FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FortiMail-2000E/3000E
FortiMail-2000E/3000E FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Document Version: 1.6
Publication Date: January 4, 2019
Description: Documents FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Security Policy issues, compliancy and requirements for FIPS
compliant operation.
Firmware Version: FortiMail v6.0, build108, 180731
Hardware Version: FortiMail-2000E (C1AD94)
FortiMail-3000E (C1AD97)
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FortiMail-2000E/3000E FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
06-602-508669-20180817
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Overview 5
References 5
Introduction 6
Security Level Summary 7
Module Descriptions 8
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 8
FortiMail-2000E 10
FortiMail-3000E 11
Web-Based Manager 12
Command Line Interface 12
Roles, Services and Authentication 13
Roles 13
FIPS Approved Services 13
Non-FIPS Approved Services 15
Authentication 16
Physical Security 16
Operational Environment 18
Cryptographic Key Management 19
Random Number Generation 19
Entropy 19
Key Zeroization 19
Algorithms 19
Cryptographic Keys and Critical Security Parameters 21
Alternating Bypass Feature 24
Key Archiving 25
Mitigation of Other Attacks 25
Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) 26
FIPS 140-2 Compliant Operation 27
Enabling FIPS-CC mode 28
Self-Tests 29
Startup and Initialization Self-tests 29
Conditional Self-tests 29
Critical Function Self-tests 30
Error State 30
Overview References
Overview
This document is a FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for Fortinet's FortiMail-2000E and 3000E message security
appliances. This policy describes how the FortiMail-2000E and 3000E appliances (hereafter referred to as the
‘modules’) meet the FIPS 140-2 security requirements and how to operate the modules in a FIPS compliant
manner. This policy was created as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation of the modules.
The Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 - Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules (FIPS 140-2) details the United States Federal Government requirements for cryptographic modules.
Detailed information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST (National
Institute of Standards and Technology) website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.
References
This policy deals specifically with operation and implementation of the modules in the technical terms of the FIPS
140-2 standard and the associated validation program. Other Fortinet product manuals, guides and technical
notes can be found at the Fortinet technical documentation website at http://docs.fortinet.com.
Additional information on the entire Fortinet product line can be obtained from the following sources:
l Find general product information in the product section of the Fortinet corporate website at
http://www.fortinet.com/products.
l Find on-line product support for registered products in the technical support section of the Fortinet corporate
website at http://www.fortinet.com/support.
l Find contact information for technical or sales related questions in the contacts section of the Fortinet corporate
website at http://www.fortinet.com/contact.
l Find security information and bulletins in the FortiGuard Center of the Fortinet corporate website at
http://fortiguard.com.
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Introduction
The FortiMail family of message security appliances provide an effective barrier against the ever-rising volume of
spam, maximum protection against sophisticated messagebased attacks, and features designed to facilitate
regulatory compliance. FortiMail 6.0 offers both inbound and outbound scanning, advanced antispam and
antivirus filtering capabilities, IP address black/white listing functionality, and extensive quarantine and archiving
capabilities. Three deployment modes offer maximum versatility: transparent mode for seamless integration into
existing networks with no IP address changes, gateway mode as a proxy Mail Transfer Agent (MTA) for existing
messaging gateways, or server mode to act as a mail server with functionality for small businesses (SMBs) and
remote offices.
Note: The server mode of operation is not a FIPS approved mode of operation.
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Security Level Summary
The modules meet the overall requirements for a FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation.
Table 1: Summary of FIPS security requirements and compliance levels
Security Requirement Compliance Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services and Authentication 3
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
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Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces Module Descriptions
Module Descriptions
The FortiMail-2000E and 3000E are multiple chip, standalone cryptographic modules consisting of production
grade components contained in a physically protected enclosure in accordance with FIPS 140-2 Level 2
requirements.
The modules have a similar appearance and both have 6 network interfaces with a status LED for each network
interface (2x 1GB SFP, 4x 10/100/1000 Base-T).
The FortiMail-2000E has one, 8 core, x86 compatible CPU and 8 removable hard drives..
The FortiMail-3000E has two, 8 core, x86 compatible CPUs and 12 removable hard drives.
The modules are 2U rackmount devices.
The FortiMail-2000E and 3000E use a Fortinet entropy token as the entropy source. Refer to the Cryptographic
Key Management section for more information on entropy and entropy sources.
The validated firmware version is FortiMail v6.0, build108, 180731.
