2. Key / SSP Generation ...............................................................................................25
9.3. Keys/SSPs Establishment ........................................................................................25
9.4.Keys/SSPs Import/Export.........................................................................................25
9.5. Keys/SSPs Storage ..................................................................................................25
9.6. Keys/SSPs Zeroization.............................................................................................25
10.Self-tests ........................................................................................................26
10.1.Pre-operational Software Integrity Test ...................................................................26
10.2.Conditional Self-Tests ............................................................................................26
10.2.1.Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests..................................................................................26
10.2.2.Conditional Pairwise Consistency Test ................................................................................................27
10.3.Error Handling ........................................................................................................27
11. Life-cycle assurance ........................................................................................28
11.1.Delivery and Operation ............................................................................................28
11.2.Crypto Officer Guidance..........................................................................................28
12.Mitigation of other attacks ...............................................................................29
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
List of Tables
Table 1 - Security Levels 5
..........................................................................................................................................
Table 2 - Tested Operational Environments 6
.............................................................................................................
Table 3 - Vendor Affirmed Operational Environments 7
.............................................................................................
Table 4 - Approved Algorithms 9
................................................................................................................................
Table 5 - Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation 11
.........................................
Table 6 - Interfaces 12
................................................................................................................................................
Table 7 - Approved Services 15
..................................................................................................................................
Table 8 - Non-Approved Services 18
..........................................................................................................................
Table 9 - SSPs 24
.......................................................................................................................................................
Table 10 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification 25
............................................................
Table 11 - Pre-Operational Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests 27
............................................................................
Table 12 - Error Indicators 27
......................................................................................................................................
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
1. General
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple
silicon, Kernel, Software] cryptographic module. It contains the security rules under which the module must
operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for a Security Level 1 module.
This document provides all tables and diagrams (when applicable) required by NIST SP 800-140B. The column
names of the tables follow the template tables provided in NIST SP 800-140B.
Table 1 describes the individual security areas of FIPS 140-3, as well as the Security Levels of those individual
areas.
Table 1 - Security Levels
ISO/IEC 24759 Section
6.[Number Below]
FIPS 140-3 Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces 1
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
5 Software/Firmware Security 1
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Physical Security Not Applicable
8 Non-invasive Security Not Applicable
9 Sensitive Security Parameter Management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle Assurance 1
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks Not Applicable
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
2. Cryptographic Module Specification
The Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] cryptographic module (hereafter referred to
as “the module”) is a software module running on a multi-chip standalone general-purpose computing platform.
The version of module is 11.1, written as v11.1. The module provides implementations of low-level cryptographic
primitives to the Device OS’s (iOS 14, iPadOS 14, watchOS 7, tvOS14, TXFW 11 and macOS Big Sur 11) Security
Framework and Common Crypto. The module has been tested by atsec CST lab on the following platforms with
and without PAA:
Table 2 - Tested Operational Environments
In addition to the platforms listed in Table 2, Apple Inc. has also tested the module on the following platforms and
claims vendor affirmation on them:
# Operating System Hardware Platform Processor PAA/Acceleration
1 iPadOS 14.2 iPad (5th generation) Apple A Series A9 NEON
2 iPadOS 14.2 iPad Pro 9.7-inch Apple A Series A9X NEON
3 iPadOS 14.2 iPad (7th generation) Apple A Series A10 Fusion NEON
4 iPadOS 14.2 iPad Pro 10.5 inch Apple A Series A10X Fusion NEON
5 iPadOS 14.2 iPad mini (5th generation) Apple A Series A12 Bionic NEON
6 iPadOS 14.2 iPad Pro 11-inch (1st generation) Apple A Series A12X Bionic NEON
7 iPadOS 14.2 iPad Pro 11in (2nd generation) Apple A Series A12Z Bionic NEON
8 iPadOS 14.2 iPad Air (4th generation) Apple A Series A14 Bionic NEON
9 iOS 14.2 iPhone 6S Apple A Series A9 NEON
10 iOS 14.2 iPhone 7 Plus Apple A Series A10 Fusion NEON
11 iOS 14.2 iPhone X Apple A Series A11 Bionic NEON
12 iOS 14.2 iPhone XS Max Apple A Series A12 Bionic NEON
13 iOS 14.2 iPhone 11 Pro Apple A Series A13 Bionic NEON
14 iOS 14.2 iPhone 12 Apple A Series A14 Bionic NEON
15 watch OS 7.1 Apple Watch Series S3 Apple S Series S3 NEON
16 watch OS 7.1 Apple Watch Series S4 Apple S Series S4 NEON
17 watch OS 7.1 Apple Watch Series S5 Apple S Series S5 NEON
