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Non-Proprietary Security Policy
for the FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Validated
Fortress Secure Bridge
Hardware:
ES210: Tactical Mesh Point
ES300: Inline Network Encryptor
ES440: Infrastructure Mesh Point
ES520: Deployable Mesh Point
ES820: Vehicle Mesh Point
Firmware: V5.1, V5.1.1, V5.2.1, V5.2.1.1162, 5.2.2, 5.2.2.1011 and V5.3.0
May, 2012
This security policy of Fortress Technologies, Inc., for the FIPS 140-2 validated Fortress
Secure Network units (FSN), defines general rules, regulations, and practices under
which the FSN was designed and developed and for its correct operation. These rules
and regulations have been and must be followed in all phases of security projects,
including the design, development, manufacture service, delivery and distribution, and
operation of products.
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REVISION HISTORY
Rev Date Author Description
1.0 Sept, 2009 Bill McIntosh Initial Release
2.0 Oct, 2009 Bill McIntosh Incorporated lab comments
3.0 Nov, 2009 Bill McIntosh Incorporated lab comments
4.0 Mar, 2010 Tony Margalis Incorporated NIST comments
5.0 April, 2010 Tony Margalis Incorporated V5.3.0
6.0 July, 2010 Tony Margalis Incorporated V5.2.1.1162
7.0 Nov, 2010 Tony Margalis Incorporated ES440 & ES820
8.0 Aug, 2011 Michael Chapman Merged two documents and updated correctly.
9.0 May, 2012 Michael Chapman Updated for new patch release.
9.1 May, 2012 Michael Chapman Updated based on lab comments.
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Contents
CONTENTS................................................................................................................................... 3
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES ............................................................................................ 5
1.0 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 6
1.1 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT ................................................................................... 6
1.2 PRODUCTS......................................................................................................................... 6
1.3 CHANGES FROM 5.2.1.1162 TO 5.2.2 SOFTWARE RELEASE .............................................. 6
1.4 CHANGES FROM 5.2.2 TO 5.2.2.1011 SOFTWARE RELEASE .............................................. 7
1.5 RELATED DOCUMENTS ..................................................................................................... 7
1.6 GLOSSARY OF TERMS........................................................................................................ 8
1.7 FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION............................................................................................. 10
1.8 OVERALL AND INDIVIDUAL FIPS 140-2 LEVELS ............................................................ 12
1.9 MOBILE SECURITY PROTOCOL (MSP) ............................................................................ 12
1.10 ROBUST SECURITY NETWORK (RSN) (ES210, ES440, ES520, ES820).......................... 13
1.11 SECURE SOCKETS LAYER (SSL) ..................................................................................... 13
1.12 SECURE SHELL ................................................................................................................ 13
1.13 SECURE CONFIGURATION PROPAGATION (SCP) - V5.1.1 ONLY..................................... 13
1.14 MANAGEMENT ................................................................................................................ 13
1.15 ALGORITHMS................................................................................................................... 14
1.16 GUI VIEWS...................................................................................................................... 15
2.0 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY.......................................... 16
2.1 ROLES.............................................................................................................................. 16
2.2 SERVICES......................................................................................................................... 16
2.3 AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHENTICATION DATA........................................................... 17
2.3.1 Authentication Methods........................................................................................... 17
2.3.2 Authentication Server Methods................................................................................ 18
2.3.3 Authentication Strength ........................................................................................... 18
2.3.4 Administrative Accounts.......................................................................................... 19
3.0 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS AND CSP .......................................................................... 20
3.1 FOR MSP......................................................................................................................... 20
3.2 FOR RSN (AVAILABLE IN THE ES210, ES440, ES520, ES820) ...................................... 21
3.3 FOR SSL AND SSH.......................................................................................................... 23
3.4 CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS................................................................................. 24
4.0 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY....................................................................................... 26
4.1 ROLES EACH SERVICE IS AUTHORIZED TO PERFORM...................................................... 26
4.2 ROLES, SERVICES AND ACCESS TO KEYS OR CSPS ........................................................ 26
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4.3 ZEROIZATION .................................................................................................................. 27
4.4 UPGRADES....................................................................................................................... 28
4.4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 28
4.4.2 Selecting the Firmware Image................................................................................. 28
5.0 PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY ................................................................................. 29
5.1 HARDWARE ..................................................................................................................... 29
5.2 DISTRIBUTION AND DELIVERY........................................................................................ 29
5.3 TAMPER EVIDENCE APPLICATION .................................................................................. 29
5.4 TAMPER EVIDENCE INSPECTIONS ................................................................................... 29
6.0 FIRMWARE SECURITY ............................................................................................... 33
7.0 OPERATING SYSTEM SECURITY............................................................................. 33
8.0 SELF TESTS..................................................................................................................... 34
9.0 SECURITY POLICY FOR MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY ........ 35
10.0 EMI/EMC.......................................................................................................................... 35
11.0 CUSTOMER SECURITY POLICY ISSUES ................................................................ 35
12.0 FIPS MODE...................................................................................................................... 35
12.1 FIPS MODE REQUIREMENTS........................................................................................... 36
12.2 ALTERNATING BYPASS MODE...................................................................................... 36
13.0 MAINTENANCE ISSUES............................................................................................... 37
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List of Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Example Configurations of an FSN Network......................................................... 10
Figure 2: ES210 with Tamper Evidence Tape ....................................................................... 30
Figure 3: ES300 with Blue Blocker .......................................................................................... 31
Figure 4: ES440 Tamper Evidence.......................................................................................... 31
Figure 5: ES520V1 with Blue Blocker...................................................................................... 32
Figure 6: ES520V2 with Blue Blocker...................................................................................... 32
Figure 7: ES820 Tamper Evidence.......................................................................................... 33
Table 1: Firmware to Hardware hierarchy ................................................................................ 6
Table 2: Physical Port Difference Listing ................................................................................ 11
Table 3: Individual FIPS Level.................................................................................................. 12
Table 4: Protocols and Features Usage.................................................................................. 13
Table 5: FIPS Approved Algorithms ........................................................................................ 14
Table 6: Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms................................................................................ 15
Table 7: Authentication Data..................................................................................................... 17
Table 8: Probability of guessing the authentication data...................................................... 18
Table 9: MSP Keys..................................................................................................................... 20
Table 10: RSN Keys (ES210, ES440, ES520V1 and V2, ES820)............................................. 21
Table 11: SSL and SSH Crypto Keys...................................................................................... 23
Table 12: Other Keys and Critical Security Parameters....................................................... 24
Table 13: Roles each Service is authorized to Perform ....................................................... 26
Table 14: Roles who have Access to Keys or CSPs............................................................. 26
Table 15: Defaults and Zeroization.......................................................................................... 28
Table 16: Recommended Physical Security Activities.......................................................... 30
Table 17: Self Tests ................................................................................................................... 34
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1.0 Introduction
1.1 The Purpose of this Document
This security policy defines all FIPS 140-2 level 2 security rules under which the Fortress
Secure Network units (FSN) complies with and enforces. The FSN is a multi-chip
standalone module.