Any firmware version that is not shown on the module certificate is out of scope of this validation and requires a
separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
Figures 1 and 2 are representative of the modules tested.
Note that the modules include a VGA port that is not supported by the validated firmware and therefore is not part
of the evaluated configuration.
Also note that the removable hard drives are used to store email, log and quarantine data only. No CSPs are
stored on the removable hard drives.
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
All of the modules have status LEDs as described in the following table:
Table 2: Module Status LEDs
LED State Description
Power Green The module is powered on.
Off The module is powered off.
Status Green The module is running normally.
Flashing The module is starting up.
Off The module is powered off.
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Module Descriptions Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
LED State Description
HA Green HA is enabled.
Off The unit is in standalone mode.
Alarm Red The unit has a major alarm.
Amber The unit has a minor alarm.
Off The unit is operating normally.
Ethernet Ports Link/ACT Green Port is connected.
Flashing Port is sending/receiving data.
Off No link established.
Speed Green Connected at 1000 Mbps.
Amber Connected at 100 Mbps
Off Connected at 10 Mbps
SFP Ports Green Port is connected.
Flashing Port is sending/receiving data.
Off No link established.
SFP Ports (Bypass pair) Green Inline mode
Amber Bypass mode
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Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces Module Descriptions
FortiMail-2000E
Figure 1 - FortiMail-2000 Front and Rear Panels
Table 3: FortiMail-2000E Connectors and Ports
Connector Type Speed Supported Logical Interfaces Description
Ports 1-4 RJ-45 10/100/1000
Base-T
Data input, data output, control
input and status output
Connection to 10/100/1000
networks.
Ports 5-6 SFP 1 Gbps Data input, data output, control
input and status output
Fiber optic connection to
gigabit optical networks.
Console Port RJ-45 9600 bps Control input, status output Optional connection to the
management computer.
Provides access to the
command line interface
(CLI).
USB Port USB A N/A Key loading and archiving,
entropy input
Optional USB token and
entropy token.
AC POWER N/A N/A Power 120/240VAC power
connection.
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Module Descriptions Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
FortiMail-3000E
Figure 2 - FortiMail-3000E Front and Rear Panels
Table 4: FortiMail-3000E Connectors and Ports
Connector Type Speed Supported Logical Interfaces Description
Ports 1-4 RJ-45 10/100/1000
Base-T
Data input, data output, control
input, and status output
Copper gigabit connection to
10/100/1000 copper
networks.
Ports 5-6 SFP 1 Gbps Data input, data output, control
input and status output
Fiber optic connection to
gigabit optical networks.
USB USB-A N/A Key loading and archiving, entropy
input
Optional USB token and
entropy token.
Console RJ-45 9600 bps Control input, status output Optional connection to the
management computer.
Provides access to the
command line interface
(CLI).
AC POWER N/A N/A Power 120/240VAC power
connection.
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Web-Based Manager Module Descriptions
Web-Based Manager
The FortiMaill web-based manager provides GUI based access to the modules and is the primary tool for
configuring the modules. The manager requires a web browser on the management computer and an Ethernet
connection between the FortiMail unit and the management computer.
A web-browser that supports Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.1 or 1.2 is required for remote access to the web-
based manager when the module is operating in FIPS-CC mode. HTTP access to the web-based manager is not
allowed in FIPS mode and is disabled.
Figure 3 - The FortiMail web based manager
Command Line Interface
The FortiMail Command Line Interface (CLI) is a full-featured, text based management tool for the module. The
CLI provides access to all of the possible services and configuration options in the module. The CLI uses a
console connection or a network (Ethernet) connection between the FortiMail unit and the management
computer. The console connection is a direct serial connection. Terminal emulation software is required on the
management computer using either method. For network access, a Telnet or SSH client that supports the SSH
v2.0 protocol is required (SSH v1.0 is not supported in FIPS mode). Telnet access to the CLI is not allowed in
FIPS mode and is disabled.
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Module Descriptions Roles, Services and Authentication
Roles, Services and Authentication
Roles
When configured in FIPS mode, the module provides the following roles:
l Crypto Officer
l User
The Crypto Officer role is initially assigned to the default ‘admin’ operator account. The Crypto Officer role has
read-write access to all of the module’s administrative services. The initial Crypto Officer can create additional
operator accounts. These additional accounts are assigned the Crypto Officer role and can be assigned a range
of read/write or read only access permissions including the ability to create operator accounts.