18 watch OS 7.1 Apple Watch Series S6 Apple S Series S6 NEON
19 tvOS 14.2 Apple TV 4K Apple A Series A10X Fusion NEON
20 TxFW 11.0.1 Apple Security Chip T2 Apple T Series T2 NEON
21 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 MacBook Air Apple M Series M1 NEON
# Operating
System
Hardware Platform Processor Model
1 iPadOS 14.2 iPad Pro 12.9-inch Apple A Series A9X A1584, A1652
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Table 3 - Vendor Affirmed Operational Environments
The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the
generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.
The table below lists all Approved or Vendor-affirmed security functions of the module, including specific key
size(s) employed for approved services, and implemented modes of operation. The module is in the Approved
mode of operation when the module utilizes the services that use the security functions listed in the table below.
The Approved mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only be transitioned into the
non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved services listed in Table 8 - Non-Approved Services. If
the device starts up successfully, then the module has passed all self-tests and is operating in the Approved
mode.
2 iPadOS 14.2 iPad (6th generation) Apple A Series A10 Fusion A1893, A1954
3 iPadOS 14.2 iPad Pro 12.9-inch (2nd
generation)
Apple A Series A10X
Fusion
A1670, A1671, A1821
4 iPadOS 14.2 iPad Air (3rd generation) Apple A Series A12 Bionic A2152, A2154, A2123, A2153
5 iPadOS 14.2 iPad (8th generation) Apple A Series A12 Bionic A2270, A2428, A2429, A2430
6 iPadOS 14.2 iPad Pro 12.9-inch (3rd generation) Apple A Series A12X Bionic A1876, A2014, A1895, A1983
7
iPadOS 14.2
iPad Pro 12.9-inch (4th
generation)
Apple A Series A12Z Bionic A2229, A2232, A2069, A2233
8 iOS 14.2 iPhone SE Apple A Series A9 A1662, A1723, A1724
9 iOS 14.2 iPhone 6S Plus Apple A Series A9 A1634, A1687, A1690, A1699
10 iOS 14.2 iPhone 7 Apple A Series A10 Fusion A1660, A1779, A1780, A1778
11 iOS 14.2 iPhone 8 Apple A Series A11 Bionic A1863, A1906, A1907, A1905
12 iOS 14.2 iPhone 8 Plus Apple A Series A11 Bionic A1864, A1898, A1899, A1897
13
iOS 14.2
iPhone XS Apple A Series A12 Bionic A1920, A2097, A2098, A2099,
A2100
14
iOS 14.2
iPhone XR Apple A Series A12 Bionic A1984, A2105, A2106, A2107,
A2108
15 iOS 14.2 iPhone 11 Apple A Series A13 Bionic A2111, A2221, A2223
16 iOS 14.2 iPhone 11 Pro Max Apple A Series A13 Bionic A2161, A2220, A2218, A2219
17 iOS 14.2 iPhone SE (2nd generation) Apple A Series A13 Bionic A2275, A2296, A2297, A2298
18 iOS 14.2 iPhone 12 mini Apple A Series A14 Bionic A2176, A2398, A2399, A2400
19 iOS 14.2 iPhone 12 Pro Apple A Series A14 Bionic A2341, A2406, A2407, A2408
20 iOS 14.2 iPhone 12 Pro Max Apple A Series A14 Bionic A2342, A2410, A2411, A2412
21
watch OS 7.1
Apple Watch SE Apple S Series S5 A2351, A2352, A2353, A2354,
A2355, A2356
22 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 MacBook Pro 13” Apple M Series M1 A2338
23 macOS Big Sur 11.0.1 Mac mini Apple M Series M1 A2348
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
CAVP Cert. Algorithm and
Standard
Mode / Method Description / Key
Size(s)
Use /
Function
A943 (vng_asm) CTR_DRBG
[SP800-90A]
AES-128, AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled
No Prediction Resistance
Key Length: 128, 256 Random
Number
Generation
A945 (c_asm) CTR_DRBG
[SP800-90A]
AES-128, AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled
No Prediction Resistance
Key Length: 128, 256 Random
Number
Generation
A942 (vng_ltc) HMAC_DRBG
[SP800-90A]
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
No Prediction Resistance
Key Length: 112 bits or
greater
Random
Number
Generation
A944 (c_ltc) HMAC_DRBG
[SP800-90A]
SHA-384, SHA-512
No Prediction Resistance
Key Length: 112 bits or
greater
Random
Number
Generation
A945 (c_asm) AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-38A]
CBC, ECB, CFB128, CFB8, OFB, CTR Key Length: 128, 192, 256 Symmetric
Encryption and
Decryption
A946 (asm_arm) AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-38A]
CBC, CFB128,
ECB, OFB
Key Length: 128, 192, 256 Symmetric
Encryption and
Decryption
A946 (asm_arm) AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-38E]
XTS Key Length: 128, 256 Symmetric
Encryption and
Decryption
A943 (vng_asm) AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-38A]
[SP 800-38C]
[SP 800-38D]
ECB, CCM, CTR, GCM Key Length: 128, 192, 256 Symmetric
Encryption and
Decryption
A945 (c_asm) KTS (AES)
[SP 800-38F]
AES-KW Key Length: 128, 192, 256 Key Wrapping
and
Unwrapping
A942 (vng_ltc) RSA
[FIPS 186-4]
Signature Generation
(PKCS#1 v1.5) and (PKCS PSS)
Modulus: 2048, 3072,
4096
Digital
Signature
Generation
A942 (vng_ltc) RSA
[FIPS 186-4]
Signature Verification
PKCS#1 v1.5) and (PKCS PSS)
Modulus: 1024, 2048,
3072, 4096
Digital
Signature
Verification
A942 (vng_ltc) ECDSA
ANSI X9.62
[FIPS 186-4]
Key Pair Generation (CKG). The
module’s CKG uses the method
described in Section 5.1 of SP
800-133. The seeds used for
generating the asymmetric keys are
obtained from the output of an
approved random bit generator.
Curve: P-224, P-256,
P-384, P-521
Asymmetric
Key
Generation
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Table 4 - Approved Algorithms
This module does not have any non-Approved algorithms used in the Approved mode of operation (with or
without security claimed).
The table below lists the non-Approved algorithms and security functions that are used in the non-Approved
mode of operation:
A942 (vng_ltc) ECDSA
ANSI X9.62
[FIPS 186-4]
Public Key Validation (PKV) Curve: P-224, P-256,
P-384, P-521
Asymmetric
Key Validation
A942 (vng_ltc) ECDSA
ANSI X9.62
[FIPS 186-4]
Signature Generation Curve: P-224, P-256,
P-384, P-521
Digital
Signature
Generation
A942 (vng_ltc) ECDSA
ANSI X9.62
[FIPS 186-4]
Signature Verification Curve: P-224, P-256,
P-384, P-521
Digital
Signature
Verification
A942 (vng_ltc) SHS
[FIPS 180-4]
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/256
N/A Message
Digest
A944 (c_ltc) SHS
[FIPS 180-4]
SHA-384, SHA-512,
SHA-512/256
N/A Message
Digest
A947 (vng_neon) SHS
[FIPS 180-4]
SHA-256 for all CPUs in Table 2
except S3)
N/A Message
Digest
A942 (vng_ltc) HMAC
[FIPS 198]
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/256
Key Length: 112 bits or
greater
Keyed Hash
A944 (c_ltc) HMAC
[FIPS 198]
SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/256 Key Length: 112 bits or
greater
Keyed Hash
A947 (vng_neon) HMAC
[FIPS 198]
SHA-256 (for all CPUs in Table 2
except S3)
Key Length: 112 bits or
greater
Keyed Hash
N/A ENT (P)
[SP800-90B]
ENT (NP)
[SP800-90B]
N/A Seeding for the DRBG.
(is provided by the
underlying operational
environment)
Random
Number
Generation
CAVP Cert. Algorithm and
Standard
Mode / Method Description / Key
Size(s)
Use /
Function
Algorithm/Functions Use / Function Notes
RSA
 