1.2 Products
The current FSN products this Security Policy is relevant to are identified as:
Hardware FSN Modules:
ES210: Tactical Mesh Point
ES300: Inline Network Encryptor
ES440: Infrastructure Mesh Point
ES520(V1 & V2): Deployable Mesh Point
ES820: Vehicle Mesh Point
Firmware Version: 5.1, 5.1.1, 5.2.1, 5.2.1.1162, 5.2.2, 5.2.2.1011 and 5.3.0
Table 1 shows the FSN Firmware to Hardware hierarchy.
Table 1: Firmware to Hardware hierarchy
Hardwar
e
Module
Firmware
V5.1
Firmware
V5.1.1
Firmware
V5.2.1
Firmware
V5.2.1.1162
Firmware
V5.2.2
Firmware
V5.2.2.101
1
Firmware
V5.3.0
ES210     
ES300  
ES440       
ES520V1       
ES520V2       
ES820       
1.3 Changes from 5.2.1.1162 to 5.2.2 Software Release
 Modify DA autoconfig to set 802.11b band for ES520 Radio 1.
 Atheros Legacy driver – Always send Probe Response regardless of received rate set in
Probe Requests.
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 Restrict 802.11b band setting to Infrastructure mode only (no WDS‐enabled BSS over
802.11b).
 Fix GUI bug in Add BSS page where bad multicast rate was set on 802.11a band.
 Expose new 802.11b radio band setting in CLI and GUI for 2.4GHz radios.
 Defects 403659 and 354219 legacy driver panic, Radio Manager “vicious cycle” when
all available channels are exhausted and one or more radios are disabled, and avoid
same SSID across multiple BSSs during BSS edit).
 Correct SSLCipherSuite in httpd.conf. These would only happen if someone had a
badly configured browser.
1.4 Changes from 5.2.2 to 5.2.2.1011 Software Release
 GTK settings defaults – Add a new comprehensive DBP converter (167) to ensure that on
upgrade from earlier 5.2.x releases, BSS GTK strict rekey is disabled, GTK rekeying is
disabled, and GMK rekeying is set to 30 minutes. Modify schema file to ensure any new
BSSs have these defaults whether created by DA auto‐configuration, or CLI/GUI BSS
controls.
 Reset BSS rate defaults during band change to prevent artificially low TX rates (11 Mbps
vs. 54 Mbps) after changing radio band from 802.11b802.11g.
 Modifications to ensure ni reference is properly decremented on RX/TX errors for
AES/CCMP frames.
 hostapd fix for adding timestamps to debug messages logged to
/var/log/svc.log.
 Log rotate fix for Services Manager log file (/var/log/svc.log).
1.5 Related Documents
# Document Name Date
1 IEEE Standard for
Information technology—
Telecommunications and information
exchange between systems—
Local and metropolitan area networks—
Specific requirements
Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC)
and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications
12 June 2007
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1.6 Glossary of Terms
 AES (Advanced Encryption Standard): also known as Rijndael, is a block
cipher adopted as an encryption standard by the U.S. government.
 ANSI (American National Standards Institute): a private non-profit
organization that oversees the development of voluntary consensus standards
for products, services, processes, systems, and personnel in the United States
 CBC (cipher-block chaining): A mode of operation where each block of
plaintext is XORed with the previous ciphertext block before being encrypted.
This way, each ciphertext block is dependent on all plaintext blocks processed up
to that point. Also, to make each message unique, an initialization vector must be
used in the first block.
 Crypto Officer (Crypto Officer): an operator or process (subject), acting on
behalf of the operator, performing cryptographic initialization or management
functions.
 Diffie-Hellman: is a cryptographic protocol that allows two parties that have no
prior knowledge of each other to jointly establish a shared secret key over an
insecure communications channel. This key can then be used to encrypt
subsequent communications using a symmetric key cipher.
 ECB (Electronic codebook): This is the simplest of the encryption modes. The
message is divided into blocks and each block is encrypted separately. The
disadvantage of this method is that identical plaintext blocks are encrypted into
identical ciphertext blocks; thus, it does not hide data patterns well. In some
senses, it doesn't provide serious message confidentiality, and it is not
recommended for use in cryptographic protocols at all.
 EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol): is a universal authentication
framework frequently used in wireless networks and Point-to-Point connections.
 EAP-TLS: is an IETF open standard that is the original standard wireless LAN
EAP authentication protocol, and is well-supported among wireless vendors.
 Hard Key: A key that is generated using information that is static.
 HMAC (Hash Message Authentication Code): a keyed Hash Message
Authentication Code is a type of message authentication code (MAC) calculated
using a specific algorithm involving a cryptographic hash function in combination
with a secret key.
 HTTPS: Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Secure Socket Layer
 IEEE 802.11: is a set of standards for wireless local area network (WLAN)
computer communication, developed by the IEEE LAN/MAN Standards
Committee (IEEE 802) in the 5 GHz and 2.4 GHz public spectrum bands.
 IEEE 802.11i: Is an amendment to the IEEE 802.11 standard specifying security
mechanisms for wireless networks.
 MAC (Message Authentication Code): a short piece of information used to
authenticate a message.
 MIC (Message Integrity code): is a short piece of information used to check the
integrity of a message. This is the same as a MAC. Normally in communications
this would be called a MAC (Message Authentication Code) however since the
term MAC is used in IEEE 802 products to mean the physical address of a
Network Interface Card the term MIC was created.
 Mode: In cryptography, a block cipher operates on blocks of fixed length, often
64 or 128 bits. Because messages may be of any length, and because
encrypting the same plaintext under the same key always produces the same
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output (as described in the ECB), several modes of operation have been
invented which allow block ciphers to provide confidentiality for messages of
arbitrary length.
 Multi-factor Authentication™: The FSN guards the network against illicit
access by checking three levels of access credentials before allowing a
connection.
o Network authentication mandates that connecting devices use the correct
shared identifier for the network. The Fortress Security System requires
all members of a secure network to authenticate with the correct Access
ID.
o Device authentication mandates that a connecting device is individually
recognized on the network through its unique device identifier. The
Fortress Security System requires each device to authenticate on the
secure network with the unique Device ID generated for that device.
o User authentication requires the user of a connecting device to enter a
recognized user name and valid credentials, a password, for example, or
a digital certificate. The Fortress Security System can authenticate users
locally
 Nonce: stands for number used once. It is often a random or pseudo-random
number issued in an authentication protocol to ensure that old communications
cannot be reused in replay attacks.
 PMK (Pairwise Master Key): an EAP exchange will provide the shared secret
key called a PMK (Pairwise Master Key) in IEEE 802.11 security. This key is
designed to last the entire session and should be exposed as little as possible.
 PRNG (pseudorandom number generator): is an algorithm for generating a
sequence of numbers that approximates the properties of random numbers. The
sequence is not truly random in that it is completely determined by a relatively
small set of initial values, called the PRNG's state.
 RNG (Random Number Generator): is a computational or physical device
designed to generate a sequence of numbers or symbols that lack any pattern,
i.e. appear random.
 PSK (Pre Shared Key): is a shared secret which was previously shared between
the two parties using some secure channel before it needs to be used.