The User role can make use of the encrypt/decrypt services, but cannot access the module for administrative
purposes. The User role has access to the quarantine and email relay services as defined by a Crypto Officer.
Operators can be logged in concurrently and separation is enforced via separate identities.
The module does not provide a Maintenance role.
FIPS Approved Services
The following tables detail the types of FIPS approved services available to each role in each mode of
operation, the types of access for each role and the Keys or CSPs they affect.
The access types are abbreviated as follows:
Read Access R
Write Access W
Execute Access E
Table 5: Services available to Crypto Officers
Service Access Key/CSP
connect to module locally using the
console port
WE N/A
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Roles, Services and Authentication Module Descriptions
Service Access Key/CSP
connect to module remotely using TLS* WE
Diffie-Hellman Key, EC Diffie Hellman
Key, HTTPS/TLS Premaster Secret and
Master Secret, HTTPS/TLS Server/Host
Key, HTTPS/TLS Session Authentication
Key, and HTTPS/TLS Session Encryption
Key, DRBG v and key values, DRBG
Output, DRBG Seed, NDRNG Output
String
connect to module remotely using SSH* WE Diffie-Hellman Key, SSH Server/Host Key,
SSH Session Authentication Key, SSH
Session Encryption Key, DRBG v and key
values, DRBG Output, DRBG Seed,
NDRNG Output String
authenticate to module WE Crypto Officer Password
show system status WE N/A
show FIPS-CC mode enabled/disabled
(console/CLI only)
WE N/A
enable FIPS-CC mode of operation
(console only)
WE Configuration Integrity Key
key zeroization WE All Keys
execute factory reset (disable FIPS-CC
mode, console/CLI only)
E All keys stored in Flash RAM
execute FIPS-CC on-demand self-tests
(console only)
E
Configuration Integrity Key, Firmware
Integrity Key
add/delete crypto officer and users WE Crypto Officer Password,User Password
set/reset crypto officer and user
passwords
WE Crypto Officer Password, User Password
modify user preferences RWE N/A
backup/restore configuration file WE
Configuration Encryption Key,
Configuration Backup Key
read/set/delete/modify module
configuration
RWE N/A
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Module Descriptions Roles, Services and Authentication
Service Access Key/CSP
execute firmware update E Firmware Update Key
read log data R N/A
delete log data (console/CLI only) WE N/A
format log disk (console/CLI only) WE N/A
enable/disable alternating bypass mode WE N/A
read/set/modify HA configuration WE HA Password, HA Encryption Key
Table 6: Services available to Users in FIPS-CC mode
Service/CSP Access Key/CSP
connect to module remotely using TLS* WE Diffie-Hellman Keys, EC Diffie-Hellman
Keys, HTTPS/TLS Premaster Secret and
Master Secret, HTTPS/TLS Server/Host
Key, HTTPS/TLS Session Authentication
Key, HTTPS/TLS Session Encryption Key,
DRBG v and key values, DRBG Output,
DRBG Seed, NDRNG Output String
authenticate to module WE User Password
access to quarantined email RE N/A
modify user preferences E N/A
Non-FIPS Approved Services
The module also provides the following non-FIPS approved services:
l Configuration backups using password protection
l Services marked with an asterisk (*) in Tables 4 and 5 are considered non-approved when using the following
algorithms:
l Non-compliant-strength Diffie-Hellman
l Non-compliant-strength RSA key wrapping
The above services shall not be used in the FIPS approved mode of operation.
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Physical Security Module Descriptions
Authentication
The module uses identity based authentiction. By default, operators and users authenticate with a username and
password combination to access the module. The username/password can be stored in the local database or in a
remote LDAP database. Remote operator authentication is done over HTTPS (TLS) or SSH. Local operator
authentication is done over the console connection. Remote user authentication is done over HTTPS (TLS).
Password entry is obfuscated using asterisks.
Note that operator authentication over HTTPS/SSH and user authentication over HTTPS are subject to a limit of
3 failed authentication attempts in 1 minute; thus, the maximum number of attempts in one minute is 3.
Therefore the probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is 3 in {(10)*
(26^2)*(32)*(94^4)} which is less than 1/100,000. Operator authentication using the console is not subject to a
failed authentication limit, but the number of authentication attempts per minute is limited by the bandwidth
available over the serial connection which is a maximum of 115,200 bps which is 6,912,000 bits per minute. An 8
byte password would have 64 bits, so there would be no more than 108,000 passwords attempts per minute.