Signature Generation
PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS Signature Generation
Key Size < 2048
Non-Approved
RSA
 

Signature Verification
PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS Signature Verification
Key Size < 1024
Non-Approved
RSA Key Wrapping OAEP, PKCS#1 v1.5 and -PSS schemes Non-Approved
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Table 5 - Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation
Ed25519 Key Agreement
Key Generation
Signature Generation
Signature Verification
Non-Approved
ANSI X9.63 KDF Hash based Key Derivation Function Non-Approved
RFC6637 Key Derivation Function Non-Approved
HKDF [SP800-56C] Key Derivation Function Non-Approved
DES Encryption / Decryption
Key Size 56-bits
Non-Approved
CAST5 Encryption / Decryption
Key Sizes 40 to 128-bits in 8-bit increments
Non-Approved
RC4 Encryption / Decryption
Key Sizes 8 to 4096-bits
Non-Approved
RC2 Encryption / Decryption
Key Sizes 8 to 1024-bits
Non-Approved
MD2 Message Digest
Digest size 128-bit
Non-Approved
MD4 Message Digest
Digest size 128-bit
Non-Approved
MD5 Message Digest
Digest size 128-bit
Non-Approved
RIPEMD Message Digest
Digest size 160-bits
Non-Approved
ECDSA PKG: Curve P-192
PKV: Curve P-192
Signature Generation: Curve P-192
Signature Verification: Curve P-192
Non-Approved due to the small curve
size
Key Pair Generation for compact point
representation of points
Non-Approved
Integrated Encryption Scheme on
elliptic curves (ECIES)
Encryption / Decryption Non-Approved
Blowfish Encryption / Decryption Non-Approved
OMAC (One-Key CBC MAC) MAC generation Non-Approved
Triple-DES [SP 800-67] CBC, ECB Encryption/Decryption
Note: The module does not enforce the
limit of 216 encryptions with the same
Triple-DES key, as required by FIPS
140-3 IG C.G.
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
The Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] executes within the kernel space of the
computing platforms and operating systems listed in Table 2 - Tested Operational Environments. Figure 1 below
shows the logical block diagram representing the following information:
1
o The location of the logical object of the module with respect to the operating system, other supporting
applications, and the cryptographic boundary so that all the logical and physical layers between the logical
object and the cryptographic boundary are clearly defined; and
o The interactions of the logical object of the module with the operating system and other supporting
applications resident within the cryptographic boundary.
Figure 1 - logical block diagram
KEXT stands for Kernel Extension. A kernel extension (or kext) is a bundle that performs low-level tasks. KEXTs run in kernel space, which
1
gives them elevated privileges and the ability to perform tasks that user-space apps can’t.
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces
As a software-only module, the module does not have physical ports. For the purpose of the FIPS 140-3
validation, the physical ports are interpreted to be the physical ports of the hardware platform on which it runs.
The underlying logical interfaces of the module are the C language Kernel Interfaces (KPIs). In detail these
interfaces are described in (Table 6 ):
Table 6 - Interfaces
The module is optimized for library use within the Device OS kernel space and does not contain any terminating
assertions or exceptions. It is implemented as a Device OS dynamically loadable library. The dynamically
loadable library is loaded into the Device OS kernel and its cryptographic functions are made available to Device
OS kernel services only. Any internal error detected by the module is reflected back to the caller with an
appropriate return code. The calling Device OS kernel service must examine the return code and act accordingly.
The module communicates any error status synchronously through the use of its documented return codes, thus
indicating the module’s status. It is the responsibility of the caller to handle exceptional conditions in a FIPS
140-3 appropriate manner.
Caller-induced or internal errors do not reveal any sensitive material to callers. Cryptographic bypass capability
is not supported by the module.
Logical Interface Data that passes over port/interface
Data Input Data inputs are provided in the variables passed in the KPI and callable service
invocations, generally through caller-supplied buffers
Data Output Data outputs are provided in the variables passed in the KPI and callable service
invocations, generally through caller-supplied buffers
Control Input Control inputs which control the mode of the module are provided through dedicated
parameters, namely the kernel module plist whose information is supplied to the
module by the kernel module loader.
Control Output Not Applicable
Status Output Status output is provided in return codes and through messages. Documentation for
each KPI lists possible return codes. A complete list of all return codes returned by the
C language KPIs within the module is provided in the header files and the KPI
documentation. Messages are also documented in the KPI documentation.
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
4. Roles, services, and authentication
The module supports a single instance of one authorized role: The Crypto Officer. No support is provided for
multiple concurrent operators or a Maintenance Operator.
FIPS 140-3 does not require an authentication mechanism for level 1 modules. Therefore, the module does not
implement an authentication mechanism for Crypto Officer. The Crypto Officer role is authorized to access all
services provided by the module (see Table 7 - Approved Services and Table 8 - Non-Approved Services below).
The module implements a dedicated KPI function to indicate if a requested service utilizes an approved security
function. For services listed in Table 7 - Approved Services, the indicator function returns 1. For services listed in
Table 8 - Non-Approved Services, the indicator function returns 0.
The table below lists all approved services that can be used in the approved mode of operation. The
abbreviations of the access rights to keys and SSPs have the following interpretation:
G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).
W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP.
N/A= The service does not access any SSP during its operation
Service Description and Input/
Output
Approved Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights to
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
AES Encryption /
Decryption
Input for Encryption:
key and plain text
Output for Encryption:
cipher text
Input for Decryption:
key and cipher text