 PTK (Pairwise Transient Key): A Key generated by concatenating the following
attributes in IEEE 802.11 security: PMK, AP nonce (ANonce), STA nonce
(SNonce), AP MAC address and STA MAC address.. The product is then put
through a cryptographic hash function.
 SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm): these are a set of cryptographic hash functions
designed by the National Security Agency (NSA) and published by the NIST as a
U.S. Federal Information Processing Standard.
 TRNG (True Random Number Generator): This is the Fortress implementation
of a non-deterministic Random Number Generator. The design of the TRNG
contains two free-running oscillators, a fast and slow one. Neither is intentionally
related in any way, and indeed the relationship changes with physical affects.
The basic principle of operation is that the slow oscillator samples the fast one,
and it is the thermal jitter effects present on the slow oscillator which are
“measured” as the sources of random entropy. The TRNG is used to generate
real cryptographically strong random numbers to use as seeds into the PRNG.
The PRNG are started from this arbitrary starting state, using the TRNG ‘random’
seed state.
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 TLS (Transport Layer Security): Along with its predecessor the Secure Sockets
Layer (SSL) are cryptographic protocols that provide secure communications on
the Internet for such things as web browsing, e-mail, Internet faxing, instant
messaging and other data transfers. TLS in this module is implemented by using
SSL 3.1.
 WPA2 (Wireless Protected Access 2): The advanced protocol, certified through
Wi-Fi Alliance's WPA2 program, implements the mandatory elements of 802.11i.
In particular, it introduces a new AES-based algorithm, CCMP, which is
considered fully secure.
 ANSI X9.31 PRNG: This is a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number
generator with properties that make it suitable for use in cryptography.
Figure 1: Example Configurations of an FSN Network
1.7 Functional Description
The Fortress Secure Network units (FSN) is an all-in-one network access device that
implements the strongest security commercially available today. The different models
can have different number types of interfaces and enclosures however the security
functionality is exactly the same. The FSN can serve as a wireless bridge (ES210,
ES440, ES520, ES820), a WLAN access point (ES210, ES440, ES520, ES820), an
eight-port LAN switch (ES520), a two port LAN bridge (ES300) while it encrypts traffic
and provides Multi-factor Authentication™ for devices on the network it secures.
The ES520 V1 (i.e. legacy unit) has one 48V power input and the newer ES520 V2 has
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one 48V power input along with a variable 12/24 power input connector. The ES210,
ES300, ES440 and ES820 allow for variable 7/30V power. The ES520 V1 has 2 unused
USB ports and the ES440, ES520V2 and ES820 have 1 unused USB port. USB ports
are for future development and are not functional at this time.
The hardware enclosures are all rugged, compact chassis as shown in the network
drawings above. The FSN can be used indoors or outdoors. The FSN can be quickly
and transparently integrated into an existing network to provide enhanced FIPS 140-2
security.
The LED’s indicate the FSN is booting or operating normally and when clear text is in the
encrypted zone. For the ES210 and ES520 V1&V2 there is are LEDs to indicate when
radio(s) are on/off or passing traffic or when a firmware error occurs. For the ES210 only
there is an LED indicating the battery condition.
Any of the interfaces can be used within a Clear Text Zone1
or Encrypted Zones2
. The
unit can be powered with standard AC current (using a AC/DC Converter), as an
Ethernet powered device (PD) through its WAN port which supports power over Ethernet
(PoE) or with a battery (ES210). The FSN can accept secure or unsecured connections
from a device (i.e. laptops or handheld) by means of an Ethernet interface (all models) or
by its low powered WAN interface (ES210, ES440, ES520, ES820).The FSN can be
wirelessly networked together by using its high power Ethernet interface or it WAN
Ethernet interface (ES440, ES520, ES820).
The FSN in v5.3.0 can create its own wireless mesh network. This allows the coverage
area to be extended with each additional node that is meshed together. This also allows
the network to be more robust with each additional node added to the network.
The FSN uses two methods to protect and secure End Users data. They are the
Fortress’ proprietary Mobile Security Protocol (MSP) available on all models or IEEE
802.11 security recommendations referred to as Robust Security Network (RSN)
available on the ES210, ES440, ES520 and ES820. Both of these methods can protect
IEEE802.11 wireless network communication while MSP can also protect Ethernet
communication. It also uses the SSL protocol to protect HTTPS connections into the GUI
or SSH connections (SSH use the same cryptographic algorithms as SSL) into the CLI.
Table 2: Physical Port Difference Listing
Port/Product ES210 ES300 ES440 ES520 ES520 ES8203
1
Clear Text Zone refers to the portions of the network that are trusted and that the FSN will normally only
send and receive packets that have not been FIPS encrypted. These could be packets that have come from a
encrypted zone that have been decrypted or packet that have originated from the FSN like from the GUI,
CLI or SNMP.
2
Encrypted Zone refers to the portions of the network that are untrusted and that the FSN will normally
only send or receive encrypted packets.
3
The ES820 has a 37 pin I/O port that the Power, Ethernet, Console, USB, LED and Switch connections.
These connections are design to be interfaced to a breakout box that will the responsibility of the customer.
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V1 V2
Ethernet Port 1 1 1 8 8 1
Wan Port 1 1 1 1 1 1
WLAN IEEE 802.11a/b/g Port 1 None 4 1 1 2
GPS Antenna Port 1 None None None None None
USB Ports (Not Used) None 1 1 2 1 1
Console Port 1-3 pin 1-RJ48 1-RJ48 1-RJ48 1-RJ48 1
Serial Port None 1-RJ48 None None 1-RJ48 None
LED 4 4 8 8 8 6
Pushbuttons 3 3 1 3 3 1
Static DC Power Port None None None 48 V DC 48 V DC None
Selectable DC Power Port None None None None 12v/24v/4
8v
None
Variable DC Power Port Input 7-30 Volt 7-30 Volt 7-30 Volt None None 7-30 Volt
Internal Battery 1 None None None None None
1.8 Overall and Individual FIPS 140-2 Levels
This product has an overall FIPS 140-2 certification of level 2.
Table 3: Individual FIPS Level
FIPS Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment 2
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks 2
1.9 Mobile Security Protocol (MSP)
MSP is used by all FSNs to secure connections between an End User and the FSN.
MSP uses the Diffie-Hellman (D-H) or Elliptic Curve Cryptography Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) for key generation and agreement, AES-CBC for strong encryption and Multi-
factor Authentication for added protection for clients. It protects both users Peer-to-Peer
packets and Multicast/Broadcast packets.
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FSN supports the National Security Agency Suite B recommendations using the 384 bit
prime-modulus curve.
Once it’s installed and configured, operation is automatic, requiring no or little
administrator intervention as it protects data transmitted on WLANs and between WLAN
devices and the wired LAN.