Therefore the probability of success would be 1/({(10)*(26^2)*(32)*(94^4)} /108,000) which is less than 1/100,000.
Note that the user’s username and password are not stored on the module. The module operates as a proxy for
user authentication to a backend server (typically a mail server). User authentication is done over HTTPS,
POP3S, or IMAPS. HTTPS, POP3S and IMAPS all use the underlying TLS protocol to protect user data between
the client and the module and the module and the back end server during the authentication process.
The minimum password length is 8 characters when in FIPS-CC mode (maximum password length is 32
characters) chosen from the set of ninety four (94) characters. New passwords are required to include 1
uppercase character, 1 lowercase character, 1 numeric character, and 1 special character. The odds of guessing
a password are 1 in {(10)*(26^2)*(32)*(94^4)} which is significantly lower than one in a million.
Physical Security
The modules meet FIPS 140-2 Security Level 2 requirements by using production grade components and an
opaque, sealed enclosure. Access to the enclosure is restricted through the use of tamper-evident seals to secure
the overall enclosure. The tamper-evident seals shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS Approved
mode of operation. All Networking devices need tamper-evident seals to meet the FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Physical
Security requirements.
The seals are red wax/plastic with black lettering that reads “Fortinet Security Seal”.
The tamper seals are not applied at the factory prior to shipping. It is the responsibility of the Crypto Officer to
apply the seals before use to ensure full FIPS 140-2 compliance. Once the seals have been applied, the Crypto
Officer must develop an inspection schedule to verify that the external enclosure of the modules and the tamper
seals have not been damaged or tampered with in any way. Upon viewing any signs of tampering, the Crypto
Officer must assume that the device has been fully compromised. The Crypto Officer is required to zeroize the
cryptographic module by following the steps in the Key Zeroization section of the SP.
The Crypto Officer is responsible for securing and controlling any unused seals. The Crypto Office is also
responsible for the direct control and observation of any changes to the modules such as reconfigurations where
the tamper-evident seals are removed or installed to ensure the security of the module is maintained during such
changes and ensuring the module is returned to a FIPS approved state.
The surfaces should be cleaned with 99% Isopropyl alcohol to remove dirt and oil before applying the seals.
Ensure the surface is completely clean and dry before applying the seals. If a seal needs to be re-applied,
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Module Descriptions Physical Security
completely remove the old seal and clean the surface with an adhesive remover before following the instructions
for applying a new seal. Allow 12 hours for the seals to fully cure.
Additional seals can be requested through your Fortinet sales contact. Reference the ‘FIPS-SEAL-RED’ SKU
when ordering. Specify the number of seals required based on the specific model as described below:
The FortiMail-2000E and 3000E use two seals to secure the external enclosure as shown in the figures below.
Figure 4 - External enclosure seal, left side
Figure 5 - External enclosure seal, right side
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Operational Environment Module Descriptions
Figure 6 - External enclosure seals, top view
Operational Environment
The modules consist of the combination of the FortiMail operating system and the FortiMail appliances. The
FortiMail operating system can only be installed, and run, on a FortiGate appliance. The FortiMail operating
system provides a proprietary and non-modifiable operating system.
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Module Descriptions Cryptographic Key Management
Cryptographic Key Management
Random Number Generation
The modules use a firmware based, deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) that conforms to NIST Special
Publication 800-90A.
Entropy
The module uses a Fortinet entropy token (part number FTR-ENT-1 or part number FTR-ENT-2) to seed the
DRBG during the modules’ boot process and to periodically reseed the DRBG. The entropy token is not included
in the boundary of the module and therefore no assurance can be made for the correct operation of the entropy
token nor is there a guarantee of stated entropy.
Entropy Strength
The entropy loaded into the approved AES-256 bit DRBG is 256 bits. The entropy source is over-seeded and then
an HMAC-SHA-256 post-conditioning component is applied.
Reseed Period
The RBG is seeded from the entropy token during the boot process and then reseeded periodically. The default
reseed period is once every 24 hours (1440 minutes) and is configurable (1 to 1440 minutes). The entropy token
must be installed to complete the boot process and to reseed the DRBG.
Key Zeroization
The zeroization process must be performed under the direct control of the operator. The operator must be
present to observe that the zeroization method has completed successfully.
All keys and CSPs are zeroized by erasing the module’s boot device and then power cycling the FortiMail unit. To
erase the boot device, execute the following command from the CLI:
execute erase-disk <boot device>
The boot device ID may vary depending on the FortiMail module. Executing the following command will output a
list of the available internal disks:
execute erase-disk ?