Output for Decryption:
plain text
AES-CBC, AES-ECB,
AES-CFB128, AES-
CFB8, AES-OFB, AES-
CTR, AES-XTS, AES-
GCM, AES-CCM
AES key CO W, E 1
AES Key
Wrapping
Input:
key-encryption key and key to
be wrapped
Output:
wrapped key
AES-KW AES key-
encryption
key
CO W, E 1
Secure Hash
Generation
Input:
message
Output:
Hash value
Message Digest:
SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512,
SHA-512/256
none CO N/A 1
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
HMAC
generation and
verification
Input for Generation:
HMAC key and message
Output:
keyed Hash value
Input for Verification:
HMAC key, message, and
keyed hash value
Output:
True or False
HMAC Keyed Hash HMAC key CO W, E 1
RSA signature
generation and
verification
Input for Signature Generation:
RSA private key and message
Output:
signature
Input for Signature Verification:
RSA public key and signature
Output:
True or False
RSA Signature
Generation,
RSA Signature
Verification
RSA key pair CO W, E 1
ECDSA
signature
generation and
verification
Input for Signature Generation:
ECDSA private key and
message
Output:
signature
Input for Signature Verification:
ECDSA public key and
signature
Output:
True or False
ECDSA Signature
Generation,
ECDSA Signature
Verification
ECDSA key
pair
CO W, E 1
Random number
generation
Input:
Entropy input string, nonce
Output:
Random numbers
HMAC_DRBG,
CTR_DRBG
Entropy Input
String, Seed,
V value and
Key
CO G, R, E, Z 1
ECDSA key pair
generation
Input:
curve size
Output:
generated private and public
key pair
Key Pair Generation:
ECDSA KeyGen
ECDSA key
pair
CO G, R, E 1
Release all
resources of
symmetric
crypto function
context
Input:
handler of symmetric crypto
function context
Output:
zeroised and released
memory space
N/A AES key CO Z 1
Service Description and Input/
Output
Approved Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights to
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Table 7 - Approved Services
The table below lists all non-Approved services that can only be used in the non-Approved mode of operation.
Release all
resources of
hash context
Input:
handler of hash context
Output:
released memory space
N/A HMAC key CO Z 1
Release of all
resources of
asymmetric
crypto function
context
Input:
handler of asymmetric crypto
function context
Output:
zeroised and released
memory space
N/A RSA/ECDSA
keys
CO Z 1
Self-test Input:
power
Output:
Pass/Fail status
AES-CCM, AES-GCM,
AES-XTS, AES-CBC,
AES-ECB,
HMAC_DRBG,
CTR_DRBG, HMAC,
RSA Signature
Generation, RSA
Signature Verification,
ECDSA Signature
Generation, ECDSA
Signature Verification
Software
integrity key
CO E 1
Show Status Input:
KPI invocation
Output:
Operational/Error status
N/A None CO N/A None
Show Module
Info
Input:
KPI invocation
Output:
Module Base Name + Module
Version Number
N/A None CO N/A None
Service Description and Input/
Output
Approved Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights to
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Service Description and Input/Output Algorithms Accessed Role Indicator
Triple-DES encryption
/ decryption
Module does not meet FIPS 140-3 IG C.G because it
does not have a control over the number of blocks
to be encrypted under the same Triple-DES key.
Input for Encryption:
key and plaintext data
Output for Encryption:
cipher text
Input for Decryption:
key and ciphertext data
Output for Decryption:
plaintext data
Triple-DES CO 0
RSA Key Wrapping The CAST does not perform the full KTS, only the
raw RSA encrypt/decrypt.
Input (RSA encrypt):
RSA public key and key to be wrapped
Output(RSA encrypt):
wrapped key
Input (RSA decrypt):
RSA private key and key to be unwrapped
Output(RSA decrypt):
plaintext key
RSA encrypt/decrypt CO 0
RSA Signature
Generation
PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS Signature Generation
Key Size < 2048
Input:
private key and message
Output:
signature
RSA Signature Generation CO 0
RSA Signature
Verification
PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS Signature Verification
Key Size < 1024
Input:
RSA public key and signature
Output:
True or False
RSA Signature Verification CO 0
ECDSA PKG and PKV ECDSA PKG and PKV using curve P-192
Input for PKG:
curve size (P-192)
Output for PKG:
generated (P-192) key pair
Input for PKV:
public key
Output for PKG:
True or False
ECDSA Key Generation,
ECDSA Key Validation
CO 0
ECDSA Signature
Generation
Input:
(P-192) private key and message
Output:
signature
ECDSA Signature Generation CO 0
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
ECDSA Signature
Verification
Input:
(P-192) public key and signature
Output:
True or False
ECDSA Signature Verification CO 0
ECDSA Key Pair
Generation for
compact point
representation of
points
Key Pair Generation for compact point
representation of points
Input:
key size
Output:
generated private and public key pair
ECDSA Key Generation CO 0
Ed25519 Key
Generation
Ed25519 Key Generation
Input:
none
Output:
generated Curve25519 private and public key pair
Ed25519 Key Generation CO 0
Ed25519 Signature
Generation
EdDSA Signature Generation over Curve25519
Input:
(Curve25519) private key and message
Output:
signature
Ed25519 Sig Generation CO 0
Ed25519 Signature
Verification
EdDSA Signature Verification over Curve25519
Input:
(Curve25519) public key and signature
Output:
True or False
Ed25519 Sig Verification CO 0
Ed25519 Key
Agreement
Ed25519 Key Agreement
Input:
peer public key and own private key
Output:
shared secret
Ed25519 Key Agreement CO 0
ECIES Elliptic Curve encrypt/decrypt
Input for encryption:
peer public key, plaintext
Output for encryption:
public key, ciphertext (with authentication tag)
Input for decryption:
authentication tag, ciphertext, own private key
Output for decryption:
plaintext message or error
ECIES Encrypt/Decrypt CO 0
ANSI X9.63 Key
Derivation
SHA-1 hash-based key derivation function
Input:
key derivation key
Output:
derived key
SHA-1 CO 0
Service Description and Input/Output Algorithms Accessed Role Indicator
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Table 8 - Non-Approved Services
SP800-56C Key
Derivation (HKDF)
SHA-256 hash-based key derivation function
Input:
key derivation key
Output:
derived key
SHA-256 CO 0
RFC 6637 Key
Derivation
SHA hash based key derivation function
Input:
key derivation key
Output:
derived key
SHA-256, SHA-512, AES-128,
AES-256
CO 0
OMAC Message
Authentication Code
Generation and
Verification
One-Key CBC MAC using 128-bit key
Input:
message and key
Output:
message authentication code
OMAC CO 0
Message digest
generation.
Input:
message
Output:
message digest
MD2, MD4, MD5, RIPEMD CO 0
(other) symmetric
encryption /
decryption
They are non-approved encryption algorithms.