1.10 Robust Security Network (RSN) (ES210, ES440, ES520, ES820)
RSN is used to secure connections between an End User and the FSN. RSN is a
component of WPA2 that implements only the FIPS capable portions of the IEEE 802.11
security recommendations. It uses the AES-CCM (CCMP) IEEE 802.11 security
recommendations which utilize two methods to acquire a master key: one method uses
a pre-shared Master Key that is configured by the Crypto Officer (Crypto Officer) and the
other gets the Master Key from an EAP-TLS session. If the latter is used a Pair-wise
Master Key is generated between the Client and Authentication Server (AS). The AS
sends this to the FSN. A Pairwise Transient Key will be generated between the client
and the FSN. A four way handshake is used to guarantee that both the Client and the
FSN will have the appropriate information and will generate the same Pairwise Transient
Key.
1.11 Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
The SSL protocol is used by all FSNs to secure HTTPS connections into the FSN GUI
that a Crypto Officer can use for administration. The FSN uses the SSL version 3.1 as a
library. SSL provides confidentiality, integrity, and message digest services. OpenSSL
toolkit version 1.1.1 with patch was used in the creation of the SSL library.
1.12 Secure Shell
The SSH protocol is used by all FSNs to secure remote terminal connections into the
FSN that a Crypto Officer can use for administration. The SSH protocol uses the same
cryptographic algorithms as SSL.
1.13 Secure Configuration Propagation (SCP) - V5.1.1 only
In a mesh network of FSNs, a user can designate one of them as the network’s Secure
Configuration Propagation (SCP) master Bridge and then use the SCP master to automatically
propagate configuration changes to the rest of the network Bridges.
1.14 Management
The FSN can be managed by the following:
 Internet browser through the Graphical User Interface (GUI);
 A directly connected terminal plugged into the Console Port through the
Command Line Interface (CLI);
 A remote workstation using SSH through the CLI;
 using SNMP Version 3 Network Station or Utility.
Table 4: Protocols and Features Usage
Port/Product ES300 ES210, ES440, ES520 V1,
ES520V2, ES820
Mobile Secure Protocol √ √
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Robust Secure Network No √
Secure Socket Layer √ √
Secure SHell √ √
Secure Configuration Propagation √ √
Graphic User Interface √ √
Command Line Interface √ √
SNMP √ √
1.15 Algorithms
This firmware contains four different security methods MSP, SSL and SSH for all FSN
and the RSN for the FSN. All hardware versions use all algorithms listed below. MSP
and RSN will secure End User data while SSL and SSH will secure Crypto Officer
connections to the FSN. They all use the algorithms as detailed in Table 5. The non-
FIPS algorithms are detailed in Table 6.
The AMD Alchemy will execute the code containing the algorithms that are mainly
written in the C or C++ programming language. The FPGA will have loaded a binary
package that will set up the chip for the algorithm processing. This will define the
makeup of the FPGA and was designed using a binary language called VHDL.
Table 5: FIPS Approved Algorithms
Algorithm Cert # Implementation Operational Environment
AES 698 Fortress SWAB FW Algorithms AMD Alchemy MIPS
Processor
AES 694 Fortress SWAB FPGA Algorithms Xilinx Spartan FPGA
AES 688 Fortress SWAB 5.0 SSL AMD Alchemy MIPS
Processor
RSA 439 Fortress Secure Bridge 5.1 SSL AMD Alchemy MIPS
Processor
SHS 726 Fortress SWAB FW Algorithms AMD Alchemy MIPS
Processor
SHS 722 Fortress SWAB SHS and HMAC Xilinx Spartan FPGA
SHS 721 Fortress SWAB FPGA Algorithms Xilinx Spartan FPGA
SHS 717 Fortress SWAB 5.0 SSL AMD Alchemy MIPS
Processor
SHS 715 Fortress SWAB SHS-384 Algorithm AMD Alchemy MIPS
Processor
HMAC 376 Fortress SWAB FW Algorithms AMD Alchemy MIPS
Processor
HMAC 372 Fortress SWAB SHS and HMAC Xilinx Spartan FPGA
HMAC 371 Fortress SWAB FPGA Algorithms Xilinx Spartan FPGA
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Algorithm Cert # Implementation Operational Environment
HMAC 367 Fortress SWAB 5.0 SSL AMD Alchemy MIPS
Processor
ANSI X9.31
PRNG
409 Fortress SWAB FW Algorithms AMD Alchemy MIPS
Processor
ANSI X9.31
PRNG
406 Fortress SWAB FPGA Algorithms Xilinx Spartan FPGA
ANSI X9.31
PRNG
402 Fortress SWAB 5.0 SSL AMD Alchemy MIPS
Processor
Table 6: Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms
Algorithm Notes
Diffie-Hellman Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology
provides 80 or 112 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less
than 80-bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key
agreement; key establishment methodology provides 192 bits of
encryption strength)
MD5 Used within SSL to create the “Key Block”, The key block is the
repository for information that will be used for encryption key
generation part of TLS Key Derivation Function.
Hardware RNG True Random Number Generator used to generate seeds for the
ANSI X9.31 PRNG
1.16 GUI Views
This firmware contains three GUI Views: Advanced View, Simple View or Legacy View.
When firmware is installed on a ES210, ES300, ES440, ES520V2 or an ES820 platform
it will be able to use either the Advanced View and Simple View. If the firmware is
installed on an ES520V1 platform it will automatically use the Legacy View.
The Advanced View or Simple View can be toggled through the GUI. The Advance View
contains configuring, monitoring and maintaining parameters. The Simple View only
contains a subset of these parameters.
The Legacy View contains configuring, monitoring and maintaining parameters that
closely resemble Fortress’ legacy products.
The code is exactly the same and all security functions are the same in all versions.
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2.0 Identification and Authentication Policy
2.1 Roles
There are five Crypto Officer Roles.
 Crypto Officer Roles
o Advanced and Simple Views:
 Log Viewer: account users can view only high-level system health
indicators and only those log messages unrelated to configuration
changes.
 Maintenance4
: account users can view complete system and
configuration information and perform a few administrative
functions but cannot make configuration changes.
 Administrator: the main manager/administrator of the FSN.
o Legacy View (ES520 v1 only)
 Operator: account users can view complete system and
configuration information and perform a few administrative
functions but cannot make configuration changes.
 csscaisi: the main manager/administrator of the FSN.
 User Roles
 MSP End User: This role will utilize either a MSP secure client loaded on a
workstation or a MSP secure controller like the FSN to establish a secure
connection over an untrusted network.
 RSN End User: (ES210, ES440, ES520, ES820) This role will utilize either a
RSN (802.11i) secure client loaded on a workstation or a RSN (802.11i)
secure controller like a VPN to establish a secure connection over an
untrusted network.
2.2 Services
The following list summarizes the services that are provided by the FSN both in FIPS
mode and Non-FIPS mode:
 Encryption: use the encryption services of the FSN;
 Show Status: observe status parameters of the FSN;
 View Log: view log messages;
 Write Configuration: change parameters in the FSN including changing the FIPS
Mode, Bypass Setting, Zeroization and setting passwords;
 Read Configuration: read parameters in the FSN;
 Diagnostic: execute some network diagnostic and self tests services of the FSN;
 Upgrade: Upgrade the unit with a new release of firmware.
4
The Maintenance User is a CO and is not the same as a maintenance user as defined in FIPS 140-2.