Algorithms
Table 7: FIPS approved algorithms
Algorithm NIST Certificate Number
AES in CBC mode (128-, 256-bits) 5321
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Cryptographic Key Management Module Descriptions
Algorithm NIST Certificate Number
AES in GCM mode (128-, 256-bits) 5321
CTR DRBG (NIST SP 800-90A) with 256-bits 2050
CVL (SSH) - AES 128 bit-, AES 256 bit -CBC (using SHA-256) 1787
CVL (TLS 1.1 and 1.2) 1787
CVL(KAS)
l FFC “dhEphem” (FC: SHA: SHA-256)
l ECC “Ephemeral Unified” (EC: P-256 and ED: P-384)
1786
HMAC SHA-1 3517
HMAC SHA-256 3517
HMAC SHA-384 3517
RSA
l Key Pair Generation: 2048 and 3072-bit (FIPS 186-4)
l Signature Generation: 2048 and 3072-bit (PKCS1 v1.5)
l Signature Verification: 1024, 2048 and 3072-bit (PKCS1 v1.5)
l For legacy use, the module supports 1024-bit RSA keys and SHA-
1 for signature verification
2849
SHA-1 4271
SHA-256 4271
SHA-384 4271
KTS (AES Cert. #5321 and HMAC Cert. #3517; key establishment methodology provides 128 or 256 bits of
encryption strength).
In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG)
as per SP800-133 (vendor affirmed). The resulting generated symmetric key and the seed used in the asymmetric
key generation are the unmodified output from SP800-90A DRBG.
There are algorithms, modes, and keys that have been CAVs tested but are not available when the module is
configured for FIPS compliant operation. Only the algorithms, modes/methods, and key lengths/curves/moduli
shown in this table are supported by the module in the FIPS validated configuration.
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Module Descriptions Cryptographic Key Management
Table 8: FIPS allowed algorithms
Algorithm
Diffie-Hellman (CVL Certs. #1786 and Cert. #1787, key agreement; key establishment methodology
provides between 112 and 201 bits of encryption strength)
EC Diffie-Hellman (CVL Certs. #1786 and Cert. #1787, key agreement; key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
MD5 (used in the TLS protocol only)
NDRNG (Entropy Token)
RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength)
Table 9: Non-FIPS approved algorithms
Algorithm
Diffie-Hellman is non-compliant when keys less than 2048 bits are used, since such keys do not provide the
minimum required 112 bits of encryption strength.
RSA is non-compliant when keys less than 2048 bits are used, since such keys do not provide the minimum
required 112 bits of encryption strength.
Note that the SSH and TLS protocols, other than the KDF, have not been tested by the CMVP or CAVP as per
FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance D.11.
The module is compliant to IG A.5: GCM is used in the context of TLS.
For TLS, The GCM implementation meets Option 1 of IG A.5: it is used in a manner compliant with SP 800-52
and in accordance with RFC 5246 for TLS key establishment. The AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with
RFC 5288 and shall only be used for the TLS protocol version 1.2 to be compliant with FIPS140-2 IG A.5, Option
1 (“TLS protocol IV generation”); thus, the module is compliant with [SP800-52]. During operational testing, the
module was tested against an independent version of TLS and found to behave correctly.
In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption or decryption
shall be re-distributed.
Cryptographic Keys and Critical Security Parameters
The following table lists all of the cryptographic keys and critical security parameters used by the modules.