Input for Encryption:
key and plaintext data
Output for Encryption:
ciphertext data
Input for Decryption:
key and ciphertext data
Output for Decryption:
plaintext data
Blowfish, CAST5, DES, RC2,
RC4
CO 0
Service Description and Input/Output Algorithms Accessed Role Indicator
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
5. Software/Firmware security
5.1. Integrity Techniques
The Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software], which is made up of a single component, is
provided in the form of binary executable code. A software integrity test is performed on the runtime image of
the module. The HMAC-SHA256 implemented in the module is used as an approved algorithm for the integrity
test. If the test fails, the module enters an error state where no cryptographic services are provided, and data
output is prohibited i.e., the module is not operational.
5.2. On-Demand Integrity Test
Integrity tests are performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed at power-on.
It can also be invoked by self-test service or powering-off and reloading the module.
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
6. Operational Environment
6.1. Applicability
The Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] operates in a modifiable operational
environment per FIPS 140-3 level 1 specifications. The module is supplied as part of Device OS, a commercially
available general-purpose operating system executing on the computing platforms specified in section 2.
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
7. Physical Security
The FIPS 140-3 physical security requirements do not apply to the Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon,
Kernel, Software], since it is a software module.
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
8. Non-invasive Security
Currently, the non-invasive security is not required by FIPS 140-3 (see NIST SP 800-140F). The requirements of
this area are not applicable to the module.
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
9. Sensitive Security Parameter Management
The following table summarizes the keys and Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the
cryptographic services implemented in the module:
Key/SSP
Name /
Type
Strength Security
Function and
Cert. Number
Generat-
ion
Import
/
Export
Establi
-
shme
nt
Storage Zeroisation Use and
related
keys
AES Keys 128 to
256 bits
AES Encryption/
Decryption
A943 (vng_asm),
A945 (c_asm),
A946 (asm_arm)
N/A Import
from
calling
applicati
on
No
Export
N/A N/A: The
module does
not provide
persistent
keys/SSPs
storage.
Automatic
zeroisation
when structure
is deallocated
or when the
system is
powered down
Symmetric
Encryption
and
Decryption
AES Key-
encryption
Keys
128 to
256 bits
AES Key Wrapping
A945 (c_asm)
N/A Import
from
calling
applicati
on
No
Export
N/A N/A: The
module does
not provide
persistent
keys/SSPs
storage.
Automatic
zeroisation
when structure
is deallocated
or when the
system is
powered down
Key
Transport
HMAC Keys Min: 112
bits
HMAC generation
and verification
A942 (vng_ltc),
A944 (c_ltc),
A947 (vng_neon)
N/A Import
from
calling
applicati
on
No
Export
N/A N/A: The
module does
not provide
persistent
keys/SSPs
storage.
Automatic
zeroisation
when structure
is deallocated
or when the
system is
powered down
Keyed
Hash
ECDSA Key
Pair
(including
intermediate
keygen
values)
112 to 256
bits
ECDSA signature
generation and
verification
A942 (vng_ltc)
The key
pairs are
generated
conformant
to
SP800-133
r2 (CKG)
using
FIPS186-4
Key
Generation
method,
and the
random
value used
in the key
generation
is
generated
using
SP800-90A
DRBG
Import
and
Export
to
calling
applicati
on.
Interme
diate
keygen
values
are not
output.
N/A N/A: The
module does
not provide
persistent
keys/SSPs
storage.
Automatic
zeroisation
when structure
is deallocated
or when the
system is
powered down.
Intermediate
keygen values
are zeroized
before the
module returns
from the key
generation
function.
Digital
Signature
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Table 9 - SSPs
9.1. Random Number Generation
A NIST approved deterministic random bit generator based on a block cipher as specified in NIST [SP 800-90A]
is used. The default Approved DRBG used for random number generation is a CTR_DRBG using AES-256 with
derivation function and without prediction resistance. The random numbers used for key generation are all
generated by CTR_DRBG in this module. Per section 10.2.1.1 of [SP 800-90A], the internal state of CTR_DRBG is
the value V and Key.
The module also employs a HMAC_DRBG for random number generation. The HMAC_DRBG is only used at the
early boot time of Device OS kernel for memory randomization. The output of HMAC_DRBG is not used for key
generation. Per section 10.1.2.1 of [SP 800-90A], the internal state of HMAC_DRBG is the value V and Key .
The deterministic random bit generators are seeded by “read_random”. The read_random is the Kernel Space
interface. Two entropy sources (one non-physical entropy source and one physical entropy source) residing
within the TOEPP provide the random bits. The output of entropy pool provides 256-bits of entropy to seed and
reseed SP800-90B DRBG during initialization (seed) and reseeding (reseed).
RSA Key Pair 112 to 150
bits
RSA signature
generation and
verification
A942 (vng_ltc)
N/A Import
from
calling
applicati
on
No
Export.
Interme
diate
keygen
values
are not
output.
N/A N/A: The
module does
not provide
persistent
keys/SSPs
storage.
Automatic
zeroisation
when structure
is deallocated
or when the
system is
powered down.
Intermediate
keygen values
are zeroized
before the
module returns
from the key
generation
function.
Digital
Signature
Entropy Input
String
256 bits Random Number
Generation
ENT (P) and ENT
(NP)
Obtained
from two
entropy
sources
Import
from OS
No
Export
N/A N/A: The
module does
not provide
persistent
keys/SSPs
storage.
Automatic
zeroisation
when structure
is deallocated
or when the
system is
powered down
Random
Number
Generation
DRBG Seed,
internal
state: V value
and Key
256 bits Random Number
Generation
A942 (vng_ltc)
A943 (vng_asm)
A944 (c_ltc)
A945 (c_asm)
Derived
from
entropy
input string
as defined
by
SP800-90A
N/A N/A N/A: The
module does
not provide
persistent
keys/SSPs
storage.
Automatic
zeroisation
when structure
is deallocated
or when the
system is
powered down
Random
Number
Generation
Software
integrity key
N/A HMAC SHA-256
A942 (vng_ltc),
A944 (c_ltc),
A947 (vng_neon)
N/A N/A N/A Stored in the
module
binary
computed
during build.
N/A Self-Test
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Table 10 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification
9.2. Key / SSP Generation