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2.3 Authentication and Authentication Data
All roles must be authenticated before they can use module services. The module uses
identity based authentication. This can be processed either internally by the module or
externally using an EAP authentication server.
2.3.1 Authentication Methods
All roles must be authenticated if they use FSN services. For Crypto Officer
authentication, a User Name and Password must be presented. The module forces the
Crypto-Officer to change the default password at first login. The FSN will not accept
new passwords that do not meet specified requirements. A Crypto Officer can utilize
four secure communication methods to access the FSN, They are:
 Secure SSL connection;
 Directly connected terminal;
 Secure SSH connection;
 SNMP.
SNMP is authenticated since it’s enabled and configured within an already authenticated
Secure SSL, Direct Connect or Secure SSH connection.
A Crypto Officer can apply up to nine rules for administrative passwords that allow
stronger passwords. This can be reviewed in the User Guide. Both modules having the
same Access ID authenticate the MSP user. The RSN End User will use either a Shared
Secret or will be authenticated by the use of an external EAP Server (i.e. Radius). The
Authentication Data for each of these roles are shown in Table 7.
Table 7: Authentication Data
Operator Type of
Authentication
Connect
Using
Authentication Data
Log Viewer Password Secure SSL The possible character space is 91
characters and the password length is
between 8 and 32 characters with the
default being 15 characters.
Maintenance Password Secure SSL The possible character space is 91
characters and the password length is
between 8 and 32 characters with the
default being 15 characters.
Administrator Password Secure SSL
Direct
Connect
Secure SSH
SNMP
The possible character space is 91
characters and the password length is
between 8 and 32 characters with the
default being 15 characters.
operator Password Secure SSL The possible character space is 91
characters and the password length is
between 8 and 32 characters with the
default being 15 characters.
csscaisi Password Secure SSL The possible character space is 91
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Operator Type of
Authentication
Connect
Using
Authentication Data
characters and the password length is
between 8 and 32 characters with the
default being 15 characters.
MSP End User Access ID MSP 16-byte Access ID. (FIPS Mode)
Non-FIPS users may select 8-byte s
RSN End User Master Key or
Secret
RSN 16 bytes
2.3.2 Authentication Server Methods
The Crypto Officer can also be authenticated by using an Authentication Server. The
Authentication Server can be the one built into the FSN, one on another FSN or it can be
an external Authentication Server.
The service(s) available are determined by the FSN’s configuration for authentication
services as determined by the settings in Authentication Servers and/or Local
Authentication.
To use an external server (RADIUS) for administrator authentication, it must be
configured to use Fortress’s Vendor-Specific Attributes (see User Guide for more
information).
2.3.3 Authentication Strength
The probability of guessing the authentication data is shown in Table 8.
Table 8: Probability of guessing the authentication data
Role Probability of guessing the
authentication data
Probability of guessing the authentication data with
multiple attempts
Log Viewer Between 1/(1+91)^8 and
1/(1+91)^32.
The FSN requires that all variants of the Crypto Officer
manually enter the password. Manual entry limits the number
of attempts to eight per minute, therefore, the probability would
be between one in (2^3)/(2^62)^8 and one in (2^3)/(2^92)^32
which is less than 1 in 10^5. The maximum number of login
attempts can be set between 1 and 9 and lockout duration
between 0 and 60 minutes.
Maintenance
Administrator
operator
cssCAISI
MSP End User Either 1/(1+1)^64 or
1/(1+1)^128 for a 8 or 16- byte
Access ID respectively.
16-byte used in FIPS Mode
User authentication attempts are limited by FLASH read/write
speed to less than 16.7 MB/sec. For a 16 Byte Access ID this
represents 120x10^6 password attempts per minute.
The 2^64/120x10^6 ~ = 2^64/2^7x2^20 or a probability one in
2^37 which is better than 1 in 10^5 .
RSN End User 1/(1+1)^128. Shared Secret: User authentication attempts are limited by
FLASH read/write speed to less than 16.7 MB/sec. For a 16
Byte Shared Secret this represents 120x10^6 attempts per
minute.
The 2^64/120x10^6 ~ = 2^64/2^7x2^20 or a probability one in
2^37 which is less than 1 in 10^5 .
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Using EAP: User authentication attempts are limited by
accessing a EAP based authentication. The best this could be
is no better than the shared secret thus the same rational
applies.
2.3.4 Administrative Accounts
The FSN uses identity based authentication. The identities are configured by adding
administrative accounts to a Role. These are configured through the GUI. For instance the
product can have multiple administrative accounts each having a unique Username and Password
and each being assigned to a particular role (i.e., Log Viewer, Maintenance or Administrator).
When a user is logged into the FSN he will have all the rights of the Role he has been assigned.
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3.0 Cryptographic Keys and CSP
3.1 For MSP
The FSN contains a number of cryptographic keys and Critical Security Parameters
(CSP) for MSP as shown in Table 9. All keys are generated using FIPS approved
algorithms and methods as defined in SP800-56. All the keys are kept in RAM and never
stored to disk
Table 9: MSP Keys
Key Key Type Generation Use
Module Secret Key
(Hardkey)
AES – 128, 192, or
256 bit.
Uses Manually entered AccessID
as material. Not a valid FIPS key.
Used to mask static Diffie-Hellman
public key requests and responses over
the wire.
Static Private Key Diffie-Hellman: 1024
or 2048 bits
ECDH: 384 bits
Automatically Generated using the
ANSI X9.31 PRNG.
Along with received Diffie-Hellman
Static Public Key from partner is used
to generate the Static Secret Encryption
Key
Static Public Key Diffie-Hellman:1024
or 2048 bits
ECDH: 384 bits
Automatically Generated using
Diffie Hellman or ECDH.
Sent to communicating Module in a
packet masked with the MSK (Hardkey)
Static Secret
Encryption Key
AES – 128,192, or
256 bit.
Automatically Generated using
Diffie Hellman or ECDH.
Used to encrypt dynamic public key
requests and responses over the wire.
Dynamic Private Key Diffie-Hellman: 1024
or 2048 bits
ECDH: 384 bits
Automatically Generated using
Diffie Hellman or ECDH.
Along with received Dynamic Public
Key from partner is used to generate
the Dynamic Secret Encryption Key
Dynamic Public Key Diffie-Hellman: 1024
or 2048 bits
ECDH: 384 bits
Automatically Generated using
Diffie Hellman or ECDH.
Sent to communicating Module in a
packet encrypted with the Static Secret
Encryption Key
Dynamic Secret
Encryption Key
AES – 128, 192, or
256 bit.
Automatically Generated using
Diffie Hellman or ECDH.
Used to encrypt all packets between
two communicating Modules over the
wire
Static Group Key
(SGK)
Uses Manually
entered AccessID as
a seed.
AES – 128, 192, or
256 bit.
Generated using the AccessID and
a SALT constant to seed the
Approved RNG.
Used to mask user-data frames until a
DGK becomes active or the unicast
DKey is computed.