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Cryptographic Key Management Module Descriptions
Table 10: Cryptographic Keys and Critical Security Parameters used in FIPS-CC mode
Key or CSP Generation Storage Usage Zeroization
NDRNG output
string
Automatic Boot device
Plain-text
Input string for the
entropy pool (5120-
bits)
By erasing the Boot
device and power
cycling the module
DRBG seed Automatic Boot device
Plain-text
256-bit seed used by
the DRBG (output
from NDRNG
By erasing the Boot
device and power
cycling the module
DRBG output Automatic Boot device
Plain-text
Random numbers
used in cryptographic
algorithms (256-bits)
By erasing the Boot
device and power
cycling the module
DRBG v and key
values
Automatic Boot device
Plain-text
Internal state values
for the DRBG
By erasing the Boot
device and power
cycling the module
Diffie-Hellman
Keys
Automatic SDRAM
Plain-text
Key agreement and
key establishment
By erasing the boot
device and power
cycling the module
EC Diffie-Hellman
Keys
Automatic SDRAM Plain-
text
Key agreement and
key establishment
(key pairs on the
curves secp256r1,
secp384r1 and
secp521r1
By erasing the boot
device and power
cycling the module
Firmware Update
Key
Preconfigured Boot device
Plain-text
Verification of
firmware integrity
when updating to new
firmware versions
using RSA public key
(firmware load test,
2048-bit signature)
By erasing the boot
device and power
cycling the module
Firmware Integrity
Key
Preconfigured Boot device
Plain-text
Verification of
firmware integrity in
the firmware integrity
test using RSA public
key (firmware integrity
test, 2048-bit
signature)
By erasing the boot
device and power
cycling the module
HTTPS/TLS
Server/Host Key
Preconfigured Boot device
Plain-text
RSA private key used
in the HTTPS/TLS
protocols (key
establishment, 2048-
or 3072-bit)
By erasing the boot
device and power
cycling the module
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Module Descriptions Cryptographic Key Management
Key or CSP Generation Storage Usage Zeroization
HTTPS/TLS Pre-
Master Secret
Automatic SDRAM
Plain-text
Generation of
HTTPS/TLS Master
Secret (384 bits)
By erasing the boot
device and power
cycling the module
HTTP/TLS Master
Secret
Automatic SDRAM
Plain-text
Generation of TLS
Session Keys and TLS
Authentication Key
(384-bits)
By erasing the boot
device and power
cycling the module
HTTPS/TLS
Session
Authentication Key
Automatic SDRAM
Plain-text
HMAC SHA-1, -256 or
-384 key used for
HTTPS/TLS session
authentication
By erasing the boot
device and power
cycling the module
HTTPS/TLS
Session Encryption
Key
Automatic SDRAM
Plain-text
AES key used for
HTTPS/TLS session
encryption
By erasing the boot
device and power
cycling the module
SSH Server/Host
Key
Preconfigured Boot device
Plain-text
RSA private key used
in the SSH protocol
(key establishment,
2048- or 3072-bit)
By erasing the boot
device and power
cycling the module
SSH Session
Authentication Key
Automatic SDRAM
Plain-text
HMAC SHA-1 or
HMAC SHA-256 key
used for SSH session
authentication
By erasing the boot
device and power
cycling the module
SSH Session
Encryption Key
Automatic SDRAM
Plain-text
AES (128-, 256-bit)
key used for SSH
session encryption
By erasing the boot
device and power
cycling the module
Crypto Officer
Password
Manual Boot device
SHA-1 hash
Used to authenticate
operator access to the
module
By erasing the boot
device and power
cycling the module
Configuration
Integrity Key
Preconfigured Boot device
Plain-text
HMAC SHA-256 hash
used for configuration
integrity test
By erasing the boot
device and power
cycling the module
Configuration
Encryption Key
Preconfigured Boot device
Plain-text
AES 256-bit key used
to encrypt CSPs on
the Boot device and in
the backup
configuration file
(except for crypto
officer passwords in
the backup
configuration file)
By erasing the boot
device and power
cycling the module
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Cryptographic Key Management Module Descriptions
Key or CSP Generation Storage Usage Zeroization
Configuration
Backup Key
Automatic Boot device
Plain-text
HMAC SHA-256 key
used to hash crypto
officer passwords in
the backup
configuration file
By erasing the boot
device and power
cycling the unit
User Password Manual Boot device
SHA-256 hash
Used to authenticate
network access to the
module
By erasing the boot
device and power
cycling the unit
HA Password Manual Boot device
AES encrypted
Used to authenticate
FortiMail units in an
HA cluster
By erasing the boot
device and power
cycling the unit
HA Encryption Key Manual Boot device
AES encrypted
Encryption of traffic
between units in an
HA cluster using AES
128-bit key
By erasing the boot
device and power
cycling the unit
The Generation column lists all of the keys/CSPs and their entry/generation methods.
Manual entered keys are entered by the operator electronically (as defined by FIPS)
using the console or a management computer. Pre-configured keys are set as part of
the firmware (hardcoded) and are not operator modifiable. Automatic keys are
generated as part of the associated protocol.
Alternating Bypass Feature
The primary cryptographic function of the module is encrypting/decrypting email messages sent/received using
SMTP over TLS (SMTPS). The module can also send/receive plain-text email messages using SMTP. The
module implements an alternating bypass feature based on the module’s configuration and the direction of
traffic. If the traffic is sent/received using SMTPS, the module is operating in a non-bypass state. If the traffic is
sent/received using SMTP, the module is operating in a bypass state.