The module generates Keys and SSPs in accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H. The cryptographic module
performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys as per [SP800-133r2] (vendor affirmed),
compliant with [FIPS186-4], and using DRBG compliant with [SP800-90A]. A seed (i.e., the random value) used
in asymmetric key generation is obtained from [SP800-90A] DRBG. The key generation service for ECDSA as
well as the [SP 800-90A] DRBG have been ACVT tested with algorithm certificates found in Table 4.
9.3. Keys/SSPs Establishment
The module provides the following key/SSP establishment services in the Approved mode:
• AES-Key Wrapping
The module implements a Key Transport Scheme (KTS) using AES-KW compliant to [SP800-38F]. The SSP
establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.
9.4. Keys/SSPs Import/Export
All keys and SSPs that are entered from, or output to module, are entered from or output to the invoking
application running on the same device. Keys/ SSPs entered into the module are electronically entered in plain
text form. Keys/SSPs are output from the module in plain text form if required by the calling application.
The module allows the output of plaintext CSPs (i.e., ECDSA Key Pair). To prevent inadvertent output of sensitive
information, the module performs the following two independent internal actions:
1. The module will internally request the random number generation service to obtain the random numbers and
verify that the service completed without errors.
2. Once the keys are generated the module will perform the pairwise consistency test and verify that the test is
completed without errors.
Only after successful completion of both these actions, are the generated CSPs output via the KPI output
parameter in plaintext.
9.5. Keys/SSPs Storage
The Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] stores ephemeral keys/SSPs in memory
only. They are received for use or generated by the module only at the command of the calling application. The
module does not provide persistent keys/SSPs storage.
The module protects all keys/SSPs through the memory separation and protection mechanisms provided by the
operating system. No process other than the module itself can access the keys/SSPs in its process’ memory.
9.6. Keys/SSPs Zeroization
Keys and SSPs are zeroised when the appropriate context object is destroyed or when the system is powered
down. Input and output interfaces are inhibited while zeroisation is performed.
Entropy Source Minimum number of
bits of entropy
Details
NIST SP800-90B compliant
ENT (P) and
NIST SP800-90B compliant
ENT (NP)
256 The seed is provided by post-processed entropy
data from two entropy sources
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
10.Self-tests
This section specifies the pre-operational and conditional self-tests performed by the module. The pre-
operational and conditional self-tests ensure that the module is not corrupted and that the cryptographic
algorithms work as expected. The module does not implement a bypass mode nor security functions critical to
the secure operation of the cryptographic module and thus, does not implement neither a pre-operational
bypass test nor pre-operational critical functions test. While the module is executing the self-tests, services are
not available, and input and output are inhibited. If the test fails either pre-operational and conditional self-tests,
the module reports an error message indicating the cause of the failure and enters the Error State. See section
10.3. The module permits operators to initiate the pre-operational or conditional self-tests on demand for
periodic testing of the module by rebooting the system (i.e., power-cycling).
10.1.Pre-operational Software Integrity Test
The module performs a pre-operational software integrity automatically when the module is loaded into memory
(i.e., at power on) before the module transitions to the operational state. A software integrity test is performed on
the runtime image of the Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] with HMAC-SHA256
used to perform the approved integrity technique. Prior to using HMAC-SHA-256, a Conditional Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-Tests (CAST) is performed. If the CAST on the HMAC-SHA-256 is successful, The HMAC value
of the runtime image is recalculated and compared with the stored HMAC value pre-computed at compilation
time.
10.2.Conditional Self-Tests
Conditional self-tests are be performed by a cryptographic module when the conditions specified for the
following tests occur: Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test, Pair-Wise Consistency Test.
The module does not implement any functions requiring a Software/Firmware Load Test, Manual Entry Test,
Conditional Bypass Test nor Conditional Critical Functions Test; therefore, these tests are not performed by the
module.
The following sub-sections describe the conditional tests supported by the Apple corecrypto Module v11.1
[Apple silicon, Kernel, Software].
10.2.1.Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests
In addition to the pre-operational software integrity test described in Section 10.1, the Apple corecrypto Module
v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] also runs the Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests (CAST) for all
cryptographic functions of each approved cryptographic algorithm implemented by the module during power-up
as well. All CASTs are performed prior to the first operational use of the cryptographic algorithm. These tests are
detailed in the table below.
Cryptographic Algorithm Notes
HMAC-SHA256 Used for module integrity test
AES implementations selected by the module for the
corresponding environment
AES-CCM, AES-GCM, AES-XTS, AES-CBC, AES-ECB using
128-bit key
Separate encryption / decryption operations are performed
CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG Each DRBG mode tested separately
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512 KAT
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512 Covered by high level HMAC self-test
RSA, 2048-bit modulus with SHA-256 Separate Signature generation/ verification KAT are performed
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Table 11 - Pre-Operational Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests
10.2.2.Conditional Pairwise Consistency Test
The Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] does generate asymmetric ECDSA keys and
performs the required ECDSA pair-wise consistency tests on the newly generated key pairs.
10.3.Error Handling
If any of the self-tests described in Sections 10.1, 10.2.1 or 10.2.2 fail, the module reports the cause of the error