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3.2 For RSN (Available in the ES210, ES440, ES520, ES820)
An RSN or 802.11i wireless secure LAN can use either a PreShared Secret Key (PSK)
or a EAP generated master key. If a PSK is used each peer must configure the correct
hex value. This PSK becomes the Master Key. If the EAP method is used the Master
Key is generate through the EAP process and it’s correctly given to both the Client and
FSN.
RSN are FIPS capable portions of the the IEEE 802.11 Specification for wireless LAN
networks. The keys for RSN are shown in Table 10.
All keys are keep in RAM and never stored on disk.
Table 10: RSN Keys (ES210, ES440, ES520V1 and V2, ES820)
Key Key Type Generation Use
Pairwise Master
Key (PMK)
256 bit key. Using the key generation procedure as defined in the
IEEE 802.11 specification.
Pre-shared key:
a) Electronically entered as plaintext over a direct
connection to the console port
b) Electronically entered encrypted over a network
connection via SSH or SSL
EAP Method: PMK is created using key material
generated during authentication, which is then
transferred to FSN using RADIUS protocol.
Used to derive
pairwise
transient key
(PTK).
Pairwise
Transient Key
(PTK)
For AES-CCMP, 384
bit key comprised of
three 128 bit keys:
Data
Encryption/Integrity
key, EAPOL-Key
Encryption key, and
EAPOL-Key Integrity
key.
Using the key generation procedure as defined in the
IEEE 802.11
5
specification.
Used to protect
link between
end user
station and
FSN.
Group Master
Key (GMK)
256 bit key. Using the key generation procedure as defined in the
IEEE 802.11 specification.
Used to derive
group transient
key (GTK).
Group Transient
Key (GTK)
For RSN/TKIP and
WPA, 256 bit key
comprised of two 128
bit keys: Group
Encryption key and
Group Integrity key.
For AES-CCMP, 128
bit key comprised of
Group
Encryption/Integrity
key.
Using the key generation procedure as defined in the
IEEE 802.11 specification.
Used to protect
multicast and
broadcast
(group)
messages sent
from FSN to
associated end
user station. .
PRF HMAC 80-bit ANSI X9.31 RNG IEEE802.11i
HMAC SHA-1
5
Using the Pseudo Random Function defined in IEEE 802.11i (8.5.1.1), HMAC-SHA1
Security Policy for the Fortress Secure Bridge
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PRF function
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3.3 For SSL and SSH
The SSL protocol is used to establish a FIPS secured connection from a management
workstation running a standard Internet Browser to either the FSN GUI or the CLI. The
SSH protocol uses the cryptographic algorithms of the SSL protocol. The cryptographic
keys for SSL and SSH are shown in Table 11. All keys are kept in RAM and never
stored on disk.
Table 11: SSL and SSH Crypto Keys
Key Key Type Generation Use
RSA Private Key
SSL
RSA Key
2048 bit
Automatically Generated Used to encrypted data.
Used to decrypt data for
signature purposes.
RSA Public Key
SSL
RSA Key
2048 bits
Automatically Generated Used to decrypt data
Used to encrypt data for
signature purposes
DH Private Key
SSL & SSH
Diffie-Hellman Key
1024 bits
Seed is automatically
pulled from ANSI X9.31
PRNG.
Used along to calculate the Pre-
Master Secret from DH
DH Public Key
SSL & SSH
Diffie-Hellman Key The DH Private Key is
fed to the Diffie-Hellman
function to automatically
generate this key
Used along to calculate the Pre-
Master Secret from DH
Key Block
SSL & SSH
Generic Key
Information
Automatically Generated
by SSL Protocol
The Key Block is the keying
material that is generated for the
AES encryption key or the RSA
public/private key pair will taken
from.
Secret Encryption
Key (SSH and SSL
Session Key)
AES Key 128, 192,
256 bit
Automatically taken from
the Key Block depending
on Key Size
Encrypt Data Packets
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3.4 Critical Security Parameters
There are other critical security parameters that present in the FSN as shown in Table
12. The Pre-Master Secret from RSA and DH and the Master Secret for DH are kept in
RAM everything is in Non-Volatile Storage.
Table 12: Other Keys and Critical Security Parameters
CSP Type Generation Use
Access ID 32 Hex
Digits
Seed Generated by the Approved RNG when
in FIPS Mode.
MSK, SGK & privD-H
Group key component
and used for
authentication
Pre-Master Secret
(S) from RSA
Secret A 48 byte secret is generated by the
client.
The client will send this
data encrypted with the
RSA Public Key to the
FSN and it will be used
to generate the Master
Secret,
Pre-Master Secret
(S) from DH
Diffie-Hellman Key Diffie-Hellman: Both Client and Server Used to develop the
Master Secret
Master Secret Secret By TLS Protocol This is the key that is
used to encrypt the
Data
Log Viewer
Password
Password 8 to 16 Characters, entered by the
Crypto Officer
To authenticate the
Log View
Maintenance or
operator Password
Password 8 to 16 Characters, entered by the
Crypto Officer
To authenticate the
operator
Administrator or
csscaisi Password
Password 8 to 16 Characters, entered by the
Crypto Officer
To authenticate the
Maintenance
SNMPV3
Authentication Pass
phrase
Pass phrase 8 to 64 Characters To authenticate the use
of SNMPV3
D-H Prime Number Intermediate Crypto
Value
Hard Code Value The D-H Algorithm
Upgrade Key RSA Public Key The upgrade key is the public RSA key
used to decrypt the SHA hash value that
is attached to the firmware image that
has been loaded from an external
workstation via the GUI.
Used to decrypt the
Hash value that is
attached to the
upgrade package
Load Key RSA Public Key The load key is the public RSA key used
to decrypt the SHA hash value that is
attached to the executable firmware
image that has been loaded from the
internal flash drive
Used to decrypt the
Hash value that is
attached to the load
package
PRNG ANSI X9.31
Seed
Random Seeding
information received
from the TRNG
Automatically Generated per seeding
A loop is started where the ANSI X9.31
PRNG is seeded with 64 bits from the
TRNG each time through the loop.
Seed the ANSI X9.31
PRNG ANSI X9.31
Key K1, K2
Internal 3DES Key Automatically Generated per seeding This is an internal key
used for ANSI X9.31
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CSP Type Generation Use
192 bits Internal Key generate from the seed and
seed key
PRNG.
HMAC Key SSL Generated within the SSL package SSL module integrity
SSL code integrity
SSL message integrity
Configuration Data
Base Key (Not a
CSP)
AES Hardcoded Used to obfuscate the
Data Base however not
a CSP.
Pre-Shared Key Component Manual Entry Used to create the PTK
and the PMK
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4.0 Access Control Policy
The same Crypto Officer may not be simultaneously logged in. However, the module
supports concurrent login of different crypto-officer variants. An administrator and
maintenance or other combination of crypto-officers may be logged in at the same time.
4.1 Roles each Service is authorized to Perform
In general a Crypto Officer is allowed to login and manage the FSN and end users can
use cryptographic services as shown in Table 13.