Incoming traffic is processed according to the protocol used and the domain configuration. An SMTPS message
received by the module is decrypted before being processed. Once processed, if the specified domain is
configured to use SMTPS, the message is encrypted before being sent to the mail server (non-bypass state). If
the specified domain is configured to use SMTP, then the message is sent to the mail server in plain-text (bypass
state).
Outgoing traffic is processed according to the message delivery configuration. If the destination domain is
configured to use SMTPS, then the message is encrypted before it is sent (non-bypass state). If the destination
domain is configured to use SMTP, then the message is sent in plain-text (bypass state).
Use of SMTPS for incoming traffic is enabled/disabled by checking/unchecking the “Use SMTPS” checkbox in the
domain configuration. Use of SMTPS for outgoing traffic is enabled/disabled by creating a delivery policy with
valid TLS and encryption profiles.
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Fortinet Inc.
Module Descriptions Key Archiving
Key Archiving
The module supports key archiving to a management computer as part of the module configuration file backup.
Operator entered keys are archived as part of the module configuration file. The configuration file is stored in
plain text, but keys in the configuration file are either AES encrypted using the Configuration Encryption Key or
stored as a keyed hash using HMAC SHA-256 using the Configuration Backup Key.
Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not mitigate against any other attacks.
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Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic
Compatibility (EMI/EMC)
The modules comply with EMI/EMC requirements for Class A devices as specified by Part 15, Subpart B, of the
FCC rules. The following table lists the specific lab and report information for the modules.
FCC Report Information
Module Lab Information FCC Report Number
FortiMail-2000E Bay Area Compliance Laboratories Corp.
1274 Anvilwood Ave. Sunnyvale, CA 94086
(408)-732-9162
R1608171-20
FortiMail-3000E Bay Area Compliance Laboratories Corp.
1274 Anvilwood Ave. Sunnyvale, CA 94086
(408)-732-9162
R1605053-15
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FIPS 140-2 Compliant Operation
The Fortinet hardware is shipped in a non-FIPS 140-2 compliant configuration. The following steps must be
performed to put the module into a FIPS compliant configuration:
1. Download the model specific FIPS validated firmware image from the Fortinet Support site at
https://support.fortinet.com/
2. Verify the integrity of the firmware image
3. Install the FIPS validated firmware image
4. Install the entropy token
5. Enable the FIPS-CC mode of operation
These steps are described in detail in the "add technote link" document that can be found on the Fortinet
Technical Documentation website.
In addition, FIPS 140-2 compliant operation requires both that you use the module in its FIPS-CC mode of
operation and that you follow secure procedures for installation and operation of the FortiMail unit. You must
ensure that:
l The FortiMail unit is configured in the FIPS-CC mode of operation.
l The FortiMail unit is installed in a secure physical location.
l The tamper seals are applied as per the Physical Security instructions.
l Physical access to the FortiMail unit is restricted to authorized operators.
l The Fortinet entropy token is enabled.
l The Fortinet entropy token remains in the USB port during operation.
l Administrative passwords are at least 8 characters long.
l Administrative passwords are changed regularly.
l Administrator account passwords must have the following characteristics:
l One (or more) characters must be capitalized
l One (or more) chartacters must be lower case
l One (or more) characters must be numeric
l One (or more) characters must be non alpha-numeric (e.g. punctuation mark)
l Administration of the module is permitted using only validated administrative methods. These are:
l Console connection
l Web-based manager via HTTPS
l Command line interface (CLI) access via SSH
l Diffie-Hellman groups of less than 2048 bits are not used.
l Client side RSA certificates must use 2048 bit or greater key sizes.
l Only approved and allowed algorithms are used.
The module can be used in either the Gateway or Transparent modes of operation as described in the
Introduction. Note that "mode of operation" in this context does not refer or have any impact on the FIPS
approved mode of operation. The FIPS approved mode of operation is independent of the Gateway and
Transparent modes of operation. The current operation mode is displayed on the web-based manager status
page and in the output of the get system status CLI command.