and enters an error state. In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is
prohibited. The only method to recover from the error state is to power cycle the device which results in the
module being reloaded into memory and reperforming the pre-operational software integrity test and the
Conditional CASTs. The module will only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre-
operational software integrity test and the Conditional CASTs. The table below shows the different causes that
lead to the Error State and the status indicators reported.
Table 12 - Error Indicators
ECDSA, P-256 curve with SHA-256 Separate Signature generation/ verification KAT are performed
Cryptographic Algorithm Notes
Cause of Error Error Indicator
Failed Pre-operational Software
Integrity Test
print statement “FAILED: fipspost_post_integrity” to stdout
Failed Conditional CAST print statement “FAILED:<event>” to stdout (<event> refers to any of the cryptographic
functions listed in Table 11. )
Failed Conditional PCT Error code “CCEC_GENERATE_KEY_CONSISTENCY” returned
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
11. Life-cycle assurance
11.1. Delivery and Operation
The module is built into iOS 14, iPadOS 14, watchOS 7, tvOS 14, TXFW 11 and macOS Big Sur 11.1 and delivered
with Device OS. There is no standalone delivery of the module as a software library.
The vendor’s internal development process guarantees that the correct version of module goes with its intended
Device OS version. For additional assurance, the module is digitally signed by vendor, and it is verified during the
integration into Device OS.
This digital signature-based integrity protection during the delivery/integration process is not to be confused
with the HMAC-256 based integrity check performed by the module itself as part of its pre-operational self-
tests.
11.2.Crypto Officer Guidance
The Approved mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only be transitioned into the
non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved services listed in Table 8 - Non-Approved Services. If
the device starts up successfully, then the module has passed all self-tests and is operating in the Approved
mode.
A Crypto Officer Role Guide is provided by Apple which offers IT System Administrators with the necessary
technical information to ensure FIPS 140-3 Compliance of the deployed systems. This guide walks the reader
through the system’s assertion of cryptographic module integrity and the steps necessary if module integrity
requires remediation. A link to the Guide can be found on the Product security, validations, and guidance page
found in [Device OS].
The Crypto Officer shall consider the following requirements and restrictions when using the module
o AES-GCM IV is constructed in compliance with IG C.H scenario 1. The GCM IV generation follows RFC
4106 and shall only be used for the IPsec protocol version 3. When the IV in RFC 4106 exhausts the
maximum number of possible values for a given security association, either party to the security
association that encounters this condition triggers a rekeying with IKEv2 to establish a new encryption key
for the security association. The module uses RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret
SKEYSEED from which the AES-GCM encryption keys are derived. In case the module’s power is lost and
then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be re-distributed. This condition
is not enforced by the module.
o AES-XTS mode is only approved for hardware storage applications. The length of the AES-XTS data unit
does not exceed 220 blocks. The module checks explicitly that Key_1 ≠ Key_2 before using the keys in the
XTS-Algorithm to process data with them compliant with IG C.I.
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
12.Mitigation of other attacks
The module does not claim mitigation of other attacks.
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
A. Glossary and Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CAST Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test
CAST5 A symmetric-key 64-bit block cipher with 128-bit key
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
CFB Cipher Feedback
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter Mode
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
ENT NIST SP 800-90B Compliant Entropy Source
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
GCM Galois Counter Mode
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
KEXT Kernel Extension
KW AES Key Wrap
MAC Message Authentication Code
KPI Kernel Programming Interface
NIST National Institute of Science and Technology
OFB Output Feedback
PAA Processor Algorithm Acceleration
PKG Key-Pair Generation
PKV Public Key Validation
PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Addleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
TOEPP Tested Operational Environment Physical Perimeter
XTS XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with cipher text Stealing
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
B. References
FIPS140-3 FIPS PUB 140-3 - Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
March 2019
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-3
SP 800-140x CMVP FIPS 140-3 Related Reference
https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/fips-140-3-
standards
FIPS140-3_IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program
September 2020
https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/fips-140-3-ig-
announcements
FIPS140-3_MM CMVP FIPS 140-3 Draft Management Manual
https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/
documents/fips%20140-3/Draft%20FIPS-140-3-
CMVP%20Management%20Manual%2009-18-2020.pdf
SP 800-140 FIPS 140-3 Derived Test Requirements (DTR)
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140/final
SP 800-140A CMVP Documentation Requirements
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140a/final
SP 800-140B CMVP Security Policy Requirements
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140b/final
SP 800-140C CMVP Approved Security Functions
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140c/final
SP 800-140D CMVP Approved Sensitive Security Parameter Generation and Establishment Methods
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140d/final
SP 800-140E CMVP Approved Authentication Mechanisms https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/
detail/sp/800-140e/final
SP 800-140F CMVP Approved Non-Invasive Attack Mitigation Test Metrics https://csrc.nist.gov/
publications/detail/sp/800-140f/final
FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS
)