Table 13: Roles each Service is authorized to Perform
Role/Services
Encryption
Show
Status
View
Log
Write
Configuration
(including
Bypass,
Setting
FIPS
Mode,
Setting
Passwords,
and
Zeroization)
Read
Configuration
Diagnostic
(including
self
tests)
Upgrade
Administrator √ √ √ √ √ √
Maintenance √ √ √ √
Log Viewer √
csscaisi √ √ √ √ √ √
operator √ √ √ √
MSP End User √
RSN End User √
4.2 Roles, Services and Access to Keys or CSPs
The FSN doesn’t allow the access of encryption keys and most critical security
parameters. These are protected within the operating environment. The FSN does allow
the configuration of some important parameters and passwords as detailed in Table 14.
Table 14: Roles who have Access to Keys or CSPs
Service Role Access to Cryptographic Keys and CSPs R W E
Encryption MSP
RSN
Access ID
PreShared Secret (IEEE)
All Keys
√
Show Status Administrator
Maintenance
Logviewer
csscaisi
operator
None √
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Service Role Access to Cryptographic Keys and CSPs R W E
View Log Administrator
Maintenance
Logviewer
csscaisi
operator
None √
Write
Configuration
Administrator Change own, Maintenance, and Logveiwer
password
√
csscaisi Change own and operator password √
Administrator
csscaisi
Set Access ID
Set Bypass
Set FIPS Mode
zeroization
Set SNMP Passphase
Set IEEE 802.11 Preshared Key
√
Read
Configuration
Administrator
Maintenance
Csscaisi
operator
None √
Diagnostic
(including self
tests)
Administrator
Maintenance
csscaisi
operator
None √
Upgrade Administrator
csscaisi
Upgrade Key √
W = Write access, R = Read access, E = Execute access
4.3 Zeroization
Only the CSP’s listed in Table 15 are stored in a database, which are zeroed when
restoring the defaults. Other configuration values are returned to their factory default. All
other keys and keying material are stored in RAM and are zeroized when the unit is
either rebooted or powered off. Please refer to the appropriate User Guide to determine
the actual zeroization process.
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Table 15: Defaults and Zeroization
CSP Reset value
AccessID All Zeros
Administrator Password Default Password
Log Viewer Password Default Password
Maintenance Password Default Password
CAISI Password Default Password
operator Password Default Password
SNMPV3 Authentication
Pass phrase
FSGSnmpAdminPwd.
Preshared Key All Zeros
4.4 Upgrades
4.4.1 Introduction
The FSN firmware can be upgraded in FIPS mode and in Non-FIPS mode. Any firmware
version that can be loaded on the FSN has been FIPS validated. The upgrade image is
downloaded from a workstation via using the GUI. The upgrade image is integrity
checked and stored on the internal flash and booted. The previous image is kept stored
on flash and can be selected as the boot image in case of problems with the upgrade
image.
4.4.2 Selecting the Firmware Image
The FSN stores two, user-selectable copies (or images) of the FSN software on
separate partitions of the internal flash memory. Please refer to the User Guide to
determine how to select the image for execution.
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5.0 Physical Security Policy
5.1 Hardware
The FCB executes the following hardware platforms:
 ES210
 ES300
 ES440
 ES520 Version 1
 ES520 Version 2
 ES820
Refer to the figures below.
5.2 Distribution and Delivery
The purchaser will receive an invoice that indicates which product(s) were purchased along with
the serial number(s) of the product being shipped.
The FSN is then packed and sealed and also has a packing slip placed on the outside of the box so
the customer can verify the contents. The packing slip indicates the product in the package along
with the serial number of the TOE.
FSN’s are shipped via UPS directly from Fortress Technologies to the customer site.
5.3 Tamper Evidence Application
ES210, ES440, ES820
The hardware uses 3/8 X 3/4 inch tamper evidence destructible vinyl tape as shown in
the following figures The tape is applied during manufacturing. If the tape is removed or
becomes damaged it’s recommended that the unit be returned to Fortress to reapply.
ES300, ES440, ES520V1 and ES520V2
These hardware platforms use Loctite 425 blue adhesive to cover screws for tamper
evidences as shown in the following figures. The adhesive is applied during
manufacturing. If the glue is removed or becomes damaged it’s recommended that the
unit be returned to Fortress to reapply.
5.4 Tamper Evidence Inspections
The FSN Firmware is installed by Fortress Technologies on a production-quality, FCC
certified hardware device, which also define the FSN’s physical boundary. All hardware
platforms are or will be manufactured to meet FIPS 140-2, L2 requirements. If using vinyl
tape, the tape is applied to the edge of the panel. If using epoxy potting material then
some screws on the front and back panel are covered with the material for tamper
evidence, see the following figures.
Table 16 details the recommended physical security activities that should be carried out
by the Crypto Officer.
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The host hardware platform server must be located in a controlled access area. Tamper
evidence is provided by the use of epoxy potting material covering the chassis access
screws or by vinyl tape.
If using vinyl tape, the tape is applied to the edge of the panel. If using epoxy potting
material then some screws on the front and back panel are covered with the material for
tamper evidence, see the following figures.
Table 16: Recommended Physical Security Activities
Physical Security Object Recommended
Frequency of
Inspection
Inspection Guidance
Appropriate chassis screws covered
with epoxy coating.
Daily Inspect screw heads for chipped epoxy
material. If found, remove FSN from
service.
Tape appropriately Applied Daily Inspect the tape to make sure it securely
in place.
Overall physical condition of the FSN Daily Inspect all cable connections and the
FSN’s overall condition. If any
discrepancy found, correct and test the
system for correct operation or remove
FSN from service.
Figure 2: ES210 with Tamper Evidence Tape
Vinyl Tape
Front – Right
Front -Left
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Figure 3: ES300 with Blue Blocker
Figure 4: ES440 Tamper Evidence
Blue Blocker Blue Blocker
Back
Front
Vinyl Tape
Vinyl Tape
Blue Blocker
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Figure 5: ES520V1 with Blue Blocker
Figure 6: ES520V2 with Blue Blocker
Blue Blocker
Blue Blocker
Blue Blocker
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Security Policy for the Fortress Secure Bridge
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Copyright  2010 Fortress Technologies, Inc., 4023 Tampa Rd., Suite 2200, Oldsmar, FL 34677
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Figure 7: ES820 Tamper Evidence
6.0 Firmware Security
Self-tests validate the operational status of each product, including critical functions and
files. If the firmware is compromised, the FSN enters an error state in which no
cryptographic processing occurs, preventing a security breach through a malfunctioning
device.
7.0 Operating System Security
The FSN operates automatically after power-up. The FSN operates on Fortress
Technologies proprietary version of hardened Linux operating system that is installed
along with the FSN’s software, with user access to standard OS functions eliminated.
The FSN provides no means whereby an operator could load and execute software or
firmware that was not included as part of the FSN’s validation. Updates to the firmware
are supported, but can only be made using the Vendor provided services.
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Security Policy for the Fortress Secure Bridge
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Copyright  2010 Fortress Technologies, Inc., 4023 Tampa Rd., Suite 2200, Oldsmar, FL 34677
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
8.0 Self Tests
The following tables will summaries the FSN self tests. A self-test status indication is
provided in the event log (passed or failed) for both the CLI and GUI interfaces, including
the firmware load test.