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Enabling FIPS-CC mode FIPS 140-2 Compliant Operation
Once the FIPS validated firmware has been installed and the module properly configured in the FIPS-CC mode of
operation, the module is running in a FIPS compliant configuration. It is the responsibility of the CO to ensure the
module only uses approved algorithms and services to maintain the module in a FIPS-CC Approved mode of
operation. Using any of the non-approved algorithms and services switches the module to a non-FIPS mode of
operation. Prior to switching between modes the CO should ensure all keys and CSPs are zeroized to prevent
sharing of keys and CSPs between the FIPS Approved and non-FIPS mode of operation.
Enabling FIPS-CC mode
To enable the FIPS 140-2 compliant mode of operation, the operator must execute the following command from
the Local Console:
config system fips-cc
set status enable
end
The Operator is required to supply a password for the admin account which will be assigned to the Crypto Officer
role. The supplied password must be at least 8 characters long and correctly verified before the system will restart
in FIPS-CC mode. Upon restart, the module will execute self-tests to ensure the correct initialization of the
module’s cryptographic functions.
After restarting, the Crypto Officer can confirm that the module is running in FIPS-CC mode by executing the
following command from the CLI:
get system status
If the module is running in FIPS-CC mode, the system status output will display the line:
FIPS-CC mode: enable
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Self-Tests
Startup and Initialization Self-tests
The module executes the following self-tests during startup and initialization:
l Firmware integrity test using RSA 2048-bit signatures
l Configuration bypass test using HMAC SHA-256
l AES, CBC mode, encrypt known answer test
l AES, CBC mode, decrypt known answer test
l AES, GCM mode, encrypt known answer test
l AES, GCM mode, decrypt known answer test
l HMAC SHA-1 known answer test
l SHA-1 known answer test (tested as part of HMAC SHA-1 known answer test)
l HMAC SHA-256 known answer test
l SHA-256 known answer test (tested as part of HMAC SHA-256 known answer test)
l HMAC SHA-384 known answer test
l SHA-384 known answer test (tested as part of HMAC SHA-384 known answer test
l RSA signature generation known answer test
l RSA signature verification known answer test
l DRBG known answer test
The results of the startup self-tests are displayed on the console during the startup process.
The startup self-tests can also be initiated on demand using the CLI command execute fips kat all(to
initiate all self-tests) or execute fips kat <test> (to initiate a specific self-test).
When the self-tests are run, each implementation of an algorithm is tested - i.e. when the AES self-test is run, all
AES implementations are tested.
Conditional Self-tests
The module executes the following conditional tests when the related service is invoked:
l Continuous NDRNG test
l Continuous DRBG test
l RSA pairwise consistency test
l Configuration integrity test using HMAC SHA-256
l Firmware load test using RSA signatures
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Critical Function Self-tests Self-Tests
Critical Function Self-tests
The module also performs the following critical function self-tests applicable to the DRBG, as per NIST SP 800-
90A Section 11:
l Instantiate test
l Generate test
l Reseed test
l Uninstantiate test
Error State
If any of the self-tests or conditional tests fail, the module enters an error state as shown by the console output
below:
Self-tests failed
Entering error mode...
The system is going down NOW !!
The system is halted.
All data output and cryptographic services are inhibited in the error state.
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Copyright© 2019 Fortinet, Inc. All rights reserved. Fortinet®, FortiGate®, FortiCare® and FortiGuard®, and certain other marks are registered trademarks of Fortinet,
Inc., in the U.S. and other jurisdictions, and other Fortinet names herein may also be registered and/or common law trademarks of Fortinet. All other product or company
names may be trademarks of their respective owners. Performance and other metrics contained herein were attained in internal lab tests under ideal conditions, and
actual performance and other results may vary. Network variables, different network environments and other conditions may affect performance results. Nothing herein
represents any binding commitment by Fortinet, and Fortinet disclaims all warranties, whether express or implied, except to the extent Fortinet enters a binding written
contract, signed by Fortinet’s General Counsel, with a purchaser that expressly warrants that the identified product will perform according to certain expressly-identified
performance metrics and, in such event, only the specific performance metrics expressly identified in such binding written contract shall be binding on Fortinet. For
absolute clarity, any such warranty will be limited to performance in the same ideal conditions as in Fortinet’s internal lab tests. In no event does Fortinet make any
commitment related to future deliverables, features, or development, and circumstances may change such that any forward-looking statements herein are not accurate.
Fortinet disclaims in full any covenants, representations,and guarantees pursuant hereto, whether express or implied. Fortinet reserves the right to change, modify,
transfer, or otherwise revise this publication without notice, and the most current version of the publication shall be applicable.