March 201
2

http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf
FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS
)

July 201
3

http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard
November 200
1

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
FIPS198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
July 200
8

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf
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This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.
1

February 200
3

http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
RFC3394 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm
September 200
2

http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3394.txt
RFC5649 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm
September 200
9

http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5649.txt
SP800-38A NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation Methods and Technique
s

December 200
1

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
SP800-38C NIST Special Publication 800-38C - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentialit
y

May 200
4

http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38c.pdf
SP800-38D NIST Special Publication 800-38D - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC
November 2007
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf
SP800-38E NIST Special Publication 800-38E - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The XTS AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Device
s

January 201
0

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf
SP800-38F NIST Special Publication 800-38F - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping
December 201
2

http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf
SP800-56Cr2 Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key-Establishment Schemes
 

August 202
0

https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2.pdf
SP800-57 NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 5 - Recommendation for Key
Management Part 1: General
 

May 202
0

https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5.pdf
SP800-67 NIST Special Publication 800-67 Revision 1 - Recommendation for the Triple
Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
January 201
2

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-67-Rev1/SP-800-67-Rev1.pdf
SP800-90Ar1 NIST Special Publication 800-90A - Revision 1 - Recommendation for Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generator
s

June 201
5

http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf
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This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.
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Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
SP800-90B NIST Special Publication 800-90B - Recommendation for the Entropy Sources
Used for Random Bit Generatio
n

January 201
8

https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf
SP800-108 NIST Special Publication 800-108 - Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
Pseudorandom Functions (Revised
)

October 200
9

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-108/sp800-108.pdf
SP800-131Ar2 Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths
 

March 201
9

https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf
SP800-133r2 Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation
 

June 202
0

https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf
SP800-135 NIST Special Publication 800-135 Revision 1 - Recommendation for Existing
Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions
 

December 201
1

http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-135r1.pdf
Developer Device OS Technical Overview
https://developer.apple.com
SEC Apple Platform Security (February 2021)
https://support.apple.com/guide/security/welcome/web
https://manuals.info.apple.com/MANUALS/1000/MA1902/en_US/apple-platform-
security-guide.pdf
Device OS Product security certifications for Device OS
macOS: https://support.apple.com/HT201159
T2: https://support.apple.com/HT208675
iOS: https://support.apple.com/HT202739
iPadOS: https://support.apple.com/HT211006
watchOS: https://support.apple.com/HT208390
tvOS: https://support.apple.com/HT208389
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This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirely without revision.
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