Table 17: Self Tests
Test Description MSP
Alchemy
MIPS
Processor
MSP
Xilinx
Spartan
FPGA
SSL
Alchemy
MIPS
Processor
RSN
Alchemy
MIPS
Processor
RSN
Xilinx
Spartan
FPGA
Power Up Test
AES Known Answer Test
(KAT)
Note: For all lengths, CBC
and ECB modes
A known answer test is performed √ √ √
RSA KAT A known answer test is performed √
RNG
(All Implementations)
A known answer test is performed. √ √ √ √
SHA (1, 384). KAT A known answer test is performed √ √ √ √
SHA (256, 512). KAT A known answer test is performed √ √
HMAC (SHA 1,384) A known answer test is performed √ √ √ √
HMAC (SHA 256, 512) A known answer test is performed √ √ √
Software/ Firmware
Integrity Check
Uses a RSA Signature Algorithm
for integrity checking of the image.
This algorithm uses a
Public/Private Key Pair.
√ √ √ √ √
Elliptic Curve Test A known answer test is performed √
Conditional Tests
Software/ Firmware Load
Check
This is used when
upgrading the BRIDGE.
The upgrade package for the Bridge
uses a RSA Signature Algorithm for
integrity checking of the image.
√ √ √ √ √
RNG Test
(All Implementations)
This test will compare the current
random number and a previous
random number output to ensure that
they are not the same. If they are the
same the test failed.
√ √ √
Bypass Test Bypass test run happens when a MAC
lookup table entry changes or when an
interface is added/changed/deleted.
√ √ √ √ √
Bypass Mechanism Test This will do an integrity check on the
parameters that are used to turn on
and off allowing clear text traffic to
bypass cryptographic processing. This
guarantees these parameters were not
compromised.
√ √
Security Policy for the Fortress Secure Bridge
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Copyright  2010 Fortress Technologies, Inc., 4023 Tampa Rd., Suite 2200, Oldsmar, FL 34677
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9.0 Security Policy for Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
No special mechanisms are built in the FSN; however, the cryptographic module is
designed to mitigate several specific attacks above the FIPS defined functions.
Additional features that mitigate attacks are listed here:
1. The MSP Dynamic Secret Encryption Key is changed at least once every 24
hours, with 4 hours being the factory default duration: Mitigates key discovery.
2. In the MSP, the second Diffie-Hellman key exchange produces a dynamic
common secret key in each of the modules by combining the other module’s
dynamic public key with the module’s own dynamic private key: Mitigates “man-
in-the-middle” attacks.
3. In MSP and RSN key exchanges after the first Diffie-Hellman exchange are
encrypted: Mitigates encryption key sniffing by hackers.
4. In MSP compression and encryption of header information inside of the frame,
making it impossible to guess. MSP, RSN or SSL uses strong encryption further
protects the information. Any bit flipping would be useless in this frame to try to
change the IP address of the frame: Mitigates active attacks from both ends.
5. In both MSP and RSN encryption happens at the datalink layer so that all
network layer information is hidden: Mitigates hacker’s access to the
communication.
6. In MSP Multi-factor Authentication: The FSN guards the network against illicit
access with “multi-factor authentication”, checking three levels of access
credentials before allowing a connection. These are:
a) Network authentication requires a connecting device to use the
correct shared identifier for the network
b) Device authentication requires a connecting device to be individually
recognized on the network, through its unique device identifier.
c) User authentication requires the user of a connecting device to enter
a recognized user name and password.
10.0 EMI/EMC
All models of the FSN hardware are FCC compliant and certified (Part 15, Subpart J,
Class A) devices.
11.0 Customer Security Policy Issues
Fortress Technologies, Inc. expects that after the FSN’s installation, any potential
customer (government organization or commercial entity or division) employs its own
internal security policy covering all the rules under which the FSN(s) and the customer’s
network(s) must operate. In addition, the customer systems are expected to be
upgraded as needed to contain appropriate security tools to enforce the internal security
policy.
12.0 FIPS Mode
Security Policy for the Fortress Secure Bridge
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Copyright  2010 Fortress Technologies, Inc., 4023 Tampa Rd., Suite 2200, Oldsmar, FL 34677
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12.1 FIPS Mode Requirements
The following are the requirements for FIPS mode:
a. At module start-up the module shall be set to FIPS Mode.
b. A valid FIPS network shall use an Approved RNG generated AccessID
from one FSN. All other FSN in the network will need to be setup using
this generated AccessID.
c. The Pre-Shared Key shall be entered using 64-hex values. The
passphrase method shall not be used in the FIPS mode of operation.
d. Enable the SSH protocol for remote CLI management.
The FSN comes up in the FIPS operating mode during module initialization. FIPS can
be disabled or enabled through the GUI or through the Command Line Interface (CLI) by
the Administrator. When FIPS is disabled FIPS tests are not executed.
 On the GUI the Mode Indicator (Left Top of the GUI Screen) will show whether
the unit is in Normal or FIPS module. To change operating mode on the GUI:
o Log on to the Bridge GUI through an Administrator-level account and
select Configuration -> Security from the menu on the left. On the
Security screen click EDIT.
o In the Edit Security screen’s Security Settings frame change the
Operating Mode to Normal or FIPS.
 To change operating mode on the CLI
o The operating mode can be determined by whether the command prompt
displays FIPS; Normal operating mode displays only the hostname and
single-character command prompt (> or #).
o FIPS operating mode is the default Bridge mode of FSN: Bridge CLI
operation. The FSN Normal operating mode does not comply with FIPS.
o Change between operating modes with the set fips command. To turn
FIPS operating mode on:
 # set fips on
 To place the Bridge in Normal operating mode, turn FIPS operating mode off:
o FIPS# set fips off
 You must be logged on to an administrator-level account to change the operation
mode.
12.2 Alternating BYPASS Mode
The FSN may be configured to allow cleartext traffic in the encrypted zone in FIPS
mode. The FSN will support alternating Bypass since it allows both clear text and
encrypted data on the same interface. Cleartext Traffic is enabled by configuring a
Trusted Device rule or when using IEEE802.1x.
A Trusted Device is activated by configuring the Trusted Device/AP Settings then
clicking APPLY to apply the setting.
Security Policy for the Fortress Secure Bridge
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Copyright  2010 Fortress Technologies, Inc., 4023 Tampa Rd., Suite 2200, Oldsmar, FL 34677
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The IEEE-802.1x authentication is enabled by setting the parameter in the Ethernet
Setting to On then clicking APPLY to apply the setting.
The module performs alternating Bypass by allowing cleartext traffic and encrypted
traffic together. If Cleartext Traffic is Enabled the hardware’s front-panel Cleartext LED
on the ES300, ES520V1 and V2, the Crypto LED on the ES210 or the Status LED on the
ES440 and ES820 flashes a signal whenever the Bridge passes unencrypted traffic in an
encrypted zone.
13.0 Maintenance Issues
The FSN have no operator maintainable components. Unserviceable FSN must be
returned to the factory for repair.